Apr 17, 2012

Angelina Jolie appointed as Special Envoy of High Commissioner Guterres

Angelina Jolie appointed as Special Envoy of High Commissioner Guterres

Briefing Notes, 17 April 2012
This is a summary of what was said by UNHCR spokesperson Adrian Edwards  to whom quoted text may be attributed  at the press briefing, on 17 April 2012, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.
UNHCR is pleased to announce today that Angelina Jolie will take on a new and expanded role for the UN refugee agency as Special Envoy of High Commissioner António Guterres.
During a decade of service as UNHCR's Goodwill Ambassador, Ms. Jolie has conducted more than 40 field visits around the world, becoming an expert on the phenomenon of forced displacement and a tireless advocate on their behalf.
In her new role, she is expected to focus on large-scale crises resulting in the mass displacement of people, to undertake advocacy and represent UNHCR and Mr. Guterres at the diplomatic level, engaging with relevant interlocutors on global displacement issues. Ms. Jolie will focus on complex emergencies and will work to facilitate lasting solutions for people displaced by conflict.
High Commissioner Guterres is grateful to Ms. Jolie for accepting this role at a critical time in global displacement. Her new status as Special Envoy is effective immediately.
For further information on this topic, please contact:
  • In Geneva: Melissa Fleming on mobile +41 79 557 91 22
  • In Geneva: Adrian Edwards on mobile +41 79 557 91 20

LAOS: Communal land titles could save more than forests


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LAOS: Communal land titles could save more than forests

A villager cuts bamboo from the local forest
VIENTIANE, 16 April 2012 (IRIN) - With pressure on natural resources increasing in Laos, the first community land titles granted to five villages in Vientiane Province could provide a national model for environmental protection while safeguarding the livelihoods of villagers. 

“It’s very important because the communal land titles can give communities the right to access and harvest natural resources, and overcome land concessions to companies,” Souvanpheng Phommasane, an advisor for SNV Netherlands Development Organization told IRIN. 

The title deeds cover an area of 2,189 hectares of bamboo-producing forest. After a two-year process the land was finally handed over to the five villages in Sangthong District, 50km west of the capital, Vientiane, in February. 

Hanna Saarinen, coordinator for the Land Issues Working Group, which represents 40 concerned civil society organizations, says the issue of land ownership is becoming more urgent. 

“In the last five to 10 years there have been more and more competing interests [seeking control] over natural resources,” she said. Private sector companies as well as communities “have been using the same land, the same forest for years”. 

The government’s 2011-2015 development plan sets a target of at least 8 percent annual economic growth, driven primarily by extractive industries, such as mining, hydropower and plantation agriculture. All these activities require significant land allocation, while slash-and-burn agriculture and logging further diminish forested areas. 

Trees once spread across 70 percent of Laos, but in 2010 the Department of Forestry estimated that this has now been reduced to just 40 percent. The decline in forest cover not only has wide environmental impacts but also affects rural incomes. 

Per capita income stands at just over US$1,000 per year, the World Bank reports, and 75 percent of the country’s workforce earns a livelihood from agriculture. 

Government statistics note that non-timber forest products, such as bamboo, contribute about 40 percent of rural income. 

A bamboo trade association in Sangthong District, set up in 2007, designs and produces furniture and handicrafts made from local bamboo. The district administration states that households involved in the project can earn an additional 2 million Lao Kip ($250) a month - a significant amount for villagers living in one of the 46 districts designated by the government as the poorest in the country. 


Photo: Contributor/IRIN
Villagers practice slash and burn agriculture in northern Laos
Salongsay Mixay, the head of Na Po village, says the local forests were under threat before the land titles were granted. 

“There were different cases. A big truck comes from somewhere - no one knows where, maybe the city - and they cut [bamboo] and went away. The second case is the investor who talks to the villagers and says, ‘I want to cut this much [bamboo],’ and pays a little amount of money, and leaves.” 

Replicating the land-grant model across this Southeast Asian nation may not be straightforward. “In Sangthong it was a specific case because they had this bamboo project - they were already managing the bamboo areas, they had a forest management plan - but there are no clear guidelines or manuals, so the districts do not know how to do it in practice,” said Saarinen. 

Support from a number of development organizations, with funding through the Global Environment Facility Small Grants Programme, and implementation by the United Nations Development Programme, helped the Sangthong District administration to tackle the procedures needed to apply for and eventually be granted the title deeds to the land. 

Phommasane from SNV Netherlands believes that if other districts receive similar support they could also get communal land titles. The government is carrying out a land policy review that is expected to formalize the procedures for granting communal land titles. 

Giving ownership of more of the land to the villagers who earn their living from it could be critical to the government’s stated ambition of restoring forest cover to 65 percent of the country by 2015. 

Khamoon Tiengthila, the Sangthong District deputy governor, says he is proud of what his district has achieved. “It’s a small project that contributes to preserving the world’s environment. The forest is important for development and the economy.” 

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Conflict Risk Alert: Bahrain

Conflict Risk Alert: Bahrain

Brussels   |   16 Apr 2012

Beneath a façade of normalisation, Bahrain is sliding toward another dangerous eruption of violence. The government acts as if partial implementation of recommendations from the November 2011 Independent Commission of Inquiry (the Bassiouni Report) will suffice to restore tranquillity, but there is every reason to believe it is wrong. Political talks – without which the crisis cannot be resolved – have ground to a halt, and sectarian tensions are mounting. A genuine dialogue between the regime and the opposition and a decision to fully carry out the Bassiouni Report – not half-hearted measures and not a policy of denial – are needed to halt this deterioration.
Clashes between young protesters and security forces occur nightly, marked by the former’s use of Molotov cocktails and the latter’s resort to tear gas. Several have died, in most cases reportedly due to tear gas inhalation. The 9 April explosion of a handmade bomb in al-Akar, a Shiite village in the east of the Kingdom, which injured seven policemen, crossed a significant threshold and could be followed by worse. Already, even before authorities could investigate, pro-government Sunni vigilante groups retaliated, vandalising two cars and a supermarket owned by a Shiite firm accused of supporting the February 2011 protests.
Amid these and other violent events – including the death of a young protester apparently shot from a civilian car – there are two potential time bombs. The first concerns Bahrain’s scheduled hosting of a Formula 1 race on 22 April. On 8 April, the Coalition of the Youth of the February 14 Revolution, an umbrella for an array of opposition groups that commands the loyalty of Shiite neighbourhoods, warned that it would consider participants, sponsors and spectators as regime allies and declared that it would not accept blame for “any violent reaction” during the event. The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights has pledged to use the expected presence of foreign tourists and journalists to highlight human rights violations; the government’s 15 April arrest of human rights activists shows that it will try hard to prevent this.
Despite internal disagreements over the wisdom of proceeding with the Grand Prix, and amid repeated opposition calls to cancel, the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile, the Formula 1 governing body, gave its definitive go-ahead on 13 April. The regime is trying to make the competition a symbol of national unity and is banking on it symbolising a return to stability. Instead it is underscoring deep divides and risks further inflaming the situation.
The second time bomb relates to the fate of Abdulhadi Alkhawaja, a well-known human rights activist. Charged with attempting to overthrow the regime due to his participation in last year’s demonstrations, he has been on a hunger strike since 8 February to protest his conviction and obtain his release. Despite a groundswell of support for his cause in Bahrain and around the world, the regime has not relented. His death likely would spark a serious intensification in anti-regime activism.
The only path out of the current crisis is a return to dialogue and negotiations over real political reforms, much as the Bassiouni Report suggested. The regime has shown little enthusiasm for talks – not least because its Sunni supporters oppose them, fearing that any accommodation of the opposition’s proposals could jeopardise their privileged status. Both of them insist that violence must end before dialogue can begin. The opposition argues in turn that the regime is unserious about resuming talks, let alone reforms; that it torpedoed secret negotiations held in February by leaking them to the public; and that it failed to follow up on demands put forward by the opposition a month later at the government’s request.
To break this stalemate and move forward, the government should fully implement the Bassiouni Report’s recommendations, releasing all political prisoners (including Alkhawaja) and holding senior officials accountable for excessive force and torture. It also must begin reforming the security forces, ensuring they fully reflect Bahrain’s make-up by integrating members of all communities. For its part, the opposition should abjure violence more explicitly than in the past and declare its readiness to participate in a dialogue on reform without preconditions.
The alternative is a serious escalation in violence and the empowerment of hardliners on both sides. It is quite clear where such a process would begin. It is far less clear where it might end.

Thaksin Rally Raises Interference Questions

Thaksin Rally Raises Interference Questions

2012-04-16
Analysts say Cambodia’s backing of the former Thai PM’s supporters sends mixed messages.
AFP
Thaksin Shinawatra sprays water towards supporters in front of Angkor Wat temple in Siem Reap, April 15, 2012.
Cambodia’s hosting of a mass rally at the weekend for ousted Thai premier Thaksin Shinawatra may result in warmer ties between governments of the two countries but has also raised questions of Phnom Penh’s interference in the internal politics of a neighboring country, experts say.

The fugitive Thaksin on Saturday addressed thousands of his "Red Shirt" supporters, who streamed across the border from Thailand to Cambodia’s northwestern Siem Reap province in the first major rally he has attended since being toppled from power in a military coup in 2006.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen welcomed Thaksin’s supporters into the country, ordering immigration officials to provide “special treatment” to the visitors and waiving their fees for entry to the ancient Angkor Wat temple complex near Siem Reap.

Independent analyst Sok Touch said Hun Sen’s move could mend ties with Thailand following several military skirmishes near a shared border area last year.

“The Cambodian government’s decision … is a message to the Democrat Party and Opposition Party in Thailand that the Cambodian government is taking a balanced political stance or has a political strategy towards solving border conflicts between the two countries.”

The two countries traded heavy arms fire over a disputed border in early 2011 under the previous Thai government, but ties have warmed significantly since Thaksin’s sister Yingluck came to power later that year after her party ousted the then Democrat Party-led government.

Chheang Vannarith, executive director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, said the arrival of Thaksin and the Red Shirts in Cambodia demonstrated better relations between the two countries and their people.

“Not only Cambodia, but other countries, such as Laos, Burma and Malaysia—all of these four countries surrounding Thailand have opened their doors to welcome him,” he said.

“When he was in power, Thaksin had shown good cooperation with Thailand’s neighboring countries.”

The 62-year-old Thaksin was toppled by royalist military generals in 2006 and lives in Dubai to avoid a two-year prison sentence for corruption that he contends is politically motivated.

By hosting and lending support to the weekend rallies, Cambodia was interfering in Thailand’s internal affairs, another Cambodian analyst, Lao Mong Hay, said.

“It is unwise for the government to only maintain relations with the Red Shirt group or the ‘Pheu Thai’ Party. To do so [could damage relations] with the Democratic Party of the former Thai prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, and also the Thai King. Both are unhappy with Thaksin.”

Thaksin received a similar welcome from Lao authorities. He has now visited four of Thailand’s neighbors, including Burma and Malaysia, since the beginning of the year.

Thaksin told his supporters over the weekend that he hopes to return on his own terms to Thailand in 2012, which he called an “auspicious year” for Thailand—currently celebrating Songkran, or Thai New Year. Thaksin’s sister refused to comment on his plan to return to the country at a press briefing in Bangkok Monday.

cambodia-laos-map-400.jpg

Controversy

Thaksin is Thailand’s most controversial politician. After fleeing Thailand, he lent his support to the Red Shirt movement to counter the Yellow Shirt Royalist group whose street demonstrations led to his ouster in 2006.

He then backed Red Shirt rioting in 2009 against the anti-Thaksin government led by the Democrat Party and encouraged street demonstrations in Bangkok which led to the worst political violence in decades, with 91 people killed over two months.

Thaksin has been accused of mixing business with politics and of an intolerance of criticism, but many Thais believe the first-ever politician to serve a full term as prime minister was removed from office because he posed a threat to Thailand’s powerful military and royalist power base.

Yingluck’s government is in the process of removing obstacles to Thaksin’s return, including the proposal of changes to a military-backed post-coup constitution which weakened Thailand’s political parties and legislation that would grant an amnesty to participants in the last six years of political turmoil.

Thaksin’s opponents fear that he would run for office upon his return to Thailand and seek revenge against his political enemies. Analysts say they are likely working to forge an agreement granting the army and monarch protection in exchange for the lifting of charges against him.

But many say that with his growing support in Thailand, time may be running out for the royalists.

Reported by RFA’s Khmer service. Translated by Yanny Hin. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

Bloggers Face Further Imprisonment

Bloggers Face Further Imprisonment

2012-04-16
Outspoken writer Nguyen Van Hai and two others face charges for speaking out against the Vietnamese government.
RFA
Nguyen Van Hai (pen name Dieu Cay) in an undated photo taken before his 2008 detention.
Three bloggers in Vietnam are facing charges of conducting propaganda against the one-party communist state, official media said over the weekend, amid indications they will be thrown in jail again.

Nguyen Van Hai, Phan Thanh Hai, and Ta Phong Tan will be prosecuted for material they posted between Sept. 2007 and Oct. 2010 on the "Free Journalists Club" website they co-founded.

The articles, which covered politically sensitive topics including workers’ strikes, dissident trials, and anti-China protests, had "distorted and denigrated the party and state," the Thanh Niennewspaper reported Sunday.

The three will be charged under Article 88 of the penal code and could face up to 20 years in prison. 

They are currently in custody, having suffered harassment by authorities since they founded the group. Founding manager Nguyen Van Hai has been held since April 2008.
   
Nguyen Van Hai’s lawyer, Nguyen Quoc Dat, said he was not optimistic about battling the charges.

“I intend to argue for an acquittal for [him], but the chances are slim,” Dat said Monday.

“Regardless, I will do my best to the utmost of my ability and with my whole sense of responsibility. I will raise an argument with all circumstances to reject the prosecution’s accusation, but in reality I cannot tell what the result of the verdict will be,” he said.

“So based on my experience I can only say that the chances for an acquittal are low.” 

The case has been transferred to the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Court, state media reported Saturday, signaling a court session was imminent. But no date has been set, Dat said.

“I went to the court this morning along with Dzung, [Van Hai’s] son. The court secretary said the session is occurring in the coming days but there’s no exact time or day. He said he would inform the family and lawyer in advance for our preparation when there is an exact date and time.” 
Fresh charges
Nguyen Van Hai, known by his pen name Dieu Cay, was detained following his participation in anti-China protests ahead of the Beijing Olympics and later prosecuted on allegedly trumped-up tax evasion charges.

He was sentenced to 30 months in prison and scheduled for release in Oct. 2010.

But on the day of his scheduled release, Nguyen Van Hai’s family woke up to a pre-dawn police raid on their home. Police beat his wife and told neighbors he was facing new charges. 

Nguyen Van Hai had been held incommunicado until he met with lawyers recently, rights groups said.

 “[He] has been detained incommunicado for the past 17 months in gross violation of domestic and international law, and he should never have been arrested in the first place. A trial under these conditions would be nothing other than a parody of justice,” Vo Van Ai, president of the Paris-based Vietnam Committee on Human Rights, said in a statement Monday.

“Vietnam must respect its international commitments and call off this mockery of justice before it is too late,” he said. 
Two others
The Thanh Nien newspaper said Nguyen Van Hai is also accused of attending a training course in Thailand aimed at overthrowing the Vietnamese government, along with Phan Thanh Hai.

Phan Thanh Hai, 43, blogged under the pen name Anh Ba Saigon about issues including territorial disputes with China, environmentally sensitive bauxite projects, a corruption scandal surrounding the state-owned shipbuilder Vinashin, and state harassment of dissidents.

He was arrested in October 2010.

The third blogger in the case, Ta Phong Tan, 44, a former policewoman and member of Vietnam’s ruling communist party before she became a freelance journalist, blogged about abuses in Vietnam’s legal system.

Authorities detained her in September 2011.   
Calls for release
The Vietnam Committee on Human Rights called on Vietnamese authorities to release the bloggers, saying they are being detained “for the legitimate expression of their peaceful opinions.”

The U.S.-based Human Rights Watch, which had given awards to each of the three bloggers, also called for their immediate release in a statement Monday.

“Locking up bloggers does nothing to suppress or solve the controversies they reported. The authorities have not just violated the rights of these authors, but of their readers as well,” Phil Robertson, Human Rights Watch’s deputy director for Asia said.

Human Rights Watch has accused Vietnam of mounting a sophisticated and sustained attack on online dissent that includes detaining and intimidating anti-government bloggers.

France-based Reporters Without Borders, which lists Vietnam as an “Enemy of the Internet,” says at least three journalists and 17 bloggers are currently in jail in the one-party state.

In Vietnam, blog platform hosts are required to regularly provide the government with information about the activities of their clients, and news outlets are overseen by communist party censors who hold weekly meetings with senior editors to criticize transgressions and guide coverage.

Earlier this month, Vietnam’s information ministry released new draft regulations that, if adopted, will require users to use their real names when posting online and will hold bloggers personally liable for all the published content on their blogs.
Reported by Chan Nhu for RFA's Vietnamese service. Translated by Viet Long. Written in English by Rachel Vandenbrink.

Apr 16, 2012

Swing states: Obama still has electoral advantages despite a much-changed map

Swing states: Obama still has electoral advantages despite a much-changed map:


By Published: April 15

This year will not be like 2008, at least as far as the electoral map is concerned.
Four years ago, Sen. Barack Obama (Ill.) swept to an eye-popping 365-electoral-vote victory — and a nearly 10 million popular-vote edge — with wins in places where a Democrat hadn’t won a presidential race in decades, such as Indiana, North Carolina and Virginia.
Today, the expanded map of 2008 has shrunk somewhat, with states including Indiana and Missouri almost certain to go Republican and longtime Democratic strongholds such as Michigan and Wisconsin looking more tenuous than in the recent past because of the continuing struggles of the manufacturing economy.
That means the 2012 map is more likely to resemble the 2004 map. That year, President George W. Bush eked out a 286-electoral-vote win over Sen. John F. Kerry (Mass.).
And yet, according to a detailed Fix analysis of the electoral playing field, President Obama retains major advantages over former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney, the likely GOP nominee, when it comes to winning the 270 votes he needs for a second term. Not only does Obama have more paths to 270 than Romney, but he has considerable leeway — judging from his 2008 performance — in many of the purest swing states.
Let’s start with the states that are genuinely a tossup. Our analysis suggests that nine of them fit well in that swing category: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia and Wisconsin.
Republicans would argue for the inclusion of three more — Michigan, Pennsylvania and New Mexico — but of those, only New Mexico has voted for the GOP nominee in any of the past five presidential elections (Bush in 2004).
Democrats would argue that Arizona, Indiana and Missouri should be included in the swing category. But neither Arizona nor Missouri has voted for a Democrat for president in any of the past three elections, and Obama’s 0.9-percentage-point margin in Indiana seems like a major outlier in a state that backed Bush with 60 percent in 2004 and 57 percent in 2000.
That leaves us with nine states that truly qualify as swing — meaning it’s nearly certain that both candidates and the national party committees will spend heavily to win them.
A detailed look at those nine states reveals Obama’s strength when it comes to the electoral map.
First, he carried every one of our nine swing states in 2008. Second — and even more surprising — his average (yes, average) margin of victory across those nine states was nearly 7.6 points. Remove North Carolina, where Obama won by just four-tenths of a percentage point, from the equation and his average winning margin stands at a whopping 8.5 points. (Perhaps the most amazing state margin for Obama was in Wisconsin, which he captured by 14 points just four years after Kerry won it by four-tenths of a point.)
That means Obama’s path to a second term goes through states he has already won once — and by considerable margins in most cases. Although no one — not even people within the Obama campaign — expect him to carry Virginia by seven points or Colorado by nine points, the fact that he averaged a 7.5-point win across these nine states four years ago is nothing to sneeze at.
Republicans will, rightly, point to history in these nine states — a view that suggests at least the possibility that Obama’s 2008 victory was anomalous. Before his wins in 2008, Colorado, Florida, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio and Virginia had all voted for the Republican presidential nominee in the previous two elections.
If all six of those states revert to their 2000/2004 form, Republicans carry Indiana (as seems likely) and Obama wins no other state that he lost in 2008 (as seems likely), the incumbent would drop to 258 electoral votes and lose the presidency. But if Obama wins any one among Florida, North Carolina, Ohio or Virginia, he will be reelected.
If Romney can turn Wisconsin — and its 10 electoral votes — or Michigan (16) or Pennsylvania (20) to his side while also winning the vast majority of the six swing states mentioned above, he will have a bit more wiggle room for a national victory.
There’s no doubt that the 2012 playing field will be narrower than the one Obama dominated in 2008. But the president still retains far more flexibility than Romney in building a map that adds up to 270 electoral votes.

New Arab order: In Morocco, uproar over marriage law tests Islamist government

New Arab order: In Morocco, uproar over marriage law tests Islamist government:

Amina el-Filali, a moon-faced Moroccan peasant girl, seemed destined for an obscure life in this dreary little farming village 50 miles south of Tangiers.
But that was before she was lured into sexual relations at age 15 by a 23-year-old unemployed laborer who took her into a shed next to the eucalyptus grove behind her house. That was before she was ushered into an early wedding, with the man who took her virginity, by a traditional Muslim family eager to salvage its honor. And that was before she swallowed rat poison to commit suicide rather than endure what she told her mother was an unbearable marriage.





Since Amina took her life shortly before lunch March 10, she has become a national cause, an icon for women’s groups, human rights organizations, progressive politicians and millions of ­Western-oriented Moroccans who have demanded changing a law that permits marriage at such a young age.
The law under attack is based on Islamic jurisprudence and tradition. As a result, the demands for change present a particularly unwelcome challenge to Morocco’s new Islamist government, which was elected in November on a promise to make Morocco more Islamic — not less.
The quandary faced by Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane and his Justice and Development Party, Morocco’s main Islamist group, has high stakes for Morocco, which depends heavily on European tourism and thus on its reputation abroad.
But it is emblematic of tensions emerging in places such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, where Islamic groups rising to positions of power in the aftermath of the Arab Spring are beginning to confront pressures pitting principles imported from the West against their Islamic traditions.
“Little girls raped in their village — it happens all the time,” said Khadija Ryadi, head of the Moroccan Human Rights Association in Rabat, the capital, about 100 miles south of here. “But it was important this time, because everyone is waiting to see what the reaction of an Islamic government will be.”
The demands for change have arisen only eight years after a landmark modernization of the country’s family code, spearheaded by King Mohammed VI. That effort was widely hailed — by the United States, the United Nations, European governments and human rights groups — as a triumph for the then-newly crowned king and an example for the rest of the Arab world.
The family code, or mudawana, set 18 as the legal age for marriage for both sexes. But it also provided for exceptions to be decided by judges on the basis of special legal and social circumstances. In practice, the provision robbed the age limit of much of its meaning; the Justice Ministry estimates the number of such exceptions at about 35,000 a year.
Now the uproar set off by Amina’s case has led to an effervescent Internet reaction in Morocco, with loose allegations of rape and demands for immediate change, including a Facebook site named “We are all Amina” and a deluge of tweets repeating the slogan.
Anti-rape demonstrations have been staged in the largest cities, attended mainly by women. The U.N. office in Morocco declared that marriage laws should be modernized, and the left-wing Socialist Union of Popular Forces party has petitioned for a parliamentary investigation mandated to recommend amendments.
The parents’ account
Amina grew up in a cinder-block home, one of a few dozen scattered around the dirt lanes of Karmida. Her father, Lahsin el-Filali, 48, a farmhand who makes about $6 a day, took a second wife when Amina was 10. The family remained united, and she was close to her mother, Zohra, 44. Although she was behind several grades, Amina attended a local school and, according to her mother, dreamed of becoming an engineer.
Amina went to the shed by the eucalyptus grove only because the laborer, a neighbor named Mustapha el-Hallaq, forced her to, the mother said. “She was never his girlfriend,” she said. “If she went with him, it was because he would accost her on the way home from school. He would take her to the grove, and that’s where it happened.”
The parents discussed their daughter’s relationship with Hallaq in a lengthy interview at the family’s home, over heavily sugared mint tea, fried eggs and several loaves of bread.
Amina’s father described Hallaq as a local tough and said he had complained to the police about Hallaq’s advances toward Amina. When she revealed the sexual relations, he and Amina’s mother said, she told them that Hallaq had forced himself on her. “Rape” was the word they used.
Nevertheless, the parents met with Hallaq’s parents, and together they de­cided to go to a judge and ask for authorization for the young couple to marry, what Zohra described as a “compromise” between the families. Both sets of parents knew that in Moroccan tradition, particularly in the countryside, a later marriage to another man would have been impossible once it became known Amina was no longer a virgin. In addition, Hallaq was to pay a bride’s price of $625. According to Moroccan tradition, the amount was specified in the marriage contract. But Amina’s father said it was never paid.
“I did not want the marriage,” said the father, sitting with his first wife across the table and his second, seven years younger than Zohra and the mother of a boisterous 5-year-old daughter, a little to his left. “But Zohra said it was necessary for the honor of our family.”
Informed of the marriage plans, Amina instinctively resisted and then resigned herself, he said. “She said at first that she didn’t love him,” he said, “but then, as the procedure with the judges went on, she said, ‘Okay, he’ll be my husband.’ ”
The couple were formally married Dec. 12, and Amina moved in with Hallaq’s family nearby. Zohra said her daughter visited frequently and soon began to express her misery, citing beatings from Hallaq and unkind treatment from his family.
“I don’t know for sure what was happening, because she was at his house and I was at my house,” the mother said. “But she used to come here and complain that he was beating her. I told her that if that was so, she should go to the police and lodge a formal complaint. But she never did. She was afraid of him.”
(Hallaq was unable to provide his version of events; his mother said he was gone from Karmida. But he told a Moroccan journalist recently that the affair began with a phone call from Amina. He said that all the sexual relations were consensual and that he agreed to the marriage out of regard for Amina. As for the suicide, he said, his bride often seemed sick after her visits home, where, he said, her father would beat her.)
Even on the day Amina went to the market to buy rat poison, the mother said, witnesses saw Hallaq beating her along the way. She bought the poison and took it home in the late morning. She began vomiting after lunch and died in the hospital that afternoon, the parents said.
On the walls of their living room, decorated in gaudy plastic, hung studio photographs of Amina’s two elder sisters, Fatiha and Hamida, both beaming in their wedding dresses. Asked why Amina’s photo was not also displayed, the mother reached into a plastic bag and pulled out an ID-style head shot showing Amina with a strict Muslim covering over her hair and forehead. Another photo in the sack showed Hallaq on the day he married Amina, decked out in new clothes with a stylish scarf around his neck and standing alone in front of an idealized seaside scene painted on the wall.
The government’s stance
The Islamist government’s justice and liberties minister, Mustafa Ramid, and its family affairs minister, Bassima Hakkaoui, declined to be interviewed about Amina’s case. Earlier, however, Hakkaoui said a change in the early-marriage provisions, contained in Article 475 of the penal code, was not on her agenda.
“Article 475 is unlikely to be abrogated from one day to the next under pressure from international public opinion,” she told Moroccan journalists. “Sometimes marriage of the raped woman to her rapist does not bring real harm.”
Hisham Mellati, Ramid’s penal-law attache, said a police investigation, citing neighbors, showed that Amina and Hallaq had been sweethearts for months, stealing off frequently to the shelter of the eucalyptus trees. Mellati, fingering through a thick file at the Justice Ministry in Rabat, said that, on the basis of the investigation and Amina’s testimony, judges concluded that the sexual relations were consensual and that Amina was a willing partner in the marriage.
Much of the agitation surrounding Amina’s case, including its description as a rape, is thus ill-founded, he said.
According to Morocco’s penal law, Mellati said, rape with the use of violence is automatically prosecuted and is punishable by prison. Even if the sexual relations between a young girl and an older man are consensual, he said, there can be a crime classified as “leading a minor astray,” which is roughly parallel to statutory rape. But the degree to which Amina was pressured into the sexual relations was unclear, he said.
In any case, if there is no violence, judges can grant permission for early marriage despite the family code, he said, provided the families petition the court and follow a procedure that takes several months. In Amina’s case, he added, there were five sessions, including one in which the judge sat alone with Amina to ensure she was not being pressured to accept the marriage. “The law was strictly followed,” Mellati said.
The Justice Ministry has for some time been studying an overhaul of the entire penal code, which dates to 1962, Mellati said. When it comes time to consider Article 475, it will be judged according to the same criteria as other laws and amended “if Moroccan society wants it,” he added. In the meantime, he said, a police investigation is looking into what pushed Amina to commit suicide. It has as yet reached no conclusion.
Although the wave of protests has been directed at the Islamist government, Morocco’s monarch, regarded as a descendant of the prophet Muhammad, has retained the right to intervene. His role as ultimate arbiter of religious values gives him the power. Moreover, the controversy is tied to the family code, which was his signature initiative.
new constitution, issued last year after demonstrations tied to the Arab Spring, was welcomed as an advance toward democracy because it committed the king to name a government from the party with the most votes. This put Islamists into the government, but the king kept defense, security and national religious affairs in his hands.
So far, in public at least, he has kept silent on Amina.











East Timor Elections 2012: Run-Off Vote Held

East Timor Elections 2012: Run-Off Vote Held:

East Timor
An East Timorese puts his finger into ink after voting at a polling center in Dili on April 16, 2012. East Timor went to the polls to elect a new president in a run-off vote, as the young democracy prepares to celebrate its first decade of independence and bid goodbye to UN forces. (SONNY TUMBELAKA/AFP/Getty Images)
DILI, East Timor — Two former guerrilla leaders vied for East Timor's presidency Monday, each hoping to help steer the region's newest and poorest nation after U.N. peacekeeping troops begin their planned withdrawal later this year.
Taur Matan Ruak appeared headed for an easy victory over Francisco "Lu Olo" Guterres in the run-off vote, according to an early quick count.
Incumbent Jose Ramos-Horta, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, bowed out last month following a poor showing in the first round.
East Timor, a half island nation of 1.1 million people, voted overwhelmingly in 1999 to end 24 years of brutal Indonesia occupation that had left more than 170,000 dead.
When withdrawing soldiers and proxy militias went on a rampage, killing another 1,500 people and destroying much of the infrastructure, the international community jumped in to help, deploying U.N. peacekeepers and pouring in billions of dollars.
But the road to democracy has been anything but easy, with gang violence and splits in the army and police turning deadly several times and, six years ago, leading to the collapse of the government.
While the role of president is largely ceremonial, the winner has the ability, like Ramos-Horta did, to act as a moral compass.
He will do so at a crucial time.
If parliamentary elections that follow on July 7 are peaceful, discussions will begin about the withdrawal of 400 international peacekeepers still deployed in the country, Australian Defense Minister Stephen Smith said recently.
They could start heading home before the end of the year.
Voting was largely peaceful Monday, with only a few reported incidents, a big improvement from the last polls.
"That in itself is good news and has to be regarded as a consolidation of the democratic process," said Damien Kingsbury, an Australian academic familiar with East Timor politics.
The United States congratulated East Timor for the successful conduct of a "peaceful and orderly" election.
"So far the information available to us suggests that the election was free and fair," State Department spokesman Mark Toner told a news briefing in Washington.
Official results are not expected until Wednesday.
But with 75 percent of the ballots tallied in a quick count, Ruak. a former chief of the guerrilla forces, had nearly 61 percent, according to the National Election Commission.
That means his victory is all but assured.
"I'm ready to lead," said Ruak, 55, who ran as an independent but had strong backing from Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao. "But I appeal to the great people of our country to accept the result whatever it is. ... Let's show the world that we are civilized and ready to promote our own democracy with dignity."
Lu Olo, a 57-year-old former guerrilla commander representing the opposition Fretilin party, had 39 percent in the quick count.
He, too, earlier said whatever the result, he would accept it.
Justino Menezes, who was among more than 700,000 eligible voters, said he wanted most to see his country develop economically.
Many people earn less than 50 cents a day. Roads are still in disrepair. There is little access to clean water or health services. And the capital is littered with abandoned, burned-out buildings where the homeless squat.
"It's time to move forward," said Menezes, a 61-year-old farmer. "And to move forward without fear."
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Associated Press writer Matthew Pennington in Washington contributed to this report.

Timor-Leste's Language Policy: The Boulder On The Shoe ...

Timor-Leste's Language Policy: The Boulder On The Shoe ...: Written by: RSIS April 14, 2012 -  


Timor-Leste has chosen Portuguese as its official language of government, though Tetum remains the other official language. This language policy, a return to its colonial heritage, has future implications for the state’s development and geopolitical relations in the region.

By Victor R Savage

THE CURRENT presidential election in Timor-Leste has brought international visibility to this rather marginalised state within Southeast Asia. The freedom-fighter generation of Timor-Leste has everything to be proud of in these elections. This is one country which testifies that an irredentist movement that fought for independence could eventually create statehood in the 21st century. It also underscores a moment in Indonesian history when the domestic fervour for reformasi was best symbolised not just in political change in Indonesia but in the granting of independence for East Timor as it was then known.

Challenges Making Portuguese The Official Language


The simmering issue on the ground in Timor-Leste however has less to do with the presidential election. The likely source of future political debate lies in its language policy. The Timor-Leste government has chosen to use Portuguese as its official language of government since 2002 despite the fact that less than five percent of the population spoke the language. According to official sources the government chose Portuguese to safeguard their unique culture and identity, maintain their connections with the former colonial master, Portugal, as well as their privileged ties and friendships with other Portuguese-speaking nations. While the country’s leaders had privately defended keeping the Portuguese language as a matter of heritage, they have also recognised the importance of learning English in schools to survive in a competitive world and to popularise Bahasa Indonesia.

Yet on the ground one gets the feeling that Portuguese has been given priority because it is the language of communication of the political and social elites – in short it is an elitist language in Timor Leste. This language policy has its own challenges.

Firstly, Portuguese is not an international language that will connect the people of Timor-Leste with a globalising world. Besides Portugal, the only Portuguese-speaking heavyweight is Brazil which is thousands of kilometers away. The ability to connect with the rest of the world for trade, tourism and business is likely to be hampered. In Asia, Portuguese is no longer a language of political power that it once was from Goa to Malacca and Macau in the 16th century.

Secondly, Portugal is certainly not a country of economic and political prowess either globally or in the European Union (EU) to warrant the use of its language. Indeed Portugal forms one of the five PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) countries of the EU where the governments are saddled with huge debt. Portugal cannot be expected to lend financial support and advice to the Timor-Leste government. As one Timorese researcher said to me: “Portugal is a poor country, Timor-Leste is poor, and the relationship will make Timor-Leste poorer.” When there are so many more economically developed states in Asia, why does the Timor-Leste government need to reconnect with its former colonial master?

Thirdly, the current language situation in Timor Leste is highly diversified – the people are exposed to essentially four main languages and many more dialects: Tetum, the native language, Bahasa Indonesia which is widely spoken, English and finally Portuguese – a language retained by the older generation Portuguese Eurasians in Timor Leste. One can understand the logic that after having won a bloody war of independence with Indonesia, the government wanted to distance itself from Indonesia. Yet, the reality on the ground begs for a more pragmatic political consideration:

Bahasa Indonesia is already the unofficial lingua franca in the country; Timor-Leste cannot separate itself from its geographical links and geopolitical realities of Indonesia. Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia – accounting for 40 percent of the region’s land area, population and GNP. Many Timor-Leste government officials and educational personnel have graduated from Indonesian universities and technical institutes and estimates show about 5000 students are currently enrolled in Indonesian institutions. Indonesia is also currently a rising economy which Timor-Leste cannot afford to ignore and yet could tap into.

Why Not English As The Top Official Language?

If the Timor-Leste government did not want to use Indonesian as its official language, it certainly could have considered English as the official language of priority. This neutral language would be amenable to all citizens and offer far more advantages than Portuguese: i) English is a language of international politics, trade, tourism, and higher education; ii) it is quite widely spoken in the country amongst the informed public and even youths; iii) many students expressed keen interest in learning English rather than Portuguese which they find of no cultural or economic relevance; and iv) if Timor-Leste is interested in joining ASEAN, does it not make more sense to give priority to English which is the operating language of the region? Given that Australia, New Zealand, India, Singapore and the Philippines are all English-speaking neighbouring countries, the use of English will certainly give the government economic and political leverage.

It is noteworthy that a private university in Dili, as a protest against the government’s language policy, decided to conduct its classes in Tetum, Bahasa Indonesia and English – leaving out Portuguese.

One might say the Timor-Leste government is caught between the devil and the deep blue sea in pursuing the Portuguese language: its biggest English-speaking neighbour Australia has been unfriendly and certainly opportunistic with regard to off-shore oil and gas reserves and its Indonesian neighbour is viewed with apprehension and veiled distrust. Yet language forms the foundation and bedrock of a country – language cannot be changed overnight once set in place.

For a fledgling country with limited resources and a low level of development, Timor Leste needs to consider pragmatic, long term and viable educational programmes. The government’s belief that the people of Timor Leste can pursue a multiple-language educational programme (Tetum, Portuguese, English, Bahasa Indonesia) seems flawed since there are few examples of successful bi-lingual much less multi-lingual national programmes regionally or globally. While pre-independence East Timor might have been for Indonesia’s former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas the “pebble in the shoe”, the Portuguese language might be a veritable boulder on the shoe for independent Timor-Leste’s future progress and development.

Victor R Savage is an Associate Professor in Geography at the National University of Singapore and Honorary Vice-President of the Commonwealth Geographical Bureau. This article, specially written for RSIS Commentaries, reflects his personal views.


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