For example, when you search for a movie and click "explore more", Google shows more cast members. You can use the arrow icons to switch to a different category.
{ Thanks, Maarten. }
Jul 25, 2012
Google Tests an Expanded Knowledge Graph Box
Google Tests an Expanded Knowledge Graph Box: Google tests a new feature of the knowledge sidebar: a link that invites you to "explore more". The Knowledge Graph section doesn't allow Google to show more than 5 related people, books, albums, movies, so the experiment displays more of them below the search box.
For example, when you search for a movie and click "explore more", Google shows more cast members. You can use the arrow icons to switch to a different category.
{ Thanks, Maarten. }
For example, when you search for a movie and click "explore more", Google shows more cast members. You can use the arrow icons to switch to a different category.
{ Thanks, Maarten. }
Use Your Real Name on YouTube
Use Your Real Name on YouTube: Now that YouTube uses Google Accounts and integrates with Google+, it's a lot easier for Google to bring more Google+ features to YouTube.
You can now use your full name on YouTube. Just go to YouTube's settings page, click "advanced" next to your email address and click "Begin using my full name on YouTube".
What will change after enabling this feature?
1. Your full name from your Google+ profile will replace your username on YouTube.
2. Your channel title and photo will change.
The YouTube username can still be used to log in and the channel URL will stay the same.
Google's goal is to use the same identity on YouTube, Google+ and other Google services so that it can provide an unified experience. For example, other people that know you will find your YouTube videos much easier if you're using your full name and your photo. YouTube's commmenting system can also improve if people use their real identity.
Obviously, not everyone will want to drop their username, especially if they like/need anonymity or their username is very popular. That's probably the reason why this feature is optional.
A Google spokesperson told LA Times that "YouTube will let people change their usernames back if they decide to start using their full name. (...) New users can still set their YouTube name however they want. The prompt comes up only for users who have a Google+ profile."
"You'll see this option when you upload or comment on YouTube (...). For partners, brands, and organizations, you won't see this just yet. In the coming months we'll be working on new options to give you even more control over your presence on YouTube," informs Google.
{ Thanks, Katty. }
You can now use your full name on YouTube. Just go to YouTube's settings page, click "advanced" next to your email address and click "Begin using my full name on YouTube".
What will change after enabling this feature?
1. Your full name from your Google+ profile will replace your username on YouTube.
2. Your channel title and photo will change.
The YouTube username can still be used to log in and the channel URL will stay the same.
Google's goal is to use the same identity on YouTube, Google+ and other Google services so that it can provide an unified experience. For example, other people that know you will find your YouTube videos much easier if you're using your full name and your photo. YouTube's commmenting system can also improve if people use their real identity.
Obviously, not everyone will want to drop their username, especially if they like/need anonymity or their username is very popular. That's probably the reason why this feature is optional.
A Google spokesperson told LA Times that "YouTube will let people change their usernames back if they decide to start using their full name. (...) New users can still set their YouTube name however they want. The prompt comes up only for users who have a Google+ profile."
"You'll see this option when you upload or comment on YouTube (...). For partners, brands, and organizations, you won't see this just yet. In the coming months we'll be working on new options to give you even more control over your presence on YouTube," informs Google.
{ Thanks, Katty. }
South Sudanese supermodel Alek Wek's journey home
South Sudanese supermodel Alek Wek's journey home: The former refugee met with recent arrivals from Sudan and stressed her commitment to support programmes helping returnees settle back home.
Daily Number: 58% - Support for Capitalism Declines in Europe
Daily Number: 58% - Support for Capitalism Declines in Europe: Faith in capitalism has fallen in Europe, with 58% of the public saying that most people are better off in a free market economy.
SOUTH AFRICA: Court orders Cape Town to process asylum applications
SOUTH AFRICA: Court orders Cape Town to process asylum applications:
 | JOHANNESBURG, 25 July 2012 (IRIN) - Refugee rights organizations in Cape Town are breathing a sigh of relief following a high court judgement that will force the Department of Home Affairs to reverse a policy of not accepting new asylum-seeker applications at the region's only Refugee Reception Office (RRO). |
Foreigners appreciate Khmer language
Foreigners appreciate Khmer language: Wednesday, 18 July 2012
Ngo Menghourng
Phnom Penh Post
Foreigners take Khmer-language lessons in Phnom Penh. Photograph: Phnom Penh Post
Sounds and pronunciation usually practiced by young Cambodian school
children are being mumbled by foreigners in Phnom Penh. “Kor, Khor, Koa,
Khoa…” More and more people from all over the world are taking Khmer
classes at the Institute of
Ngo Menghourng
Phnom Penh Post
Foreigners take Khmer-language lessons in Phnom Penh. Photograph: Phnom Penh Post
Sounds and pronunciation usually practiced by young Cambodian school
children are being mumbled by foreigners in Phnom Penh. “Kor, Khor, Koa,
Khoa…” More and more people from all over the world are taking Khmer
classes at the Institute of
CambodiaWatch-Australia: Defence teams press scholar
CambodiaWatch-Australia: Defence teams press scholar: Even co-accused Brother No 2 Nuon Chea had two questions of his own for the one-time US diplomat who has spent the better part of his academic career researching Cambodia and the Democratic Kampuchea period.
KHMER KAMPUCHEA KROM | 21 PPROVINCES: Worldwide ...
KHMER KAMPUCHEA KROM | 21 PPROVINCES: Worldwide ...: A Brief History of Kampuchea Krom ” was commissione... Khmer Krom Dialects. Khmer language is a Khmer-Mon linguistic group in South East Asia peninsula. It is presently spoken by Cambodia, upper land Khmers living in.
How well do you use social media?
How well do you use social media?:
It’s nice to be back home in Cambodia, though I miss the whole Seliger2012! This Wednesday (25th, I will be speaking for some good 5 minutes about being an online journalist and blogger for some 5 years at the Meta … Continue reading →
Related posts:
Social media impact on Cambodia
my favourite media or...
[[ This is a content summary only. Visit my website for full links, other content, and more! ]]
It’s nice to be back home in Cambodia, though I miss the whole Seliger2012! This Wednesday (25th, I will be speaking for some good 5 minutes about being an online journalist and blogger for some 5 years at the Meta … Continue reading →
Related posts:
Social media impact on Cambodia
my favourite media or...
[[ This is a content summary only. Visit my website for full links, other content, and more! ]]
Bruce Lawson's personal site : Cambodia Rap: thoughts revisiting ...
Bruce Lawson's personal site : Cambodia Rap: thoughts revisiting ...: Cambodia Rap: thoughts revisiting Angkor Wat. Tuesday 24 July 2012. “Cambodia's great”, enthuses the twenty-something gap-year Italian woman in the air-conditioned internet cafe where they bake great croissants. “It's just that there are too ...
Gang rape in Cambodia an increasing trend
Gang rape in Cambodia an increasing trend: "At the end, she was in so much pain, I was afraid she had died,” a Cambodian sex buyer recounted.
Thai government reconsiders deportation
Thai government reconsiders deportation: 
Thailand is rethinking a controversial plan to deport pregnant migrant workers from countries such as Cambodia and support them instead.
Thailand is rethinking a controversial plan to deport pregnant migrant workers from countries such as Cambodia and support them instead.
State and National Polls Tell Different Tales About State of Campaign
State and National Polls Tell Different Tales About State of Campaign: President Obama's average lead in our top 10 "tipping point" states is larger than his average lead in national polls.
July 24: The Incredibly Steady Presidential Race
July 24: The Incredibly Steady Presidential Race: We've now been running our presidential forecast model for almost two months, and each day, we have shown Barack Obama as a modest favorite to win re-election. At no point has projected margin of victory in the popular vote been smaller than 1.7 percentage points.
Baltimore puts out welcome mat for immigrants, hoping to stop population decline
Baltimore puts out welcome mat for immigrants, hoping to stop population decline:
The fate of Baltimore may rest with immigrants like Alexandra Gonzalez.
A native of Puebla, Mexico, Gonzalez feels more at home in Baltimore with every passing year. She attends city-run nutrition and exercise classes in Spanish and takes her two young children to a Spanish-language storytelling hour at her neighborhood library. She plans to earn a GED and become a teacher.
Read full article >>
The fate of Baltimore may rest with immigrants like Alexandra Gonzalez.
A native of Puebla, Mexico, Gonzalez feels more at home in Baltimore with every passing year. She attends city-run nutrition and exercise classes in Spanish and takes her two young children to a Spanish-language storytelling hour at her neighborhood library. She plans to earn a GED and become a teacher.
Read full article >>
Individual Fights for Control of the House
Individual Fights for Control of the House: With no partisan surge this year, the overall dynamic favors Republicans, who look poised to maintain their hold on the House.
Drone operations over Somalia pose danger to air traffic, U.N. report says
Drone operations over Somalia pose danger to air traffic, U.N. report says:
The skies over Somalia have become so congested with drones that the unmanned aircraft pose a danger to air traffic and potentially violate a long-standing arms embargo against the war-torn country, according to United Nations officials.
Read full article >>
The skies over Somalia have become so congested with drones that the unmanned aircraft pose a danger to air traffic and potentially violate a long-standing arms embargo against the war-torn country, according to United Nations officials.
Read full article >>
IDP News Alert, 25 July 2012
IDP News Alert, 25 July 2012: Mali: Situation critical for 107,000 IDPs amidst renewed fighting
Syria: 1 million people displaced in Syria following beginning of Ramadan
China: over a 1.2 million internally displaced by disasters since end June
Japan:Â Heavy rains and landslide risk prevent hundreds from returning home
Bangladesh: Floods and landslides displace over 600,000 people
Syria: 1 million people displaced in Syria following beginning of Ramadan
China: over a 1.2 million internally displaced by disasters since end June
Japan:Â Heavy rains and landslide risk prevent hundreds from returning home
Bangladesh: Floods and landslides displace over 600,000 people
North Korean Succession and the Risks of Instability
North Korean Succession and the Risks of Instability: Despite last week’s abrupt shuffle at the top of the military leadership, Kim Jŏng-ŭn appears to be firmly established as the new leader of North Korea, completing a faster and smoother power transition than many experts anticipated.
Struggle Can Weaken Pyongyang Regime
Struggle Can Weaken Pyongyang Regime:
Those who have heard of recent news about North Korea will be interested in the fact that Kim Jong Un received the title of Marshal of the Republic and that the Korean People's Army's Chief of General Staff Ri Young Ho was relieved of all his posts. I think these two developments are closely related.
Ironically, these changes in North Korea may not have anything to do with Kim Jong Un.
Kim Jong Un, who is young and has not had a chance to solidify his power base, may be a dictator with no power within the current political circles. It looks like against such a scenario, Kim’s circle began the struggle for power.
Kim Jong Un already had supporters when Kim Jong Il ruled North Korea. Kim Kyung Hee, Jang Sung Taek, and Ri Young Ho became his supporters as his father had wished.
Aside from the Kim family’s close high-profile officials such as Kim Kyung Hee and Jang Sung Taek, the supporters included representatives from the party and administration. They all have titles of military generals, but it is hard to consider them as soldiers.
On the other hand, Ri Young Ho, who devoted his whole life to the military, is considered one of the most typical military men.
It seems that the relations between the Workers’ Party and the People’s Army began deteriorating in March and April this year. Many new Party officials have no military experience even though they wore uniforms just like Choi Ryong Hae.
At the same time, high-ranking military officers who served in the military for their entire careers and the military as a whole began losing their powers.
Serious blow
Dismissing Ri Young Ho struck a serious blow to those whose backgrounds are in the People’s Army. The military lost its leader overnight. Of course, officially, Ri was removed because of his health, but no one believes it.
Ri was a relatively young leader compared to those in similar positions. In addition, there was no need to hold a meeting on a Sunday if Ri was going to be discharged only for health reasons.
Giving the title of Marshal to Kim Jong Un also requires a meeting of high-ranking party officials such as Jang Sung Taek. This also is to emphasize the superiority and importance of the party.
It remains to be seen what these conflicts between the military and the party will mean politically in North Korea.
We can just say an invisible power struggle is taking place in the inner circle of North Korea. Some view the military as conservatives and high-ranking officials in the Workers’ Party as progressives. This is possible, but it is hard to say with the available information.
However, the fights between the military and the party which are so obvious that even regular people notice could weaken the roots of the North Korean regime in the long run.
Andrei Lankov, a professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, is a Russian historian, North Korea expert, and regular RFA contributor.
Those who have heard of recent news about North Korea will be interested in the fact that Kim Jong Un received the title of Marshal of the Republic and that the Korean People's Army's Chief of General Staff Ri Young Ho was relieved of all his posts. I think these two developments are closely related.
Ironically, these changes in North Korea may not have anything to do with Kim Jong Un.
Kim Jong Un, who is young and has not had a chance to solidify his power base, may be a dictator with no power within the current political circles. It looks like against such a scenario, Kim’s circle began the struggle for power.
Kim Jong Un already had supporters when Kim Jong Il ruled North Korea. Kim Kyung Hee, Jang Sung Taek, and Ri Young Ho became his supporters as his father had wished.
Aside from the Kim family’s close high-profile officials such as Kim Kyung Hee and Jang Sung Taek, the supporters included representatives from the party and administration. They all have titles of military generals, but it is hard to consider them as soldiers.
On the other hand, Ri Young Ho, who devoted his whole life to the military, is considered one of the most typical military men.
It seems that the relations between the Workers’ Party and the People’s Army began deteriorating in March and April this year. Many new Party officials have no military experience even though they wore uniforms just like Choi Ryong Hae.
At the same time, high-ranking military officers who served in the military for their entire careers and the military as a whole began losing their powers.
Serious blow
Dismissing Ri Young Ho struck a serious blow to those whose backgrounds are in the People’s Army. The military lost its leader overnight. Of course, officially, Ri was removed because of his health, but no one believes it.
Ri was a relatively young leader compared to those in similar positions. In addition, there was no need to hold a meeting on a Sunday if Ri was going to be discharged only for health reasons.
Giving the title of Marshal to Kim Jong Un also requires a meeting of high-ranking party officials such as Jang Sung Taek. This also is to emphasize the superiority and importance of the party.
It remains to be seen what these conflicts between the military and the party will mean politically in North Korea.
We can just say an invisible power struggle is taking place in the inner circle of North Korea. Some view the military as conservatives and high-ranking officials in the Workers’ Party as progressives. This is possible, but it is hard to say with the available information.
However, the fights between the military and the party which are so obvious that even regular people notice could weaken the roots of the North Korean regime in the long run.
Andrei Lankov, a professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, is a Russian historian, North Korea expert, and regular RFA contributor.
New City in Troubled Waters
New City in Troubled Waters:
Beijing on Tuesday established a new administrative city in the South China Sea where it also plans to station a military garrison to defend its claims on the disputed waters, drawing protests from Vietnam and the Philippines.
The Chinese flag was raised and the national anthem played at a ceremony to mark the creation of the new 1,000-resident Sansha city on Woody Island, the largest of the Paracel Islands, which are claimed by Vietnam.
Sansha, the new prefecture-level municipality under Hainan province, will administer the Paracel archipelago as well as the nearby Spratly Islands and Macclesfield Bank, the official Xinhua news agency said.
The move strengthens Beijing’s foothold in the resource-rich South China Sea, portions of which are also claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, and raises tensions in the region where experts have warned of the possibility of armed conflicts erupting.
Luo Baoyu, the Hainan secretary for the ruling Chinese Communist Party, said at the ceremony that Sansha, a settlement supplied with food and water by ship, will help China assert its control over the sea and promote its economic interests there.
"The provincial government will be devoted to turning the city into an important base to safeguard China's sovereignty and serve marine resource development," he said, Xinhua reported.
Objections
Sansha will also host troops as part of a new military garrison, according to China’s Central Military Command Friday, escalating territorial spats with Vietnam and the Philippines.
The garrison command will be responsible for managing the city's national defense, mobilizing military reserves, and carrying out military operations, China’s state media reported.
Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi told Agence France-Presse on Tuesday that the plan for the garrison "violates international law, seriously violates Vietnam’s sovereignty... and is invalid.”
He said China must revoke its "wrongdoings" and urged "friendly and cooperative" relations in order to "maintain peace and stability" in the region.
Vietnam has faced off with China over Beijing’s detention of Vietnamese fishermen and its opening of oil and gas lots to international bidders in the disputed waters.
In the Philippines, the department of foreign affairs summoned China’s Ambassador to the Philippines Ma Keqing on Tuesday to protest against the garrison announcement.
Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario said the Philippines had expressed “grave concern” and “strong protest” over China’s actions in the Paracels, the Manila Standard newspaper reported.
“We hope that China, as a responsible country, will exercise self-restraint on the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability in the region,” he said.
The Philippines became embroiled in a standoff with China at the Scarborough Shoal earlier this year, with both sides sending ships to the area after Manila accused Beijing of poaching in its exclusive economic zone.
On Monday, Philippine president Benigno Aquino said in an annual state of the nation address to parliament that the country would be upgrading its military capabilities in the South China Sea.
"If someone enters your yard and told you he owns it, would you allow that?" he said.
China’s actions have also drawn reactions from the U.S., where senior senator John McCain on Tuesday called the planned garrison in Sansha “unnecessarily provocative” and urged a multilateral solution to the overlapping claims in the waters.
‘New heights’
China’s expansion of Sansha comes as long-simmering tensions over the South China Sea disputes reached “new heights,” according to a new report by the International Crisis Group released Wednesday.
The think tank warned that tensions have grown particularly explosive since divisions over the territorial claims prompted the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to postpone for the first time in 45 years its customary joint statement at the conclusion of its annual ministerial talks two weeks ago.
“As long as ASEAN fails to produce a cohesive South China Sea policy, a binding set of rules on the handling of disputed claims cannot be enforced,” said Paul Quinn-Judge, the International Crisis Group’s acting Asia director.
“Without a consensus on resolution mechanisms, tensions in the South China Sea can easily spill over into armed conflict,” he said.
Reported by Rachel Vandenbrink.
Beijing on Tuesday established a new administrative city in the South China Sea where it also plans to station a military garrison to defend its claims on the disputed waters, drawing protests from Vietnam and the Philippines.
The Chinese flag was raised and the national anthem played at a ceremony to mark the creation of the new 1,000-resident Sansha city on Woody Island, the largest of the Paracel Islands, which are claimed by Vietnam.
Sansha, the new prefecture-level municipality under Hainan province, will administer the Paracel archipelago as well as the nearby Spratly Islands and Macclesfield Bank, the official Xinhua news agency said.
The move strengthens Beijing’s foothold in the resource-rich South China Sea, portions of which are also claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, and raises tensions in the region where experts have warned of the possibility of armed conflicts erupting.
Luo Baoyu, the Hainan secretary for the ruling Chinese Communist Party, said at the ceremony that Sansha, a settlement supplied with food and water by ship, will help China assert its control over the sea and promote its economic interests there.
"The provincial government will be devoted to turning the city into an important base to safeguard China's sovereignty and serve marine resource development," he said, Xinhua reported.
China's territorial claim to the South China Sea includes two disputed island chains.
Sansha will also host troops as part of a new military garrison, according to China’s Central Military Command Friday, escalating territorial spats with Vietnam and the Philippines.
The garrison command will be responsible for managing the city's national defense, mobilizing military reserves, and carrying out military operations, China’s state media reported.
Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi told Agence France-Presse on Tuesday that the plan for the garrison "violates international law, seriously violates Vietnam’s sovereignty... and is invalid.”
He said China must revoke its "wrongdoings" and urged "friendly and cooperative" relations in order to "maintain peace and stability" in the region.
Vietnam has faced off with China over Beijing’s detention of Vietnamese fishermen and its opening of oil and gas lots to international bidders in the disputed waters.
In the Philippines, the department of foreign affairs summoned China’s Ambassador to the Philippines Ma Keqing on Tuesday to protest against the garrison announcement.
Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario said the Philippines had expressed “grave concern” and “strong protest” over China’s actions in the Paracels, the Manila Standard newspaper reported.
“We hope that China, as a responsible country, will exercise self-restraint on the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability in the region,” he said.
The Philippines became embroiled in a standoff with China at the Scarborough Shoal earlier this year, with both sides sending ships to the area after Manila accused Beijing of poaching in its exclusive economic zone.
On Monday, Philippine president Benigno Aquino said in an annual state of the nation address to parliament that the country would be upgrading its military capabilities in the South China Sea.
"If someone enters your yard and told you he owns it, would you allow that?" he said.
China’s actions have also drawn reactions from the U.S., where senior senator John McCain on Tuesday called the planned garrison in Sansha “unnecessarily provocative” and urged a multilateral solution to the overlapping claims in the waters.
‘New heights’
China’s expansion of Sansha comes as long-simmering tensions over the South China Sea disputes reached “new heights,” according to a new report by the International Crisis Group released Wednesday.
The think tank warned that tensions have grown particularly explosive since divisions over the territorial claims prompted the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to postpone for the first time in 45 years its customary joint statement at the conclusion of its annual ministerial talks two weeks ago.
“As long as ASEAN fails to produce a cohesive South China Sea policy, a binding set of rules on the handling of disputed claims cannot be enforced,” said Paul Quinn-Judge, the International Crisis Group’s acting Asia director.
“Without a consensus on resolution mechanisms, tensions in the South China Sea can easily spill over into armed conflict,” he said.
Reported by Rachel Vandenbrink.
Jul 24, 2012
Khmer Krom NGO Status Revoked
Khmer Krom NGO Status Revoked:
The United Nations has revoked the special consultative status of a non-governmental organization representing the indigenous Khmer Krom group in Vietnam, drawing protests from human rights groups which accused the global body of buckling to pressure from Hanoi.
Member states of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on Monday voted 27-14, with 10 abstentions, to rescind a consensus decision in May approving the application by the Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation (KKF) for special consultative status with the Council.
Vietnam protested strongly against the May decision and proposed a resolution overturning the move along with El Salvador and fellow Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
The United States and the European Union meanwhile had expressed their opposition to the resolution revoking the special status of the KKF representing the Khmer Krom, an ethnic group that U.S.-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) says faces serious restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, association, information, and movement in Vietnam.
The ECOSOC had “caved to Vietnamese pressure," a joint statement by the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (OPHRD) and the Vietnam Committee on Human Rights (VCHR) said.
The OPHRD is a joint program of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT).
Ahead of the vote, the OPHRD, along with 12 international and regional human rights groups, urged ECOSOC member states to oppose the draft resolution and to “support the ability of civil society organizations to freely participate in the work of the United Nations.”
In the statement, the OPHRD pointed out that special consultative status is granted to NGOs that “have a special competence in, and are concerned specifically with, only a few of the fields of activity covered by the Council and its subsidiary bodies, and that are known within the fields for which they have or seek consultative status.”
Resolution condemned
In Tuesday’s joint statement, Vo Van Ai, president of the Paris-based VCHR, condemned those U.N. member states that had joined Vietnam in rescinding the decision.
“It is shameful that many U.N. member states caved in to Vietnam’s pressure and became an accomplice in stifling the rightful voices of human rights defenders,” he said.
“It sends a chilling signal to the people in Vietnam that the international community is not on their side in their quest for greater freedom.”
Souhayr Belhassen, president of the FIDH, said that Vietnam, which intends to run for a seat on the U.N. Human Rights Council, has repeatedly attacked independent human rights defenders at home and abroad, reflecting its “consistently dismal human rights record.”
“Before it is even elected to the Human Rights Council, Vietnam is already busy obstructing human rights groups from cooperating with the U.N. to promote human rights,” he said.
“This kind of intimidation must not be tolerated anywhere in the U.N. system.”
Gerald Staberock, secretary-general of the OMCT, called the resolution “an expression of fear to hear unpleasant truths and opinions.”
“The basis of any commitment to human rights defenders is the recognition of their very existence and their right to speak and to be heard, and the states have failed in this test—Vietnam in the first place,” he said.
Plans to reapply
Thach Ngoc Thach, the president of the KKF who led a delegation to join the ECOSOC, said his federation would reapply for membership in the next three years.
“The federation will continue to advocate to countries that didn’t vote or voted in absentia to support our bid for next time,” he said.
He added that Vietnamese allegations that the Khmer Krom are seeking independence from Vietnam were untrue.
“We cannot accept these allegations,” he said.
Thach Ngoc Thach said that even though the KKF was refused the right to act as an ECOSOC member, the federation remains recognized by the international community for its work on behalf of the Khmer Krom.
“This should not be considered a failure because we have received support from the U.S., France, and England. The countries that support Vietnam are Russia and China,” he said.
“The communist countries are supporting each other.”
Persecuted group
The Khmer Krom, many of whom have moved to Cambodia to escape persecution, are from southern Vietnam’s lower Mekong delta region, which Cambodians sometimes call "Kampuchea Krom," or "Lower Cambodia." As Khmers, they are ethnically similar to most Cambodians, and are considered outsiders in Vietnam.
The Vietnamese government has banned Khmer Krom human rights publications and tightly controls the Theravada Buddhism by the minority, who see the religion as a foundation of their distinct culture and ethnic identity.
In 2007, the Vietnamese government suppressed protests by over 200 ethnic Khmer Buddhist monks in Suc Trang who were calling for religious freedom and more Khmer-language education.
On the other side of the border, the Khmer Krom who leave Vietnam for Cambodia remain one of the country’s “most disenfranchised groups,” HRW has said.
Because they are often perceived as Vietnamese by Cambodians, many Khmer Krom in Cambodia face social and economic discrimination.
They also face hurdles in legalizing their status in the country, as despite promises to treat them as Cambodian citizens, authorities have failed to grant many Khmer Krom citizenship or residence rights, according to HRW.
Reported by Samean Yun for RFA’s Khmer service. Translated by Samean Yun. Written in English with additional reporting by Joshua Lipes.
The United Nations has revoked the special consultative status of a non-governmental organization representing the indigenous Khmer Krom group in Vietnam, drawing protests from human rights groups which accused the global body of buckling to pressure from Hanoi.
Member states of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on Monday voted 27-14, with 10 abstentions, to rescind a consensus decision in May approving the application by the Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation (KKF) for special consultative status with the Council.
Vietnam protested strongly against the May decision and proposed a resolution overturning the move along with El Salvador and fellow Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
The United States and the European Union meanwhile had expressed their opposition to the resolution revoking the special status of the KKF representing the Khmer Krom, an ethnic group that U.S.-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) says faces serious restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, association, information, and movement in Vietnam.
The ECOSOC had “caved to Vietnamese pressure," a joint statement by the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (OPHRD) and the Vietnam Committee on Human Rights (VCHR) said.
The OPHRD is a joint program of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT).
Ahead of the vote, the OPHRD, along with 12 international and regional human rights groups, urged ECOSOC member states to oppose the draft resolution and to “support the ability of civil society organizations to freely participate in the work of the United Nations.”
In the statement, the OPHRD pointed out that special consultative status is granted to NGOs that “have a special competence in, and are concerned specifically with, only a few of the fields of activity covered by the Council and its subsidiary bodies, and that are known within the fields for which they have or seek consultative status.”
Resolution condemned
In Tuesday’s joint statement, Vo Van Ai, president of the Paris-based VCHR, condemned those U.N. member states that had joined Vietnam in rescinding the decision.
“It is shameful that many U.N. member states caved in to Vietnam’s pressure and became an accomplice in stifling the rightful voices of human rights defenders,” he said.
“It sends a chilling signal to the people in Vietnam that the international community is not on their side in their quest for greater freedom.”
Souhayr Belhassen, president of the FIDH, said that Vietnam, which intends to run for a seat on the U.N. Human Rights Council, has repeatedly attacked independent human rights defenders at home and abroad, reflecting its “consistently dismal human rights record.”
“Before it is even elected to the Human Rights Council, Vietnam is already busy obstructing human rights groups from cooperating with the U.N. to promote human rights,” he said.
“This kind of intimidation must not be tolerated anywhere in the U.N. system.”
Gerald Staberock, secretary-general of the OMCT, called the resolution “an expression of fear to hear unpleasant truths and opinions.”
“The basis of any commitment to human rights defenders is the recognition of their very existence and their right to speak and to be heard, and the states have failed in this test—Vietnam in the first place,” he said.
Plans to reapply
Thach Ngoc Thach, the president of the KKF who led a delegation to join the ECOSOC, said his federation would reapply for membership in the next three years.
“The federation will continue to advocate to countries that didn’t vote or voted in absentia to support our bid for next time,” he said.
He added that Vietnamese allegations that the Khmer Krom are seeking independence from Vietnam were untrue.
“We cannot accept these allegations,” he said.
Thach Ngoc Thach said that even though the KKF was refused the right to act as an ECOSOC member, the federation remains recognized by the international community for its work on behalf of the Khmer Krom.
“This should not be considered a failure because we have received support from the U.S., France, and England. The countries that support Vietnam are Russia and China,” he said.
“The communist countries are supporting each other.”
Persecuted group
The Khmer Krom, many of whom have moved to Cambodia to escape persecution, are from southern Vietnam’s lower Mekong delta region, which Cambodians sometimes call "Kampuchea Krom," or "Lower Cambodia." As Khmers, they are ethnically similar to most Cambodians, and are considered outsiders in Vietnam.
The Vietnamese government has banned Khmer Krom human rights publications and tightly controls the Theravada Buddhism by the minority, who see the religion as a foundation of their distinct culture and ethnic identity.
In 2007, the Vietnamese government suppressed protests by over 200 ethnic Khmer Buddhist monks in Suc Trang who were calling for religious freedom and more Khmer-language education.
On the other side of the border, the Khmer Krom who leave Vietnam for Cambodia remain one of the country’s “most disenfranchised groups,” HRW has said.
Because they are often perceived as Vietnamese by Cambodians, many Khmer Krom in Cambodia face social and economic discrimination.
They also face hurdles in legalizing their status in the country, as despite promises to treat them as Cambodian citizens, authorities have failed to grant many Khmer Krom citizenship or residence rights, according to HRW.
Reported by Samean Yun for RFA’s Khmer service. Translated by Samean Yun. Written in English with additional reporting by Joshua Lipes.
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Necessary Scapegoats? The Making of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
Necessary Scapegoats? The Making of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Stéphanie Giry
David van der Veen/AFP/Getty Images
Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen (left) shaking hands with former Khmer Rouge foreign minister Ieng Sary, October 22, 1996
This spring, almost a decade after its difficult birth, the joint Cambodian-UN tribunal set up to prosecute the officials who orchestrated the Khmer Rouge’s worst crimes seemed finally to be gaining momentum. In February, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia sentenced Duch, the head of the regime’s most notorious torture center, to life in prison. A month later, Duch appeared as a key witness in the court’s second and most important case, the trial of the only remaining members of Pol Pot’s immediate entourage: Nuon Chea, the Khmer Rouge’s chief ideologue; Ieng Sary, the foreign minister; and Khieu Samphan, the head of state. At last, the tribunal appeared to be making real progress toward finding out why, or at least how, the Khmer Rouge killed some 1.7 million Cambodians between 1975 and 1979.
Outside the courtroom, though, a crisis was erupting. On the very first day of Duch’s testimony, a Swiss judge tasked with investigating other former Khmer Rouge officials resigned, citing “egregious dysfunctions” at the court. As a mixed tribunal, the ECCC performs its most important functions—investigating, prosecuting, defending the accused, judging—with teams that include both Cambodian and international appointees. As he quit, the judge said that for months his Cambodian counterpart had stonewalled his efforts to pursue two cases against five mid-level Khmer Rouge officials, each one thought to be responsible for 40,000 to 100,000 deaths—far more than even the more than 12,000 deaths ascribed to Duch. The judge’s dramatic announcement was the strongest accusation yet that the Cambodian government has been trying to sabotage the tribunal’s work.
Behind this story of remarkable breakthroughs and confounding setbacks stands Cambodia’s protean leader, Hun Sen, one of the longest-serving prime ministers in the world. Hun Sen has long been keen to go down in history as the man who brought the surviving leaders of the Pol Pot regime to justice. But as a one-time Khmer Rouge battalion commander, he knows only too well that important members of the governing Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) have complicated ties to the former regime and that more investigations down the Khmer Rouge chain of command could expose their own shady pasts.
No less responsible for the ECCC’s zigzagging course are the UN, which co-runs the court, and the court’s major donors: Japan, the European Union, Australia, and the United States. The ECCC’S foreign backers have largely let Hun Sen have his way, despite much talk of accountability and universal values. They, too, seem eager to present themselves as guardians of international justice for as small a political price as possible.
Although international criminal tribunals often serve the specific needs of a few powerful players, the Khmer Rouge tribunal may stand apart for so effectively dispensing justice in the service of political expediency. The ECCC may have the formal trappings of an independent institution, but it is best understood as the judicial chapter in the awkward, and often dirty, story of political accommodations that Hun Sen, the Khmer Rouge, the United Nations, and major states have been making with one another for almost forty years.
Digital Archive of Cambodian Holocaust Survivors
Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh, April 17, 1975
When in 1997 Hun Sen asked the UN for help setting up a court to try the Khmer Rouge, he had already distinguished himself as a master political operator. Though he had been a mid-level Khmer Rouge cadre, in 1977 he defected from the movement to Vietnam, Cambodia’s enemy at the time. Two years later, when the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, he was installed as Cambodia’s foreign minister. He remained in the government throughout the Vietnamese occupation during the 1980s.
Then the USSR collapsed, and by 1990, Vietnam, a Soviet ally, had withdrawn from Cambodia. Over the next few years, the UN helped broker a peace settlement; Cambodia was to become a model for state reconstruction. In 1993, elections were held. From those Hun Sen once again reemerged at the top, first as co-prime minister and then soon enough, after wresting more power still, as sole prime minister.
It was the late 1990s, and remnant factions of the Khmer Rouge were still waging sporadic attacks on government forces. One of Hun Sen’s strategies was to bring some of these groups over to the government’s side; in 1996, he even obtained a royal amnesty for Khmer Rouge foreign minister Ieng Sary. But he knew that formally prosecuting top members of Khmer Rouge would be a chance to cast himself as a savior-statesman, the leader who would pacify Cambodia after decades of conflict. It would also be an opportunity to burnish his credentials with Cambodia’s foreign aid donors. During the final years of the Cold War, despite wide knowledge of the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities, Pol Pot’s group had held on to Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations, thanks to support from the West, China, and ASEAN, the economic group of Southeast Asian states. (Better to carry on diplomacy with mass murderers than Soviet proxies, the reasoning went.) But the late 1990s were the heyday of special criminal courts, and by then Cambodia’s foreign backers, too, were ready to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice.
Hun Sen’s plan was to have only the Khmer Rouge’s leading figures prosecuted; the movement’s lower officials and rank and file would be reintegrated into Cambodian society, no questions asked. But he faced one particular challenge: how to separate out the members of Pol Pot’s “genocidal clique”—as goes a still-favored expression—from mid-level Khmer Rouge who had had some measure of authority, like himself and some of his colleagues at the CPP.
AP Photo/Heng Sinith, Munshi Ahmed/Bloomberg, Khem Sovanara/AFP/Getty Images
Cambodian leaders with Khmer Rouge ties, from left, Deputy Prime Minister Keat Chhon, Senate President Chea Sim, and National Assembly Chairman Heng Samrin
Drawing that line has been tricky. Cambodia’s current finance minister and deputy prime minister, Keat Chhon, worked in the Khmer Rouge’s foreign ministry—under Ieng Sary, who is now on trial despite the 1996 amnesty—and occasionally acted as an interpreter for Pol Pot. Heng Samrin, the chairman of the National Assembly, was the commander of the Fourth Division of the so-called Eastern Zone, which is suspected of committing war crimes during incursions into Vietnam in 1977. Chea Sim, who has been President of the Senate since 1999, was the party secretary of Sector 20, also in the Eastern Zone, where vast purges are known to have occurred.
There’s also the troubling story of Hor Nam Hong, Cambodia’s long-time foreign minister. He was ambassador to Cuba for the regime of General Lon Nol, which was overthrown by the Khmer Rouge in 1975; Pol Pot’s people called him home, arrested him upon arrival, and sent him to Boeung Trabek, a reeducation camp for diplomats in Phnom Penh. But he was spared—reportedly thanks to the intervention of his former schoolmate Ieng Sary—and is said to have then helped run the camp. A 2002 US embassy cable released by Wikileaks last summer says that Hor Nam Hong and his wife may have “collaborated in the killing of many prisoners.” Last year in France he lost a final appeal in a defamation suit he had brought regarding such crimes.
Hun Sen as a Khmer Rouge battalion commander, 1970s
And then there is Hun Sen himself. In 1975, he headed a battalion that oversaw a brutal crackdown against the Cham, a Muslim minority group in Cambodia that opposed the Khmer Rouge. He has said that he sat out the attack in a hospital, recovering from earlier battle injuries. Historians have yet to contradict him, but some have doubts.
With so few degrees of separation between the crimes of yesterday and the leaders of today, establishing the ECCC was predictably tortuous. It wasn’t difficult for the Cambodian government to agree with the UN and other international negotiators that the tribunal should prosecute genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of Cambodian criminal law. But while UN lawyers favored creating a fully international court–-much like the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia—Hun Sen insisted it be Cambodian.
Even more controversial was the question of who would be prosecuted. In December 1999, with negotiations still under way, Hun Sen announced that only four or five members of the Khmer Rouge regime would be tried. His short list did not include Pol Pot, who had died in 1998, but it included Duch, who had just been arrested, as well as the three senior leaders now on trial. Stephen Heder, a leading American expert on Cambodia, and David Scheffer, at the time the US Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues, have since said that no such understanding existed. According to them, international negotiators assumed that ten, maybe even fifteen, people might eventually be tried.
Yet correspondence from that time reveals that top UN lawyers repeatedly suggested it was up to the Cambodian government to define the court’s reach. Throughout 2000, they variously wrote to Sok An, who is today arguably Hun Sen’s most powerful deputy prime minister, that determining the ECCC’s ambit was “an internal Cambodian matter,” “a political decision to be taken at the national level,” and “of course for the legislature to decide upon.” The two sides eventually agreed to grant the court authority to try both the senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge and “those most responsible” for the regime’s crimes. Settling on these three vague words may have been necessary to get the court off the ground, but when the UN endorsed them, it was embarking on a joint venture that its own negotiators knew, and acknowledged, the Cambodian government had every reason to control.
ECCC Pool/Mak Remissa
A pre-trial hearing at the Khmer Rouge tribunal, Phnom Penh, February 11, 2010
Duch’s trial (known as “Case 001”) and the investigation against the leaders (“Case 002”) proceeded largely as expected. These were the uncontroversial files, after all: everyone involved could get behind trying the regime’s emblematic torturer and its top brass. And so the ECCC stumbled along, overcoming with more or less grace the hurdles inherent in cases of this magnitude, investigated more than three decades after the facts, run by a mixed Cambodian and international staff, and operating under a combination of common law and civil law.
The court struggled with low-level corruption and an elaborate kickback scheme benefiting a senior administrator. There was also resistance from the Cambodian government whenever the investigating judges came too close. In 2009 six witnesses who had been subpoenaed to talk about Case 002 simply refused to meet the judges. Among them were four of the senior government officials known to have ties to the Khmer Rouge: Keat Chhon, Heng Samrin, Chea Sim, and Hor Nam Hong. Still, the case against Duch went to trial, and in 2010 a formal indictment was completed against the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders.
When it came to other suspects—names not on Hun Sen’s original list—it was a different story. Laurent Kasper-Ansermet, the Swiss judge who resigned this spring because of “constant and active opposition” from his Cambodian counterpart, was trying to investigate the five mid-level Khmer Rouge officials targeted in Cases 003 and 004. As soon as the court had officially opened those cases back in 2009—at the instigation of the international prosecutor and the international investigating judge then in those posts—Hun Sen had declared that civil war would break out if they were allowed to proceed.
Khmer Rouge suspects Meas Mut (left), the former army chief, and Im Chaem, a former regional leader
This wasn’t a very plausible threat: most Khmer Rouge fighters are now well into their 50s or older and were disarmed years ago. But the hyperbole revealed both Hun Sen’s real unease and his skill at manipulating the court to placate his cronies in the ruling party. The suspects in Case 003—Meas Mut, the Khmer Rouge’s army chief, and Sou Met, its navy chief—are now well-connected two-star generals. Although the three suspects in Case 004—Ta An, Ta Tith, and Im Chaem, all regional leaders under the Khmer Rouge—are not powerful today, some influential members of the CPP arguably had as much authority under the former Khmer Rouge as they did. If those three can be tried, who might be next?
Taking the hint, the Cambodian prosecutor and the Cambodian investigating judge, You Bunleng, quickly found legal obstacles to slow Cases 003 and 004 to a crawl. At first, the UN and the court’s foreign backers hardly complained; they were focused on seeing through the cases against Duch and the senior leaders. And as long as the court’s international staffers pushed for investigating the two additional cases in the face of local resistance, donors could gesture at the process’s semblance of integrity, at least on their side.
But then something bizarre happened: the court’s foreign investigating judge came out against pursuing Cases 003 and 004. In 2011, just four months after taking over the international slot in the investigating judges’ office, the German judge Siegfried Blunk announced that he was formally closing the inquiry for Case 003. (Case 004 remained open, but no work was being conducted.)
This was a puzzling decision. A considerable amount of evidence already suggested that the two suspects, Meas Mut and Sou Met, had orchestrated vast purges within their ranks. And documents made public during Duch’s trial indicated that Sou Met had transferred prisoners into Duch’s custody to be tortured and executed. The international prosecutor asked for more field investigations; Blunk refused. Half of Blunk’s team resigned, including Heder, who had been assisting the ECCC for several years by then. Blunk’s motivations were so unclear that his colleagues and court observers started trading theories about incompetence and disloyalty, unhappy coincidences and ungodly conspiracies.
When I met Blunk in Phnom Penh last July, he had been refusing to speak to the press. To me, he would say only that he had applied no “fanciful notions” and had relied on the precedent set by the special court that is examining major crimes committed in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2002. If a suspect’s “authority in the command structure” was limited, if he had “little room to maneuver,” Blunk told me, “no amount of further investigation will change that—no matter how many mass graves are opened or crime scenes are investigated.”
Whatever the judge’s logic–-and officially no one knew what it was since he hadn’t made any public statements—diplomats from donor countries didn’t seem particularly troubled. The week I saw Blunk, Stephen Rapp, the US Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues, was in Phnom Penh for the official opening of the trial in Case 002. One day at a press conference, even as he was fielding tough questions about how Hun Sen seemed to be dictating the court’s agenda, Rapp said that “reasonable people” could disagree about which suspects fell within the ECCC’S mandate. He explained that in 2007, while he was chief prosecutor for the special Sierra Leone tribunal, he had decided to indict only people at the “top level in command,” not regional or divisional operatives. Rapp couldn’t have given Blunk a better way out of Cases 003 and 004.
When Blunk eventually did resign, last October, it was just days before a procedural ruling criticizing him for secretly backdating orders under appeal. He looked worse than ever. Still, the UN and the ECCC’s foreign backers showed little interest in examining his work. During a special visit to Cambodia, the UN’s top legal officer, Patricia O’Brien, gave a press conference in which she explained why there would be no inquiry: too complicated and too cumbersome. At a meeting with NGOs in Phnom Penh days later, according to the Cambodia Daily, O’Brien said that if anything were uncovered after a probe, the defense teams would “have a field day” and “undermine Case 002.” The message was clear: whatever impropriety the investigating judges may have committed, better to leave it be. Save Cases 001 and 002 and bury the rest.
The tribunal's former international investigating judge, Laurent Kasper-Ansermet
By early this year, it was difficult to imagine how Cases 003 and 004 might proceed. Still, Kasper-Ansermet, the Swiss judge who had replaced Blunk in December, threw himself into the task; he even tweeted about wanting to do the job right. Immediately he got into trouble. Cambodia’s Supreme Council of Magistracy, on which both the Cambodian investigating judge You Bunleng and the ECCC’s Cambodian prosecutor sit, said it could not recognize Kasper-Ansermet’s appointment: apparently, his tweets violated ethics rules.
Scheffer, who is now the UN Secretary-General’s special adviser to the court, promptly protested that by getting in Kasper-Ansermet’s way the Cambodian government was breaching the ECCC’s foundational treaty. The Secretary-General’s office added that this was sufficient legal ground for the UN to pull out of the entire project. It was also a lot of puffing. Taking this stance so loudly and so publicly left the Cambodian government with no face-saving way to reverse the decision of the magistracy council. In other words, the UN’s move was less a negotiation gambit than an attempt to regain some credibility with disheartened NGOs and victims’ advocates.
Then, in February, the appeals chamber of the court issued its final verdict against Duch. Touted as a historic victory for the Khmer Rouge’s victims, the decision was more remarkable for delivering everything Hun Sen and his supporters might have wanted. It took a severe position—at least by international standards—against the regime’s most recognizable torturer, making little allowance for Duch’s admissions and cooperation or for his illegal detention by a military tribunal from 1999 to 2007. And while the verdict said nothing that might undermine the case against the three senior Khmer Rouge leaders—the court’s, and Hun Sen’s, big prize—it was a death knell for Cases 003 and 004.
Duch had appealed the sentence of the court’s trial chamber by claiming, somewhat implausibly, that he was not among “those most responsible.” The appeals judges might simply have ruled that he was: after all, he did supervise the killing of more than 12,000 people. But in the final verdict they claimed instead that it was neither for them nor for the trial judges to decide whom the court should try. That matter was “exclusively” a “policy decision” for the prosecutors and the investigating judges—precisely some of the people who have been blocking Cases 003 and 004 for more than two years.
This was extraordinary. Judges rarely give up the prerogative to determine the scope of their own authority and in this instance abdicating that power would have major implications. Considering Hun Sen’s adamant opposition to these cases, it was also hard not to interpret the appeals judges’ decision as a political concession. And with no dissenting opinion—not even from any of the three international judges, who have dissented on other matters—it looked like all the key players were agreed on pocket-vetoing Cases 003 and 004.
There’s little reason to expect much change. Kasper-Ansermet, who left his post on May 4 stating he thought the suspects in Cases 003 were among “those most responsible,” has not yet been replaced. In a confidential order addressed to his colleagues at the court, he also recommended that the prosecutors’ office investigate crimes committed during Khmer Rouge incursions into Vietnam in 1977. In particular, he advised interviewing National Assembly Chairman Heng Samrin and Senate President Chea Sim—and intimated doing more. But the prosecutors swiftly issued a press release stating that the relevant facts had already been investigated in Case 002 and that, in any event, it was their “established public position” that “no further cases would be initiated following Cases 003 and 004.”
Preventing the court from embarking on more investigations remains a paramount concern for Hun Sen, who continues to consolidate his power. Cambodia currently chairs ASEAN, and it is trying to secure a seat as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council. There were local elections in June—dominated by the CPP—and National Assembly elections will take place next year. Having largely succeeded in neutralizing the Cambodian political opposition over the past few years—by way of anticorruption investigations and defamation lawsuits—Hun Sen is now even more concerned than before with shoring up his patronage network within the CPP.
At the same time, the UN and the court’s international backers are likely to continue invoking high-minded principles while disavowing their unspoken understandings with the Cambodian government. Having come this far on Case 002—and paid much of the $160 million or so tab the court has racked up since 2006—they won’t want to pull out before sentences are secured against Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan.
Bruno Barbey/Magnum Photos
Killing field south of Phnom Penh, 1996
The only open question, it seems, is whether the controversies rocking the court could derail the leaders’ trial. Lawyers for Nuon Chea—the Khmer Rouge’s chief ideologue—have filed a criminal complaint in a local Cambodian court against Hun Sen and assorted Cambodian government officials for “interfering with the administration of justice at the ECCC.” That won’t go anywhere, of course, but the trial judges in Case 002 issued a statement in May saying that Hun Sen’s various references to Nuon Chea as a “killer” and a perpetrator of “genocide” were “incompatible with the presumption of innocence to which Nuon Chea is entitled.”
The trial judges also added that such accusations by the government would not influence them in “the exercise of their duties.” This assurance, which would have been unnecessary at a properly functioning tribunal, sounded more like an entreaty to ECCC watchers: please believe that this made-to-measure court can be impartial even if it is not entirely independent. That’s a tall order, especially in view of the final verdict against Duch, which has all the makings of a double standard. How can Duch, but not the suspects in Cases 003 and 004, be among “those most responsible” for the Khmer Rouge’s crimes when each of them is thought to be accountable for four to ten times as many deaths as he is?
One lawyer at a prominent NGO in Phnom Penh justified the disparity by calling it “unequal but not unfair.” Or, as a longtime government adviser said to me, considering the “singularity” of Case 001 (Duch’s secret prison was the regime’s most important) and the “sufficiency” of Case 002 (the leaders’ trial is supposed to reveal the workings of the entire regime), “it would be wasteful to prosecute more suspects.” Raoul Jennar, a Cambodia expert from Belgium and until last fall also an adviser to Hun Sen, cast both the problem and its solution like this: “Yes, Duch is a scapegoat, but that’s a political necessity. One cannot afford the luxury of proceeding on the basis of justice alone.”
David van der Veen/AFP/Getty Images
Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen (left) shaking hands with former Khmer Rouge foreign minister Ieng Sary, October 22, 1996
Outside the courtroom, though, a crisis was erupting. On the very first day of Duch’s testimony, a Swiss judge tasked with investigating other former Khmer Rouge officials resigned, citing “egregious dysfunctions” at the court. As a mixed tribunal, the ECCC performs its most important functions—investigating, prosecuting, defending the accused, judging—with teams that include both Cambodian and international appointees. As he quit, the judge said that for months his Cambodian counterpart had stonewalled his efforts to pursue two cases against five mid-level Khmer Rouge officials, each one thought to be responsible for 40,000 to 100,000 deaths—far more than even the more than 12,000 deaths ascribed to Duch. The judge’s dramatic announcement was the strongest accusation yet that the Cambodian government has been trying to sabotage the tribunal’s work.
Behind this story of remarkable breakthroughs and confounding setbacks stands Cambodia’s protean leader, Hun Sen, one of the longest-serving prime ministers in the world. Hun Sen has long been keen to go down in history as the man who brought the surviving leaders of the Pol Pot regime to justice. But as a one-time Khmer Rouge battalion commander, he knows only too well that important members of the governing Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) have complicated ties to the former regime and that more investigations down the Khmer Rouge chain of command could expose their own shady pasts.
No less responsible for the ECCC’s zigzagging course are the UN, which co-runs the court, and the court’s major donors: Japan, the European Union, Australia, and the United States. The ECCC’S foreign backers have largely let Hun Sen have his way, despite much talk of accountability and universal values. They, too, seem eager to present themselves as guardians of international justice for as small a political price as possible.
Although international criminal tribunals often serve the specific needs of a few powerful players, the Khmer Rouge tribunal may stand apart for so effectively dispensing justice in the service of political expediency. The ECCC may have the formal trappings of an independent institution, but it is best understood as the judicial chapter in the awkward, and often dirty, story of political accommodations that Hun Sen, the Khmer Rouge, the United Nations, and major states have been making with one another for almost forty years.
Digital Archive of Cambodian Holocaust Survivors
Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh, April 17, 1975
Then the USSR collapsed, and by 1990, Vietnam, a Soviet ally, had withdrawn from Cambodia. Over the next few years, the UN helped broker a peace settlement; Cambodia was to become a model for state reconstruction. In 1993, elections were held. From those Hun Sen once again reemerged at the top, first as co-prime minister and then soon enough, after wresting more power still, as sole prime minister.
It was the late 1990s, and remnant factions of the Khmer Rouge were still waging sporadic attacks on government forces. One of Hun Sen’s strategies was to bring some of these groups over to the government’s side; in 1996, he even obtained a royal amnesty for Khmer Rouge foreign minister Ieng Sary. But he knew that formally prosecuting top members of Khmer Rouge would be a chance to cast himself as a savior-statesman, the leader who would pacify Cambodia after decades of conflict. It would also be an opportunity to burnish his credentials with Cambodia’s foreign aid donors. During the final years of the Cold War, despite wide knowledge of the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities, Pol Pot’s group had held on to Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations, thanks to support from the West, China, and ASEAN, the economic group of Southeast Asian states. (Better to carry on diplomacy with mass murderers than Soviet proxies, the reasoning went.) But the late 1990s were the heyday of special criminal courts, and by then Cambodia’s foreign backers, too, were ready to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice.
Hun Sen’s plan was to have only the Khmer Rouge’s leading figures prosecuted; the movement’s lower officials and rank and file would be reintegrated into Cambodian society, no questions asked. But he faced one particular challenge: how to separate out the members of Pol Pot’s “genocidal clique”—as goes a still-favored expression—from mid-level Khmer Rouge who had had some measure of authority, like himself and some of his colleagues at the CPP.
AP Photo/Heng Sinith, Munshi Ahmed/Bloomberg, Khem Sovanara/AFP/Getty Images
Cambodian leaders with Khmer Rouge ties, from left, Deputy Prime Minister Keat Chhon, Senate President Chea Sim, and National Assembly Chairman Heng Samrin
There’s also the troubling story of Hor Nam Hong, Cambodia’s long-time foreign minister. He was ambassador to Cuba for the regime of General Lon Nol, which was overthrown by the Khmer Rouge in 1975; Pol Pot’s people called him home, arrested him upon arrival, and sent him to Boeung Trabek, a reeducation camp for diplomats in Phnom Penh. But he was spared—reportedly thanks to the intervention of his former schoolmate Ieng Sary—and is said to have then helped run the camp. A 2002 US embassy cable released by Wikileaks last summer says that Hor Nam Hong and his wife may have “collaborated in the killing of many prisoners.” Last year in France he lost a final appeal in a defamation suit he had brought regarding such crimes.
Hun Sen as a Khmer Rouge battalion commander, 1970s
With so few degrees of separation between the crimes of yesterday and the leaders of today, establishing the ECCC was predictably tortuous. It wasn’t difficult for the Cambodian government to agree with the UN and other international negotiators that the tribunal should prosecute genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of Cambodian criminal law. But while UN lawyers favored creating a fully international court–-much like the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia—Hun Sen insisted it be Cambodian.
Even more controversial was the question of who would be prosecuted. In December 1999, with negotiations still under way, Hun Sen announced that only four or five members of the Khmer Rouge regime would be tried. His short list did not include Pol Pot, who had died in 1998, but it included Duch, who had just been arrested, as well as the three senior leaders now on trial. Stephen Heder, a leading American expert on Cambodia, and David Scheffer, at the time the US Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues, have since said that no such understanding existed. According to them, international negotiators assumed that ten, maybe even fifteen, people might eventually be tried.
Yet correspondence from that time reveals that top UN lawyers repeatedly suggested it was up to the Cambodian government to define the court’s reach. Throughout 2000, they variously wrote to Sok An, who is today arguably Hun Sen’s most powerful deputy prime minister, that determining the ECCC’s ambit was “an internal Cambodian matter,” “a political decision to be taken at the national level,” and “of course for the legislature to decide upon.” The two sides eventually agreed to grant the court authority to try both the senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge and “those most responsible” for the regime’s crimes. Settling on these three vague words may have been necessary to get the court off the ground, but when the UN endorsed them, it was embarking on a joint venture that its own negotiators knew, and acknowledged, the Cambodian government had every reason to control.
ECCC Pool/Mak Remissa
A pre-trial hearing at the Khmer Rouge tribunal, Phnom Penh, February 11, 2010
The court struggled with low-level corruption and an elaborate kickback scheme benefiting a senior administrator. There was also resistance from the Cambodian government whenever the investigating judges came too close. In 2009 six witnesses who had been subpoenaed to talk about Case 002 simply refused to meet the judges. Among them were four of the senior government officials known to have ties to the Khmer Rouge: Keat Chhon, Heng Samrin, Chea Sim, and Hor Nam Hong. Still, the case against Duch went to trial, and in 2010 a formal indictment was completed against the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders.
When it came to other suspects—names not on Hun Sen’s original list—it was a different story. Laurent Kasper-Ansermet, the Swiss judge who resigned this spring because of “constant and active opposition” from his Cambodian counterpart, was trying to investigate the five mid-level Khmer Rouge officials targeted in Cases 003 and 004. As soon as the court had officially opened those cases back in 2009—at the instigation of the international prosecutor and the international investigating judge then in those posts—Hun Sen had declared that civil war would break out if they were allowed to proceed.
Khmer Rouge suspects Meas Mut (left), the former army chief, and Im Chaem, a former regional leader
Taking the hint, the Cambodian prosecutor and the Cambodian investigating judge, You Bunleng, quickly found legal obstacles to slow Cases 003 and 004 to a crawl. At first, the UN and the court’s foreign backers hardly complained; they were focused on seeing through the cases against Duch and the senior leaders. And as long as the court’s international staffers pushed for investigating the two additional cases in the face of local resistance, donors could gesture at the process’s semblance of integrity, at least on their side.
But then something bizarre happened: the court’s foreign investigating judge came out against pursuing Cases 003 and 004. In 2011, just four months after taking over the international slot in the investigating judges’ office, the German judge Siegfried Blunk announced that he was formally closing the inquiry for Case 003. (Case 004 remained open, but no work was being conducted.)
This was a puzzling decision. A considerable amount of evidence already suggested that the two suspects, Meas Mut and Sou Met, had orchestrated vast purges within their ranks. And documents made public during Duch’s trial indicated that Sou Met had transferred prisoners into Duch’s custody to be tortured and executed. The international prosecutor asked for more field investigations; Blunk refused. Half of Blunk’s team resigned, including Heder, who had been assisting the ECCC for several years by then. Blunk’s motivations were so unclear that his colleagues and court observers started trading theories about incompetence and disloyalty, unhappy coincidences and ungodly conspiracies.
When I met Blunk in Phnom Penh last July, he had been refusing to speak to the press. To me, he would say only that he had applied no “fanciful notions” and had relied on the precedent set by the special court that is examining major crimes committed in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2002. If a suspect’s “authority in the command structure” was limited, if he had “little room to maneuver,” Blunk told me, “no amount of further investigation will change that—no matter how many mass graves are opened or crime scenes are investigated.”
Whatever the judge’s logic–-and officially no one knew what it was since he hadn’t made any public statements—diplomats from donor countries didn’t seem particularly troubled. The week I saw Blunk, Stephen Rapp, the US Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues, was in Phnom Penh for the official opening of the trial in Case 002. One day at a press conference, even as he was fielding tough questions about how Hun Sen seemed to be dictating the court’s agenda, Rapp said that “reasonable people” could disagree about which suspects fell within the ECCC’S mandate. He explained that in 2007, while he was chief prosecutor for the special Sierra Leone tribunal, he had decided to indict only people at the “top level in command,” not regional or divisional operatives. Rapp couldn’t have given Blunk a better way out of Cases 003 and 004.
When Blunk eventually did resign, last October, it was just days before a procedural ruling criticizing him for secretly backdating orders under appeal. He looked worse than ever. Still, the UN and the ECCC’s foreign backers showed little interest in examining his work. During a special visit to Cambodia, the UN’s top legal officer, Patricia O’Brien, gave a press conference in which she explained why there would be no inquiry: too complicated and too cumbersome. At a meeting with NGOs in Phnom Penh days later, according to the Cambodia Daily, O’Brien said that if anything were uncovered after a probe, the defense teams would “have a field day” and “undermine Case 002.” The message was clear: whatever impropriety the investigating judges may have committed, better to leave it be. Save Cases 001 and 002 and bury the rest.
The tribunal's former international investigating judge, Laurent Kasper-Ansermet
Scheffer, who is now the UN Secretary-General’s special adviser to the court, promptly protested that by getting in Kasper-Ansermet’s way the Cambodian government was breaching the ECCC’s foundational treaty. The Secretary-General’s office added that this was sufficient legal ground for the UN to pull out of the entire project. It was also a lot of puffing. Taking this stance so loudly and so publicly left the Cambodian government with no face-saving way to reverse the decision of the magistracy council. In other words, the UN’s move was less a negotiation gambit than an attempt to regain some credibility with disheartened NGOs and victims’ advocates.
Then, in February, the appeals chamber of the court issued its final verdict against Duch. Touted as a historic victory for the Khmer Rouge’s victims, the decision was more remarkable for delivering everything Hun Sen and his supporters might have wanted. It took a severe position—at least by international standards—against the regime’s most recognizable torturer, making little allowance for Duch’s admissions and cooperation or for his illegal detention by a military tribunal from 1999 to 2007. And while the verdict said nothing that might undermine the case against the three senior Khmer Rouge leaders—the court’s, and Hun Sen’s, big prize—it was a death knell for Cases 003 and 004.
Duch had appealed the sentence of the court’s trial chamber by claiming, somewhat implausibly, that he was not among “those most responsible.” The appeals judges might simply have ruled that he was: after all, he did supervise the killing of more than 12,000 people. But in the final verdict they claimed instead that it was neither for them nor for the trial judges to decide whom the court should try. That matter was “exclusively” a “policy decision” for the prosecutors and the investigating judges—precisely some of the people who have been blocking Cases 003 and 004 for more than two years.
This was extraordinary. Judges rarely give up the prerogative to determine the scope of their own authority and in this instance abdicating that power would have major implications. Considering Hun Sen’s adamant opposition to these cases, it was also hard not to interpret the appeals judges’ decision as a political concession. And with no dissenting opinion—not even from any of the three international judges, who have dissented on other matters—it looked like all the key players were agreed on pocket-vetoing Cases 003 and 004.
There’s little reason to expect much change. Kasper-Ansermet, who left his post on May 4 stating he thought the suspects in Cases 003 were among “those most responsible,” has not yet been replaced. In a confidential order addressed to his colleagues at the court, he also recommended that the prosecutors’ office investigate crimes committed during Khmer Rouge incursions into Vietnam in 1977. In particular, he advised interviewing National Assembly Chairman Heng Samrin and Senate President Chea Sim—and intimated doing more. But the prosecutors swiftly issued a press release stating that the relevant facts had already been investigated in Case 002 and that, in any event, it was their “established public position” that “no further cases would be initiated following Cases 003 and 004.”
Preventing the court from embarking on more investigations remains a paramount concern for Hun Sen, who continues to consolidate his power. Cambodia currently chairs ASEAN, and it is trying to secure a seat as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council. There were local elections in June—dominated by the CPP—and National Assembly elections will take place next year. Having largely succeeded in neutralizing the Cambodian political opposition over the past few years—by way of anticorruption investigations and defamation lawsuits—Hun Sen is now even more concerned than before with shoring up his patronage network within the CPP.
At the same time, the UN and the court’s international backers are likely to continue invoking high-minded principles while disavowing their unspoken understandings with the Cambodian government. Having come this far on Case 002—and paid much of the $160 million or so tab the court has racked up since 2006—they won’t want to pull out before sentences are secured against Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan.
Bruno Barbey/Magnum Photos
Killing field south of Phnom Penh, 1996
The trial judges also added that such accusations by the government would not influence them in “the exercise of their duties.” This assurance, which would have been unnecessary at a properly functioning tribunal, sounded more like an entreaty to ECCC watchers: please believe that this made-to-measure court can be impartial even if it is not entirely independent. That’s a tall order, especially in view of the final verdict against Duch, which has all the makings of a double standard. How can Duch, but not the suspects in Cases 003 and 004, be among “those most responsible” for the Khmer Rouge’s crimes when each of them is thought to be accountable for four to ten times as many deaths as he is?
One lawyer at a prominent NGO in Phnom Penh justified the disparity by calling it “unequal but not unfair.” Or, as a longtime government adviser said to me, considering the “singularity” of Case 001 (Duch’s secret prison was the regime’s most important) and the “sufficiency” of Case 002 (the leaders’ trial is supposed to reveal the workings of the entire regime), “it would be wasteful to prosecute more suspects.” Raoul Jennar, a Cambodia expert from Belgium and until last fall also an adviser to Hun Sen, cast both the problem and its solution like this: “Yes, Duch is a scapegoat, but that’s a political necessity. One cannot afford the luxury of proceeding on the basis of justice alone.”
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