Aug 21, 2012
Afghan rockets hit US army chief's plane
Afghan rockets hit US army chief's plane: Attack at Bagram airbase did not injure Martin Dempsey, the highest-ranking US military officer, spokesman says.
Russia warns West after Obama Syria threats
Russia warns West after Obama Syria threats: Lavrov warns against unilateral action after Obama threatens military force if Syria uses chemical weapons.
India cracks down on internet over Assam
India cracks down on internet over Assam: New Delhi has asked Facebook and Twitter to remove "inflammatory" content it says helped spark an exodus of migrants.
ETHIOPIA: Getting a better deal for coffee farmers
ETHIOPIA: Getting a better deal for coffee farmers:
 | ADDIS ABABA, 21 August 2012 (IRIN) - Ethiopia is regarded as arabica coffee's birthplace, but while the country's high-quality coffee has made it to the gourmet shelves of major coffee houses around the world, many of its growers remain poor. |
DRC: Violence hampers aid work in Ituri
DRC: Violence hampers aid work in Ituri:
 | BUNIA, 21 August 2012 (IRIN) - Inter-ethnic tensions have again turned violent in north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo's Ituri region, compromising the delivery of humanitarian aid to more than 100,000 people, according to officials there. |
ISRAEL-SYRIA: Could a new regime in Syria be good for the Golan Heights?
ISRAEL-SYRIA: Could a new regime in Syria be good for the Golan Heights?:
 | MAJDAL SHAMS, 21 August 2012 (IRIN) - The Syrian Druze communities of the occupied Golan Heights have traditionally supported Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. But they are increasingly divided over the conflict in their homeland. And now, some Arab residents of the Golan feel that a change in Syria's government could put the Golan's status back on the national and regional agenda. |
Uganda: Growing Intimidation, Threats to Civil Society
Uganda: Growing Intimidation, Threats to Civil Society:
(Nairobi) – Research and advocacy organizations in Uganda that deal with controversial topics are facing increasing harassment by Uganda’s government, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.
read more
Research and advocacy organizations in Uganda that deal with controversial topics are facing increasing harassment by Uganda’s government. Groups have recently faced forced closure of meetings, threats, harassment, arrest, and punitive bureaucratic interference. The Ugandan government should end its hostile rhetoric and repeated obstructions of nongovernmental organizations.
read more
ASAA Asian Currents August 2012
www.asaa.asn.au/publications/ac/2012/asian-currents-12-08.pdf
In this issue:
The August 2012 issue of "Asian Currents" from the Asian Studies Association of Australia is now available from the ASAA web site at http://www.asaa.asn.au/
In this issue:
- The death of rights in China?
- Korea obligations continue to deny East Asia peace and stability
- Korean Buddhism: the dangers of toeing the party line
- Building demand for Asia literacy
- Centre fosters Australia–Mongolia ties
- Far from provincial: contemporary literature in East Kalimantan
- Doorstep interactions: Chinese influence in Southeast Asia
- ASAA 19th Biennial Conference
- Symposium: labour migration in the Asia–Pacific
- Asian artists strong show at Sydney Biennale
- 4A presentation at Shanghai biennale Coming events
- Fellowships and grants
Starting with this issue clicking on any item in the contents listing in the PDF will take you to that article.
Aug 20, 2012
Amazon.com: Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds (9780415297578): Michael Francis Laffan: Books
Amazon.com: Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds (9780415297578): Michael Francis Laffan: Books
Fee. Always also try bookfinder.com site for any available less expensive copies.
Fee. Always also try bookfinder.com site for any available less expensive copies.
Amazon.com: The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics) (9780691145303): Michael Laffan: Books
Amazon.com: The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics) (9780691145303): Michael Laffan: Books
Fee. Always also try bookfinder.com site to search for any available less expensive copies.
Fee. Always also try bookfinder.com site to search for any available less expensive copies.
Thaksin and the palace
Thaksin and the palace:
Last week I had a lengthy overview of Thai politics published at Inside Story. There are a few different sections that will be of interest to New Mandala readers. I conclude that:
Last week I had a lengthy overview of Thai politics published at Inside Story. There are a few different sections that will be of interest to New Mandala readers. I conclude that:
Under these circumstances the final months of 2012 are likely to see more aggressive efforts by Thaksin to return to the kingdom. He will not want to miss an opportunity to pay his final respects to King Bhumibol. It is easy to overlook Thaksin’s own royalist views and the fact that he has worked very closely with the palace and the military in the past. The coup put an end to that, but Yingluck’s words and actions have signalled that rapprochement is conceivable.
Radical shifts in allegiance have happened before in Thai politics and they will happen again. Far from being a republican trouble-maker, Thaksin may ultimately prove a key ally for the palace in any future crisis. His capacity for personal reinvention is legendary, and this means that as he and the palace both face the challenges of the years ahead they may find that a common cause can guarantee mutual survival.
Thaksin has a track record of indestructibility. It makes sense that in the difficult years to come the palace will want him on their side.
Revamped Sina Weibo Set to Come with Google+ Style Sharing
Revamped Sina Weibo Set to Come with Google+ Style Sharing:
Chinese mega social network Sina Weibo is set for a major revamp that will see it incorporate Google+ style sharing.
Chinese blog Techweb claims to have exclusive screenshots (translate) of the new version of the social network. The release, called “Version 5″ was first outed as existing by Sina CEO Charles Chao during the company’s earnings call last week.
One of the most obvious features from the screenshots is a revamped profile page that incorporates elements of Facebook and Google+.
You can also now choose who to share things with, as you can on Google+, by groups including “colleagues” and “classmates.”
As The Next Web notes however, the biggest challenge for Sina Weibo is to find a way of monetising. That means it’ll have to make the platform as attractive to advertisers as possible.
This has been a constant battle for one of China’s most high-profile social networks. Its most recent bid at money-making involved launching a social credit card.
The new version of Sina Weibo will reportedly launch some time in the third financial quarter of 2012.
This article by Nur Bremmen originally appeared on Memeburn and was republished with permission.
Chinese mega social network Sina Weibo is set for a major revamp that will see it incorporate Google+ style sharing.
Chinese blog Techweb claims to have exclusive screenshots (translate) of the new version of the social network. The release, called “Version 5″ was first outed as existing by Sina CEO Charles Chao during the company’s earnings call last week.
One of the most obvious features from the screenshots is a revamped profile page that incorporates elements of Facebook and Google+.
You can also now choose who to share things with, as you can on Google+, by groups including “colleagues” and “classmates.”
As The Next Web notes however, the biggest challenge for Sina Weibo is to find a way of monetising. That means it’ll have to make the platform as attractive to advertisers as possible.
This has been a constant battle for one of China’s most high-profile social networks. Its most recent bid at money-making involved launching a social credit card.
The new version of Sina Weibo will reportedly launch some time in the third financial quarter of 2012.
This article by Nur Bremmen originally appeared on Memeburn and was republished with permission.
Deadly battles grip Syria as UN ends mission
Deadly battles grip Syria as UN ends mission: Army tanks shell Damascus suburb as fighting continues in Aleppo and deaths are reported in clashes in Deraa.
SRI LANKA: Water conservation “desperately” needed
SRI LANKA: Water conservation “desperately” needed:
 | COLOMBO, 20 August 2012 (IRIN) - Rising temperatures, a late monsoon and dwindling rivers in parts of Sri Lanka are straining the energy sector and threatening crop yields. Local experts say water conservation has become an urgent necessity. |
A Measure of Change: Slow Response to Housing Crisis Now Weighs on Obama
A Measure of Change: Slow Response to Housing Crisis Now Weighs on Obama: President Obama’s response to the housing crisis was deliberately subdued, and some economists believe stronger action could have softened the economic impact.
Romney Campaign Works Feverishly to Project Relaxed Image
Romney Campaign Works Feverishly to Project Relaxed Image: Mitt Romney’s campaign has recruited professionals to manage his appearance at the Republican convention, hoping to overcome his image of being stiff and aloof.
As always, Florida in the middle of the voting wars
As always, Florida in the middle of the voting wars:
JACKSONVILLE, Fla. — Stick a pin almost anywhere on a map of Florida and you’ll find a legal battle over who will be eligible to vote in the coming presidential election — and when, and how, and where.
Read full article >>
JACKSONVILLE, Fla. — Stick a pin almost anywhere on a map of Florida and you’ll find a legal battle over who will be eligible to vote in the coming presidential election — and when, and how, and where.
Read full article >>
In Syria, group suspected of al-Qaeda links gaining prominence in war to topple Assad
In Syria, group suspected of al-Qaeda links gaining prominence in war to topple Assad:
ALEPPO, Syria — A shadowy jihadist organization that first surfaced on the Internet to assert responsibility for suicide bombings in Aleppo and Damascus has stepped out of the shadows and onto the front lines of the war for Syria’s cities.
Read full article >>
ALEPPO, Syria — A shadowy jihadist organization that first surfaced on the Internet to assert responsibility for suicide bombings in Aleppo and Damascus has stepped out of the shadows and onto the front lines of the war for Syria’s cities.
Read full article >>
Smartphone payment space packed with competition
Smartphone payment space packed with competition:
Salad in hand, Carol Lyn Brown walked up to the cashier at K Street Cafe and Bagel in Northwest Washington and handed over her credit card.
Erin Cullen, the cashier, didn’t run it through a traditional cash register. Instead, she swiped it through a small plastic attachment on her iPad — and within seconds the payment was processed. The receipt can be texted or e-mailed back to the customer.
Read full article >>
Salad in hand, Carol Lyn Brown walked up to the cashier at K Street Cafe and Bagel in Northwest Washington and handed over her credit card.
Erin Cullen, the cashier, didn’t run it through a traditional cash register. Instead, she swiped it through a small plastic attachment on her iPad — and within seconds the payment was processed. The receipt can be texted or e-mailed back to the customer.
Read full article >>
Report: GOP lawmakers reprimanded for drinking, skinny-dipping in Israel
Report: GOP lawmakers reprimanded for drinking, skinny-dipping in Israel:
Updated Monday, 12:22 p.m. ET
House Republican leaders reprimanded 30 lawmakers last August for antics including drinking and skinny-dipping during a fact-finding trip to Israel, according to published reports.
Read full article >>
Updated Monday, 12:22 p.m. ET
House Republican leaders reprimanded 30 lawmakers last August for antics including drinking and skinny-dipping during a fact-finding trip to Israel, according to published reports.
Read full article >>
Mitt Romney, as a leader in Mormon church, became a master of many keys
Mitt Romney, as a leader in Mormon church, became a master of many keys:
BOSTON — In the back office of his Weston, Mass., headquarters a quarter-century ago, Mitt Romney, the chief Mormon authority in the Boston area, told the leader of his Spanish-speaking congregation that he would not directly pay for lawyers to help the growing number of illegal immigrants in his church. Then he carefully instructed his subordinate on how to circumvent the Mormon Church’s new hard line against such assistance and subsidize their legal aide.
Read full article >>
BOSTON — In the back office of his Weston, Mass., headquarters a quarter-century ago, Mitt Romney, the chief Mormon authority in the Boston area, told the leader of his Spanish-speaking congregation that he would not directly pay for lawyers to help the growing number of illegal immigrants in his church. Then he carefully instructed his subordinate on how to circumvent the Mormon Church’s new hard line against such assistance and subsidize their legal aide.
Read full article >>
In Mexico’s murder city, the war appears over
In Mexico’s murder city, the war appears over:
CIUDAD JUAREZ, Mexico — When this city was among the most murderous in the world, the morgue ran out of room, the corpses stacked to the ceiling in the wheezing walk-in freezers.
Medical examiners, in plastic boots, performed a dozen autopsies a day as families of victims waited outside in numbers sufficient to require a line.
Read full article >>
CIUDAD JUAREZ, Mexico — When this city was among the most murderous in the world, the morgue ran out of room, the corpses stacked to the ceiling in the wheezing walk-in freezers.
Medical examiners, in plastic boots, performed a dozen autopsies a day as families of victims waited outside in numbers sufficient to require a line.
Read full article >>
Can Obama Win Over the Billionaires? : The New Yorker
Can Obama Win Over the Billionaires? : The New Yorker
Obama doesn’t like cozying up to billionaires. Could it cost him the election?
Obama doesn’t like cozying up to billionaires. Could it cost him the election?
Aug 19, 2012
Mass-circulation ‘Asia Weekly’ launched in Phuket
Mass-circulation ‘Asia Weekly’ launched in Phuket: Phuket News discovered by ThaiVisual at Phuket daily news headlines story – PHUKET: The Phuket Gazette is proud this week to be ushering into Phuket the China Daily Asia Weekly, a world-class publication built in Hong Kong by, among others, senior expatriate editors from the UK, the United States, Europe, India, Australia, South Africa and [...]
Three Uzbekistan Women arrested for Trafficking Uzbekistan Girls
Three Uzbekistan Women arrested for Trafficking Uzbekistan Girls: Chiang Rai News discovered by ThaiVisual at Chiang Rai daily news headlines story – The arrested were identified as Ms. Notira Nakodgeiva, age 28; Ms. Golea or Gulnora Butaeva, age 50; and Ms. Asisa or Robiya Gerbonova, age 52. Chiangrai Times – Three Uzbekistan women were arrested in Bangkok’s Nana district for tricking Uzbekistan [...]
Monarchy’s twilight II
Monarchy’s twilight II:
As with the commentators in our previous post, Nicholas Farrelly at the Australia’s Inside Story comments on the decline of what the royalists call “the institution.” Okay, the story is really about Thaksin Shinawatra’s political tenacity, but the monarchy is also central.
The author points out:
As with the commentators in our previous post, Nicholas Farrelly at the Australia’s Inside Story comments on the decline of what the royalists call “the institution.” Okay, the story is really about Thaksin Shinawatra’s political tenacity, but the monarchy is also central.
The author points out:
In the years since then [the 2006 coup], Thailand’s military, palace, bureaucratic and judicial power brokers have remained sensitive about any discussion of the political role of the royal family. In recent years the country’s lese-majesty law, which demands harsh penalties for any perceived slights against the king or senior royals, has become newly problematic [sic.]. Since the crackdown on the Red Shirt protests of April and May 2010, anti-palace graffiti and slogans have infused rallies with radical sentiments.
Like one of the commentators we quoted in our earlier post, we think Farrelly is wrong on lese majeste under the Yingluck Shinawatra government when he claims:Under her government, Thailand continues to lock up critics of the palace and determinedly pursues legal proceedings against any minnows who dare challenge royal prestige.
As we have said before, the rhetoric was initially strong, but the record of locking people up is miniscule when compared with the Abhisit Vejjajiva regime. He is right in observing:What Yingluck’s government knows is that the lese-majesty law holds back an avalanche of scrutiny and criticism looming over the palace. They have decided that this is not the time to unleash its destructive potential.
The perverse consequence of continuing to clamp down on critical references to the royal family is that intrigue, scuttlebutt and animosity multiply. Discussions of the most sensitive topics have not been eradicated and, like a festering wound, are left to draw attention in ways unwanted and uncomfortable.
The author then turns to Thaksin and succession:His opponents remain preoccupied with the palace succession and the need to ensure the continuity of the Chakri dynasty. There are also those hoping to keep control of what Forbes estimates could be a $30 billion royal fortune. [PPT: It's $37 billion at last count.]
… The $30 billion question is: what happens when … Bhumibol dies? It remains the question that nobody is prepared to touch. But if we have understood anything of Thailand’s political action since the 2006 coup then any tentative answer matters a great deal. It provides an explanation for what we have seen and what, we assume, lurks just out of sight. On everyone’s lips there is an unspoken view that things could get very bad as Thailand seeks to clarify its longer term political future.
Unresolved questions about Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn’s reckless behaviour haunt the equation. His apparent incapacity to generate consistent popular goodwill must infuriate those pragmatic types who have sought to provide every chance for his success…. Millions of Thais have stopped believing in the official, benign portrayal of the Crown Prince.
The palace plan, we think, is unchanged; the prince steps up. The issue is whether this will unleash political forces betting on and promoting others. For the author, succession plays out for Thaksin too:Under these circumstances the final months of 2012 are likely to see more aggressive efforts by Thaksin to return to the kingdom. He will not want to miss an opportunity to pay his final respects to King Bhumibol. It is easy to overlook Thaksin’s own royalist views and the fact that he has worked very closely with the palace and the military in the past. The coup put an end to that, but Yingluck’s words and actions have signalled that rapprochement is conceivable.
Seat belts might be required.
Monarchy’s twilight I
Monarchy’s twilight I:
PPT said it some time ago: the monarchy is in decline. This is re-confirmed by two recent commentaries, by Thitinan Pongsudhirak and Sonia Rothwell.
Rothwell, writing at the Zurich-based International Relations and Security Network (ISN), comments on the south and red shirts, with an interesting link about rising political consciousness:
Rothwell asserts that the aging monarch “has been widely regarded as a unifying figure for Thailand over the past 66 years…”. On this, she is exaggerating, but many other journalists make this point from palace propaganda. The next exaggeration is a big one: “With the continuity of Thai nationhood at present largely resting on the continuity of the royal family, it is perhaps unsurprising that the country’s notoriously stringent lese majeste laws (which prohibit criticism of the royal family) continue to be tightly enforced.” The first claim about monarchy and nation is most usually heard from the yellow-shirted royalists, while the second claim neglects that lese majeste is a political crime, and that its most extravagant use corresponds with political crises.
Despite being a little mixed-up, Rothwell does identify the passing of an era.
The second commentary is by Thitinan in an article available from the Journal of Democracy, which has been outlined by Bangkok Pundit. It is an academic article that argues that the conservative elite is losing its battle to hold Thailand’s democratization back. Bangkok Pundit emphasized some parts of the article, and we’ll do that too. There are some things we think are errors (the death toll in the war on drugs was not 2,300; Yingluck’s government hasn’t been “strictly enforcing” lese majeste; Thaksin did make big bucks from state concessions; the new palace-sanctioned biography of the king is anything but “scholarly”), but much that deserves attention.
At present the fight is, Thitinan claims, a stalemate, so Yingluck continues in government:
Both articles recognize an end is near. Thitinan notes that the way forward is murky because there are so few alternatives: Thaksin and his flaws do not augur well for a broader-based democratization.
PPT said it some time ago: the monarchy is in decline. This is re-confirmed by two recent commentaries, by Thitinan Pongsudhirak and Sonia Rothwell.
Rothwell, writing at the Zurich-based International Relations and Security Network (ISN), comments on the south and red shirts, with an interesting link about rising political consciousness:
Building on the political awakening of the middle classes in the 1990s, there has been increasing political awareness both in the far south and among Thailand’s poor. Encouraged by Prime Minister Yingluck [Shinawatra]’s brother Thaksin, the politicization culminated in the so-called Red Shirt protests of 2010.
She then writes about the monarchy and while the general drift of the remarks are acceptable, some aspects deserve criticism. The author states: “The declining health of Thailand’s long-serving King Bhumibol also threatens to seriously fracture the fragile unity of the country.” PPT isn’t sure there is much unity, but the point that the king’s death will lead to unpredictable outcomes is correct.Rothwell asserts that the aging monarch “has been widely regarded as a unifying figure for Thailand over the past 66 years…”. On this, she is exaggerating, but many other journalists make this point from palace propaganda. The next exaggeration is a big one: “With the continuity of Thai nationhood at present largely resting on the continuity of the royal family, it is perhaps unsurprising that the country’s notoriously stringent lese majeste laws (which prohibit criticism of the royal family) continue to be tightly enforced.” The first claim about monarchy and nation is most usually heard from the yellow-shirted royalists, while the second claim neglects that lese majeste is a political crime, and that its most extravagant use corresponds with political crises.
Despite being a little mixed-up, Rothwell does identify the passing of an era.
The second commentary is by Thitinan in an article available from the Journal of Democracy, which has been outlined by Bangkok Pundit. It is an academic article that argues that the conservative elite is losing its battle to hold Thailand’s democratization back. Bangkok Pundit emphasized some parts of the article, and we’ll do that too. There are some things we think are errors (the death toll in the war on drugs was not 2,300; Yingluck’s government hasn’t been “strictly enforcing” lese majeste; Thaksin did make big bucks from state concessions; the new palace-sanctioned biography of the king is anything but “scholarly”), but much that deserves attention.
As twilight settles over the 65-year reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej (b. 1927), Thais find themselves caught in a national stalemate. Those who favor maintaining the monarchy-centered hierarchy as the ultimate source of political power are arrayed against others who want to reform the monarchy and reconcile it with a fuller and more mature form of democracy.
He adds at the end of the paper:For Thaksin’s establishment foes, conceding to his spectacularly successful populism would have been tantamount to admitting that most people in the … have been—and have been kept—poor.
As Thitinan indicates, bereft of popular support and wanting things to be as they were “before”, the conservative elite fights on as “it has too much at stake to simply give way to the challenges that Thaksin…”. Thitinan reckons that the rift between the palace and Thaksin began after the latter’s huge 2005 election victory. That seems true enough, although criticism from the Privy Council is mentioned in a Wikileaks cable from just prior to the election, focused on the south.At present the fight is, Thitinan claims, a stalemate, so Yingluck continues in government:
As long as the monarchy remains sacrosanct and the symbiotic relationship between it and the military remains untouched, Yingluck may be able to muddle along with a reheated populist agenda …. Should the palace begin to perceive a clear and present danger, however, the Yingluck government and anyone who actively aspires to a basic reform of the monarchy will likely face stepped-up pressure and perhaps even the specter of violence from royalist and conservative quarters.
Judicialization is a big section of the paper, and seeing this as an elite strategy, fostered by the palace, Thitinan sees it as having failed:The monarchy is associated with the launch of the judicialization strategy, and that strategy’s failure appears to have compromised the
monarchy up to a point.
That’s a big call, especially given the Constitutional Court’s (re)positioning in political space in recent weeks. PPT thinks the judiciary remains an important elite and palace weapon against democratization.monarchy up to a point.
Both articles recognize an end is near. Thitinan notes that the way forward is murky because there are so few alternatives: Thaksin and his flaws do not augur well for a broader-based democratization.
Doctors find woman accused of lèse majesté insane
Doctors find woman accused of lèse majesté insane:
A 63-year-old woman, who was alleged to have committed lèse majesté during a protest in front the Constitution Court in July, has been diagnosed as mentally ill by psychiatrists.
On 16 Aug, Pol Lt Col Phiphob Sukkam, a Deputy Superintendent of Investigation at Thung Song Hong Police Station in Bangkok, said that the Galya Ratchanakharin Institute, where Thitinan Kaewjantranon had been held since her arrest, had already submitted its diagnosis of her mental health.
Thitinan was examined by a team of psychiatrists, psychologists and other specialists, led by a former Director-General and a Deputy Director-General of the Department of Mental Health under the Ministry of Public Health.
‘According to the diagnosis, Thitinan is mentally ill and is in need of at least a further two months’ medical treatment at the institute. She is now incapable of giving any testimony and handling any legal action,’ the police officer said.
The case will be forwarded to Deputy Commander of Metropolitan Police Pol Maj Gen Parinya Chansuriya, the chief investigator in charge of the case, to consider what to do next, he said.
On the same day, Criminal Court Director-General Thawee Prachuablarb told reporters that in cases where the accused claimed during police investigation that they were mentally ill [in committing alleged crimes], police investigators were obliged to send them to be examined by psychiatrists.
If the accused are found to be permanently mentally ill, having committed the alleged crimes without being able to control themselves, they will probably be acquitted. But, if found to be temporarily mentally ill, they will probably be sentenced to punishment less severe than that prescribed in the law, he said, citing Section 65 of the Criminal Law:
Whenever any person commits an offence at the time of not being able to appreciate the nature, or illegality of his act or not being able to control himself on account of defective mind, mental disease or mental infirmity, such person shall not be punished for such offence.
But, if the offender is still partially able to appreciate the nature or illegality of his act, or is still partially able to control himself, such person shall be punished for such offence, but the Court may inflict less punishment to any extent than that provided by the law for such offence.
As Section 112 of the Criminal Code prescribes a penalty of lèse majesté of from 3 to 15 years’ imprisonment, those who are found to be ‘partially able’ to control themselves might, for example, be sentenced to one or two years’ imprisonment, he said.
If investigators or the courts view that the accused are mentally ill and not capable of handling their legal cases, they are authorized by law to suspend any legal proceedings and send the accused to receive medical treatment at mental institutes or hospitals until they are considered able to account for themselves, he said.
Thitinan, a New Zealand resident, was accused of lèse majesté for her allegedly improper actions against a picture of HM the King in front of the Constitution Court on 13 July.
Having been held under medical care by the institute since her arrest, she has been officially forbidden go abroad by the police.
A 63-year-old woman, who was alleged to have committed lèse majesté during a protest in front the Constitution Court in July, has been diagnosed as mentally ill by psychiatrists.
On 16 Aug, Pol Lt Col Phiphob Sukkam, a Deputy Superintendent of Investigation at Thung Song Hong Police Station in Bangkok, said that the Galya Ratchanakharin Institute, where Thitinan Kaewjantranon had been held since her arrest, had already submitted its diagnosis of her mental health.
Thitinan was examined by a team of psychiatrists, psychologists and other specialists, led by a former Director-General and a Deputy Director-General of the Department of Mental Health under the Ministry of Public Health.
‘According to the diagnosis, Thitinan is mentally ill and is in need of at least a further two months’ medical treatment at the institute. She is now incapable of giving any testimony and handling any legal action,’ the police officer said.
The case will be forwarded to Deputy Commander of Metropolitan Police Pol Maj Gen Parinya Chansuriya, the chief investigator in charge of the case, to consider what to do next, he said.
On the same day, Criminal Court Director-General Thawee Prachuablarb told reporters that in cases where the accused claimed during police investigation that they were mentally ill [in committing alleged crimes], police investigators were obliged to send them to be examined by psychiatrists.
If the accused are found to be permanently mentally ill, having committed the alleged crimes without being able to control themselves, they will probably be acquitted. But, if found to be temporarily mentally ill, they will probably be sentenced to punishment less severe than that prescribed in the law, he said, citing Section 65 of the Criminal Law:
Whenever any person commits an offence at the time of not being able to appreciate the nature, or illegality of his act or not being able to control himself on account of defective mind, mental disease or mental infirmity, such person shall not be punished for such offence.
But, if the offender is still partially able to appreciate the nature or illegality of his act, or is still partially able to control himself, such person shall be punished for such offence, but the Court may inflict less punishment to any extent than that provided by the law for such offence.
As Section 112 of the Criminal Code prescribes a penalty of lèse majesté of from 3 to 15 years’ imprisonment, those who are found to be ‘partially able’ to control themselves might, for example, be sentenced to one or two years’ imprisonment, he said.
If investigators or the courts view that the accused are mentally ill and not capable of handling their legal cases, they are authorized by law to suspend any legal proceedings and send the accused to receive medical treatment at mental institutes or hospitals until they are considered able to account for themselves, he said.
Thitinan, a New Zealand resident, was accused of lèse majesté for her allegedly improper actions against a picture of HM the King in front of the Constitution Court on 13 July.
Having been held under medical care by the institute since her arrest, she has been officially forbidden go abroad by the police.
Thitinan on the decline of the establishment
Thitinan on the decline of the establishment:
BP blogged on journal article by Chula academic Thitinan in the Journal of Democracy entitled “Thailand Since the Coup” back in October 2008. Now, Thitinan has another article in the Journal of Democracy (April 2012). The article is entitled “Southeast Asia: Thailand’s Uneasy Passage” (available from here). Some excerpts below (at pages 55-56):
Then on page 57 on reconciling monarchy and democracy:
Then on page 59 on Thaksin and his legacy:
BP blogged on journal article by Chula academic Thitinan in the Journal of Democracy entitled “Thailand Since the Coup” back in October 2008. Now, Thitinan has another article in the Journal of Democracy (April 2012). The article is entitled “Southeast Asia: Thailand’s Uneasy Passage” (available from here). Some excerpts below (at pages 55-56):
The monarchy is associated with the launch of the judicialization strategy, and that strategy’s failure appears to have compromised the monarchy up to a point. If the bans and dissolutions, the postcoup seizure or freezing of Thaksin’s assets, and his 2010 Supreme Court conviction in absentia on “policy corruption” charges had succeeded in ending the challenge that he represented, then perhaps Thai politics might have stabilized and returned to something like its pre-Thaksin form, led by a weak party system and a strong military-monarchy-bureaucracy trium- virate. But Thaksin with all his strengths and weaknesses—the innova- [p56] tive efforts to increase economic competitiveness, the offer of greater upward mobility to those on society’s bottom rungs, and also the cor- ruption, the conflicts of interest, and the human-rights violations of the war on drugs—became “indestructible.” The failure of judicialization marked the monarchy’s failure to extinguish the political awakening and the runaway expectations that Thaksin’s TRT years had ignited. Moreover, when a senior general left the Privy Council to head the coup- appointed government, then rejoined the king’s advisory body after the December 2007 poll, it reinforced the popular perception that the putsch had been carried out to protect and promote the crown (and the military- bureaucratic establishment long associated with it) at the expense of a democratically elected government.BP: Prayuth’s vote for good people statement was a colossal mistake. By framing the issue with good and its opposite, which has has to be evil, you push Puea Thai voters into a corner by indirectly labelling them as supporters of ‘not good’ people.
That perception gained force when Chanchai Likitjitta, justice minister for the coup government, was named to the Privy Council on 8 April 2008. Similarly, Air Chief Marshal Chalit Pookpasuk, a core coupmaker who had headed the Council for National Security after September 2007, was appointed to the Privy Council on 18 May 2011. Many also noted the queen’s conspicuous attendance at the October 2008 funeral of the yellow-shirt protester. The lese-majesté law may deter public discussion, but it cannot prevent people from taking private notice. Then there were the televised comments in which top army general Prayuth Chan-ocha effectively endorsed the DP just weeks before the 2011 election, urging viewers not to vote for the same politicians but to elect “good people” who would defend the monarchy. This could not help but tarnish the revered institution when Pheu Thai won handily.
Then on page 57 on reconciling monarchy and democracy:
As of early 2012, no other reformist groups or individuals had appeared on the scene possessing anything like what it will take to reconcile monarchy and democracy in Thailand. All the same, however, it appears that Thailand cannot escape the challenge of reaching a new consensus that will root the monarchy more squarely within the constitution of an emerging democracy, but in a way that reconciles conservative royalists. The desire of the rural lower classes to have their voices heard and their numbers felt is legitimate, but so is the desire for a government that does not simply replace the lack of accountability that characterized the old military-bureaucratic power centers with a similarly unaccountable populist strongman.BP: The coup and its aftermath has damaged the establishment.
Then on page 59 on Thaksin and his legacy:
Thaksin was well positioned by circumstance and insight to take advantage of this new and more open political environment. Given an opportunity, he overhauled the bureaucracy, delivered on his populist pledges to do more for poorer Thais, mapped out plans to upgrade the country’s industrial base, and even pursued an ambitious foreign-policy agenda in pursuit of Thai regional leadership. Yet there was to all this an underside of corruption, conflicts of interest, cronyism, human-rights violations, abuses of power, and other sins of misrule. Such is Thaksin’s mixed legacy. The wider opportunities that he opened for the downtrodden and his ambitious plans for Thailand’s future were inextricably entangled with his self-dealing, his penchant for corruption, and his habit of abusing the powers of his office. Thaksin Incorporated went hand-in-hand with Thailand Incorporated.BP: Pandora’s box has been opened and it won’t be shut again. Have a read of the whole thing. Who will be the one to offer reforms and on what? There is an opening – just see headlines about the easing of royal motorcade rules, e.g. AP article is entitled “Thai king updates motorcade rules to ease traffic” - and you can see how other reforms will be framed positively. Lese majeste surely must be high up there on the agenda…
Yet Thaksin’s enemies have shown their own limits in refusing to admit that there is more to him and what he stands for than graft and corruption. They should have weighed his policy innovations and put forward their own ideas for assisting the impoverished and marginalized. In the end, they came up with the Abhisit government and its programs for “welfare” and fostering a “sufficiency economy” that most voters find insufficient. For Thaksin’s establishment foes, conceding to his spectacularly successful populism would have been tantamount to admitting that most people in the hospitable, smiling, conspicuously tourist-friendly Kingdom of Thailand have been—and have been kept— poor. Wittingly or not, Thaksin has been the catalyst for propelling Thailand into the twenty-first century while his adversaries have stayed stuck in Cold War times. Although he committed many infractions, Thaksin’s most egregious crime and gravest sin were that he changed the way Thais see themselves and their country. Some see this change as usurpation and manipulation by Thaksin and his cronies. Others see it as Thailand’s overdue deliverance from the Cold War era. Those who have ruled in the past must accept this new reality, just as those who are atop the polls now must accept the legacy of the past.
Has there been an upsurge in violence in the deep south this year?
Has there been an upsurge in violence in the deep south this year?:
Kavi in The Nation:
Below are some statistics from Deep South Watch:*
Chart 1 : Deaths : January 2009 – July 2012
NOTE: A very large chart of deaths from January 2004 – July 2012 can be found here.
BP: In the year from August 2011-July 2012, there have been 502 deaths. This is 502 total deaths and not just civilian deaths. Simply, relying on Deep South Watch statistics there were not 421 civilian deaths in the previous 6 months.
So how does 502 deaths between August 2011-July 2012 compare with under the Abhisit government? Between December 2008-May 2011, there were 1248 deaths or an average of 41.6 deaths a month. Between August 2011-July 2012 of the Yingluck government, there were 41.83 deaths per month.
There is a good question of when to count the end of the Abhisit government. We could say the end of May 2011 (the month of dissolution), the end of June 2011 (last month before the election), or the end of July 2011 (last month of caretaker responsibility). If it was the end of June 2011, there would be 41.45 deaths per month. If the end of July 2011, there would be 41 deaths per month. Regardless, we are looking at 41 or 42 deaths per month whoever was in government. The difference is negligible. Some months the violence is higher, some months it is lower, but we have remained at a fairly consistent number of deaths since 2008.
Some other statistics on the Deep South:
Chart 2 : Injuries : January 2009-July 2012
NOTE: A very large chart of injuries from January 2004 – July 2012 can be found here.
In March, you had a huge increase in the number of injuries with around 350 injuries from the March 31 Hat Yai bombings and more than 100 injuries in Yala (MCOT). Hence, these two incidents explains the increase in the number of injuries. Most of the injuries were minor, ie. smoke inhalation, and vast majority went home that day. This is not to understate what happened that day, but it is a single day and on its own, it does not yet suggest a sustained increase in violence as you can see that April-July 2012, we are back to more normal levels of injuries.
Between December 2008-May 2011 under the Abhisit government, there were 2,478 injuries or an average of 82.6 injuries a month. Between August 2011-July 2012 of the Yingluck government, there were 117 injuries per month (if you exclude March 2012, there have been 78 injuries per month).
Chart 3 : Incidents : January 2009- July 2012
NOTE: A very large chart of incidents from January 2004 – July 2012 can be found here.
BP: Despite the large injury toll, incidents were not up. This just demonstrates how much deadlier attacks are now. To paraphrase something that BP read recently, it is more efficient to plant a large car bomb and cause massive damage than to undertake daily drive-bys (i.e riding up on a motorcycle and shooting another person on a motorcycle which exposes the shooter to the risk of getting caught each time).
Between December 2008-May 2011 under the Abhisit government, there were 2,391 incidents or an average of 79.7 incidents a month. Between August 2011-July 2012 of the Yingluck government, there were 77.91 incidents per month.
CONCLUSION: There has been no*upsurge in violence. We had the coordinated bombings in Hat Yai on March 31, 2012 which gives up a high injury count, but most of the injuries being smoke inhalation and people were check at the hospital and released the same day, but this is a single day and smoke inhalation pales in comparison to the standard gunshot victim or someone who has been injured by shrapnel.
*The January 2004-March 2012 statistics come directly by e-mail from Ajarn Srisompob of Deep South Watch. BP has then added the April, May, June, and July 2012 monthly statistics from the Deep South Watch Web site. If there are any errors in converting the statistics into charts then those are errors by BP. Please note that there are always slight discrepancies between one set of Deep South Watch statistics and another as previous months statistics get slightly adjusted (one assumes to correct previous errors) For example, in BP’s previous post, BP stated there were 547 injuries in March 2012 (this came directly from DSW by e-mail), the monthly statistics for March 2012 on the DW Web site still list 547 injuries, but this analysis (PDF) by Deep South Watch from July 2012 states there were 572 injuries.
BP should note that the above figures are not necessarily all insurgent violence. For example, in 2004 you will see large death tolls in April and October. This was not only because the insurgents were killing more people, but the state was through the Kru Se and Tak Bai incidents. In addition, it is difficult to discern between insurgent and non-insurgent violence as the insurgents do not leave calling cards. It is estimated that around 25-30 percent of the violence is non-insurgent, but the culture of impunity and violence can also be a contributing factor to an increase in non-insurgent violence so it is not as though insurgent and non-insurgent violence is unrelated.
* Corrected to add “no”
Kavi in The Nation:
That helps to explain why the containment of conflicts during 2009-11 was working allowing the government to claim some success. The trust has increased between the Malays and the Thai state at the time however it has not impacted on the insurgency and the state of violence there. More attacks were targeting urban areas with car combs even though they were less frequent.BP: Kavi doesn’t cite a source for the 421 civilian deaths in 6 months (he means 6 months, right? Just ask as his phrasing of this sentence is odd) but given the citing of Deep South Watch statistics a reader may believe it is from Deep South Watch. As someone who closely follows Deep South Watch statistics on violence in the Deep South – BP has previously blogged on DeepSouthWatch’s statistics on the violence in the Deep South in 2007 (here), 2008 (posts here and here), 2009 (here), up until September 2010 (here), and up until March 2012 (here). BP was very surprised by the mention of 421 civilian deaths in six months. He doesn’t specify the six month period although a January-June 2012 or February-July 2012 would be reasonable to assume (or given he is talking about the Yingluck government, we can even stretch this until any six month block between August 2011-July 2012 then).
…
As in the previous six months, there have been heavy tolls on the civilians – nearly 421 deaths. If the past is any judge, when the military was in good terms with the government in power, the soldiers are able to prevent attacks because of the better coordination on the ground among various agencies with shared intelligence.
…
According to the Deep South Watch’s statistics, from January 2004-July 2012 there were 11,754 attacks, killing 5,206 and wounding 9,137 persons.
Below are some statistics from Deep South Watch:*
Chart 1 : Deaths : January 2009 – July 2012
NOTE: A very large chart of deaths from January 2004 – July 2012 can be found here.
BP: In the year from August 2011-July 2012, there have been 502 deaths. This is 502 total deaths and not just civilian deaths. Simply, relying on Deep South Watch statistics there were not 421 civilian deaths in the previous 6 months.
So how does 502 deaths between August 2011-July 2012 compare with under the Abhisit government? Between December 2008-May 2011, there were 1248 deaths or an average of 41.6 deaths a month. Between August 2011-July 2012 of the Yingluck government, there were 41.83 deaths per month.
There is a good question of when to count the end of the Abhisit government. We could say the end of May 2011 (the month of dissolution), the end of June 2011 (last month before the election), or the end of July 2011 (last month of caretaker responsibility). If it was the end of June 2011, there would be 41.45 deaths per month. If the end of July 2011, there would be 41 deaths per month. Regardless, we are looking at 41 or 42 deaths per month whoever was in government. The difference is negligible. Some months the violence is higher, some months it is lower, but we have remained at a fairly consistent number of deaths since 2008.
Some other statistics on the Deep South:
Chart 2 : Injuries : January 2009-July 2012
NOTE: A very large chart of injuries from January 2004 – July 2012 can be found here.
In March, you had a huge increase in the number of injuries with around 350 injuries from the March 31 Hat Yai bombings and more than 100 injuries in Yala (MCOT). Hence, these two incidents explains the increase in the number of injuries. Most of the injuries were minor, ie. smoke inhalation, and vast majority went home that day. This is not to understate what happened that day, but it is a single day and on its own, it does not yet suggest a sustained increase in violence as you can see that April-July 2012, we are back to more normal levels of injuries.
Between December 2008-May 2011 under the Abhisit government, there were 2,478 injuries or an average of 82.6 injuries a month. Between August 2011-July 2012 of the Yingluck government, there were 117 injuries per month (if you exclude March 2012, there have been 78 injuries per month).
Chart 3 : Incidents : January 2009- July 2012
NOTE: A very large chart of incidents from January 2004 – July 2012 can be found here.
BP: Despite the large injury toll, incidents were not up. This just demonstrates how much deadlier attacks are now. To paraphrase something that BP read recently, it is more efficient to plant a large car bomb and cause massive damage than to undertake daily drive-bys (i.e riding up on a motorcycle and shooting another person on a motorcycle which exposes the shooter to the risk of getting caught each time).
Between December 2008-May 2011 under the Abhisit government, there were 2,391 incidents or an average of 79.7 incidents a month. Between August 2011-July 2012 of the Yingluck government, there were 77.91 incidents per month.
CONCLUSION: There has been no*upsurge in violence. We had the coordinated bombings in Hat Yai on March 31, 2012 which gives up a high injury count, but most of the injuries being smoke inhalation and people were check at the hospital and released the same day, but this is a single day and smoke inhalation pales in comparison to the standard gunshot victim or someone who has been injured by shrapnel.
*The January 2004-March 2012 statistics come directly by e-mail from Ajarn Srisompob of Deep South Watch. BP has then added the April, May, June, and July 2012 monthly statistics from the Deep South Watch Web site. If there are any errors in converting the statistics into charts then those are errors by BP. Please note that there are always slight discrepancies between one set of Deep South Watch statistics and another as previous months statistics get slightly adjusted (one assumes to correct previous errors) For example, in BP’s previous post, BP stated there were 547 injuries in March 2012 (this came directly from DSW by e-mail), the monthly statistics for March 2012 on the DW Web site still list 547 injuries, but this analysis (PDF) by Deep South Watch from July 2012 states there were 572 injuries.
BP should note that the above figures are not necessarily all insurgent violence. For example, in 2004 you will see large death tolls in April and October. This was not only because the insurgents were killing more people, but the state was through the Kru Se and Tak Bai incidents. In addition, it is difficult to discern between insurgent and non-insurgent violence as the insurgents do not leave calling cards. It is estimated that around 25-30 percent of the violence is non-insurgent, but the culture of impunity and violence can also be a contributing factor to an increase in non-insurgent violence so it is not as though insurgent and non-insurgent violence is unrelated.
* Corrected to add “no”
VIETNAM: Farmers brace for bird flu
VIETNAM: Farmers brace for bird flu:
 | HANOI, 16 August 2012 (IRIN) - Farmers in north and central Vietnam are bracing for a new wave of bird flu outbreaks as local authorities are urged to take precautions against the disease. |
SOUTH AFRICA: Liz Gatley, “You can actually have an influence, make a difference”
SOUTH AFRICA: Liz Gatley, “You can actually have an influence, make a difference”:
 | JOHANNESBURG, 19 August 2012 (IRIN) - In South Africa's Zithulele Village, the local hospital services 130,000 people - but operates without enough health workers. |
Further Decline in Credibility Ratings for Most News Organizations
Further Decline in Credibility Ratings for Most News Organizations: For the second time in a decade, the believability ratings for major news organizations have suffered broad-based declines. In the new survey, the ratings have fallen significantly for nine of 13 news organizations tested. The falloff affects organizations in most sectors: national newspapers, such as the New York Times and USA Today, all three cable news outlets, the broadcast TV networks and NPR.
Indonesia cuts sentence of over 50000 prisoners - Firstpost
Indonesia cuts sentence of over 50000 prisoners - Firstpost:
Indonesia cuts sentence of over 50000 prisoners Firstpost Among high profile convicts receiving remission of sentences were Australian drug smuggler Schapelle Corby, former tax official Gayus H. Tambunan, and former Garuda Indonesia pilot Pollycarpus Budihari Priyanto, who was sentenced for his role in the ... and more » |
In Indonesia, ethnic Chinese see a new future - Washington Post
In Indonesia, ethnic Chinese see a new future - Washington Post:
In Indonesia, ethnic Chinese see a new future Washington Post JAKARTA, Indonesia — When mob violence swept across the Indonesian capital in May 1998, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, an ethnic Chinese geologist and businessman, joined terrified neighbors in the heavily Chinese district of Pluit to defend their lives and ... and more » |
Indonesian Nationalism: Between the Bellicose and the Inclusive - The Nation
Indonesian Nationalism: Between the Bellicose and the Inclusive - The Nation:
Indonesian Nationalism: Between the Bellicose and the Inclusive The Nation During his recent public lecture in Singapore on 1 August 2012, Indonesian Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto highlighted the need for his country to remain nationalist in its outlook and to adopt a nationalist stand on issues of national interest ... |
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)