Bangalore brings India’s startup ecosystem into the limelight, but how exactly is it faring?

Bangalore brings India’s startup ecosystem into the limelight, but how exactly is it faring?:
In the world of technology, it is possible to have centers of innovation outside of Silicon Valley. Shocking, right? We’re not talking about just Boulder, Austin, Los Angeles, or even New York City. Think more globally like Tel Aviv, London, Berlin, Toronto, and Sao Paulo. Another country that is emerging on the world stage as a place investors, entrepreneurs, and technologists should pay attention to is India.

Top 20 city in the Global Startup Ecosystem Index

In a country of approximately 1.2 billion people, there are at least two notable places where startups seem to be emerging: Delhi and Bangalore. It is the latter city that made it onto the Startup Genome’s Global Startup Index in 2012.

Bangalore may not have the same pizazz for startups compared to, say Silicon Valley, but it should not be discounted because of it. The city, and even India itself, has shown itself as having potential for a budding ecosystem. The Startup Genome Project says that while India might be one of the toughest countries in the world for a startup to flourish, by having one of the biggest global markets, it sets a foundation in which a startup scene could prosper. Additionally, another core strength of the country is the talent available — as the report says, Indian entrepreneurs are well-educated and highly skilled.
The problem? According to the report, it’s the support structure from the local cities, like Bangalore, that are needed in order to foster that growth. As Sswati Prasad, a New Delhi-based freelance journalist, says in the report:

While opportunities are there, India lacks the right startup ecosystem. It is noted that except for some top business schools in the country, most educational institutions do not help students to become entrepreneurs.

If you have a chance to read about the Startup Genome Project report, it offers some fascinating findings about Bangalore:

• Bangalore startups are 24 percent more likely to monetize directly than Silicon Valley startups.
• There is similar motivation in Bangalore to Silicon Valley: 56 percent of entrepreneurs in Bangalore are motivated by building a great product, and 30 percent are motivated by trying to change the world. In Bangalore, entrepreneurs do not seek to change or clone already proven business models.
• There is an overall funding gap, with 74 percent less funding raised in Bangalore compared to Silicon Valley.
• Bangalore startups are 67 percent more likely to tackle smaller markets than their peers in Silicon Valley. They are 10 percent less likely to tackle markets sized $1 to $10 billion, and 51 percent less likely to tackle markets greater than $10 billion.
• Bangalore has a low rate of technology adoption: Bangalore engineers heavily rely on PHP and Java, and much less on Ruby and Python compared to their peers in Silicon Valley.

Bangalore: The Startup Capital of India?

In collaboration with Unstoppable India’s founder Vlad Dubovskiy and Shashi Kiran, the city is supporting an upcoming technology showcase called Startup Festival India. This four-day event is said to be a way to celebrate Bangalore’s rise as India’s “Startup Capital”. According to Dubovskiy, this festival was formed “out of fire in an entrepreneurial heart.” He says the organizers have a desire to reshape the city with entrepreneurship at the heart of the city’s future.
In a 2012 YourStory Research survey called the “State of the Start Up“, it found that in India, 34.78 percent of companies felt Bangalore was the place to begin. The second one was Mumbai with 20.90 percent. The groundwork for the city to become a bastion of tech for the country was laid when it accounted for 35 percent of India’s 1 million IT professionals.
To recognize this trend and to help jumpstart innovation and transform the city into a technological powerhouse that could rival any other hub around the world, Startup Festival India aims to be inclusive to everyone — entrepreneurs, early stage startups, investors, or ordinary citizens.
TiE Bangalore, a chapter of the non-profit global network of entrepreneurs and professionals, believes that such a festival will serve as “a platform for aspiring and established entrepreneurs alike to more effectively engage and exchange with the larger entrepreneurial ecosystem here in the city.”

This event is not just your ordinary technology conference. It says that it will include a variety of activities too, including morning workout sessions, plenary sessions, a startup crawl featuring 50 Bangalore-based startups, and parties.
When we spoke with Dubovskiy, he said the format was inspired by how entrepreneurship is not a career choice, but rather a lifestyle. Startup Festival India, he says, is intended to help attendees experience what startup founders go through every day in a city like Bangalore. In the end, the belief is that this will help to grow the community in the city and get people to break away from their insular groups and reach out to others to help validate their ideas. Right now, Dubovskiy says that in the country, there are few tech gatherings and perhaps Startup Festival India will begin a grassroots effort to encourage more social events.

More than just a call center

Some people, when they think about India and technology, might associate it with call centers. While that may or may not be a reality, it’s not the complete picture. There have been, and will continue to be, startups of various kinds, many that may even surprise you.
Perhaps one of the more notable ones that those in the United States might be familiar with is document-sharing service SlideShare. Started by Rashmi Sinha, Jonathan Boutelle, and Amit Ranjan, the company was acquired last year by LinkedIn for $119 million. According to the South Asian Diaspora organization, SlideShare’s founders have become a spotlight on how Indian entrepreneurs can succeed.
Other notable Indian technologists that have made a name for themselves outside of their home country include Khosla Venture’s Vinod Khosla (formerly with Sun Microsystems), Hotmail’s Sabeer Bhatia, and the US government’s first CTO Aneesh Chopra. In a Kaufmann Foundation study, it found that immigrant entrepreneurs that went to the US hailed from more than 60 countries, of which 33.2 percent surveyed came from India.
The list of successful Indians is not a short one and raises an interesting question: If these companies and individuals have succeeded not only in the US, but elsewhere in the world, couldn’t Bangalore and other cities in India do the same to promote its innovations?

Understanding the ecosystem

We spoke with 500 Startups venture partner Pankaj Jain about what’s going on in Bangalore and he agrees with all the reports about Bangalore’s ecosystem — he tells us that the city has a very young culture and a very professional work ethic, something that mimics Silicon Valley.
If you want to know how important India is to the technology community, then you don’t need to look any further than the growing number of multi-national companies, investors, and incubators/accelerators that are heading there to set up shop. For 500 Startups, it says it sees a huge opportunity to be in the country, not because other venture firms have already set up shop there, including Accel Partners, Nexus Venture Partners, and Bessemer Venture Partners, but because:

Over the last decade, GDP has gone from around 400 billion to over $1.8 trillion. And everywhere you look, it shows: new roads are being built, internet speeds are increasing, lower priced smartphones and tablets are becoming more widely available, and higher priced iPads and other devices are seen regularly. Best of all, many of the poor are sending their children to schools instead of having them work.

Jain, along with 500 Startups’ founding partner and self-described “Sith Lord” Dave McClure, recently led a group of technologists to India as part of his “Geeks on a Plane” excursion (you can read about some of the adventures here, here, here, and here).

With regards to Bangalore, and India’s, ecosystem, Jain says that it is moving away from being just a service industry, but rather more about a product development market — specifically that the country is starting to build products around existing services like Twitter and Facebook. He is also noticing that localization and location have become a big thing in the country to help people shop, find who’s near them, and more.

Internet and mobile adoption lower than other countries

India’s Internet usage is not that substantial compared to the United States. In a Kleiner Perkins Caufield Byers report given by partner Mary Meeker in 2012, it showed that India had 121 million Internet users in 2011, a 38 percent year-over-year growth. However, that only amounted to a 10 percent penetration of the entire population. If you look at the US, there were 245 million Internet users in that same time period, but only a 1 percent year-over-year increase. But this amounted to 79 percent penetration.
Mobile usage also poses an issue in India — Meeker says that the country ranks 8 out of 30 in terms of mobile 3G subscribers. The country had an estimated 39 million subscribers in 2011, which represents a 4 percent penetration in the population. If you compare that to the US, which is number one, the number is staggering — 208 million subscribers, comprising 64 percent of the population.
Jain agrees with what Meeker has in her reports, telling us that since data adoption has been low in the country, companies have been working on building products and services around SMS technology. The same mobile-first phenomenon that startups and influencers expound in the US and elsewhere does not wholly apply in this emerging market.
But in the face of these restrictions, Indian entrepreneurs have produced some fascinating services that are designed to help with their own issues:

• RedBus: This Bangalore-based company took the unorganized bus ticketing market in India and assembled an online platform where riders can purchase inter-city bus tickets easily.
• Fusion Charts: Started by a young kid in Calcutta, this bootstrapped company functions as a data visualization service.
• ZipDial: Built around the concept of a missed call, in India, incoming calls are free, but outgoing calls are not. The idea is that someone can dial from an office line to a mobile phone and then hang up. The recipient on the cell phone will activate ZipDial and call back, thereby having a free call.

More about India’s startups can be found on TNW’s India or Asia sections.

Investors and support

The majority of startups need help getting their business off the ground. In Silicon Valley, there’s the world-famous Sand Hill Road that entrepreneurs flock to and seek investments from the likes of Menlo Ventures, SV Angel, Shasta Ventures, and others. But India does not have that proliferation of VC money — yet. What it does have is a growing support structure, not only from the firms we mentioned earlier, but also from a slew of incubators in the country. Whether it’s The Morpheus, Seedfarm, Springboard, or TLabs, there are many options available to a company.
Last month, in fact, 11 startups took part in the first national edition of the Microsoft Accelerator for Windows Azure with some that people might even be hearing and using around the world.

In a July 2012 report by YourStory Research, it delved into the perception of the VC community by Indian startups. Based on those surveyed, they say that the majority of startups that are funded are either in their growth or later stage. This is interesting because if you look at the number of companies that responded to that same survey, more than a third indicated that they were an early-stage company — only those that were growth-stage companies exceeded that number.
Jain agrees with that, but says that while early stage investments might not be as frequent, the country is seeing more angel investments happening from executives in large companies, entrepreneurs, or former Indian expatriates. Eventually, the environment will be created where early-stage funding support will be more widely available.
Bangalore, and India in general, may well be the next big hub of technological innovation, and investors should take note, if they haven’t already. In a country that’s home to more than a billion people, with a veritable bounty of technical talent, it’s hardly surprising that we’re seeing such a startup movement. Perhaps the only surprise is why we haven’t seen more SlideShare-style exits thus far, though that may well be about to change.
Main header image: DIPTENDU DUTTA/AFP/Getty Images


Photo credit: Uriel Sinai/Getty Images, Chart of India’s Best City to Start Up via Srikanth Acharya, FINDLAY KEMBER/AFP/Getty Images

Stymied by a GOP House, Obama looks ahead to 2014 to cement his legacy - The Washington Post

Stymied by a GOP House, Obama looks ahead to 2014 to cement his legacy - The Washington Post

Obama pushing to diversify federal judiciary amid GOP delays - The Washington Post

Obama pushing to diversify federal judiciary amid GOP delays - The Washington Post

Deal to avert government shutdown likely, officials say - The Washington Post

Deal to avert government shutdown likely, officials say - The Washington Post

Conservative Pundits Wrote Malaysian Propaganda

Conservative Pundits Wrote Malaysian Propaganda:
Articles written by conservative American pundits, but paid for with money from the government of Malaysia, appeared in a number of U.S. media outlets between 2008 and 2011, BuzzFeed reported on Friday.
The news came out of a filing that conservative commentator and RedState co-founder Joshua Treviño recently made with the U.S. Department of Justice. The disclosure, which was made in late January under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA), detailed how Treviño was paid $389,724.70 by the "[g]overnment of Malaysia, its ruling party, or interests closely aligned with either" between May 2008 and April 2011. According to the filing, Treviño did not deal directly with Malaysian representatives or officials. Instead, he had relationships with and was paid by three groups: the British firm FBC Media, the lobbying firm APCO Worldwide, and the now-shuttered online consulting firm David All Group.

Treviño was paid to blog at two websites -- malaysiamatters.com and malaysiawatcher.com -- which have now gone dark, and also to generate and secure the placement of opinion pieces in U.S. media outlets. The FARA filing also details how Treviño paid thousands of dollars to ten other writers -- including the conservative writer Ben Domenech, American Center for Democracy director Rachel Ehrenfeld, and Commentary editor Seth Mandel -- to write opinion pieces.

According to BuzzFeed, work tied to the Malaysian money appeared in The Huffington Post, The San Francisco Examiner, The Washington Times, National Review, and RedState, and much of the work focused on the campaign against Anwar Ibrahim, a pro-democracy opposition leader in Malaysia. In an interview with BuzzFeed, Treviño called the arrangement "a fairly standard PR operation."

"To be blunt with you, and I think the filing is clear about this, it was a lot looser than a typical PR operation," Treviño told the website. "I wanted to respect these guys' independence and not have them be placement machines."

Whispers of Treviño's connection to the Malaysian government surfaced in the Malaysian press in July 2011, and the story was picked up by Ben Smith, who was then blogging at Politico and is now the editor of BuzzFeed. At the time, Treviño denied that he was on "any 'Malaysian entity's payroll'" and, when asked why he had not registered as a foreign agent, replied that he was "confident I am within the law." A year later, however, Treviño left a gig at The Guardian after failing to disclose his ties to "Malaysian business interests" in a column.

Treviño, who is currently vice president of communications at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, told TPM on Friday that he had asked his lawyer about the foreign agent issue after being asked about it by Smith in 2011. He said his lawyer told him then that his status as a subcontractor meant he did not need to register. But after The Guardian incident in August, a different lawyer advised Treviño to approach the Department of Justice about making a FARA filing.

"They let me do a retroactive filing and that was that," Treviño told TPM.

Treviño said that since the filing, his only communication with the Department of Justice came when he was informed that "the filing was closed and they were happy with it."

Treviño maintains he was never told explicitly that he was working for the Malaysian government, but he had "a really strong suspicion the entire time." And asked about the other writers he hired to write pieces, Treviño said he alone had chosen who to hire, and they were "just asked to provide their opinion on the subject matter" and not told what to write.

Friday afternoon, Treviño was also answering questions about the FARA filing and the BuzzFeed story on Twitter. He rejected accusations that his actions had broken any rules of journalism.

"I'm not a journalist and never was," Treviño wrote. "That's a pretty key distinction. What most PR does is comment/opinion."

Read the FARA filing:

Joshua Trevino FARA Filing by tpmdocs

1965/66 Indonesian massacres echoed in East Timor

1965/66 Indonesian massacres echoed in East Timor:
A recent Canberra seminar on the infamous mass violence in Indonesia in 1965-66 revealed many parallels with East Timorese experience under Indonesian military occupation a decade later.
CHART’s John Waddingham participated, sharing his Timor archives project experience with those now seeking to build and share documentary evidence on Indonesia’s trauma in the 1960s.

Indonesian leftists being herded off to public execution. [Source: Unknown]

The killings of several hundred thousand communists and alleged sympathisers marked the rise to presidential power of General Suharto in 1965-66. The broad story has been well-known but the detail has not.
Any critical discussion of the Suharto government’s official narrative on the killings, and its subsequent long-term imprisonment of huge numbers of ‘leftists’, was taboo in Indonesia. The fall of Suharto in 1998 has seen the lid lifted. Indonesian non-government organisations, activists and academics are now openly exploring those events – many with the aim of seeking reparations for victims and their families and holding perpetrators accountable for crimes against humanity.
Seminar topics

Held at the Australian National University, Canberra, New perspectives on the 1965 violence in Indonesia (11-13 February 2013) was organised by Australian-based academics researching 1965. In addition to well-known western researchers in this area like Robert Cribb and Kate McGregor, a number of very active researchers and activists flew in from Indonesia to communicate their work.
Topics included the emerging public debate in Indonesia, the local and Cold War aspects of the killings, Indonesian activist actions to counter the official narrative, to remove stigmas still disadvantaging victims’ families, to collect victim and perpetrator first-hand accounts and to document claims for justice and reparations. Several presentations explored the relationship between Suharto’s military and militias and other non-state actors responsible for many killings. The evidence for external support for the military, especially from the USA and UK, was one of a number of consistent threads in seminar discussion.

Komnas HAM report launch, Jakarta, July 2012. [Jakarta Post]

Komnas HAM report

A recent four year study on 1965 by the official Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) was also discussed. The Commission’s landmark report, completed in July 2012, reported evidence of widespread crimes against humanity including killings, slavery, forced removal and displacement, torture, rape, extra-legal executions. The report recommended State apologies and reparations for victims and that responsible Indonesian military officials be charged with crimes against humanity. The 200-page Indonesian language executive summary is available here.
The Komnas HAM investigations shows that the issue is no longer taboo, but some reactions to the report suggest resistance to truth and justice on the matter remains strong. Indonesia’s Attorney-General, responsible for implementing the recommendations, has rejected the report’s legitimacy.

Shared experience: Indonesians and East Timorese. [CHART]

CHART inputs

CHART participated in the third day of the seminar – a closed session for current activists and researchers to exchange views, information resources and strategies. While time was restricted, John Waddingham outlined CHART’s program and methods to locate, document and provide access to archival materials. He particularly emphasised the importance of authenticating documents to ensure they were genuine and the need to demonstrate the authenticity of newly collected oral and documentary evidence from victims and perpetrators so that they cannot be challenged as fabrications.
Many exact matches were observed in the language to describe the 1965/66 killings and the invasion and occupation of East Timor. This shared experience provides an opportunity for Indonesians and East Timorese to better understand each other’s modern history.
The strong emergence of a raft of Indonesian activists and others now digging into their hidden past is a marvellous development. We hope that one spin-off from this blossoming will be increasing interest from Indonesians in uncovering documentary and other evidence of their military’s interventions in East Timor.

- – - – - – - – - –  

Useful introductory guides to the topic:
Inside Indonesia special edition, 2010
Online Encyclopedia of mass violence item, 2009

50% of TL Community Ignorant About Corruption

50% of TL Community Ignorant About Corruption:
According to an Anti-Corruption Commission (KAK) survey released in 2012 a lot of the Timorese community still do not understand what corruption is.

“About 50% of people said they don’t understand what corruption is,” said KAK President, Commissioner Aderito de Jesus Soares, (19/02), in Farol, Dili.

Prayuth believes fighting will continue in deep South despite peace-talk agreement

Prayuth believes fighting will continue in deep South despite peace-talk agreement: Army Commander-in-Chief Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha Sunday expressed confidence that violent attacks by insurgents will continue in the deep South despite a peace talk agreement with an insurgent group.

New Taliban target: ringtones

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Soldiers march to Pheu Thai beat

Soldiers march to Pheu Thai beat: Army personnel were allowed to vote freely without pressure from their superiors and the majority chose Pheu Thai candidate Pol Gen Pongsapat Pongcharoen to become the new Bangkok governor, according to an army source after the ballot count at booths near their units.

Against expectations Sukhumbhand wins second term as Bangkok Governor

Against expectations Sukhumbhand wins second term as Bangkok Governor:
AP:

Bangkok’s governor won a second term Sunday in an election that was overshadowed by Thailand’s national politics and seen as a major test for his Democrat party.
The gubernatorial election was Bangkok’s first since it was paralyzed by deadly anti-government protests in 2010. The Red Shirt protesters – mostly rural-based supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra – were demanding fresh elections from then-Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Democrat party.
Bangkok is one of the few strongholds that the Democrats did not lose to the Pheu Thai party, led by Thaksin’s sister and current Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, in the 2011 general election, thanks to the capital’s pro-establishment middle class and elite voters.
The Democrats have ruled Bangkok for the past nine years, but they found themselves in a fight with Pheu Thai in a gubernatorial election that was seen as a barometer of their relevance in Thai politics.
The governor’s race also highlighted the political divisiveness that has wracked Thailand for much of the past eight years, with the results showing that there is still a major divide.
…
The rift between the ruling and the opposition party was apparent during Sukhumbhand’s first term, especially during a 2011 flooding crisis that crippled parts of Bangkok.
Yingluck said after Pongsapat conceded defeat Sunday that the ruling party would have to re-evaluate its performance in Bangkok’s constituencies. She said the government would help the Democrats serve the city’s residents.
In his victory speech, Sukhumbhand, 60, said he was “ready to work seamlessly with the government.”

Reuters:

Thailand’s main opposition party won an election for the governor of Bangkok on Sunday, dealing a surprise blow to the ruling party of exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra which had hoped to win the city and cement its supremacy.
Incumbent governor and Democrat Party member Sukhumbhand Paribatra beat the candidate of Thaksin’s Puea Thai Party, winning almost half the vote, the city administration said as the count neared completion.
“The Democrats won because a large part of Bangkok were scared of Puea Thai holding too much power,” political analyst Kan Yuenyong at Siam Intelligence Unit, told Reuters.
“In the long-term, Thailand is heading towards a system ruled by two main political parties.“

Bloomberg:

The victory provides a boost to opposition leader Abhisit Vejjajiva even as the narrow margin signaled gains for Yingluck in Bangkok. The opposition had won the past three governor contests dating back to 2004 by margins of more than 10 percentage points, and took more than 75 percent of the capital’s seats in the past two nationwide elections.
Yingluck congratulated Sukhumbhand on his victory and pledged to cooperate with him.
“Even though our votes were not enough to become governor, I and the party are still ready to serve Bangkok people,” she told supporters in a briefing with Pongsapat. “I am ready to work with the governor seamlessly.”

The Bangkok Post:

“I want to thank Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra [of the Pheu Thai Party] who has promised that I’ll be able to work seamlessly with the government.
“I would like to take this opportunity to invite about 800,000 Bangkokians who did not cast their votes today to help build Bangkok with me.
“I promise you that I’ll work harder and be more committed and that I’ll serve the people of Bangkok – the city I love, where I was born and raised, and will die,” said the re-elected governor.

BP: The below is from around 9 p.m. from PRD and Post Today:

NOTE:  Each time, BP looks there seems a slight adjustment in the figures and there are still unofficial figures so votes and % may slightly differ from final results. The unaccounted is no votes, spoilt votes etc.
BP: The gap is just under 180,000 votes or around 6.5%. In comparison with the previous 4 elections:

NOTE:  Ind = Independent; Dem = Democrat Party candidate; and TS = candidate of the pro-Thaksin party whether it is Thai Rak Thai, PPP, or Puea Thai. This also includes Pavena who was an independent in 2004, but was unofficially backed by Thai Rak Thai. Sources for 2013 are as above. For previous elections,  all figures from Wikipedia.

NOTE: This % for 2013 differs from chart above as didn’t include No vote and spoilt votes because understand they were not included in figures for previous elections so for comparison purposes haven’t included.
Some comments:
A. Sukhumbhand’s 1,256,231 votes is the highest number of votes for any candidate, but then again Pongsapat’s 1,077,899 votes is the second highest ever.
B. Sukhumbhand received 321,171 more votes than he got in 2009, but then again Pongsapat got 465,465 more votes than Puea Thai’s candidate received in 2009.
C. Sukhumbhand also increased his share of the vote.
D.  Pongsapat’s 1,077,899 votes or 39.69% is the most by any pro-Thaksin party candidate. It beats the previous best by 458,095 (that is Paveena in 2004). The previous highest % was Yuranan in 2009 with 29.72% .
E. This is also the closest election in terms of narrowest margin (180,000 vs 292,402 in 2004) or % (6.5% vs 12.3% in 2004).
F. The vote for independents drops to less than 300,000 votes or 11.28%. As is happening nationally, Thailand is becoming more of a two-party system.
G. Sukhumbhand’s winning percentage appears to be the most of any candidate/Democrat in the previous 5 elections (DISCLAIMER: He is only very marginally ahead of Apirak in 2004 ( 45.9%) and previous years have not all been collated from the same source),  but Pongsapat’s losing % percentage was the highest losing percentage as well.
NOTE: Will look at the “why” and “what the victory means” in a separate post(s).

Filipino farmers - a dying breed?

Filipino farmers - a dying breed?:

MANILA, 26 February 2013 (IRIN) - Historically, as countries have industrialized, the number of small farms has dwindled, with workers opting for city life. But the Philippines government is concerned that this trend could exacerbate food insecurity in an import-dependent country already struggling to meet current food demand.

Somalia Refugees in the Region, 20 February 2013

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Sulu sultan unmoved despite pressure from Philippine, Malaysian leaders

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Delhi protest at 'child sex attack'

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Pakistan-Iran pipeline 'to start'

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Philippines clan urged to surrender

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Afghan graffiti artist makes her mark in India

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Deadly gun battle in east Malaysia

Deadly gun battle in east Malaysia: At least five police officers have died in another armed clash with gunmen in eastern Sabah state, officials in Malaysia say.

Thai ivory ban proposal welcomed

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Karachi bomb blast kills dozens

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Bangladesh clashes: Your reaction

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VIDEO: Emotions high as Bangladeshis strike

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Desperately seeking success

Desperately seeking success:

Over the last nine months the insurgency in the Deep South of Thailand has escalated dramatically. Just within the last week two bombs went off in Narathiwat province, another bomb exploded within the Pattani commercial centre, and five people were injured in a drive by shooting also in Pattani. Even with the Thai military killing 16 insurgents during an attack on a marine base just recently, there is little evidence of military progress in the insurgency.
At the same time Malaysia is heading into what could be called a “watershed” election. Premier Najib’s personal popularity rating has fallen, there have been a number of campaigning mishaps for him of late, and there is an embarrassing military stand-off in Sabah with a group loyal to the Sulu Sultan, where the Philippine President Aquino is the one taking initiatives.
In this environment, both governments are in desperate need of a breakthrough with the insurgency. Of late, the insurgents have undertaken many embarrassing ploys like displaying Malaysian flags in the South last August 31st on Malayan Independence day. In addition, troops and other security forces are all tied in the south trying to protect major towns like Hat Yai and Chana from attacks, and Premier Yingluck Shinawatra has her brother’s legacy of poor handling of the Southern insurgency problem hanging over her. Premier Najib badly needs some form of diplomatic coup to bolster his credentials, particularly with the rural Malays in Kelantan who are not unsympathetic to the insurgents cause, and the general population of Malaysia with the oncoming election due anytime in the near future.
Perhaps this is why the surprise of an agreement signed between the Thai Government during Premier Yinluck Shinawatra’s visit to Kuala Lumpur with one of the major insurgent groups the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), should actually not be a surprise.
A memorandum was signed in Putra Jaya by Lieutenant-General Panradom Pattanathabur, Secretary general of Thailand’s National Security Council, and Utaz Hassan Taib who was identified as the chief of the BRN liaison office in Malaysia. The document was witnessed by Mohamed Thajudeen Bin Abdul Wahab who is the Secretary General of the National Security Council within The Prime Minister’s Department.
The simple text of the document reads as follows under the heading “General Consensus on Peace Dialogue Process”:

The Government of Thailand has appointed the Secretary General of the National Security Council (Lieutenant-General Panradom Pattanathabur) to head the group supporting favourable environment creation to peace promotion in the Southern Border Provinces of Thailand.
We are willing to engage in peace dialogue with people who have different opinions and ideologies from the state (note not directly referring to the BRN only), as one of the stakeholders in solving the Southern Border problem under the framework of the Thai Constitution while Malaysia would act as facilitator. Safety measures shall be provided to all members of the Joint Working Group throughout the entire process.  (Dated and signed 28th February 2013)

This document was heralded by all as an historical agreement and has been reported widely in both the mainstream Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur Press, although it’s interesting Malaysia’s online press hardly mentioned it.
The BRN was formed in 1963 and is one of up to 20 different insurgency groups in the Deep South of Thailand. Although the BRN may one of the largest groups, it is yet to be seen if any other groups may come onboard with these negotiations, or even take a hostile view of these negotiations believing that they have been left out and should be the group that the government be negotiating with. With jealousies between some of these groups, this is a minor risk that the Thai Government has taken.
As it has actually not been spelt out by the various insurgency groups what demands and aspirations they have, this process will at least put these points on the table for examination. In this sense the memorandum is a potential breakthrough because it may establish the gambit of positions both sides will talk from. Ironically through this insurgency, very few concrete demands or aspirations have actually been aired, although the various groups harbor ideals and aspirations alone a wide continuum.
The role of Malaysia will be interesting. The Federal Government wants peace along the border and there are actually great trade advantages to a peaceful south through the IMT-GT. The Malaysian military and police are generally cooperative with the Thai authorities over border security issues and established good relationships. However some insurgents within the Deep South are also Malaysian citizens, or at least have very close Malaysian relatives, and to some degree integrated within the “pondok communities” within Kelantan. Perhaps Malaysia’s prime role will be just acting as a chairman to these meetings to maintain negotiations, rather than acting more proactively in suggesting solutions. The true value of the Malaysian role will therefore be just to hold the process together, which may not be an easy task, given the emotional issues involved.
Any success will depend upon there not being any hidden agendas between the 2+1 parties during these talks. With the complexities of Thai politics, the military, the various insurgency groups and their splinters, and Malaysian politics, particularly related to the constituency of Kelantan, this could be a tall order. However there is also the hope that all sides are tired and through this process, there can be reaching out to other insurgency groups. Much of this will personally depend upon the skills and attitude taken by Panradom Pattanathabur and the reception he gets from members of the BRN delegation. The other question here is who does Hassan Taib actually represent within the BRN which has a number of splinter groups? Even if Hassan is speaking for a wide series of groups, every point of negotiations would have to be discussed in community Syura in every province to obtain any consensus, which could be daunting.
One must remember this is not the first time peace talks have been attempted with many different moderators including former Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamed in the Langkawi talks a few years ago, and later with former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra where both went nowhere.
One aspect that has not been tackled by both governments in this agreement is the role drug traffickers, bandits, gangsters, and other criminal elements are playing in this insurgency problem. It is in their interest to have turmoil in the Deep South so they can carry out their trade. These groups are part of the problem and they need to be dealt with in any process for it to be a success.
The first meeting is scheduled to be held in Malaysia within the next two weeks, and every fortnight afterwards. It would be surprising if much information about these talks actually leaks out. However the meeting itself is something positive and who actually turns up to these meetings from the insurgents side will be very telling of eventual success of this process.
What is sure, the violence will not stop immediately, but the immediate level of violence may indicate how seriously various groups look at this upcoming process of negotiation. The Yingluck Government has given some authority to the military to negotiate, who may take a more hardline than the government would. However from the Thai point of view some process is going on which is better than no process. The agreement to the Malaysian Government as the moderator is a redeeming event in foreign policy for the Najib Government. The BN will be hoping that this may provide some positive mileage among the rural Malays of Kelantan, who they need to win over if any positive electoral.
Meanwhile the people of the Deep South will continue to go about their daily lives with extreme caution.

Indonesia: Signs of new thinking on Papua

Indonesia: Signs of new thinking on Papua:
Gary Hogan was the first foreigner to graduate from Indonesia's Institute of National Governance (Lemhannas) and was Australia's Defence Attaché to Indonesia from 2009 to 2012.
The 21 February slaying of eight soldiers in two separate incidents by anti-government rebels in Indonesia's troubled Papua province sent shock waves through Jakarta's presidential palace, as well as the country's national defence headquarters in nearby Cilangkap. It was the largest number of military security forces killed in a single day in the restive province, which borders Papua New Guinea.

The shock was felt as far away as Canberra, since Jakarta's adroit handling of its separatist problem in Papua is crucial to our ability to progress bilateral relations with Indonesia.
Australia's ambassador in Jakarta was the first foreign official to extend condolences and to reaffirm Australia's unequivocal commitment to Indonesian sovereignty over Papua. Canberra knows it would be impossible to engage Jakarta in a comprehensive strategic partnership without a mature and unfettered relationship with Indonesia's powerful defence forces, Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI.
Any undisciplined retaliatory conduct by TNI elements in Papua, such as random reprisals for the eight deaths, would weigh heavily on the current upward trajectory in both our defence and broader bilateral relations. Fortunately, there is cause for optimism that, at least at the top, TNI might adopt some fresh thinking about Papua and the international ramifications of an ongoing cycle of violence.
Nobody is more aware of the potential for an arbitrary, heavy-handed overreaction by security forces in Papua to tarnish Indonesia's international image than President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. He has done a great deal in the past eight years as president to try to improve Indonesia's global standing on human rights, investing in security sector reform and attempting to consolidate democracy and economic prosperity.
In Papua, Yudhoyono has promised a new approach based on building a stronger, fairer and more inclusive economy. His key man on the ground is retired general Bambang Darmono, a respected and experienced soldier and diplomat who played an important role in the successful Aceh peace process.
But Darmono, who the president has charged with overseeing a fast-track development plan for Papua, faces an uphill battle. Indonesia lacks a clear strategy for pacifying Papua, partly because Jakarta focuses on economics when many Papuans cry for political dialogue.
Moreover, the search for a solution is frustrated by poor coordination and an absence of imagination among government departments, factionalism and corruption in Papua itself, where vested interest is fueled by the prospect of limitless resource wealth, and a reactionary streak in some Jakarta elites, who refuse to even countenance the term 'indigenous' because it implies special rights.
Fallout from the 21 February shootings is still on the cards. The Free Papua Movement (OPM) is proving itself a learning organisation. Recent rebel actions demonstrate an ability to conduct reconnaissance, detect patterns, use intelligence effectively in planning and exploit poor operational security. The OPM now appears capable of moving beyond its basic hit and run tactics of the past. Incidents like the two which killed eight Indonesian soldiers last month could continue and even escalate.
In dealing with the Papua problem, Indonesia has occasionally demonstrated a disconnection between operational directions from Jakarta and tactical actions in the field. This will need to improve under TNI's emerging leaders, and there are promising signs it might. That is the subject of a follow-on post.
Photo courtesy of Wikipedia.

Sihanouk’s legacy

Sihanouk’s legacy:

No-one in the modern history of Southeast Asia has had such a continuous and lasting effect on the politics of their country than the late King Father Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. His cremation on 4 February in Phnom Penh brought to an end a career reaching back to his coronation on 3 May 1941. Since then, in one form or another – king, prime minister, head of government in exile, guerrilla leader, king again and finally King Father after he abdicated for the second time – Sihanouk bestrode Cambodian politics.
Sihanouk’s cremation was an extraordinarily lavish affair. Rumours circulating in Phnom Penh reported that the current Cambodian strongman, Hun Sen, was “shocked” by the spontaneous outpouring of grief by the hundreds of thousands of ordinary Cambodians who lined the processional route when Sihanouk’s body was returned from China, and concluded that his government would gain popular approval by giving the King Father a right royal send-off. Whether this is true or not, Hun Sen’s order to conduct a full-scale royal cremation sent officials to scour the archives to find out proper procedures. The whole ceremony thus became an occasion to restore and celebrate Khmer traditional culture. No expense was spared in constructing the five-storey high central  Phra Meru  (within which the body was burned) along with its surrounding gardens, pavilions, cloisters and walls – all of which will eventually be dismantled.
All the streets converging on the cremation site beside the palace were blocked off and people kept well away. But as invited VIPs left in their fleet of cars and night fell, the barriers were drawn aside and crowds surged into the open space in front of the palace to make offerings of flowers, burn incense, pray, or just sit quietly in groups remembering – what? What did Sihanouk represent for ordinary Cambodians? Judging by the documentary footage shown repeatedly on Cambodian TV channels, Sihanouk’s great achievements were gaining independence from France in 1953, and instituting a building program in the 1960s that converted Phnom Penh into a modern city. But there was surely more than that in the minds of those who mourned his passing.
For those in their 70s, the Sihanouk years are mostly remembered as an era of peace and prosperity before war and revolution tore the country apart. In idealised form, survivors have passed on this version of history to successive generations, a version reinforced by the horrors of the decade of civil war and Khmer Rouge tyranny that followed the removal of Sihanouk from power in 1970. For some the revival of the monarchy under United Nations auspices in 1993 and the return of Sihanouk to the throne was a powerful symbol, along with the re-emergence of Theravada Buddhism, of the survival of Cambodian culture and society in face of terrible adversity.
Most Cambodians are aware of, and proud of, their Angkorean heritage. Those with even limited education know the names of one or two of their great kings, if little else. As their direct descendant, Sihanouk connected them to a glorious past that anchors Cambodian identity in the present. Even the Khmer Rouge placed the outline of Angkor Wat on their national flag. For every Cambodian, it is the person of Sihanouk who represented the monarchy, even after he relinquished the throne to his son, Norodom Sihamoni – just as he continued to do after he placed his father on the throne in 1955. For abdication is a constitutional act that in the Theravada worldview in no way diminishes the store of merit that ensured royal birth in the first place. In fact it may increase merit, as for example, when a king steps down to become a monk. Sihanouk’s evident compassion for his people and concern for their welfare added to the store of his merit in the eyes of his people. The respect paid to Sihanouk by ordinary Cambodians was for his accumulated merit, which they believe ensures rebirth directly into one of the Buddhist heavens.  Its basis, therefore, is identical to the respect shown for monks and nuns.
The question most frequently asked with Sihanouk’s passing has been where does this leave the Cambodian monarchy? Well, we shall see, though at present the institution does not seem to be under threat. But if we cannot peer into the future, we can look back at the past. The more interesting question to ask, therefore, concerns Sihanouk’s historical legacy. What have his years in politics bequeathed to his country?
Between his coronation in 1941 and his overthrow in 1970, Sihanouk made two decisions that were crucial not just for his personal career, but for the history of Cambodia. These were his decision to take the leading role in Cambodia’s struggle for independence from France, and his decision to abdicate in order to assume political leadership of the country. The first of these has been widely acclaimed by both Cambodians and historians, but its celebrated outcome exacerbated two persistent weaknesses in Sihanouk’s character – his craving for adulation and his conviction that he alone had the foresight, the wisdom, and yes, the semi-divine power that comes with the possession of great merit, to guide and develop (modernise) his country. Yet Cambodia would still have obtained independence from France without Sihanouk’s dramatic exodus to Angkor, though it is true that Sihanouk’s actions took the wind out of the sails of the so-called Khmer Vietminh, enabling Cambodia at Geneva in 1954 to escape division into separate areas of control for government and insurgent forces (as in Laos).
Sihanouk’s abdication and creation of his own political movement, the Sangkum Reastr Niyum, had by contrast a much more baleful effect on modern Cambodian history. Sihanouk had already shown himself to be no friend of democracy when in 1952, with French collusion; he dismissed the popularly elected Democratic Party government, and jailed several DP leaders without trial. Those leaders were French-educated. For all their squabbles they admired French democracy. Sihanouk disliked the DP because it aimed to make Cambodia a constitutional monarchy, which would have relegated him to a largely ceremonial position. Parties further to the left were overtly republican, but particularly after 1953 they attracted limited popular support. Immediately upon independence Sihanouk could have used his considerable influence and stature to support multi-party democratic government. Instead he sought personal power.
The Sangkum masqueraded as a political party, but in reality it was an entirely different animal. Sihanouk built the Sangkum as a royal patronage network whose lofty purpose was to unify the country, but whose modus operandi was to eliminate all political opposition, or drive it underground, while concentrating power in the hands of Sihanouk as legitimate, if ex, king. The structure of the Sangkum derived from the ‘mandala’ model of the kings of Angkor, whose power rested on the loyalty of regional rulers and court officials, given in return for favours ascribed to the beneficence of the king in the form of delegated administrative authority and status. Educated urban Cambodians flocked to join the Sangkum to facilitate access to such benefits as government employment and contracts, entry to top schools and universities for their children, overseas scholarships, and useful contacts with government officials. Peasants supported the Sangkum because it was led by their meritorious king, though they got little in return.
As a political movement the Sangkum was remarkably successful. Elections were still held, but became formalities in which the Sangkum won up to 85 per cent of the vote. Such a degree of popular support fed Sihanouk’s craving for adulation and reinforced his conviction that his leadership was indispensable for the future of his country. If Sihanouk had a motto at this time, it surely was “Cambodge, c’est moi!” What was less apparent was that in establishing the Sangkum as a royal patronage network centred on himself, Sihanouk had sealed off the tiny window of opportunity that existed to create a modern democratic political order in Cambodia. Instead the Sangkum drew upon traditional Cambodian political culture to provide a model of how to concentrate and exercise political power.
Perhaps that small window of opportunity to create a democratic system in Cambodia that Sihanouk slammed shut in 1955 never really existed. Perhaps if political parties had been permitted freely to contest elections they would sooner or later have degenerated into rival patronage networks. What is certain, however, is that the very success of the Sangkum as a patronage network centred on Sihanouk as leader destroyed any possibility of instituting an alternative political order. All subsequent Cambodian leaders have applied the Sangkum model in consolidating their power.
Sihanouk used the power he gained from leadership of the Sangkum to pursue his vision for his country. That vision was of a modern Cambodia, proudly taking its place among the nations of the world. The symbols of that modernity were concentrated, however, almost entirely in Phnom Penh. Sihanouk set out to create a capital he could proudly display to international delegations and visiting heads of state. In this too he was following in the footsteps of Angkorean kings, particularly his favourite role model Jayavarman VII, who built the last great city of Angkor Thom. The boulevards, monuments, government buildings, universities, theatres and sports stadium that he built remain impressive architectural achievements for which Sihanouk will long be remembered.
Two other areas Sihanouk promoted were education and the arts. Phnom Penh came to boast seven universities, devoted to separate disciplines (medicine, law, fine arts, etc.), and a number of good secondary schools. Primary education came much lower on his list of priorities. Sihanouk had genuine compassion for the peasant families he rather disparagingly called his ‘children’, especially compared to subsequent Cambodian rulers, but did little to provide them with opportunities for economic or social advancement. Economic development was tied to government. The Sangkhum system did not promote entrepreneurship, but rather dependency on opportunities provided by working political connections.
Ironically, in the end it was the failure of tertiary education that was in large part responsible for Sihanouk’s political demise. Urban supporters of the Sangkum expected admission to universities for their children, irrespective of their abilities – and expected them to be awarded degrees. Standards fell as a result, and universities turned out graduates of poor quality in numbers too large to employ in government jobs. Avenues for advancement for the bright and ambitious were limited by the employment of the children of the politically well-connected. As popular dissatisfaction grew, Sihanouk turned to film making and the arts. For Sihanouk these were another arena to showcase Cambodian modernity, but in the process he took his eye off the political main game, and was destroyed by the weakness that makes all patronage systems inherently unstable – which is the ability of clients to shift their allegiance to another patron.
Sihanouk has been much lauded for his efforts to shield Cambodia from the war in Vietnam – and rightly so. But his commitment to neutrality and his activism within the non-aligned movement were not sufficient of themselves to insulate Cambodia from all repercussions of the Cold War – and Sihanouk knew it. So he used every means at his disposal: the media, open threats and denunciations, and secret agreements of the kind with Hanoi that guaranteed Cambodia’s borders and kept the Khmer Rouge on a leash in return for infiltration rights for Vietnamese guerrillas through Cambodian territory. At the same time his suspicion of the intentions of the Vietnamese communist regime, which he rightly believed would win the war, led him to build close relations with China as the only power with the capacity to keep Vietnam in check.
As a strategy this was remarkably perspicacious: Sihanouk foresaw likely developments in Indochina more clearly than anyone in Washington. This led him, however, to pursue a left-leaning neutrality that eventually led to a rift with the United States that deprived Cambodia of considerable US aid. This was an avoidable error on Sihanouk’s part. Neutrality works best when it is balanced, thus ensuring a competitive flow of aid from both sides. Breaking relations with Washington reinforced Sihanouk’s credentials in Beijing, but it deprived him of a significant source of projects and funds with which to ‘oil’ the Sangkum patronage network. The lack was felt most severely in the military. It would have required astute diplomacy to keep American aid flowing while currying favour with China. But it was not impossible, even under the prevailing circumstances. Relations were re-established after four years in 1969, but the damage had been done, and was an additional factor behind Sihanouk’s overthrow.
Sihanouk’s gravest error of judgment came in 1970 when he angrily responded to his removal from power by calling upon the people of Cambodia to join with the Khmer Rouge to overthrow those who had deposed him. Sihanouk acted out of hurt pride, and his egotistical belief that he alone could lead Cambodia. So blinded, he misread the situation that was unfolding, and entirely failed to understand how his action would affect his people. With Sihanouk removed, his tacit agreement with North Vietnam collapsed. Hanoi not only unleashed the Khmer Rouge, but poured in support for the insurgency – just as Sihanouk’s call to arms massively increased recruitment to the revolutionary cause.
Did Sihanouk really think that from exile in Beijing he could control the course of events in Cambodia? If so, he was delusional. Despite his friendly relations with Chinese leaders, he had always distrusted and repressed the revolutionary left inside Cambodia. Was he so ill-informed that he only realised the true nature of the Khmer Rouge once he returned to Cambodia to become their prisoner at the end of 1975? His resignation in April 1976 as titular head of what was by then the KR regime left him under palace arrest and vulnerable. That he survived the KR years was thanks to his Chinese friends.
The Vietnamese invasion that overthrew the Khmer Rouge at the end of 1979 realised Sihanouk’s worst fears: Cambodia effectively became part of an Indochinese union dominated by Vietnam. This time backed by an unholy de facto alliance between the US, ASEAN and China, Sihanouk once again found himself in coalition with the Khmer Rouge – though this time leading his own separate guerrilla force. There was no alternative, as he explained to journalists in his engaging trademark way, with Gallic shrug, upturned palms, and perplexed expression, plaintively asking: “What could Sihanouk do?”
When Vietnamese forces finally withdrew a decade later, and the United Nations moved in, Sihanouk found himself in the position he had so determinedly refused to accept forty years before: that of constitutional monarch. But democracy in the new Kingdom of Cambodia was almost bound to fail. To begin with there was no precedent. No-one except perhaps Sihanouk himself remembered that brief period of democratic government installed under the French that the Sangkum had effectively destroyed. After Sihanouk had been overthrown, Cambodia had had one military and two single-party governments, all of which concentrated power at the apex of a hierarchical organisation that brooked no political opposition. A combination of coercion and fear kept members in line and loyal to the leadership.
From the point of view of Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the imposition of multi-party democracy in 1993 threatened their hold on power. The election result giving a narrow victory to Prince Ranarridh’s FUNCINPEC Party was perceived not as an expression of the hopes and desires of the Cambodian people, but as a call to political struggle. The CPP response was not to formulate more appealing policies, but to extend the tentacles of its social power. And its model of how this should be done was the Sangkum. The CCP set out to build a patronage network that would draw in clients through the lure of promised benefits for them and their extended families. But for this strategy to work the Party needed the wherewithal to buy client loyalty. At the same time FUNCINPEC was building its own rival patronage network, also modelled on the Sangkum, though Ranarridh was no Sihanouk. Real political competition, therefore, was not for votes, but for control over resources – in the form not only of exploitable natural resources such as timber and minerals, but also government revenues and the perks associated with foreign aid. The outcome over time was pervasive corruption – and victory for the CPP.
The CCP is not organised as and does not function as a Marxist party modelled on the Chinese or Vietnamese communist parties. Its exemplar is the Sangkum. Hun Sen does not exercise power as Chinese or Vietnamese leaders do, by virtue of the offices they hold within their respective parties, but because of his position at the apex of a vast patronage network. Hun Sen will not be deposed by a vote at a CCP congress. The only way he could lose power is through the erosion of client loyalty and their ultimate defection to alternative patrons – just as happened to Sihanouk.
Hun Sen has been the most successful Cambodian political leader over the last twenty years in large part because he modelled himself closely on Sihanouk, even down to how he comports himself in public. Sihanouk owed his political status to his birth and his achievement of independence from France; Hun Sen can only advert to his role in freeing Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge through alliance with Vietnam. He has therefore had to rely more on greasing the strings of patronage. This is why it took so long to pass an anti-corruption law, which is in any case ineffective. It was passed to ensure the continuation of foreign aid (so avoiding Sihanouk’s mistake), which is necessary if revenue is to be freed up for patronage. The patronage network that keeps Hun Sen in power has produced massive maldistribution of wealth, most of which has been concentrated in Phnom Penh, plus a few regional centres like Siem Reap. Few resources have trickled out to rural areas, not even for basic health care or primary education, because too much revenue gets siphoned off into private pockets.
This is unlikely to change while Hun Sen maintains his patronage network in place. Like the monarchy (or North Korea), Hun Sen reportedly wants his position to become hereditary, to be handed on to one of his sons. This makes even more evident the extent to which Hun Sen has taken Sihanouk and the Sangkum as his political paradigms. Sihanouk’s lasting legacy, one can only conclude, has been the system of government Cambodia currently enjoys. 

Islamic education’s desperate plight

Islamic education’s desperate plight:

If a frequent traveler to Thailand goes around the country today, a rapid rise in the prominence of Muslims will be noticed, stretching from Chiang Rai in the north of the country right down into the south of the country. Many of Thailand’s 6-7 Million Muslins are totally integrated into Thai culture and society, a country that takes great pride in its cultural homogeneity. However in the South of Thailand, many, if not most Muslims still live in close knit rural villages undertaking traditional activities such as rubber tapping, fishing, and rice farming. A distinct culture, different from the mainstream “Thai” culture has been able to nurture in the relaxed air of religious freedom in Thailand.
Generally speaking, there is a great contrast economically between the rural Muslims of Southern Thailand and the rest of the community. The incidence of poverty among Muslims in Southern Thailand is high. To many Muslims however this is not considered a problem, as a simple religious based lifestyle is deeply valued and indeed is perceived to offer protection to the community from external “morally corrupting forces”.
As a consequence many rural Muslim parents prefer to send their children to one of the hundreds of Islamic schools around the south of the country. Many, if not most of these schools are set up, owned, and staffed by the communities themselves providing an Islamic education, in addition to the primary and secondary school national curriculum.
A few lucky students may get a place in the prestigious and well equipped Pondok Bantan in Nakhon Si Thammarat, founded by the recently retired Secretary General of ASEAN Dr. Surin Pitsuwan and his family, or one of the local Islamic Council schools, which are also relatively well equipped. Pondok Bantan has been generously funded by a number of Middle East sources, including the Islamic Development Bank, and even the Sasakawa Peace Foundation based in Japan. However the majority of Muslims must opt for one of the local schools set up by one of the members of the community.
These local community schools operate with the minimal infrastructure and facilities. Classrooms are grossly inadequate, with poor libraries and few other teaching resources available. There is a drastic shortage of teachers for national curriculum subjects, often relying upon volunteers to assist. In the schools or “pondoks” where students are resident, students are often forced to sleep up to 10 students per hut, which is barely habitual and potentially a fire and disease trap. Many of these schools are overloaded with students and finding it difficult coping with the large numbers.

The attitudes of the owners who in many cases are  descendants of  a Tok Guru or traditional religious teachers of small “pondoks” tends to be protective and conservative. Their prevailing vision tends to rather short with some exceptions, where small short term successes are sort, rather than spending money on long term development. They rather stick to the old “ways of doing things” and take pride in preserving tradition which is now out of context in today’s society. The aim of many schools is not about developing student integration within the community, but more about developing what could be called the “Islamization of knowledge”. Consequently any real progress is slow and doesn’t engage the rapid pace of change in society, where the schools become less competitive in long term.
As national curriculum studies are of a low standard in the Islamic Schools, where failure rates are extremely high, little government funding is attracted in the competitive private school environment of Thailand. However, Islamic schools are still attractive to many parents as the very low fees, or no fees,  lightens their economic burden, compared to other educational options.
In addition to the above problems, a number of other problematic issues exist within these schools around Southern Thailand today.
Firstly, the religious curriculum is set by local Ulama or religious scholars. The majority of Ulama themselves came through the “pondok” system and have little, if any trans-disciplinary or holistic educational experience. They tend to see the world the way that they were taught to see the world through their own education. This has led to great emphasis on Fard’ain (compulsory duties a Muslim must perform such as prayer) aspects of Islam, at the expense of Fard Kifayah (duty out in the world). This “narrow” approach to the holism of Islam may hinder student’s ambitions and abilities to integrate within mainstream Thai society.
Secondly, it is very difficult to get any unified approach as Islamic leaders in Southern Thailand are fragmented and may even be competitive with each other, rather than cooperative. This leaves the community without any answers or any common approach towards problems.
Due to the diversity of interpretation, there are very few safeguards against the infiltration of distorted and fringe views about the meaning of Qu’ranic texts. Although regional Islamic Councils have the responsibility to monitor religious teaching within their regions, there are no requirements for any teachers to conform to any agreed or centralized interpretation. If unchecked, religious schools and ‘pondoks” could become potential breeding grounds of deviant teachings, further isolating students from mainstream Thai society.
For many of Southern Thailand’s Muslim youth, the “pondoks’ have become a refuge where students can drift in and out of society as they feel. Very few students ever get to a university, or acquire the skills to open a business. This tends to reinforce a separate identity rather than students encompassing the aims and values of the general community.
The above is compounded by the generally poor standard of national curricula education. Students that complete their education within the Islamic school system are at great disadvantage to those who have attended secular schools focusing purely on the national curriculum. This generally hinders rural Islamic communities participating in the current economic growth and development going on today in Southern Thailand, thus widening the income gap and perpetuating relative poverty among Southern Thai Muslim communities.
If this gap continues to widen, this may lead to some groups questioning the equity distribution of Thailand, which could potentially lead to some form of resentment, or allow other groups to take advantage of the situation through introducing new dogma into the community. However as of today there are no links with the fragmented insurgency groups in the troubled provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala. This is fundamentally a separate and little acknowledged problem.
Funding, and in particular the lack of grants and donations coming into these schools is causing immense hardships. In some “pondoks” the students have to buy and cook their own meals and build accommodation at their own expense. Yet, despite all the hardship, the students are happy and ever willing to stay at the school as long as they feel the need for a Muslim education.
Islamic schools in Southern Thailand are neglected, and this is of particular concern when education is a major contributor to the capacity of any community to improve general wellbeing. With international agencies unaware or ignoring the problem, the gap in assistance has meant that schools are open to any potential benefactors who are willing to assist. One group that has moved into this vacuum is the Pakistan based Taliban, now funding a number of schools around the Southern provinces, where these funds are gratefully accepted.
In addition, Islamic schools have not been successful in protecting youth from “morally corrupting forces”. Islamic schools have just been able to reinforce certain Muslim cultural characteristics, rather than develop deep Islamic identities.
Government agencies are pushing harder to make sure the schools are keeping up with the standard. But a corrupted educational system, politics, the inertia of Thai culture, and in some cases negative sympathy towards neglected schools hinder standards enforcement, thus reducing Islamic schools general competitiveness even further. Many Islamic schools circumvent the standard enforcement process by documenting exaggerated school discipline, standard conformity, academic success to pass the official audits. So far there has been no appetite to take the educational QA process as an effective tool for improving sustainable educational quality.
Some fault lies with the communities themselves. Islamic schools have become extremely competitive among themselves, destroying any potential for cooperation. More importantly there are many barriers for any leader to emerge and unify the community on matters of education. Ironically some have had the chance but not taken it, depriving the community with a voice and a will to evolve with the rest of society and advance Islamic education. As a consequence many Islamic communities look to their various community and religious leaders, leading to political fragmentation of the community.
From a geopolitical perspective there doesn’t appear to be any link between donations from Taliban sources and any developing militant philosophy on the part of the schools. However, this issue shows up the problems that the US “war on terror” should be dealing with around the world, but is failing to recognize, let alone act upon. The war on terror can only be won through assisting in the education and development of Muslim communities around the world and not by drone warfare which is apparently the method of choice by the US administration today. What is happening in Southern Thailand shows a need for policy re-evaluation.
There are large numbers of Southern Thai Muslims who would prefer a religious based education and this is a basic human right. However it is also important that the best possible well-rounded education is provided if Southern Thai Muslim youth are to be empowered to become citizens contributing to the communities they belong to. This is not calling for them to adopt the same growth paradigms other pursue, but rather seeing the need to empower today’s youth to participate in economic, social, and spiritual development the Islamic way. Without attention the students mind will be easily infiltrated by militant ideas, which Taliban is gradually doing. Development agencies must see this need before the potential problems outlined above fester into realities that will be much more complex to repair in the future.
The Taliban may now understand that the battle for “hearts and minds” is an important facet of their international strategy. Note this is very different to their own domestic strategies. They have opened up philanthropy as a new front in the “war on terror” to nurture and win sympathy among the world Islamic community or Ummah.
Is there anybody out there willing and able to compete?

Reef and Relations: Is the Philippines-US Alliance Finally Maturing?

Reef and Relations: Is the Philippines-US Alliance Finally Maturing?: $0.00
Title By Alpha:


Reef and Relations: Is the Philippines-US Alliance Finally Maturing?








$0.00



Julio S. Amador III






Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 202






Publisher:

Washington, D.C.: East-West Center




Copyright Date:


Tue, 2013-02-26






pCopyright:
February 26, 2013













Binding:
electronic






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