Introduction to Luzon

Introduction to Luzon:
By: Gen Caracena

Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao – these are the three primary island groups of the Philippines, of which Luzon is the largest. Luzon is also the country’s chief economic center and seat of political power since it is the location of Manila and Quezon City, Philippines’s official capital and most populated city respectively.

Economy in Manila is diverse and the majority of the country’s industries and services are found here. Manila hosts the international airport and it is the Chief Seaport of the Country. It is also the center of education being the home of the oldest and leading colleges and universities in the country.

All smiles in Luzon, By: Rain Rannu

People & Culture of Luzon

The people of Luzon are Filipinos of different cultural groups and ethnicities, thus speak dialects or languages that vary from region to region, but the majority speaks Tagalog. For foreign visitors, language is not a barrier because most Filipinos can communicate well in English, both verbally and written.

Christians dominate the island and the majority is Roman Catholic. Other religions include the Philippine Independent Church and Iglesia ni Cristo. Protestantism and Evangelicals are also on the rise under different denominations. Minority groups of indigenous tribes are present in some parts of the island. Communities of Buddhists and Muslims are also present in Metro Manila by virtue of the migration of Muslims and Chinese to the place.

Leading Tourist Destinations in Luzon

Blessed with natural resources and wondrous tourist sites, Luzon has so much to offer to travelers. Here are some of the best destinations you may consider for your next travel adventure to Luzon:

1. METRO MANILA – This bustling city is probably your entry point to the Philippines. Stick around for a few days; Manila has plenty on offer!

Storm over Manila, By: Cript Manila

Historical sites. Take in the old remnants of the old historical sites such as the Intramuros otherwise known as the Walled City, which was the seat of government during the Spanish Colonial Period. As a cultural center of the Philippines, Manila houses a number of museums like the National  Museum of the Philippines.

Nature parks. Visit parks and green areas, such as the familiar landmark, the Rizal Park commonly known as Luneta Park where the statue of Dr. Jose Rizal, the country’s national hero stands. Free performances and events are regularly staged in Rizal Park. Just behind Rizal Park, be fascinated by the wonders of the sea through the excellent marine life exhibits and other great attractions at the All-Season Holiday Destination within the city, the Manila Ocean Park.

Situated at the heart of Quezon City you will find the Ninoy Aquino Parks and Wildlife, a nature park named after Benigno “Ninoy Aquino, Jr. for his fight against a dictatorship that  led to his death on August 21, 1986. The park’s great attractions to visitors especially the kids consist of exhibits of wildlife that includes birds, reptiles and other mammals. Inside a wide landscape awaits you with beautiful Philippine flora that provides shades to picnic areas, cottages, playgrounds, and a calming lagoon, my favorite spot.

A short distance from the nature park stands the Quezon Memorial Circle, a national park and shrine serving as the city’s landmark. It is a 27-hectare circular park bound by an elliptical road. Trees provide some shade to visitors. Having gone to the place several times, I have seen how full of life the place is especially on weekends or holidays, when families have fun while enjoying their physical fitness routines like biking, jogging, aerobics, brisk walking and strolling. Within the park are playgrounds, bicycle rentals, shopping stalls, food establishments and a lot more. Standing prominently in the center is a shrine where lies the remains of Manuel L. Quezon, the Philippines second president.

Another fun destination in Quezon City is the La Mesa Dam Ecopark, a 33 hectare public park outside the boundaries of the La Mesa Dam Watershed and 40 meters below the reservoir. For minimal fees, you are allowed to use their facilities like fishing rods, swimming pool and boats for paddling. La Mesa Dam Watershed is the main source of drinking water for about 12 million Metro Manila residents.

Shopping Centers. After some breathtaking, but enjoyable tours around Metro Manila, you can pamper yourself by shopping to your heart’s content in the major shopping malls spread all over Metro Manila.

2. BICOL REGION. The region is famous specifically for its Mayon Volcano in the province of Albay. The almost perfect cone shape of the volcano makes a beautiful backdrop for pictures. Apart from Mayon Volcano, the beautiful scenery in the regionincludes beaches, mountains and waterfalls. The region is also a good scuba diving destination.

The Mayon volcano, By: Richard

3. LAGUNA PROVINCE. The  Pagsanjan Falls are a major tourist attraction plus the hot spring resorts located in the municipality of Los Banos and Calamba City on the slopes of Mount Makiling.  The province is also known for its beautiful wood carvings by the people of the municipality of Paete. Laguna is situated southeast of Metro Manila.

4. TAGAYTAY CITY. A city in the province of Cavite, Tagaytay is one of the country’s favorite destinations because of its exceptional panorama and cooler environment. The high elevation makes Tagaytay one of the coldest places near the capital city of Manila and with barely 55 kilometers away, a convenient getaway for Manila residents. At the ridges of Tagaytay you can see the famous Taal Volcano, the world’s smallest active volcano located within a lake called Taal Lake.

5. PANGASINAN is the third biggest province in the Philippines endowed with outstanding natural beauty and unique attractions. Enjoy island hopping in the famous Hundred Islands National Park located in the city of Alaminos.

6. ILOCOS NORTE. The province of Ilocos has beautiful white sand beach resorts, historical museums and heritage sites such as the Paoay Church, known for its baroque architecture.

Luzon's Ilocos Norte, By: Eric Molina

Among those must-visit sites in the province is the spectacular Bangui Windmills built alongside an unspoiled black sand beach located in the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos. It is the first wind farm in the country that supplies 40%  of the power requirement in the province.

Paoay Church, By: Hub Hayag

7. VIGAN CITY– Located in the northern part of the Philippines, is one of the most beautiful cities in the country that showcases the cultural past and Spanish heritage of the Ilocandia region. The Vigan Heritage Village is a row of houses built during the Spanish colonial period that is best preserved for the future generations and listed as a World Heritage Site. The village has cobblestone streets with a unique combination of Philippine and European architectural design. Visitors can enjoy the site using a Calesa, a horse driven carriage.

8. IFUGAO – The province of Ifugao is mountainous and rugged, with river valleys and vast forests. Main attractions to the place are the 2000 years old Rice Terraces of the Philippine Cordilleras and Banaue Rice Terraces hand-carved into the mountains by the ancestral tribes, to produce level steps for rice cultivation. These 2000 years old terraces are listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Banaue Rice Terraces, By: Jon Rawlinson

9.  BAGUIO CITY. The center of trade and commerce and the center of education in the entire Northern Luzon, nicknamed the City of Pines, the City of Flowers, the Summer Capital of the Philippines -  these are some of the highlights of Baguio City.

The weather of Baguio makes tourism one of the major industries in the city. It is known specifically for its beautiful cut flowers, strawberries and vegetables that are transported to other major urban markets across the country.

The world renowned Panagbenga festival attracts local and foreign tourists. Panagbenga or Baguio Flower Festival is a month long affair every February that celebrates the gift of flowers and the richness of culture of Baguio and Ifugao province. The festival includes a parade of colorful floats adorned with flowers, and street dancing in flower-inspired costumes.

El Nido in Palawan, By: Guido

10. PALAWAN – Palawan is an island province with Puerto Princesa City as its capital. The island offers beautiful beaches and rich flora and fauna. Visit El Nido Marine Reserve Park, Coron Reefs, and Calauit Game Preserve and Wildlife Sanctuary, all part of the richest and best preserved natural ecosystem in the entire world.

Also worth a visit is the Puerto Princesa Underground River that was recently confirmed as one of the New 7 Wonders of Nature.

You see, Luzon has plenty to offer for travelers. Bustling cities with historical sights, shady parks and perfect shopping, rice paddies, volcanoes and beaches, you name it, Luzon has it!

Daily SG: 21 June 2012

Daily SG: 21 June 2012:


(Credit: Spore Says Political Cartoons)
Singaporeans First?

- sgthinker: A pink IC does not give you the right to a job
Daily Disclosure

- Mr. Smith: Older woman argues with younger woman over priority seat

- Blogging for Myself: Kind Act Harshly Repaid on the MRT

- Everything Also Complain: Wallhola more hazardous than rock climbing

- Leong Sze Hian: Petir: Towards higher wages, higher productivity for all?
Internet Code of Conduct – See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Write No Evil

- New Asia Republic: Cherian George, stop pontificating
Truth, Justice, and the Singapore Way

- Alps Tan: Woffles Wu: Justice done or an aesthetic cover-up?

- Limpeh Is Foreign Talent: Woffles and the system part 2

- Feed Me To The Fish: Woffling Through Cheng San . . .
Defending OUR Lion City?

- Yahoo: Man robs NSF of rifle with a screwdriver

- New Nation: BREAKING NEWS: NSF to be awarded for keeping calm
Preserving Heritage

- The Gigamole Diaries: Selling off our heritage – the plight of Kampong Glam
A Vote for Change

- Blogging for Myself: Assimilating the foreigners among us

- Singapore Notes: Talk About Town

Singapore appoints diplomats to head US, New Zealand missions

Singapore appoints diplomats to head US, New Zealand missions: SINGAPORE: The Singapore government on Thursday appointed two diplomats to head its missions in New Zealand and the United States of America.

Five Nations provide language training to UNTL teachers and lecturers

Five Nations provide language training to UNTL teachers and lecturers:
Five nations currently support the National University of Timor Lorosa’e UNTL with languages – Portuguese and English – teaching at the Faculty of Education, Department of English and Portuguese.
Lecturers from five nations, Brazil, Portugal, New Zealand, Australia and the United States of America, provide Portuguese and English language training to lecturers and students at the university to improve their language ability.

“We now have an English Language Training Centre (ELC), supported by Australia. Currently we are in the process to try and make this language centre the best model in Timor-Leste,” said UNTL Administrator Mateus Fernandes (24/05), at the Liceu, UNTL, in Dili.
According to him, even though Tetum and Portuguese are the official languages of the country, English is equally important because it is an International language.

Courts using Portuguese, translators on hand

Courts using Portuguese, translators on hand:
Timor-Leste Courts make available interpreters and translators to try and ensure the general population can follow court proceedings because in most instances, cases are heard in Portuguese.

“The Courts have translators on hand. The Appeals Tribunal has one interpreter. At the Baucau Court there are three. In Oe-cusse there is one and as well, in Suai  there is one. The Dili Court has four,” said Justice of Peace Jose Ximenes (04/06) from the Court of Appeals, in Caicoli, Dili.

He added, to become an interpreter the individual needs to be fluent in all the languages – Portuguese, English and Tetum – and they must also have knowledge of other local languages.

Academics: Asean's 'sick patient'

Academics: Asean's 'sick patient': Unless Thailand decisively ends the prolonged debate over whether the country should be led by guided or popular democracy, it will remain a sick patient in the emerging and competitive Asean Community, academics said at a seminar on Thursday.

Is a judicial coup in Thailand imminent?

Is a judicial coup in Thailand imminent?:
BP has already blogged on what BP views as the very low likelihood of a military coup. This post will look at a judicial coup. We have already seen the increased role that the judiciary has played in politics over the past few years, but we really need to go back to the Thaksin concealment case in 2001 for the first time in “modern, post-1997″ Thai politics where the court intervened politically and gave Thaksin the benefit of the doubt.
Then, you can say there was a lull until 2006, but after HM the King’s speech in 2006 the judiciary’s role become more prominent. (In 2007, a former judge and then constitutional drafter stated “Even HM the King places trust in the judges; would you condemn them?”). The Court invalidated the April 2006 election and then judges refused to grant bail to the election commissioners (Kaewsan even criticized that decision) as the commissioners refused to resign. The result of spending time in jail was that the commissioners lost their positions and they were granted bail after that.
In 2007, after the coup, we saw a changing in the balance of power in Thailand with the judiciary being given more powers under the 2007 constitution including being on committees to appoint Senators (who then in turn confirm judges) and members of independent agencies. Judges also choose against themselves who will fill the top positions in the judiciary.  This meant that judges were no longer exercising only judicial power, but judges were still able to use  contempt of court to limit criticism (also see these posts about contempt of court here and here )*. Nevertheless, this didn’t stop the judiciary from making public comments criticizing politicians and the political system and moved beyond appearing as merely impartial observers who are above politics.
With all this power though, you still had the question on, who will guard our judicial guardians? The essence of the reason for separation of powers is as explained by Wikipedia that you “[n]ever give ultimate power to any one group; the executive, legislative, or judicial”. The 2007 Constitution gave, in BP’s opinion, too much power towards the judiciary.
It was though in 2008 that the judiciary really started to assert its authority. You had the Samak case where Samak lost his position as Prime Minister because of his role on a cooking show deemed him to be an employee of the show and this was contrary to the Constitution- see posts here, here, and here. Then, you had the Constitution Court apply a very broad meaning to Section 190 of the Constitution when they  ruled that the Communique with Cambodia on Preah Viehar was a treaty which needed parliamentary approval and hence as it didn’t have such approval, it was unconstitutional. This surprised the Foreign Ministry who had been approving the signing of MOUs for years and eventually the broad interpretation caused so many problems with even minor agreements needing parliamentary approval that this provision of the Constitution was amended last year. Yes, interpretations have consequences. Even now, there are concerns that things are still uncertain.
Former Foreign Minister and now ASEAN Sec-Gen Surin as quoted in the Bangkok Post:

A lack of detail as to which agreements require parliament scrutiny has been holding back Thailand as the government has failed to make decisions out of concerns of violating the charter.
“It is barring Thailand from taking a leading role. There are delays in a number of issues because the [country's] leaders do not make decisions and have to ask for parliamentary approval.
“These issues do not require legal amendments, just ministerial directives. In the eyes of other countries, Thailand lacks a clear international policy and continuity in [following up on] agreements,” Mr Surin said on the sidelines of the Asean Economic Ministers meeting held from Tuesday until today in Indonesia.

BP: The situation is that a Minister or the Prime Minister goes off overseas for a bilateral or multilateral meeting, but there is a fear of signing a minor agreement or MOU lest it be deemed to be a treaty – which legally is a different type of document – and the signing being deemed unconstitutional and this leading to criminal charges. In essence, you have few decisions being made out of fear on what may happen.**
Then, of course, you had the dissolving of the pro-Thaksin PPP and two other parties in December 2008 and banning of executives of each party. The dissolution happened so quickly with the court restricting testimony from the defense and holding the final hearing in the morning and writing the judgment in less than an hour delivering that afternoon. This directly led to the downfall of the PPP-led government as it allowed Newin and MPs in his faction to leave the Thaksin fold (as they were no longer PPP MPs as PPP had been dissolved, they could legally join a new party without restrictions which wouldn’t have been possible without the dissolution). This decision was the actual judicial coup – a coup requires the removal or effective removal from power. The fix was clearly known as a Wikileaks cable entitled “THAI PRIME MINISTER SOMCHAI DISREGARDS ARMY COMMANDER’S SUGGESTION HE RESIGN” (08BANGKOK3143) dated October 17, 2008 showed.  The key paragraph is:

6. (C) Anuporn Kashemsant, a foreign liaison officer for the Queen in the Principal Private Secretary’s office, remarked to us October 17 that various political maneuvers were ongoing. He said ”a coup like what happened September 19, 2006 is not one of the options” for resolving Thailand’s political crisis, because the military had proven it was incapable of running the country. His qualification evoked the remark of former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun on October 16 (ref A) to Charge that there would not be ”a coup in the traditional sense of the word.” Anuporn hinted that significant developments likely would take place in the coming days, but refused to predict what might occur, beyond saying there were two possible paths forward.

BP: Indeed, there was not a coup in the traditional sense of the word, but there was a judicial coup about 6 weeks later…Although, of course in a decision in 2009, we see that politicians such as Newin who had by then left the Thaksin fold were acquitted on corruption charges in 2009.
Even though the judiciary has more power, there has been little public discussion about our new judicial guardians. This is despite surveys showing widespread payment of money to judges in cases and whether this is a good thing. The judiciary can come under all kinds of influence, but there is little mention in the media about corruption in the justice system. Surveys of foreign businessman on corruption showed concerned about the expanded powers for the judiciary. Given the increased role of the court and many controversial decisions, BP was not surprised when a survey in 2011 found that 57% of those surveyed had little or no confidence in the Constitution Court.
It is in the above context that things are currently being played out. Talk of deals and with the introduction of the reconciliation bills and the constitutional amendments, it appeared things were on track, but things appeared to quickly fall apart. On Friday June 1, the Constitution Court accepted a petition to review amendments to the constitution on the grounds that the amendments have (or potentially will in the future?) breach Section 68 of the Constitution which provides that “No person shall exercise the rights and liberties prescribed in the Constitution to overthrow the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State under this Constitution”.  After the acceptance, we saw concern expressed about another judicial coup.
Daniel Ten Kate for Bloomberg:

Another ‘‘judicial coup” may take place before street protests spin out of control, a possible pretext for another military intervention, according to Paul Chambers, director of research at the Southeast Asian Institute of Global Studies at Payap University in Chiang Mai, a city in northern Thailand.
“If things continue as they are right now, then Yingluck’s days are numbered,” he said. “If Pheu Thai steps back and ends the attempts to change the constitution, then Yingluck can stay in office perhaps until her term is over.”

Nirmal Ghosh in the Straits Times:

Meanwhile, efforts to amend the Constitution have stalled after the Constitution Court accepted a petition from the Democrat Party and four individuals questioning the legality of the government’s action.
“The ‘judicial coup’ has begun,” a Puea Thai minister said in a text message, using a common term to describe a stream of court judgments against Thaksin and his parties since 2007.
“And they (the PAD and Democrat Party) are trying to stir up violence so that the army can step in,” the minister added.

BP: Since the court’s acceptance of the petition there has been widespread criticism of the court by legal experts. BP has summarized some of the criticisms here. BP has blogged on the defence of the Constitution Court provided by noted Thaksin opponent, Kaewsan. BP has blogged on the Constitution Court’s defence of the acceptance of the petition and also blogged on the Attorney-General stating that the amendments don’t breach the constitution. BP has also blogged querying why the Court has changed its interpretation of the wording in Section 68 from a previous case where the Court rejected to accept a petition directly against the Democrats.
As blogged on the court’s acceptance and the likely outcome:

The amendments do guarantee – actually they are much broader than the current guarantee – that the monarchy will not be amended.
...Simply put, it is one thing to delay the amendments. It is another to go beyond that. The Court in its defence did not actually state what evidence of a threat there was. They have just said people said there was a threat so we would look into that. Based on the evidence presented, and the actual wording of the amendments is the most relevant, there is no evidence of a threat to overthrow the monarchy. Unless there is some no evidence introduced – exactly what is even hard to imagine – it will be very difficult for the court to find an argument to stop the amendments, let alone, do something beyond that like dissolving Puea Thai and banning its executives.
The court then is much more likely to (a) either dismiss the petitions, or (b) look for a face-saving move, such as, require a more strongly worded guarantee. This then provides the rationale for the court accepting the petition in the first place (and hence avoiding criticism of the court for delaying the amendments). It would mean we have additional delays in the amendments which was the whole point of the entire exercise in the first place. The government is then put in a position of defying an actual decision of the court – which is different from an actual order – as opposed to complying and there only be a further delay.* The easier thing to do for the government then is to comply…

BP: Now, you may say, well BP look at what happened in 2008. Simply put, the process was unusually sped up in 2008, but the major problem then was the harsh law. BP does not think you can say the court’s interpretation of the law was unreasonable. The law was designed for the precise propose of dissolving parties and banning executives. This time around to get the judicial coup removing Yingluck and PT from power on the grounds of Section 68 would mean the Court would need to disregard the the actual wording of Section 68 making such a decision a farce. BP thinks this is not that easy to do and the court is unlikely to go down that road.
Not every hiccup for the government will result in a judicial coup. For example, just after last year’s election, when the Election Commission was slow to endorse Yingluck after the 2011 election there was speculation that we are embarking on another judicial coup. As noted at the time, BP thought such claims were, as they turned out to be, premature. Then, you had the Constitution Court accepting the petition to review the constitutionality of executive decrees transferring 1997 financial crisis debt to the Central Bank & authorizing 350 billion baht in loans for flood recovery, but the Court then ruled them constitutional.
Hence, merely because the court has accepted the petition doesn’t mean the court will permanently block amendments or dissolve Puea Thai. The court may do so, but BP sees only a 25% chance of that happening. A temporary delay or some other face-saving measure is more likely.
There are many other cases that have recently cropped up including the Alpine Land case (mainly affecting the Interior Minister), the Ombudsman “ethics” investigation into Yingluck and other politicians etc.  They may eventually develop into cases where the government can be removed, but there do not appear to any imminent serious threats on the horizon although things are less certain than they were just a month ago and can change at anytime.
*Although, returning to the present day,  the court’s acceptance of the petition against the constitutional amendments has resulted in significant criticism, but so far contempt of course has not been raised, as far as BP is aware so perhaps this is less of an issue now.
**A diplomat told BP of an instance where a minor donation was to be made, but the donating country required a MOU to be signed on the Thai side ensuring that the donation was used properly. And then things hit a roadblock as no one from the Thai side wanted to sign the MOU…

Are we any closer to a settlement with the insurgents in Thailand’s Deep South?

Are we any closer to a settlement with the insurgents in Thailand’s Deep South?:
BP has previously blogged about the idea of autonomy for the Deep South when Chavalit raised the issue here, the idea of a referendum here, on a op-ed by Achara here in the Bangkok Post,  another op-ed by Veera in the Bangkok Post here, an op-ed by Chandler Vandergrift in the Bangkok Post here, and on an article that independent researcher Jason Johnson has written an article for Asia Times on the Deep South here.
Then, a few months back BP blogged some statistics on the level of violence in the Deep South including from March 2012 and the coordinated attacks at the end of March which injured hundreds. In March 2012, there were  56 deaths and 547 injuries in Thailand’s Deep South. 547 injuries was a dramatic increase and was the most number of injuries ever in a single month although the number of deaths was above the previous few months although not unusually high. As noted then:

Hence, these two incidents explains the increase in the number of injuries. Most of the injuries were minor, ie. smoke inhalation, and vast majority went home that day. This is not to understate what happened that day, but it is a single day and on its own, it does not yet suggest a sustained increase in violence – you can see there were 221 injuries between November 2011-February 2012 which is less than the number of injuries in the two months prior to this (i.e September-October 2011 where there were 268). The violence goes up and down like a yo-yo at times – look at deaths in Chart 4 in particular – so we need to wait for another 3-6 months to see if there is a consistent increase.
Nevertheless, the demonstration of the increased capacities of the Hat Yai and Yala bombings shows the insurgents have the capacity to dramatically increase the number of fatalities from a couple of incidents, but we are still waiting to see whether this will happen (i.e was March 31 a one-off, an escalation, or something in between – BP thinks the latter).

Jason Johnson, an independent researcher based in the Deep South, had an article last month in Asia Times Online. Some key excerpts below:

While journalists and security analysts have emphasized growing insurgent strength, will and capacity to escalate the unrest, statistics show the insurgency remains locked in a military stalemate. The number of deaths, injuries and violent incidents continues to fluctuate month to month but has shown no clear indications of an upward or downward trend.
There were 56 and 28 deaths resulting from violent incidents in the region respectively in March and April, according to data provided by the Deep South Watch, a Pattani-based think-tank that monitors violence in the region. Both figures fall within the general statistical range of deaths in the region since mid-2007.

BP: So no increase in April. There is not yet any pattern to suggest an upsurge in the violence and agree with Jason that the March and April death figures fall within the general statistical range of deaths.
Jason continues and raises negotiations and Thaksin’s role, particularly in light of stories of Thaksin meeting with some insurgent leaders (as blogged about here):

Yet Thaksin’s role in aggravating regional unrest may have little bearing on future negotiations. Far more significant, according to sources knowledgeable about the situation, is the government’s limited ability to kick-start a negotiation process. At this stage, they say, Yingluck, Thaksin and Tawee lack the political clout to push forward a peace deal.
Thai army chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha, a loyalist to the country’s influential monarchy and known Thaksin adversary, has denounced Puea Thai’s push for “Pattani Mahanakorn”, a proposed model of decentralized democratic regional governance crafted by civil society groups that some have suggested could be introduced as a bill to the country’s parliament.
Prayuth has also criticized Thaksin and Tawee for not talking with all separatist figures believed to have authority over insurgents in the region. The shadowy insurgency is believed to be fragmented into several groups and Thaksin is believed to have been in contact with only certain group representatives.
Since secretive and informal peace talks began under the coup-appointed government of General Surayud Chulanont in 2006, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN-C), the group playing the largest role in the violence but believed to be highly factionalized, has largely refused to engage in talks.
Military figures emphasize that BRN-C’s refusal stems from hardline aspirations for full-blown independence rather than more autonomy. Yet other sources with knowledge of the talks say that as long as Yingluck’s government is unable to demonstrate it is sincere about negotiations and at the same time guarantee it has civilian authority over the powerful military, the movement will never come forward coherently to the negotiation table.
That authority is in doubt, despite Prayuth’s insistence that the army operates on Yingluck’s civilian orders. While her government may be too weak to draw separatist figures with authority over insurgents to the table, Thaksin’s apparent position is precisely what civil society and the international community have long hoped for: a government that intends to end the protracted conflict through negotiations and by introducing some form of special democratic regional governance for the minority region.
Stalemates and settlements

Even if a unified commitment towards a negotiated settlement takes hold in Bangkok, comparative literature on the termination of internal conflicts indicates that it is highly questionable that any such settlement would stick.

BP: To be honest, BP doesn’t have much to argue with Jason about so will keep it short and suggest you give the article a read as am largely in agreement. His opinion is that there is no settlement in sight for now. Will the government push more further given the strong opposition from Prayuth particularly given other political problems? Possibly although unlikely. The situation in the Deep South has been in ‘too hard basket’ for a while now with successive governments outsourcing the issue to the military. Will Thaksin risk the wrath of the military and possible failure in negotiations? If not, there is little chance in a settlement. The constitutional amendments and reconciliation bills providing amnesty are likely much greater priorities….
As BP blogged at the end of 2010 on whether autonomy is a solution:

First, BP is of the view that some form of substantive autonomy/decentralization would assist in reducing the violence. Sure the hardline insurgent leaders would not be happy, but counterinsurgency doesn’t require you win the hearts and the minds of the hardliners. It requires you win the hearts and minds of the local population. Let’s not mince words. The insurgents could not operate without such tacit support/turning a blind eye by many sections of the local community (other sections provide more active support). But those tacit supporters are not always necessarily going to be tacit supporters. Therefore, not only must your words help develop trust with the local population, but your actions must, too. One way to do this is provide the local population with a greater say over how their affairs are organized instead of top-handed, Bangkok-appointed bureaucrats running the show.
BP’s problem with the Ministry proposal is that it appears to be one of these meaningless symoblic gestures which won’t do much and well if it is Ministry it will still be a Bangkok-appointed peson running the show. There are not enough specifics in the article, but it doesn’t seem to go far enough. BP is not opposed to a stepping stone/incremental approach, but just if the step is too small then the reaction may also be small. The reduction in violence or other changes are also likely to be small. If the progress is neglible because the first step is too small, will there be a second step? BP is just very sceptical that a Minister on its own is a substantive step. A Minister + elected governors now that would be….
btw, autonomy is not a pancea for all problems, please see these posts (here, here, and here) on the situation in the Philippines where the violence did not end, although it did drop.

WBO says Pacquiao won over Bradley–report

WBO says Pacquiao won over Bradley–report: World boxing icon Manny Pacquiao won over Timothy Bradley in .....

Baseless rumor over Thailand's U-Tapao

Baseless rumor over Thailand's U-Tapao: A United States request to expand its use of Thailand's civil-military U-Tapao air base for humanitarian and climate-research missions has led to speculation over a political deal that would see the US "pivot" to Asia strengthened in return for self-exiled former premier Thaksin Shinawatra receiving a US visa. The conspiracy theory ignores that hundreds of tourists use the airport daily, rendering it useless for intelligence operations. - John Cole and Steve Sciacchitano (Jun 21, '12)

Eco destination: Laos

Eco destination: Laos:
Totally land locked and without the principal Southeast Asian holiday lure of white sand beach resorts, Laos is certainly a less-than-typical resort tourist destination. All the better for eco-conscious and nature oriented travelers, I say.
Though not dwarfed by its neighbors in terms of physical size, all nations with which Laos shares its borders are far more densely populated than this slow-paced country of 6.5 million.

pic: McKay Savage (Flickr CC)

Covered in forestland and mountainous terrain, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), as it is officially known, is home to many of what are termed Bio-Diversity Conservation Areas. An estimated 50% of the country’s woodland is primary forest, especially rainforest. Though it is still one of the poorest nations in the region, Laos is developing its National Ecotourism Strategy and Action Plan in order to foster tourism while protecting its biodiversity and unique culture.
More can be read about the government’s vision for ecotourism here.
Before development hits, now is probably the time to take advantage of a true nature holiday in Laos. I don’t know if Laos is destined to be thronged by tourists or remain a primarily backpacker destination (there are apparently more monks than tourists at any given time), but for a laid-back cultural and nature trekking holiday there’s no better time than the present.
In general, Laos is full of opportunities for the serious nature traveler. Besides pristine forests and jungle, the Mekong River winds its way through the entire western portion of the country, affording ample adventure and sights. Not least are the spectacular limestone karsts that dot the northern portion of the river. Other natural wonders of note in Laos include the beautiful Kuangsi Waterfall and nearby fascinating Pak Ou Caves, a group of grottos along the Mekong full of wooden Buddhist figures.
If trekking through mountains and jungle, camping in the forest or participating in adventure sports like mountain biking, climbing, caving, rafting and kayaking are your thing, you might want to check out the northern province of Luang Namtha, “the province of life and nature”.

Kuangsi Waterfall, photo: Lars Olsen (Flickr CC)

Some tour operators offer package holidays like Mekong River Cruises, cultural-themed holidays exploring Lao’s ancient Buddhist temples and palaces or adventure trips incorporating other neighboring countries like Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia.
Animals
A diverse array of fauna can be spotted in Laos, including gibbons, leopards, Javan mongooses, goat-antelopes, Malayan sun and Asiatic black bears, and of course elephants. Irrawaddy Dolphins can be seen swimming through southern parts of the Mekong River near Khong Island in Champassack province. Laos is also home to some 800 species of migratory and resident birds, including the rare Green Peafowl.
Ethical options
Hardcore ethical travelers who want to “give something back” might consider “voluntourism” – benefiting poor ethnic minorities in the far north of the country; or staying in a culture lodge in a traditional ethnic village and taking part in their daily activities. Read more about those options here.
If you’d like a bit of a tranquil urban break, visit Luang Prabang, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and considered one of the cleanest and most charming cities in Southeast Asia. Luang Prabang is full of Buddhist temples and traditional wooden houses as well as the occasional French colonial detail. It’s also surrounded by views of green forests and picturesque mountains.
Keep in mind

• Though Laos is a communist country, it is very traditional as well as ethnically and culturally rich. There are some 49 ethnic groups and the nation is officially Buddhist.

• Sexual relations between foreigners and Lao nationals are forbidden outside of marriage. One should also respect local customs by dressing modestly in temples (cover your legs).

• Drink bottled water and bring mosquito repellent to be safe from water-borne illnesses, especially dengue and malaria.

• Make sure you find out whether you require a visa to enter Laos. ASEAN nationals, Koreans, Russians, Japanese and Swiss do not. It is also possible to get a visa on arrival at an airport or other point of entry, but it’s best to be sure depending on your circumstances.

For a brief lowdown on eco-tourism opportunities in the different regions of Laos check out this website.

Luang Prabang, photo: brongaeh (Flickr CC)

PNG election: Ominous signs of violence

PNG election: Ominous signs of violence:
Scott Flower is a McKenzie Fellow at the University of Melbourne. He is regularly engaged by multinational companies as a risk management consultant to major resource projects in PNG.
The two-week polling period for the Papua New Guinea national elections begins in 3 days. There are already ominous signs that the intense electoral competition is evolving into what may be the most violent and corrupt elections in the nation's 37-year post-independence history.
Since the start of the 'official' campaigning period just three weeks ago there have been 19 election-related deaths. Historically, the worst violence occurs following the polls, so if this level of pre-polling violence is any indicator, it is likely that this election will surpass the electoral lows of 2002.

Most troubling, there is increasing evidence confirming a shifting pattern of weapons use. In the past, guns were primarily for tribal fights, but now they are used to influence electoral politics, and as the first polling day approaches, the public display of weapons is increasing in an effort to intimidate and cajole voters ahead of ballots boxes arriving.
These are not homemade shot guns but serious automatic weapons. In the village of Angore in Hela province, the owner of a brand new Uzi Pro sub-machinegun (see photo) said his gun 'is for the election, not tribal fighting'. This is not an isolated example; in March 2011 when I was visiting a village close to Angore a man was shot dead with an M16 as a result of tribal fighting.
Recent observations from the field suggest that election candidates are more than ever before acquiring weapons to influence and intimidate. On 12 June Police and PNGDF forces confiscated a cache of illegal weapons from a candidate's home near Mount Hagen. The weapons included a self-loading rifle, a Sig pistol with 29 rounds of ammunition, a box containing 25 buckshot cartridges and a telescope.
Since the Lowy Institute published its policy brief on the foreign support necessary to avert violence in the upcoming elections, New Zealand and Australia have increased their assistance. From an initial offer of two aircraft as part of the Electoral Support Program, Australia and New Zealand have stepped up their support to include 250 military personnel, 13 helicopters and 2 fixed-wing aircraft, civilian technical experts to complete the electoral rolls and train polling officers, and logistics support to help organise the security and transportation of election materials and officials.
However, recent examples of corruption and violence might lead one to conclude that the foreign assistance is too little, and too late to mitigate the further erosion and potential collapse of PNG's electoral integrity and democratic processes.
Intense electoral competition is the key factor driving violence, intimidation and corruption. The 3435 candidates across the country are competing for only 109 seats in parliament. The incumbent Chimbu Governor, John Garia, is facing 72 rival candidates, the largest number of challengers in a single electorate in the country.
More candidates than ever have leveraged traditional customary debt networks to fund their electoral campaign, creating a 'win at all costs' environment. Candidates know that if they lose, their inability to repay creditors will, at best, reduce their social status to that of 'rubis man' (tok pisin for rubbish man). At worst, it will trigger customary forms of payback violence which generally escalate into a spiral of tit-for-tat violence.
Increasing levels of political violence and incidents of corruption involving police and PNG Defence Force personnel highlight the tenuous situation PNG faces through this election period. Electoral officials, police and PNGDF personnel are supposed to act in a professional and impartial capacity to ensure electoral integrity. But increasingly, they are observed engaging in local politics and being influenced by tribal links and money. The following events over last three weeks give a taste of what is yet to come:

• A provincial election manager was arrested for ballot box manipulation; police confiscated alcohol, an unlicensed pistol and K200,000 (US$94,300) cash.
• A PNGDF officer has managed to ensure he and his troops are deployed to Wabag electorate, where his tribesmen are located, in order to help protect his tribe's ballot boxes.
• Police reported uncovering a conspiracy involving well funded groups using money to 'bribe security forces personnel' and purchase military, police and correctional service uniforms.
• Police officers across the highlands have smuggled weapon magazines and ammunition, and smashed unfavoured candidates' posters within their electorates; some police members supported a candidate's attack on a sitting MP.

Last week an article in The Australian detailed how Australia planned to respond to a 'fundamental breakdown of order' in Port Moresby by deploying troops to PNG to evacuate Australians and 'secure the government'. The article further damaged Australia's legitimacy to influence PNG political elites and eroded public support among locals for greater Australian intervention. Whatever happens in PNG this election, it is clear that Australia and other friends of PNG need to revise their strategy if there is any chance of helping the country gain greater stability.

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Religious intolerance and law reform challenges in Indonesia

Religious intolerance and law reform challenges in Indonesia:
Author: Melissa Crouch, University of Melbourne
One of the biggest challenges facing the Indonesian government is how to deal with religious intolerance, as sporadic acts of inter-religious violence continue to occur despite the introduction of democracy more than 13 years ago.

This year, the government proposed a program of legislative reform and prioritised two bills that it believes will help to prevent and resolve inter-religious conflict. The first, which has recently been passed, is the Law on Resolving Social Conflict. The second, which has yet to be passed, is the Draft Law on Inter-religious Harmony.
These proposals are based on the simplistic assumption that inter-religious conflict occurs because there are no laws against it. The new legislation addresses the perceived need for greater regulation of religious affairs and the criminalisation of religious offences. Yet it fails to identify both the real political, economic and social factors behind religious intolerance and conflict.
For example, there is often a real or perceived economic disparity between a Christian congregation that intends to build a church and local Muslim residents. Opposition to the construction of churches can be diffused if a church is willing to allow local Muslim residents to work as parking attendants. Such an arrangement ensures the local community benefits from the church by way of employment.
Further, there are also the contributing issues of poor law enforcement and the complicity of law enforcement agencies in social conflicts. In the Cikeusik incident of February 2011, for example, the police were clearly informed and aware that a demonstration or attack was going to take place at the house of an Ahmadi leader in Cikeusik. The police failed to intervene and protect the 17 Ahmadis in the face of a crowd of 1,000, which led to the brutal deaths of 3 Ahmadis.
For example, the Law on Resolving Social Conflict presumes that current social and religious conflicts are caused by the police’s lack of power to break up ethnic and religious conflicts, including disputes over permits for places of worship. This new regulation thus confers wide powers on the police, allows national or regional governments to declare a 90-day state of emergency, and enables the government to call on the military for ‘assistance’.
The law is problematic because it indicates a return to authoritarian policies of military control over religious and ethnic communities, and relies on a Social Conflict Resolution Commission to resolve conflict. The Commission, which has not been established yet, will include representatives from the police, the army, religious leaders, and the parties involved in the conflict. The Commission is a cause for concern because it is described as existing ‘outside of the courts’, suggesting that its decisions cannot be reviewed and, therefore, cannot be held to account.
The second proposal, the Draft Law on Inter-religious Harmony, also fails to address the real factors and causes at the root of religious tensions. The Draft Law circulated in late 2011 attempts to regulate issues as broad as religious education, burial practices, proselytisation and religious celebrations. It also defines an array of offences that would amount to the crime of blasphemy.
The suggestion of a Draft Law on Inter-religious Harmony has been around in various forms since the 1980s. The fact that this law has not yet been passed suggests that there is no agreement on what it means to regulate religion in Indonesia, or to what extent religious affairs should be regulated. While it is generally accepted that states may regulate the activities of religious communities in the interests of social order and public harmony, there is much debate over the best way to achieve this.
While Indonesia has made a remarkable transition to democracy and made significant progress in many areas including the issue of terrorism, it has failed to make real progress in regard to inter-religious conflict. The ongoing opposition and incidents of violence against religious minorities, such as the Islamic sect Ahmadiyah or Christians, are not caused by a lack of police powers to prosecute offenders.
Rather, these disputes arise due to a complex series of factors, including a lack of basic law enforcement and indications that law enforcement agencies may be complicit in — or unwilling to — address religious conflict. As the 2014 national elections approach, the need for the government to address religious intolerance remains a pressing concern. The search for an appropriate way to regulate religion must complement rather than replace efforts to create other (non-legal) means of preventing and resolving inter-religious tensions.
Melissa Crouch is Research Fellow at the Melbourne Law School, the University of Melbourne.

1. Religious intolerance and law reform challenges in Indonesia
2. Exit Sri Mulyani: Corruption and reform in Indonesia
3. Muslim organisations and governance reform in Indonesia

Jakarta Post: West Papua Updates

Jakarta Post: West Papua Updates:
Article – West Papua Media Alerts
1) Papua and problem of structural injustice 2) Top minister tries to woo Papuan leaders 3) Govt to continue welfare approach to deal with Papua problems ————————————Jakarta Post: West Papua Updates
1) Papua and problem of structural injustice



2) Top minister tries to woo Papuan leaders



3) Govt to continue welfare approach to deal with Papua problems



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http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/06/19/papua-and-problem-structural-injustice.html
1) Papua and problem of structural injustice



Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Jakarta | Opinion | Tue, 06/19/2012 9:25 AM
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The problem confronted by Papua, the easternmost province of Indonesia, is structural, rather than developmental as perceived by the current government.
The creation of the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B) was also based on an assumption that Papua suffered from developmental neglect and that its development should be accelerated to solve the problem.
Such a technocratic view was proved to be wrong as shown by the collapse of the Soeharto regime that was built on the “developmentalist” ideology.
Last week, I had a chance to visit Jayapura, Merauke and Boven Digoel, observing and talking with some experts and ordinary people about the latest developments in Papua. My visit coincided with daily mysterious shooting incidents, mostly in Jayapura. Intentionally or unintentionally, these random acts of violence looked to be perpetrated to create a specter of terror that would contribute to a climate of fear that has long characterized Papuan society.
Political relations between the center and the periphery are an old problem in this country. Following the end of Soeharto regime in 1998, the format of center-periphery relations was renewed with bigger autonomy given to regional governments. But the horror of disintegration, particularly among the military elites, was the reason for a halfhearted decentralization policy, as autonomy is given to the regency/municipality rather the provincial level of government.
Apart from this problematic decentralization, the post-Soeharto era was also marked by the Timor Leste partition in 1999, and a peace agreement in the rebellious province of Aceh in 2005. After Timor Leste and Aceh, Papua is now seen as the main problem of center-periphery relations in the republic. Armed rebels grouped under the Free Papua Organization (OPM) radically call for a separation from Indonesia.
Some argue that a healthy dialogue is urgently needed between Papuans and the central government in order to address the intractable tension and conflict in the province. Dialogue is important but I would argue that it will not be sufficient. Apart from the immediate problem of representation, a dialogue assumes the presence of two opposite but equal parties. Such an assumption is unlikely to be accepted by the Indonesian government.
As the basic issues in Papua are structural rather developmental, I would argue that a new perspective should be proposed to resolve the problem in Papua. From a structural perspective, the problem of Papua is not unique. By seeing Papua’s problems as Indonesia’s problems we look at the solution to Papua as a solution for the whole of Indonesia without any exception.
A structural perspective views the problem of the society as a result of structural injustices emanating from continuing economic and political inequalities between the center and periphery. The central government’s policies toward Papua have officially changed in the guise of special autonomy, yet the structural injustices persist.
These injustices are a problem facing not only Papuans but the majority of Indonesian citizens. Structural injustices are rooted in the wrong assumption in the Constitution that the state will unquestionably take care of the life of its citizens, but in reality we continue witnessing the state’s failure to protect its citizens from violence and the abuse of power.
What is currently happening in Papua is only a reflection of the state’s failure to resolve the continuing problem of structural injustices in this country. The difference between Papua and other places in Indonesia, including in the capital city of Jakarta, is just a matter of the degree of violence. In Papua the level of violence is higher than that in other places as the latest string of fatal shootings strongly indicated. The basic right of the Indonesian citizens to security protection from the state is simply violated. The climate of fear and the insecurities felt by ordinary citizens in Papua are growing unchecked.
From what I have witnessed, today, both sociologically and demographically, Papuans can no longer be divided into particular ethnic or racial groups. The movement of people, in and out-migration in Papua, has occurred for centuries. The latest population census (2010) clearly indicated the high level of in-migration into Papua.
Papua is in fact a pluralistic society, in which any attempt to distinguish between indigenous and migrants is becoming more futile. Every day, the number of people who move in and out of Papua is increasing as the number of daily flights and weekly ships obviously indicate. While certain Papuan elites and their organizations understandably try to reassert their claims about a pure Papuan identity, such a move runs counter to the reality.
Cities and urban areas in Papua have become the most pluralistic places, in which people from different social and economic backgrounds mingle and interact. In such urban settings, social tensions and conflicts normally occur, as people are competing for economic and political resources.
It is the constitutional duty of the state to protect its citizens from discrimination. Economic and political fairness should be the order of the day, where the state has to act as an impartial referee when tensions and conflicts arise between different groups and people in society. Yet as we are witnessing these days in Papua, the Constitution, which mandates the state to protect all its citizens, is simply being violated.
The writer is a researcher at the Research Center for Society and Culture, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and the author of Looking for Indonesia 2: The Limits of Social Engineering (LIPI Press, 2010
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2) Top minister tries to woo Papuan leaders



Nethy Dharma Somba and Margaretha Aritonang, The Jakarta Post, Jayapura/Jakarta | Headlines | Tue, 06/19/2012 9:51 AM
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Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Djoko Suyanto ruled out a military operation to tackle the escalating violence, which claimed another two lives in Mimika on Monday.
“We have so far adopted an approach that promotes the economy and people’s welfare, not a military [approach], because military action should only be used to deal with crimes,” Djoko said as quoted by Antara news agency during a gathering with community figures, religious leaders and members of the Papua Legislative Council (DPRP) and Papuan Consultative Assembly (MPRP) in Jayapura on Monday.
He was accompanied by Indonesian Military (TNI) chief Adm. Agus Suhartono, National Police chief Gen. Timur Pradopo, National Intelligence Agency (BIN) head Lt. Gen. Marciano, and Papua’s caretaker governor Syamsul Arief Rivai.
The arrival of the top-ranking delegation was reported in the wake of escalating violence that has claimed dozens of lives. Djoko, however, insisted that it was a routine tour of duty, and not specifically prompted by the ongoing security challenges in the province.
The latest communal clash in Mimika, Papua on Monday killed two people and injured dozens of others, including four police personnel.
The clash reportedly had its roots in ongoing resentment following a fatal traffic accident in May.
“The clash [on Monday] killed two people, but they have not yet been identified. Four police officers were rushed to hospital with arrow wounds,” Papua Police spokesman, Adj. Sn. Comr. Johanes Nugroho, told The Jakarta Post.
The fighting crowds also burned five Mimika Police vehicles and two motorcycles.
It was reported that the clash between the residents from Harapan and Bawah villages began at 7:30 a.m. The police were called in to deal with the situation but received a rough reception as the crowd turned on them, despite their firing warning shots into the air.
As the police retreated, the crowd vented their fury upon the vehicles and motorcycles.
The incident is the latest in a spate of violent attacks that have battered the country’s easternmost province over the past few weeks, including unsolved shooting deaths and riots in Jayapura and a rampage by military personnel in Wamena.
The marked escalation in violence has prompted the House of Representatives to establish a working committee to deal with the issue.
“We need to form a working committee and we are discussing what measures we need to take. For sure, the committee must seek an amiable and dignified solution. Weapons should be avoided in order to restore security; so, we are prioritizing dialogue and trust building,” said TB Hasanuddin, who chairs the House Commission I overseeing defense and foreign affairs.
“We met with the chief of the military and he said they were awaiting instructions,” he said in Jakarta on Monday.
He quoted the military chief as saying further: “If we are asked to launch a security operation, give us the legal as well as political umbrella so that we do not bear the brunt of the blame.”
Hasanuddin said the effectiveness of the policy to form a committee would depend on the government’s political will to execute the measures.
Violent cases 2007-2012:



Oct. 17, 2007

Eight people are killed and 19 injured in violence involving four tribes in Tembagapura district, Mimika.
March 11, 2007

Tribal violence in Paniai regency kills nine people. The violence is sparked by the death of a local teacher.
Jan. 5-19, 2010

Three people are killed and 34 people injured in a clash between two groups in Kwamki Lama, Mimika regency. The conflict is sparked by a rape and the payment of customary fines.
July 30, 2011

Seventeen people die and dozens are injured when the supporters of rival candidates in a local regency election clash in Ilaga district, Puncak Jaya regency.
Jan. 21, 2012

One person dies in a regional election clash during campaigning for a local regency election in Tolikara regency.
Feb. 15, 2012

Four die and almost 100 others are injured as supporters of rival candidates in the Tolikara regency election clash.
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3) Govt to continue welfare approach to deal with Papua problems



Mon, June 18 2012 21:30 | 278 Views
Jayapura, Papua (ANTARA News) – President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has continued implementing a welfare approach to deal with the problems in Papua, according to chief security minister Djoko Suyanto.
“Until now the approach used is welfare and not military, because a military approach is only useful for dealing with crimes,” Djoko said at a meeting with community and religious leaders and members of the Papuan legislative assembly (DPRP) and the Papuan People Council (MRP) here on Monday.
He stated that he had come to Papua not because of the recent violent incidents, but because of his duty to learn about what happened in the region.
“Indeed it is not easy to unite the views of different parties, but the most important thing is how to unite Papua peacefully so that the province could catch up with other regions,” Djoko noted.
He added that the government hoped to “bring Papua in harmony with the Unitary State of Indonesia”.
Regarding the implementation of special autonomy in Papua, Djoko said the program had not yet been able to meet public expectations.
In view of that, he added, the implementation of the program would continue to be evaluated, which had led to the issuance of Presidential Instruction Number 5 of 2005 and the establishment of the UP4B (Papua and West Papua Development Acceleration Unit) in 2011.
The meeting was also attended by defense forces commander Admiral Agus Suhartono, national police chief General Timur Pradopo, and National Intelligence Agency chief Marciano Norman.(*)
Editor: Heru
ENDS
Content Sourced from scoop.co.nz

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West Papua: Tragedy as farce

West Papua: Tragedy as farce:
The Indonesian government’s attempt to initiate dialogue with West Papuan independence activists has declined into farce, following the shooting on 14 June of key West Papuan leader Mako Tabuni. Tabuni’s killing follows seven other recent shootings of West Papuans by Indonesian police and soldiers.

Despite eye witnesses saying that Tabuni was unarmed and trying to flee Indonesian police, Indonesian police spokesman, Senior Commissioner Johnannes Nugroho claimed that Tabuni was armed with a police pistol.

Last Thursday, however, Indonesian police chief General Timur Pradopo said Tabuni had been shot while trying to seize a pistol from police officers. ‘Prior to the capture, a conversation took place,’ Pradopo said in an official statement. ‘Then the gun of a police officer was seized, so other police members protected [the officer].’
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Megatrends at Malaysia’s 13th general elections

Megatrends at Malaysia’s 13th general elections:
New Mandala readers interested in Malaysia, may want to read my take on the coming general election in Malaysia. I have an article in Asia Currents, the electronic newsletter of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA), that discusses what I think are the key issues, how they are likely to impact on the two coalitions, and the ability of the two coalitions to respond to these issues.
I note that there are five critical issues that the two coalitions will have to face both in the short and long term.

Five critical megatrends face the contenders at the national level: economic performance, demographic changes, urbanisation, Islamisation and an island/peninsular divide.
The middle-income trap: The popular diagnosis for Malaysia’s stagnating economic performance is that Malaysia is caught in a middle-income trap, where it is unable to compete with low-cost producers on cost, but also by not having the institutions, human resources and technological capabilities to compete with advanced economies in innovative products and processes.
A young nation: 71 per cent of Malaysians are under the age of 40, with 34 per cent aged between 20 and 40.
An urban nation: 71 per cent of Malaysia is now urban, with only Kelantan, Pahang, Perlis, Sabah and Sarawak still being largely rural. Urbanisation rates are below 55 per cent.
An Islamic nation: The pervasiveness of Islam as a political tool and the increasing piety among Muslims have reached unprecedented levels.
Two nations: The politics of Peninsular Malaysia starkly differ from that of the island of Borneo. Political leaders and citizens in Sabah and Sarawak continue to distrust peninsular politicians, and all politics in these two states is local.

I conclude that the coalition that is better able at managing these megatrends, will have the better chance of winning, and staying in power.

The two main contenders have framed their arguments for support in a contrasting manner. UMNO, through the BN, has argued that social stability delivers economic growth and that only a strong UMNO can guarantee social stability.
At the 13th general election, UMNO will be arguing that it has the track record in delivering social stability and economic growth. PR, instead, is arguing that good governance and social justice are critical to Malaysia’s continued economic growth and social stability. PR argues that the persistent weakening of the Malaysian economy, and social unrest, are due to the BN’s mismanagement of the economy, its divisive racial and religious politics, and the abuse of the rule of law.
The 2008 general election solidified the two-coalition system, and this is unlikely to be reversed. The surprising aspect of this development is that it took opposition parties 50-odd years to cooperate effectively, considering that Malaysians never gave the BN, on average, more than 57 per cent of the popular votes—with its best-ever result of 65 per cent achieved only in the booming 90s, at the 1995 general election.
Malaysians have demonstrated time and again that, despite its hegemony, the BN is not an overwhelmingly popular coalition. While the results of the 13th general election will depend mainly on the leadership abilities of Najib Razak and Anwar Ibrahim to manage their coalitions in addressing issues, neither coalition will remain in power for long—even with the support of a rigged electoral system—if it fails to address these megatrends effectively.

Blaming villagers for global warming

Blaming villagers for global warming:

Humans cutting down forest land to farm is nothing new. However, charging rural farmers for causing global warming is. A controversial formula is quantifying the damage villagers have to pay for their small scale farming. Now, the villagers are taking a stand against what they know is wrong.
PHETCHABUN – Early one Thursday morning, a gun was pointed at Ms. Kwanla Saikhumtung, a 34-year-old mother, because she was farming.
The man who pointed the gun was one of ten armed officers from Phu Pha Daeng, the local wildlife sanctuary in Lomsak district. After observing the villagers for three days, the officers finally informed Ms. Kwanla and twelve fellow villagers from Huay Kontha that they were trespassing on wildlife sanctuary land. They demanded that the villagers come to the police station to talk with them.
They refused. The villager that hired them paid taxes on the plot, leading the villagers to believe they had a right to work the land, and they worried about finishing their work.
The officers quickly became annoyed. One threatened to shoot any villager that resisted the officers’ orders.
“Are you really going to shoot? I’m here to harvest the corn, and you want to shoot us?” Ms. Kwanla shouted.  She then bravely grabbed the barrel of the gun, pressed it to her chest, and said, “If you’re going to shoot, shoot.”
The officer lowered his gun. That night, the officers marched the reluctant villagers through the community and drove them to the police station.
This incident was the beginning of a seven-year-long legal battle, pitting Ms. Kwanla against the Thai government. She and the other twelve villagers — the youngest only sixteen at the time — were first charged with trespassing.
The real shock, however, came when they were slapped with a 470,000 baht fine for contributing to global warming under the charge of causing environmental damage.
As the landowner was paying taxes on the plot of land in question, he had the right to grow crops on it. Since Ms. Kwanla and the other villagers had been hired to harvest his corn, it had seemed that they were not breaking the law by being there. However, unknown to the landholder, his plot overlapped with the wildlife sanctuary land.
The Royal Forestry Department (RFD) fined the villagers for cutting down trees and farming, drawing from the 1992 National Environmental Quality Act which forbids “destruction, loss, or damage to natural resources owned by the State.” Their fine was determined according to a formula used to calculate environmental damage. The formula measures the increase in temperature caused by cutting down trees. Any increase in the land temperature shows ‘global warming’. In essence, cutting down trees to farm corn leads to global warming.
The Huay Kontha villagers have a running joke, “Because we pick the corn, the world gets hotter.”
The charges that Ms. Kwanla and the other villagers face shed light on an emerging trend in Thailand. Land dispute issues are becoming increasingly common. According to Pramote Pholpinyo, coordinator of the Northeast Land Reform Network (LRN), there are currently 35-40 “global warming” cases against villagers in Thailand, with charges amounting to almost 33 million baht.
While many of these trespassing charges are currently on appeal, the LRN has launched a countersuit against the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation in the Administrative Court of First Instance.
Kritsada Koonarong, a lawyer working with Environmental Litigation and Advocacy for the Wants (EnLAW) on the countersuit case, says, “this case is the first where people faced with this issue have come together and rose up to fight.”
A lawyer working with the Huay Kontha villagers who wishes to remain unnamed, believes that whether villagers win or lose the countersuit, it is important to fight this case: “We know we might lose, but we have to fight anyway… So that society will know even if we do not win.”
Thailand’s forestland rapidly decreased throughout most of the 20^th century. By 1998 only 25 percent of the original forestland remained.  Since then, the Thai government, through the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), has taken a hard-line stance on reforestation by creating a network of national parks, reserves, and sanctuaries. As a result, between 1979 and 2004, forestland tripled.  This system has undoubtedly been effective in increasing forestland, thereby decreasing greenhouse gases.
The borders of these areas, however, were created with Global Positioning System (GPS) technology rather than with the more accurate Geographic Information System (GIS) technology. As a result, borders separating the forest areas and village farming areas have become unclear.
These border disputes have also led to debate over villager’s historical claims to the land.   A veteran RFD official, Dr. Permsak Makarabhirom elaborates, “The proclamation of an area as a national park effectively makes ‘illegal’ residents of people who had settled these areas years before the proclamation.” The overlapping claims on protected forest areas are affecting approximately two million people across Thailand.
According to Dr. Vute Wangwacharakul, a climate change expert, “Thailand has been doing its best to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the impact…of climate change.”
Though Dr. Wangwacharakul recognizes that the creation of forest reserves is “one important tool” in combating climate change, he also admits that “any expansion of forest land would have trade-offs with other land uses and the affected parties are mainly the rural poor.”
The global warming fines that the villagers must pay are calculated using a formula created in the 1994 by Dr. Pongsak Wittawatchutikul, a National Parks Department specialist. With this formula, a thermometer is used to measure the temperature of soil in degraded land and soil in forest land. The difference in the temperatures is calculated. Then an estimate is made about the amount of energy it would take to cool down the hotter deforested area using an air conditioner. This calculation, along with an approximation of the number of trees cut down and the amount of soil loss, determines the fine.
A National Parks Department report says the formula was created with the intention of “finding the value of ecosystems with the support of academic people from human rights committees.” Lawyers involved in the countersuit question the legitimacy of this formula, first used in court in 2004.
Dr. Ponsgak’s formula has also faced criticism from the academic community. A climate change specialist and director of Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency, Dr. Anont Sanitwong na Ayutthaya, argues, “Scientists agree that this doesn’t make any sense at all…it has nothing to do with global climate change.”
Even Dr. Pongsak himself came out against the use of this formula to fine villagers. In an interview with the National Human Rights Commission, he recently said, “I accepted that some parts of the formula needed to be fixed, and I’ve tried to make it the most accurate and correct,” but due to the complexity of the government systems and procedures, he has not been able to make such adjustments.
However, many government agencies continue to affirm the formula’s legitimacy. Mr. Thongchai Siripattananukulchai, Director of the Region 11 Protected Areas Office states: “I think this formula has been studied well enough to be used… It is legitimate, therefore we are using it.”
Today, Thailand is the only country that has attempted to quantify damages and fine its citizens for contributing to global warming. The Department of National Parks also admits that Thailand is the first country to even think of charging citizens in this manner, says Mr. Kristada.
According to the UNFCCC, industry and energy production account for approximately 75 percent of Thailand’s greenhouse gas emissions. But to date, only small-scale farmers have been charged with environmental damage, using the global warming formula. The focus on villagers is disproportionate, and does not focus on the real producers of greenhouse gases. Dr. Wangwacharakul claims, “Emissions from fossil fuels are the most important factor contributing to climate change.”
The unnamed lawyer working with the Huay Kontha villagers acknowledges that Thailand has implemented sound environmental regulations. Yet, it does not punish private industrial companies harshly enough for violating these regulations. “In terms of economics and business internationally,” he says, “it would cause a bad image for Thailand.”
When asked about charging industries with environmental damage, Mr. Thongchai of the Protected Areas Office claims, “all parties will be treated equally regardless of if they are companies or individuals.”
If used fairly, the Environmental Quality Act holds much potential for mitigating climate change in Thailand.  According to Mr. Kritsada, “the environmental law was intended for the people who destroy the environment to get it back to its original state.”  However, to get to the root of the problem, the relationship between industry and the environment must be further scrutinized if the true perpetrators are to be held responsible.
Meanwhile, Ms. Kwanla continues her life as an agricultural laborer, now harvesting cassava and onions. She says that she has to fight back on principle. “I want to show them that I am not wrong. If we accept the charges, that is saying I am wrong.”
While she has not been to court since last February, and does not know when her next court date will be, she remains hopeful.
Her village stands by her side in support, because she represents their communal struggle, and that of hundreds of other farmers throughout Thailand.
“Every time I go to court, most of the villagers come and support me, every time… The judge knows that when I come, it gets crowded.”
The story in images

No longer able to harvest corn since the lawsuit, Ms. Kwanla and her fellow villagers now harvest cassava and hom jean, a local onion variety.

Since being charged with global warming, villagers have begun working on farms farther from the reserve, harvesting cassava. The man in red was one of the thirteen villagers who was charged along with Ms. Kwanla.


A fellow villager labors in the field harvesting cassava. Every morning the villagers must wake up extremely early to travel to the field, as it is located thirty kilometers outside of the village.

Standing in front of her humble home in Huay Kon Tha village located in Petchabhun Province, Ms. Kwanla prepares to join her fellow villagers at the nearby cassava fields.

Ms. Kwanla uses charcoal to cook her breakfast of an omelette and grilled frog accompanied with the ever ubiquitous sticky rice, a common meal among rural Thai villages.

While being charged for contributing to global warming, Ms. Kwanla’s regular electricity use consists of only two light bulbs, a television and a washer and dryer..

King Bhumibol Adulyadej has said, “has the forest trespassed the people, or have the people trespassed the forest…this problem has never been solved.” For Ms. Kwanla, this statement is all too true.

Sitting in her home, Ms. Kwanla discusses how the charges have affected her husband and her two daughters who are all currently living at home with her.

Ms. Kwanla’s home is comprised of two small rooms. She uses little electricity other than two light bulbs, a television and a washer and dryer.

Since being charged after harvesting corn Ms. Kwanla has begun growing and selling hom jean, a local variety of onion, on her farm.
By Fay Walker, Occidental College; Coral Keegan, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; Abigal Friedman, Kenyon College; Morgan Washburn, Loras College; Ellery Graves, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Thailand’s reconciliation proposals

Thailand’s reconciliation proposals:

Following Nick Nostitz’s very informative coverage of the opposition to what he calls “reconciliation games,” below is an unofficial translation of the four versions of the important articles of the proposed reconciliation bills.
Given the recent mayhem in parliament, the debate on the bills has been put on hold at least until the next parliamentary session in August. This has ended speculation that the third reading might be called in the House-Senate joint meeting. This is a commendable move on the part of House Speaker, Somsak Kiatsuranont, to not purposely exclude opposition to the bills, such as from the Democrats, and to heed the calls from the judiciary.
Pheu Thai suffered an embarrassing blow from its failed attempt to boycott the Constitution Court’s order to postpone constitutional amendment. When it came time for the House-Senate deliberation on the boycott, in which the ruling government needed 322 votes to pass, they merely garnered 318 votes despite their majority. Only 41 out of 149 senators agreed, while 8 MPs from Chat Thai Pattana were no shows, resulting in an angry phone call to Banharn from Thaksin. Worse, 16 Pheu Thai MPs were absent. Nattawut Saikua admits there is a “rift” within the party as to the role of the Constitutional Court as well as what should constitute the “unity bill.”
There are four versions to the proposed unity bills. Only one of them was presided over by a non-Pheu Thai member. None of the proposed bills included the Democrat Party, however. Also note that none of the proposed bills mention Article 112 of the penal code.
All official drafts can be viewed on-line at the Thai Parliament Information System.
Draft I: proposed by General Sonthi Boonyaratklin (Matubhumi Party) and MPs from Chart Thai Pattana Party, Mahachon Party, Chart Pattana Party, Palangchol Party, New Democrat Party, Pheau Thai Party

• Article 3. Anyone whose actions relating to political protests or political activities between 15 September 2005 and 10 May 2011 that were against the law shall be given amnesty. This applies to both ordinary citizens and state authorities.
• Article 4. Any pending investigation on individuals who meet the criteria of article 3 must cease and anyone who has partially served his/her term will be released immediately.
• Article 5. Any individual who has been affected by the action of individuals, groups or authorities set up by the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy (CDRCM) will no longer be considered as an offender. Article 4 will apply to such individual.
• Article 6. Voting rights of members of political parties that were dissolved shall be reinstated.

Draft II: proposed by Niyom Worapanya and Pheu Thai MPs

• Article 3. Any individual or groups who were affected by the coup d’état on 19 September 2006 up until the day this legislation is promulgated shall be given amnesty. This includes individuals and state officials who acted on the orders of the CDRCM; individuals whose political rights have been revoked; actions relating to protest or opposition to the CDRCM; actions by independent bodies according to articles 1,2,3 and 4 of the interim 2006 constitution or the 2007 constitution.

Draft III: proposed by Nattawut Saikua and Pheu Thai MPs (Red Shirt version)

• Article 3. Anyone whose actions relating to political protests or political activities between 15 September 2005 and 10 May 2011 that were against the law shall be given amnesty. Any pending investigation on individuals who meet the criteria of Article 3 must cease and anyone who has partially served his/her term will be released immediately. However this article does not apply to terrorist acts or actions aimed to hurt the lives of others.

Draft IV: proposed by Samart Kaewmeechai and Pheu Thai MPs

• Similar to General Sonthi’s draft version