| 2009 November | |
| APEC at 20: Old Promises, New Challenges by Barry Desker RSIS Commentary No. 111 | |
| The Armed Forces of Southeast Asia in 2020 by Bernard Loo RSIS Commentary No. 110 | |
| Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia: Timor-Leste as a Staging Point by Loro Horta RSIS Commentary No. 109 | |
| Future Soldier Systems: Promise or Hubris of the Network-centric Infantryman by Ong Weichong RSIS Commentary No. 108 | |
| After Noordin Top: What Next for Indonesia? by V. Arianti RSIS Commentary No. 107 | |
| UMNO General Assembly 2009: Najib in Charge by Raja Segaran Arumugam RSIS Commentary No. 106 | |
| October | |
| The Rush for Survival: New Catharsis in Malaysian Politics? by Yang Razali Kassim RSIS Commentary No. 105 | |
| The Fatal Allure of Extremist Logic: Syaifudin Zuhri and the July 17 Suicide Bombers by Sulastri Osman RSIS Commentary No. 104 | |
| Free Trade and Globalisation: Boon or Bane for the Emerging World? by Wang Di and Ron Matthews RSIS Commentary No. 103 | |
| The US and Myanmar: Moving into a New Phase by Alistair D. B. Cook RSIS Commentary No. 102 | |
| The Inter-National Serviceman of the SAF: Citizen Soldiers in Overseas Missions by Ong Weichong RSIS Commentary No. 101 | |
| Increased Risks at Sea? Global Shipping Downturn and Maritime Security by Sam Bateman RSIS Commentary No. 100 | |
| Human Security: A Response to the Climate Security Debates by Lorraine Elliott RSIS Commentary No. 99 | |
| Ketsana and its Aftermath: Lessons on Social Resilience by Kevin Punzalan RSIS Commentary No. 98 | |
| September | |
| TYPHOON KESTANA: ASIA’S KATRINA by Mely Caballero-Anthony, Irene A. Kuntjoro & Sofiah Jamil RSIS Commentary No. 97 | |
| China’s 60th Anniversary: Celebrating Beijing’s Peaceful Rise by Wang Di and Ron Matthews RSIS Commentary No. 96 | |
| Singapore's Defence Policy: Deterrence, Diplomacy and the Soldier-Diplomat by Ho Shu Huang RSIS Commentary No. 95 | |
| Australia's Security Challenges: Lessons for Others? by Nicholas Floyd RSIS Commentary No. 94 | |
| Imagining the future:The world in 2020 by Barry Desker RSIS Commentary No. 93 | |
| Counter-Ideological Work:The Need for Intellectual Rigour by Mohamed Redzuan Salleh & Muhammad Haniff Hassan RSIS Commentary No. 92 | |
| The US Defence Industry under Obama:Are the Good Times Over? by Richard A. Bitzinger RSIS Commentary No. 91 | |
| The Dragon and the Anaconda:China, Brazil and the power balance in the Americas by Loro Horta RSIS Commentary No. 90 | |
| After 17 July: Who is Prince of Jihad? by Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin RSIS Commentary No. 89 | |
| Peace Mission 2009: Securing Xinjiang and Central Asia by Nadine Godehard and Wang Pengxin RSIS Commentary No. 88 | |
| The Terrible Allure of Nuclear Weapons by Bernard Loo RSIS Commentary No. 87 | |
| August | |
| Surge in the Red Tide: Rise of Maoist Militancy in India by Sujoyini Mandal, Akanksha Mehta &. Kunal Kirpalani RSIS Commentary No. 86 | |
| Talibanisation of Pakistan: End of the Road? by Khuram Iqbal RSIS Commentary No. 85 | |
| The South China Sea Declaration: A China Perspective by Zhai Kun and Wendy Wang RSIS Commentary No. 84 | |
| Australian Home-Grown Terror by Sam Mullins and Adam Dolnik RSIS Commentary No. 83 | |
| Migrant Workers and the Right to Labour by Nur Azha Putra RSIS Commentary No. 82 | |
| AUSTRALIA’S FORCE 2030: PREPARING FOR THE POSSIBLITY OF WORLD WAR by Joshua Ho RSIS Commentary No. 81 | |
| Coming to the Rescue of the Oceans: The Climate Change Imperative by Sam Bateman and Mary Ann Palma RSIS Commentary No. 80 | |
| Aung San Suu Kyi’s Verdict: Implications for ASEAN by Alistair D. B. Cook and Mely Caballero-Anthony RSIS Commentary No. 79 | |
| Clinton’s Coup in Pyongyang: North Korean Denuclearisation Next? by Koh Swee Lean Collin RSIS Commentary No. 78 | |
| THE FORGOTTEN ROLE OF GOVERNMENT by Bill DurodiƩ RSIS Commentary No. 77 | |
| July | |
| ASEAN’S Next Challenge:PREVENTING INCIDENTS AT SEA by Kwa Chong Guan RSIS Commentary No. 76 | |
| Sarkozy and the Burqa:A New Policy or Provocation? by Tuty Raihanah Mostarom and Eric Frecon RSIS Commentary No. 75 | |
| Oil Pipeline from Myanmar to China: Competing Perspectives by Zha Daojiong RSIS Commentary No. 74 | |
| Post-Elections Aceh: An Outlook for Peace and Security by Andini Gelar Ardani and Tuty Raihanah Mostarom RSIS Commentary No. 73 | |
| Xinjiang Unrest:Catalyst for New Grand Vision for China? by Li Mingjiang RSIS Commentary No. 72 | |
| Bombs After the Presidential Election:SLOWING INDONESIA'S RISE? by Yang Razali Kassim RSIS Commentary No. 71 | |
| After the Presidential Election:INDONESIA RISING? by Yang Razali Kassim RSIS Commentary No. 70 | |
| AFGHANISTAN:When the War is Unwinnable by Greg Mills RSIS Commentary No. 69 | |
| Ethnic Violence in China: Time for a Change in Beijing’s Approach? by Rohan Gunaratna RSIS Commentary No. 68 | |
| Reflections on the 40th SAF Day and Beyond by Ong Wei Chong RSIS Commentary No. 67 | |
| ANTI-PIRACY IN SOMALIA: Models for Maritime Security Institutions by Joshua Ho RSIS Commentary No. 66 | |
| Outer Shelf Claims in the South China Sea:New Dimension to Old Disputes by Sam Bateman and Clive Schofield RSIS Commentary No. 65 | |
| June | |
| Pandemics and International Norms:China's handling of the H1N1 flu by Zha Daojiong RSIS Commentary No. 64 | |
| Hard Choices in Hard Times: Taiwan-Russia Defence Cooperation by Curie Maharani and Collin Koh RSIS Commentary No. 63 | |
| Air-Independent Powered Submarines in the Asia- Pacific: Proliferation and Repercussions by Richard A. Bitzinger RSIS Commentary No. 62 | |
| THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE (NSR): A NEW TRANSIT PASSAGE BETWEEN EUROPE AND ASIA? by Joshua Ho RSIS Commentary No. 61 | |
| PAS Beyond the 2009 Party Elections:Islamism or Post-Islamism? by Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman RSIS Commentary No. 60 | |
| Love-Hate Relationship:Australia,Timor and a Rising China by Loro Horta RSIS Commentary No. 59 | |
| Responding to Non-Traditional Security Challenges in Asia by Mely Caballero-Anthony RSIS Commentary No. 58 | |
| NATO Supply Lines in Afghanistan:The Search for Alternative Routes by Ryan Clarke and Khuram Iqbal RSIS Commentary No. 57 | |
| AN ABOUT-FACE TO THE FUTURE:The SAF's New Career Schemes by Ho Shu Huang RSIS Commentary No. 56 | |
| PAS AND NEW POLITICS:WHEN THE ULAMA REASSERT LEADERSHIP by Yang Razali Kassim RSIS Commentary No. 55 | |
| Ending the LTTE: Recipe for counter-terrorism? by Arabinda Acharya RSIS Commentary No. 54 | |
| The Arrest of Mas Selamat Kastari: Why the Silence? by Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin RSIS Commentary No. 53 | |
| China’s Re-emergence as an Arms Dealer by Richard A. Bitzinger RSIS Commentary No. 52 | |
| Root Causes of Piracy in Somalia by Bruno Mpondo-Epo RSIS Commentary No. 51 | |
| May | |
| Military Defeat of the Tamil Tigers:From Velvet Glove to Iron Fist by Ong Weichong RSIS Commentary No. 50 | |
| The “Asia-Pacific Community” Idea: What Next? by Tan See Seng RSIS Commentary No. 49 | |
| Recession: Impact on Security and Cohesion by Bill DurodiƩ RSIS Commentary No. 48 | |
| F-15SG: The Last Manned Fighter for the RSAF? by Bernard Loo RSIS Commentary No. 47 | |
| IS MAS SELAMAT RAMBO? by Barry Desker RSIS Commentary No. 46 | |
| Australian Defence White Paper:What Price Maritime Security? by Sam Bateman RSIS Commentary No. 45 | |
| Weapons acquisition in the US: Streamlining the Process by Adrian W. J. Kuah RSIS Commentary No. 44 | |
| Declining support for Islamist Parties: Exploring the Indonesian ‘Paradox’ by Tuty Raihanah Mostarom and V. Arianti RSIS Commentary No. 43 | |
| April | |
| The Swine Flu Alert: Keeping Asia Safe by Mely Caballero-Anthony, Julie Balen and Belinda Chng RSIS Commentary No. 42 | |
| THE MUMBAI ATTACKS Does Amir Kasab deserve a free and fair trial? by Akanksha Mehta and Arabinda Acharya RSIS Commentary No. 41 | |
| The Great Australian Defence Debate: Is China a Threat? by Sam Bateman RSIS Commentary No. 40 | |
| Polluting the Seas:The Risks of Human Error by Sam Bateman RSIS Commentary No. 39 | |
| NUCLEAR ENERGY: Addressing the Not-in-my-Backyard Syndrome by Alvin Chew and Jor-Shan Choi RSIS Commentary No. 38 | |
| EEZs: US Must Unclench its Fist First by B.A.Hamzah RSIS Commentary No. 37 | |
| Post-Kyoto Protocol:Changing a Climate of Denial? by Sofiah Jamil RSIS Commentary No. 36 | |
| Aircraft Carriers:China's Emerging Maritime Ambitions by Richard A Bitzinger RSIS Commentary No. 35 | |
| Avoiding Unnecessary Radicalization in Bangladesh: Learning from Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Experiences in FATA by Ryan Clarke and Clint Lorimore RSIS Commentary No. 34 | |
| March | |
| ICC’s Verdict on Darfur: Whose Responsibility? by Mely Caballero-Anthony, Belinda Chng and Roderick Chia RSIS Commentary No. 33 | |
| NAJIB’S UMNO: ENTER A NEW ERA by Yang Razali Kassim RSIS Commentary No. 32 | |
| In Defence of High Seas Freedoms by Patrick J. Neher, Raul A. Pedrozo & J. Ashley Roach RSIS Commentary No. 31 | |
| ABDULLAH AZZAM:WOULD HE HAVE ENDORSED 9/11? by Muhammad Haniff Hassan & Mohamed Redzuan Salleh RSIS Commentary No. 30 | |
| The Politics of Consumption in Thailand:Back to Basics by Antonio L Rappa RSIS Commentary No. 29 | |
| ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement:Sealed or Leaking? by Chang Youngho and Collin Koh RSIS Commentary No. 28 | |
| CLASHES AT SEA:When Chinese vessels harass US Ships by Sam Bateman RSIS Commentary No. 27 | |
| Elizabeth Wong, Karpal Singh and Hudud: Can Pakatan Survive Differences? by Goh Nur Firdaus Firoz RSIS Commentary No. 26 | |
| Sri Lanka’s Civil War: End of an Era? by Nadeeka Withana RSIS Commentary No. 25 | |
| Underground Nuclear Power Plant: Why not? by Alvin Chew RSIS Commentary No. 24 | |
| Global Crisis and Climate Change:Will recession undermine climate change negotiations? by Barry Desker RSIS Commentary No. 23 | |
| Food Terrorism: How Real? A Historical Survey since 1950 by Gregory Dalziel RSIS Commentary No. 22 | |
| February | |
| Obama’s Afghan Arm-Twisting:Weakening Karzai to give him Strength? by Clint Lorimore and Ryan Clarke RSIS Commentary No. 21 | |
| Singapore’s Gulf Anti-Piracy Operations: A Shift In Strategic Thinking by Joshua Ho RSIS Commentary No. 20 | |
| Counter-Ideology: Remaining Vigilant During Economic Slump by Muhammad Haniff Hassan & Sharifah Thuraiya S A Alhabshi RSIS Commentary No. 19 | |
| Piracy in the South China Sea: Maritime Ambushes off the Mangkai Passage by Eric FrƩcon RSIS Commentary No. 18 | |
| FACING ECONOMIC ADVERSITY: Between Tactical and Strategic Response by Ngiam Tong Dow RSIS Commentary No. 17 | |
| 25 Years of Total Defence in Singapore: Revisiting the Assumptions by Adrian W. J. Kuah RSIS Commentary No. 16 | |
| The Gaza Crisis: Impact on Southeast Asia by Nhina Le Thi Minh Huong RSIS Commentary No. 15 | |
| Al Qaeda's Female Jihadists: The Islamist Ideological View by Tuty Raihanah Mostarom RSIS Commentary No. 14 | |
| Israel's Propaganda War in Gaza: Losing the Moral High Ground by Ong Wei Chong RSIS Commentary No. 13 | |
| January | |
| GAS FEUDS: Russia and the EU's Energy Security by Jesmeen Khan and Chang Youngho RSIS Commentary No. 12 | |
| Obama’s Challenge:Addressing Muslim Radicalization in Pakistan by Clint Lorimore RSIS Commentary No. 11 | |
| PRIORITIES FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION by Barry Desker RSIS Commentary No. 10 | |
| Piracy In The Gulf Of Aden: Lessons From The Malacca Strait by Joshua Ho RSIS Commentary No. 9 | |
| Afghanistan: From Military to Political Solution by Vinay Kumar Pathak and Syed Adnan Ali Shah RSIS Commentary No. 8 | |
| Indonesia’s 2009 Legislative Election: The Emerging Danger of Charismatic Politics by Hazelia Margaretha RSIS Commentary No. 7 | |
| Afghanistan:Avoiding another Iraq by Li Hongyan RSIS Commentary No. 6 | |
| More than Warfighters: Role of ‘Strategic Corporals’ in the SAF by Ong Weichong RSIS Commentary No. 5 | |
| China’s Gulf of Aden Expedition:Stepping Stone to East Asia? by Li Mingjiang RSIS Commentary No. 4 | |
| Commodities, Africa and China by Jeffrey Herbst & Greg Mills RSIS Commentary No. 3 | |
| The Other ‘Pirates’ of the Horn of Africa by Clive Schofield RSIS Commentary No. 2 | |
| Singapore’s Arms sale to UK:A Defence Export Breakthrough by Ron Matthews and Curie Maharani RSIS Commentary No. 1 |
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Nov 12, 2009
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies List of Downloadable Commentaries
Nov 11, 2009
U.S. ambassador dissents on Afghan troop increase - washingtonpost.com
Image by PaDumBumPsh via Flickr
By Greg Jaffe, Scott Wilson and Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, November 11, 2009 6:11 PM
The U.S. ambassador in Kabul sent two classified cables to Washington in the last week expressing deep concerns about sending more U.S. troops to Afghanistan until Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government demonstrates that it is willing to tackle the corruption and mismanagement that has fueled the Taliban's rise, said senior U.S. officials.
Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry's memos were sent in the days leading up to a critical meeting Wednesday between President Obama and his national security team to consider several options prepared by military planners for how to proceed in Afghanistan. The proposals, which mark the last stage of a months-long strategy review, all call for between 20,000 to 40,000 more troops and a far broader American involvement of the war.
The last-minute dissent by Eikenberry, who commanded U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007, has rankled his former colleagues in the Pentagon -- as well as Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, said defense officials. McChrystal has bluntly stated that without an increase of tens of thousands of troops in Afghanistan in the next year, the mission there "will likely result in failure."
Eikenberry retired from the military in April 2009 as a senior general in NATO and was sworn in as ambassador the next day. His position as a former commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan is likely to give added weight to his concerns. It will also likely fan growing doubts about U.S. prospects for Afghanistan among an increasingly pessimistic public.
Although Eikenberry's extensive military experience was one of the main reasons he was chosen by Obama for the top diplomatic job in Afghanistan, the former general had been reluctant as ambassador to weigh in on military issues. Some officials who favor an increase in troops said they were befuddled by last-minute nature of his strongly worded cables.
In his communications with Washington, Eikenberry has expressed deep reservations about Karzai's erratic behavior and Afghan government corruption, particularly in the senior ranks of the Karzai government, said U.S. officials familiar with the cables. Since Karzai was officially declared re-elected last week, U.S. diplomats have seen little sign that the Afghan president plans to address the problems of corruption they have raised repeatedly with him.
U.S. officials were particularly irritated by a interview this week in which a defiant Karzai said that the West has little interest in Afghanistan and that its troops are there only for their own reasons. "The West is not here primarily for the sake of Afghanistan," Karzai told PBS's The News Hour with Jim Lehrer. "It is here to fight terrorism. The United States and its allies came to Afghanistan after September 11. Afghanistan was troubled like hell before that, too. Nobody bothered about us."
Karzai expressed indifference when asked about the withdrawal of most of the hundreds of U.N. employees from Afghanistan following a bombing late last month in Kabul. The blast killed six foreign U.N. officials.
"They may or may not return," Karzai said of the departing U.N. employees. "I don't think Afghanistan will notice it."
In the cables, Eikenberry also expressed frustration with the relative paucity of money set aside for spending on development and reconstruction this year in Afghanistan, a country wrecked by three decades of war. Earlier this summer he asked for $2.5 billion in nonmilitary spending for 2010, a 60 percent increase over what Obama had requested from Congress. But the request has languished even as the administration has debated spending tens of billions of dollars on new troops.
The ambassador also has worried that sending tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops would increase the Afghan government's dependence on U.S. support at a time when its own security forces should be taking on more responsibility for fighting. Prior to serving as the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Eikenberry was in charge of the Afghan army training program.
Eikenberry's cables emerged as military planners presented Obama with several options for how to proceed in Afghanistan on Wednesday afternoon that at a minimum would send 20,000 additional U.S. troops. The proposals, marking the last stage of a months-long strategy review, all call for a broader American involvement in the war.
Obama received the options Wednesday afternoon in a Situation Room meeting with his national security team, and he will consider each on his nine-day trip to Asia that begins Thursday. Each strategy is accompanied by precise troop figures and the estimated annual costs of the additional deployments, which run into the tens of billions of dollars.
Facing a nation increasingly pessimistic about U.S. prospects in Afghanistan, Obama is considering a set of options that would all draw America deeper into the war at a time of economic hardship and rising fiscal concerns at home. His own party is largely opposed to expanding the war effort after eight years, and the extended review has revealed a philosophical division within his administration over how to proceed.
The internal deliberations have been shaped in large part by the hard skepticism of his civilian counselors, led by Vice President Biden, who have argued for a more narrow counterterrorism strategy that would not significantly expand the U.S. combat presence in Afghanistan.
But Obama's senior military advisers, supported by such influential Cabinet members as Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, have said that only a "jump" in U.S. forces can turn back the Taliban and prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a haven for al-Qaeda.
Obama has been seeking a middle ground, along with his national security adviser, James L. Jones, a four-star general described as skeptical that a large additional troop deployment would help stabilize the country. The review has already concluded that the Taliban cannot be eliminated as a military and political force, only weakened to the extent that it no longer poses a threat to the weak central government in Kabul.
The options range from a modest deployment of new troops combined with a focus on counterterrorism operations to a broader and probably longer-running counter-insurgency program. Whichever course he chooses, Obama will probably have to explain a recalibrated set of U.S. goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan nine months after he first articulated his administration's interests there.
Obama is taking into consideration the potential length of an additional American commitment, the effectiveness of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the preparedness of Afghanistan's security forces, according to officials familiar with the review. He is also considering the uncertain support of neighboring Pakistan, and his own conclusions about what is realistically achievable against a rising indigenous insurgency.
A senior administration official involved in the review, who like others spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the internal deliberations, said "the troop level is only a way of measuring each of these equities against each other."
"Do we have any assurances of what Pakistan will do?" asked the official, who is identified with the group of Obama advisers skeptical of the merits of a large additional troop deployment. "At least in Iraq, you had some functioning government there at the time of the surge. In Afghanistan, there is no government there."
Obama and his senior advisers are also considering the cost of an additional years-long troop deployment, which would require an expensive new base construction program in Afghanistan to accommodate extra personnel.
Administration officials say it costs approximately $1 billion a year to support 1,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, a country whose gross domestic product is roughly $900 million. The recently passed defense-spending bill already includes $120 billion for U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the coming fiscal year, but any additional resources would have to be approved by Democratic congressional leaders who generally favor few, if any, additional combat troops.
"Everybody's sensitive to costs, for obvious reasons, because we don't have unlimited resources," said a second senior administration official briefed frequently on the internal deliberations. "But the idea is to get the strategy right, determine what's achievable, then select the resources needed. That will drive the cost decisions."
Obama asked for the troop options last month in a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs told reporters Tuesday that he would receive four proposals.
But officials said it is unclear whether Pentagon planners will include an option that calls for an additional deployment of 10,000 to 15,000 troops, the lowest number originally under consideration. The proposal holds little merit for military planners because, after building bases to accommodate 10,000 or so additional soldiers and Marines, the marginal cost of adding troops beyond that figure would rise only slightly.
The most ambitious option Obama is set to receive Wednesday calls for 40,000 additional U.S. troops and mirrors the counterinsurgency strategy outlined by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, commander of U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan, in his stark assessment of the war filed at the end of August.
Military planners put the additional annual cost of McChrystal's recommendation at $33 billion, although White House officials say the number is probably closer to $50 billion.
McChrystal called for significantly more U.S. troops to protect Afghan civilians in the country's 10 to 12 largest urban areas, and to take the fight to the Taliban quickly to turn back recent insurgency gains within the next 18 months. Under the best of circumstances, military planners and White House officials say, a deployment of that size would not be completed until 2011.
Although that plan was originally favored by senior military officials, a second option now appears to have Gates's backing and is said to be the Pentagon's preferred choice, according to military planners.
The strategy, referred to by military planners as the "Gates Option," would deploy an additional 30,000 to 35,000 U.S. troops to carry out McChrystal's strategy. It would also rely on the administration's NATO allies to make up the 5,000- to 10,000-troop difference between the U.S. deployment and McChrystal's requested force size.
Of the roughly 100,000 international forces in Afghanistan, 68,000 are American. Obama dispatched 21,000 additional troops in March, a deployment that is just now arriving in full.
Last month, NATO defense ministers endorsed McChrystal's strategy during a meeting in Slovakia, although they did not pledge any additional forces. The war, like the conflict in Iraq, is seen by much of the European public as an unpopular U.S. project.
According to Pentagon and White House officials, Gates will appeal for more troops from the governments of Britain and Canada, in particular. Canada's parliament has ordered the country's 2,800 soldiers in Afghanistan out by the end of 2011.
The Dutch government is also scheduled to pull its more than 2,000 troops from Afghanistan next year. White House officials point out that, if Canada and the Netherlands carry out the scheduled withdrawals, one additional U.S. combat brigade sent to Afghanistan would simply be replacing the allies' departing forces, resulting in no net gain on the ground.
Obama has reached out to European allies since taking office, emphasizing the alliances neglected for years by the Bush administration. European leaders have praised the diplomacy, and Gates believes it is time for them to show their support with tangible commitments.
But advisers say that Obama, while supportive of Gates's appeal in theory, is skeptical he can succeed given the depth of European opposition to the war. Military planners estimate that the Gates option would cost $27 billion a year.
The third option, known by military planners as "the hybrid," would send 20,000 additional U.S. troops to shore up security in the major population areas.
In the rest of the country, the military would adopt a counterterrorism strategy targeting al-Qaeda operatives, using Predator drones and other tactics that leave a light U.S. footprint on the ground. The military puts the annual cost at $22 billion.
Although McChrystal identifies between 10 to 12 population areas that need U.S. protection, White House officials say the number could be lower.
Obama asked for a province-by-province analysis of the country to determine where local leaders could be counted on to ensure security, information he is using in part to determine how long U.S. forces might have to remain in the country and at what level.
One senior administration official noted that roughly 68 percent of the Afghan population lives in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, adding that "all of them have some need of protection."
"What do you have to protect to ensure that the Afghan government stays in power?" asked one senior administration official. "You need a level of control over the population that legitimately represents Afghanistan. Whether that's three or five or 10 cities is still part of the debate."