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Jul 25, 2011
Jul 24, 2011
Awakening of the Malaysian Diaspora
New Mandala
July 21st, 2011 by Greg Lopez ·Starting from spontaneous expressions of patriotism at a few international locations where Malaysians were residents in fairly significant numbers, the desire to show support for the Bersih 2.0 ‘Walk for Electoral Reform’ in Kuala Lumpur sprouted into a worldwide event that spanned most of the major time zones. New Zealand started the day rolling followed by rallies happening in several Australian, Asian and European cities. The ripple then spread across the Atlantic Ocean, to cities in North America, ending the historical day at the West Coast cities of Los Angeles, Portland and San Francisco. Indeed the sun did not quite set on Bersih 2.0.
The sun decidedly shone down it’s warm yellow rays on Bersih 2.0 participants everywhere, especially in places with chilly winds. But quite the contrary, if not ironic, back in in Kuala Lumpur, as rally participants were doused with stinging tear-gas and chemical-laced water, the skies opened up, washing everything clean! This occasion proved to be a new paradigm for Malaysians, especially the youth. They were experiencing Unity in Diversity, a concept few imagined was possible. Optimists estimate that some 50,000 Malaysians had gathered together without regard to ethnic origin or religious leaning. This was a Malaysia dreams were made of.
Elsewhere in the world, the outpouring of patriotism was just as impressive. Malaysians were united as one, in foreign lands. In places where Malaysians had existing committees and who met up regularly, organising a rally was pretty straightforward. But in some cities, rookies who had never even attended a rally before stepped up and asked how they could organise one. The results were most gratifying, as the numbers below show.
City (attendance): Wellington (10), Auckland (35), Christchurch (15), Brisbane (100), Sydney (500), Canberra (40), Hobart (30), Melbourne (1000), Adelaide (150), Osaka (14), Seoul (35), Suzhou (20), Taipei (300), Shenzen (20), Hong Kong (80), Perth (120), Singapore Online(63), Singapore Picnic (200), Dubai (40), Cairo (100), Istanbul (2),Stockholm (10), Graz, Austria (2), Zurich (42), Geneva (12), Paris (30), London (450), Glasgow (30), Belfast (25), Dublin (60), Cork (14), Limerick (11), New York City (130), Ottawa (11), Washington DC (50), Chicago (35), Los Angeles (85), Portland, OR (14), San Francisco (120)
Total attendance for all 38 locations = 4003 participants. The cities are sequenced according to longitude.
Apart from these heart-warming numbers of participants in these locations, there were unconfirmed reports in the social network site, Facebook, of people in other locations such as Cambodia, Jerusalem, Frankfurt… also standing up to be counted. But in the absence of verifiable sources, we have to leave those claims open. The organisers in Singapore, aware of the restrictions on public gatherings posed by the Singapore authorities, quite cleverly decided to do an online show of their love for Malaysia and their support for the Bersih 2.0 campaign. However, there were some folks who decided to gather informally for a picnic at a popular park. We have reported the numbers of both these gatherings. Sympathy rallies were also held in Manila, Bangkok and Jakarta but we have not included those attendance numbers.
The Steering Committee of GLOBAL BERSIH 2.0 would like to thank all participants for the tremendous support extended towards the call for Free and Fair Elections and Real Democracy in Malaysia. Through your actions, that some may deem indirect or small, you have provided irrefutable proof that Diaspora Malaysians still hold Malaysia dearly in your hearts and would return if you could. You have staked your claim to having a part to play in what happens at home.
Despite the excessive use of force encountered by the Bersih 2.0, Walkers in Kuala Lumpur, all the locations elsewhere proved that peaceful demonstrations are a part and parcel of the democratic process and can be managed effectively with minimal impact on non-participants. This is testimony to the maturity of Malaysians in their ability to participate fully in a vibrant democracy. Authorities should take cognizance of this and allow the political evolution of Malaysia to proceed naturally.
The myriad of global locations displayed banners and posters, with participants wearing YELLOW – t-shirts, scarves, ribbons. In some locations loud hailers were used to address the crowd while in other more cosy locations, participants took turns to read and discuss the 8 demands. A Samad Said’s almost-banned poem was read, memoranda and posters were signed, catchy phrases were chanted and the Negaraku was sung with fervour. Many locations also called for the immediate release of the 6 detained under Emergency Ordinance without legal recourse. In every location, the local authorities were most helpful, some even suggesting more impactful vantage points to gather at. Sadly, at almost every location, representatives of Malaysian authorities took photos and videos and tried to record the names of participants.
Carnival atmosphere aside, the most significant impact of Global Bersih 2.0 is the realisation that has dawned upon many Diaspora Malaysians that you are not alone in your love of and concern for your mother country. You met and interacted, many for the first time, with others like yourselves living relatively near to where you live. This has sparked the desire on the part of many to remain in contact with each other and continue to come together for activities that can help improve your nation.
The Steering Committee of GLOBAL BERSIH 2.0 proposes to extend the ongoing domestic activities of Bersih 2.0 by promoting the following activities internationally. The first three of these will be carried out by those interested participating locations while the next three will be coordinated by the Steering Committee.
Yellow Saturday movements – gathering in any public places, dressed in yellow or carrying out any activities involving the colour yellow;
Public events to explain the 8 points and broaden understanding of what Bersih 2.0 seeks to accomplish;
Photo exhibitions and video shows, again to broaden general understanding of the realities at home;
Lobbying with sympathetic NGOs and friendly governments to seek the release of the 6 persons still detained under the Emergency Ordinance;
An international petition pushing for the first 4 demands of Bersih 2.0 to be implemented within 3 months and for full disclosure on any amendments made to the electoral process; and
Promotion of the MyOverseasVote campaign to enable Malaysians to register and vote from wherever they happen to be resident.
Global Bersih 2.0 is a turning point in the relationship of Diaspora Malaysians with your mother country. Many of you showed that you were willing to cast aside your fears and contribute towards making our land the better country it can be. Those committed, let us bring our skills and resources to bear to help rebuild our nation and fulfil the promise of potential it showed when it was first born 54 years ago. Let us work together to make Malaysia the great model nation it was meant to be.
This report was prepared by the Steering Committee of Global BERSIH 2.0
Jul 23, 2011
HRW - Schools and Armed Conflict
A Global Survey of Domestic Laws and State Practice Protecting Schools from Attack and Military Use
July 20, 2011
This 162-page report examines domestic
laws and military policies in 56 countries around the world. Governments
have been slow to update and align their domestic legislation with the
explicit prohibitions on attacks on schools under international criminal
law, Human Rights Watch said. They are also failing to account for the
negative consequences for children's right to education when armed
forces convert schools into bases and barracks.
Read the Report
ISBN: 1-56432-794-9
ISBN: 1-56432-794-9
Feature content
Get the Report
- Download the full report (PDF, 1.9 MB)
- Purchase this report in print
Table of Contents
- Schools and Armed Conflict
- Summary
- Recommendations
- Introduction
- Methodology
- Terminology
- I. Implicit Protection from Attack: Protections for “Civilian Objects”
- II. Explicit Protection from Attack: Criminalizing Deliberate Attacks on Education Buildings
- III. Protecting Education Buildings from Military Use
- Appendix: Laws and State Practice by Country
- Acknowledgments
Jul 13, 2011
The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide
Damascus/Brussels | 13 Jul 2011
Even in its attempts to survive at all costs, the Syrian regime appears to be digging its own grave.Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VII): The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide, the second of a two-part report from the International Crisis Group, examines the regime's approach to the crisis. Although the outcome remains in doubt, as many Syrians still fear the prospect of chaos and sectarian strife in the event of abrupt change, the regime has significantly hurt its case through its brutal repression, half-hearted reform suggestions and squandered credibility.
“Playing catch-up with protester demands, the regime has always lagged one if not several steps behind, proposing measures that might have had some resonance if suggested earlier yet falling on deaf ears by the time they were unveiled”, says Peter Harling, Crisis Group’s Iraq, Syria and Lebanon Project Director. “Demonstrators have turned to something else. It is not regime reform they are pursuing. It is regime change”.
By sowing fear of instability, the regime seeks to check the extent of popular mobilisation and deter its less committed detractors. But while this appears to have had the desired impact on some Syrians, the balance sheet has been overwhelmingly negative from the authorities’ standpoint. The security services’ brutal and often erratic performance has created more problems than it has solved, as violence almost certainly has been the primary reason behind the protest movement’s growth and radicalisation.
The situation has reached an apparent stalemate but it would be wrong to bet on the status quo enduring. Economic conditions are worsening; should they reach breaking point the regime could well collapse. Predominantly Allawite security forces are overworked, underpaid and increasingly worried. They could conclude that the regime is unsalvageable and defect, precipitating its end.
The international community’s options remain limited. Military intervention would be unquestionably disastrous, potentially unleashing a sectarian civil war, provoking further instability and benefiting a regime that repeatedly has depicted the uprising as a foreign plot. Sanctions against regime officials can be of use, but going further and targeting economic sectors that would hurt ordinary Syrians would backfire. International condemnation can keep the spotlight on – and potentially deter– human rights violations, but it only goes so far. At a time when a number of Syrians remain on the fence, they could view a premature determination by the international community that Bashar must go as undue interference in their affairs.
If the regime falls, Syrians will have to start almost entirely from scratch. A weak and demoralised army cannot form the backbone of an emerging state. The police are corrupt and unpopular, as is the justice system. Elected members of parliament are wholly unrepresentative, while the opposition in exile would remain distrusted by those who stayed inside. Yet, although ethnic and sectarian fault lines run deep, this would not necessarily doom the country to civil war. The Syrian people have been remarkably resistant to sectarian or divisive tendencies, defying regime prophecies of confessional strife and Islamisation.
“Ultimately, the burden lies with the protesters to counter the regime’s divisive tactics, reassure citizens who remain worried about a successor regime, and build a political platform capable of rallying broad public support”, says Robert Malley, Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program Director. “Risks abound, to be sure, but if Arab uprisings are the story of societies taking their future into their own hands, the Syrian people deserve no less respect than any other for their right and ability to do so”.
Jul 12, 2011
Official Description of Burma Monitor Group on Facebook
## July 23 edit - This Facebook description will change soon once changes to the group there are implemented. ##
Facebook does not make this info easy to find, so I reproduce it here. The description applies only to the Burma Monitor group _on Facebook_. A few supplementary guidelines appear from time to time in group postings and in my comments on postings. For example, group members may expect a Facebook 'friend' request from me. Accepting is optional, but makes group administration much easier.
***
Online news, commentary, and other sources dealing mainly with contemporary Burma/Myanmar. Includes a portion of the materials in Burma Monitor research blog at http://burmamonitor.blogspot.com but does not include the link directories, feeds, or pre-set searches there. The full blog reader on it have the most complete and useful coverage.
This group is intended for postings in English and those who rely on English for getting information about Burma. A large proportion of members of this small new group does _not_ read Burmese. After many complaints, including 'Burmanization' by persons of Burmese nationality, and after non-Burmese readers leaving the group, the following new language policy for postings has been adopted. Language Postings in Burmese by members should be sent to _other_ large, active groups like Freedom Burma. Many other groups, open and closed, follow Burmese-only or mainly-Burmese posting policies and practices. The main current admin here in Burma Monitor _may_ make a _few_ highly selective Burmese postings daily. Others' Burmese postings will be deleted and such persons may be removed from the group without notice.
Members are also expected at least to scan posting headlines and not duplicate postings since these annoy other members, especially those who do not know how to Edit Settings lon the grouppage and turn off email notiifications. Some accidental duplication is inevitable, but known duplicates will be removed as quickly as possible.
Cross-posting and sharing Burma Monitor postings with other Facebook groups is permitted. No special permission request is required. Members implicitly agree to this policy.
All members may 'add' or 'invite' non-member to the group. However, an admin retains final authority to approve requests to join.
Facebook does not make this info easy to find, so I reproduce it here. The description applies only to the Burma Monitor group _on Facebook_. A few supplementary guidelines appear from time to time in group postings and in my comments on postings. For example, group members may expect a Facebook 'friend' request from me. Accepting is optional, but makes group administration much easier.
***
Online news, commentary, and other sources dealing mainly with contemporary Burma/Myanmar. Includes a portion of the materials in Burma Monitor research blog at http://burmamonitor.blogspot.com but does not include the link directories, feeds, or pre-set searches there. The full blog reader on it have the most complete and useful coverage.
This group is intended for postings in English and those who rely on English for getting information about Burma. A large proportion of members of this small new group does _not_ read Burmese. After many complaints, including 'Burmanization' by persons of Burmese nationality, and after non-Burmese readers leaving the group, the following new language policy for postings has been adopted. Language Postings in Burmese by members should be sent to _other_ large, active groups like Freedom Burma. Many other groups, open and closed, follow Burmese-only or mainly-Burmese posting policies and practices. The main current admin here in Burma Monitor _may_ make a _few_ highly selective Burmese postings daily. Others' Burmese postings will be deleted and such persons may be removed from the group without notice.
Members are also expected at least to scan posting headlines and not duplicate postings since these annoy other members, especially those who do not know how to Edit Settings lon the grouppage and turn off email notiifications. Some accidental duplication is inevitable, but known duplicates will be removed as quickly as possible.
Cross-posting and sharing Burma Monitor postings with other Facebook groups is permitted. No special permission request is required. Members implicitly agree to this policy.
All members may 'add' or 'invite' non-member to the group. However, an admin retains final authority to approve requests to join.
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