Kenya: Stop Recruitment of Somalis in Refugee Camps - Human Rights Watch

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Deception Used to Enlist Refugees to Fight in Somalia
October 22, 2009

(Nairobi) - The Kenyan government should immediately stop the recruitment of Somalis in refugee camps to fight for an armed force in Somalia, Human Rights Watch said today. Kenyan authorities have directly supported the drive, which has recruited hundreds of Somali men and boys in the sprawling Dadaab refugee camps as well as Kenyan citizens from nearby towns.

Since early October, Somali recruiters claiming to act on behalf of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) have operated openly in the Dadaab camps in northeast Kenya, near the Somali border, to enlist young refugees in a new force intended to fight in Somalia. But military recruitment in these camps contravenes the principle recognized in international law that refugee camps should be entirely civilian and humanitarian in character.

"Permitting recruitment of fighters in refugee camps undermines the very purpose of the camps - to be a place of refuge from the conflict," said Georgette Gagnon, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. "Kenyan authorities need to immediately put a stop to this recruitment drive targeting Somali refugees."

The recruitment drive is also targeting Kenyans around the towns of Dadaab and Garissa. The Somali armed group al-Shabaab has also sought to recruit fighters among Somali refugee communities and Kenyans.

Human Rights Watch investigations have found that recruiters for the new force have used deceptive practices, promising exorbitant pay and claiming that the force has United Nations and other international backing. They have urged teenage refugees to lie about their ages and to join without informing their families. Former recruits say that their cell phones were taken from them before they were transported to the training center.

Top Kenyan officials including the foreign minister have categorically denied this recruitment drive is taking place at all, but in fact it is operating with direct Kenyan support, including government transport vehicles and guards.

The Dadaab camps, built to house 90,000 people in the early 1990s, are now home to over 280,000 refugees, mostly from Somalia. It is the largest concentration of refugees in the world. More than 50,000 people have arrived in the camps since January 2009. Many are fleeing the bloody conflict between Somalia's weak TFG and various armed opposition groups, including al-Shabaab, some of whose leaders have publicly linked themselves to al-Qaeda.

Human Rights Watch has documented war crimes and serious human rights abuses by all sides to the conflict, which has caused thousands of civilian deaths, tremendous destruction of civilian property, and massive displacement. The Kenyan government strongly supports the TFG and has become increasingly apprehensive about the possibility of attacks on its soil by al-Shabaab.

This month, Human Rights Watch researchers visited the Kenyan town of Dadaab and the three refugee camps that surround it-Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera. They interviewed more than two dozen people, including young men and boys who had been approached by recruiters, parents of young men who joined the force, individuals involved in the recruitment effort, and community leaders in the camps.

Recruiters began circulating in the refugee camps in early October. According to local community leaders and a recruiter working in two of the camps, they have recruited at least several hundred refugees. Many recruits are promised an initial payment of between US$400 and $600 for the military training itself, to be followed with a generous monthly salary upon deployment to Somalia. Most of the recruiters are telling prospects that they will be deployed to fight alongside the transitional government's forces, either in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, or in southern Somalia.

The recruiters operating in the camps are themselves refugees who have been promised generous payments by the coordinators of the drive. Recruiters have also been operating in the town of Dadaab, seeking to enlist ethnic Somali Kenyan citizens into the same force. Residents and local officials in Garissa, the provincial capital of Kenya's North Eastern Province, and surrounding communities said that recruitment is also taking place among their own young men and boys.

The recruitment program is being coordinated by a small group of Somali nationals who are living and operating openly from a hotel in Dadaab. The team is allegedly headed by two prominent individuals from southern Somalia who had ties to the administration of the former president of the transitional government, Abdullahi Yusuf.

Recruiters hire private cars to transport young men and boys to one of at least two isolated staging locations near the town of Dadaab. From there they are loaded into Kenyan military and National Youth Service trucks and told that they are being taken to a Kenyan government facility at Manyani, near Mombasa, for military training. Two sources - a young man who went searching for a recruited relative at the Manyani training center, and a government official with knowledge of the recruitment program - told Human Rights Watch that this facility is a Kenya Wildlife Service field training school. The school provides paramilitary training to anti-poaching rangers as well as other branches of the Kenyan security forces. Police personnel for Somalia's transitional government have also undergone training at the facility in the past.

International Law Prohibitions on Refugee Recruitment

The principle that refugee camps should be "exclusively civilian and humanitarian in character" is derived from international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and is embodied in the guidelines of the UN refugee agency and UN Security Council resolutions.

Guidelines of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) aim to prevent the military recruitment of refugees in camps and settlements. The refugee agency's executive committee has called upon all countries to "ensure that measures are taken to prevent the recruitment of refugees by government armed forces or organized armed groups." Ensuring the civilian character of refugee camps is essential for efforts to protect refugees, since the military use of camps-and the refugee population-by armed forces and non-state armed groups can make the sites vulnerable as military objectives and place the civilian population at increased risk.

The refugee agency recently distributed a bulletin in the camps warning that refugees who join an armed group risk losing their refugee status. It also warned that family members may be permanently disqualified for resettlement if they support the efforts of a relative to join an armed group. The young men interviewed by Human Rights Watch appeared to be unaware of this.
False Promises and Claims of UN Backing

Many recruiters for the force have been telling young men in the camps and nearby towns that their effort is backed by the United Nations, the United States government, and the European Union. Some are even saying that recruits will be deployed as part of a new UN force in Somalia. One elderly Kenyan Somali man in Dadaab whose 20-year-old son joined told Human Rights Watch that, "My son is educated and he told me that the United Nations is recruiting an army. So I gave him my blessing and he has my total support." Officials from the UN Political Office for Somalia, the US government, and the European Commission, in interviews with or statements to Human Rights Watch, all denied involvement.

In addition to the $600 promised for undergoing the military training, most recruiters are promising a similar amount in monthly salary after the recruits are deployed to Somalia. While most recruiters tell the young men that they will be sent to fight in Somalia, some promise that they will only be incorporated into a civilian police force that will never see combat or that they will be employed as guards at UN or African Union installations.

Recruits are poorly treated. After the first leg of their journey from their homes, many find themselves stranded in an open expanse of desert without food, water, or shelter, sometimes overnight, as they await onward transport. Human Rights Watch researchers traveled to a staging area near Ege one late afternoon and found a group of nine young men who had been sitting in the scorching sand since morning waiting to be picked up. They had neither water nor food throughout the entire day.

Recruits also soon hear that salaries are to be as low as $200 a month, much less than originally promised. Human Rights Watch interviewed several young men who managed to return home after learning this. Many Somali refugee parents who sought to find their sons who had enlisted were not able to do so because they lack Kenyan government permission to leave the camps.

"Kenyan government-backed recruiters are luring young men with false claims of UN and other international support," Gagnon said. "Getting the recruiters out of the camps and publicly dissociating the UN from any involvement are first steps to shutting the program down."

Human Rights Watch is deeply concerned that children are being recruited. Some recruiters are encouraging teenagers under 18 to lie about their age so they can enlist. Human Rights Watch interviewed boys as young as 15 who had been approached by recruiters but did not enlist. However, several recruits told Human Rights Watch that they had seen recruiters persuade boys of 14 or 15 to lie about their ages. International law to which Kenya is a party and Somalia a signatory prohibits non-state armed groups from recruiting persons under age 18.
Kenyan Government Involvement

Kenyan government officials are directly involved in the unlawful recruitment drive of refugees from the camps. Publicly, Kenyan national and provincial authorities deny any government involvement. "We are not involved in any such operation - it is propaganda," the Kenyan military spokesman, Bogita Ongeri, told Human Rights Watch, saying that only Somali militia groups working independently and illegally have been recruiting in the camps. James ole Seriani, provincial commissioner for the North Eastern province, told Human Rights Watch that the reports could not be true because, "There is no way the government can recruit people at night. We only recruit during the day." The transitional government's president, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, has also publicly denied his government is involved in recruitment in Kenya.

However, one Kenyan government official, who asked not to be identified because he feared repercussions, told Human Rights Watch that the team has been telling Kenyan Somalis whom they recruit "not to mention they are Kenyan." The source added: "They are given the names of specific parts of Somalia and told to say those are the places they come from."

The Kenyan military actively participates in the recruitment process. After being transported in small groups to staging points between Ege and Saredo, near Dadaab, recruits are driven onward on Kenyan military or National Youth Service trucks, usually after dark. Kenyan military personnel have turned away parents of enlistees within sight of the assembled recruits. The young men who board the trucks are required to turn over their cell phones and National ID cards (in the case of Kenyan citizens) or ration cards (in the case of refugees) if they have them. However, the father of one recruit said that his son had retained his cell phone and had called from the road to Mombasa.

Human Rights Watch interviewed a few young men who had escaped from the military trucks when they stopped late at night for food in Garissa. All said that they did not feel they could leave freely by that point. One group cut through the canvas covering the back of the truck and ran into town. One young man said that he traveled to the Kenyan Wildlife Service training school at Manyani to look for a relative but was turned away and briefly detained after persisting.

Kenyan authorities have made no attempt to stop the recruitment drive in the camps or in nearby towns. Parents, deserters, and community leaders said recruitment was brazenly taking place in tea shops and other public places. UNHCR has received several such complaints in recent weeks. And while police in Hagadera camp briefly detained a group of alleged recruiters who were brought there by angry community members, they were released within 24 hours.

One recruiter interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that he had operated openly and without fear of the authorities. "I was told that the Kenyan government was aware of this and I did not have any problem with the police," he said. "Our biggest problem was the parents of the recruits, not the police."

"Rumors of recruitment in refugee camps by Somalia's warring factions have been rife for years, but a Kenyan government-sanctioned program of this magnitude is unprecedented," said Gagnon. "The government's denials of its involvement are completely implausible."

Accounts from Recruits, Recruiters, and Relatives

Recruits

"I had never seen those men around before. They told me they would employ me and give me $600 to be a military man. They told me I would be taken for training inside of Kenya and then taken to Somalia. They said I will be fighting Al Shabaab, who are slaughtering people. I said, ‘No, I do not want to do that, I am a student.' I told them if I get an education I can help myself and my family instead of being sent to war and dying. But now I am regretting it my father cannot afford the uniform for school and the teacher always chases me from class."

- Hagadera camp refugee, age 15.

"When I first told them I was 18 he [the recruiter] said, ‘We are not interested in 18-year-old boys but we will just write that you are 20.'"

- R., young Somali refugee recruited from Ifo camp

"I was seated waiting for passengers in the car. The recruiter approached me and said, ‘This is not a job. You should join us and you will be paid well. You will not be fighting but part of a new Somali police.' I never expected such an opportunity, so I accepted.... An hour later he called me and told me to wait for pickup.

"[At Ege] we were called together and given a lecture by a Somali man with a big belly. He was with four other men and there were three military trucks waiting there. That is when we actually heard the truth of the matter-that we would be trained for 21 days, taken to Somalia and fight. They said the fighting is meant for you to kill the dirt and the mess that is in the country right now, the Al Shabaab. They said the least paid soldier will earn $200 [a month]. At that moment my wish to go to Mombasa [the training center] disappeared. The message was totally different from what I first heard.

"We had to surrender all of our cell phones, identity cards or other personal effects.

"After 10 p.m. we reached Garissa. The truck stopped in the middle of town. Me and three others cut through the canvas with a razor blade, jumped out of the truck and disappeared into town. We had no money, no phones, nowhere to sleep. So we started walking back to Dadaab. We were afraid they would follow us."

- Ifo camp refugee and commercial van driver who deserted, age 18

"A man came to me at home and said this is recruitment by the United Nations. You will be taken to Mombasa for two years of training and after that you will be assigned to the UN. But later after we had left Ege, a man who said he was a Somali general told us we will be trained for only 21 days and only get $50 until we started fighting. . . . He said this was funded by the US, the European Union, and the African Union."

- Ifo camp refugee who deserted, age 24

Recruiters

"I used to frequent and visit public gathering centers-the car parks, hotels, water pumps, to sensitize and talk to the youth. Mostly I sat at the hotel [tea kiosk] and waited for the youth to approach me. I was telling them, ‘We are recruiting an army for the Somali government. You will be paid $600 [a month]-are you interested?' I was told that the Kenyan government was aware of this and I did not have any problem with the police. Our biggest problem was the parents of the recruits, not the police. I was approached by several young boys but I turned them down. I was looking for boys 18 and above. I can look at them and tell if they are 18."

- Recruiter, Ifo refugee camp

"[Ege] was in a brush area with trees next to a dam with dirty water. The recruits were thirsty and had no water. The dam had dried up so they were digging through the soil to find water to drink. They drank the water. It was time to pray so I wanted to use the water for ablution but it was so dirty I could not."

- Refugee hired to drive recruits from Ifo refugee camp to Ege

Relatives

"He did not come home at lunch or at night. I got worried and started searching for him. Some of his friends told me that he had gone with the recruiters. Four of his closest friends have also disappeared. I left Somalia with him because of conflict, where he would either kill or be killed. But it seems the same problem has followed me here. If I had known about this I would not have let him go, even if it meant asking the police to arrest him. I want to know where he is so I can make him come back. This is the same as kidnapping our sons."

- Mother of unemployed, 19-year-old recruit, Hagadera

"My son is educated and he told me that the UN is recruiting an army. I saw in the media that the UN had decided to support the Somali army so this did not come as a surprise to me. So I gave him my blessings and he has my total support. I am happy as a father that my son has taken a decisive action. If it is a genuine effort let me pray to God that it goes well and for peace to prevail on the people he is going to serve. He is a son of the soil. He was born here and nowhere else. Please inform the world of what he is doing."

- Father of unemployed, 20-year-old Kenyan Somali recruit, Dadaab

"I have not complained to the police. It is not bandits or kidnappers who are hiding him from me but the government. So how can I complain to them?"

- Father of 19-year-old, unemployed Kenyan Somali recruit, Dadaab

"His phone was shut off immediately after he disappeared. Finally after some days he escaped and called me on a borrowed phone. He was still many kilometers away. I found him lying under a tree. He was tired and starving and traumatized. Who are these people who would take my underage boy? These boys [in the camps] are vulnerable and it is easy for anyone to overcome them psychologically."

- Father of 17-year-old deserter from Ifo refugee camp, who fetched his son after he deserted

"Initially the senior officers denied it. But finally they told me, ‘You are an educated man, you do understand he has been here a week, we have spent a lot of money on him for medical checkups and training and there is no way we can release him now.' They said, ‘Kenya has no involvement. This is being done by outsiders.' They said it was the Americans and the UN and other members of the international community."

- Elder brother of a 17-year-old Kenyan recruit, who tried to fetch his brother from the Kenyan Wildlife Service training center

Libya: Drop Charges against Journalist - Human Rights Watch

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Reporter Prosecuted for Reporting Sexual Harassment Claims by Abuse Victims

October 27, 2009

(New York) - The Libyan government should investigate allegations of sexual harassment in a state-run residence for women who had been orphaned instead of charging the journalist who reported the story with criminal defamation, Human Rights Watch said today.
On October 21, 2009, Mohamed al-Sareet, a Libyan journalist, wrote on Jeel Libya, an independent news website based in London, about a rare demonstration in Benghazi by women who live in a state-run care residence for women and girls who were orphaned as children, calling for an end to sexual harassment they said they had experienced in the center. The demonstrators were also demanding the return of the center's former director. After the article appeared, the police and then the General Prosecutor's office summoned al-Sareet for interrogation and charged him with criminal defamation.
"Libya should investigate the alleged abuse and ensure the protection of these women instead of intimidating the man who wrote about it," said Sarah Leah Whitson. "A journalist should not have criminal sanctions hanging over his head for doing his job."
In the October 21 demonstration, at least 10 women and girls between the ages of 18 and 27 who live in the care center walked through the streets of Benghazi to the Center's governing body, the Social Solidarity Center, holding up placards calling for the reinstatement of the Care Center's former director, who marchers said had treated them well and protected them.
Several of the women told Libyan journalists that officials who run the center had sexually harassed them and allowed security officers into their rooms at night. One woman said that an official had propositioned her and threatened to beat her if she did not comply. Besides Jeel Libya another Libyan website, Libya al Youm, published photos of the demonstration and interviews with some of the residents.
On October 22, local police summoned al-Sareet to the Hadaek police station for questioning. On October 26, the General Prosecutor's Office summoned him for further questioning and charged him with criminal defamation, which carries a prison sentence. Jeel Libya's director told Human Rights Watch that al-Sareet had received threats to burn down his house to intimidate him into retracting his article.
On October 23, some of the women who had been quoted called another Libyan news website, Al Manara, and denied that administrators had sexually harassed them. Libya al Youm reported that officials had threatened to expel those who demonstrated from the center, and pressured them to retract their statements and to sue al-Sareet for slander. On October 26, Quryna, one of two private newspapers affiliated with Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, the son of Libyan leader Mu'ammar Gaddafi, published an article in which several of the women denied that any sexual harassment had taken place. "We are now without honor in the eyes of society after what this journalist did," the paper quoted them as saying.
During a visit to Libya in 2005, Human Rights Watch found widespread official denial that violence against women exists in Libya, and a lack of adequate laws and services, leaving victims of violence without effective remedies and deterring reporting. A group of students conducting a study on sexual harassment in Tripoli in April 2009 had great difficulty in persuading women to talk about their experiences, since some felt it would bring shame on them to discuss it.
Human Rights Watch said that countries have a duty to investigate and prevent sexual harassment, a form of violence against women. Libya was among the first countries to ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, Article 8 of which requires state parties to adopt all necessary measures to prevent, punish, and eradicate all forms of violence against women. Gender-based violence is a form of discrimination prohibited by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Libya is party. Furthermore, both the African Charter and the ICCPR require Libya to protect freedom of expression. Journalists should be able to report freely without fear of imprisonment for their writings.
"Official denial and reprisals against journalists is not the way to protect women in Libyan society," said Whitson, "Women should be encouraged to bring forward complaints of sexual harassment and other forms of violence so the government can act to prevent abuses."

Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated - Human Rights Watch

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In-Depth Investigation Also Documents Widespread Rape

October 27, 2009

(New York) – An in-depth investigation into the September 28, 2009 killings and rapes at a peaceful rally in Conakry, Guinea, has uncovered new evidence that the massacre and widespread sexual violence were organized and were committed largely by the elite Presidential Guard, commonly known as the “red berets,” Human Rights Watch said today. Following a 10-day research mission in Guinea, Human Rights Watch also found that the armed forces attempted to hide evidence of the crimes by seizing bodies from the stadium and the city’s morgues and burying them in mass graves.

Human Rights Watch found that members of the Presidential Guard carried out a premeditated massacre of at least 150 people on September 28 and brutally raped dozens of women. Red berets shot at opposition supporters until they ran out of bullets, then continued to kill with bayonets and knives.

“There is no way the government can continue to imply the deaths were somehow accidental,” said Georgette Gagnon, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “This was clearly a premeditated attempt to silence opposition voices.”

“Security forces surrounded and blockaded the stadium, then stormed in and fired at protesters in cold blood until they ran out of bullets,” added Gagnon. “They carried out grisly gang rapes and murders of women in full sight of the commanders. That’s no accident.”

A group of Guinean military officers calling themselves the National Council for Democracy and Development (Conseil national pour la démocratie et le développement, CNDD) seized power hours after the death on December 22, 2008, of Lansana Conté, Guinea’s president for 24 years. The CNDD is headed by a self-proclaimed president, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara.

Human Rights Watch reiterated its call for full support for, and speedy implementation of, the international commission of inquiry into the violence as proposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to be led by the United Nations and with involvement from the African Union. Criminal investigation leading to fair and effective prosecutions of the crimes – through domestic efforts, but failing that, international efforts – is essential, Human Rights Watch said.

A four-member team of Human Rights Watch investigators interviewed more than 150 victims and witnesses in Guinea from October 12 to 22. Among those interviewed were victims wounded during the attack, witnesses present in the stadium, relatives of missing people, military officers who participated in the crackdown and the cover-up, medical staff, humanitarian officials, diplomats, and opposition leaders.

Killings at the Stadium on September 28

According to the accounts of numerous witnesses, a combined force of a few hundred Presidential Guard troops known as “red berets,” gendarmes working with the Anti-Drug and Anti-Organized Crime unit, some members of the Anti-Riot Police, and dozens of civilian-clothed irregular militias entered the stadium around 11:30 a.m. on September 28, sealing off most exits, following the firing of tear gas into the stadium by Anti-Riot Police. The stadium was packed with tens of thousands of peaceful pro-democracy supporters protesting the military regime and Camara’s presumed candidacy in the upcoming presidential elections.

There had been limited violence between opposition supporters and security forces during the course of the morning. In several deadly incidents, security forces fired at opposition members in an attempt to stop them from reaching the stadium. In response to one such lethal shooting, enraged opposition supporters set fire to the Bellevue police station.

However, witness accounts and video evidence obtained by Human Rights Watch showing the stadium crowd just before the shooting shows a peaceful and celebratory atmosphere with opposition supporters singing, dancing, marching around the stadium with posters and the Guinean flag, and even praying. Human Rights Watch has not seen any evidence that any opposition supporters were armed, and no security officials were wounded by opposition supporters at the stadium, suggesting that there was no legitimate threat posed by the opposition supporters that required the violence that followed.

Witnesses said that as soon as the Presidential Guard entered the stadium, its members began firing point-blank directly into the massive crowd of protesters, killing dozens and sowing panic. The attackers, particularly members of the Presidential Guard but also gendarmes attached to the Anti-Drug and Anti-Organized Crime unit, continued to fire into the crowd until they had emptied the two clips of AK-47 ammunition many of them carried. Since most of the exits had been blocked and the stadium was surrounded by the attackers, escape for the trapped protesters was extremely difficult, and many were crushed to death by the panicked crowd.

One opposition supporter, a 32-year-old man, described to Human Rights Watch how the red berets entered the stadium and began firing directly at the protesters, and how the killings continued as he tried to escape:

“They first began to fire tear gas from outside the stadium – many canisters of tear gas were fired into the stadium. Just then, the red berets entered from the big gate to the stadium. As soon as they entered, they began to fire directly at the crowd. I heard a soldier yell, ‘We’ve come to clean!’ I decided to run to the gate at the far end. As I looked back, I could see many bodies on the grass. I decided to try and run out of the stadium. At the far gate, one of the doors was open but there were so many people trying to flee, I decided to climb over the closed door…

“I ran toward the perimeter wall. Near the basketball court, a group of red berets and gendarmes from Tiégboro [Captain Moussa Tiégboro Camara, secretary of state in charge of the fight against drug trafficking and serious crime – no relation to the CNDD president, Dadis Camara] were chasing us. They fired on a group of eight of us, and only three of us were able to get away alive. Five of us were killed, shot down near the wall facing the [Gamal Abdel Nasser] University.

“We couldn’t get out there, so we ran back to the broken wall near Donka road. A group of red berets was there waiting for us, two trucks of them. They were armed with bayonets. I saw one red beret kill three people right in front of us [with a bayonet], so I wanted to run back. But my friend said, ‘There are lots of us, let’s try and push through,’ and that is how we escaped.”

One of the opposition leaders described to Human Rights Watch how he watched in disbelief from the podium as the killing unfolded below them:

“We went up to the podium and when the people knew the leaders had arrived, many more people came into the stadium, filling it up. We were just preparing to leave the stadium and tell people to go home when we heard gunshots outside, and then tear gas was fired. The soldiers put electric current on the metal doors by cutting down the electric wires overhead and encircled the stadium.

“Then they entered the stadium firing. They began firing from the big entry gate to the stadium. We were up on the podium and could see people falling down; it was just unbelievable. When everyone ran away, there were bodies everywhere and we remained on the podium.”

Witnesses also described the killing of many more opposition supporters by the Presidential Guard and other security forces on the grounds surrounding the stadium, which is enclosed by a two-meter-high wall. As protesters tried to scale the walls to escape, many were shot down by the attackers. The opposition supporters said they were also attacked by men in civilian dress and armed with knives, pangas (machetes), and sharpened sticks.

The evidence collected by Human Rights Watch strongly suggests that the massacre and widespread rape (documented below) were organized and premeditated. This conclusion is supported by the evidence, both from witnesses and video, that the security forces began firing immediately at the protesters on entering the stadium, and that the opposition protest was peaceful and did not represent a threat requiring a violent response. The manner in which the massacre appears to have been carried out – the simultaneous arrival of the combined security force, the sealing off of exits and escape routes, and the simultaneous and sustained deadly firing by large numbers of the Presidential Guard – suggests organization, planning, and premeditation.

Ethnic Dimension

During interviews, many Guineans expressed shock at the apparent ethnic nature of the violence, which threatens to destabilize the situation in Guinea further. The vast majority of the victims were from the Peuhl ethnic group, which is almost exclusively Muslim, while most of the commanders at the stadium – and indeed key members of the ruling CNDD, including Camara, the coup leader – belong to ethnic groups from the southeastern forest region, which are largely Christian or animist.

Witnesses said that many of the killers and rapists made ethnically biased comments during the attacks, insulting and appearing to target the Peuhl, the majority ethnicity of the opposition supporters, and claiming that the Peuhl wanted to seize power and needed to be “taught a lesson.” Human Rights Watch also spoke with witnesses to the military training of several thousand men from the southeast forest region at a base near the southwestern town of Forécariah, apparently to form a commando unit dominated by people from ethnic groups from the forest region.

Many of the Peuhl victims reported being threatened or abused on account of their ethnicity. For example, one woman who was gang raped by men in uniform wearing red berets described how her attackers referred repeatedly to her ethnicity: “Today, we’re going to teach you a lesson. Yes, we’re tired of your tricks… we’re going to finish all the Peuhl.” A young man detained for several days in the Koundara military camp described how a red beret put a pistol to his head and said, “You say you don’t want us, that you prefer Cellou [the leading Peuhl opposition candidate, Cellou Dalein Diallo]… we’re going to kill all of you. We will stay in power.”

Death Toll and the Government Cover-Up

Human Rights Watch’s research confirms that the death toll of the September 28 massacre was much higher than the government’s official toll of 57 dead, and is more likely to be about 150 to 200 dead. According to hospital records, interviews with witnesses and medical personnel, and the records collected by opposition political parties and local human rights organizations, at least 1,000 people were wounded during the attack on the stadium. Human Rights Watch found strong evidence that the government engaged in a systematic attempt to hide the evidence of the crimes. During the afternoon of September 28, members of the Presidential Guard seized control of the two main morgues in Conakry and prevented families from recovering the bodies of their relatives.

In the hours that followed, witnesses and family members said, soldiers, most wearing red berets, removed bodies from the city morgues and collected bodies from the stadium, then took them to military bases and concealed them. Human Rights Watch investigated more than 50 cases of confirmed deaths from the massacre and found that half of those bodies had been taken away by the military, including at least six that had initially been taken to the main Donka Hospital morgue.

For example, the body of Mamadou “Mama” Bah, a 20-year-old student killed on September 28, was transported to Donka morgue by the local Red Cross. The body disappeared and has not been recovered. Bah’s father described what he experienced to Human Rights Watch:

“The Red Cross took the body to Donka Hospital morgue, and I followed them myself. At the hospital, I spoke to the doctors and they told me I should come back the next day to collect the body. But the next day, the morgue was encircled by red berets who refused anyone access. We tried to negotiate with them, but they refused. On Friday, I went to the Grand Fayçal Mosque when they displayed the bodies from Donka morgue, but his body wasn’t there. It had disappeared.”

Hamidou Diallo, a 26-year-old shoe salesman, was shot in the head and killed at the stadium. A close friend, who was wounded, watched the red berets remove Diallo’s body from the stadium and take it away to an unknown location. Despite an extensive search of the morgue and the military bases, the family was unable to find Diallo’s body.

One witness inside the Almamy Samory Touré military camp described to Human Rights Watch how in the hours after the massacre, the military brought 47 bodies from the stadium to the camp, and then later that evening went to the morgue that he was told was at the Ignace Deen Hospital and collected an additional 18 bodies. The witness further stated that the 65 bodies were taken from the military base in the middle of the night, allegedly to be buried in mass graves.

Widespread Rape and Sexual Violence

The Presidential Guard, and to a lesser extent gendarmes, carried out widespread rape and sexual violence against dozens of girls and women at the stadium, often with such extreme brutality that their victims died from the wounds inflicted.

Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed 27 victims of sexual violence, the majority of whom were raped by more than one person. Witnesses described seeing at least four women murdered by members of the Presidential Guard after being raped, including women who were shot or bayoneted in the vagina. Some victims were penetrated with gun barrels, shoes, and wooden sticks.

Victims and witnesses have described how rapes took place publicly inside the stadium, as well as in several areas around the stadium grounds, including the nearby bathroom area, the basketball courts, and the annex stadium. In addition to the rapes committed at the stadium, many women described how they were taken by the Presidential Guard from the stadium and from a medical clinic where they had sought treatment to private residences, where they endured days and nights of brutal gang rape. The level, frequency, and brutality of sexual violence that took place at and after the protests strongly suggests that it was part of a systematic attempt to terrorize and humiliate the opposition, not just random acts by rogue soldiers.

A 35-year-old teacher described to Human Rights Watch how she was gang raped at the stadium:

“After the shooting began I tried to run, but the red berets caught me and dragged me to the ground. One of them struck me twice on the head with the butt of his rifle. After I fell down, three set upon me. One whipped out his knife and tore my clothes off, cutting me on the back in the process. I tried to fight but they were too strong. Two held me down while the other raped me. They said they would kill me if I didn’t leave them to do what they wanted. Then the second one raped me, then the third. They beat me all the while, and said again and again they were going to kill all of us. And I believed them – about three meters away another woman was being raped, and after they had finished, one of them took his bayonet and stuck her in her vagina, and then licked the blood from his knife. I saw this, just next to me… I was so terrified they would also do this to me.”

A 42-year-old professional woman who was held in a house and gang raped for three days described her ordeal to Human Rights Watch:

“As I tried to run from the firing, I saw a few red berets raping a young woman. One of them put his gun in her sex and fired – she didn’t move again. Oh God, every time I think of that girl dying in that way… I can’t bear it. As this happened, another red beret grabbed me hard from behind and said, ‘Come with me, or I will do the same thing to you.’ He led me to a military truck with no windows. In it were about 25 young men and about six women, including me. After some distance they stopped and the soldiers told three or four women to get out. Later they stopped at a second house where they told the women who remained to get out. I was immediately led into a room and the door was locked behind me.

“Some hours later three of them came into the room – all dressed in military and with red berets. One of them had a little container of white powder. He dipped his finger in it and forced it into my nose. Then all three of them used me. They used me again the next day, but after a while others came in, two by two. I didn’t know how many or who. I felt my vagina was burning and bruised. I was so tired and out of my head. The first three of them were watching each other as they raped me.

“I was there for three days. They said, ‘You don’t really think you’ll leave here alive, do you?’ and at times argued among themselves, ‘Should we kill her now?’ ‘No… let’s get what we need and then kill her.’ At times I heard another woman crying out from a nearby room, ‘Please, please… oh my God, this is the end of my life.’ On the last day at 6 a.m., the soldiers put a cover over my head, drove for some time, and then let me go on a street corner, completely naked.”

Commanders at the scene clearly were aware of the widespread rapes, but there is no evidence that they made any attempt to stop them. One opposition leader told Human Rights Watch how he was led out of the stadium by Lieutenant Abubakar “Toumba” Diakité, the commander of the Presidential Guard, past at least a dozen women as they were being sexually assaulted by red berets. He noted how Toumba did nothing to stop the rapes:

“I saw lots of cases of rape. The opposition leaders were taken slowly out of the stadium, so we saw a lot. As we came down from the podium, I saw a woman naked on the ground surrounded by five red berets who were raping her on the grass. I saw other naked women there being taken away by the red berets [to be raped]. There were even more rapes outside the stadium. Just outside the stadium, where the showers are, there was a woman naked on the ground. There were three or four red berets on top of her, and one had pushed his rifle into her [vagina]. She was screaming so loudly in pain that we had to look and see it. All along that passage, there were about a dozen women being raped. Lieutenant Toumba was right next to us and saw it all, but he didn’t do anything to stop the rapes.”

Responsibility for the Massacre, Sexual Violence, and Other Abuses

Based on the evidence gathered, Human Rights Watch found that the massacre and sexual violence committed on September 28 at the stadium appeared to be both organized and pre-planned. All those responsible, including those who gave the orders, should be held criminally accountable for their actions, as should anyone who tried to cover up the crimes and dispose of any evidence. That the killings, sexual violence, and persecution on the grounds of ethnicity appear to have been systematic suggests that this may have been a crime against humanity. As such, the principle of “command responsibility” applies. Those in positions of responsibility, who should have known about the crime (or its planning) and who failed to prevent it or prosecute those responsible, should be held criminally responsible.

Human Rights Watch believes that independent criminal investigations leading to the identification and prosecution of those responsible, including those liable under command responsibility, are urgently needed. Among those whose possible criminal responsibility for the massacre and sexual violence should be investigated are:

• Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, president of the CNDD: While Camara was not believed to have been present at the stadium on September 28, he was involved in trying to prevent the protest. All witness accounts said killings were carried out by members of the Presidential Guard, which Camara ultimately commands, and that the person in command of the red berets at the stadium was Camara’s personal aide de camp and head of his personal bodyguard, Lieutenant Abubakar “Toumba” Diakité. Evidence suggests that the Presidential Guard at the stadium came there from the Alpha Yaya Diallo military camp where Camara is based. Further, there is no evidence that Camara has initiated any proceedings to discipline or hold accountable any of his subordinates directly implicated in the massacre and rapes.

• Lieutenant Abubakar “Toumba” Diakité: Many witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch have stated that Toumba was physically present at the stadium and in direct command of the Presidential Guard that carried out the massacre and widespread sexual violence there. There is no evidence that he made any attempt to stop troops from carrying out the killings or the sexual violence.

• Lieutenant Marcel Kuvugi: Kuvugi is a deputy to Diakité and sometimes serves as Camara’s personal driver. Witnesses, including several opposition leaders, have said he violently attacked and repeatedly threatened to kill the political opposition leaders present at the stadium. The political leaders said that when they were taken from the stadium to a clinic for first-aid treatment, Kuvugi threatened to shoot them if they got out of the car and to throw a grenade at them, keeping them from getting medical treatment.

• Captain Claude “Coplan” Pivi, minister for presidential security: There are conflicting reports about whether Pivi was present at the stadium during the massacre. Witnesses have alleged that he participated in attacks on the homes of opposition leaders on the evening of September 28 and in the violent attacks on opposition-dominated neighborhoods in the following days.

• Captain Moussa Tiégboro Camara: As secretary of state in charge of the fight against drug trafficking and serious crime, Tiégboro commands the elite gendarme unit that took part in the massacre at the stadium. Witnesses have stated that Tiégboro was present. Witnesses have also said the gendarmes made several attempts to stop the protesters before they reached the stadium, in a few instances firing into the crowds and killing at least three protesters. Witnesses have stated that the gendarme unit then participated in the massacre at the stadium, though its members were less frequently implicated in murder and rape than were the Presidential Guard. At least 72 protesters were detained in the custody of the gendarme unit following the massacre, and those held by the unit said they were severely mistreated.

Need for an International Commission of Inquiry and Criminal Accountability

Due to the serious nature of the crimes committed by Guinea’s security forces, particularly the Presidential Guard, on September 28 and on the days that followed, there should be a strong response from the international community. Human Rights Watch therefore calls upon the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union, and the United Nations to:

• Support fully the international commission of inquiry into the events of September 28 proposed by ECOWAS and already established by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, to ensure that it immediately has the resources to carry out its investigation and promptly publish its results, and urge Guinea’s authorities to cooperate fully with this inquiry.

• Strongly urge Guinean authorities to ensure that prompt, independent, fair, and open criminal investigations take place into the crimes and their cover-up, leading to the fair and effective prosecution of those allegedly responsible in accordance with international standards, including those who gave orders or who are liable under command responsibility. Should the Guinean authorities fail to ensure such investigations and prosecutions, the Guinean government, the AU, ECOWAS, EU, and UN should fully support international investigations and prosecutions, including by the International Criminal Court (ICC) if the requirements of its statute are met. Guinea is a state party to the ICC, which gives the court jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed on its territory. Following the violence on September 28, the ICC prosecutor indicated that Guinea is under preliminary examination by his office. Preliminary examination is a phase that may precede the opening of an investigation.

Human Rights Watch plans to release a full-length report on its findings. Human Rights Watch is now releasing a summary of its core findings because of the gravity of the abuses committed and the need for immediate international action to bring the perpetrators of the abuses to justice.

Free Markets, Free Muslims - Foreign Affairs

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Can a New Middle Class Make a New Middle East?

November/December 2009
Jon B. Alterman
JON B. ALTERMAN is Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

It was not long ago that word of "the Dubai miracle" was on everyone's lips. Driven by little more than a grand idea of itself, this sparsely populated, sun-baked strip on the Persian Gulf had become a gleaming multiethnic metropolis overnight. Dubai was bursting with financial assets, boasting the world's most luxurious hotels, and attracting more than six million visitors every year -- no small feat for an emirate of a mere 100,000 citizens. But in the last year, the speculative bubble that had driven much of Dubai's growth popped: cranes fell still, and ambitious projects lay languishing on the drawing board. Behind the scenes, it took tens of billions of dollars in financial guarantees from Abu Dhabi to keep the whole enterprise afloat.

Vali Nasr's new book, Forces of Fortune, was written largely in the exuberant phase of Dubai's story, but it is being published in a more sober time. It reflects some of the old enthusiasm for the notion that "the Dubai model" -- a multiethnic, capitalist society insulated from violence and ideology -- could save the Middle East from a downward spiral of intolerance and political extremism. Nasr's overall conclusion -- that the triumph of free markets in the Middle East "will pave the way to the decisive defeat of extremism and to social liberalization" -- is sympathetic to the Dubai experience. "If that battle is won by private-sector business leaders and the rising middle class tied to them," Nasr argues, "then progress with political rights will follow."

This is not merely a book about Dubai, however. It is a book about the enduring promise of Dubai, the struggles of Iran, and the success of Turkey. Bolstering these cases with brief studies on Egypt and Pakistan, Nasr suggests that where capitalism flourishes, so, too, do tolerance and moderation. He also thinks that the resurgence of Islam is promising rather than threatening. Judging that the tide has turned against extremism, he views middle-class religiosity as a path through which Muslim communities can integrate with the rest of the world. In Nasr's words, "This upwardly mobile class consumes Islam as much as practicing it," seeking to embrace modernity on Muslim terms rather than rejecting it as a form of corruption. The old populist dogmas that focused on injustice and encouraged resistance are waning. Consequently, resources poured into bolstering liberal ideals in Muslim communities merely feed the culture wars, Nasr cautions. Instead, "The key struggle that will pave the way to the decisive defeat of extremism and to social liberalization will be the battle to free the markets."

DUBAI OR NOT DUBAI

Of the three models of social and political change presented in the book, Dubai is clearly the headliner. Its remarkable wealth and its embrace of immigrants stand out against the anticolonial sentiment and xenophobia found in much of the rest of the Middle East. Its efficient business environment and high quality of life make the emirate a more attractive base for Western expatriates than any other place in the Middle East, and its can-do business culture makes it a place where even Arab businesspeople often go to broker deals. Iranians flock in, too, to trade and to party; by some estimates, there are four times as many Iranians in Dubai as native Dubaians. The city has become a safe harbor from the battles that rage throughout the Middle East over money, politics, and religion. Dubai is not about a clash of civilizations. It is about modernity, comfort, and profit.

Yet for all of its success, Dubai is an inadequate model for the future of the Middle East. Its small native population has had to learn, by necessity, to live as a minority on its home turf. The tiny native work force is easy to employ fully; the needs of customs and law enforcement alone absorb much of it. Equally important, Dubai owes at least part of its success to its wealthy neighbor Abu Dhabi, whose petrodollars act as insurance against Dubai's collapse. The Dubai model works well for Dubai, but it has limited relevance for the rest of the Middle East.

Iran's circumstances are more relevant to most countries in the region, and they present a far more cautionary tale. With its strong imperial history, vast oil and gas wealth, and population of almost 70 million, Iran is a natural powerhouse in the Middle East. Yet Nasr argues that Iran's combination of religion, politics, and economics, which mixes "theocratic Shia fundamentalism with a strong dose of class warfare and hatred for capitalism," has dragged the country down. As he explains, Iran's clerical leadership has often used Iran's isolation from the world to consolidate its economic and political grip on the country. Immediately following the 1979 revolution, private businesses were nationalized or sold, the state payroll was tripled, and the economy was crippled by international sanctions and a bloody war with Iraq. With all other options exhausted by the early 1990s, Nasr writes, President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani cautiously sought to revive the private sector; after President Muhammad Khatami was elected in 1997, those efforts accelerated and foreign capital began to flow in. Alongside the economic reform came gradual political openness. Civil-society groups became increasingly active, the rule of law began to return, and public debate surged.

But all of this proved too much for Iran's leadership, and it reversed course. Nasr lays much of the blame for this at the feet of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who called out Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps to curb social reform and preserve the unholy alliance between religious clerics and political cronies that the revolution had spawned. The election of the populist president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 consolidated the counterreform effort and dealt a harsh blow to those hoping for more economic openness. What was opened, instead, was the Treasury, which poured tens of billions of dollars into subsidies, handed out wads of cash, and embarked on a state-supported building spree. Many in Iran's lower class appreciated the relief, but the middle class was devastated. Over the past few years, the value of Iran's currency has plummeted and inflation has soared, straining pensioners and government workers. The political consequences were made clear last June, when the government cracked down on the opposition for claiming that the government had stolen the presidential elections. Many close observers believed the episode was a putsch by Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards to keep themselves in power, against the wishes of tens of millions of Iranian voters. Less attention has been paid to the economic component of Iranian authoritarianism and the creation of what Nasr calls "Islamic Republic, Inc." The government's economic and political monopolies go hand in hand.

To Nasr, Turkey represents a happier balance between the state and the public. Under the logic of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish republic, the government pushed economic and social development from the top down throughout the middle years of the twentieth century. The state planned the economy, built industries, and managed trade. The state also enforced strict secularism as a necessary component of modernization. But in recent decades, a more bottom-up, free-market, and religious logic has emerged in the country, tied to the rising fortunes of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). This story's hero is Turkey's prime minister in the 1980s, Turgut Özal. He breathed life into Turkey's Anatolian heartland by helping create networks of entrepreneurs untethered to the state-led capitalist system that Atatürk had built. The proprietors of these thriving small and medium-sized enterprises were typically conservative and pious -- Nasr compares them to Midwestern Republicans -- and they helped lead to a fusion of religion and politics that had previously been inconceivable in Turkey.

The Turkish General Staff, the keeper of the Kemalist flame, still regards the AKP warily, and Turkish politics is rife with accusations that the AKP is little more than a gang of fundamentalists in suits who seek to overthrow the Turkish republic. For his part, Nasr is satisfied with the state of competition in Turkey. As he sees it, "commerce has both shackled state power and softened Islam's hard edges." The rise of the AKP has coincided with the rise of a capitalist middle class and a turn away from state control over the economy. Nasr also suggests that the demands of middle-class voters have forced the AKP to become a relatively tolerant technocratic force in Turkish politics. The challenge of electoral competition has helped forge a more moderate form of political Islam.

MIDDLE-CLASS HEROES

So what went right in Turkey, and what went wrong in Iran? As Nasr tells it, the two countries rose from the ashes of the failed modernization process that characterized the Middle East in the middle of the twentieth century -- secular, state-led efforts that produced little wealth and even less freedom. In 1963, the Middle East scholar Manfred Halpern predicted that as independent states in the region became stronger, the growing petite bourgeoisie of schoolteachers, army officers, and bureaucrats would constitute a "new middle class" and a modernizing force. But, Nasr writes, because this group was "a product of the state . . . it forfeited its role as the vehicle of liberalization, opting instead for state patronage."

Yet it was a broad swath of this group that grew frustrated by continued poverty and felt alienated by rulers who seemed more comfortable in the salons of Europe than in their own capitals. Islam provided both a space to organize against the status quo and a rationale for doing so. In Iran, the shah's repressive form of secular nationalism gave birth to the opposition movements that created the Islamic Republic, and in Egypt and elsewhere, secular nationalism created violent groups that have employed Islamic slogans and symbols in their efforts to overthrow existing governments. These movements, in turn, have given many observers the impression that more Islamically oriented governments would be intolerant of women and minorities, distrustful of the majority's will, and hostile to Western interests.

Nasr disagrees, arguing that a more Islamic form of nationalism throughout the region would sit more easily with the middle class, liberalize politics, and lead to new moderation throughout the Middle East. He contends that a sustained effort to promote secularist principles is a losing fight because "the current battle line in many Muslim societies lies not between Islam and secularism but rather between types of Islam." The continued defense of unalloyed secularism, he argues, only gives Muslims a feeling that they are being besieged, feeding a culture war that the West cannot win. Nasr suggests that it is far better to promote greater economic openness to empower the middle class and then to rely on these people's good sense to curb the more extreme manifestations of Islamist politics. After all, Muslims in the Middle East "have generally not thrown their support behind fundamentalist parties in elections -- at least not until those parties have abandoned the fundamentalist component of their stated goals." The new breed of Muslim yuppies have no hatred in their hearts; their Islam is one that "celebrates piety while rejecting violence and extremism."

A WAY OUT

But Nasr's view is by no means universally held. Many Christians and secularists in the Middle East would quarrel with it, and their exodus from the region is a sign that they distrust the Islamist forces.

Another flaw is that Nasr does not put forward a plan for opening the region economically, religiously, and politically or suggest how such an evolution might be managed. At points, Forces of Fortune feels as if it is guided more by sentiment than argument. Nasr points consistently to the Turkish model, but he does not dwell on its nuances and particularities -- for example, the way in which prospective membership in the European Union has both restrained Turkey's generals and inspired the AKP to pursue orthodox economic policies. Nor does Nasr dwell on the fact that in some instances wealth has been no barrier to extremism in the region (although he does mention this). After all, Osama bin Laden grew up in a very wealthy Saudi family, and his Egyptian deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was raised by an upper-middle-class family in Cairo and trained as a physician. Moreover, some countries, such as Tunisia, have nurtured a middle class at the same time as they have stifled political openness, and in Dubai, elections play a vanishingly small role in governance.

But the most puzzling omission is Saudi Arabia, which barely appears in this book about religion, economics, and politics in the Middle East, despite having an abundance of all three. Saudi Arabia is the most prominent voice defining orthodox Islam, and it supports a range of nongovernmental groups in Muslim communities around the world. No government spends more money indoctrinating its own people and spreading its understanding of Islam beyond its borders. The Saudi royals and those close to them own virtually all the pan-Arab media, and the Saudi government trains thousands of clerics and prints millions of religious books every year. The country is a major economic force, too, with a GDP almost twice as large as that of the United Arab Emirates, three times as large as that of Kuwait, and four times as large as that of Qatar. Nasr describes Iran as "the only state ever created from scratch by fundamentalists," but Saudi Arabia is certainly another, and it is one that matters.

In Nasr's defense, one might argue that Saudi Arabia's oil-based economy has eviscerated the middle class and has led to precisely the sort of state-centered authoritarian system that Nasr hopes will be undermined. Nevertheless, Saudi influence -- in terms of both money and ideas -- is ubiquitous in Muslim circles. If the future of Islam lies in the marketplace, omitting Saudi Arabia from a discussion of how that is to happen is a religious, economic, and political distortion.

Even so, Nasr has written a rewarding and impressive book. He is a lively guide to a maze of issues that rarely get discussed, and he uses the fruits of his wide travels in the Middle East with great skill. Forces of Fortune is full of knowing insights, telling jokes, and subtle personal portraits, and it is an easy -- although not breezy -- read.

Judging by this book, it is no mystery that Nasr has risen to such prominence in U.S. government circles as a preeminent explainer of the complex phenomena that define the modern Middle East. Since writing it, he has become a senior adviser to Richard Holbrooke, the State Department's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nasr's new responsibilities include figuring out how to tip these countries toward greater stability and moderation -- a process, Nasr suggests, that will take decades of sustained effort.

Is Turkey Leaving the West? - Foreign Affairs

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An Islamist Foreign Policy Puts Ankara at Odds With Its Former Allies

Soner Cagaptay

SONER CAGAPTAY is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?

In early October, Turkey disinvited Israel from Anatolian Eagle, an annual Turkish air force exercise that it had held with Israel, NATO, and the United States since the mid-1990s. It marked the first time Turkey's governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) let its increasingly anti-Western rhetoric spill into its foreign policy strategy, and the move may suggest that Turkey's continued cooperation with the West is far from guaranteed.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's prime minister and the leader of the AKP, justified the decision by calling Israel a "persecutor." But only a day after it dismissed Israel, Turkey invited Syria -- a known abuser of human rights -- to joint military exercises and announced the creation of a Strategic Cooperation Council with the Syrian regime. A mountain is moving in Turkish foreign policy, and the foundation of Turkey's 60-year-old military and political cooperation with the West may be eroding.

Starting in 1946, when Turkey chose to ally itself with the West in the Cold War -- later sending troops to Korea and joining NATO -- successive Turkish governments have pursued close cooperation with the United States and Europe. Turkey viewed the Middle East and global politics through the lens of their own national security interests. This made cooperation possible, even with Israel, a state Turkey viewed as a democratic ally in a volatile region. The two countries shared similar security concerns, such as Syria's support for terror groups abroad -- radical Palestinian organizations in the case of Israel, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey. In 1998, when Ankara confronted Damascus over its support for the PKK, Turkish newspapers wrote headlines championing the Turkish-Israeli alliance: "We will say 'shalom' to the Israelis on the Golan Heights," one read.

The AKP, however, viewed Turkey's interests through a different lens -- one colored by a politicized take on religion, namely Islamism. Senior AKP officials called the 2004 U.S. offensive in Fallujah, Iraq, a "genocide," and in February 2009, Erdogan compared Gaza to a "concentration camp."

But the AKP's foreign policy has not promoted sympathy toward all Muslim states. Rather, the party has promoted solidarity with Islamist, anti-Western regimes (Qatar and Sudan, for example) while dismissing secular, pro-Western Muslim governments (Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia). This two-pronged strategy is especially apparent in the Palestinian territories: at the same time that the AKP government has called on Western countries to "recognize Hamas as the legitimate government of the Palestinian people," AKP officials have labeled Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas the "head of an illegitimate government." According to diplomats, Abbas' last visit to Ankara in July 2009 went terribly -- now, these diplomatic sources say, Abbas does not trust the AKP any more than he trusts Hamas.

As the cancelled military exercises with Israel show, the AKP's moralistic foreign policy is not without inherent hypocrisies. An earlier example came last January, when, a day after Erdogan harangued Israeli President Shimon Peres, as well as Jews and Israelis, at the World Economic Forum for knowing "well how to kill people," Turkey hosted the Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha in Ankara. This is a dangerous position because it suggests -- especially to the generation coming of age under the AKP -- that Islamist regimes alone have the right to attack their own people or even other states. In September, Erdogan defended Iran's nuclear program, arguing that the problem in the Middle East is Israel's nuclear arsenal.

Some analysts have dismissed such rhetoric as domestic politicking or simply an instance of Erdogan losing his temper. But Erdogan is an astute politician, and he is now reacting to changes in Turkish society. After seven years of the AKP's Islamist rhetoric, public opinion has shifted to embrace the idea of a politically united "Muslim world." According to independent polling in Turkey, the number of people identifying themselves as Muslim increased by ten percent between 2002 and 2007; in addition, almost half of those surveyed describe themselves as Islamist.

The AKP's foreign policy now has a welcome audience at home, making it more likely to become entrenched. After Erdogan stormed out of his session at the World Economic Forum, thousands gathered to greet his plane as it arrived back home in what appeared to be an orchestrated welcome. (Banners with Turkish and Hamas flags stitched together appeared from nowhere in a matter of hours.)

The transformation of Turkish identity under the AKP has potentially massive ramifications. Guided by an Islamist worldview, it will become more and more impossible for Turkey to support Western foreign policy, even when doing so is in its national interest. Turkish-Israeli ties -- long a model for how a Muslim country can pursue a rational, cooperative relationship with the Jewish state -- will continue to unravel. Such a development will be greeted only with approval by the Turkish public, further bolstering the AKP's popularity. Thus, the party will be able to kill two birds with one stone: distancing the country from its former ally and shoring up its own power base.

The same dynamic will also apply to Turkey's relations with the European Union and the United States. The AKP has a tactical view of Turkey's possible accession to the EU: it pushes for membership when it brings the party public approval, but it does not take a strategic view of closer ties with Europe. Thus, the AKP is reluctant to take on tough, potentially unpopular reforms mandated by the EU, making accession seem less and less a likely reality. Statements such as Erdogan's calling the West "immoral" in 2008 only erode popular support for EU membership: by last year, about one-third of the population wanted their country to join the EU, down sharply from more than 80 percent in 2002, when the AKP took power.

Meanwhile, as the United States devotes much of its energy abroad to Muslim countries, from opposing radicalism to countering Iran's nuclear program, the AKP will oppose these policies through harsh rhetoric and opt out of any close cooperation.

Many suggested that the AKP's rise to power presented Turkey with an opportunity to "go back to the Middle East" and adopt more of an Islamic identity. The hope was that such a shift would help "normalize" Turkey, recalibrating the secularizing and nationalist reforms of Kemal Atatürk, who turned Turkey to the West in the early twentieth century. The outcome, however, has not been so positive. Turkey's experience with the AKP proves that Islamism in the country's foreign policy may not be so compatible with the West, after all.

BBC - Fugitive Thai banker faces trial

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A fugitive Thai banker has lost a 13-year extradition battle and has been put on a plane back to Thailand from Vancouver, Canada.

The Thai authorities accuse Rakesh Saxena of defrauding more than $80m (£48m) from the Bangkok Bank of Commerce - something he denies.

The bank's collapse in 1996, under the weight of bad loans, exposed regulatory failures in the Thai banking system.

Thai officials say the collapse helped spark the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

Mr Saxena has argued that he would be harmed if he returned to Thailand and that he would not receive a fair trial.

But when his lawyer, Amandeep Singh, and his mother, Amrit Sarup, left Vancouver Airport where Mr Saxena was put on a plane, Mr Singh described his client as confident.

Many charges?

"He has chosen not to pursue any more legal challenges here, and ... he'll pursue his legal case in Thailand. He's very confident," Mr Singh told AP Television News.

"He's in good spirits when I spoke to him last, and we will keep abreast of his case in Thailand."

The fugitive is expected to land in Bangkok late on Friday after taking a Thursday afternoon flight from Vancouver to China, and then from Beijing to Thailand, Bangkok.

Thai authorities are reportedly dusting off dozens of case files relating to Mr Saxena's activities - a spokesman for the Office of Thailand's Attorney General told reporters that Mr Saxena has over 20 cases pending against him.

But Mr Singh argued that extradition law provided for trial on one charge only and said he had been assured by the Thai justice department that this would be the case.

Loss of confidence

Mr Saxena, who suffered a stroke last March and uses a wheelchair, was an adviser for the Bangkok Bank of Commerce when Thai authorities charged him in 1996 with setting up a series of phoney loans to siphon millions from the bank.

He fled Thailand and was arrested later that year in the British Columbia ski resort town of Whistler.

The collapse of the bank under $3bn in debts - partly accumulated by unsecured loans made to Thai politicians - created a loss of confidence in the Thai banking system that is blamed for helping to trigger Asia's economic crisis a year later.

Mr Saxena has maintained he is being made a scapegoat by well-connected executives of the bank and by financial regulators embarrassed by the scandal.

BBC - Africa backs Darfur crimes court

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African leaders have agreed to establish a new court to bring justice to the Sudanese region of Darfur.

The hybrid court would consist of Sudanese and foreign judges appointed by the African Union in consultation with the Khartoum government.

US-based Human Rights Watch told the BBC the new court should not replace the International Criminal Court.

The ICC is seeking to prosecute Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir for committing war crimes in Darfur, which he denies.

A rebel leader is currently on trial in The Hague and the court has also issued arrest warrants for a Sudanese minister and pro-government militia leader.

DARFUR CONFLICT

300,000 died, 2.7 million homeless

Black African rebels say they face discrimination

Government denies mobilising Arab militias

Violence flared in Darfur in 2003 when black African rebel groups took up arms against the government in Khartoum, complaining of discrimination and neglect.

Pro-government Arab militias then started a campaign of violence, targeting the black African population.

The UN says some 300,000 people have been killed in Darfur's six-year conflict. Khartoum says about 10,000 died.

Speed

The African leaders, meeting in the Nigerian capital Abuja, agreed to the proposals in a report put forward by South Africa's former President Thabo Mbeki.

Thabo Mbeki himself is asked to head a new implementation panel. This will have an enormous remit, not only helping bring into force the former South African president's own proposals, but also helping Sudan's troubled north-south peace process.

Elections are planned for April next year, to be followed by a referendum on independence the year after. The timetable is tight and much needs to be done.

To strengthen Mr Mbeki's hand there are now suggestions that he will in due course take over as the joint African Union-United Nations mediator in Darfur and the north-south process. This would be an enormous task, but Mr Mbeki is a man of keen intelligence and great patience - skills he will need if he is to succeed.

Mr Bashir was invited to the meeting, but after an angry reaction from human rights groups, he stayed away.

The BBC's Africa analyst Martin Plaut says Mr Mbeki's 148-page report is written in diplomatic language, but makes clear that previous attempts to dispense justice in Darfur have made little progress.

Neither the special courts established by the Sudanese government nor the ICC warrant are considered to have contributed to peace.

Human Rights Watch's Georgette Gaignon told the BBC's Network Africa the organisation welcomed the proposal.

"It's part of the whole package of providing justice to victims in Darfur," she said.

"There are many who have suffered in Darfur and there are many alleged criminals.

"These people should be tried in a domestic system that conforms to fair trial standards, but the most serious cases are now before the International Criminal Court and those should be dealt with there."

She added that it was important that the court was set up as quickly and efficiently as possible.

But the response from the Sudanese participants in the Darfur civil war has been less than enthusiastic.

Sudan's Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, who was at the Abuja meeting, said the proposals needed closer scrutiny to see whether they were in line with the constitution.

One rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement, described Mr Mbeki proposals as impractical, but did not reject them outright.

BBC - Honduras rivals resolve deadlock

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The interim leader of Honduras says he is ready to sign a pact to end its crisis which could include the return of ousted President Manuel Zelaya.

Roberto Micheletti said the agreement would create a power-sharing government and require both sides to recognise the result of November's presidential poll.

Mr Zelaya said the deal, which requires the approval of the Supreme Court and Congress, would be signed on Friday.

The president was forced out of the country on 28 June.

His critics said he was seeking to amend the constitution to remove the current one-term limit on serving as president, and pave the way for his re-election.

The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has described this agreement as "historic", that suggests we are extremely close to a deal.

It is also significant that both sides say that the Congress of Honduras has to approve this.

That could mean a slight delay, but it might actually also have been the key to the solution. Neither side could agree and so ultimately, perhaps to save face, they had to leave it to others finally, and symbolically, to make an agreement.

It appears the US government put the pressure on the Micheletti government to say leave this to the Honduran Congress. And although the Congress initially voted to remove President Zelaya from power, now it wants him back, as everyone understands that it is the only way out of this.

Mr Zelaya returned covertly to Tegucigalpa on 21 September and has since been holed up in the Brazilian embassy. He says he has returned "for the restoration of democracy".

His term of office is due to finish at the end of January.

Negotiators for Mr Zelaya and Mr Micheletti resumed talks in the capital on Thursday in an attempt to resolve the political crisis which has gripped Honduras since the army-backed coup four months ago.

The opponents had earlier been told by US Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon that they had to reach an accord in order to ensure international support for the election on 29 November.

Afterwards, Mr Micheletti announced that a power-sharing deal had been reached that included a "significant concession".

"I have authorised my negotiating team to sign a deal that marks the beginning of the end of the country's political situation," the interim leader told a news conference.

"With regard to the most contentious subject in the deal, the possible restitution of Zelaya to the presidency" would be included, he said.

Mr Zelaya described the accord as a "triumph for Honduran democracy", and said he was "optimistic" of returning to power.

The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, meanwhile said she wished to congratulate both sides on "reaching an historic agreement".

Mr Micheletti said the ousted president would only be able return to office after a vote in his favour in Congress that would first have to be authorised by the country's Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled that Mr Zelaya had violated the constitution in June, while Congress voted to remove him from office.

Mr Micheletti - who as the speaker of Congress was constitutionally second-in-line to the presidency - was sworn in by Congress as interim leader following the coup.

BBC - Internet addresses set for change

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The internet regulator has approved plans to allow non-Latin-script web addresses, in a move that is set to transform the online world.

The board of Icann voted at its annual meeting in Seoul to allow domain names in Arabic, Chinese and other scripts.

More than half of the 1.6 billion people who use the internet speak languages with non-Latin scripts.

It is being described as the biggest change to the way the internet works since it was created 40 years ago.

The first Internationalised Domain Names (IDNs) could be in use next year.

Plans for IDNs were first approved at a meeting in June 2008, but testing of the system has been going on for two years.

Technical upheaval

The move paves the way for the internet's Domain Name System (DNS) to be changed so it can recognise and translate non-Latin characters.

The DNS acts like a phonebook, turning easily understood domain names into strings of computer-readable numbers, known as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.

“ This change is very much necessary for not only half the world's internet users today but more than half, probably, of the future users as the internet continues to spread ”
Rod Beckstrom President of Icann

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Icann) said the "fantastically complicated technical feature" allowing IDNs would represent the "biggest change" to the coding that underlies the internet since it was invented four decades ago.

BBC technology correspondent Mark Gregory says in the early days of the internet, language posed no problem, as most web-surfers spoke English and those that did not usually wrote in languages based on the Latin alphabet.

But this is no longer true, adds our correspondent.

Icann said it would accept the first applications for IDNs by 16 November, with the first up and running by "mid-2010".

It is likely the majority of early non-Latin net addresses to be approved will be in Chinese and Arabic script, followed by Russian.

Some countries, such as China and Thailand, have already introduced workarounds that allow computer users to enter web addresses in their own language.

However, these were not internationally approved and do not work on all computers.

Autonomy

Our correspondent says the point of the Icann vote was to create a universal internet address code that will work in any language and every place so all the world's computers can connect with each other. HAVE YOUR SAY There is a danger that the internet - a tool for culture, information - sharing and dialog on a non-national level, may become irreversibly fragmented Stefanos Likkas, Athens, Greece

"Of the 1.6 billion internet users today worldwide, more than half use languages that have scripts that are not Latin-based," said Icann president and CEO Rod Beckstrom earlier this week.

"So this change is very much necessary for not only half the world's internet users today but more than half, probably, of the future users as the internet continues to spread."

Icann, set up by the US government, was founded in 1998 to oversee the development of the net.

Last month, after years of criticism, the US government eased its control over the non-profit body.

It signed a new agreement that gave Icann autonomy for the first time. The agreement came into effect on 1 October and puts it under the scrutiny of the global "internet community".