Feb 23, 2013

Aliens in the land – Indian migrant workers in Malaysia (part 2)

Aliens in the land – Indian migrant workers in Malaysia (part 2):
HINDRAF Rally 2007
A second labour reserve comprised Chinese workers. Chinese migration overseas could best be described as being conducted under both a personal recruitment system and a mixture of recruitment arrangements directed by Chinese business interests. The recruitment method included a kinship-based migration network in China and the credit-ticket network in Malaya. The kinship-based migration network involved recruiter-couriers who recruited migrants from their own villages/regions, and relatives or friends from the migrants’ hometown normally guaranteed the passage and travel expenses. The credit-ticket system, which most migrants relied upon, necessitated the passage and travel expenses being paid by labour brokers, captains of junks or labour agencies.  The system exemplified the ‘coolie’ trade that supplied the greater part of Chinese labour migrants. This trade was controlled by Chinese and foreign agencies in the Chinese treaty ports. The migrants normally entered into verbal or written contracts for the repayment of their debt in the form of labour service. There was no recognised “establishment body” and the influence of secret societies was ubiquitous. Labourers were free men and often changed employment and job location depending on market conditions.
Parmer argues that the system of contracted workers on the rubber plantation was a Chinese innovation. This system allowed European planters to manage Chinese workers through Chinese labour contractors. Planters paid the contractors on the basis of specific work contracts on plantations. The contractors then paid the workers their wages and supplied housing and other supplies, including food. Javanese workers comprised another labour reserve since planters were concerned about being unable to maintain a continuous and unlimited supply of workers, following the abolition of Indian indentured labour in 1910. The Javanese were recruited as indentured workers until the early 1930s. The Dutch colonial government in Indonesia regulated their employment while Dutch recruiting firms handled the recruitment procedures. They formed the smallest proportion of rubber plantation workers on Western plantations.
All three groups worked under different employment conditions on the one plantation and had dissimilar pay scales and labour protections. According to Bauer European planters made use of south Indian labour as the permanent core of European plantation labour forces, in a ratio of about 10.2 Indians compared to 2.7 Chinese, per 100 planted acres. Whereas Indians were housed in permanent lines (compound housing) in the central section of the plantation, Chinese contract workers lived outside the plantations in their own kongsi accommodation (communal housing) or in separate huts. Javanese also lived in compound housing but they had greater opportunities for interaction with Malays due to language and religious connections. The entire process of labour market functioning and organisation in the plantation sector was effectively regulated through legislation, recruitment systems and immigration policies that served to protect the interests of Western firms and maintain workforce fragmentation. The colonial administration was also able to repatriate unemployed Indian workers during depressed economic conditions while Chinese workers’ mobility was restricted through immigration policies, since they were considered aliens.
The Indians were the most marginalised of workers. They resided in closed plantation societies in frontier zones and the plantation symbolised the boundary of their existence. The isolation of plantations and colonial vagrancy laws also prevented them from leaving the plantation. In any case, the Indian workers’ low caste backgrounds and inability to speak either Malay or English intensified their isolation and vulnerability. They were trapped in an unending cycle of dependency and poverty on the plantation. According to one writer, the provision of housing and other amenities by planters had a built-in mechanism for social control.  Labourers living in estate housing were not charged rent (which was included in the wage calculation).  Consequently if they were dismissed, they faced eviction.  They were thus effectively tied to the estates and the low-wage structure inherent in the plantation system. Crucially, the plantation system infantilised the Indians since they became dependent on their plantation masters for provision of services such as housing, crèches, and plots for growing vegetables or raising livestock and had problems making the transition to urban surroundings when they were evicted from the plantations. 
Oil Palm Plantations and Migrant Labour      
In the aftermath of the 1969 racial riots, the national government instituted a new policy known as the New Economic Policy, which incorporated poverty reduction and income redistribution programs based on affirmative action policies on behalf of the Malays. The state’s economic goals prioritised a centralised approach to national development and economic diversification. The main concern was to raise the standard of living of Malays and hence a rural development strategy became critical in development planning. The rural development strategy and land reforms thus correlated with the opening up of large areas of land for commercial crop production to raise the incomes of the rural poor and landless Malay peasants. The reforms incorporated block new planting schemes under the Rubber Industry Smallholders’ Development Authority and the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA). The rubber industry thus underwent a major replanting and operational reorganisation phase. FELDA, on the other hand, was tasked with diversification of crops and led the move into oil palm production. Concurrently, between 1957 and 1960 over 300 rubber plantations with a land area of about 230,000 acres were converted into smallholdings. This figure rose to about 324,000 acres in 1967. The fragmentation of plantations had severe repercussions for the Indian plantation workers and most of them returned to India. Subsequently attempts were made to form plantation workers’ cooperatives to purchase rubber estates for them but these involved small numbers of Indians.
Since colonialism had also bred resentment of foreign Asians in Malaya, the national government instigated new legislation in 1957 that effectively closed access to the labour market for them. “Foreign” Asians or “aliens” (Chinese and Indians who were not granted citizenship) were forced to leave or were repatriated, despite their earlier connections and residence in the country. The Malay-dominated government’s Immigration Act 1959 was primarily intended to control the movement of non-citizens into the country. Next, after the creation of Malaysia (1963), the government passed the Employment Restriction Act 1968, which was intended primarily to restrict the quantity and manipulate the ‘quality’ of migrants to ensure that only skilled non-citizens were permitted entry into the country. The government also made it compulsory for non-citizens to apply for work permits for about 2,000 employment categories. These included the plantation industry, railways and municipal services, all of which were dominated by Indians. The Indians’ work permits were non-renewable and consequently 60,000 Indians left for India. Although they were eligible for citizenship, they were unable to acquire citizenship, and their reasons for wanting it to secure employment were not acceptable to the Malays.
The new exclusionist policies also discriminated against Indians’ economic and political rights, turning them into “orphans of empire”. Importantly there was a shift in citizenship classification categories in the country. From an earlier racial categorisation, Indians became non-citizen aliens and were transformed into “stateless” and illegal migrants. The new Malaysian state hence became a closed labour market and citizenship conferred both the right to reside and work in the country. The share of Indian workers in agriculture (i.e. plantations for the Indians) declined, falling from 12.8 per cent in 1950 to 9.7 per cent in 1970. Most of the Malayan citizen-Indians then either continued to work on rubber plantations or were absorbed within the oil palm sector.
But the demand for a less-skilled hired workforce had not diminished in Malaysia. The government subsequently modified its labour migration policy and this change signalled a second period in the history of plantation structures and associated labour regimes. Indonesia, Thailand and subsequently Bangladesh became the preferred labour providers for the plantation sector and the workers were hired under guest worker schemes. Employers also subcontracted all responsibilities to labour contractors. This second period of foreign labour recruitment for the plantation sector is best observed through the lens of business cycles and structural changes in the Malaysian economy. During an initial phase the government surreptitiously allowed local contractors/intermediaries to recruit Indonesian workers from the Indonesian squatter settlements in Kuala Lumpur and the Klang Valley. Subsequently both regular and irregular migrants formed the nucleus of less-skilled foreign workers in the oil palm plantations during this period. In the 1980s an offshore recruitment program was started, consistent with the launch of a consortium of labour recruiting agencies in Indonesia, known as the pengusaha pengerah tenaga kerja Indonesia (PPTKI) in 1981. This consortium was established by the Indonesian Manpower Supply Association to organise and manage Indonesians migrants’ mobility overseas.
The Malaysian government’s intention was to keep the workers coming through legal channels and it then established a Committee for the Recruitment of Foreign Workers in 1982 to ensure the Indonesians were employed in the designated sectors. This was also done to appease Malaysians generally, the Malaysian Trades Union Congress, representing Malaysian workers, and opposition leaders. Afterwards, Malaysia instigated labour accords with labour-sending countries. The government’s role was largely confined to official immigration procedures and formalisation of recruitment regulations while employers and private recruiting agencies handled recruitment tasks. Consequently, migration industries evolved in both countries to handle the trade in migrant workers under explicit conditions. Contract migrant workers were categorised as semi-skilled or unskilled workers (who earned less than $2, 500 per month). They were given visit passes for temporary employment in Malaysia and the passes were used to regulate their admittance, place of residence and employment type. They were not allowed to bring their dependents with them. The government’s plan was to ensure that the workers’ employment remained temporary and encourage employers to introduce labour-saving technology on plantations. Another major policy change impacted on the remaining Indian plantation workers’ employment conditions. In the 1980s, rubber and oil palm planters extended the contract system to Indian workers, although Indians were employed directly by them. One researcher has surmised that since the “ties” between the kangani (the field supervisor) and Indian workers had been removed following passing of the 1955 Employment Act, planters extended the contract system to their Indian workers in order to have greater control over them.
Against the backdrop of continuing irregular migration and depressed economic conditions the government then suspended foreign labour recruitment in 1986. Then, in 1989 the government introduced another policy amendment, i.e. declaration of an amnesty for the irregular workers, followed by a legalisation program for these (mainly Indonesian) workers in the oil palm plantation sector. The government’s regularisation program subsequently became a recurring characteristic of Malaysian foreign labour policy and a long-term policy instrument for labour force growth. In implementing this strategy of offering amnesty and an opportunity to become regularised, Malaysia followed closely behind the United States, Europe and Thailand. Furthermore, the policy also contributes to a larger legal labour pool that has consequences both for domestic and international investment. Simultaneously, the government introduced a levy or tax to reduce planters’ reliance on foreign workers and encouraged them to upgrade their operations. This annual levy (or tax) on migrant workers was stipulated in the 1991/2 national budget and the levy differed according to the sector and migrants’ skill categories (general, semi-skilled and unskilled). Although the levy was imposed on employers, in fact levy payments could legally be passed on to workers from 1992 -2009. In 2009 employers became responsible for payment of the levy but this ruling has recently (2013) been rescinded, with the implementation of a minimum wage, so as not to “burden” employers. One reason could be that “2013 is an election year and strange things happen in election years”.
Nevertheless, the harsh working conditions and remoteness of plantations, coupled with a non-existent social life and the contract labour environment, resulted in workers absconding and also deterred employee stability on plantations. Compared to other sectors, the government has been “fairly generous” as regards plantation workers’ contract periods. The contracts have been extended from 3 years in 1984 to 5 years in 1994 and 7 years in 1998.  In 2002 the figure dropped to 6 years and employers were allowed to recruit workers from 9 countries. The government also enacted new legislation, the Workers Minimum Housing Standards and Amenities Act 1990. This legislation prescribed minimum standards of housing and provision of nurseries for workers and their dependents. Additionally, employers were required to allocate land for cultivation and grazing and provide medical and social services. Nevertheless, the legislation was initially applicable to Peninsular Malaysia only and covered plantations that were more than 20 hectares.
Thus the oil palm plantation complex has been beset with acute problems under the national government’s (mis)management of the plantation system. The contractor system has also led to allegations of forced labour in the oil palm industry by the United States Department of Labour and the Malaysian government has had to pass new legislation on working conditions (See Malaysia’s response to allegations of forced labour in the Oil Palm and Textile Industries, 2012). Planters also dislike having to rely excessively on one particular ethnic group and the guest worker program since the oil palm industry is seen as “the pillar of rural economy and provides job opportunities for more than 1.5 million people in the sector.
Overall, the government’s policy of undue reliance on cheap foreign labour and the plight of the dispossessed marginalised communities in the country have clearly contributed to this dismal situation. Perhaps the new minimum wage in the plantation sector (as of 2013) may draw in some of the earlier marginalised Indians but it will certainly require more accommodation on the part of the state to make it work.
This is Part 2 which concludes the two part series revisiting the history of Indian migrant workers in then Malaya, now citizens of Malaysia and exploring the possible reasons for the continued backwardness of a significant number of them. Amarjit Kaur, is Professor of Economic History at the University of New England. Her research interests include Southeast Asian Labour history, Indian labour migration and the Indian diaspora, and governance of international labour migration in Southeast Asia. Part 1 is available HERE.  

Allegations of aid politicization in Philippines ahead of elections

Allegations of aid politicization in Philippines ahead of elections:
BAGANGA/MANILA, 22 February 2013 (IRIN) - Caridad Calungsod and her three children have been living in a makeshift shelter along the highway leading into Baganga, a coastal farming municipality in the southern Philippine province of Davao Oriental on Mindanao Island that was among the hardest hit by typhoon Bopha last December.

Reformer’s Drive to Change Indonesia State Firms Hits Roadblocks

Reformer’s Drive to Change Indonesia State Firms Hits Roadblocks:

JAKARTA — On an overcast Saturday in early January, the man in charge of modernizing Indonesia’s state companies suddenly lost control of his prototype electric sports car and plowed into the side of a mountain in East Java.
State-Owned Enterprises Minister Dahlan Iskan was unhurt, but the US $300,000 bright red “Tucuxi,” dubbed “Indonesia’s Ferrari” by local media, was a write-off.
It looks like his chances of pulling off an ambitious reform of the bloated state sector are heading the same way.
More than a year after his appointment, most of Iskan’s initiatives to fix state firms have either been revoked or blocked by parliament or remain stuck in ministries, according to government and parliamentary documents obtained by Reuters.
“The political challenge is still huge,” said Iskan, who started his career as a journalist and still writes a regular column in his newspaper, in an interview. “Life is like that. It’s difficult to make this country better.”
Iskan has abandoned plans to start mass production of the privately funded Tucuxi, named after a type of dolphin.
But criticism over the crash—he is being investigated by police for driving an unlicensed car on public roads, although no charges have been filed—dented his reputation and further sapped his political capital, making it even tougher for him to battle powerful vested interests.
It is a frustration that, according to those close to him, is motivating the media mogul to consider standing as a candidate in next year’s presidential election despite being viewed as a rank outsider.
“I would lie if I say I don’t want to, I want to,” Iskan said, when asked if he wanted the presidency.
He conceded he held only a small chance of winning, and declined to discuss his reasons for running because he was still a serving minister. But several people close to him said he saw the presidency as the only way to achieve change.
“Iskan is impatient over the lack of action just like any private sector guy. He’s frustrated with the political pressure especially from the parliament,” said a source close to Iskan who declined to be named due to the sensitivity of the issue.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, two-thirds of the way through his second and final five-year term, has made reform of state companies a priority in developing the G20 economy.
Yudhoyono turned for help to Iskan, who made his reputation turning the near-bankrupt Jawa Pos Group into one of Indonesia’s biggest media companies.
Just over a year since his appointment in late 2011, Iskan has struggled to implement any of his ambitious plans. On Jan. 23, he announced that he might have to cancel all his planned initial public offerings (IPOs).
It is not the first time Yudhoyono has picked a reformist and then failed to give them protection. His highly respected finance minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, became so exhausted by relentless politically motivated criticism she left in 2010.
Indonesia’s 140 state-controlled firms account for a huge chunk of Southeast Asia’s biggest economy—their total revenues are estimated to have hit 1,500 trillion rupiah ($155 billion) last year, or nearly a fifth of gross domestic product.
Several of the companies have complete or near control of key industries such as energy, power and agriculture that underpin Southeast Asia’s biggest economy.
“There is an ownership fetish—the state wants to act as a entrepreneur,” said James Castle, chairman of CastleAsia, one of Indonesia’s leading consultancies for foreign firms.
“They are everywhere, acting like private companies, and they crowd out the private sector.”
Even Iskan’s attempt to take control of the appointment of senior state company managers has largely failed.
In November 2009, Yudhoyono, criticized over repeated power cuts, gave Iskan the job of heading state electricity monopoly PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) and agreed to allow him to choose his own board. The appointment was seen as a success.
As state-owned enterprises minister in 2011, he wanted similar freedom to make appointments free of political considerations. He discovered quickly that wasn’t so easy.
Executives connected to political party chiefs and the presidential palace are on the board of more than half of the top 25 state firms, according to state-owned enterprises ministry data and the companies documents from 2012.
Two presidential decrees, issued in 2005 a year into Yudhoyono’s first term, gave the authority to choose top managers of state firms to a “Final Assessment Team” (TPA) led by the president.
“These are, of course, assignments … they are missions from the government,” Firmanzah, a special adviser to the president with responsibility for administration and financial matters, said in defense of presidential staff appointments.
“This is to push for good governance.”
Iskan has also antagonized members of two parliamentary commissions with oversight of state companies.
“He is not an expert in bureaucracy, politics and lobbying. He’s a businessman,” said Muhammad Said Didu, chief commissioner of state planter PT Perkebunan Nusantara IV.
He faced a setback only a few months into the job when he was forced to revoke his first decree to give more flexibility to executives in state firms to take major business decisions.
Parliament warned Iskan the decree, which gave his ministry such powers as deciding share buy backs, was illegal.
“My questions are: Does he have the authority to do that? And is it in line with the state-firms law?” said Harry K. Harman, vice chairman of one of the parliamentary commissions overseeing state firms, who is from Yudhoyono’s party.
Differences of interpretation and overlapping, sometimes conflicting, laws also hinder Iskan’s attempts at major reform and can make executives afraid to act for fear of prosecution.
In 2012, he planned five state firm initial public offerings. Only one, builder PT Waskita Karya, went to the market and that had already been approved by parliament back in 2008, before he came into office.
Last month, he announced that all IPO and rights issue plans by state firms would probably be postponed because of technical and regulatory issues.
He declined to discuss a plan to create one of the world’s largest palm-oil and rubber firms with $5.6 billion in assets, which had once been set for completion in March 2012.
“Changing the law in this country is like changing the Koran,” senior Iskan aide Wahyu Hidayat told Reuters. “Next to impossible.”
Additional reporting by Fathiya Dahrul and Neil Chatterjee

Chinese Police Detain, Beat Tibetan Protesters

Chinese Police Detain, Beat Tibetan Protesters:
Chinese police rounded up and brutally beat a group of Tibetans following a protest at the start of the Lunar New Year this month, leaving two with broken bones and taking at least six into custody, sources said this week.

The Feb. 10 protest in the Meyul township of the Tibet Autonomous Region’s Dzogang (in Chinese, Zuogong) county came after authorities insisted that area residents fly the Chinese national flag from the roofs of their homes, a local source told RFA’s Tibetan Service.

“But the Tibetans refused to fly the flags from their roofs,” the man said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Instead, they tore them down and stamped on them,” he said.

Chinese county officials also distributed solar panels as gifts, but Tibetan residents smashed them in a gesture of defiance, RFA’s source said.

On Feb. 10, the eve of the Tibetan New Year, local Tibetans pasted posters on the walls of Chinese government offices calling for religious freedom and independence for Tibet and staged a public protest, he said.

A large contingent of Chinese security personnel arrived in the area the next day to take the protesters into custody, an exile Tibetan news outlet said, confirming the incident.

“Chinese authorities in Dzogang detained six Tibetans and brutally beat them, leaving two with broken bones, after the protest erupted on Feb.10,” the online Tibet Express reported this week.

“One of those detained sustained two broken ribs, while another’s arm was broken in the ruthless beating,” the Tibet Express said.

More may be held

The names of the detained protesters have not been learned, a local source said, adding that Chinese security forces may be detaining even more Tibetans than the six reported held.

“The Chinese government has deployed a large number of security forces in the area and has blocked all traffic going into Meyul town,” he said.

“Residents wanting to leave have been blocked by checkpoints set up at a bridge leading to the area.”

Chinese officials have also recently been visiting nearby Tibetan towns and villages and taking down the names and locations of area residents, he added.

Calls seeking comment from county and prefecture police rang unanswered Thursday.

Separately, RFA reported this week that Chinese security forces detained six monks at a restive monastery in Markham (in Chinese, Mangkang) county in the Tibet Autonomous Region also on Feb. 10.

The detentions followed protests calling for Tibetan independence and the return of Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, according to sources.

Prayers for self-immolators

Tibetans in China chose to forgo traditional Losar new year festivities this year, opting instead to mourn and pray for compatriots who burned themselves to death during the year to challenge Chinese rule, sources said.

Prayers were held in Tibet and across Tibetan-populated areas in Chinese provinces as Tibetans marked the New Year.

Some 104 Tibetans have self-immolated so far in protest against Chinese rule in Tibetan-populated areas and calling for the return of the Dalai Lama, who lives in exile in India.

Beijing has defended its rule of Tibet and says the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan leaders in exile have orchestrated the self-immolations from their base in India.

But Tibetan exile leaders deny involvement in the burnings and have called on Tibetans in Tibetan-populated regions of China to exercise restraint.

Rights groups have condemned Chinese authorities for criminalizing the fiery protests and for cracking down on Tibetans believed to have provided encouragement and support.

Reported by RFA’s Tibetan Service. Translated by Dorjee Damdul. Written in English by Richard Finney.

That Luang Marsh Residents Refuse to Move

That Luang Marsh Residents Refuse to Move:
Over 100 families living in a part of the Lao capital slated for a Chinese-invested urban development project are refusing to relocate, saying compensation offered for their land is too low.
Officials have touted the planned U.S. $1.6 billion project under construction in the That Luang marsh area as a showpiece commercial center that will bring a modern facelift to fast-growing Vientiane.
But a group of residents are refusing to move to make way for the 1.25 square mile (3.25 square kilometer) That Luang Marsh Specific Economic Zone, which broke ground in December, saying the compensation offered is ten times less than the market value of their land.
They say the amount is too little to settle into a new life and that they will be forced into debt from borrowing money to build new homes.
A Lao official working on the issue said around 80 percent of the households in the project site had accepted relocation compensation and that the government was working to make disbursements to the remaining residents.
“Now almost 80 percent of the landowners have come forward to receive compensation. For the remaining compensation, the committee will continue coordinating with landowners to give it out soon,” the official said.
Urban commercial, residential center
Developer Shanghai Wan Feng Group plans to create a lagoon in the center of what will become a new urban area that will also include open spaces, a public park, a drainage site, several new roads, a sports center, and trade and service centers with five-star hotels, shopping centers, and entertainment venues.
The groundbreaking ceremony in December was attended by Lao’s deputy prime minister, the mayor of Vientiane, and China’s ambassador to Laos, among other senior officials, and the project is expected to be completed in 15 to 20 years.
Work has also begun on a 6 mile (9.5 kilometer) highway cutting through the marsh to link Sisattanak and Xaysettha districts.
But residents say they have had little say in the decision-making process about development in the area, for which plans have been in the works for several years.
Last year, sources said plans for the project were delayed by a tussle between investors from China and Vietnam.
In 2010, plans for a even bigger urban development project on a 3.9 square mile (10 square kilometer) area in the same location by a different Chinese developer were scrapped because, according to then-minister of planning and investment Sinlavong Khoutphaythoune, the company was reluctant to pay U.S. $400 million in relocation compensation to the roughly 7,000 affected households.
Foreign investment in Laos
Laos, one of the least developed Southeast Asian states, has become  the subject of massive foreign investment, especially from companies from China, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Last October, it was announced that the construction of a mega mall set to be Laos’s largest shopping complex in Vientiane’s Sikhottabong district has been suspended after the project’s international developer ran out of funds despite having collected advance rent from retailers.
The planned U.S. $50 million Regal Mega Mall was touted as a landmark center for commerce and entertainment when construction on the seven-storey shopping plaza began in 2011.
But its developer, Regal Global Investment Development Group, a Singapore company, halted the project while it looked for another investor to take over, sources had said.
Reported by RFA’s Lao Service. Written in English by Rachel Vandenbrink.

Election List May Widen Divide in Hun Sen's Party

Election List May Widen Divide in Hun Sen's Party:
By selecting their children to run in upcoming elections, Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen and other government leaders may be widening the gap between the rich and powerful and the grass-root members in the country's ruling party, observers and rights groups say.

Cheam Yeap, a senior member of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), confirmed this week that Hun Sen's youngest son, 30-year-old Hun Many, and his son-in-law, Dy Vichea, a senior police officer in the Interior Ministry, will run for parliament in the July general election.

There have been unconfirmed reports that Hun Sen's eldest son Hun Manet, 35, the chief of the ministry of defense's anti-terrorism unit as well as the deputy chief of Hun Sen's personal bodyguard unit, and his third son, Hun Manith, 31, an army colonel and deputy head of a powerful military intelligence unit, will also run in the polls.

The candidacies of Hun Many, who is currently an official in his father's cabinet, and Dy Vichea are expected to add to speculations that Hun Sen is setting the stage for his children to succeed him and establish a political dynasty, observers said.

The sons of several other senior CPP officials, including those of Deputy Prime Minister Sok An and Interior Minister Sar Kheng, have also been picked to stand in the general elections in July, Cheam Yeap said.

Other candidates include the sons of CPP Senate first Deputy President Say Chhum and CPP Supreme Court President Dith Munthy.

Ou Virak, the president of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, said that nominating only the rich and powerful children within the CPP to become lawmakers would discourage other CPP members' children  sidelined from the polls.

"Children of other CPP leaders will think they don't have any chance like those of the rich and powerful," he told RFA's Khmer Service.

Ou Virak believes that Hun Sen, prime minister since 1985 and Southeast Asia's longest serving government leader, is paving the way for his oldest son Hun Manet, currently a two-star general, to replace him in the future.

"Hun Manet is holding a very crucial position in the military. I think during Hun Sen's regime, the military will play an important role in controlling the country. I think this is what Hun Sen is thinking," Ou Virak said.

Hun Sen, who has vowed to remain in power until he is 90, believes in the military controlling the country, he said.

Even though the powerful prime minister's youngest son is the only one among his sons to be confirmed running in the elections, Hun Sen wants Hun Manet to succeed him, Ou Virak said.

Human rights abuses

The Hun Sen government has been accused of blatant human rights abuses and widespread corruption. 

Opposition political party figures, critics of the government, and those resisting CPP-backed abuses, such as land-grabbing, have been increasingly subjected in recent years to groundless prosecutions, judicial investigations, and unfair trials leading to wrongful convictions and prison sentences, the U.S.-based Human Rights Watch said in a recent report.

Global graft watchdog Transparency International considers Cambodia one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

Political analyst Lao Mong Hay said the move to field Hun Many, who has been actively running the CPP-linked Voluntary Youth Movement, as an election candidate is aimed at creating a political dynasty, Agence France-Presse reported.

The analyst said that one of Hun Sen's sons could succeed him.

"For years, he has prepared his children to join in politics," he said.

Government spokesman Khieu Kanharith played down the speculation, saying the CPP was in "a state of rejuvenating its ranks after years of preparation".

Cheam Yeap, who is a member of the CPP's permanent committee, said the party has a new policy of fielding at least two younger candidates to run in each province for the national elections, according to the local The Cambodia Daily newspaper.

“These are the children of CPP leaders, they are really talented and hold at least a master’s degree,” said Yeap, whose son is also among the party's candidates in the elections.

Cheam Yeap also said that just 10 of CPP's 90 lawmakers have been ordered to retire. Not on the retirement list however are veteran parliamentarians Finance Minister Keat Chhon, 79, and Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, 77.

The CPP controls 90 of the 123 seats in the lower house of parliament after a landslide victory in 2008.

Opposition leader

The National Rescue Party, an opposition coalition formed in 2012, is gearing up to challenge the CPP but its leader, Sam Rainsy, is in exile and the government has threatened to jail him if he returns.

Sam Rainsy, who is living in France, was convicted of offenses linked to a protest over border demarcation with Vietnam in a case he says is politically motivated. He faces 12 years in prison.

But he is confident of returning to participate in the July elections, saying international pressure on Hun Sen over the vote's legitimacy if he cannot stand in elections could convince the authorities to allow him back to the country.

Sam Rainsy said that the opposition could give the CPP a run for its money following the recent merger between his erstwhile Sam Rainsy Party and another leading group, the Human Rights Party.

"Actually, as president of the Cambodia National Rescue Party representing the united democratic opposition, I am the only serious challenger to Mr. Hun Sen for premiership," Sam Rainsy said.

Reported by RFA's Khmer Service. Translated by Samean Yun. Written in English by Parameswaran Ponnudurai.

Feb 21, 2013

Google's First Ultrabook

Google's First Ultrabook: Chromebook Pixel is the first Chromebook designed by Google and the first premium Chromebook. Until now, Chromebooks used low-end CPUs, average displays and plastic chassis. Google decided to change all that and build "the best laptop possible" to inspire other manufacturers. It's like the first Nexus Chromebook.


But why is it called Pixel? It's the first Chromebook with a retina-like display, 3:2 aspect ratio and 2560x1700 resolution. Much like Apple's Retina MacBook Pro, Chromebook Pixel uses pixel doubling to make everything look sharp and crisp. The display has "the highest pixel density (239 pixels per inch) of any laptop screen on the market today" and it's a 12.85-inch IPS touchscreen with 400 nit brightness and 178° extra-wide viewing angles.


Pixel has an anodized aluminium body, glass touchpad, backlit keyboard, hidden vents, Intel i5 processor and 4GB of RAM. "The touchpad is made from etched glass, analyzed and honed using a laser microscope to ensure precise navigation. The Pixel also has powerful, full-range speakers for crisp sound, a 720p webcam for clear video, and a total of three microphones designed to cancel out surrounding noise," informs Google.

Google also includes 1TB of free Google Drive Storage for 3 years. You can also buy a special model with an integrated LTE modem for Verizon.

The Verge has some cool pictures. "There are subtle design touches throughout the machine that help add to the 'premium' feel that Google is going for. The fan vents out in the hinge, every edge is subtly bezeled to prevent sharp angles, the speakers are fairly loud despite being hidden underneath the keyboard, and Google even opted to not put labels next to the ports."

The downside is that Google's Chromebook is really expensive: $1300 (WiFi)/$1450 (WiFi+LTE). It's more expensive than Apple's MacBook Air and most ultrabooks. While it has a better display, Chrome OS is more limited than MacOS (or Windows) and it only became popular when Samsung and Acer started to offer $200-$250 Chromebooks. When you can buy tablets with high-resolution displays for $400 (Nexus 10) or $500 (iPad), the $1300 Chromebook Pixel feels out of place and overkill. After all, you can buy a Nexus 4, Nexus 7, Nexus 10 and a Samsung Chromebook for less than $1200. An ARM device would've been a lot cheaper, but less powerful.

"The Pixel will be available for purchase starting today on Google Play in the U.S. and U.K., and soon on BestBuy.com. The WiFi version ($1,299 U.S. and £1,049 U.K.) will start shipping next week and the LTE version ($1,449) will ship in the U.S. in April. If you're interested in a hands-on experience, you can visit select Best Buy (U.S.) and Currys PC World (U.K.) store locations."

Now Google has a good reason to open its own physical stores.

{ via Google Blog }

Google Drive's File Previews

Google Drive's File Previews: Google Drive has a new feature that lets you preview files using an interface borrowed from Google+. This feature is not restricted to photos and videos, it also works for Google Docs documents, presentations, spreadsheets, forms, drawings, Microsoft Office files, PDF, PostScript and XPS files and TrueType fonts.


It's interesting that Google Drive shows the new previews if you click a file that's not associated with a web application. For examples, the previews don't show up if you click a Google Docs document, so you need to right-click the file and select "Preview".


"When previewing a file, it's easy to flip through nearby files by clicking the arrows on the left and right sides of the preview window. This is a great way to scan through a group of photos you've stored in your Drive," explains Google. You can also use the left and right arrow keys to navigate to the other files and up/down arrow keys to scroll up/down in documents. While the previews don't let you edit documents, you can select text, zoom in or out, find text (Ctrl+F), print the documents or share them with other people.


The feature is currently rolled out, so you may not see it yet in your account. Check back later or sign in to a different Google account.

{ via Google Drive Blog }

Feb 20, 2013

KPK seizes four more of Djoko’s homes

KPK seizes four more of Djoko’s homes: The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has seized four more houses belonging to former National Traffic Police Corps (Korlantas) head Insp. Gen. Djoko Susilo in Jakarta and Depok, West Java.KPK ...

In Indonesia, religious blends only improve families - The Daily Star

In Indonesia, religious blends only improve families - The Daily Star:

In Indonesia, religious blends only improve families
The Daily Star
A new survey by the Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace identifies which Indonesian provinces have the most instances of religious intolerance, demonstrating that the issue is unfortunately a real problem in the country. However, I, as an ...

E. Kalimantan's population growth highest in Indonesia - Jakarta Post

E. Kalimantan's population growth highest in Indonesia - Jakarta Post:

Jakarta Post

E. Kalimantan's population growth highest in Indonesia
Jakarta Post
The population growth rate in East Kalimantan, home to about four million people, has reached an average of 3.8 percent each year - the highest in Indonesia - according to East Kalimantan Governor Awang Faroek Ishak on Wednesday. In comparison, the ...

AirAsia Launches First Sales Office in Eastern Indonesia - Jakarta Globe

AirAsia Launches First Sales Office in Eastern Indonesia - Jakarta Globe:

Jakarta Globe

AirAsia Launches First Sales Office in Eastern Indonesia
Jakarta Globe
“The inauguration of AirAsia Indonesia's sales office in the South Sulawesi capital is a follow-up of the company's decision to make Makassar a hub for eastern regions of Indonesia,” Dharmadi said in a press statement, according to Indonesian news ...

Latitudes.nu | Spoil yourself in these Luxury Hotels in Yogya | YOUR GATEWAY TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

Latitudes.nu | Spoil yourself in these Luxury Hotels in Yogya | YOUR GATEWAY TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

Big boys roll up sleeves to battle for Jakarta's monorail project

Big boys roll up sleeves to battle for Jakarta's monorail project: After being left idle for more than four years due to legal and financial woes, the Jakarta monorail project has unexpectedly attracted family conglomerations into vying for a piece of the action. A .....


Thai army chief visits Pattani

Thai army chief visits Pattani: Thailand's Army Commander in Chief Prayuth Chanocha on Wednesday travelled to Pattani in the country's south to to follow up operations against the insurgency in the area while intelligence informatio .....


VIDEO: Filipino workers speak of abuse

VIDEO: Filipino workers speak of abuse: Many people faced with limited job options and grinding poverty in the Philippines have decided to look for work overseas - but they risk being forced into slave labour.

Kuala Lumpur says no compromise

Kuala Lumpur says no compromise: Malaysian forces close in on Sulu sultan̢۪s followers


Indonesia's next president: A form guide

Indonesia's next president: A form guide:
Gary Hogan was the first foreigner to graduate from Indonesia's Institute of National Governance (Lemhannas) and was Australia's Defence Attaché to Indonesia from 2009 to 2012.
For over eight years, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has cut a large and impressive figure on the world stage. SBY's profile is Gorbachev-like. Regionally, he has restored his nation to pre-eminence. Globally, he has pursued an activist foreign policy in the UN and international forums like the G20. He has even been knighted by the Queen.

All of this has been good for Australia-Indonesia relations. But like Gorbachev, SBY's domestic standing has declined as steadily as his international stocks have risen, despite an impressive economic record. He is viewed widely among Indonesia's commentariat as a prevaricating leader who has difficulty controlling an ill-disciplined party and a factionalised cabinet. There is a gathering tide of opinion across the Indonesian electorate that a strong, almost authoritarian, leadership style will be needed to make good the reform slippages of the SBY decade.
Yudhoyono's role at its helm will end next year, when he will be ineligible to stand for a third term as president. As next-door neighbor and strategic partner, Australia needs now to start examining the form guide and following the smart money. Indonesia post-2014 is certain to be more problematic for us than the SBY years as we seek to negotiate a closer and more prosperous relationship with the world's fourth largest country and largest Muslim nation.
While the field is by no means final, a clearer picture of the front runners for next year's election is starting to emerge.
Retired military officers are as prominent as always, including the president's brother-in-law (who currently heads the Indonesian Army) and a senior cabinet minister. Yudhoyono is himself a former general. A 2011 poll by Indonesia’s largest national newspaper, Kompas, concluded that most Indonesians of lesser education (the vast majority of voters) wanted a president with a military background.
As they did in 2009, former president Megawati and former vice president Jusuf Kalla are likely to chance their arm. Kalla is more fancied than his party's official nominee, businessman Aburizal Bakrie. The power of money politics notwithstanding, most pundits consider Bakrie unelectable due to his poor public image. Kalla, with no Javanese bloodline, would need to buck a trend of elected presidents coming from Indonesia's most populous island. Not unthinkable, but akin to winning the US presidency without carrying the Midwest.
Dark horses are always possible in Indonesia's volatile political scene and may yet emerge. Like Joko Widodo, the unassuming populist mayor of Solo in Central Java, the 18th century seat of the Mataram Kingdom, who was last year swept into office as governor of Indonesia’s ten million-strong mega city, Jakarta.
Among the various candidates, Australia should pay careful heed to the fortunes of former general and renowned strongman Prabowo Subianto (pictured), who is shaping up early in the election campaign as a reasonable each-way bet. The son of a prominent finance and trade minister who spent his formative years abroad, Prabowo graduated from Indonesia's military academy the year after SBY. He then married one of the daughters of Indonesia's autocratic leader, General Suharto, and gained notoriety for his actions in East Timor, Papua and Jakarta in the final days of his father-in-law's regime.
As a presidential candidate, Prabowo fits the bill on a number of levels. He was Megawati's running mate in her unsuccessful 2009 campaign, and he will have learned much from that. His reputation feeds the belief that Indonesia needs a return to assertive leadership, while his association with the former first family strikes a chord among the cross section of Indonesians who feel let down by democracy and who harbour a genuine nostalgia for the Suharto era.
Those who know Prabowo say he has more faces than Sybil. One is never sure which Prabowo is on show, from charming and urbane to raving and irrational. His reputation as a hothead is infamous. He once burst into the presidential palace demanding to see President Habibie, brandishing a firearm. When he was drummed out of the army for exceeding his authority, Prabowo sent himself into exile in Jordan, where he was guest of his close friend, fellow military man King Abdullah.
The Prabowo spin, from prime-time TV commercials to billboards in all major cities, is pure Mad Men. His billionaire elder brother, who bankrolled his 2009 tilt with Megawati, has engaged a prominent New York advertising agency to refine and project the Prabowo image for Election 2014. While rumors surround the state of his health, the 62-year-old Prabowo has a strong public presence, whether indulging his passion for polo or supporting members of his Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party, attired in the conservative garb of a devout Muslim.  One handicap in a conservative country is that he is single, having long since divorced Suharto's daughter.
Internationally, Prabowo carries an odious legacy because of his association with the Suharto regime and allegations of human rights abuses. He is currently banned from entering the US. Prabowo has tried to address his poor reputation with foreigners by portraying a kinder, gentler face to the world, as he did last August in a landmark speech to a distinguished gathering in Singapore. It is no accident Prabowo spoke in Singapore when he wanted to reach an international audience. It would be easy for a country like Singapore, whose pretensions to democracy are at best dubious, to engage with Prabowo were he to occupy the presidential palace next year.
It would be less easy for Australia. We would need to put hard-nosed self-interest ahead of certain principles before candidate Prabowo could address a similar forum here. General Prabowo's human rights record would make it difficult for him to tread on Australian soil without first addressing some serious questions. In one sense, this is ironic. Prabowo would be the most Westernised leader Indonesia has ever had.
Like Australia, Indonesia adjoins both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It also lies across a key international trade route. As the US shifts its strategic weight toward Asia, using Australia as a fulcrum, Indonesia is already key to its wider global interests. Should the Prabowo campaign gather momentum in coming months, watch the welcome mat get rolled out in Washington to receive him. In the Asian century, we need also to be realistic about how we relate to the behemoth off our northwest shelf. Never again should we allow relations with Indonesia to be defined by a single issue, as they were over East Timor.
It is quite possible that the next president of the Republic of Indonesia will be someone we instinctively recoil from. With the countdown to the election already underway, Australians should work out sooner rather than later where our national interests lie, and how we might position ourselves to achieve them.           
Don't get me wrong. A democratic Indonesia is a good thing that has transformed the art of the diplomatically possible between our countries. Gone are the negative aspects of Suharto's plutocracy. But gone, too, are its positive aspects, like the strategic certainty that came with the knowledge Indonesia would be led by an internationally-moderate and generally pro-Western leader, which is what Suharto undeniably was, for all his other faults.
Democracies have a habit, from time to time, of delivering unexpected, even unpalatable results. We will no doubt respect the choice Indonesians make next year. But we should anticipate a leader who will not make things as easy for us as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono did for ten years. Which is why we need to get smarter about managing the relationship, refusing to let sideshows like the 2011 live cattle imbroglio damage or distract from our broader narrative with Indonesia.
One thing is for certain. Life after SBY will prove more, not less, challenging for our bilateral relationship.
Photo courtesy of Wikipedia.

Aliens in the land – Indian migrant workers in Malaysia (part 1)

Aliens in the land – Indian migrant workers in Malaysia (part 1):
HINDRAF Rally 2007
In the past 130 years, the number of foreign migrant workers in Malaya has grown from about 84,000 in 1880 to more than three million in 2010. Originally, foreign workers were predominantly from China and India and most were locked into semi-permanent “labour circulation” arrangements through their employment contracts. Currently, foreign workers originate from a range of South and Southeast Asian countries, and Indonesians dominate labour flows. These workers migrate to Malaysia because they and their governments believe that temporary labour migration is a pathway to development. Predictably, most have also become trapped in circulating contract labour regimes. The debate on the developmental impacts of migration meanwhile continues to exclude discussion on the risks involved and the longer-term consequences of temporary migration. There is no conversation either on integration of earlier cohorts of migrant workers in society, let alone recent migrant workers who are increasingly referred to as aliens. The outlook is particularly gloomy for Malaysia’s marginalised South Indian plantation workers who became “orphans of empire” when hardliners in the ruling United Malays National Organisation legislated to deny them citizenship rights.
Commodities of empire and migrant labour, 1880s – 1970s
Britain’s ‘forward movement’ in Malaya after the 1870s resulted in the country’s greater integration into the international economy and facilitated the production of mineral and agricultural commodities. Concurrently, labour migration became a fundamental component of Malaya’s economic growth model and related social structures. Malaya’s main’s commodity exports were tin, coffee and sugar. Chinese entrepreneurs monopolised tin production, recruiting workers from China for their mines. European planters were chiefly involved in coffee and sugar cultivation and they relied on indentured labour from India for their enterprises. In the early 20th century, the planters switched to rubber and it subsequently became the main agricultural commodity. However, they lacked the capital to establish large properties and British trading (agency) houses in Singapore consequently played a vital role in bringing together planters and overseas financial interests (mainly in Britain), to convert the estates into joint-stock companies through flotation on the stock market in London. The 1909-10 rubber boom led to further changes and the proprietary estates largely disappeared, with their former owners often taking up shares in the new corporate entities as part of the sale price. These events foreshadowed major changes in the industry since rubber production necessitated the development of a distinctive agricultural ‘complex’ with inter-connected operations and a particular cultural milieu. Moreover, the development of the rubber industry reinforced the connections between Indian labour mobility and capital and both the Indian and Malayan colonial administrations strategically planned and organised Indian labour migration to Malaya.
The plantation production system effectively established the Indian workers’ subsequent employment circumstances and contributed to their marginalisation in Malaysia. The plantation system has since continued into the 21st century and has been adapted for oil palm production. Analogous to colonial frameworks, the Malaysian government and labour-sending states presently organise inter-state labour mobility. Additionally, since the 1980s Indonesian and Bangladeshi migrant workers have mostly replaced the former Indian workforce on plantations. These new migrant workers face a similar marginalisation progression. This paper compares past and present plantation labour regimes in Malaysia and frames the subject in the broader context of the plantation complex to suggest the larger, wider significance of the plantation management system and its institutional frameworks.
Indian workers and rubber    
The rubber production system that was developed in Malaya was centred on cultivation of a single crop– rubber; an imported workforce mainly from India; and capital for the enterprise came from Britain, the United States and Europe. By 1910, rubber plantations covered approximately 225 000 hectares, rising to 891 000 hectares in 1921. This accounted for 53 per cent of the total land under rubber in South and Southeast Asia; and Malayan rubber exports also rose from 6500 to 204 000 tonnes between 1910 and 1919. As stated previously, rubber cultivation necessitated recruitment of a large, cheap and “disciplined” workforce that had be settled and organised to work under pioneering conditions in the country. British India with its teeming poverty-stricken millions and caste-ridden society was the preferred provider for this labour. The state and planters (as employers) essentially regarded the Indian labourer headed for Malaya as another tradable commodity in the production cycle. All the essential arrangements for his sojourn abroad – recruitment, transport and employment – were made by four parties: the sub-imperial Indian Government (or India Office); the Colonial Office in London; the Malayan (Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States) Government; and the employers. Since most Indian emigrants lacked the funds for spontaneous mass migration, Indian labour recruitment was managed by the India Office and sponsored by the Malayan administration. Governance arrangements for the plantation labour regime rested on two pillars – the mobilisation of a largely migrant labour force that facilitated the use of economic and extra-economic measures to maintain low wage bills; and an ethnic (and gender) differentiation of the labour force that enabled the manipulation of both workers and wages.
Private labour brokers/intermediaries were entrusted with the important task of facilitating and driving labour migration under the auspices of two recruitment methods – the indenture system and its variant, the kangani system. The indenture recruitment method authorised employers to utilise enforceable, written labour contracts. Malayan planters either engaged the services of one of the labour recruitment firms in Nagapattinam or Madras, or sent their own agents to south India to recruit labourers directly. The agents advanced money to individuals wanting to migrate to Malaya, the advance being conditional on the intending migrants signing a contract on arrival in the country. The migrants were then considered to be under indenture to their employers for a fixed period, varying from three to five years (reduced to three years after 1904). Subsequently, rubber planters started utilising their trusted workers as labour brokers to recruit Indian labour, thus introducing a chain migration outcome based on specific recruitment areas in south India. This system, known as the kangani recruitment system, was primarily a personal or informal recruitment system and it became the preferred recruitment method after 1910. The kangani also provided the vital connection between poverty stricken rural south India and the frontier regions of Malaya, and enabled Indian migration to take place. Moreover, planters favoured this method since the prospect of workers absconding became less likely, especially since the kangani had a vested interest in ensuring that the labourers did not abscond.
Growing demand for labour and the Colonial Administration’s own labour needs for public works projects led to a turning point in Indian labour recruitment in 1907. The Malayan Administration approved the Tamil Immigration Fund Ordinance 1907, establishing an Indian Immigration Committee (IIC) to manage a fund, later known as the Tamil Immigration Fund. This legislation was important for three reasons. First the British established a state-controlled structure to handle the mass recruitment of “free” South Indian labour. Second, the Tamil Immigration Fund (renamed the Indian Immigration Fund in 1910) was set up to provide free passage for Indian labourers intending to come to Malaya. The recruiting of workers for plantations continued to be undertaken by licensed kangani with the approval of individual planters. Third, all employers of Indian labour were charged a quarterly charge to cover the travel and related costs of Indian labour immigrants to Malaya. The levy was based on each “man-day” worked and amounted to about M$ 29.39 per head in 1912. The IIC was authorised to manage the movement of assisted labour migrants to Malaya by monitoring the number of recruiting licenses given to the kangani and also the recruiting allowance or subsidy to migrants. Crucially, this legislation resulted in Indian labour migration evolving into two distinct categories, namely recruited and non-recruited migrants. Henceforth, whether migrants were recruited under the kangani system or arrived independently, they were considered “free” migrants.
These transformations represented a major policy change, i.e. a move away from labour circulation to a permanently settled Indian labour force on plantations. Consequently, Indian workers recruited under the auspices of the Fund were subsequently either confined to plantations or government public projects in emerging townships. Furthermore, although workers arrived in Malaya without any debt obligations, they continued to be considered under contract to plantation owners and under the supervision of the kangani. The government also upheld penal sanctions for breaches of labour contracts. These penal provisions were only abolished in the Malayan Labour Codes of 1921 and 1923. Plantation production was also organised on military industrial lines and about 1,000 workers were employed on one plantation. In the early 1920s the colonial government implemented reforms that had broad implications for subsequent Indian welfare and the Indian sex ratio in Malaya. These changes were incorporated in the 1923 Labour Code. The Malayan government endorsed two main codes: a standard wage and an improved sex ratio on the plantations, in accordance with earlier Emigration Acts. Wages were sufficient to induce migrants to migrate to Malaya and were not revised upwards when rubber prices rose. Thus the plantation wage structure continued to be a productivity-linked wage scheme. Consequently, an Indian worker’s income, despite incorporating the concept of a standard (maintenance) wage, was based on the number of days worked. Employment was also tied to the price of rubber.
This is Part 1 of a two part series revisiting the history of Indian migrant workers in then Malaya, now citizens of Malaysia and exploring the possible reasons for the continued backwardness of a significant number of them. Amarjit Kaur, is Professor of Economic History at the University of New England. Her research interests include Southeast Asian Labour history, Indian labour migration and the Indian diaspora, and governance of international labour migration in Southeast Asia. Part 2 appears tomorrow. 

ICG - Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn - International Crisis Group

Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn - International Crisis Group

Violations of the law by both the State and CPD-RDTL dissidents in Manufahi | East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin

Violations of the law by both the State and CPD-RDTL dissidents in Manufahi | East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin

Ditch the PDF headaches: Three safer, speedier Adobe Reader alternatives | PCWorld

Ditch the PDF headaches: Three safer, speedier Adobe Reader alternatives | PCWorld

View Point: Pakistan: A nation cursed, a nation blessed | The Jakarta Post

View Point: Pakistan: A nation cursed, a nation blessed | The Jakarta Post

Feb 19, 2013

Indonesia's Bill on Mass Organizations Raises Concerns - the Diplomat

Indonesia's Bill on Mass Organizations Raises Concerns - the Diplomat:

Indonesia's Bill on Mass Organizations Raises Concerns
the Diplomat
The Indonesian parliament is set to approve a bill that would amend the law governing mass organizations. Human rights groups and experts have warned against the repressive provisions of the new legislation. The latest draft requires mass organizations ...

and more »

Stunning reversal? Why 'big paper' just went green in Indonesia. - Christian Science Monitor

Stunning reversal? Why 'big paper' just went green in Indonesia. - Christian Science Monitor:

Christian Science Monitor

Stunning reversal? Why 'big paper' just went green in Indonesia.
Christian Science Monitor
It's all around you, all the time. Tidily rolled up next to the toilet when you wake up in the morning, handed to you at the corner cafe with your morning coffee, all over your desk at work, and surrounding much of the food you buy at the grocery store ...

and more »

‘Anis and Anas’: A controversial tale of two parties

‘Anis and Anas’: A controversial tale of two parties: The Year of the Snake has begun with what seems to be bad omens for two leading Indonesian political parties. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Democratic Party (PD) have attempted to ...

N. Sumatra gov hopefuls kick off campaigns

N. Sumatra gov hopefuls kick off campaigns: Five candidate pairs contesting the upcoming North Sumatra gubernatorial election revealed their missions and visions in a special plenary meeting at the provincial legislative council (DPRD) as the ...

Future of Indonesia depends on new curriculum: Minister

Future of Indonesia depends on new curriculum: Minister: Education and Culture Minister Mohammad Nuh says that the ministry will go ahead with its plan to implement the new national curriculum in July this year, despite mounting criticism from teachers and ...

Obituary: Former TNI commander Feisal Tanjung dies at 73

Obituary: Former TNI commander Feisal Tanjung dies at 73: Former Indonesian Military (TNI) commander and coordinating political and security minister Gen. (ret.) Feisal Tanjung died on Monday morning at the Siloam Hospital in Jakarta, having been ill with ...

Political parties: In desperate need of leadership and strategy

Political parties: In desperate need of leadership and strategy: The transformation of this nation as a whole cannot be separated from the governance of political parties. It is no secret that in Indonesia, proximity to those who are in power is the predominant ...

Landslides, floods kill 17 in Manado

Landslides, floods kill 17 in Manado: Hardship: Residents whose houses were badly damaged by flooding on Sunday wash their cooking utensils in the river running through their neighborhood in Manado, North Sulawesi, on Monday. Floods and ...

A healthcare revolution in the regions

A healthcare revolution in the regions:

Regional governments around Indonesia are devising new and ambitious free healthcare schemes for their electorates, but to what end?

Edward Aspinall and Eve Warburton

warburton1‘Improve the free medical service for a glorious South Sumatra’: having lost in Jakarta, Alex Noerdin is running for re-election this year in his home province, relying heavily on his healthcare program - Edward Aspinall
Over the past decade, Indonesia has witnessed an explosion of local health insurance programs, or Jamkesda (Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah). The nature and scope of these schemes vary greatly from region to region, but most involve a district or provincial government subsidising basic medical services for residents. Sometimes the services are provided free to all residents, more commonly just for the poorest. While accurate data is hard to obtain, the World Bank recently estimated a rise from some 60 district insurance schemes in 2008 to over 300 in 2010. This means that a majority of Indonesia’s districts have such local schemes in operation, and the number keeps growing. What accounts for this sudden spike over such short period?
The surge in local healthcare programs is directly related to democratisation and local electoral politics. Populist campaigns have become a prominent feature of Indonesia’s regional elections, as candidates promise free social services, like healthcare or education, in a bid to appeal to voters. The new political salience of healthcare at the local level (and at the national level too) amounts to a near revolution in the way politicians engage with their electorates.
Since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, people in Indonesia have become used to accounts of oligarchic politicians who manipulate legal processes and use the power of money to gain power at the local level. The spread of local healthcare schemes shows there is more to the story. Politicians are realising that their electorates want better social welfare and public services, and many are trying to respond. However, the impact so far on healthcare standards and indicators has, sadly, been far from revolutionary.

A history of healthcare

Local governments first began delivering health insurance back in 2003 when Megawati Soekarnoputri’s government introduced the Health Service Insurance for Poor Families program, or JPK-Gakin. The idea was for district administrations to implement their own community health insurance schemes in line with local needs. However, few programs ever really got off the ground before Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s new government introduced a bill that laid the foundation for a nation-wide program and made JPK-Gakin redundant, Law no. 40/2004 on a National Social Security System (SJSN). At the same time, Yudhoyono’s government introduced a program to provide free, but rather basic, healthcare to the poor - Askeskin (heath insurance for the poor), which was replaced in 2008 by Jamkesmas (community health insurance).
Some regional administrations put up a fight. In 2005, East Java’s government spearheaded a challenge at the Constitutional Court claiming that SJSN gave the central government a monopoly on social service provision and contravened the constitution and Law no. 32/2004 on Regional Governance. The court agreed that SJSN did not prevent local governments from developing their own social security programs, including for healthcare. Since then, the number of local health insurance programs has multiplied year on year.
One of the pioneering schemes was Jaminan Kesehatan Jembrana (JKJ) introduced in 2003 by Gede Winasa, the head of Jembrana district in Bali. Under this scheme, all members of JKJ, whether poor or non-poor, get free primary care from public and private providers. Residents identified as poor get secondary and tertiary care as well. Funding comes primarily from the district budget, with some central and provincial government subsidies. Winasa had previous experience in the health sector, both as a dentist and as a health bureaucrat, and he was widely praised for his vision and effective leadership by the media. It seems that many politicians around the country looked at the good publicity he received, and his popularity with voters, and free healthcare schemes began to spread like wildfire.
Most Jamkesda programs offer basic care at community health centres (puskesmas), and usually just for the poor who aren’t covered by other programs, like the national scheme Jamkesmas. But in resource-rich regions like Aceh, healthcare programs are far more generous. In 2009 Aceh’s then Governor, Irwandi Yusuf, introduced the Jaminan Kesehatan Aceh program. Like the scheme in Jembrana, JKA offers universal coverage for all residents of Aceh, and it caused a dramatic spike in the uptake of health services with the result that some local hospitals have struggled to cope ever since.
JKA also covers virtually all ailments and patients with complicated conditions can be flown to hospitals in Jakarta to receive treatment. Costs are so far about Rp. 400 billion (US$41 million) per year. Officials on the border of Aceh report that people are crossing over from North Sumatra to obtain Aceh identity cards that will allow them to access free healthcare. The funding for JKA comes from ‘special autonomy funds’ paid by the central government as a result of the 2005 peace deal that ended the separatist insurgency in Aceh.
Even in the poorer regions of Indonesia, local administrations feel compelled to offer some kind of free or heavily subsidised health service. In Kupang, the capital city of one of Indonesia’s poorest provinces, East Nusa Tenggara, the government introduced an insurance program that offered free basic care at public hospitals to residents not covered by alternative schemes, like Jamkesmas. Meanwhile in Central Lombok, rather than providing basic healthcare coverage, the district head promised an even narrower program that offered free maternal heath services to pregnant women.

Driven by politics

Local free healthcare schemes mostly have their origins in elections. Over the last five years or so, candidates competing for local office right across the country have made promises of free healthcare and other services in a bid to mobilise support. The model is so widespread that most local politicians see it as a basic ingredient of a winning campaign nowadays. Some of the politicians offering these schemes, like Gede Winasa, have reputations as reformers, but many of them are machine politicians and oligarchs of the traditional sort.
warburton2Local politicians have to be seen to care about healthcare: the former head of Bireuen district in Aceh, Nurdin Abdul Rahman, talking to journalists at the district’s main public hospital, Edward Aspinall
Alex Noerdin, the Golkar-affiliated governor of South Sumatra, for example, has made healthcare a central component of all his recent political bids. As the head of the resource rich district of Musi Banyuwasin in South Sumatra, Noerdin fulfilled his campaign promise to provide free healthcare to all residents in 2006. Noerdin then capitalised on this success and made free healthcare a cornerstone of his bid for South Sumatra Governor in 2008. Once elected, Noerdin introduced Jamsoskes Semesta, an insurance program that provides all South Sumatran residents access to free health services at government hospitals and community health centres.
In 2012, Noerdin ran in Jakarta’s gubernatorial election and adopted the same approach. According to the media, his campaign team was even given material incentives (cash, trips to Mecca, motorbikes) to sign up Jakarta residents to an insurance plan offering free healthcare. Membership would kick in following Noerdin’s victory. This time it wasn’t enough, and Noerdin didn’t win the governorship. But the successful candidate, Joko Widodo (‘Jokowi’), made his own healthcare promise – the ‘Healthy Jakarta Card’ offers Jakarta residents free care at puskesmas and class III hospitals all over the city. Jokowi promised a significant improvement on the Jamkesda program introduced by the previous governor, Fauzi Bowo, earlier in 2012. Fauzi’s scheme only offered free care to poor residents at a limited number of hospitals. Jokowi’s new program is open to all Jakartans and is expected to cover around 4.7 million residents by the end of 2013.
The Jakarta election is a good example of the dynamic now in play through regional Indonesia. Many local elections have become virtual bidding wars, in which rival politicians offer ever more generous health insurance schemes (alongside other campaign promises and inducements) to entice voters. Alex Noerdin, after losing in Jakarta has returned to South Sumatra where in 2013 he will stand for re-election as governor, again relying in large part on his record or healthcare policy reform. Rather than running to other issues, his rivals point out the deficiencies in Alex’s scheme, and are promising even more generous coverage.

False promises?

Yet for all the various healthcare initiatives that have emerged at district and provincial levels, the overall picture is one of deteriorating health indicators and services across the country. A 2008 World Health Organization report found that decentralisation has led to the erosion of a once unified health system, seriously undermining the quality of disease surveillance and public health programs. Diseases like polio and leprosy, once under control, are reemerging and the districts are not able to address these or other complex diseases like avian influenza (see Scott Naysmith’s article in this edition).
Health experts are sceptical of local programs that are introduced by district officials with little knowledge or experience in the health sector. The fact that many schemes are designed primarily to attract votes often means that they do not meet the community’s complex health needs. And some regions are struggling to cope with the costs. In East Java, where the government once agitated for regional administrations’ right to implement local programs, healthcare services are overwhelmed and underfunded. In 2010, the program was badly in debt, with a budget allocation of just Rp50 billion (a little over $US 5 million) and costs totalling Rp112 billion. This kind of blow-out is not uncommon. Often it happens because poor health infrastructure cannot deal with the sudden spike in demand that comes once services are offered for free. Sometimes the problem comes when officials incorrectly (and often corruptly) identify residents as ‘poor’ and thus eligible for free services, leading to overburdening of the system.
In fact, health insurance may soon no longer be the vote getter that regional politicians have come to rely on. In 2012 the national parliament passed the bill on Social Security Administering Bodies (BPJS), bringing important parts of SJSN into effect. The new bill basically recentralises social security administration and makes one non-profit body responsible for implementing a nation-wide health insurance program for all Indonesians, including the poor and those working in the informal sector. In theory, all the local programs will now be folded into this nationwide scheme. The tentative beginnings of universal social protection, even of an Indonesian welfare state, are now visible.
To be sure, Indonesia’s system of public health is beset by deep problems, many of them made worse by the policy incoherence that has come with political democratisation and decentralisation (see Elizabeth Pisani’s article in this edition for a catalogue of some of the worst problems). In the regions, ordinary people still bemoan the quality of the healthcare they can get in the public system, and people who can afford it will go to private providers or even overseas. But in many places, too, it’s now easy to find people who speak with amazement and delight at the fact that they or family members have been treated for serious complaints without paying a thing. Politics is leading the way in opening up a system of comprehensive and free healthcare coverage. It might just end up leading to the delivery of better quality and more effective healthcare services too.
Edward Aspinall (edward.aspinall@anu.edu.au) researches Indonesian politics at Australian National University and is an editor of Inside Indonesia. Eve Warburton (evewarburton@gmail.com) is a research assistant at the Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University, and administrator of the Sydney Southeast Asia Centre, University of Sydney.


Inside Indonesia 111: Jan-Mar 2013

Traveling for a cure

Traveling for a cure:

Rebuilding trust in doctors will be an important part of Aceh’s post-conflict recovery

Catherine Smith

smithCome on over! Acehnese have many reasons to be tempted by Malaysia’s health system - Aceh Magazine
The term ‘medical tourism’ often invokes images of wealthy elites travelling to poorer countries to obtain cheap health care with a holiday to boot. The past decade has seen a boom in medical travel in many parts of the world. Some of Indonesia’s neighbours – such as Malaysia – now actively advertise themselves as medical tourism destinations. Far from catering solely to the wealthy, it has become increasingly clear in recent years that large numbers of poor and lower-middle class people also choose to cross a border to obtain health care.
There are a variety of factors motivating people to make what sometimes seems a surprising choice to travel abroad while ill. Some people seek more affordable health care, others need specialised medical care that is hard to access in their home country, while others choose destinations with shorter wait times or better post-operative support. In all of these situations people recognise the limitations of their own health care systems and make an active choice to travel to a place that can best address their own particular needs and preferences. In many ways, medical travel can be seen as a positive element of globalisation. Cheaper airfares and more porous borders mean that people are able to overcome the limitations of their home country’s health care systems by seeking health care abroad.
However, something that is not yet well understood is the way in which medical tourism affects the health care systems in the home countries of these travelling patients. In particular, how is public confidence in a health care system affected when large numbers of citizens find themselves unable to access quality health care in their own countries and instead are forced to travel abroad? This is a particularly important point to consider when, as in Aceh, medical travel is motivated by a deep-seated discontent and, in some cases, fear of local doctors.
In the post-conflict period, large numbers of Acehnese regularly travel to clinics in Penang and Kuala Lumpur. The close proximity of Malaysia to Aceh, and the rise of budget airlines, makes this travel easy for middle class Acehnese, while many poor Acehnese pool resources so that they can make the trip. Malaysian clinics actively promote this travel, offering relatively affordable and easy to purchase prepaid travel and health care. Many Acehnese people have friends and family living in Malaysia, which also helps.
Many Acehnese believe that Malaysian clinics are more modern, less bureaucratic and the staff friendlier and better skilled than their Indonesian counterparts. Some people travel to Malaysia to manage chronic conditions such as diabetes, while others have checkups to screen for cancer and other diseases that they fear local doctors might have overlooked. Many seek second opinions for persistent health problems that have not responded to treatment in Aceh. What is perhaps of most concern is that many Acehnese seek health care in Malaysia because they do not trust in the ability or the integrity of Acehnese doctors and state-run clinics.

Medicine, health and violence in Aceh

Seven years have passed since the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a peace agreement with the government of Indonesia, bringing an end to almost 30 years of brutal violent conflict. Although many positive changes have occurred in Aceh since the resolution of the conflict, there is much work to be done before Acehnese people fully trust the state. During the conflict (1976-2005) many Acehnese endured extreme forms of violence, including torture, beatings, arson attacks, frequent interrogation and public humiliation. Aceh is also one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia and conflict survivors often emphasise the economic burdens that the conflict added to their already difficult lives.
Through my research with Acehnese conflict survivors, I heard many stories of people avoiding health care out of fear, while others told me that during the conflict years they were refused medical treatment for dubious reasons or no reason at all. I interviewed many people with scars from conflict-related injuries and many told me that they are afraid of revealing these scars to their doctors. For people whose bodies bear physical marks from the conflict, clinical examinations can be traumatic. Many conflict survivors recall loved ones dying during the conflict, not from fighting itself, but because they were unable to access medical care to assist with emergencies such as stroke or complications during childbirth. This memory of loved ones who died due to lack of medical care is fresh in the memory of many Acehnese.
Even after the conflict is resolved many continue to doubt that their doctors have the skills or the will to successfully treat their patients. It is common to hear people question whether local doctors are sufficiently trained. For instance one woman explained to me that endemic corruption meant that she doubted whether a university degree really gives her doctor the skills to practice medicine. ‘The Indonesian government is the most corrupt government in the world’, she protested to me, ‘Can you imagine allowing them to cut open your body?!’
Sadly, many people told me that they doubted whether doctors had good will in their interactions with their patients. I frequently heard people express a fear of dying at the hands of incompetent physicians. Stories of being misdiagnosed, receiving incorrect pharmaceuticals or being unable to access diagnostic technology are common. This becomes complicated again when Acehnese make the short trip to Malaysia and encounter more sympathetic doctors, receive different diagnoses, and access treatment that they perceive to be more modern and of higher quality. Both negative experiences within Aceh and positive experiences in Malaysia contribute to the phenomenon of post-conflict medical travel, and to the widespread criticisms of Acehnese doctors.
Although these public criticisms target doctors in particular, they also indicate broader structural shortcomings in the Indonesian health care system that affect many other Indonesians. While there have been significant increases in the health budget over the past decade, the World Bank reports that Indonesia has a shortage of doctors and continues to lag behind many of its neighbours on a number of health indicators. A new hospital was built in Banda Aceh after the Indian Ocean tsunami, but there continues to be a shortage of doctors, and Aceh’s predominately rural population relies heavily on nurses and midwives for primary health care. Within Banda Aceh too, it is common to hear people complaining of being unable to access diagnostic technology, so that travel to Malaysia becomes necessary. There is also a common perception that the pharmaceuticals circulating within Indonesia are outdated, poor quality or counterfeit and essentially ineffective.
The structural problems with the Indonesian health care system are, of course, concerning in themselves. These health inequalities are also apparent to ordinary Acehnese people, many of whom recognise that some of the illnesses that are common in Aceh are easier to diagnose or cure in places with better health care systems. For example, Acehnese know that Malaysians are more likely to be able to access technology to have an earlier diagnosis of cancer. When they return from Malaysia and tell others of their encounters with ‘friendly’ and ‘intelligent’ Malaysian doctors, Acehnese depict the disparities between the Indonesian and the Malaysian health care systems as a form of injustice. As medical travel becomes more accessible to poor and middle-class Indonesians, the regional health disparities that have long been noted in statistical reports are becoming increasingly apparent to ordinary people.

The practical and symbolic importance of doctors

The practice of Acehnese medical travel to Malaysia reveals problems in the Indonesian health care system that are not readily apparent through health statistics alone. The bottom line is that many Acehnese people simply do not trust their doctors. While it is important to continue developing health infrastructure, it is vital not to underestimate the importance of rebuilding public confidence in the health care system. People’s health suffers greatly when state institutions become a focal point of fear. This is most evident in situations where people delay seeking health care because they have lost faith in the credibility of doctors.
While medical travel to Malaysia enables many Acehnese to access much needed health care, it also provides a dramatic contrast to the Indonesian health care system, sets the benchmark for desirable health care at a very high level and reinforces this public criticism of doctors. Medical travel is a good option for Acehnese seeking health care, at least for those who can afford it. However it is no substitute for building an efficacious and trusted health care system accessible to all local people who need it.
Catherine Smith (cat.catherinesmith@gmail.com) is a medical anthropologist researching trauma and healing in Aceh.


Inside Indonesia 111: Jan-Mar 2013