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Feb 18, 2013
Bangkok faces a smelly future if garbage goes unchecked
Bangkok faces a smelly future if garbage goes unchecked: If there is no effective waste management, Bangkok will be overwhelmed with garbage in 2015 when the integration of the Asean community allows the free movement of workers within member countries. "W .....
Thai Cabinet rejects curfew for south
Thai Cabinet rejects curfew for south: At the recommendation of the National Security Council (NSC), the Cabinet yesterday rejected a proposal to impose a curfew in the strife-torn deep South, as "requests to restrict night-time travel" ha .....
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M'sian party prepared to withdraw from alliance
M'sian party prepared to withdraw from alliance: Pan-Islamic Party (PAS) has no qualms about leaving Pakatan Rakyat (coalition) if its alliance with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and People's Justice Party (PKR) does not benefit Islam and the Ma .....
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Lee Kuan Yew discharged from hospital, resting at home
Lee Kuan Yew discharged from hospital, resting at home: Former Singapore prime minister Lee Kuan Yew has been discharged from hospital and is now resting at home, said the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) yesterday. He was admitted to Singapore General Hospi .....
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Banking in Laos a thriving business
Banking in Laos a thriving business: The number of banks setting up in Laos has been increasing recently, reflecting the growth in the banking business as the country's economy expands. The growth rate of Banque Franco-Lao Ltd (BFL), a .....
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Indonesian churchgoers defy threats, violent attacks
Indonesian churchgoers defy threats, violent attacks: The members of several beleaguered Christian congregations in different parts of Indonesia defied the peril of new Molotov cocktail attacks and violent threats yesterday to conduct religious activit .....
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Can M'sia be a peacemaker in south Thailand?
Can M'sia be a peacemaker in south Thailand?: If everything goes well - and it is a big if - by the end of this month in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia could broker a framework peace plan between the Thai government and southern Thai-Malay insurgents to .....
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Jakarta housemaids rally for domestic rights bill
Jakarta housemaids rally for domestic rights bill: Hundreds of Indonesian housemaids rallied at the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in Central Jakarta yesterdat, demanding that the government and the House of Representatives protect their rights. The .....
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Indonesia's only synagogue struggles to find wider acceptance
Indonesia's only synagogue struggles to find wider acceptance: In the hill towns and villages an hour out of Manado, it is not uncommon for churches and mosques to be within 50m of each other, the ringing of church bells mingling with the call to prayer. But in .....
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PNG plans military build-up, but why?
PNG plans military build-up, but why?:
Donald Gumbis is a Lecturer in political science at the University of Goroka and an intern at the Lowy Institute.
Papua New Guinea's Defence Minister Dr Fabian Pok has announced that PNG plans to build up its military capacity from around 2000 personnel to 10,000.
While it is hardly unusual for fast-growing resource-rich countries to increase military spending as their national ambitions expand, Papua New Guinea has yet to address very significant development challenges in basic health and education. Increased spending on the military in such circumstances must therefore be questioned.
Why does Papua New Guinea need a larger military capacity? One factor in the Government's consideration could be the land border with Indonesia. The border skirmishes between the traditional people of PNG's Sandaun Province and Indonesian military spotlight the PNG Government's inattention to border issues. These issues pose a test for the Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation PNG has with Indonesia.
In a Radio Australia interview, former PNGDF Commander General Jerry Singirok noted key issues of concern with the announcement. He said there was no PNGDF White Paper to guide this proposed expansion, the PNG Government has never prioritised defence spending and there would be a substantial cost involved in rebuilding a downsized force.
The ongoing retrenchment exercise of close to 2000 personnel, which began in 1999, is a difficult issue that the Defence Department is still not adequately addressing. Further to that, there are challenges for the PNGDF to raise its performance level and the security of its weaponry. The recent mutiny case, insubordination and misconduct of soldiers all undermine the ministerial statement.
Policy announcements have tended to be more frequent than policy implementation in Papua New Guinea. But if this announcement reflects a serious intention by the PNG Government, it warrants more discussion.
Photo courtesy of the Defence Department.
Donald Gumbis is a Lecturer in political science at the University of Goroka and an intern at the Lowy Institute.
Papua New Guinea's Defence Minister Dr Fabian Pok has announced that PNG plans to build up its military capacity from around 2000 personnel to 10,000.
While it is hardly unusual for fast-growing resource-rich countries to increase military spending as their national ambitions expand, Papua New Guinea has yet to address very significant development challenges in basic health and education. Increased spending on the military in such circumstances must therefore be questioned.
In a Radio Australia interview, former PNGDF Commander General Jerry Singirok noted key issues of concern with the announcement. He said there was no PNGDF White Paper to guide this proposed expansion, the PNG Government has never prioritised defence spending and there would be a substantial cost involved in rebuilding a downsized force.
The ongoing retrenchment exercise of close to 2000 personnel, which began in 1999, is a difficult issue that the Defence Department is still not adequately addressing. Further to that, there are challenges for the PNGDF to raise its performance level and the security of its weaponry. The recent mutiny case, insubordination and misconduct of soldiers all undermine the ministerial statement.
Policy announcements have tended to be more frequent than policy implementation in Papua New Guinea. But if this announcement reflects a serious intention by the PNG Government, it warrants more discussion.
Photo courtesy of the Defence Department.
The Three Thousand Year Old Wave
The Three Thousand Year Old Wave:
Surin Village, photo by Project Moken
Having migrated along with other Austronesian groups from Southern China around 4,000 years ago, the Moken Sea Nomads of the Andaman Sea have always lived a precarious existence, spending half the year on the ocean, travelling in flotillas. It is against this ocean backdrop that they have developed a unique cultural identity and a world-view informed by a tapestry of folklore which weaves together a vast patchwork of maritime knowledge and experiences. These myths serve to preserve and reinforce their cultural values and make sense of relations with external societies as well as the forces of nature that have such a direct impact on their nomadic lifestyle.
In 2004, Laboon — the apocalyptic wave described in Moken myth as the “wave that eats people” — burst out of the floodgates of mythology and crashed upon the shores of Thailand after more than three thousand years of gestation in the Moken imagination. The real life events of the 2004 tsunami, perceived through the Moken’s mythological lens, creates a kaleidoscopic picture which merges past and present natural disasters with legend. It is believed by many that such catastrophe was initiated by the angry spirits of their ancestors, in a cleansing process similar to the great Biblical flood.
Since 1982 when the Surin islands (situated 55 km from the Thai mainland), where declared a national marine park by the Thai government Moken cultural sovereignty has been under threat. Many have found themselves hemmed in by state boundaries, depriving them of their nomadic liberty and yet without equal rights, due to the state’s refusal to grant them citizenship. This two-pronged assault on their freedom and rights, combined with restricted access to natural resources increases their dependence on the state and NGOs for jobs, housing and education, placing them in a culturally vulnerable position.
In the wake of the tsunami’s epic destruction some Moken believed the pathway was clear for them to create a revitalised identity for themselves, however it also prompted a free-for-all in which parties with vested interests including government officials and developers, attempted to prevent the return of survivors to their destroyed homes and villages claiming rights to their land. One particular group who sought refuge in a Buddhist temple on the mainland, found themselves at the mercy of various agents of power including some of the monks. After weeks of meetings and wrangling with the authorities they were eventually allowed to return their village on Ko Surin but unfortunately this has not secured the Moken’s cultural and economic autonomy. Eight years after the tsunami engulfed their island, the rip-tide of hegemony continually threatens to drag them under and drown any remnants of their distinct nomadic identity.
Nonetheless a number of Moken believe it is still possible to assert a renewed identity which can withstand the tides of environmental and cultural change. Hook, a member of the Moken community of Surin has emerged as a leader of the cause. Working closely with Norwegian film director Runar Jarle Wiik to make the documentary No Word for Worry (which is part of the wider multimedia initiative Project Moken), Hook embarked on a journey to make contact with Moken communities who had experienced less external interference and still had access to the resources needed to build a kabang (traditional houseboat) as well as other indigenous knowledge contained within mythology. Through this voyage he hoped to reinvigorate his own sense of identity and in turn other Moken of his generation.
In his mission to reassert a distinct identity, Hook has embraced modern media technologies such as film and social media to communicate his message to a wider audience. He also speaks Thai and some English as well as Moken, enabling him to act as a spokesman for the whole community. Although Hook and his supporters cannot restore an original Moken identity, by embracing the changes wrought by the tsunami and the latest technological developments whilst simultaneously reviving indigenous skills and knowledge they may just be able to harness the power of the Three Thousand Year Old Wave to produce what anthropologist Arunotai describes as “a cultural force…to inspire and revive their culture and traditions” to ensure their survival in an increasingly undifferentiated Thai cultural landscape.
Joshua Barron recently completed an MA in Social Anthropology at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
Surin Village, photo by Project Moken
Having migrated along with other Austronesian groups from Southern China around 4,000 years ago, the Moken Sea Nomads of the Andaman Sea have always lived a precarious existence, spending half the year on the ocean, travelling in flotillas. It is against this ocean backdrop that they have developed a unique cultural identity and a world-view informed by a tapestry of folklore which weaves together a vast patchwork of maritime knowledge and experiences. These myths serve to preserve and reinforce their cultural values and make sense of relations with external societies as well as the forces of nature that have such a direct impact on their nomadic lifestyle.
In 2004, Laboon — the apocalyptic wave described in Moken myth as the “wave that eats people” — burst out of the floodgates of mythology and crashed upon the shores of Thailand after more than three thousand years of gestation in the Moken imagination. The real life events of the 2004 tsunami, perceived through the Moken’s mythological lens, creates a kaleidoscopic picture which merges past and present natural disasters with legend. It is believed by many that such catastrophe was initiated by the angry spirits of their ancestors, in a cleansing process similar to the great Biblical flood.
Since 1982 when the Surin islands (situated 55 km from the Thai mainland), where declared a national marine park by the Thai government Moken cultural sovereignty has been under threat. Many have found themselves hemmed in by state boundaries, depriving them of their nomadic liberty and yet without equal rights, due to the state’s refusal to grant them citizenship. This two-pronged assault on their freedom and rights, combined with restricted access to natural resources increases their dependence on the state and NGOs for jobs, housing and education, placing them in a culturally vulnerable position.
In the wake of the tsunami’s epic destruction some Moken believed the pathway was clear for them to create a revitalised identity for themselves, however it also prompted a free-for-all in which parties with vested interests including government officials and developers, attempted to prevent the return of survivors to their destroyed homes and villages claiming rights to their land. One particular group who sought refuge in a Buddhist temple on the mainland, found themselves at the mercy of various agents of power including some of the monks. After weeks of meetings and wrangling with the authorities they were eventually allowed to return their village on Ko Surin but unfortunately this has not secured the Moken’s cultural and economic autonomy. Eight years after the tsunami engulfed their island, the rip-tide of hegemony continually threatens to drag them under and drown any remnants of their distinct nomadic identity.
Nonetheless a number of Moken believe it is still possible to assert a renewed identity which can withstand the tides of environmental and cultural change. Hook, a member of the Moken community of Surin has emerged as a leader of the cause. Working closely with Norwegian film director Runar Jarle Wiik to make the documentary No Word for Worry (which is part of the wider multimedia initiative Project Moken), Hook embarked on a journey to make contact with Moken communities who had experienced less external interference and still had access to the resources needed to build a kabang (traditional houseboat) as well as other indigenous knowledge contained within mythology. Through this voyage he hoped to reinvigorate his own sense of identity and in turn other Moken of his generation.
In his mission to reassert a distinct identity, Hook has embraced modern media technologies such as film and social media to communicate his message to a wider audience. He also speaks Thai and some English as well as Moken, enabling him to act as a spokesman for the whole community. Although Hook and his supporters cannot restore an original Moken identity, by embracing the changes wrought by the tsunami and the latest technological developments whilst simultaneously reviving indigenous skills and knowledge they may just be able to harness the power of the Three Thousand Year Old Wave to produce what anthropologist Arunotai describes as “a cultural force…to inspire and revive their culture and traditions” to ensure their survival in an increasingly undifferentiated Thai cultural landscape.
Joshua Barron recently completed an MA in Social Anthropology at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
Campaigning on lèse-majesté
Campaigning on lèse-majesté:
In a recent post, Andrew Walker mentioned that Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra had demonstrated an “unwillingness, or inability, to put in place any meaningful reform of Thailand’s lèse-majesté law” which had seen “outrageous prison sentences.” He also noted that the sentencing of Somyot Prueksakasemsuk was an “obscene legal abuse.” I agree on all counts.
I also have great respect for the role played by New Mandala in opening up debates on lèse-majesté (LM) and the monarchy in recent years. Likewise, Andrew’s positions on the monarchy and LM have been very important interventions. For all this good work, however, I have some reservations regarding his most recent post.
I start to diverge from Andrew when he states that: “One line of argument that has emerged in the flurry of debate in recent weeks is that non-Thai journalists and academics must lead the campaign…”. I admit that I haven’t seen this call for leadership by foreign academics on LM. (The discussion of journalists was long and involved, so I won’t comment further on those and the responses.)
In the original post, now with over 100 comments, I interjected on academics with a statement that they had “been too quiet on this sentencing [of Somyot].” That comment was not addressed to any particular nationality of academic. The other comment on academics was essentially supportive of “foreign academics … [who] have fulfilled their professional obligations. You will not find a credible recent study of Thailand by a respected international academic that fails to acknowledge the difficult issue of the monarchy when appropriate.” It strikes me that this comment, if a tad overblown, is telling; such a statement could not have been made 10-15 years ago.
Andrew’s comment that he is “uncomfortable about the claim that non-Thai commentators have a central role to play in the lèse-majesté reform campaign” is, I think, something of a strawperson argument. Yet the comments he proceeds to make on his reservations about the role of foreign academics deserve consideration.
Andrew’s first reservation is “practical.” If I am not misreading him, his view seems to be that junior academics should not necessarily “speak the truth” on Thailand. He states: “The careers of journalists and academics who work on Thailand are dependent on ongoing access to it. The idea that they should give up that access in order to speak truth to power is noble, but it is unrealistic.”
I find it surprising that junior academics are advised to be self-censoring. Of course, I understand that academics in places where the truth cannot be stated face real threats to their person and freedom. However, I can’t think of circumstances where I would feel comfortable advising a graduate student or junior colleague to not speak the truth. In many countries, one of the privileges of working in a university is academic freedom, which we sometimes have to struggle to defend. It seems odd to advise junior colleagues to ignore that privilege – indeed, do it damage – in order to research and write but “not speak the truth.” My view is that senior academics should encourage their students and junior colleagues to be fearless, ethical and noble.
Andrew’s second “reservation” has to do with political strategy. His view is that an elected government can only achieve reform if there is an “electoral cost-benefit ratio shift … in favour of reform.” Hence, “Western commentators can bang on … for as long as we want, but reform of lèse-majesté will only come when there the government feels confident to act without prompting a backlash…”. While I’m not convinced that all political reform is based on electoral sums, even if it is, I am uncertain why this should be a reason for an academic to hold his or her tongue.
Andrew’s suggestion that academics are speaking to the converted on LM and arguing that they have little or no “meaningful role in shifting opinions among the majority” is probably true for Thailand’s voters, but not for an international audience. I am convinced that the more critical academic commentary on the monarchy and LM has had a marked impact on the thinking of international audiences in embassies, parliaments, universities, the media and beyond. As noted above, the academic discussion of LM and the monarchy, internationally and within Thailand, has advanced considerably since the 2006 military coup.
Finally, in his list of reservations, Andrew refers to “non-Thai commentators” as possibly strengthening “the hand of these who defend the status quo” by being hypercritical of LM. I have no way to judge this speculation although we do know that ultra-nationalist rhetoric is as likely to round on foreign commentary just as much as it is threatening of domestic criticism.
In this listing of reservations it is noticeable that Andrew leaves out the possibility that “non-Thai” commentary can be advantageous for domestic critics. Reading blogs, social media and newspapers from Thailand, I am pretty sure that international support is generally considered useful – sometimes even important – for locals who strive for more political freedom including free expression.
In some very dark days, foreign support and commentary for those jailed for political offenses was important. Not all academics supported those political prisoners then and there are a wide range of academic motivations and political positions now. However, when some see “outrageous prison sentences” handed out for LM, I see no reason why outrage can’t be expressed. If that outrage drives some academic research and writing, some of it may be better for it and reveal that speaking the truth is noble.
In a recent post, Andrew Walker mentioned that Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra had demonstrated an “unwillingness, or inability, to put in place any meaningful reform of Thailand’s lèse-majesté law” which had seen “outrageous prison sentences.” He also noted that the sentencing of Somyot Prueksakasemsuk was an “obscene legal abuse.” I agree on all counts.
I also have great respect for the role played by New Mandala in opening up debates on lèse-majesté (LM) and the monarchy in recent years. Likewise, Andrew’s positions on the monarchy and LM have been very important interventions. For all this good work, however, I have some reservations regarding his most recent post.
I start to diverge from Andrew when he states that: “One line of argument that has emerged in the flurry of debate in recent weeks is that non-Thai journalists and academics must lead the campaign…”. I admit that I haven’t seen this call for leadership by foreign academics on LM. (The discussion of journalists was long and involved, so I won’t comment further on those and the responses.)
In the original post, now with over 100 comments, I interjected on academics with a statement that they had “been too quiet on this sentencing [of Somyot].” That comment was not addressed to any particular nationality of academic. The other comment on academics was essentially supportive of “foreign academics … [who] have fulfilled their professional obligations. You will not find a credible recent study of Thailand by a respected international academic that fails to acknowledge the difficult issue of the monarchy when appropriate.” It strikes me that this comment, if a tad overblown, is telling; such a statement could not have been made 10-15 years ago.
Andrew’s comment that he is “uncomfortable about the claim that non-Thai commentators have a central role to play in the lèse-majesté reform campaign” is, I think, something of a strawperson argument. Yet the comments he proceeds to make on his reservations about the role of foreign academics deserve consideration.
Andrew’s first reservation is “practical.” If I am not misreading him, his view seems to be that junior academics should not necessarily “speak the truth” on Thailand. He states: “The careers of journalists and academics who work on Thailand are dependent on ongoing access to it. The idea that they should give up that access in order to speak truth to power is noble, but it is unrealistic.”
I find it surprising that junior academics are advised to be self-censoring. Of course, I understand that academics in places where the truth cannot be stated face real threats to their person and freedom. However, I can’t think of circumstances where I would feel comfortable advising a graduate student or junior colleague to not speak the truth. In many countries, one of the privileges of working in a university is academic freedom, which we sometimes have to struggle to defend. It seems odd to advise junior colleagues to ignore that privilege – indeed, do it damage – in order to research and write but “not speak the truth.” My view is that senior academics should encourage their students and junior colleagues to be fearless, ethical and noble.
Andrew’s second “reservation” has to do with political strategy. His view is that an elected government can only achieve reform if there is an “electoral cost-benefit ratio shift … in favour of reform.” Hence, “Western commentators can bang on … for as long as we want, but reform of lèse-majesté will only come when there the government feels confident to act without prompting a backlash…”. While I’m not convinced that all political reform is based on electoral sums, even if it is, I am uncertain why this should be a reason for an academic to hold his or her tongue.
Andrew’s suggestion that academics are speaking to the converted on LM and arguing that they have little or no “meaningful role in shifting opinions among the majority” is probably true for Thailand’s voters, but not for an international audience. I am convinced that the more critical academic commentary on the monarchy and LM has had a marked impact on the thinking of international audiences in embassies, parliaments, universities, the media and beyond. As noted above, the academic discussion of LM and the monarchy, internationally and within Thailand, has advanced considerably since the 2006 military coup.
Finally, in his list of reservations, Andrew refers to “non-Thai commentators” as possibly strengthening “the hand of these who defend the status quo” by being hypercritical of LM. I have no way to judge this speculation although we do know that ultra-nationalist rhetoric is as likely to round on foreign commentary just as much as it is threatening of domestic criticism.
In this listing of reservations it is noticeable that Andrew leaves out the possibility that “non-Thai” commentary can be advantageous for domestic critics. Reading blogs, social media and newspapers from Thailand, I am pretty sure that international support is generally considered useful – sometimes even important – for locals who strive for more political freedom including free expression.
In some very dark days, foreign support and commentary for those jailed for political offenses was important. Not all academics supported those political prisoners then and there are a wide range of academic motivations and political positions now. However, when some see “outrageous prison sentences” handed out for LM, I see no reason why outrage can’t be expressed. If that outrage drives some academic research and writing, some of it may be better for it and reveal that speaking the truth is noble.
Who makes public policy in Malaysia?
Who makes public policy in Malaysia?:
When Malaysia faced the Asian economic crisis back in 1997, the then Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamed called on his old friend Tun Daim Zainuddin to head the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) set up under the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) to find a solution through the National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP). On the advice of the NEAC, the Malaysian Government pegged the Ringgit at 3.8 to the US dollar, put in place a number of capital controls, and undertook a number of bailouts of large firms.
Putting the individuals and controversies aside, the actions taken at that time were counterintuitive to what every other country was doing, following IMF prescriptions.
The NEAC is an example of public policy making in Malaysia at a time of crisis. It was a top down process, formulated without any consultation, ending up favoring select groups, and triggered vigorous debate about the merits of the action taken.
Just as the Genting Casino complex can be seen overlooking over much of Kuala Lumpur symbolizing gambling, public policy in Malaysia is also top down and often a gamble.
The Malaysian Economy and the Policy Process
The Malaysian economy is uniquely organized. The government is business friendly, but not necessarily market friendly, utilizing many quotas, subsidies, concessions, and licensing mechanisms to regulate business, and the economy. The policy process very closely resembles a centrally controlled economy, where detailed 5 year plans spell out the current economic situation and outline in some detail the agenda for the next 5 to 10 years. Government owned businesses control many sectors like palm oil, and state economic development corporations actively pursue new business opportunities, sometimes competing with the private sector.
Federal ministries tightly control their jurisdictions. For example the Ministry of Agriculture selects potential new industries to support as national priorities, independent of market forces. The relatively new Ministry of Higher Education exercises a lot of discretion over higher institutes of learning in areas of Vice Chancellor selection, course approval, the setting of KPIs, and many other matters related to day to day operations. Consequently very little university autonomy actually exists.
At state level, government is more concerned with how to implement national policy, rather than formulating any regional policies of their own. Federalism in Malaysia is skewed towards tight central control where the Federal Government controls taxation and budget allocations, giving the prime minister great personal control, at least in the states that his government controls.
In addition each prime minister brings his own agenda into public policy; Wawasan or Vision 2020 under Premier Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, the corridor development approach under Premier Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, and Economic Transformation Program (ETP) under the current Premier Najib Razak.
There are in fact huge policy gaps in Malaysia today. For example, an electric motor cycle or car for that matter could not be registered to as a motor vehicle because there is currently no policy or regulations existing on this issue today. Green bio-fuels are very difficult to develop in Malaysia as hydrocarbon fuels are heavily subsidized, acting as a disincentive to new bio-fuel development. Islamic banking cannot be diversified into communities through Muslim Savings Cooperatives because policies don’t yet exist. Very little policy exists in the public forum concerning Malaysia’s entry into the ASEAN Economic Community scheduled for 2015.
With an impending election due within the next couple of months, one would expect this to be a time where future visions for Malaysia are extolled and explained by political party leaders to the people. But if one scans the media in Malaysia, news and comment is almost totally focused upon scandals, who has or doesn’t have the right to use the word “Allah”, Hudud laws, and who should have citizenship, etc. Emotional issues emerge without much informed discussion. Both sides of politics are campaigning hard, but without much, if any debate on public policy issues. At public meetings locally known as ceramah certain politicians are famous for what they say about their political adversaries and attract large crowds.
In parliament, the opposition tends to oppose government initiatives just because they are government initiatives rather than putting them under parliamentary scrutiny, like recent opposition to the Automated Enforcement System (AES) speed trap cameras.
Policy doesn’t seem to be a major variable in Malaysian politics and if you go and ask supporters of both sides of politics what their party stands for, very few people will actually be able to tell you the specific policies of the parties they support. Malaysia’s political parties as such are not known for being policy generating organizations.
Rather, Malaysia’s political parties have developed sets of values, where the meaning in government is rather vague. Most often pragmatic considerations influence the implementation of policy, rather than principles and doctrines.
Malaysia is rich in political discussion, a favorite pass time in coffee shops and offices all around the country, but very light on policy. Most street side discussion focuses on personalities, scandals, corruption, and tactics. Most are interested in who will win the next election, but not overly concerned with what this will mean in terms of public policy.
The formation of public policy in Malaysia seems to be separated from the political process. Malaysian ministers are extremely busy dividing their time between party, constituency, parliamentary, and ceremonial duties. A large percentage of a minister’s time is dedicated to meeting with people, something embedded into Malaysian culture. So the time for a minister to be actually engaged in doing ministerial work would be very limited. Most ministers with a few exceptions like Mustapa Mohamed, who is an experienced micro-managing technocrat, leave the running of their ministries to department heads.
The Increasing Power of the Prime Minister’s Department
For years the Malaysian public service has been the chief policy maker through the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) within the Prime Minister’s Department. The PM’s department accumulates up to date information on Malaysian affairs and the economy to rival any ministry. The PM’s department through the EPU dictates policy all around the country. It’s a super-ministry centered in Putra Jaya with offices in each state of the country. Other ministries manage the details and fill in the gaps where the EPU doesn’t outline any policy framework.
Through the rise of the Prime Minister’s Department, the power of other ministries has gradually being curtailed and subordinated. This began under Premier Mahathir Mohammed and was continued under Premier Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, where the PM’s department became almost infamous, perceived to be controlled by the back room boys led by his son in law Khairy Jamaluddin. This lead to many criticisms that policy was being formulated by faceless and unelected people, which was probably a contributing factor to Badawi’s demise as Prime Minister not long after the 2008 election.
The Rise of Outside Consultancy
Another trend during the Badawi era was the increase in the use of outside consultants to make policy papers. All the corridor policy statements where formulated by consultants appointed by Government Linked Corporations (GLCs) selected by the government to oversee each corridor. Much of Malaysia’s public policy generation is now in the hands of consultants from the private sector.
During the Najib Administration public policy has almost become the complete domain of consultants who undertake studies for the EPU, Corridor authorities, and the Economic Transformation Program (ETP). These consulting jobs are lucrative and many firms seek them out.
Although there is something positive about using outside consultants to break out of the “public service” mold and bring in fresh ideas for government, in practice many of these reports are undertaken by fresh graduate MBA types who rely on popular terms, clichés, and graphics to deliver ideas that may in some cases not be well thought out or practical.
Another problem with all these reports is that in most cases outcomes are forecast so far into the future, i.e., 15years in the Malaysian Biotechnology Policy, they lose their realism and become “wish-lists” that nobody is really responsible for achieving. This leaves many of these programs open to the criticism of being more public relations exercises and programs for “connected” businesses to get rich on. This weakens program integrity. A number of scandals involving ministers like the National Feedlot Centre over the last few years has undermined public confidence.
Very few of these consultants actually have direct experience or expertise in the areas they are developing reports about. For example, the Northern Corridor Economic Region (NCER) Master plan developed a few years ago recommended mini paddy estates run by large companies that would rent farmers’ land and employ farmers back as general laborers, something reeking of feudalism to many. Worse still, some reports look like “cut and paste” jobs, while others are “sub-contracted” out to ghost writers.
Of greatest concern is the growing culture of “political correctness” in Malaysian Government today. People are restricted from saying what needs to be said out of fear that someone may be offended. There are many stories around the corridors of Putra Jaya where figures are manipulated to show scenarios in particular ways just to look good. Consequently many reports become “feel good” papers designed to give a glow about the future.
Most development policy is now in the hands of a corporatized organization called the Performance Management and Delivery Unit (Pemandu), also meaning “driver” in Bahasa Malaysia. The unit’s head Idris Jala leads a dynamic group of technocrats who employ lots of consultants in the pursuit of transforming the economy and government.
What is also of concern today is so much public policy is actually now generated outside the parliamentary process and cannot be directly reviewed by parliament as it has been “sub-contracted” to corporations.
There is a risk here that public policy has become a commodity in government, and to some the policy is the end in itself. Kuala Lumpur and Putra Jaya are now towns full of consultants who rely on these studies for their income. These consultants personally lobby ministers, the EPU, and Pamandu officials for these lucrative contracts where little expertise matching, transparency or tendering procedures exist.
These reports are very rarely questioned in public and if they are, objections are ridden over in rough-shot manners and dismissive ways, as the technocrat/consultants don’t see the need for public opinion. Most often the terms of reference or TOR as it’s known in the industry don’t include public input into the report process.
Public policy in Malaysia is top down and to a great extent made behind closed doors. Even the ruling parties have little practical input into these processes as policy comes out of the EPU and/or appointed consultants reports. The top Malaysian public servants and advisors are skilled in handling their ministers, who in most situations don’t have the policy background to challenge and question what is put in front of them. Consequently most ministers act upon the advice of their public service advisors and reports presented to them.
In addition some ministries feel the need to make policy to justify their existence and performance. One such example is the Ministry of Higher Education, mentioned earlier in this article, where interference in the day to day operations of Malaysian universities may actually be counterproductive to the national objective of developing world class universities.
Good Governance Depends Upon Sound Public Policy Processes
One of the key aspects of government effectiveness is the public policy process. Good public policy is the platform that good governance is built upon and this is an issue that has been almost totally ignored by those involved within the Malaysian political process.
Malaysian public policy needs to be built upon a shared vision, with input from all potential stakeholders, equitable, and transparent. An open process would negate the ability of sectional interest groups gaining benefits over others, a very much needed aspect in the process of public policy in Malaysia today.
Political parties too must put more effort into developing comprehensive policies so the people can give a mandate based on policy at election time. Policy substance is urgently needed in Malaysia. Otherwise public policy will be continually subject to political whims and “contamination” by outside parties.
The future prosperity of Malaysia will not be determined by who governs Malaysia but by how it is governed. Good governance should be based upon a transparent public policy process. It is time that the “top down” notion of public policy making be reviewed and changed to a more consultative process. Until proper evaluations and monitoring are made on proposed and existing public policies, these policies will be nothing more than a gamble, particularly with policies where the effects will not be felt in the community until years to come.
When Malaysia faced the Asian economic crisis back in 1997, the then Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamed called on his old friend Tun Daim Zainuddin to head the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) set up under the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) to find a solution through the National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP). On the advice of the NEAC, the Malaysian Government pegged the Ringgit at 3.8 to the US dollar, put in place a number of capital controls, and undertook a number of bailouts of large firms.
Putting the individuals and controversies aside, the actions taken at that time were counterintuitive to what every other country was doing, following IMF prescriptions.
The NEAC is an example of public policy making in Malaysia at a time of crisis. It was a top down process, formulated without any consultation, ending up favoring select groups, and triggered vigorous debate about the merits of the action taken.
Just as the Genting Casino complex can be seen overlooking over much of Kuala Lumpur symbolizing gambling, public policy in Malaysia is also top down and often a gamble.
The Malaysian Economy and the Policy Process
The Malaysian economy is uniquely organized. The government is business friendly, but not necessarily market friendly, utilizing many quotas, subsidies, concessions, and licensing mechanisms to regulate business, and the economy. The policy process very closely resembles a centrally controlled economy, where detailed 5 year plans spell out the current economic situation and outline in some detail the agenda for the next 5 to 10 years. Government owned businesses control many sectors like palm oil, and state economic development corporations actively pursue new business opportunities, sometimes competing with the private sector.
Federal ministries tightly control their jurisdictions. For example the Ministry of Agriculture selects potential new industries to support as national priorities, independent of market forces. The relatively new Ministry of Higher Education exercises a lot of discretion over higher institutes of learning in areas of Vice Chancellor selection, course approval, the setting of KPIs, and many other matters related to day to day operations. Consequently very little university autonomy actually exists.
At state level, government is more concerned with how to implement national policy, rather than formulating any regional policies of their own. Federalism in Malaysia is skewed towards tight central control where the Federal Government controls taxation and budget allocations, giving the prime minister great personal control, at least in the states that his government controls.
In addition each prime minister brings his own agenda into public policy; Wawasan or Vision 2020 under Premier Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, the corridor development approach under Premier Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, and Economic Transformation Program (ETP) under the current Premier Najib Razak.
There are in fact huge policy gaps in Malaysia today. For example, an electric motor cycle or car for that matter could not be registered to as a motor vehicle because there is currently no policy or regulations existing on this issue today. Green bio-fuels are very difficult to develop in Malaysia as hydrocarbon fuels are heavily subsidized, acting as a disincentive to new bio-fuel development. Islamic banking cannot be diversified into communities through Muslim Savings Cooperatives because policies don’t yet exist. Very little policy exists in the public forum concerning Malaysia’s entry into the ASEAN Economic Community scheduled for 2015.
With an impending election due within the next couple of months, one would expect this to be a time where future visions for Malaysia are extolled and explained by political party leaders to the people. But if one scans the media in Malaysia, news and comment is almost totally focused upon scandals, who has or doesn’t have the right to use the word “Allah”, Hudud laws, and who should have citizenship, etc. Emotional issues emerge without much informed discussion. Both sides of politics are campaigning hard, but without much, if any debate on public policy issues. At public meetings locally known as ceramah certain politicians are famous for what they say about their political adversaries and attract large crowds.
In parliament, the opposition tends to oppose government initiatives just because they are government initiatives rather than putting them under parliamentary scrutiny, like recent opposition to the Automated Enforcement System (AES) speed trap cameras.
Policy doesn’t seem to be a major variable in Malaysian politics and if you go and ask supporters of both sides of politics what their party stands for, very few people will actually be able to tell you the specific policies of the parties they support. Malaysia’s political parties as such are not known for being policy generating organizations.
Rather, Malaysia’s political parties have developed sets of values, where the meaning in government is rather vague. Most often pragmatic considerations influence the implementation of policy, rather than principles and doctrines.
Malaysia is rich in political discussion, a favorite pass time in coffee shops and offices all around the country, but very light on policy. Most street side discussion focuses on personalities, scandals, corruption, and tactics. Most are interested in who will win the next election, but not overly concerned with what this will mean in terms of public policy.
The formation of public policy in Malaysia seems to be separated from the political process. Malaysian ministers are extremely busy dividing their time between party, constituency, parliamentary, and ceremonial duties. A large percentage of a minister’s time is dedicated to meeting with people, something embedded into Malaysian culture. So the time for a minister to be actually engaged in doing ministerial work would be very limited. Most ministers with a few exceptions like Mustapa Mohamed, who is an experienced micro-managing technocrat, leave the running of their ministries to department heads.
The Increasing Power of the Prime Minister’s Department
For years the Malaysian public service has been the chief policy maker through the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) within the Prime Minister’s Department. The PM’s department accumulates up to date information on Malaysian affairs and the economy to rival any ministry. The PM’s department through the EPU dictates policy all around the country. It’s a super-ministry centered in Putra Jaya with offices in each state of the country. Other ministries manage the details and fill in the gaps where the EPU doesn’t outline any policy framework.
Through the rise of the Prime Minister’s Department, the power of other ministries has gradually being curtailed and subordinated. This began under Premier Mahathir Mohammed and was continued under Premier Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, where the PM’s department became almost infamous, perceived to be controlled by the back room boys led by his son in law Khairy Jamaluddin. This lead to many criticisms that policy was being formulated by faceless and unelected people, which was probably a contributing factor to Badawi’s demise as Prime Minister not long after the 2008 election.
The Rise of Outside Consultancy
Another trend during the Badawi era was the increase in the use of outside consultants to make policy papers. All the corridor policy statements where formulated by consultants appointed by Government Linked Corporations (GLCs) selected by the government to oversee each corridor. Much of Malaysia’s public policy generation is now in the hands of consultants from the private sector.
During the Najib Administration public policy has almost become the complete domain of consultants who undertake studies for the EPU, Corridor authorities, and the Economic Transformation Program (ETP). These consulting jobs are lucrative and many firms seek them out.
Although there is something positive about using outside consultants to break out of the “public service” mold and bring in fresh ideas for government, in practice many of these reports are undertaken by fresh graduate MBA types who rely on popular terms, clichés, and graphics to deliver ideas that may in some cases not be well thought out or practical.
Another problem with all these reports is that in most cases outcomes are forecast so far into the future, i.e., 15years in the Malaysian Biotechnology Policy, they lose their realism and become “wish-lists” that nobody is really responsible for achieving. This leaves many of these programs open to the criticism of being more public relations exercises and programs for “connected” businesses to get rich on. This weakens program integrity. A number of scandals involving ministers like the National Feedlot Centre over the last few years has undermined public confidence.
Very few of these consultants actually have direct experience or expertise in the areas they are developing reports about. For example, the Northern Corridor Economic Region (NCER) Master plan developed a few years ago recommended mini paddy estates run by large companies that would rent farmers’ land and employ farmers back as general laborers, something reeking of feudalism to many. Worse still, some reports look like “cut and paste” jobs, while others are “sub-contracted” out to ghost writers.
Of greatest concern is the growing culture of “political correctness” in Malaysian Government today. People are restricted from saying what needs to be said out of fear that someone may be offended. There are many stories around the corridors of Putra Jaya where figures are manipulated to show scenarios in particular ways just to look good. Consequently many reports become “feel good” papers designed to give a glow about the future.
Most development policy is now in the hands of a corporatized organization called the Performance Management and Delivery Unit (Pemandu), also meaning “driver” in Bahasa Malaysia. The unit’s head Idris Jala leads a dynamic group of technocrats who employ lots of consultants in the pursuit of transforming the economy and government.
What is also of concern today is so much public policy is actually now generated outside the parliamentary process and cannot be directly reviewed by parliament as it has been “sub-contracted” to corporations.
There is a risk here that public policy has become a commodity in government, and to some the policy is the end in itself. Kuala Lumpur and Putra Jaya are now towns full of consultants who rely on these studies for their income. These consultants personally lobby ministers, the EPU, and Pamandu officials for these lucrative contracts where little expertise matching, transparency or tendering procedures exist.
These reports are very rarely questioned in public and if they are, objections are ridden over in rough-shot manners and dismissive ways, as the technocrat/consultants don’t see the need for public opinion. Most often the terms of reference or TOR as it’s known in the industry don’t include public input into the report process.
Public policy in Malaysia is top down and to a great extent made behind closed doors. Even the ruling parties have little practical input into these processes as policy comes out of the EPU and/or appointed consultants reports. The top Malaysian public servants and advisors are skilled in handling their ministers, who in most situations don’t have the policy background to challenge and question what is put in front of them. Consequently most ministers act upon the advice of their public service advisors and reports presented to them.
In addition some ministries feel the need to make policy to justify their existence and performance. One such example is the Ministry of Higher Education, mentioned earlier in this article, where interference in the day to day operations of Malaysian universities may actually be counterproductive to the national objective of developing world class universities.
Good Governance Depends Upon Sound Public Policy Processes
One of the key aspects of government effectiveness is the public policy process. Good public policy is the platform that good governance is built upon and this is an issue that has been almost totally ignored by those involved within the Malaysian political process.
Malaysian public policy needs to be built upon a shared vision, with input from all potential stakeholders, equitable, and transparent. An open process would negate the ability of sectional interest groups gaining benefits over others, a very much needed aspect in the process of public policy in Malaysia today.
Political parties too must put more effort into developing comprehensive policies so the people can give a mandate based on policy at election time. Policy substance is urgently needed in Malaysia. Otherwise public policy will be continually subject to political whims and “contamination” by outside parties.
The future prosperity of Malaysia will not be determined by who governs Malaysia but by how it is governed. Good governance should be based upon a transparent public policy process. It is time that the “top down” notion of public policy making be reviewed and changed to a more consultative process. Until proper evaluations and monitoring are made on proposed and existing public policies, these policies will be nothing more than a gamble, particularly with policies where the effects will not be felt in the community until years to come.
Officials Blamed For Water Pollution
Officials Blamed For Water Pollution: 
The latest data from Beijing has revealed that around 90 percent of ground-water in China is polluted, much of it severely, with activists blaming local governments for protecting polluting enterprises.
In a recent survey of water quality in 118 cities across China, 64 percent of cities had "severely polluted" ground-water, Xinhua news agency quoted experts from the ministry of water resources as saying.
Activists say local people suffer from increased rates of various diseases linked to such pollution, and the lack of clean water can affect farming communities' ability to make a living at all.
Sichuan-based rights activist Huang Qi said the lack of access to clean ground water had dire consequences for hundreds of millions of rural residents, who rely on such water both for personal use and for watering the crops.
"Sometimes, these pollution issues turn into mass incidents," Huang said, citing a recent case in the eastern province of Jiangxi. "In Shuangyuan village, there was an incident in which local people smashed up the [polluting] factory."
"I think this is the direct result of inaction on the part of the government, and ties between official and commercial interests that mean that governments actually protect polluting enterprises," he said.
"They often fake the environmental measurements, and take oppressive action against local people."
Only 33 percent of the cities surveyed showed "light" pollution levels, Xinhua said, while the water was measured as "clean" in only three percent of cases.
Locking wells
According to the semi-official China News Service, local governments have begun locking wells in a bid to stop people from using the contaminated water, which is no longer fit to drink.
The report blamed polluting industries and enterprises which were being allowed to continue contaminating the water with no attempt at control from local governments.
Henan-based environmental activist Huo Daishan said polluted drinking water was already being linked to higher rates of cancer, endocrine problems and gastrointestinal diseases.
"There's a problem with the treatment of ground-water for drinking purposes, and it doesn't matter what they do to treat it, if the source isn't clean. All they will do during that process is add new chemicals, and therefore new pollutants," Huo said.
He said many of the polluting factories in his hometown were paper manufacturers, adding that he had begun testing the water himself as early as 2004.
Huo, who has spearheaded a campaign on the heavily polluted Huai river, said a patented biological clean-up system had already yielded strong results on that river.
"After we treated the river water, our statistics show that cancer and congenital endocrine diseases fell by around 90 percent," he said.
"We are hoping to try this method in other locations," he said.
No enforcement
Fujian-based environmental activist Zhang Changjian said that China's ground-water had become contaminated over a long period of time, during which the country's comprehensive set of environmental protection legislation hadn't been enforced at local level.
"There are stringent requirements for waste residues," Zhang said. "They must be stored and transported according to law."
"None of them have been implemented, however," he said.
Sichuan-based environmentalist Yang Yong said that China still lacked specific technical requirements for dealing with waste water that would eventually percolate down into the water table.
"These haven't been set up yet in China," he said. "But it is illegal to allow waste water to seep into the water table with no treatment at all."
Reported by Hai Nan for RFA's Cantonese service, and by Gao Shan for the Mandarin service. Translated and written in English by Luisetta Mudie.
The latest data from Beijing has revealed that around 90 percent of ground-water in China is polluted, much of it severely, with activists blaming local governments for protecting polluting enterprises.
In a recent survey of water quality in 118 cities across China, 64 percent of cities had "severely polluted" ground-water, Xinhua news agency quoted experts from the ministry of water resources as saying.
Activists say local people suffer from increased rates of various diseases linked to such pollution, and the lack of clean water can affect farming communities' ability to make a living at all.
Sichuan-based rights activist Huang Qi said the lack of access to clean ground water had dire consequences for hundreds of millions of rural residents, who rely on such water both for personal use and for watering the crops.
"Sometimes, these pollution issues turn into mass incidents," Huang said, citing a recent case in the eastern province of Jiangxi. "In Shuangyuan village, there was an incident in which local people smashed up the [polluting] factory."
"I think this is the direct result of inaction on the part of the government, and ties between official and commercial interests that mean that governments actually protect polluting enterprises," he said.
"They often fake the environmental measurements, and take oppressive action against local people."
Only 33 percent of the cities surveyed showed "light" pollution levels, Xinhua said, while the water was measured as "clean" in only three percent of cases.
Locking wells
According to the semi-official China News Service, local governments have begun locking wells in a bid to stop people from using the contaminated water, which is no longer fit to drink.
The report blamed polluting industries and enterprises which were being allowed to continue contaminating the water with no attempt at control from local governments.
Henan-based environmental activist Huo Daishan said polluted drinking water was already being linked to higher rates of cancer, endocrine problems and gastrointestinal diseases.
"There's a problem with the treatment of ground-water for drinking purposes, and it doesn't matter what they do to treat it, if the source isn't clean. All they will do during that process is add new chemicals, and therefore new pollutants," Huo said.
He said many of the polluting factories in his hometown were paper manufacturers, adding that he had begun testing the water himself as early as 2004.
Huo, who has spearheaded a campaign on the heavily polluted Huai river, said a patented biological clean-up system had already yielded strong results on that river.
"After we treated the river water, our statistics show that cancer and congenital endocrine diseases fell by around 90 percent," he said.
"We are hoping to try this method in other locations," he said.
No enforcement
Fujian-based environmental activist Zhang Changjian said that China's ground-water had become contaminated over a long period of time, during which the country's comprehensive set of environmental protection legislation hadn't been enforced at local level.
"There are stringent requirements for waste residues," Zhang said. "They must be stored and transported according to law."
"None of them have been implemented, however," he said.
Sichuan-based environmentalist Yang Yong said that China still lacked specific technical requirements for dealing with waste water that would eventually percolate down into the water table.
"These haven't been set up yet in China," he said. "But it is illegal to allow waste water to seep into the water table with no treatment at all."
Reported by Hai Nan for RFA's Cantonese service, and by Gao Shan for the Mandarin service. Translated and written in English by Luisetta Mudie.
Youth Turning Their Backs on ‘Singapore Dream’
Youth Turning Their Backs on ‘Singapore Dream’:
Painter MaryAnn Loo poses with her pieces of her work at her home in Singapore on Feb. 4, 2013. (Photo: Reuters)SINGAPORE — Ong Hui Juan spent nearly four years working in a British bank in Singapore, but decided to leave last year to pursue her passion of working with youth—an unusual and surprising decision in the achievement-oriented city state.
But Ong, 25, is just one of a growing number of young Singaporeans who are turning their backs on the material joys of the long-cherished “Singapore Dream,” summed up as the “Five C’s”—cash, car, credit card, condominium and country club membership—to do what they enjoy, even at much lower pay.
“I wanted to get out of a nine-to-five job. It was waiting for bonus after bonus, promotion after promotion. That didn’t really appeal to me,” said Ong, who studied banking and finance at university, but had worked with young people on the side.
“I don’t need to be very rich as long as I have enough to get by for myself and my family, and I continue to have the flexible time I have now.”
Young people may want to slow down, but the government does not. Singapore has long counted on its people as its biggest resource, the one that helped drive its transformation from a sea port with few natural resources into a key financial center after independence in 1965.
The government has also placed a strong emphasis on practical skills such as science and mathematics in schools, with Singapore students usually excelling in international tests.
It is just one part of what has made Singapore one of the world’s richest countries, with gross domestic product per capita of S$63,050 (US $50,123) in 2011, 48 times the level in 1960, according to government statistics.
Not one to rest on its laurels, though, the Singapore government recently released a nearly 80-page “white paper” calling for higher productivity in its workforce and projecting population growth by as much as 30 percent by 2030.
But far from going along, some young Singaporeans feel a sense of disconnect from the traditional paths that are laid out ahead of them as part of this striving—get into a top school, land a high-paying job and hope that their children can build on their achievements.
“The institutional set up of Singapore makes it remain a more materialistic society, when the government always puts economic growth, and therefore materialistic achievement, as a first priority,” said Chung Wai Keung, assistant professor of sociology at Singapore Management University.
“When the foundation of Singapore society is getting more secure, the younger generation can afford to make decisions different from the mainstream.”
There are signs that more are already doing so, in part because financial firms have been shedding jobs the past few years, said Andrea Ross, the managing director for Singapore, Vietnam and Malaysia at recruiting consultancy Robert Walters.
“Redundancies across the board are still continuing within financial services globally, and Singapore youngsters are becoming more confident to take up jobs in industries they have a strong personal desire to be part of,” she added.
The School of the Arts in Singapore, opened in 2008, has had around 1,000 applicants for only 200 spaces each of the last three years.
MaryAnn Loo, an artist in her late 20s, said younger people may have greater freedom to pursue their interests as they have been raised in relatively more comfortable conditions than their parents or grandparents.
Loo herself became a full-time artist at the end of last year and is staging her first solo exhibition. She previously studied psychology in university and had worked as a retail assistant and a freelancer on film and TV sets.
“Our parents grew up in a difficult time, and their primary purpose was survival. But I think a lot of people have already gone past the survival stage in Singapore, and therefore they can explore more things,” Loo said.
This kind of maverick may still remain in the minority for a while at least, said Tan Ern Ser, an associate professor of sociology at the National University of Singapore.
“Some may well be able to afford ‘dropping out’ if they have the means, through inheritance, past savings, or having a rich spouse. But for most people, dropping out is not an option, at least not a long-term one,” Tan said.
Yet Chung said these young people may ultimately prove to be pioneers.
“When there are more and more young adults making alternative decisions, and when more and more of them feel satisfaction because of their choice, it could reach a tipping point where the next generation will see those alternative options as legitimate,” he added.
Painter MaryAnn Loo poses with her pieces of her work at her home in Singapore on Feb. 4, 2013. (Photo: Reuters)
But Ong, 25, is just one of a growing number of young Singaporeans who are turning their backs on the material joys of the long-cherished “Singapore Dream,” summed up as the “Five C’s”—cash, car, credit card, condominium and country club membership—to do what they enjoy, even at much lower pay.
“I wanted to get out of a nine-to-five job. It was waiting for bonus after bonus, promotion after promotion. That didn’t really appeal to me,” said Ong, who studied banking and finance at university, but had worked with young people on the side.
“I don’t need to be very rich as long as I have enough to get by for myself and my family, and I continue to have the flexible time I have now.”
Young people may want to slow down, but the government does not. Singapore has long counted on its people as its biggest resource, the one that helped drive its transformation from a sea port with few natural resources into a key financial center after independence in 1965.
The government has also placed a strong emphasis on practical skills such as science and mathematics in schools, with Singapore students usually excelling in international tests.
It is just one part of what has made Singapore one of the world’s richest countries, with gross domestic product per capita of S$63,050 (US $50,123) in 2011, 48 times the level in 1960, according to government statistics.
Not one to rest on its laurels, though, the Singapore government recently released a nearly 80-page “white paper” calling for higher productivity in its workforce and projecting population growth by as much as 30 percent by 2030.
But far from going along, some young Singaporeans feel a sense of disconnect from the traditional paths that are laid out ahead of them as part of this striving—get into a top school, land a high-paying job and hope that their children can build on their achievements.
“The institutional set up of Singapore makes it remain a more materialistic society, when the government always puts economic growth, and therefore materialistic achievement, as a first priority,” said Chung Wai Keung, assistant professor of sociology at Singapore Management University.
“When the foundation of Singapore society is getting more secure, the younger generation can afford to make decisions different from the mainstream.”
There are signs that more are already doing so, in part because financial firms have been shedding jobs the past few years, said Andrea Ross, the managing director for Singapore, Vietnam and Malaysia at recruiting consultancy Robert Walters.
“Redundancies across the board are still continuing within financial services globally, and Singapore youngsters are becoming more confident to take up jobs in industries they have a strong personal desire to be part of,” she added.
The School of the Arts in Singapore, opened in 2008, has had around 1,000 applicants for only 200 spaces each of the last three years.
MaryAnn Loo, an artist in her late 20s, said younger people may have greater freedom to pursue their interests as they have been raised in relatively more comfortable conditions than their parents or grandparents.
Loo herself became a full-time artist at the end of last year and is staging her first solo exhibition. She previously studied psychology in university and had worked as a retail assistant and a freelancer on film and TV sets.
“Our parents grew up in a difficult time, and their primary purpose was survival. But I think a lot of people have already gone past the survival stage in Singapore, and therefore they can explore more things,” Loo said.
This kind of maverick may still remain in the minority for a while at least, said Tan Ern Ser, an associate professor of sociology at the National University of Singapore.
“Some may well be able to afford ‘dropping out’ if they have the means, through inheritance, past savings, or having a rich spouse. But for most people, dropping out is not an option, at least not a long-term one,” Tan said.
Yet Chung said these young people may ultimately prove to be pioneers.
“When there are more and more young adults making alternative decisions, and when more and more of them feel satisfaction because of their choice, it could reach a tipping point where the next generation will see those alternative options as legitimate,” he added.
Wealth Gap Worries China
Wealth Gap Worries China: 
China's government has promised to narrow the gap between rich and poor, but differing measures of income may make progress hard to gauge.
In January, the government raised expectations of major policy changes after the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) released calculations of income disparity for the first time since 2005.
Using an international index known as the Gini coefficient, NBS director Ma Jiantang said inequality has
dropped gradually from a peak in 2008 but remained above a warning level set by the United Nations, state media reported.
The official English-language China Daily called the 0.474 reading for last year's Gini index "alarming." The findings mean that China "must accelerate its income distribution reform to narrow the rich-poor gap," Ma was quoted as saying.
The index devised by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini a century ago is widely seen as an indicator of social stresses and risks.
By measuring equality as 0 and absolute inequality as 1, the NBS estimate would make China's wealth gap only slightly wider than that of the United States, The New York Times said.
But China Daily cited a much higher reading of 0.61 by Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in the Sichuan provincial capital Chengdu. That estimate would put China near South Africa, which has the highest income inequality in the world, according to euromonitor.com.
Experts voiced doubts about the accuracy of the NBS data.
"I wouldn't believe any statistic which has them currently about the same as the United States," said Gary Hufbauer, senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington. "That doesn't sound plausible to me."
The World Bank's last published Gini figure for China was 0.425 in 2005, Reuters reported. That was before much of the investment-led economic boom, which favored the rich.
The New York Times cited economists as saying that China's Gini index is "actually much higher, when illicit and poorly reported sources of wealth are taken into account."
Complicating data
China's official accounting of income growth may also complicate comparisons, both between rich and poor and with industrialized economies.
For years, the NBS has reported income growth rates for urban and rural residents using dissimilar measures.
In 2012, the average per capita disposable income of city dwellers rose 9.6 percent to 24,565 yuan (U.S. $3,940), the bureau said. At the same time, average rural per capita net income increased 10.7 percent to 7,917 yuan (U.S. $1,269). Both growth rates were adjusted for inflation, it said.
While the numbers suggest that rural residents enjoyed faster growth than those in cities, their net incomes remain disturbingly low at less than 670 yuan ($U.S. 107) a month.
The government has promised to double per capita incomes of all citizens by 2020 from 2010 levels. But comparing net income for the rural poor with disposable net income for more affluent urbanites may cloud the extent of inequality.
"The methods are all over the map and they do yield very different results for the same country at the same time," Hufbauer said. "It's all kind of shaky."
Little choice
Derek Scissors, senior research fellow in Asian studies at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, said China may have little choice in its use of separate measurements.
"They're just not in a position to be using the same measure for growth," he said.
One reason is that the net income of farmers includes the food they grow to feed themselves. Without that allowance, there might be little income left to report.
"Rural disposable income could be negative," said Scissors.
Alternately, rural disposable income figures could be so low that relatively small changes would produce wide swings in growth rates, making trends impossible track.
The NBS may overstate the non-monetary value of food in farmers' net incomes or underestimate the benefits like access to services that urban residents get.
The result may make income growth rate comparisons look more favorable for the poor than they actually are.
But measurement disparities are not the main problem, Scissors argued.
City dwellers have reaped huge income gains from government stimulus programs, infrastructure investment and property development, opportunities unavailable to the rural poor.
To address that, the government would have to give farmers real property rights and protections so they can resist the advances of developers or demand fair prices for their land, he said.
"What's driving inequality now is some people have the ability to make money and others don't," said Scissors.
Wide disparity
Disparity is especially wide between the politically- connected and those without power, he said. Investment opportunities for the privileged have created fortunes for the few that may not even be captured by NBS surveys.
"What we should really be talking about is Communist Party members versus everyone else," Scissors said. "All the wealth creation in China in the past five years is among Communist Party members."
The problems of political connections and corruption cut across urban-rural dividing lines, making measurements and policy solutions even more problematic.
"Getting at real inequality in China is actually very straightforward conceptually, but we're never going to get measurements on that," Scissors said.
Gary Hufbauer agrees that the NBS reports are unlikely to reflect the real extent of the disparities that may be most destabilizing for China.
"They're not very good at saying anything about the really rich people at the top, which is where the political concern resides," Hufbauer said.
"There's a feeling that people at the top are just getting away like gangbusters. These indexes don't really capture that," he said.
Whether or not its figures are accurate, China's government has grown increasingly concerned about the implications for stability.
On Feb. 5, the State Council announced a package of steps to help close the wealth gap including requirements for pay caps at state-owned enterprises, income disclosures for government officials and expansion of experimental property taxes, the official Xinhua news agency said.
China's government has promised to narrow the gap between rich and poor, but differing measures of income may make progress hard to gauge.
In January, the government raised expectations of major policy changes after the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) released calculations of income disparity for the first time since 2005.
Using an international index known as the Gini coefficient, NBS director Ma Jiantang said inequality has
dropped gradually from a peak in 2008 but remained above a warning level set by the United Nations, state media reported.
The official English-language China Daily called the 0.474 reading for last year's Gini index "alarming." The findings mean that China "must accelerate its income distribution reform to narrow the rich-poor gap," Ma was quoted as saying.
The index devised by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini a century ago is widely seen as an indicator of social stresses and risks.
By measuring equality as 0 and absolute inequality as 1, the NBS estimate would make China's wealth gap only slightly wider than that of the United States, The New York Times said.
But China Daily cited a much higher reading of 0.61 by Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in the Sichuan provincial capital Chengdu. That estimate would put China near South Africa, which has the highest income inequality in the world, according to euromonitor.com.
Experts voiced doubts about the accuracy of the NBS data.
"I wouldn't believe any statistic which has them currently about the same as the United States," said Gary Hufbauer, senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington. "That doesn't sound plausible to me."
The World Bank's last published Gini figure for China was 0.425 in 2005, Reuters reported. That was before much of the investment-led economic boom, which favored the rich.
The New York Times cited economists as saying that China's Gini index is "actually much higher, when illicit and poorly reported sources of wealth are taken into account."
Complicating data
China's official accounting of income growth may also complicate comparisons, both between rich and poor and with industrialized economies.
For years, the NBS has reported income growth rates for urban and rural residents using dissimilar measures.
In 2012, the average per capita disposable income of city dwellers rose 9.6 percent to 24,565 yuan (U.S. $3,940), the bureau said. At the same time, average rural per capita net income increased 10.7 percent to 7,917 yuan (U.S. $1,269). Both growth rates were adjusted for inflation, it said.
While the numbers suggest that rural residents enjoyed faster growth than those in cities, their net incomes remain disturbingly low at less than 670 yuan ($U.S. 107) a month.
The government has promised to double per capita incomes of all citizens by 2020 from 2010 levels. But comparing net income for the rural poor with disposable net income for more affluent urbanites may cloud the extent of inequality.
"The methods are all over the map and they do yield very different results for the same country at the same time," Hufbauer said. "It's all kind of shaky."
Little choice
Derek Scissors, senior research fellow in Asian studies at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, said China may have little choice in its use of separate measurements.
"They're just not in a position to be using the same measure for growth," he said.
One reason is that the net income of farmers includes the food they grow to feed themselves. Without that allowance, there might be little income left to report.
"Rural disposable income could be negative," said Scissors.
Alternately, rural disposable income figures could be so low that relatively small changes would produce wide swings in growth rates, making trends impossible track.
The NBS may overstate the non-monetary value of food in farmers' net incomes or underestimate the benefits like access to services that urban residents get.
The result may make income growth rate comparisons look more favorable for the poor than they actually are.
But measurement disparities are not the main problem, Scissors argued.
City dwellers have reaped huge income gains from government stimulus programs, infrastructure investment and property development, opportunities unavailable to the rural poor.
To address that, the government would have to give farmers real property rights and protections so they can resist the advances of developers or demand fair prices for their land, he said.
"What's driving inequality now is some people have the ability to make money and others don't," said Scissors.
Wide disparity
Disparity is especially wide between the politically- connected and those without power, he said. Investment opportunities for the privileged have created fortunes for the few that may not even be captured by NBS surveys.
"What we should really be talking about is Communist Party members versus everyone else," Scissors said. "All the wealth creation in China in the past five years is among Communist Party members."
The problems of political connections and corruption cut across urban-rural dividing lines, making measurements and policy solutions even more problematic.
"Getting at real inequality in China is actually very straightforward conceptually, but we're never going to get measurements on that," Scissors said.
Gary Hufbauer agrees that the NBS reports are unlikely to reflect the real extent of the disparities that may be most destabilizing for China.
"They're not very good at saying anything about the really rich people at the top, which is where the political concern resides," Hufbauer said.
"There's a feeling that people at the top are just getting away like gangbusters. These indexes don't really capture that," he said.
Whether or not its figures are accurate, China's government has grown increasingly concerned about the implications for stability.
On Feb. 5, the State Council announced a package of steps to help close the wealth gap including requirements for pay caps at state-owned enterprises, income disclosures for government officials and expansion of experimental property taxes, the official Xinhua news agency said.
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