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Jun 21, 2012
WBO says Pacquiao won over Bradley–report
WBO says Pacquiao won over Bradley–report: World boxing icon Manny Pacquiao won over Timothy Bradley in .....
Baseless rumor over Thailand's U-Tapao
Baseless rumor over Thailand's U-Tapao: A United States request to expand its use of Thailand's civil-military U-Tapao air base for humanitarian and climate-research missions has led to speculation over a political deal that would see the US "pivot" to Asia strengthened in return for self-exiled former premier Thaksin Shinawatra receiving a US visa. The conspiracy theory ignores that hundreds of tourists use the airport daily, rendering it useless for intelligence operations. - John Cole and Steve Sciacchitano (Jun 21, '12)
Eco destination: Laos
Eco destination: Laos:
Totally land locked and without the principal Southeast Asian holiday lure of white sand beach resorts, Laos is certainly a less-than-typical resort tourist destination. All the better for eco-conscious and nature oriented travelers, I say.
Though not dwarfed by its neighbors in terms of physical size, all nations with which Laos shares its borders are far more densely populated than this slow-paced country of 6.5 million.
pic: McKay Savage (Flickr CC)Covered in forestland and mountainous terrain, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), as it is officially known, is home to many of what are termed Bio-Diversity Conservation Areas. An estimated 50% of the country’s woodland is primary forest, especially rainforest. Though it is still one of the poorest nations in the region, Laos is developing its National Ecotourism Strategy and Action Plan in order to foster tourism while protecting its biodiversity and unique culture.
More can be read about the government’s vision for ecotourism here.
Before development hits, now is probably the time to take advantage of a true nature holiday in Laos. I don’t know if Laos is destined to be thronged by tourists or remain a primarily backpacker destination (there are apparently more monks than tourists at any given time), but for a laid-back cultural and nature trekking holiday there’s no better time than the present.
In general, Laos is full of opportunities for the serious nature traveler. Besides pristine forests and jungle, the Mekong River winds its way through the entire western portion of the country, affording ample adventure and sights. Not least are the spectacular limestone karsts that dot the northern portion of the river. Other natural wonders of note in Laos include the beautiful Kuangsi Waterfall and nearby fascinating Pak Ou Caves, a group of grottos along the Mekong full of wooden Buddhist figures.
If trekking through mountains and jungle, camping in the forest or participating in adventure sports like mountain biking, climbing, caving, rafting and kayaking are your thing, you might want to check out the northern province of Luang Namtha, “the province of life and nature”.
Kuangsi Waterfall, photo: Lars Olsen (Flickr CC)Some tour operators offer package holidays like Mekong River Cruises, cultural-themed holidays exploring Lao’s ancient Buddhist temples and palaces or adventure trips incorporating other neighboring countries like Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia.
Animals
A diverse array of fauna can be spotted in Laos, including gibbons, leopards, Javan mongooses, goat-antelopes, Malayan sun and Asiatic black bears, and of course elephants. Irrawaddy Dolphins can be seen swimming through southern parts of the Mekong River near Khong Island in Champassack province. Laos is also home to some 800 species of migratory and resident birds, including the rare Green Peafowl.
Ethical options
Hardcore ethical travelers who want to “give something back” might consider “voluntourism” – benefiting poor ethnic minorities in the far north of the country; or staying in a culture lodge in a traditional ethnic village and taking part in their daily activities. Read more about those options here.
If you’d like a bit of a tranquil urban break, visit Luang Prabang, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and considered one of the cleanest and most charming cities in Southeast Asia. Luang Prabang is full of Buddhist temples and traditional wooden houses as well as the occasional French colonial detail. It’s also surrounded by views of green forests and picturesque mountains.
Keep in mind
Luang Prabang, photo: brongaeh (Flickr CC)
Totally land locked and without the principal Southeast Asian holiday lure of white sand beach resorts, Laos is certainly a less-than-typical resort tourist destination. All the better for eco-conscious and nature oriented travelers, I say.
Though not dwarfed by its neighbors in terms of physical size, all nations with which Laos shares its borders are far more densely populated than this slow-paced country of 6.5 million.
pic: McKay Savage (Flickr CC)
More can be read about the government’s vision for ecotourism here.
Before development hits, now is probably the time to take advantage of a true nature holiday in Laos. I don’t know if Laos is destined to be thronged by tourists or remain a primarily backpacker destination (there are apparently more monks than tourists at any given time), but for a laid-back cultural and nature trekking holiday there’s no better time than the present.
In general, Laos is full of opportunities for the serious nature traveler. Besides pristine forests and jungle, the Mekong River winds its way through the entire western portion of the country, affording ample adventure and sights. Not least are the spectacular limestone karsts that dot the northern portion of the river. Other natural wonders of note in Laos include the beautiful Kuangsi Waterfall and nearby fascinating Pak Ou Caves, a group of grottos along the Mekong full of wooden Buddhist figures.
If trekking through mountains and jungle, camping in the forest or participating in adventure sports like mountain biking, climbing, caving, rafting and kayaking are your thing, you might want to check out the northern province of Luang Namtha, “the province of life and nature”.
Kuangsi Waterfall, photo: Lars Olsen (Flickr CC)
Animals
A diverse array of fauna can be spotted in Laos, including gibbons, leopards, Javan mongooses, goat-antelopes, Malayan sun and Asiatic black bears, and of course elephants. Irrawaddy Dolphins can be seen swimming through southern parts of the Mekong River near Khong Island in Champassack province. Laos is also home to some 800 species of migratory and resident birds, including the rare Green Peafowl.
Ethical options
Hardcore ethical travelers who want to “give something back” might consider “voluntourism” – benefiting poor ethnic minorities in the far north of the country; or staying in a culture lodge in a traditional ethnic village and taking part in their daily activities. Read more about those options here.
If you’d like a bit of a tranquil urban break, visit Luang Prabang, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and considered one of the cleanest and most charming cities in Southeast Asia. Luang Prabang is full of Buddhist temples and traditional wooden houses as well as the occasional French colonial detail. It’s also surrounded by views of green forests and picturesque mountains.
Keep in mind
- Though Laos is a communist country, it is very traditional as well as ethnically and culturally rich. There are some 49 ethnic groups and the nation is officially Buddhist.
- Sexual relations between foreigners and Lao nationals are forbidden outside of marriage. One should also respect local customs by dressing modestly in temples (cover your legs).
- Drink bottled water and bring mosquito repellent to be safe from water-borne illnesses, especially dengue and malaria.
- Make sure you find out whether you require a visa to enter Laos. ASEAN nationals, Koreans, Russians, Japanese and Swiss do not. It is also possible to get a visa on arrival at an airport or other point of entry, but it’s best to be sure depending on your circumstances.
Luang Prabang, photo: brongaeh (Flickr CC)
PNG election: Ominous signs of violence
PNG election: Ominous signs of violence:
Scott Flower is a McKenzie Fellow at the University of Melbourne. He is regularly engaged by multinational companies as a risk management consultant to major resource projects in PNG.
The two-week polling period for the Papua New Guinea national elections begins in 3 days. There are already ominous signs that the intense electoral competition is evolving into what may be the most violent and corrupt elections in the nation's 37-year post-independence history.
Since the start of the 'official' campaigning period just three weeks ago there have been 19 election-related deaths. Historically, the worst violence occurs following the polls, so if this level of pre-polling violence is any indicator, it is likely that this election will surpass the electoral lows of 2002.
Most troubling, there is increasing evidence confirming a shifting pattern of weapons use. In the past, guns were primarily for tribal fights, but now they are used to influence electoral politics, and as the first polling day approaches, the public display of weapons is increasing in an effort to intimidate and cajole voters ahead of ballots boxes arriving.
These are not homemade shot guns but serious automatic weapons. In the village of Angore in Hela province, the owner of a brand new Uzi Pro sub-machinegun (see photo) said his gun 'is for the election, not tribal fighting'. This is not an isolated example; in March 2011 when I was visiting a village close to Angore a man was shot dead with an M16 as a result of tribal fighting.
Recent observations from the field suggest that election candidates are more than ever before acquiring weapons to influence and intimidate. On 12 June Police and PNGDF forces confiscated a cache of illegal weapons from a candidate's home near Mount Hagen. The weapons included a self-loading rifle, a Sig pistol with 29 rounds of ammunition, a box containing 25 buckshot cartridges and a telescope.
Since the Lowy Institute published its policy brief on the foreign support necessary to avert violence in the upcoming elections, New Zealand and Australia have increased their assistance. From an initial offer of two aircraft as part of the Electoral Support Program, Australia and New Zealand have stepped up their support to include 250 military personnel, 13 helicopters and 2 fixed-wing aircraft, civilian technical experts to complete the electoral rolls and train polling officers, and logistics support to help organise the security and transportation of election materials and officials.
However, recent examples of corruption and violence might lead one to conclude that the foreign assistance is too little, and too late to mitigate the further erosion and potential collapse of PNG's electoral integrity and democratic processes.
Intense electoral competition is the key factor driving violence, intimidation and corruption. The 3435 candidates across the country are competing for only 109 seats in parliament. The incumbent Chimbu Governor, John Garia, is facing 72 rival candidates, the largest number of challengers in a single electorate in the country.
More candidates than ever have leveraged traditional customary debt networks to fund their electoral campaign, creating a 'win at all costs' environment. Candidates know that if they lose, their inability to repay creditors will, at best, reduce their social status to that of 'rubis man' (tok pisin for rubbish man). At worst, it will trigger customary forms of payback violence which generally escalate into a spiral of tit-for-tat violence.
Increasing levels of political violence and incidents of corruption involving police and PNG Defence Force personnel highlight the tenuous situation PNG faces through this election period. Electoral officials, police and PNGDF personnel are supposed to act in a professional and impartial capacity to ensure electoral integrity. But increasingly, they are observed engaging in local politics and being influenced by tribal links and money. The following events over last three weeks give a taste of what is yet to come:
Scott Flower is a McKenzie Fellow at the University of Melbourne. He is regularly engaged by multinational companies as a risk management consultant to major resource projects in PNG.
The two-week polling period for the Papua New Guinea national elections begins in 3 days. There are already ominous signs that the intense electoral competition is evolving into what may be the most violent and corrupt elections in the nation's 37-year post-independence history.
Since the start of the 'official' campaigning period just three weeks ago there have been 19 election-related deaths. Historically, the worst violence occurs following the polls, so if this level of pre-polling violence is any indicator, it is likely that this election will surpass the electoral lows of 2002.
These are not homemade shot guns but serious automatic weapons. In the village of Angore in Hela province, the owner of a brand new Uzi Pro sub-machinegun (see photo) said his gun 'is for the election, not tribal fighting'. This is not an isolated example; in March 2011 when I was visiting a village close to Angore a man was shot dead with an M16 as a result of tribal fighting.
Recent observations from the field suggest that election candidates are more than ever before acquiring weapons to influence and intimidate. On 12 June Police and PNGDF forces confiscated a cache of illegal weapons from a candidate's home near Mount Hagen. The weapons included a self-loading rifle, a Sig pistol with 29 rounds of ammunition, a box containing 25 buckshot cartridges and a telescope.
Since the Lowy Institute published its policy brief on the foreign support necessary to avert violence in the upcoming elections, New Zealand and Australia have increased their assistance. From an initial offer of two aircraft as part of the Electoral Support Program, Australia and New Zealand have stepped up their support to include 250 military personnel, 13 helicopters and 2 fixed-wing aircraft, civilian technical experts to complete the electoral rolls and train polling officers, and logistics support to help organise the security and transportation of election materials and officials.
However, recent examples of corruption and violence might lead one to conclude that the foreign assistance is too little, and too late to mitigate the further erosion and potential collapse of PNG's electoral integrity and democratic processes.
Intense electoral competition is the key factor driving violence, intimidation and corruption. The 3435 candidates across the country are competing for only 109 seats in parliament. The incumbent Chimbu Governor, John Garia, is facing 72 rival candidates, the largest number of challengers in a single electorate in the country.
More candidates than ever have leveraged traditional customary debt networks to fund their electoral campaign, creating a 'win at all costs' environment. Candidates know that if they lose, their inability to repay creditors will, at best, reduce their social status to that of 'rubis man' (tok pisin for rubbish man). At worst, it will trigger customary forms of payback violence which generally escalate into a spiral of tit-for-tat violence.
Increasing levels of political violence and incidents of corruption involving police and PNG Defence Force personnel highlight the tenuous situation PNG faces through this election period. Electoral officials, police and PNGDF personnel are supposed to act in a professional and impartial capacity to ensure electoral integrity. But increasingly, they are observed engaging in local politics and being influenced by tribal links and money. The following events over last three weeks give a taste of what is yet to come:
- A provincial election manager was arrested for ballot box manipulation; police confiscated alcohol, an unlicensed pistol and K200,000 (US$94,300) cash.
- A PNGDF officer has managed to ensure he and his troops are deployed to Wabag electorate, where his tribesmen are located, in order to help protect his tribe's ballot boxes.
- Police reported uncovering a conspiracy involving well funded groups using money to 'bribe security forces personnel' and purchase military, police and correctional service uniforms.
- Police officers across the highlands have smuggled weapon magazines and ammunition, and smashed unfavoured candidates' posters within their electorates; some police members supported a candidate's attack on a sitting MP.
Religious intolerance and law reform challenges in Indonesia
Religious intolerance and law reform challenges in Indonesia:
Author: Melissa Crouch, University of Melbourne
One of the biggest challenges facing the Indonesian government is how to deal with religious intolerance, as sporadic acts of inter-religious violence continue to occur despite the introduction of democracy more than 13 years ago.
This year, the government proposed a program of legislative reform and prioritised two bills that it believes will help to prevent and resolve inter-religious conflict. The first, which has recently been passed, is the Law on Resolving Social Conflict. The second, which has yet to be passed, is the Draft Law on Inter-religious Harmony.
These proposals are based on the simplistic assumption that inter-religious conflict occurs because there are no laws against it. The new legislation addresses the perceived need for greater regulation of religious affairs and the criminalisation of religious offences. Yet it fails to identify both the real political, economic and social factors behind religious intolerance and conflict.
For example, there is often a real or perceived economic disparity between a Christian congregation that intends to build a church and local Muslim residents. Opposition to the construction of churches can be diffused if a church is willing to allow local Muslim residents to work as parking attendants. Such an arrangement ensures the local community benefits from the church by way of employment.
Further, there are also the contributing issues of poor law enforcement and the complicity of law enforcement agencies in social conflicts. In the Cikeusik incident of February 2011, for example, the police were clearly informed and aware that a demonstration or attack was going to take place at the house of an Ahmadi leader in Cikeusik. The police failed to intervene and protect the 17 Ahmadis in the face of a crowd of 1,000, which led to the brutal deaths of 3 Ahmadis.
For example, the Law on Resolving Social Conflict presumes that current social and religious conflicts are caused by the police’s lack of power to break up ethnic and religious conflicts, including disputes over permits for places of worship. This new regulation thus confers wide powers on the police, allows national or regional governments to declare a 90-day state of emergency, and enables the government to call on the military for ‘assistance’.
The law is problematic because it indicates a return to authoritarian policies of military control over religious and ethnic communities, and relies on a Social Conflict Resolution Commission to resolve conflict. The Commission, which has not been established yet, will include representatives from the police, the army, religious leaders, and the parties involved in the conflict. The Commission is a cause for concern because it is described as existing ‘outside of the courts’, suggesting that its decisions cannot be reviewed and, therefore, cannot be held to account.
The second proposal, the Draft Law on Inter-religious Harmony, also fails to address the real factors and causes at the root of religious tensions. The Draft Law circulated in late 2011 attempts to regulate issues as broad as religious education, burial practices, proselytisation and religious celebrations. It also defines an array of offences that would amount to the crime of blasphemy.
The suggestion of a Draft Law on Inter-religious Harmony has been around in various forms since the 1980s. The fact that this law has not yet been passed suggests that there is no agreement on what it means to regulate religion in Indonesia, or to what extent religious affairs should be regulated. While it is generally accepted that states may regulate the activities of religious communities in the interests of social order and public harmony, there is much debate over the best way to achieve this.
While Indonesia has made a remarkable transition to democracy and made significant progress in many areas including the issue of terrorism, it has failed to make real progress in regard to inter-religious conflict. The ongoing opposition and incidents of violence against religious minorities, such as the Islamic sect Ahmadiyah or Christians, are not caused by a lack of police powers to prosecute offenders.
Rather, these disputes arise due to a complex series of factors, including a lack of basic law enforcement and indications that law enforcement agencies may be complicit in — or unwilling to — address religious conflict. As the 2014 national elections approach, the need for the government to address religious intolerance remains a pressing concern. The search for an appropriate way to regulate religion must complement rather than replace efforts to create other (non-legal) means of preventing and resolving inter-religious tensions.
Melissa Crouch is Research Fellow at the Melbourne Law School, the University of Melbourne.
Author: Melissa Crouch, University of Melbourne
One of the biggest challenges facing the Indonesian government is how to deal with religious intolerance, as sporadic acts of inter-religious violence continue to occur despite the introduction of democracy more than 13 years ago.
This year, the government proposed a program of legislative reform and prioritised two bills that it believes will help to prevent and resolve inter-religious conflict. The first, which has recently been passed, is the Law on Resolving Social Conflict. The second, which has yet to be passed, is the Draft Law on Inter-religious Harmony.
These proposals are based on the simplistic assumption that inter-religious conflict occurs because there are no laws against it. The new legislation addresses the perceived need for greater regulation of religious affairs and the criminalisation of religious offences. Yet it fails to identify both the real political, economic and social factors behind religious intolerance and conflict.
For example, there is often a real or perceived economic disparity between a Christian congregation that intends to build a church and local Muslim residents. Opposition to the construction of churches can be diffused if a church is willing to allow local Muslim residents to work as parking attendants. Such an arrangement ensures the local community benefits from the church by way of employment.
Further, there are also the contributing issues of poor law enforcement and the complicity of law enforcement agencies in social conflicts. In the Cikeusik incident of February 2011, for example, the police were clearly informed and aware that a demonstration or attack was going to take place at the house of an Ahmadi leader in Cikeusik. The police failed to intervene and protect the 17 Ahmadis in the face of a crowd of 1,000, which led to the brutal deaths of 3 Ahmadis.
For example, the Law on Resolving Social Conflict presumes that current social and religious conflicts are caused by the police’s lack of power to break up ethnic and religious conflicts, including disputes over permits for places of worship. This new regulation thus confers wide powers on the police, allows national or regional governments to declare a 90-day state of emergency, and enables the government to call on the military for ‘assistance’.
The law is problematic because it indicates a return to authoritarian policies of military control over religious and ethnic communities, and relies on a Social Conflict Resolution Commission to resolve conflict. The Commission, which has not been established yet, will include representatives from the police, the army, religious leaders, and the parties involved in the conflict. The Commission is a cause for concern because it is described as existing ‘outside of the courts’, suggesting that its decisions cannot be reviewed and, therefore, cannot be held to account.
The second proposal, the Draft Law on Inter-religious Harmony, also fails to address the real factors and causes at the root of religious tensions. The Draft Law circulated in late 2011 attempts to regulate issues as broad as religious education, burial practices, proselytisation and religious celebrations. It also defines an array of offences that would amount to the crime of blasphemy.
The suggestion of a Draft Law on Inter-religious Harmony has been around in various forms since the 1980s. The fact that this law has not yet been passed suggests that there is no agreement on what it means to regulate religion in Indonesia, or to what extent religious affairs should be regulated. While it is generally accepted that states may regulate the activities of religious communities in the interests of social order and public harmony, there is much debate over the best way to achieve this.
While Indonesia has made a remarkable transition to democracy and made significant progress in many areas including the issue of terrorism, it has failed to make real progress in regard to inter-religious conflict. The ongoing opposition and incidents of violence against religious minorities, such as the Islamic sect Ahmadiyah or Christians, are not caused by a lack of police powers to prosecute offenders.
Rather, these disputes arise due to a complex series of factors, including a lack of basic law enforcement and indications that law enforcement agencies may be complicit in — or unwilling to — address religious conflict. As the 2014 national elections approach, the need for the government to address religious intolerance remains a pressing concern. The search for an appropriate way to regulate religion must complement rather than replace efforts to create other (non-legal) means of preventing and resolving inter-religious tensions.
Melissa Crouch is Research Fellow at the Melbourne Law School, the University of Melbourne.
Jakarta Post: West Papua Updates
Jakarta Post: West Papua Updates:
Article – West Papua Media Alerts
1) Papua and problem of structural injustice 2) Top minister tries to woo Papuan leaders 3) Govt to continue welfare approach to deal with Papua problems ————————————Jakarta Post: West Papua Updates
1) Papua and problem of structural injustice
2) Top minister tries to woo Papuan leaders
3) Govt to continue welfare approach to deal with Papua problems
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http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/06/19/papua-and-problem-structural-injustice.html
1) Papua and problem of structural injustice
Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Jakarta | Opinion | Tue, 06/19/2012 9:25 AM
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The problem confronted by Papua, the easternmost province of Indonesia, is structural, rather than developmental as perceived by the current government.
The creation of the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B) was also based on an assumption that Papua suffered from developmental neglect and that its development should be accelerated to solve the problem.
Such a technocratic view was proved to be wrong as shown by the collapse of the Soeharto regime that was built on the “developmentalist” ideology.
Last week, I had a chance to visit Jayapura, Merauke and Boven Digoel, observing and talking with some experts and ordinary people about the latest developments in Papua. My visit coincided with daily mysterious shooting incidents, mostly in Jayapura. Intentionally or unintentionally, these random acts of violence looked to be perpetrated to create a specter of terror that would contribute to a climate of fear that has long characterized Papuan society.
Political relations between the center and the periphery are an old problem in this country. Following the end of Soeharto regime in 1998, the format of center-periphery relations was renewed with bigger autonomy given to regional governments. But the horror of disintegration, particularly among the military elites, was the reason for a halfhearted decentralization policy, as autonomy is given to the regency/municipality rather the provincial level of government.
Apart from this problematic decentralization, the post-Soeharto era was also marked by the Timor Leste partition in 1999, and a peace agreement in the rebellious province of Aceh in 2005. After Timor Leste and Aceh, Papua is now seen as the main problem of center-periphery relations in the republic. Armed rebels grouped under the Free Papua Organization (OPM) radically call for a separation from Indonesia.
Some argue that a healthy dialogue is urgently needed between Papuans and the central government in order to address the intractable tension and conflict in the province. Dialogue is important but I would argue that it will not be sufficient. Apart from the immediate problem of representation, a dialogue assumes the presence of two opposite but equal parties. Such an assumption is unlikely to be accepted by the Indonesian government.
As the basic issues in Papua are structural rather developmental, I would argue that a new perspective should be proposed to resolve the problem in Papua. From a structural perspective, the problem of Papua is not unique. By seeing Papua’s problems as Indonesia’s problems we look at the solution to Papua as a solution for the whole of Indonesia without any exception.
A structural perspective views the problem of the society as a result of structural injustices emanating from continuing economic and political inequalities between the center and periphery. The central government’s policies toward Papua have officially changed in the guise of special autonomy, yet the structural injustices persist.
These injustices are a problem facing not only Papuans but the majority of Indonesian citizens. Structural injustices are rooted in the wrong assumption in the Constitution that the state will unquestionably take care of the life of its citizens, but in reality we continue witnessing the state’s failure to protect its citizens from violence and the abuse of power.
What is currently happening in Papua is only a reflection of the state’s failure to resolve the continuing problem of structural injustices in this country. The difference between Papua and other places in Indonesia, including in the capital city of Jakarta, is just a matter of the degree of violence. In Papua the level of violence is higher than that in other places as the latest string of fatal shootings strongly indicated. The basic right of the Indonesian citizens to security protection from the state is simply violated. The climate of fear and the insecurities felt by ordinary citizens in Papua are growing unchecked.
From what I have witnessed, today, both sociologically and demographically, Papuans can no longer be divided into particular ethnic or racial groups. The movement of people, in and out-migration in Papua, has occurred for centuries. The latest population census (2010) clearly indicated the high level of in-migration into Papua.
Papua is in fact a pluralistic society, in which any attempt to distinguish between indigenous and migrants is becoming more futile. Every day, the number of people who move in and out of Papua is increasing as the number of daily flights and weekly ships obviously indicate. While certain Papuan elites and their organizations understandably try to reassert their claims about a pure Papuan identity, such a move runs counter to the reality.
Cities and urban areas in Papua have become the most pluralistic places, in which people from different social and economic backgrounds mingle and interact. In such urban settings, social tensions and conflicts normally occur, as people are competing for economic and political resources.
It is the constitutional duty of the state to protect its citizens from discrimination. Economic and political fairness should be the order of the day, where the state has to act as an impartial referee when tensions and conflicts arise between different groups and people in society. Yet as we are witnessing these days in Papua, the Constitution, which mandates the state to protect all its citizens, is simply being violated.
The writer is a researcher at the Research Center for Society and Culture, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and the author of Looking for Indonesia 2: The Limits of Social Engineering (LIPI Press, 2010
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2) Top minister tries to woo Papuan leaders
Nethy Dharma Somba and Margaretha Aritonang, The Jakarta Post, Jayapura/Jakarta | Headlines | Tue, 06/19/2012 9:51 AM
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Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Djoko Suyanto ruled out a military operation to tackle the escalating violence, which claimed another two lives in Mimika on Monday.
“We have so far adopted an approach that promotes the economy and people’s welfare, not a military [approach], because military action should only be used to deal with crimes,” Djoko said as quoted by Antara news agency during a gathering with community figures, religious leaders and members of the Papua Legislative Council (DPRP) and Papuan Consultative Assembly (MPRP) in Jayapura on Monday.
He was accompanied by Indonesian Military (TNI) chief Adm. Agus Suhartono, National Police chief Gen. Timur Pradopo, National Intelligence Agency (BIN) head Lt. Gen. Marciano, and Papua’s caretaker governor Syamsul Arief Rivai.
The arrival of the top-ranking delegation was reported in the wake of escalating violence that has claimed dozens of lives. Djoko, however, insisted that it was a routine tour of duty, and not specifically prompted by the ongoing security challenges in the province.
The latest communal clash in Mimika, Papua on Monday killed two people and injured dozens of others, including four police personnel.
The clash reportedly had its roots in ongoing resentment following a fatal traffic accident in May.
“The clash [on Monday] killed two people, but they have not yet been identified. Four police officers were rushed to hospital with arrow wounds,” Papua Police spokesman, Adj. Sn. Comr. Johanes Nugroho, told The Jakarta Post.
The fighting crowds also burned five Mimika Police vehicles and two motorcycles.
It was reported that the clash between the residents from Harapan and Bawah villages began at 7:30 a.m. The police were called in to deal with the situation but received a rough reception as the crowd turned on them, despite their firing warning shots into the air.
As the police retreated, the crowd vented their fury upon the vehicles and motorcycles.
The incident is the latest in a spate of violent attacks that have battered the country’s easternmost province over the past few weeks, including unsolved shooting deaths and riots in Jayapura and a rampage by military personnel in Wamena.
The marked escalation in violence has prompted the House of Representatives to establish a working committee to deal with the issue.
“We need to form a working committee and we are discussing what measures we need to take. For sure, the committee must seek an amiable and dignified solution. Weapons should be avoided in order to restore security; so, we are prioritizing dialogue and trust building,” said TB Hasanuddin, who chairs the House Commission I overseeing defense and foreign affairs.
“We met with the chief of the military and he said they were awaiting instructions,” he said in Jakarta on Monday.
He quoted the military chief as saying further: “If we are asked to launch a security operation, give us the legal as well as political umbrella so that we do not bear the brunt of the blame.”
Hasanuddin said the effectiveness of the policy to form a committee would depend on the government’s political will to execute the measures.
Violent cases 2007-2012:
Oct. 17, 2007
Eight people are killed and 19 injured in violence involving four tribes in Tembagapura district, Mimika.
March 11, 2007
Tribal violence in Paniai regency kills nine people. The violence is sparked by the death of a local teacher.
Jan. 5-19, 2010
Three people are killed and 34 people injured in a clash between two groups in Kwamki Lama, Mimika regency. The conflict is sparked by a rape and the payment of customary fines.
July 30, 2011
Seventeen people die and dozens are injured when the supporters of rival candidates in a local regency election clash in Ilaga district, Puncak Jaya regency.
Jan. 21, 2012
One person dies in a regional election clash during campaigning for a local regency election in Tolikara regency.
Feb. 15, 2012
Four die and almost 100 others are injured as supporters of rival candidates in the Tolikara regency election clash.
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3) Govt to continue welfare approach to deal with Papua problems
Mon, June 18 2012 21:30 | 278 Views
Jayapura, Papua (ANTARA News) – President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has continued implementing a welfare approach to deal with the problems in Papua, according to chief security minister Djoko Suyanto.
“Until now the approach used is welfare and not military, because a military approach is only useful for dealing with crimes,” Djoko said at a meeting with community and religious leaders and members of the Papuan legislative assembly (DPRP) and the Papuan People Council (MRP) here on Monday.
He stated that he had come to Papua not because of the recent violent incidents, but because of his duty to learn about what happened in the region.
“Indeed it is not easy to unite the views of different parties, but the most important thing is how to unite Papua peacefully so that the province could catch up with other regions,” Djoko noted.
He added that the government hoped to “bring Papua in harmony with the Unitary State of Indonesia”.
Regarding the implementation of special autonomy in Papua, Djoko said the program had not yet been able to meet public expectations.
In view of that, he added, the implementation of the program would continue to be evaluated, which had led to the issuance of Presidential Instruction Number 5 of 2005 and the establishment of the UP4B (Papua and West Papua Development Acceleration Unit) in 2011.
The meeting was also attended by defense forces commander Admiral Agus Suhartono, national police chief General Timur Pradopo, and National Intelligence Agency chief Marciano Norman.(*)
Editor: Heru
ENDS
Content Sourced from scoop.co.nz
Original url
Article – West Papua Media Alerts
1) Papua and problem of structural injustice 2) Top minister tries to woo Papuan leaders 3) Govt to continue welfare approach to deal with Papua problems ————————————Jakarta Post: West Papua Updates
1) Papua and problem of structural injustice
2) Top minister tries to woo Papuan leaders
3) Govt to continue welfare approach to deal with Papua problems
————————————
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/06/19/papua-and-problem-structural-injustice.html
1) Papua and problem of structural injustice
Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Jakarta | Opinion | Tue, 06/19/2012 9:25 AM
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The problem confronted by Papua, the easternmost province of Indonesia, is structural, rather than developmental as perceived by the current government.
The creation of the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B) was also based on an assumption that Papua suffered from developmental neglect and that its development should be accelerated to solve the problem.
Such a technocratic view was proved to be wrong as shown by the collapse of the Soeharto regime that was built on the “developmentalist” ideology.
Last week, I had a chance to visit Jayapura, Merauke and Boven Digoel, observing and talking with some experts and ordinary people about the latest developments in Papua. My visit coincided with daily mysterious shooting incidents, mostly in Jayapura. Intentionally or unintentionally, these random acts of violence looked to be perpetrated to create a specter of terror that would contribute to a climate of fear that has long characterized Papuan society.
Political relations between the center and the periphery are an old problem in this country. Following the end of Soeharto regime in 1998, the format of center-periphery relations was renewed with bigger autonomy given to regional governments. But the horror of disintegration, particularly among the military elites, was the reason for a halfhearted decentralization policy, as autonomy is given to the regency/municipality rather the provincial level of government.
Apart from this problematic decentralization, the post-Soeharto era was also marked by the Timor Leste partition in 1999, and a peace agreement in the rebellious province of Aceh in 2005. After Timor Leste and Aceh, Papua is now seen as the main problem of center-periphery relations in the republic. Armed rebels grouped under the Free Papua Organization (OPM) radically call for a separation from Indonesia.
Some argue that a healthy dialogue is urgently needed between Papuans and the central government in order to address the intractable tension and conflict in the province. Dialogue is important but I would argue that it will not be sufficient. Apart from the immediate problem of representation, a dialogue assumes the presence of two opposite but equal parties. Such an assumption is unlikely to be accepted by the Indonesian government.
As the basic issues in Papua are structural rather developmental, I would argue that a new perspective should be proposed to resolve the problem in Papua. From a structural perspective, the problem of Papua is not unique. By seeing Papua’s problems as Indonesia’s problems we look at the solution to Papua as a solution for the whole of Indonesia without any exception.
A structural perspective views the problem of the society as a result of structural injustices emanating from continuing economic and political inequalities between the center and periphery. The central government’s policies toward Papua have officially changed in the guise of special autonomy, yet the structural injustices persist.
These injustices are a problem facing not only Papuans but the majority of Indonesian citizens. Structural injustices are rooted in the wrong assumption in the Constitution that the state will unquestionably take care of the life of its citizens, but in reality we continue witnessing the state’s failure to protect its citizens from violence and the abuse of power.
What is currently happening in Papua is only a reflection of the state’s failure to resolve the continuing problem of structural injustices in this country. The difference between Papua and other places in Indonesia, including in the capital city of Jakarta, is just a matter of the degree of violence. In Papua the level of violence is higher than that in other places as the latest string of fatal shootings strongly indicated. The basic right of the Indonesian citizens to security protection from the state is simply violated. The climate of fear and the insecurities felt by ordinary citizens in Papua are growing unchecked.
From what I have witnessed, today, both sociologically and demographically, Papuans can no longer be divided into particular ethnic or racial groups. The movement of people, in and out-migration in Papua, has occurred for centuries. The latest population census (2010) clearly indicated the high level of in-migration into Papua.
Papua is in fact a pluralistic society, in which any attempt to distinguish between indigenous and migrants is becoming more futile. Every day, the number of people who move in and out of Papua is increasing as the number of daily flights and weekly ships obviously indicate. While certain Papuan elites and their organizations understandably try to reassert their claims about a pure Papuan identity, such a move runs counter to the reality.
Cities and urban areas in Papua have become the most pluralistic places, in which people from different social and economic backgrounds mingle and interact. In such urban settings, social tensions and conflicts normally occur, as people are competing for economic and political resources.
It is the constitutional duty of the state to protect its citizens from discrimination. Economic and political fairness should be the order of the day, where the state has to act as an impartial referee when tensions and conflicts arise between different groups and people in society. Yet as we are witnessing these days in Papua, the Constitution, which mandates the state to protect all its citizens, is simply being violated.
The writer is a researcher at the Research Center for Society and Culture, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and the author of Looking for Indonesia 2: The Limits of Social Engineering (LIPI Press, 2010
————————
2) Top minister tries to woo Papuan leaders
Nethy Dharma Somba and Margaretha Aritonang, The Jakarta Post, Jayapura/Jakarta | Headlines | Tue, 06/19/2012 9:51 AM
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Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Djoko Suyanto ruled out a military operation to tackle the escalating violence, which claimed another two lives in Mimika on Monday.
“We have so far adopted an approach that promotes the economy and people’s welfare, not a military [approach], because military action should only be used to deal with crimes,” Djoko said as quoted by Antara news agency during a gathering with community figures, religious leaders and members of the Papua Legislative Council (DPRP) and Papuan Consultative Assembly (MPRP) in Jayapura on Monday.
He was accompanied by Indonesian Military (TNI) chief Adm. Agus Suhartono, National Police chief Gen. Timur Pradopo, National Intelligence Agency (BIN) head Lt. Gen. Marciano, and Papua’s caretaker governor Syamsul Arief Rivai.
The arrival of the top-ranking delegation was reported in the wake of escalating violence that has claimed dozens of lives. Djoko, however, insisted that it was a routine tour of duty, and not specifically prompted by the ongoing security challenges in the province.
The latest communal clash in Mimika, Papua on Monday killed two people and injured dozens of others, including four police personnel.
The clash reportedly had its roots in ongoing resentment following a fatal traffic accident in May.
“The clash [on Monday] killed two people, but they have not yet been identified. Four police officers were rushed to hospital with arrow wounds,” Papua Police spokesman, Adj. Sn. Comr. Johanes Nugroho, told The Jakarta Post.
The fighting crowds also burned five Mimika Police vehicles and two motorcycles.
It was reported that the clash between the residents from Harapan and Bawah villages began at 7:30 a.m. The police were called in to deal with the situation but received a rough reception as the crowd turned on them, despite their firing warning shots into the air.
As the police retreated, the crowd vented their fury upon the vehicles and motorcycles.
The incident is the latest in a spate of violent attacks that have battered the country’s easternmost province over the past few weeks, including unsolved shooting deaths and riots in Jayapura and a rampage by military personnel in Wamena.
The marked escalation in violence has prompted the House of Representatives to establish a working committee to deal with the issue.
“We need to form a working committee and we are discussing what measures we need to take. For sure, the committee must seek an amiable and dignified solution. Weapons should be avoided in order to restore security; so, we are prioritizing dialogue and trust building,” said TB Hasanuddin, who chairs the House Commission I overseeing defense and foreign affairs.
“We met with the chief of the military and he said they were awaiting instructions,” he said in Jakarta on Monday.
He quoted the military chief as saying further: “If we are asked to launch a security operation, give us the legal as well as political umbrella so that we do not bear the brunt of the blame.”
Hasanuddin said the effectiveness of the policy to form a committee would depend on the government’s political will to execute the measures.
Violent cases 2007-2012:
Oct. 17, 2007
Eight people are killed and 19 injured in violence involving four tribes in Tembagapura district, Mimika.
March 11, 2007
Tribal violence in Paniai regency kills nine people. The violence is sparked by the death of a local teacher.
Jan. 5-19, 2010
Three people are killed and 34 people injured in a clash between two groups in Kwamki Lama, Mimika regency. The conflict is sparked by a rape and the payment of customary fines.
July 30, 2011
Seventeen people die and dozens are injured when the supporters of rival candidates in a local regency election clash in Ilaga district, Puncak Jaya regency.
Jan. 21, 2012
One person dies in a regional election clash during campaigning for a local regency election in Tolikara regency.
Feb. 15, 2012
Four die and almost 100 others are injured as supporters of rival candidates in the Tolikara regency election clash.
——————————————
3) Govt to continue welfare approach to deal with Papua problems
Mon, June 18 2012 21:30 | 278 Views
Jayapura, Papua (ANTARA News) – President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has continued implementing a welfare approach to deal with the problems in Papua, according to chief security minister Djoko Suyanto.
“Until now the approach used is welfare and not military, because a military approach is only useful for dealing with crimes,” Djoko said at a meeting with community and religious leaders and members of the Papuan legislative assembly (DPRP) and the Papuan People Council (MRP) here on Monday.
He stated that he had come to Papua not because of the recent violent incidents, but because of his duty to learn about what happened in the region.
“Indeed it is not easy to unite the views of different parties, but the most important thing is how to unite Papua peacefully so that the province could catch up with other regions,” Djoko noted.
He added that the government hoped to “bring Papua in harmony with the Unitary State of Indonesia”.
Regarding the implementation of special autonomy in Papua, Djoko said the program had not yet been able to meet public expectations.
In view of that, he added, the implementation of the program would continue to be evaluated, which had led to the issuance of Presidential Instruction Number 5 of 2005 and the establishment of the UP4B (Papua and West Papua Development Acceleration Unit) in 2011.
The meeting was also attended by defense forces commander Admiral Agus Suhartono, national police chief General Timur Pradopo, and National Intelligence Agency chief Marciano Norman.(*)
Editor: Heru
ENDS
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West Papua: Tragedy as farce
West Papua: Tragedy as farce:
The Indonesian government’s attempt to initiate dialogue with West Papuan independence activists has declined into farce, following the shooting on 14 June of key West Papuan leader Mako Tabuni. Tabuni’s killing follows seven other recent shootings of West Papuans by Indonesian police and soldiers.
Despite eye witnesses saying that Tabuni was unarmed and trying to flee Indonesian police, Indonesian police spokesman, Senior Commissioner Johnannes Nugroho claimed that Tabuni was armed with a police pistol.
Last Thursday, however, Indonesian police chief General Timur Pradopo said Tabuni had been shot while trying to seize a pistol from police officers. ‘Prior to the capture, a conversation took place,’ Pradopo said in an official statement. ‘Then the gun of a police officer was seized, so other police members protected [the officer].’
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The Indonesian government’s attempt to initiate dialogue with West Papuan independence activists has declined into farce, following the shooting on 14 June of key West Papuan leader Mako Tabuni. Tabuni’s killing follows seven other recent shootings of West Papuans by Indonesian police and soldiers.
Despite eye witnesses saying that Tabuni was unarmed and trying to flee Indonesian police, Indonesian police spokesman, Senior Commissioner Johnannes Nugroho claimed that Tabuni was armed with a police pistol.
Last Thursday, however, Indonesian police chief General Timur Pradopo said Tabuni had been shot while trying to seize a pistol from police officers. ‘Prior to the capture, a conversation took place,’ Pradopo said in an official statement. ‘Then the gun of a police officer was seized, so other police members protected [the officer].’
read more
Megatrends at Malaysia’s 13th general elections
Megatrends at Malaysia’s 13th general elections:
New Mandala readers interested in Malaysia, may want to read my take on the coming general election in Malaysia. I have an article in Asia Currents, the electronic newsletter of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA), that discusses what I think are the key issues, how they are likely to impact on the two coalitions, and the ability of the two coalitions to respond to these issues.
I note that there are five critical issues that the two coalitions will have to face both in the short and long term.
New Mandala readers interested in Malaysia, may want to read my take on the coming general election in Malaysia. I have an article in Asia Currents, the electronic newsletter of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA), that discusses what I think are the key issues, how they are likely to impact on the two coalitions, and the ability of the two coalitions to respond to these issues.I note that there are five critical issues that the two coalitions will have to face both in the short and long term.
Five critical megatrends face the contenders at the national level: economic performance, demographic changes, urbanisation, Islamisation and an island/peninsular divide.I conclude that the coalition that is better able at managing these megatrends, will have the better chance of winning, and staying in power.
The middle-income trap: The popular diagnosis for Malaysia’s stagnating economic performance is that Malaysia is caught in a middle-income trap, where it is unable to compete with low-cost producers on cost, but also by not having the institutions, human resources and technological capabilities to compete with advanced economies in innovative products and processes.
A young nation: 71 per cent of Malaysians are under the age of 40, with 34 per cent aged between 20 and 40.
An urban nation: 71 per cent of Malaysia is now urban, with only Kelantan, Pahang, Perlis, Sabah and Sarawak still being largely rural. Urbanisation rates are below 55 per cent.
An Islamic nation: The pervasiveness of Islam as a political tool and the increasing piety among Muslims have reached unprecedented levels.
Two nations: The politics of Peninsular Malaysia starkly differ from that of the island of Borneo. Political leaders and citizens in Sabah and Sarawak continue to distrust peninsular politicians, and all politics in these two states is local.
The two main contenders have framed their arguments for support in a contrasting manner. UMNO, through the BN, has argued that social stability delivers economic growth and that only a strong UMNO can guarantee social stability.
At the 13th general election, UMNO will be arguing that it has the track record in delivering social stability and economic growth. PR, instead, is arguing that good governance and social justice are critical to Malaysia’s continued economic growth and social stability. PR argues that the persistent weakening of the Malaysian economy, and social unrest, are due to the BN’s mismanagement of the economy, its divisive racial and religious politics, and the abuse of the rule of law.
The 2008 general election solidified the two-coalition system, and this is unlikely to be reversed. The surprising aspect of this development is that it took opposition parties 50-odd years to cooperate effectively, considering that Malaysians never gave the BN, on average, more than 57 per cent of the popular votes—with its best-ever result of 65 per cent achieved only in the booming 90s, at the 1995 general election.
Malaysians have demonstrated time and again that, despite its hegemony, the BN is not an overwhelmingly popular coalition. While the results of the 13th general election will depend mainly on the leadership abilities of Najib Razak and Anwar Ibrahim to manage their coalitions in addressing issues, neither coalition will remain in power for long—even with the support of a rigged electoral system—if it fails to address these megatrends effectively.
Blaming villagers for global warming
Blaming villagers for global warming:
Humans cutting down forest land to farm is nothing new. However, charging rural farmers for causing global warming is. A controversial formula is quantifying the damage villagers have to pay for their small scale farming. Now, the villagers are taking a stand against what they know is wrong.
PHETCHABUN – Early one Thursday morning, a gun was pointed at Ms. Kwanla Saikhumtung, a 34-year-old mother, because she was farming.
The man who pointed the gun was one of ten armed officers from Phu Pha Daeng, the local wildlife sanctuary in Lomsak district. After observing the villagers for three days, the officers finally informed Ms. Kwanla and twelve fellow villagers from Huay Kontha that they were trespassing on wildlife sanctuary land. They demanded that the villagers come to the police station to talk with them.
They refused. The villager that hired them paid taxes on the plot, leading the villagers to believe they had a right to work the land, and they worried about finishing their work.
The officers quickly became annoyed. One threatened to shoot any villager that resisted the officers’ orders.
“Are you really going to shoot? I’m here to harvest the corn, and you want to shoot us?” Ms. Kwanla shouted. She then bravely grabbed the barrel of the gun, pressed it to her chest, and said, “If you’re going to shoot, shoot.”
The officer lowered his gun. That night, the officers marched the reluctant villagers through the community and drove them to the police station.
This incident was the beginning of a seven-year-long legal battle, pitting Ms. Kwanla against the Thai government. She and the other twelve villagers — the youngest only sixteen at the time — were first charged with trespassing.
The real shock, however, came when they were slapped with a 470,000 baht fine for contributing to global warming under the charge of causing environmental damage.
As the landowner was paying taxes on the plot of land in question, he had the right to grow crops on it. Since Ms. Kwanla and the other villagers had been hired to harvest his corn, it had seemed that they were not breaking the law by being there. However, unknown to the landholder, his plot overlapped with the wildlife sanctuary land.
The Royal Forestry Department (RFD) fined the villagers for cutting down trees and farming, drawing from the 1992 National Environmental Quality Act which forbids “destruction, loss, or damage to natural resources owned by the State.” Their fine was determined according to a formula used to calculate environmental damage. The formula measures the increase in temperature caused by cutting down trees. Any increase in the land temperature shows ‘global warming’. In essence, cutting down trees to farm corn leads to global warming.
The Huay Kontha villagers have a running joke, “Because we pick the corn, the world gets hotter.”
The charges that Ms. Kwanla and the other villagers face shed light on an emerging trend in Thailand. Land dispute issues are becoming increasingly common. According to Pramote Pholpinyo, coordinator of the Northeast Land Reform Network (LRN), there are currently 35-40 “global warming” cases against villagers in Thailand, with charges amounting to almost 33 million baht.
While many of these trespassing charges are currently on appeal, the LRN has launched a countersuit against the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation in the Administrative Court of First Instance.
Kritsada Koonarong, a lawyer working with Environmental Litigation and Advocacy for the Wants (EnLAW) on the countersuit case, says, “this case is the first where people faced with this issue have come together and rose up to fight.”
A lawyer working with the Huay Kontha villagers who wishes to remain unnamed, believes that whether villagers win or lose the countersuit, it is important to fight this case: “We know we might lose, but we have to fight anyway… So that society will know even if we do not win.”
Thailand’s forestland rapidly decreased throughout most of the 20th century. By 1998 only 25 percent of the original forestland remained. Since then, the Thai government, through the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), has taken a hard-line stance on reforestation by creating a network of national parks, reserves, and sanctuaries. As a result, between 1979 and 2004, forestland tripled. This system has undoubtedly been effective in increasing forestland, thereby decreasing greenhouse gases.
The borders of these areas, however, were created with Global Positioning System (GPS) technology rather than with the more accurate Geographic Information System (GIS) technology. As a result, borders separating the forest areas and village farming areas have become unclear.
These border disputes have also led to debate over villager’s historical claims to the land. A veteran RFD official, Dr. Permsak Makarabhirom elaborates, “The proclamation of an area as a national park effectively makes ‘illegal’ residents of people who had settled these areas years before the proclamation.” The overlapping claims on protected forest areas are affecting approximately two million people across Thailand.
According to Dr. Vute Wangwacharakul, a climate change expert, “Thailand has been doing its best to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the impact…of climate change.”
Though Dr. Wangwacharakul recognizes that the creation of forest reserves is “one important tool” in combating climate change, he also admits that “any expansion of forest land would have trade-offs with other land uses and the affected parties are mainly the rural poor.”
The global warming fines that the villagers must pay are calculated using a formula created in the 1994 by Dr. Pongsak Wittawatchutikul, a National Parks Department specialist. With this formula, a thermometer is used to measure the temperature of soil in degraded land and soil in forest land. The difference in the temperatures is calculated. Then an estimate is made about the amount of energy it would take to cool down the hotter deforested area using an air conditioner. This calculation, along with an approximation of the number of trees cut down and the amount of soil loss, determines the fine.
A National Parks Department report says the formula was created with the intention of “finding the value of ecosystems with the support of academic people from human rights committees.” Lawyers involved in the countersuit question the legitimacy of this formula, first used in court in 2004.
Dr. Ponsgak’s formula has also faced criticism from the academic community. A climate change specialist and director of Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency, Dr. Anont Sanitwong na Ayutthaya, argues, “Scientists agree that this doesn’t make any sense at all…it has nothing to do with global climate change.”
Even Dr. Pongsak himself came out against the use of this formula to fine villagers. In an interview with the National Human Rights Commission, he recently said, “I accepted that some parts of the formula needed to be fixed, and I’ve tried to make it the most accurate and correct,” but due to the complexity of the government systems and procedures, he has not been able to make such adjustments.
However, many government agencies continue to affirm the formula’s legitimacy. Mr. Thongchai Siripattananukulchai, Director of the Region 11 Protected Areas Office states: “I think this formula has been studied well enough to be used… It is legitimate, therefore we are using it.”
Today, Thailand is the only country that has attempted to quantify damages and fine its citizens for contributing to global warming. The Department of National Parks also admits that Thailand is the first country to even think of charging citizens in this manner, says Mr. Kristada.
According to the UNFCCC, industry and energy production account for approximately 75 percent of Thailand’s greenhouse gas emissions. But to date, only small-scale farmers have been charged with environmental damage, using the global warming formula. The focus on villagers is disproportionate, and does not focus on the real producers of greenhouse gases. Dr. Wangwacharakul claims, “Emissions from fossil fuels are the most important factor contributing to climate change.”
The unnamed lawyer working with the Huay Kontha villagers acknowledges that Thailand has implemented sound environmental regulations. Yet, it does not punish private industrial companies harshly enough for violating these regulations. “In terms of economics and business internationally,” he says, “it would cause a bad image for Thailand.”
When asked about charging industries with environmental damage, Mr. Thongchai of the Protected Areas Office claims, “all parties will be treated equally regardless of if they are companies or individuals.”
If used fairly, the Environmental Quality Act holds much potential for mitigating climate change in Thailand. According to Mr. Kritsada, “the environmental law was intended for the people who destroy the environment to get it back to its original state.” However, to get to the root of the problem, the relationship between industry and the environment must be further scrutinized if the true perpetrators are to be held responsible.
Meanwhile, Ms. Kwanla continues her life as an agricultural laborer, now harvesting cassava and onions. She says that she has to fight back on principle. “I want to show them that I am not wrong. If we accept the charges, that is saying I am wrong.”
While she has not been to court since last February, and does not know when her next court date will be, she remains hopeful.
Her village stands by her side in support, because she represents their communal struggle, and that of hundreds of other farmers throughout Thailand.
“Every time I go to court, most of the villagers come and support me, every time… The judge knows that when I come, it gets crowded.”
The story in images
No longer able to harvest corn since the lawsuit, Ms. Kwanla and her fellow villagers now harvest cassava and hom jean, a local onion variety.
Since being charged with global warming, villagers have begun working on farms farther from the reserve, harvesting cassava. The man in red was one of the thirteen villagers who was charged along with Ms. Kwanla.
A fellow villager labors in the field harvesting cassava. Every morning the villagers must wake up extremely early to travel to the field, as it is located thirty kilometers outside of the village.
Standing in front of her humble home in Huay Kon Tha village located in Petchabhun Province, Ms. Kwanla prepares to join her fellow villagers at the nearby cassava fields.
Ms. Kwanla uses charcoal to cook her breakfast of an omelette and grilled frog accompanied with the ever ubiquitous sticky rice, a common meal among rural Thai villages.
While being charged for contributing to global warming, Ms. Kwanla’s regular electricity use consists of only two light bulbs, a television and a washer and dryer..
King Bhumibol Adulyadej has said, “has the forest trespassed the people, or have the people trespassed the forest…this problem has never been solved.” For Ms. Kwanla, this statement is all too true.
Sitting in her home, Ms. Kwanla discusses how the charges have affected her husband and her two daughters who are all currently living at home with her.
Ms. Kwanla’s home is comprised of two small rooms. She uses little electricity other than two light bulbs, a television and a washer and dryer.
Since being charged after harvesting corn Ms. Kwanla has begun growing and selling hom jean, a local variety of onion, on her farm.
By Fay Walker, Occidental College; Coral Keegan, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; Abigal Friedman, Kenyon College; Morgan Washburn, Loras College; Ellery Graves, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Humans cutting down forest land to farm is nothing new. However, charging rural farmers for causing global warming is. A controversial formula is quantifying the damage villagers have to pay for their small scale farming. Now, the villagers are taking a stand against what they know is wrong.
PHETCHABUN – Early one Thursday morning, a gun was pointed at Ms. Kwanla Saikhumtung, a 34-year-old mother, because she was farming.
The man who pointed the gun was one of ten armed officers from Phu Pha Daeng, the local wildlife sanctuary in Lomsak district. After observing the villagers for three days, the officers finally informed Ms. Kwanla and twelve fellow villagers from Huay Kontha that they were trespassing on wildlife sanctuary land. They demanded that the villagers come to the police station to talk with them.
They refused. The villager that hired them paid taxes on the plot, leading the villagers to believe they had a right to work the land, and they worried about finishing their work.
The officers quickly became annoyed. One threatened to shoot any villager that resisted the officers’ orders.
“Are you really going to shoot? I’m here to harvest the corn, and you want to shoot us?” Ms. Kwanla shouted. She then bravely grabbed the barrel of the gun, pressed it to her chest, and said, “If you’re going to shoot, shoot.”
The officer lowered his gun. That night, the officers marched the reluctant villagers through the community and drove them to the police station.
This incident was the beginning of a seven-year-long legal battle, pitting Ms. Kwanla against the Thai government. She and the other twelve villagers — the youngest only sixteen at the time — were first charged with trespassing.
The real shock, however, came when they were slapped with a 470,000 baht fine for contributing to global warming under the charge of causing environmental damage.
As the landowner was paying taxes on the plot of land in question, he had the right to grow crops on it. Since Ms. Kwanla and the other villagers had been hired to harvest his corn, it had seemed that they were not breaking the law by being there. However, unknown to the landholder, his plot overlapped with the wildlife sanctuary land.
The Royal Forestry Department (RFD) fined the villagers for cutting down trees and farming, drawing from the 1992 National Environmental Quality Act which forbids “destruction, loss, or damage to natural resources owned by the State.” Their fine was determined according to a formula used to calculate environmental damage. The formula measures the increase in temperature caused by cutting down trees. Any increase in the land temperature shows ‘global warming’. In essence, cutting down trees to farm corn leads to global warming.
The Huay Kontha villagers have a running joke, “Because we pick the corn, the world gets hotter.”
The charges that Ms. Kwanla and the other villagers face shed light on an emerging trend in Thailand. Land dispute issues are becoming increasingly common. According to Pramote Pholpinyo, coordinator of the Northeast Land Reform Network (LRN), there are currently 35-40 “global warming” cases against villagers in Thailand, with charges amounting to almost 33 million baht.
While many of these trespassing charges are currently on appeal, the LRN has launched a countersuit against the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation in the Administrative Court of First Instance.
Kritsada Koonarong, a lawyer working with Environmental Litigation and Advocacy for the Wants (EnLAW) on the countersuit case, says, “this case is the first where people faced with this issue have come together and rose up to fight.”
A lawyer working with the Huay Kontha villagers who wishes to remain unnamed, believes that whether villagers win or lose the countersuit, it is important to fight this case: “We know we might lose, but we have to fight anyway… So that society will know even if we do not win.”
Thailand’s forestland rapidly decreased throughout most of the 20th century. By 1998 only 25 percent of the original forestland remained. Since then, the Thai government, through the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), has taken a hard-line stance on reforestation by creating a network of national parks, reserves, and sanctuaries. As a result, between 1979 and 2004, forestland tripled. This system has undoubtedly been effective in increasing forestland, thereby decreasing greenhouse gases.
The borders of these areas, however, were created with Global Positioning System (GPS) technology rather than with the more accurate Geographic Information System (GIS) technology. As a result, borders separating the forest areas and village farming areas have become unclear.
These border disputes have also led to debate over villager’s historical claims to the land. A veteran RFD official, Dr. Permsak Makarabhirom elaborates, “The proclamation of an area as a national park effectively makes ‘illegal’ residents of people who had settled these areas years before the proclamation.” The overlapping claims on protected forest areas are affecting approximately two million people across Thailand.
According to Dr. Vute Wangwacharakul, a climate change expert, “Thailand has been doing its best to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the impact…of climate change.”
Though Dr. Wangwacharakul recognizes that the creation of forest reserves is “one important tool” in combating climate change, he also admits that “any expansion of forest land would have trade-offs with other land uses and the affected parties are mainly the rural poor.”
The global warming fines that the villagers must pay are calculated using a formula created in the 1994 by Dr. Pongsak Wittawatchutikul, a National Parks Department specialist. With this formula, a thermometer is used to measure the temperature of soil in degraded land and soil in forest land. The difference in the temperatures is calculated. Then an estimate is made about the amount of energy it would take to cool down the hotter deforested area using an air conditioner. This calculation, along with an approximation of the number of trees cut down and the amount of soil loss, determines the fine.
A National Parks Department report says the formula was created with the intention of “finding the value of ecosystems with the support of academic people from human rights committees.” Lawyers involved in the countersuit question the legitimacy of this formula, first used in court in 2004.
Dr. Ponsgak’s formula has also faced criticism from the academic community. A climate change specialist and director of Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency, Dr. Anont Sanitwong na Ayutthaya, argues, “Scientists agree that this doesn’t make any sense at all…it has nothing to do with global climate change.”
Even Dr. Pongsak himself came out against the use of this formula to fine villagers. In an interview with the National Human Rights Commission, he recently said, “I accepted that some parts of the formula needed to be fixed, and I’ve tried to make it the most accurate and correct,” but due to the complexity of the government systems and procedures, he has not been able to make such adjustments.
However, many government agencies continue to affirm the formula’s legitimacy. Mr. Thongchai Siripattananukulchai, Director of the Region 11 Protected Areas Office states: “I think this formula has been studied well enough to be used… It is legitimate, therefore we are using it.”
Today, Thailand is the only country that has attempted to quantify damages and fine its citizens for contributing to global warming. The Department of National Parks also admits that Thailand is the first country to even think of charging citizens in this manner, says Mr. Kristada.
According to the UNFCCC, industry and energy production account for approximately 75 percent of Thailand’s greenhouse gas emissions. But to date, only small-scale farmers have been charged with environmental damage, using the global warming formula. The focus on villagers is disproportionate, and does not focus on the real producers of greenhouse gases. Dr. Wangwacharakul claims, “Emissions from fossil fuels are the most important factor contributing to climate change.”
The unnamed lawyer working with the Huay Kontha villagers acknowledges that Thailand has implemented sound environmental regulations. Yet, it does not punish private industrial companies harshly enough for violating these regulations. “In terms of economics and business internationally,” he says, “it would cause a bad image for Thailand.”
When asked about charging industries with environmental damage, Mr. Thongchai of the Protected Areas Office claims, “all parties will be treated equally regardless of if they are companies or individuals.”
If used fairly, the Environmental Quality Act holds much potential for mitigating climate change in Thailand. According to Mr. Kritsada, “the environmental law was intended for the people who destroy the environment to get it back to its original state.” However, to get to the root of the problem, the relationship between industry and the environment must be further scrutinized if the true perpetrators are to be held responsible.
Meanwhile, Ms. Kwanla continues her life as an agricultural laborer, now harvesting cassava and onions. She says that she has to fight back on principle. “I want to show them that I am not wrong. If we accept the charges, that is saying I am wrong.”
While she has not been to court since last February, and does not know when her next court date will be, she remains hopeful.
Her village stands by her side in support, because she represents their communal struggle, and that of hundreds of other farmers throughout Thailand.
“Every time I go to court, most of the villagers come and support me, every time… The judge knows that when I come, it gets crowded.”
The story in images
No longer able to harvest corn since the lawsuit, Ms. Kwanla and her fellow villagers now harvest cassava and hom jean, a local onion variety.
Since being charged with global warming, villagers have begun working on farms farther from the reserve, harvesting cassava. The man in red was one of the thirteen villagers who was charged along with Ms. Kwanla.
A fellow villager labors in the field harvesting cassava. Every morning the villagers must wake up extremely early to travel to the field, as it is located thirty kilometers outside of the village.
Standing in front of her humble home in Huay Kon Tha village located in Petchabhun Province, Ms. Kwanla prepares to join her fellow villagers at the nearby cassava fields.
Ms. Kwanla uses charcoal to cook her breakfast of an omelette and grilled frog accompanied with the ever ubiquitous sticky rice, a common meal among rural Thai villages.
While being charged for contributing to global warming, Ms. Kwanla’s regular electricity use consists of only two light bulbs, a television and a washer and dryer..
King Bhumibol Adulyadej has said, “has the forest trespassed the people, or have the people trespassed the forest…this problem has never been solved.” For Ms. Kwanla, this statement is all too true.
Sitting in her home, Ms. Kwanla discusses how the charges have affected her husband and her two daughters who are all currently living at home with her.
Ms. Kwanla’s home is comprised of two small rooms. She uses little electricity other than two light bulbs, a television and a washer and dryer.
Since being charged after harvesting corn Ms. Kwanla has begun growing and selling hom jean, a local variety of onion, on her farm.
By Fay Walker, Occidental College; Coral Keegan, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; Abigal Friedman, Kenyon College; Morgan Washburn, Loras College; Ellery Graves, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Thailand’s reconciliation proposals
Thailand’s reconciliation proposals:
Following Nick Nostitz’s very informative coverage of the opposition to what he calls “reconciliation games,” below is an unofficial translation of the four versions of the important articles of the proposed reconciliation bills.
Given the recent mayhem in parliament, the debate on the bills has been put on hold at least until the next parliamentary session in August. This has ended speculation that the third reading might be called in the House-Senate joint meeting. This is a commendable move on the part of House Speaker, Somsak Kiatsuranont, to not purposely exclude opposition to the bills, such as from the Democrats, and to heed the calls from the judiciary.
Pheu Thai suffered an embarrassing blow from its failed attempt to boycott the Constitution Court’s order to postpone constitutional amendment. When it came time for the House-Senate deliberation on the boycott, in which the ruling government needed 322 votes to pass, they merely garnered 318 votes despite their majority. Only 41 out of 149 senators agreed, while 8 MPs from Chat Thai Pattana were no shows, resulting in an angry phone call to Banharn from Thaksin. Worse, 16 Pheu Thai MPs were absent. Nattawut Saikua admits there is a “rift” within the party as to the role of the Constitutional Court as well as what should constitute the “unity bill.”
There are four versions to the proposed unity bills. Only one of them was presided over by a non-Pheu Thai member. None of the proposed bills included the Democrat Party, however. Also note that none of the proposed bills mention Article 112 of the penal code.
All official drafts can be viewed on-line at the Thai Parliament Information System.
Draft I: proposed by General Sonthi Boonyaratklin (Matubhumi Party) and MPs from Chart Thai Pattana Party, Mahachon Party, Chart Pattana Party, Palangchol Party, New Democrat Party, Pheau Thai Party
Following Nick Nostitz’s very informative coverage of the opposition to what he calls “reconciliation games,” below is an unofficial translation of the four versions of the important articles of the proposed reconciliation bills.
Given the recent mayhem in parliament, the debate on the bills has been put on hold at least until the next parliamentary session in August. This has ended speculation that the third reading might be called in the House-Senate joint meeting. This is a commendable move on the part of House Speaker, Somsak Kiatsuranont, to not purposely exclude opposition to the bills, such as from the Democrats, and to heed the calls from the judiciary.
Pheu Thai suffered an embarrassing blow from its failed attempt to boycott the Constitution Court’s order to postpone constitutional amendment. When it came time for the House-Senate deliberation on the boycott, in which the ruling government needed 322 votes to pass, they merely garnered 318 votes despite their majority. Only 41 out of 149 senators agreed, while 8 MPs from Chat Thai Pattana were no shows, resulting in an angry phone call to Banharn from Thaksin. Worse, 16 Pheu Thai MPs were absent. Nattawut Saikua admits there is a “rift” within the party as to the role of the Constitutional Court as well as what should constitute the “unity bill.”
There are four versions to the proposed unity bills. Only one of them was presided over by a non-Pheu Thai member. None of the proposed bills included the Democrat Party, however. Also note that none of the proposed bills mention Article 112 of the penal code.
All official drafts can be viewed on-line at the Thai Parliament Information System.
Draft I: proposed by General Sonthi Boonyaratklin (Matubhumi Party) and MPs from Chart Thai Pattana Party, Mahachon Party, Chart Pattana Party, Palangchol Party, New Democrat Party, Pheau Thai Party
- Article 3. Anyone whose actions relating to political protests or political activities between 15 September 2005 and 10 May 2011 that were against the law shall be given amnesty. This applies to both ordinary citizens and state authorities.
- Article 4. Any pending investigation on individuals who meet the criteria of article 3 must cease and anyone who has partially served his/her term will be released immediately.
- Article 5. Any individual who has been affected by the action of individuals, groups or authorities set up by the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy (CDRCM) will no longer be considered as an offender. Article 4 will apply to such individual.
- Article 6. Voting rights of members of political parties that were dissolved shall be reinstated.
- Article 3. Any individual or groups who were affected by the coup d’état on 19 September 2006 up until the day this legislation is promulgated shall be given amnesty. This includes individuals and state officials who acted on the orders of the CDRCM; individuals whose political rights have been revoked; actions relating to protest or opposition to the CDRCM; actions by independent bodies according to articles 1,2,3 and 4 of the interim 2006 constitution or the 2007 constitution.
- Article 3. Anyone whose actions relating to political protests or political activities between 15 September 2005 and 10 May 2011 that were against the law shall be given amnesty. Any pending investigation on individuals who meet the criteria of Article 3 must cease and anyone who has partially served his/her term will be released immediately. However this article does not apply to terrorist acts or actions aimed to hurt the lives of others.
- Similar to General Sonthi’s draft version
Jun 20, 2012
Google’s Transparency Report: A Good And Troubling Thing
Google’s Transparency Report: A Good And Troubling Thing:
A couple of days ago Google released its latest “Transparency Report,” part of the company’s ongoing commitment to disclose requests by individuals, corporations, and governments to change what users see in search results and other Google properties such as YouTube.
The press coverage of Google’s report was copious – far more than the prior two years, and for good reason. This week’s disclosure included Google’s bi-annual report of government takedown requests (corporate and individual requests are updated in near real time). The news was not comforting.
As the Atlantic wrote:
The number of takedown requests from governments is on the rise – up about 100% year to year for the US alone. Part of this, perhaps, can be explained by what might be called a “catchup effect” – governments are coming to terms with the pervasive power of digital information, and finally getting their heads around trying to control it, much as governments have attempted to control more analog forms of information like newspapers, television stations, and books.
But as we know, digital information is very, very different. It’s one thing to try to control the press, it’s quite another to do the same with the blog postings, YouTube videos, Twitter feeds, and emails of an entire citizenry. Given the explosion of arguably illegal or simply embarrassing information available to Google’s crawlers (cough, cough, Wikileaks), I’m rather surprised that worldwide government takedown requests haven’t grown at an exponential rate.
But to me, the rise of government takedown requests isn’t nearly as interesting as the role Google and other companies play in all of this. As I’ve written elsewhere, it seems that as we move our public selves into the digital sphere, we seem to be also moving our trust from the institutions of government to the institution of the corporation. For example, our offline identity is established by a government ID like a driver’s license. Online, many of us view Facebook as our identity service. Prior to email, our private correspondance was secured by a government institution called the postal service. Today, we trust AOL, Microsoft, Yahoo, Facebook, or Gmail with our private utterances. When documents were analog, they were protected by government laws against unreasonable search and seizure. When they live in the cloud….the ground is shifting. I could go on, but I think you get my point.
As we move ourselves into the realm of digital information, a realm mediated by private corporations, those corporations naturally become the focus of government attention. I find Google’s Transparency Report to be a refreshing response to this government embrace – but it’s an exercise that almost no other corporation completes (Twitter has a record of disclosing, but on a case by case basis). Where is Amazon’s Transparency Report? Yahoo’s? Microsoft’s? And of course, the biggest question in terms of scale and personal information – where is Facebook’s? Oh, and of course, where is Apple’s?
Put another way: If we are shifting our trust from the government to the corporation, who’s watching the corporations? With government, we’ve at least got clear legal recourse – in the United States, we’ve got the Constitution, the Freedom of Information Act, and a deep legal history protecting the role of the press – what Jefferson called the Fourth Estate. With corporations, we’re on far less comforting ground – most of us have agreed to Terms of Services we’ve never read, much less studied in sixth grade civics class.
As the Atlantic concludes:
I applaud Google’s efforts here, but I’m wary of placing such an important public trust in the hands of private corporations alone. Google is a powerful company, with access to a wide swath of the world’s information. But with the rise of walled gardens like iOS and Facebook, an increasing amount of our information doesn’t touch Google’s servers. We literally are in the dark about how this data is being accessed by governments around the world.
Google is setting an example I hope all corporations with access to our data will follow. So far, however, most companies don’t. And that should give all of us pause, and it should be the basis of an ongoing conversation about the role of government in our digital lives.
A couple of days ago Google released its latest “Transparency Report,” part of the company’s ongoing commitment to disclose requests by individuals, corporations, and governments to change what users see in search results and other Google properties such as YouTube.
The press coverage of Google’s report was copious – far more than the prior two years, and for good reason. This week’s disclosure included Google’s bi-annual report of government takedown requests (corporate and individual requests are updated in near real time). The news was not comforting.
As the Atlantic wrote:
The stories Google tells to accompany the broad-brush numbers (found in the “annotations” section and its blog) paint a picture to accompany those numbers that Google calls “alarming” — noting, in particular, that some of the requests for removal of political speech come from “Western democracies not typically associated with censorship.”
The number of takedown requests from governments is on the rise – up about 100% year to year for the US alone. Part of this, perhaps, can be explained by what might be called a “catchup effect” – governments are coming to terms with the pervasive power of digital information, and finally getting their heads around trying to control it, much as governments have attempted to control more analog forms of information like newspapers, television stations, and books.
But as we know, digital information is very, very different. It’s one thing to try to control the press, it’s quite another to do the same with the blog postings, YouTube videos, Twitter feeds, and emails of an entire citizenry. Given the explosion of arguably illegal or simply embarrassing information available to Google’s crawlers (cough, cough, Wikileaks), I’m rather surprised that worldwide government takedown requests haven’t grown at an exponential rate.
But to me, the rise of government takedown requests isn’t nearly as interesting as the role Google and other companies play in all of this. As I’ve written elsewhere, it seems that as we move our public selves into the digital sphere, we seem to be also moving our trust from the institutions of government to the institution of the corporation. For example, our offline identity is established by a government ID like a driver’s license. Online, many of us view Facebook as our identity service. Prior to email, our private correspondance was secured by a government institution called the postal service. Today, we trust AOL, Microsoft, Yahoo, Facebook, or Gmail with our private utterances. When documents were analog, they were protected by government laws against unreasonable search and seizure. When they live in the cloud….the ground is shifting. I could go on, but I think you get my point.
As we move ourselves into the realm of digital information, a realm mediated by private corporations, those corporations naturally become the focus of government attention. I find Google’s Transparency Report to be a refreshing response to this government embrace – but it’s an exercise that almost no other corporation completes (Twitter has a record of disclosing, but on a case by case basis). Where is Amazon’s Transparency Report? Yahoo’s? Microsoft’s? And of course, the biggest question in terms of scale and personal information – where is Facebook’s? Oh, and of course, where is Apple’s?
Put another way: If we are shifting our trust from the government to the corporation, who’s watching the corporations? With government, we’ve at least got clear legal recourse – in the United States, we’ve got the Constitution, the Freedom of Information Act, and a deep legal history protecting the role of the press – what Jefferson called the Fourth Estate. With corporations, we’re on far less comforting ground – most of us have agreed to Terms of Services we’ve never read, much less studied in sixth grade civics class.
As the Atlantic concludes:
Google is trying to make these decisions responsibly, and the outcome, as detailed in the report, is reason to have confidence in Google as an arbiter of these things if, as is the case, Google is going to be the arbiter of these issues. But unlike a US Court, we don’t see the transcripts of oral arguments, or the detailed reasoning of a judge. …The Transparency Report sheds more light on the governments Google deals with than with its own internal processes for making judgments about compliance….Google’s Transparency Report is the work of a company that is grappling with its power and trying to show its work.
I applaud Google’s efforts here, but I’m wary of placing such an important public trust in the hands of private corporations alone. Google is a powerful company, with access to a wide swath of the world’s information. But with the rise of walled gardens like iOS and Facebook, an increasing amount of our information doesn’t touch Google’s servers. We literally are in the dark about how this data is being accessed by governments around the world.
Google is setting an example I hope all corporations with access to our data will follow. So far, however, most companies don’t. And that should give all of us pause, and it should be the basis of an ongoing conversation about the role of government in our digital lives.
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Mexicans Back Military Campaign Against Cartels
Mexicans Back Military Campaign Against Cartels:
As Felipe Calderón’s term as Mexico’s president draws to a close, Mexicans continue to strongly back his policy of deploying the military to combat the country’s powerful drug cartels. Eight-in-ten say this is the right course, a level of support that has remained remarkably constant since the Pew Global Attitudes Project first asked the question in 2009.
Support for Calderón’s strategy continues despite limited confidence that the government is winning the drug war, and widespread concerns about its costs. Just 47% believe progress is being made against drug traffickers, virtually identical to the 45% who held this opinion in 2011. Three-in-ten today say the government is actually losing ground against the cartels, while 19% see no change in the stand-off between the authorities and crime syndicates.
At the same time, the public is uneasy about the moral cost of the drug war: 74% say human rights violations by the military and police are a very big problem. But concern about rights abuses coexist with continued worries about drug-related violence and crime – both of which strong majorities describe as pressing issues in Mexico.
President Calderón himself remains popular. A 58%-majority has a favorable opinion of Mexico’s current leader. Although down from a high of 68% in 2009, this rating nonetheless puts him on par with the 56% who have a positive view of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI’s) Enrique Peña Nieto, whose ratings clearly topped those of his opponents when the poll was conducted between March 20 and April 2 of this year.
Whether Peña Nieto or any of the other presidential candidates have a solution to Mexico’s drug problems is an open question for the Mexican public. When asked which political party could do a better job of dealing with organized crime and drug traffickers, about equal numbers name Calderón’s National Action Party (PAN) (28%) and Peña Nieto’s PRI (25%), while only 13% point to the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Fully 23% volunteer that none of the parties is particularly capable of dealing with this critical issue.
These are the principal findings from the latest survey in Mexico by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Conducted face-to-face with 1,200 adults from across the country, the poll also finds that most Mexicans (61%) blame both the United States and their own country for the continued drug violence within their borders. While solid majorities would welcome U.S. assistance in combating the cartels if the aid came in the form of training, equipment or intelligence support, only a third would approve deploying U.S. troops on Mexican soil.
Overall, a majority (56%) of Mexicans have a favorable opinion of the United States, with about the same number (53%) convinced that Mexicans who migrate to the U.S. have a better life. Despite this perception, most Mexicans have no interest in migrating north across the border, although the percentage who say they would move to the U.S. if they had the means and opportunity has remained fairly steady since 2009.
More than five years after President Calderón first ordered troops to take part in controlling drug-related violence, the public remains firmly behind the use of military units to combat drug cartels. Fully eight-in-ten say they support the use of the Mexican army in the drug war, little changed from opinion over the past several years.
Supporters of both the PAN (88%) and the PRI (84%) strongly endorse Calderón’s use of the military. Backers of the PRD are more skeptical, yet 66% still approve of the approach.
Support for Calderón’s anti-cartel strategy is widespread even though only 47% of Mexicans believe the government is making progress against the drug traffickers. Three-in-ten actually think the authorities are losing ground, while 19% essentially see a stalemate, with neither side gaining. This assessment of the drug war is virtually identical to views expressed last year.
Perhaps not surprisingly, backers of the ruling PAN are more enthusiastic about the government’s campaign against drug traffickers: 62% of them believe the authorities are making progress, compared with just 45% of PRI and 34% of PRD supporters.
When asked who is to blame for the drug violence in their country – Mexico or the United States – a majority of Mexicans (61%) say both countries bear responsibility. About one-in-five (22%) says the U.S. is mostly to blame, while 14% point to Mexico. The number of Mexicans blaming both countries is up 10 percentage points compared with 2009, when the question was first asked.
In order to combat the drug cartels, three-quarters of Mexicans would support the U.S. training Mexican police and military personnel. About six-in-ten (61%) would also approve of the U.S. providing money and weapons to the country’s police and military. However, there is much less enthusiasm for deploying U.S. troops within Mexico’s borders. Only a third would welcome such a move, while a 59% majority would oppose it.
Overall, attitudes toward U.S. assistance in the drug war are little changed from last year, although the percentage who would back the deployment of U.S. troops has fallen slightly, from 38% in 2011 to 33% today.
Support for U.S. assistance in the drug war tends to be higher among those who see the government succeeding, rather than failing, in its fight against the cartels. For example, 85% of Mexicans who see progress in the drug war back U.S. training of police and military personnel, compared with 68% among those who think the government is losing ground or stymied. Similarly, those who see success in the drug war are more like than those who do not to approve of the U.S. providing money and weapons (71% vs. 54%). Even on the issue of deploying U.S. troops, Mexicans who see progress against the cartels are much more supportive of such a measure than those who believe the government is not succeeding in the drug war (47% vs. 22%).
Mexicans remain unhappy with their country’s direction, although the national mood has improved somewhat over the past year. Currently, 63% say they are dissatisfied with the way things are going in Mexico – an improvement from 2011, when 76% were dissatisfied.
Similarly, while 62% describe the country’s economy as bad, this is a slight improvement from last year’s 68%, and is significantly lower than the 75% registered in 2010.
Regardless of these negative assessments, Mexicans are generally optimistic about the future – 51% say the economy will improve over the next 12 months. About a third (32%) believe things will stay the same and just 16% think the economy will worsen. These attitudes are virtually unchanged since last year.
Across all of these measures, Mexicans with higher incomes and better education are more likely to have a positive view of current conditions and to be optimistic about the country’s economic future. For example, almost half of higher-income Mexicans (46%) say the economy is good compared with just 23% of those with lower incomes.1 Similarly, 43% of Mexicans with a post-secondary education rate the economy positively versus 25% of those with a primary education or less.
Issues related to the ongoing drug war top the Mexican public’s list of concerns. Three-in-four say cartel-related violence is a very big problem for the country, while a roughly equal number say the same about human rights violations by the military and police. And 73% name crime as a very big problem.
Slightly smaller majorities point to corrupt political leaders, illegal drugs, and the economy as very big problems.
Roughly six-in-ten believe terrorism (62%) and pollution (58%) are very big problems, while only about half think people leaving Mexico for jobs or the poor quality of schools are top concerns.
Despite being relatively content with the overall situation in the country, Mexicans with higher incomes are more likely than others to see their country beset by problems. Specifically, wealthier Mexicans are at least 10 percentage points more likely than those with lower incomes to rate schools (+20), economic problems (+14), cartel-related violence (+10), illegal drugs (+10), human rights violations (+10) and crime (+10) as very big problems.
Given broad public concern about crime, it is perhaps unsurprising that more than half (56%) of Mexicans say they are afraid to walk alone at night within a kilometer of their home. This sentiment has increased slightly since 2007 (50%). Women (61%) are more likely to be afraid, though a sizeable percentage of men (51%) also express unease.
Felipe Calderón remains popular as he concludes his final months as president, with majorities expressing a favorable view of him personally and describing his influence on the country as positive. Ratings for the national government are also high, with roughly two-thirds (65%) saying it is having a good influence on the country’s direction.
Assessments of the national government’s impact have improved 11 percentage points since last spring, when 54% said it was having a good influence. Views of the government have particularly improved among middle-income Mexicans (+25 percentage points) and those living in the Mexico City area (+22).
Meanwhile, opinion of Calderón has slipped compared with the high marks he received in 2009. At that time, roughly two-thirds viewed him favorably (68%) compared to 58% in the latest survey, and three-quarters in 2009 thought he was having a good influence on the country compared to 57% now.
Calderón is especially trusted among people who say the Mexican government is making progress in the drug war (72% rate him a good influence) but less so among those who say the government is not making progress or losing ground (46%). Meanwhile, two-thirds of Mexicans living in the North and South regions say he is a good influence, but only about half from the Central and Mexico City areas say the same (53% and 47%, respectively).
In addition to the national government, the military is also seen in a favorable light, with nearly three-in-four (73%) saying it is having a good influence on the way things are going in the country. This represents a rebound from 2011, when 62% said the military was having a positive impact.
The media is also well-regarded: six-in-ten say television, radio, newspapers, and magazines are having a good influence on the country’s direction. Opinions of the media are unchanged from last year.
Views of the court system and police are not as positive. Less than half of Mexicans see the courts (44%) and the police (38%) as having a good influence on the way things are going in the country. A year ago, opinions of the courts and police were even more negative, with only about three-in-ten giving either institution a positive rating.
Of the three major presidential candidates, Mexicans are most positive about the PRI’s Enrique Peña Nieto. A 56%-majority has a favorable opinion of Peña Nieto, compared with 38% who see him unfavorably. The PAN’s Josefina Vazquez Mota and the PRD’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador are less popular, with only about a third expressing a favorable view of either candidate (36% and 34%, respectively). More than half express unfavorable views of López Obrador (60%) and Vazquez Mota (54%).
While Peña Nieto is broadly popular across Mexico, views of Vazquez Mota and López Obrador vary by region. Specifically, Vazquez Mota is seen more favorably in the North (47% favorable), while López Obrador has more support among Mexicans in the Mexico City region and the South (46% and 39% favorable respectively).
The public is divided when asked which party could do a better job handling some of the most pressing issues facing Mexico. On unemployment, organized crime/drug traffickers, and corruption, the three main parties come out looking pretty much the same in the eyes of most Mexicans. And confidence is generally low across the board: 30% or fewer think any of the parties is better than the others on these issues.
Generally, those on the right of the ideological spectrum express greater confidence in the ability of both the PRI and PAN to deal with these major problems, while those on the left are inclined to trust the PRD.
A 56%-majority of Mexicans say they have a positive opinion of the U.S., while just 34% rate their northern neighbor unfavorably. America’s image has improved since the passage in 2010 of the highly publicized Arizona immigration law, but has yet to return to levels seen before the law’s enactment.
In 2010, the Arizona law had a measurable impact on opinion of the United States: prior to the law’s passage 62% of those interviewed expressed a favorable view of the U.S., compared with just 44% of those interviewed after the measure was enacted.
Today, younger Mexicans and those with higher education are more likely to be favorable toward the U.S. For example, 60% of 18-29 year-olds hold a positive view of the U.S., while just half of those age 50 and older say the same. Similarly, 66% of those with a post-secondary education are favorable versus just 48% of those with a primary education or less.
More than half the public (53%) believe that Mexicans who move to the U.S. have a better life there. Just 14% say they have a worse life, while 28% believe life in the U.S. is neither better nor worse. Attitudes on this topic have shifted since last year, when there was a dip in the percentage who said life is better in the U.S.
Even though many believe life is better for those who emigrate to the U.S., most Mexicans (61%) say they would not move to the U.S., even if they had the means and opportunity to do so. Among the substantial minority who would move, half say they would emigrate without authorization (19% of the total population). These attitudes are unchanged since last year.
The young and highly educated are more likely to want to go to the U.S. Among 18-29 year-olds, 54% would like to move north, while just 37% of 30-49 year-olds and 25% of those age 50 and older say the same. Mexicans with a post-secondary education are 11 percentage points more likely to want to emigrate than those with the lowest level of education.
A sizeable minority of Mexicans know people who have returned to Mexico from the U.S., either for economic reasons or through deportation. Three-in-ten are personally familiar with someone who came back from the U.S. because they could not find a job. This percentage is down 10 points since 2009, during the depth of the U.S. recession. Similarly, 32% of Mexicans say they know someone who has been deported or detained by the U.S. government in the last 12 months.
Survey Report
As Felipe Calderón’s term as Mexico’s president draws to a close, Mexicans continue to strongly back his policy of deploying the military to combat the country’s powerful drug cartels. Eight-in-ten say this is the right course, a level of support that has remained remarkably constant since the Pew Global Attitudes Project first asked the question in 2009.Support for Calderón’s strategy continues despite limited confidence that the government is winning the drug war, and widespread concerns about its costs. Just 47% believe progress is being made against drug traffickers, virtually identical to the 45% who held this opinion in 2011. Three-in-ten today say the government is actually losing ground against the cartels, while 19% see no change in the stand-off between the authorities and crime syndicates.
At the same time, the public is uneasy about the moral cost of the drug war: 74% say human rights violations by the military and police are a very big problem. But concern about rights abuses coexist with continued worries about drug-related violence and crime – both of which strong majorities describe as pressing issues in Mexico.President Calderón himself remains popular. A 58%-majority has a favorable opinion of Mexico’s current leader. Although down from a high of 68% in 2009, this rating nonetheless puts him on par with the 56% who have a positive view of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI’s) Enrique Peña Nieto, whose ratings clearly topped those of his opponents when the poll was conducted between March 20 and April 2 of this year.
Whether Peña Nieto or any of the other presidential candidates have a solution to Mexico’s drug problems is an open question for the Mexican public. When asked which political party could do a better job of dealing with organized crime and drug traffickers, about equal numbers name Calderón’s National Action Party (PAN) (28%) and Peña Nieto’s PRI (25%), while only 13% point to the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Fully 23% volunteer that none of the parties is particularly capable of dealing with this critical issue.These are the principal findings from the latest survey in Mexico by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Conducted face-to-face with 1,200 adults from across the country, the poll also finds that most Mexicans (61%) blame both the United States and their own country for the continued drug violence within their borders. While solid majorities would welcome U.S. assistance in combating the cartels if the aid came in the form of training, equipment or intelligence support, only a third would approve deploying U.S. troops on Mexican soil.
Overall, a majority (56%) of Mexicans have a favorable opinion of the United States, with about the same number (53%) convinced that Mexicans who migrate to the U.S. have a better life. Despite this perception, most Mexicans have no interest in migrating north across the border, although the percentage who say they would move to the U.S. if they had the means and opportunity has remained fairly steady since 2009.
Army Backed in Drug War
More than five years after President Calderón first ordered troops to take part in controlling drug-related violence, the public remains firmly behind the use of military units to combat drug cartels. Fully eight-in-ten say they support the use of the Mexican army in the drug war, little changed from opinion over the past several years.Supporters of both the PAN (88%) and the PRI (84%) strongly endorse Calderón’s use of the military. Backers of the PRD are more skeptical, yet 66% still approve of the approach.
Support for Calderón’s anti-cartel strategy is widespread even though only 47% of Mexicans believe the government is making progress against the drug traffickers. Three-in-ten actually think the authorities are losing ground, while 19% essentially see a stalemate, with neither side gaining. This assessment of the drug war is virtually identical to views expressed last year.
Perhaps not surprisingly, backers of the ruling PAN are more enthusiastic about the government’s campaign against drug traffickers: 62% of them believe the authorities are making progress, compared with just 45% of PRI and 34% of PRD supporters.When asked who is to blame for the drug violence in their country – Mexico or the United States – a majority of Mexicans (61%) say both countries bear responsibility. About one-in-five (22%) says the U.S. is mostly to blame, while 14% point to Mexico. The number of Mexicans blaming both countries is up 10 percentage points compared with 2009, when the question was first asked.
In order to combat the drug cartels, three-quarters of Mexicans would support the U.S. training Mexican police and military personnel. About six-in-ten (61%) would also approve of the U.S. providing money and weapons to the country’s police and military. However, there is much less enthusiasm for deploying U.S. troops within Mexico’s borders. Only a third would welcome such a move, while a 59% majority would oppose it.Overall, attitudes toward U.S. assistance in the drug war are little changed from last year, although the percentage who would back the deployment of U.S. troops has fallen slightly, from 38% in 2011 to 33% today.
Support for U.S. assistance in the drug war tends to be higher among those who see the government succeeding, rather than failing, in its fight against the cartels. For example, 85% of Mexicans who see progress in the drug war back U.S. training of police and military personnel, compared with 68% among those who think the government is losing ground or stymied. Similarly, those who see success in the drug war are more like than those who do not to approve of the U.S. providing money and weapons (71% vs. 54%). Even on the issue of deploying U.S. troops, Mexicans who see progress against the cartels are much more supportive of such a measure than those who believe the government is not succeeding in the drug war (47% vs. 22%).Negative Ratings for Country and Economy
Mexicans remain unhappy with their country’s direction, although the national mood has improved somewhat over the past year. Currently, 63% say they are dissatisfied with the way things are going in Mexico – an improvement from 2011, when 76% were dissatisfied.Similarly, while 62% describe the country’s economy as bad, this is a slight improvement from last year’s 68%, and is significantly lower than the 75% registered in 2010.
Regardless of these negative assessments, Mexicans are generally optimistic about the future – 51% say the economy will improve over the next 12 months. About a third (32%) believe things will stay the same and just 16% think the economy will worsen. These attitudes are virtually unchanged since last year.
Across all of these measures, Mexicans with higher incomes and better education are more likely to have a positive view of current conditions and to be optimistic about the country’s economic future. For example, almost half of higher-income Mexicans (46%) say the economy is good compared with just 23% of those with lower incomes.1 Similarly, 43% of Mexicans with a post-secondary education rate the economy positively versus 25% of those with a primary education or less.
Crime and Drug Violence Top Concerns
Issues related to the ongoing drug war top the Mexican public’s list of concerns. Three-in-four say cartel-related violence is a very big problem for the country, while a roughly equal number say the same about human rights violations by the military and police. And 73% name crime as a very big problem.Slightly smaller majorities point to corrupt political leaders, illegal drugs, and the economy as very big problems.
Roughly six-in-ten believe terrorism (62%) and pollution (58%) are very big problems, while only about half think people leaving Mexico for jobs or the poor quality of schools are top concerns.
Despite being relatively content with the overall situation in the country, Mexicans with higher incomes are more likely than others to see their country beset by problems. Specifically, wealthier Mexicans are at least 10 percentage points more likely than those with lower incomes to rate schools (+20), economic problems (+14), cartel-related violence (+10), illegal drugs (+10), human rights violations (+10) and crime (+10) as very big problems.
Given broad public concern about crime, it is perhaps unsurprising that more than half (56%) of Mexicans say they are afraid to walk alone at night within a kilometer of their home. This sentiment has increased slightly since 2007 (50%). Women (61%) are more likely to be afraid, though a sizeable percentage of men (51%) also express unease.
Calderón and Government Get Positive Marks
Felipe Calderón remains popular as he concludes his final months as president, with majorities expressing a favorable view of him personally and describing his influence on the country as positive. Ratings for the national government are also high, with roughly two-thirds (65%) saying it is having a good influence on the country’s direction.Assessments of the national government’s impact have improved 11 percentage points since last spring, when 54% said it was having a good influence. Views of the government have particularly improved among middle-income Mexicans (+25 percentage points) and those living in the Mexico City area (+22).
Meanwhile, opinion of Calderón has slipped compared with the high marks he received in 2009. At that time, roughly two-thirds viewed him favorably (68%) compared to 58% in the latest survey, and three-quarters in 2009 thought he was having a good influence on the country compared to 57% now.
Calderón is especially trusted among people who say the Mexican government is making progress in the drug war (72% rate him a good influence) but less so among those who say the government is not making progress or losing ground (46%). Meanwhile, two-thirds of Mexicans living in the North and South regions say he is a good influence, but only about half from the Central and Mexico City areas say the same (53% and 47%, respectively).
Military, Media Viewed Favorably
In addition to the national government, the military is also seen in a favorable light, with nearly three-in-four (73%) saying it is having a good influence on the way things are going in the country. This represents a rebound from 2011, when 62% said the military was having a positive impact.The media is also well-regarded: six-in-ten say television, radio, newspapers, and magazines are having a good influence on the country’s direction. Opinions of the media are unchanged from last year.
Views of the court system and police are not as positive. Less than half of Mexicans see the courts (44%) and the police (38%) as having a good influence on the way things are going in the country. A year ago, opinions of the courts and police were even more negative, with only about three-in-ten giving either institution a positive rating.
Views of Presidential Candidates
Of the three major presidential candidates, Mexicans are most positive about the PRI’s Enrique Peña Nieto. A 56%-majority has a favorable opinion of Peña Nieto, compared with 38% who see him unfavorably. The PAN’s Josefina Vazquez Mota and the PRD’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador are less popular, with only about a third expressing a favorable view of either candidate (36% and 34%, respectively). More than half express unfavorable views of López Obrador (60%) and Vazquez Mota (54%).While Peña Nieto is broadly popular across Mexico, views of Vazquez Mota and López Obrador vary by region. Specifically, Vazquez Mota is seen more favorably in the North (47% favorable), while López Obrador has more support among Mexicans in the Mexico City region and the South (46% and 39% favorable respectively).
No Party Stands Out on Key Problems
The public is divided when asked which party could do a better job handling some of the most pressing issues facing Mexico. On unemployment, organized crime/drug traffickers, and corruption, the three main parties come out looking pretty much the same in the eyes of most Mexicans. And confidence is generally low across the board: 30% or fewer think any of the parties is better than the others on these issues.Generally, those on the right of the ideological spectrum express greater confidence in the ability of both the PRI and PAN to deal with these major problems, while those on the left are inclined to trust the PRD.
U.S. Image Still Positive
A 56%-majority of Mexicans say they have a positive opinion of the U.S., while just 34% rate their northern neighbor unfavorably. America’s image has improved since the passage in 2010 of the highly publicized Arizona immigration law, but has yet to return to levels seen before the law’s enactment.In 2010, the Arizona law had a measurable impact on opinion of the United States: prior to the law’s passage 62% of those interviewed expressed a favorable view of the U.S., compared with just 44% of those interviewed after the measure was enacted.
Today, younger Mexicans and those with higher education are more likely to be favorable toward the U.S. For example, 60% of 18-29 year-olds hold a positive view of the U.S., while just half of those age 50 and older say the same. Similarly, 66% of those with a post-secondary education are favorable versus just 48% of those with a primary education or less.
Better Life in the U.S.
More than half the public (53%) believe that Mexicans who move to the U.S. have a better life there. Just 14% say they have a worse life, while 28% believe life in the U.S. is neither better nor worse. Attitudes on this topic have shifted since last year, when there was a dip in the percentage who said life is better in the U.S.Even though many believe life is better for those who emigrate to the U.S., most Mexicans (61%) say they would not move to the U.S., even if they had the means and opportunity to do so. Among the substantial minority who would move, half say they would emigrate without authorization (19% of the total population). These attitudes are unchanged since last year.The young and highly educated are more likely to want to go to the U.S. Among 18-29 year-olds, 54% would like to move north, while just 37% of 30-49 year-olds and 25% of those age 50 and older say the same. Mexicans with a post-secondary education are 11 percentage points more likely to want to emigrate than those with the lowest level of education.
A sizeable minority of Mexicans know people who have returned to Mexico from the U.S., either for economic reasons or through deportation. Three-in-ten are personally familiar with someone who came back from the U.S. because they could not find a job. This percentage is down 10 points since 2009, during the depth of the U.S. recession. Similarly, 32% of Mexicans say they know someone who has been deported or detained by the U.S. government in the last 12 months.
- For income, respondents are grouped into three categories of low, middle and high. Low-income respondents are those with a reported monthly household income of 3,630 Mexican pesos or less, middle-income respondents fall between the range of 3,631 to 7,260 Mexican pesos per month, and those in the high-income category earn 7,261 Mexican pesos or more per month. ↩
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