Monarchy’s twilight I

Monarchy’s twilight I:
PPT said it some time ago: the monarchy is in decline. This is re-confirmed by two recent commentaries, by Thitinan Pongsudhirak and Sonia Rothwell.
Rothwell, writing at the Zurich-based International Relations and Security Network (ISN), comments on the south and red shirts, with an interesting link about rising political consciousness:

Building on the political awakening of the middle classes in the 1990s, there has been increasing political awareness both in the far south and among Thailand’s poor. Encouraged by Prime Minister Yingluck [Shinawatra]’s brother Thaksin, the politicization culminated in the so-called Red Shirt protests of 2010.

She then writes about the monarchy and while the general drift of the remarks are acceptable, some aspects deserve criticism.  The author states: “The declining health of Thailand’s long-serving King Bhumibol also threatens to seriously fracture the fragile unity of the country.” PPT isn’t sure there is much unity, but the point that the king’s death will lead to unpredictable outcomes is correct.
Rothwell asserts that the aging monarch “has been widely regarded as a unifying figure for Thailand over the past 66 years…”. On this, she is exaggerating, but many other journalists make this point from palace propaganda. The next exaggeration is a big one: “With the continuity of Thai nationhood at present largely resting on the continuity of the royal family, it is perhaps unsurprising that the country’s notoriously stringent lese majeste laws (which prohibit criticism of the royal family) continue to be tightly enforced.” The first claim about monarchy and nation is most usually heard from the yellow-shirted royalists, while the second claim neglects that lese majeste is a political crime, and that its most extravagant use corresponds with political crises.
Despite being a little mixed-up, Rothwell does identify the passing of an era.
The second commentary is by Thitinan in an article available from the Journal of Democracy, which has been outlined by Bangkok Pundit. It is an academic article that argues that the conservative elite is losing its battle to hold Thailand’s democratization back. Bangkok Pundit emphasized some parts of the article, and we’ll do that too. There are some things we think are errors (the death toll in the war on drugs was not 2,300; Yingluck’s government hasn’t been “strictly enforcing” lese majeste; Thaksin did make big bucks from state concessions; the new palace-sanctioned biography of the king is anything but “scholarly”), but much that deserves attention.

As twilight settles over the 65-year reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej (b. 1927), Thais find themselves caught in a national stalemate. Those who favor maintaining the monarchy-centered hierarchy as the ultimate source of political power are arrayed against others who want to reform the monarchy and reconcile it with a fuller and more mature form of democracy.

He adds at the end of the paper:

For Thaksin’s establishment foes, conceding to his spectacularly successful populism would have been tantamount to admitting that most people in the … have been—and have been kept—poor.

As Thitinan indicates, bereft of popular support and wanting things to be as they were “before”, the conservative elite fights on as “it has too much at stake to simply give way to the challenges that Thaksin…”. Thitinan reckons that the rift between the palace and Thaksin began after the latter’s huge 2005 election victory. That seems true enough, although criticism from the Privy Council is mentioned in a Wikileaks cable from just prior to the election, focused on the south.
At present the fight is, Thitinan claims, a stalemate, so Yingluck continues in government:

As long as the monarchy remains sacrosanct and the symbiotic relationship between it and the military remains untouched, Yingluck may be able to muddle along with a reheated populist agenda …. Should the palace begin to perceive a clear and present danger, however, the Yingluck government and anyone who actively aspires to a basic reform of the monarchy will likely face stepped-up pressure and perhaps even the specter of violence from royalist and conservative quarters.

Judicialization is a big section of the paper, and seeing this as an elite strategy, fostered by the palace, Thitinan sees it as having failed:

The monarchy is associated with the launch of the judicialization strategy, and that strategy’s failure appears to have compromised the

monarchy up to a point.

That’s a big call, especially given the Constitutional Court’s (re)positioning in political space in recent weeks. PPT thinks the judiciary remains an important elite and palace weapon against democratization.
Both articles recognize an end is near. Thitinan notes that the way forward is murky because there are so few alternatives: Thaksin and his flaws do not augur well for a broader-based democratization.

Doctors find woman accused of lèse majesté insane

Doctors find woman accused of lèse majesté insane:
A 63-year-old woman, who was alleged to have committed lèse majesté during a protest in front the Constitution Court in July, has been diagnosed as mentally ill by psychiatrists.
On 16 Aug, Pol Lt Col Phiphob Sukkam, a Deputy Superintendent of Investigation at Thung Song Hong Police Station in Bangkok, said that the Galya Ratchanakharin Institute, where Thitinan Kaewjantranon had been held since her arrest, had already submitted its diagnosis of her mental health.
Thitinan was examined by a team of psychiatrists, psychologists and other specialists, led by a former Director-General and a Deputy Director-General of the Department of Mental Health under the Ministry of Public Health.
‘According to the diagnosis, Thitinan is mentally ill and is in need of at least a further two months’ medical treatment at the institute.  She is now incapable of giving any testimony and handling any legal action,’ the police officer said.
The case will be forwarded to Deputy Commander of Metropolitan Police Pol Maj Gen Parinya Chansuriya, the chief investigator in charge of the case, to consider what to do next, he said.
On the same day, Criminal Court Director-General Thawee Prachuablarb told reporters that in cases where the accused claimed during police investigation that they were mentally ill [in committing alleged crimes], police investigators were obliged to send them to be examined by psychiatrists. 
If the accused are found to be permanently mentally ill, having committed the alleged crimes without being able to control themselves, they will probably be acquitted.  But, if found to be temporarily mentally ill, they will probably be sentenced to punishment less severe than that prescribed in the law, he said, citing Section 65 of the Criminal Law:
Whenever any person commits an offence at the time of not being able to appreciate the nature, or illegality of his act or not being able to control himself on account of defective mind, mental disease or mental infirmity, such person shall not be punished for such offence.


But, if the offender is still partially able to appreciate the nature or illegality of his act, or is still partially able to control himself, such person shall be punished for such offence, but the Court may inflict less punishment to any extent than that provided by the law for such offence.
As Section 112 of the Criminal Code prescribes a penalty of lèse majesté of from 3 to 15 years’ imprisonment, those who are found to be ‘partially able’ to control themselves might, for example, be sentenced to one or two years’ imprisonment, he said.
If investigators or the courts view that the accused are mentally ill and not capable of handling their legal cases, they are authorized by law to suspend any legal proceedings and send the accused to receive medical treatment at mental institutes or hospitals until they are considered able to account for themselves, he said.
Thitinan, a New Zealand resident, was accused of lèse majesté for her allegedly improper actions against a picture of HM the King in front of the Constitution Court on 13 July.
Having been held under medical care by the institute since her arrest, she has been officially forbidden go abroad by the police. 

Thitinan on the decline of the establishment

Thitinan on the decline of the establishment:
BP blogged on journal article by Chula academic Thitinan in the Journal of Democracy entitled “Thailand Since the Coup” back in October 2008. Now, Thitinan has another article in the Journal of Democracy (April 2012). The article is entitled “Southeast Asia: Thailand’s Uneasy Passage” (available from here). Some excerpts below (at pages 55-56):

The monarchy is associated with the launch of the judicialization strategy, and that strategy’s failure appears to have compromised the monarchy up to a point. If the bans and dissolutions, the postcoup seizure or freezing of Thaksin’s assets, and his 2010 Supreme Court conviction in absentia on “policy corruption” charges had succeeded in ending the challenge that he represented, then perhaps Thai politics might have stabilized and returned to something like its pre-Thaksin form, led by a weak party system and a strong military-monarchy-bureaucracy trium- virate. But Thaksin with all his strengths and weaknesses—the innova- [p56] tive efforts to increase economic competitiveness, the offer of greater upward mobility to those on society’s bottom rungs, and also the cor- ruption, the conflicts of interest, and the human-rights violations of the war on drugs—became “indestructible.” The failure of judicialization marked the monarchy’s failure to extinguish the political awakening and the runaway expectations that Thaksin’s TRT years had ignited. Moreover, when a senior general left the Privy Council to head the coup- appointed government, then rejoined the king’s advisory body after the December 2007 poll, it reinforced the popular perception that the putsch had been carried out to protect and promote the crown (and the military- bureaucratic establishment long associated with it) at the expense of a democratically elected government.
That perception gained force when Chanchai Likitjitta, justice minister for the coup government, was named to the Privy Council on 8 April 2008. Similarly, Air Chief Marshal Chalit Pookpasuk, a core coupmaker who had headed the Council for National Security after September 2007, was appointed to the Privy Council on 18 May 2011. Many also noted the queen’s conspicuous attendance at the October 2008 funeral of the yellow-shirt protester. The lese-majesté law may deter public discussion, but it cannot prevent people from taking private notice. Then there were the televised comments in which top army general Prayuth Chan-ocha effectively endorsed the DP just weeks before the 2011 election, urging viewers not to vote for the same politicians but to elect “good people” who would defend the monarchy. This could not help but tarnish the revered institution when Pheu Thai won handily.

BP: Prayuth’s vote for good people statement was a colossal mistake. By framing the issue with good and its opposite, which has has to be evil, you push Puea Thai voters into a corner by indirectly labelling them as supporters of ‘not good’ people.
Then on page 57 on reconciling monarchy and democracy:

As of early 2012, no other reformist groups or individuals had appeared on the scene possessing anything like what it will take to reconcile monarchy and democracy in Thailand. All the same, however, it appears that Thailand cannot escape the challenge of reaching a new consensus that will root the monarchy more squarely within the constitution of an emerging democracy, but in a way that reconciles conservative royalists. The desire of the rural lower classes to have their voices heard and their numbers felt is legitimate, but so is the desire for a government that does not simply replace the lack of accountability that characterized the old military-bureaucratic power centers with a similarly unaccountable populist strongman.

BP: The coup and its aftermath has damaged the establishment.
Then on page 59 on Thaksin and his legacy:

Thaksin was well positioned by circumstance and insight to take advantage of this new and more open political environment. Given an opportunity, he overhauled the bureaucracy, delivered on his populist pledges to do more for poorer Thais, mapped out plans to upgrade the country’s industrial base, and even pursued an ambitious foreign-policy agenda in pursuit of Thai regional leadership. Yet there was to all this an underside of corruption, conflicts of interest, cronyism, human-rights violations, abuses of power, and other sins of misrule. Such is Thaksin’s mixed legacy. The wider opportunities that he opened for the downtrodden and his ambitious plans for Thailand’s future were inextricably entangled with his self-dealing, his penchant for corruption, and his habit of abusing the powers of his office. Thaksin Incorporated went hand-in-hand with Thailand Incorporated.
Yet Thaksin’s enemies have shown their own limits in refusing to admit that there is more to him and what he stands for than graft and corruption. They should have weighed his policy innovations and put forward their own ideas for assisting the impoverished and marginalized. In the end, they came up with the Abhisit government and its programs for “welfare” and fostering a “sufficiency economy” that most voters find insufficient. For Thaksin’s establishment foes, conceding to his spectacularly successful populism would have been tantamount to admitting that most people in the hospitable, smiling, conspicuously tourist-friendly Kingdom of Thailand have been—and have been kept— poor. Wittingly or not, Thaksin has been the catalyst for propelling Thailand into the twenty-first century while his adversaries have stayed stuck in Cold War times. Although he committed many infractions, Thaksin’s most egregious crime and gravest sin were that he changed the way Thais see themselves and their country. Some see this change as usurpation and manipulation by Thaksin and his cronies. Others see it as Thailand’s overdue deliverance from the Cold War era. Those who have ruled in the past must accept this new reality, just as those who are atop the polls now must accept the legacy of the past.

BP: Pandora’s box has been opened and it won’t be shut again. Have a read of the whole thing. Who will be the one to offer reforms and on what? There is an opening – just see headlines about the easing of royal motorcade rules, e.g. AP article is entitled “Thai king updates motorcade rules to ease traffic” - and you can see how other reforms will be framed positively. Lese majeste surely must be high up there on the agenda…

Has there been an upsurge in violence in the deep south this year?

Has there been an upsurge in violence in the deep south this year?:
Kavi in The Nation:

That helps to explain why the containment of conflicts during 2009-11 was working allowing the government to claim some success. The trust has increased between the Malays and the Thai state at the time however it has not impacted on the insurgency and the state of violence there. More attacks were targeting urban areas with car combs even though they were less frequent.
…
As in the previous six months, there have been heavy tolls on the civilians – nearly 421 deaths. If the past is any judge, when the military was in good terms with the government in power, the soldiers are able to prevent attacks because of the better coordination on the ground among various agencies with shared intelligence.
…
According to the Deep South Watch’s statistics, from January 2004-July 2012 there were 11,754 attacks, killing 5,206 and wounding 9,137 persons.

BP: Kavi doesn’t cite a source for the 421 civilian deaths in 6 months (he means 6 months, right? Just ask as his phrasing of this sentence is odd) but given the citing of Deep South Watch statistics a reader may believe it is from Deep South Watch. As someone who closely follows Deep South Watch statistics on violence in the Deep South – BP has previously blogged on DeepSouthWatch’s statistics on the violence in the Deep South in 2007 (here), 2008 (posts here and here), 2009 (here), up until September 2010 (here), and up until March 2012 (here). BP was very surprised by the mention of 421 civilian deaths in six months.  He doesn’t specify the six month period although a January-June 2012 or February-July 2012 would be reasonable to assume (or given he is talking about the Yingluck government, we can even stretch this until any six month block between August 2011-July 2012 then).
Below are some statistics from Deep South Watch:*
Chart 1 : Deaths : January 2009 – July  2012


NOTE: A very large chart of deaths from January 2004 – July 2012 can be found here.
BP: In the year from August 2011-July 2012, there have been 502 deaths. This is 502 total deaths and not just civilian deaths. Simply, relying on Deep South Watch statistics there were not 421 civilian deaths in the previous 6 months.
So how does 502 deaths between August 2011-July 2012 compare with under the Abhisit government? Between December 2008-May 2011, there were 1248 deaths or an average of 41.6 deaths a month. Between August 2011-July 2012 of the Yingluck government, there were 41.83 deaths per month.
There is a good question of when to count the end of the Abhisit government. We could say the end of May 2011 (the month of dissolution), the end of June 2011 (last month before the election), or the end of July 2011 (last month of caretaker responsibility). If it was the end of June 2011, there would be 41.45 deaths per month. If the end of July 2011, there would be 41 deaths per month. Regardless, we are looking at 41 or 42 deaths per month whoever was in government. The difference is negligible. Some months the violence is higher, some months it is lower, but we have remained at a fairly consistent number of deaths since 2008.
Some other statistics on the Deep South:
Chart 2 : Injuries : January 2009-July 2012


NOTE: A very large chart of injuries from January 2004 – July 2012 can be found here.
In March, you had a huge increase in the number of injuries with around 350 injuries from the March 31 Hat Yai bombings and more than 100 injuries in Yala (MCOT). Hence, these two incidents explains the increase in the number of injuries. Most of the injuries were minor, ie. smoke inhalation, and vast majority went home that day. This is not to understate what happened that day, but it is a single day and on its own, it does not yet suggest a sustained increase in violence as you can see that April-July 2012, we are back to more normal levels of injuries.
Between December 2008-May 2011 under the Abhisit government, there were 2,478 injuries or an average of 82.6 injuries a month. Between August 2011-July 2012 of the Yingluck government, there were 117 injuries per month (if you exclude March 2012, there have been 78 injuries per month).
Chart 3 : Incidents : January 2009- July 2012

NOTE: A very large chart of incidents from January 2004 – July 2012 can be found here.
BP: Despite the large injury toll, incidents were not up. This just demonstrates how much deadlier attacks are now.  To paraphrase something that BP read recently, it is more efficient to plant a large car bomb  and cause massive damage than to undertake daily drive-bys (i.e riding up on a motorcycle and shooting another person on a motorcycle which exposes the shooter to the risk of getting caught each time).
Between December 2008-May 2011 under the Abhisit government, there were 2,391 incidents or an average of 79.7 incidents a month. Between August 2011-July 2012 of the Yingluck government, there were 77.91 incidents per month.
CONCLUSION: There has been no*upsurge in violence. We had the coordinated bombings in Hat Yai on March 31, 2012 which gives up a high injury count, but most of the injuries being smoke inhalation and people were check at the hospital and released the same day, but this is a single day and smoke inhalation pales in comparison to the standard gunshot victim or someone who has been injured by shrapnel.
*The January 2004-March 2012 statistics come directly by e-mail from Ajarn Srisompob of Deep South Watch. BP has then added the April, May, June, and July 2012 monthly statistics from the Deep South Watch Web site. If there are any errors in converting the statistics into charts then those are errors by BP. Please note that there are always slight discrepancies between one set of Deep South Watch statistics and another as previous months statistics get slightly adjusted (one assumes to correct previous errors) For example, in BP’s previous post, BP stated there were 547 injuries in March 2012 (this came directly from DSW by e-mail), the monthly statistics for March 2012 on the DW Web site still list 547 injuries, but this analysis (PDF) by Deep South Watch from July 2012 states there were 572 injuries.
BP should note that the above figures are not necessarily all insurgent violence. For example, in 2004 you will see large death tolls in April and October. This was not only because the insurgents were killing more people, but the state was through the Kru Se and Tak Bai incidents. In addition, it is difficult to discern between insurgent and non-insurgent violence as the insurgents do not leave calling cards. It is estimated that around 25-30 percent of the violence is non-insurgent, but the culture of impunity and violence can also be a contributing factor to an increase in non-insurgent violence so it is not as though insurgent and non-insurgent violence is unrelated.
* Corrected to add “no”

VIETNAM: Farmers brace for bird flu

VIETNAM: Farmers brace for bird flu:

HANOI, 16 August 2012 (IRIN) - Farmers in north and central Vietnam are bracing for a new wave of bird flu outbreaks as local authorities are urged to take precautions against the disease.

SOUTH AFRICA: Liz Gatley, “You can actually have an influence, make a difference”

SOUTH AFRICA: Liz Gatley, “You can actually have an influence, make a difference”:

JOHANNESBURG, 19 August 2012 (IRIN) - In South Africa's Zithulele Village, the local hospital services 130,000 people - but operates without enough health workers.

Further Decline in Credibility Ratings for Most News Organizations

Further Decline in Credibility Ratings for Most News Organizations: For the second time in a decade, the believability ratings for major news organizations have suffered broad-based declines. In the new survey, the ratings have fallen significantly for nine of 13 news organizations tested. The falloff affects organizations in most sectors: national newspapers, such as the New York Times and USA Today, all three cable news outlets, the broadcast TV networks and NPR.

Indonesia cuts sentence of over 50000 prisoners - Firstpost

Indonesia cuts sentence of over 50000 prisoners - Firstpost:

Indonesia cuts sentence of over 50000 prisoners Firstpost Among high profile convicts receiving remission of sentences were Australian drug smuggler Schapelle Corby, former tax official Gayus H. Tambunan, and former Garuda Indonesia pilot Pollycarpus Budihari Priyanto, who was sentenced for his role in the ... and more »

In Indonesia, ethnic Chinese see a new future - Washington Post

In Indonesia, ethnic Chinese see a new future - Washington Post:

In Indonesia, ethnic Chinese see a new future Washington Post JAKARTA, Indonesia — When mob violence swept across the Indonesian capital in May 1998, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, an ethnic Chinese geologist and businessman, joined terrified neighbors in the heavily Chinese district of Pluit to defend their lives and ... and more »

Indonesian Nationalism: Between the Bellicose and the Inclusive - The Nation

Indonesian Nationalism: Between the Bellicose and the Inclusive - The Nation:

Indonesian Nationalism: Between the Bellicose and the Inclusive The Nation During his recent public lecture in Singapore on 1 August 2012, Indonesian Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto highlighted the need for his country to remain nationalist in its outlook and to adopt a nationalist stand on issues of national interest ...

For the good of the people? - Inside Indonesia

For the good of the people?:

The challenges of governing ‘societal organisations’ pose difficult questions for Indonesian democracy

Lee Wilson and Eryanto Nugroho

Baladika on the road to Gianyar Image courtesy of Gus Bota

Ethnic and religious militia groups now proliferate throughout Indonesia, and present a major challenge to the governing of civil society in the nascent democracy. The most notorious of these militias is the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). FPI’s latest threats of violence caught the attention of the international media in May 2012 when the singer Lady Gaga’s sell-out Jakarta concert was cancelled after their vehement public protest against her planned performance. FPI leader, Habib Rizieq, threatened that his organisation would bring chaos to the streets of Jakarta should Lady Gaga bring her ‘Satan-worshipping’ antics to the capital city.
The Indonesian police seem little inclined to curb FPI’s violent overtures. However, recently others have taken a stronger stand against them. When four members of the FPI flew to Palangkaraya in Central Kalimantan on 11 February 2012 to open a new branch office, they were met by hundreds of armed Dayaks at Tjilik Riwut airport protesting their arrival in the province. Unable to disembark, they were forced to travel on to South Kalimantan. The protests heralded an upsurge of anti-FPI sentiment, with further demonstrations in Jakarta by the group ‘Indonesia free of the FPI’ and a declaration by the residents of Balikpapan in East Kalimantan that the FPI is

Read more...

Philippine top minister feared dead in crash

Philippine top minister feared dead in crash: President joins mass search for interior secretary Jesse Robredo, one of three people missing after plane crash at sea.

Sudan ministers among victims of plane crash

Sudan ministers among victims of plane crash: State television reports deaths of two cabinet members and almost 30 other officials traveling to war-torn south.

More Than 200 Approved for New Somali Parliament

More Than 200 Approved for New Somali Parliament: MOGADISHU — The United Nations and members of the diplomatic community say they are satisfied with the progress made so far by Somalia's political leaders and elders as they face an August 20 deadline to end the transitional government and elect a new president. Somalia's Technical Selection Committee, which is screening members for a new parliament, approved 215 new lawmakers on Sunday.   On the eve of the expected inauguration of Somalia's new parliament, representatives ...

Asia's Shopping Passion Cools - WSJ.com

Asia's Shopping Passion Cools - WSJ.com

10 Ways Mobile Technology Is Changing Our World - TIME

10 Ways Mobile Technology Is Changing Our World - TIME

Racism and the Mormon Church - NYTimes.com

Racism and the Mormon Church - NYTimes.com

Romneys at Church: Scripture, Songs and Six Grandchildren

Romneys at Church: Scripture, Songs and Six Grandchildren: For the first time, Mitt Romney’s aides invited reporters to accompany him to church services, a rare glimpse into the private life of a candidate who almost never talks about his Mormon faith.

Romney’s equating of taxes and charitable giving sparks debate - The Washington Post

Romney’s equating of taxes and charitable giving sparks debate - The Washington Post

Ammonium nitrate fertilizer is being smuggled into Afghanistan for IEDs

Ammonium nitrate fertilizer is being smuggled into Afghanistan for IEDs:
Seizures in Afghanistan of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, the main explosive used in Taliban bombs, more than doubled in the first seven months of 2012 compared with the same period last year, U.S. officials said.
Read full article >>

In Syria, role of Kurds divides opposition

In Syria, role of Kurds divides opposition:
BEIRUT — Opponents of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad are showing signs of splintering along a deep regional fault line, with Arabs and Turks uneasy about a military offensive last month by Syrian Kurds, who overran four towns in the country’s north.
Read full article >>

In one of Haitian capital’s roughest neighborhoods, a pretty good second chance

In one of Haitian capital’s roughest neighborhoods, a pretty good second chance:
In helping give birth to modern cities, disaster has been a useful, if cruel, midwife. In the months following Haiti’s massive earthquake in 2010, people hoped it might be true here, too.
There was plenty of precedent.
Read full article >>

In Yemen, revolution continues in Change Square six months after Saleh’s fall

In Yemen, revolution continues in Change Square six months after Saleh’s fall:
The tents are still in Change Square. So is the large billboard declaring “Get Out.” Portraits of young activists killed in protests still grace the walls, an inspiration to many here who say their job is unfinished.
Read full article >>

Obama slams Romney, Ryan on tax rates, Medicare in stops in New Hampshire

Obama slams Romney, Ryan on tax rates, Medicare in stops in New Hampshire:
WINDHAM, N.H. — President Obama focused sharply on his rivals’ approach to the economy in this swing state Saturday, arguing that Republican Mitt Romney and Rep. Paul Ryan, his running mate, would give tax breaks to the wealthy and strip away social programs and benefits that middle-class Americans rely on.
Read full article >>

Mobile dating apps grow in popularity

Mobile dating apps grow in popularity:
Mobile dating. It’s all the horrors of online dating transferred to your phone, where you get creepy texts from people who view your profile and use your location to stalk you. Right?
Sometimes, yes. But it could also spontaneously put you in front of the someone who likes your favorite food, books and music and might just like you, too.
Read full article >>

From Embassy Refuge, Assange Calls for End to WikiLeaks 'Witch Hunt' | PCWorld Business Center

From Embassy Refuge, Assange Calls for End to WikiLeaks 'Witch Hunt' | PCWorld Business Center

Smartphones Can Distract Diners, Prompting Restaurants to Act | PCWorld

Smartphones Can Distract Diners, Prompting Restaurants to Act | PCWorld

SOMALIA: Political transition could be deadly for journalists

SOMALIA: Political transition could be deadly for journalists:

MOGADISHU, 16 August 2012 (IRIN) - The recent murders of two Somali journalists have brought to 10 the number of media workers killed in the country since December 2011. Journalists and rights groups fear that more targeted killings lie ahead as the country prepares for a new government.

SAHEL: Education in crisis

SAHEL: Education in crisis:

OUAGADOUGOU/ABIDJAN, 16 August 2012 (IRIN) - In times of severe drought such as in the Sahel or East Africa, food funding often takes priority over other needs like education, yet children who miss out on learning remain vulnerable to future disasters, said British aid group Save the Children.

MIGRATION: Greece - “an unsafe environment for migrants”

MIGRATION: Greece - “an unsafe environment for migrants”:

BANGKOK, 17 August 2012 (IRIN) - Human rights groups in Greece have condemned recent police crackdowns on undocumented migrants, inhumane detention conditions, and hate crimes committed with impunity.

INDONESIA: Growing concern over hepatitis

INDONESIA: Growing concern over hepatitis:

JAKARTA, 17 August 2012 (IRIN) - Poor awareness about hepatitis infections and a lack of treatment have made the disease a growing public health threat in Indonesia, say experts.

MALI: Rain but too few seeds

MALI: Rain but too few seeds:

MOPTI, 17 August 2012 (IRIN) - It is raining in Mopti Region in central Mali and most of the fields are filled with millet and rice seedlings, turning the usually dusty landscape a vivid green. But interspersed with these are vast tracts of land that lie uncultivated because farmers could not get the seed to plant them.

SOUTH AFRICA: Police target foreign traders in Limpopo

SOUTH AFRICA: Police target foreign traders in Limpopo:

JOHANNESBURG, 17 August 2012 (IRIN) - Police in South Africa's northern Limpopo Province have shut down hundreds of shops run by refugees and asylum seekers during an operation to enforce trading laws that observers say were “selectively enforced” to target foreign nationals.

Beyond Turf Wars in Coup-Hit Guinea-Bissau

Beyond Turf Wars in Coup-Hit Guinea-Bissau: International actors need to commit to a common strategy to help coup-plagued Guinea-Bissau implement the security, justice and electoral reforms it needs to escape its status as a link in drug trafficking to Europe.

Link to full ICG report.

Election Reform in Pakistan

Election Reform in Pakistan: With fresh elections just months away, Pakistan’s government and opposition must urgently implement key reforms to the electoral commission to cement the transition to democracy and stave off another indefinite period of unaccountable rule.

Link to full ICG report.

Timorese Journalist stabbed, SIC Investigates

Timorese Journalist stabbed, SIC Investigates:
1The case of journalist LDG of Community Radio Ramelau Kablaki Matebian (RAKAMBIA) who was stabbed in the early morning on 10 August 2012 in Farol, Dili, is being investigated by the Criminal Investigation Services (SIC) of the National Police of Timor-Leste PNTL.

SSC Dental Clinic closed due to lack of medication

SSC Dental Clinic closed due to lack of medication:
The Comoro Health Centre’s (SSC) Dental Clinic is closed due to lack of medication.
The clinic was closed due to the strike action by workers at the Autonomous Drugs and Equipment Services (SAMES) which disrupted the supply of essential medication.

“The clinic is not servicing dental patients due to lack of medicines. They must return another day. The Director is not available today, she is probably in a meeting discussing the current situation,” said an anonymous health official working at the centre (07/08) at the Comoro Health Centre, Dili.
Two health workers are providing services at the clinic.

Consumers lament the lack of fish at the markets

Consumers lament the lack of fish at the markets:
Consumers in Oe-cussi lament the lack of fish in their markets even though good fishing equipment abounds and the ocean is rich in fish.

“With all that sea out there, Government providing fishing equipment, yet it is so hard to buy fish at the local markets,” said Domingos Ati, (30/07), at the Oe-cussi markets.

Ati asked fishermen use their equipment correctly so they could supply fish to the community.

Armindo dos Reis Santos Director of Oxfam Oe-cussi said they had provided training to many fisher folk as well as supplying them with fishing equipment, but most did not use this acquired knowledge or assets.

Vegetables for the school feeding program bought with school monies

Vegetables for the school feeding program bought with school monies:
The Primary School 28 Augustus in Oe-cussi is using its own cash to purchase vegetables for the school feeding program because they are not receiving support from the Ministry of Education (ME).

“The full complement of foodstuffs is not being distributed for the school feeding program, sometimes they only provide rice, no cooking oil or vegetables, so we took it upon ourselves to borrow some money from the school kitty to buy them,” said EP28 Augustus Principal Martinho da Cunha (27/07) in Oe-cussi.

Other measures to resolve this issue included enlisting the help of parents.

Former Vice-Minister for Health Hanjam to open centre to cater for malnutrition and provide palliative care

Former Vice-Minister for Health Hanjam to open centre to cater for malnutrition and provide palliative care:
Political positions may come and go but your professional career remains as such former Vice-Minister for Health, Madalena Hanjam, fresh out after finishing her political appointment will be looking at operating a home based clinic to treat malnutrition and to provide palliative care to members of the community.

“I have work in my profession and in the near future I will be looking at opening a practice to treat malnutrition and provide palliative care. I will also be looking at controlling the consumption of tobacco. These three things will be the core of my business,” said the former Vice-Minister at the Palácio Nobre in Lahane (08/08).

TEMPO SEMANAL RELEASES PNTL WEAPONS PURCHASE / IMPORT DOCUMENTS

TEMPO SEMANAL RELEASES PNTL WEAPONS PURCHASE / IMPORT DOCUMENTS: Tempo Semanal Exclusif

Tempo Semanal can report that on 24 July 2012 PT PINDAD Deputy Director Weapons Systems Triyono Andri Susilo issued instructions for export of weapons to Timor-Leste's national police service, via Packing List No. 16/PL/DS/P/BD/VII/2012 PM2v1 Submachine guns.

This newspaper reported on this issue here "PNTL Loses Weapons: Commander Longuinos Monteiro In Charge" on 9 August 2012 in addition to "PNTL LOSES WEAPONS AND BUYS FAULTY ONES" on 11 August 2012.

Tempo Semanal can now report it has total import documents for public review on its new facebook fanpage that can be viewed here.  Including 

1. PT PINDAD packing list for PM2v1 submachine guns, 
2. PT PINDAD packing list for  SAR-2 anti riot guns, 
3. Merpati weapons cargo export invoice, 
4. PNTL customs invoice, and 
5. letter from PNTL General Commander Longuinos Monteiro demanding customs expedite process for PNTL weapons imports.

The complete import documents are available for public review on its new facebook fanpage that can be viewed here.

PNTL WEAPONS

Tempo Semanal Facebook Fanpage http://www.facebook.com/TempoSemanal