Feb 2, 2010

Surveillance Can't Make Us Secure

H Street Bridge Surveillance Camera (Washingto...Image by takomabibelot via Flickr

January 29, 2010

In a major speech on Internet freedom last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged American tech companies to "take a proactive role in challenging foreign governments' demands for censorship and surveillance." Her call to action followed a series of dazzlingly sophisticated cyberattacks against online giant Google and more than thirty other major technology companies, believed to originate in the People's Republic of China. Few observers have found the Chinese government's staunch denials of involvement persuasive--but the attacks should also spur our own government to review the ways our burgeoning surveillance state has made us more vulnerable.

The Google hackers appear to have been interested in, among other things, gathering information about Chinese dissidents and human rights activists--and they evidently succeeded in obtaining account information and e-mail subject lines for a number of Gmail users. While Google is understandably reluctant to go into detail about the mechanics of the breach, a source at the company told ComputerWorld "they apparently were able to access a system used to help Google comply with [US] search warrants by providing data on Google users." In other words, a portal set up to help the American government catch criminals may have proved just as handy at helping the Chinese government find dissidents.

In a way, the hackers' strategy makes perfect sense. Communications networks are generally designed to restrict outside access to their users' private information. But the goal of government surveillance is to create a breach-by-design, a deliberate backdoor into otherwise carefully secured systems. The appeal to an intruder is obvious: Why waste time with retail hacking of many individual targets when you can break into the network itself and spy wholesale?

The Google hackers are scarcely the first to exploit such security holes. In the summer of 2004, unknown intruders managed to activate wiretapping software embedded in the systems of Greece's largest cellular carrier. For ten months, the hackers eavesdropped on the cellphone calls of more than 100 prominent citizens--including the prime minister, opposition members of parliament, and high cabinet officials.

It's hard to know just how many other such instances there are, because Google's decision to go public is quite unusual: companies typically have no incentive to spook customers (or invite hackers) by announcing a security breach. But the little we know about the existing surveillance infrastructure does not inspire great confidence.

Consider the FBI's Digital Collection System Network, or DCSNet. Via a set of dedicated, encrypted lines plugged directly into the nation's telecom hubs, DCSNet is designed to allow authorized law enforcement agents to initiate a wiretap or gather information with point-and-click simplicity. Yet a 2003 internal audit, released several years later under a freedom-of-information request, found a slew of problems in the system's setup that appalled security experts. Designed with external threats in mind, it had few safeguards against an attack assisted by a Robert Hanssen-style accomplice on the inside. We can hope those problems have been resolved by now. But if new vulnerabilities are routinely discovered in programs used by millions, there's little reason to hope that bespoke spying software can be rendered airtight.

Of even greater concern, though, are the ways the government has encouraged myriad private telecoms and Internet providers to design for breach.

The most obvious means by which this is happening is direct legal pressure. State-sanctioned eavesdroppers have always been able to demand access to existing telecommunications infrastructure. But the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 went further, requiring telephone providers to begin building networks ready-made for easy and automatic wiretapping. Federal regulators recently expanded that requirement to cover broadband and many voice-over-Internet providers. The proposed SAFETY Act of 2009 would compound the security risk by requiring Internet providers to retain users' traffic logs for at least two years, just in case law enforcement should need to browse through them.

A less obvious, but perhaps more serious factor is the sheer volume of surveillance the government now engages in. If government data caches contain vast quantities of information unrelated to narrow criminal investigations--routinely gathered in the early phases of an investigation to identify likely targets--attackers will have much greater incentive to expend time and resources on compromising them. The FBI's database now contains billions of records from a plethora of public and private sources, much of it gathered in the course of broad, preliminary efforts to determine who merits further investigation. The sweeping, programmatic NSA surveillance authorized by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 has reportedly captured e-mails from the likes of former President Bill Clinton.

The volume of requests from both federal and state law enforcement has also put pressure on telecoms to automate their processes for complying with government information requests. In a leaked recording from the secretive ISS World surveillance conference held back in October, Sprint/Nextel's head of surveillance described how the company's L-Site portal was making it possible to deal with the ballooning demand for information:

"My major concern is the volume of requests. We have a lot of things that are automated, but that's just scratching the surface.... Like with our GPS tool. We turned it on--the web interface for law enforcement--about one year ago last month, and we just passed 8 million requests. So there is no way on earth my team could have handled 8 million requests from law enforcement, just for GPS alone. So the [L-Site portal] has just really caught on fire with law enforcement. They also love that it is extremely inexpensive to operate and easy, so, just the sheer volume of requests.... They anticipate us automating other features, and I just don't know how we'll handle the millions and millions of requests that are going to come in."

Behold the vicious cycle. Weakened statutory standards have made it easier and more attractive for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to seek information from providers. On top of the thousands of wiretap and so-called "pen/trap" orders approved each year, there are tens of thousands of National Security Letters and subpoenas. At the ISS World conference, a representative of Cricket, one of the smaller wireless providers, estimated that her company gets 200 law enforcement requests per day, all told; giants like Verizon have said they receive "tens of thousands" annually. (Those represent distinct legal demands for information; Sprint's "8 million" refers to individual electronic requests for updates on a target's location.)

Telecoms respond to the crush of requests by building a faster, more seamless, more user-friendly process for dealing with those requests--further increasing the appeal of such tools to law enforcement. Unfortunately, insecurity loves company: more information flowing to more legitimate users is that much more difficult to lock down effectively. Later in his conference, the Sprint representative at ISS World speculated that someone who mocked up a phony legal request and faxed it to a random telecom would have a good chance of getting it answered. The recipients just can't thoroughly vet every request they get.

We've gotten so used to the "privacy/security tradeoff" that it's worth reminding ourselves, every now and again, that surrendering privacy does not automatically make us more secure--that systems of surveillance can themselves be a major source of insecurity. Hillary Clinton is absolutely right that tech companies seeking to protect Internet freedom should begin "challenging foreign governments' demands for censorship and surveillance." But her entreaty contains precisely one word too many.

About Julian Sanchez

Julian Sanchez is a research fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor for Reason magazine. You can read his personal blog here
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Talking to the Taliban, Again

Peace SignImage by Lorri37 via Flickr

posted by Robert Dreyfuss on 02/02/2010

Is there any chance that the logjam on negotiating an end to the war in Afghanistan is loosening up? You might think so, from the spate of reports that various parties -- including the United Nations and the government of Afghanistan -- are serious about reconciliation talks with Taliban officials. So far, however, the United States seems to be taking a hands-off attitude.

Let's review the bidding.

Depictions of Peace From Kandahar, Afghanistan...Image by Canada in Afghanistan / Canada en Afghanistan via Flickr

In six weeks or so, President Karzai of Afghanistan -- yes, that supposedly discredited figure who stayed in power by rigging last summer's election -- will convene a grand tribal council, or loya jirga, to seek a broad pact of reconciliation that, he says, is meant to include Afghan leaders of the Taliban. To the horror and consternation of US officials, who say that they support "reintegration" of the Taliban's fighters into Afghan society but oppose "reconciliation" with the Taliban as an organization, Karzai is offering to deal with the Taliban all the way to the top, including Mullah Omar, the one-eyed thug and would-be caliph who holds the loyalty of many if not most Taliban insurgents.

Yesterday, M. Masoom Stanekzai, the Afghan official in charge of reconcilation efforts, pooh-poohed reports that the Taliban was denying that talks are underway. He said:

"There are some contacts, and contacts will continue on the local, national and broader political level, but it is too eaerly to speak about the outcome of those contacts."

A possible signal of more breakthroughs to come occurred when the UN, with US support, removed five former Taliban officials, including former Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Mutawakil, from the blacklist that placed them under sanctions. While the exact connection of these officials to the Taliban, including Mullah Omar, today is unclear, there is hope that the UN action is a step toward loosening sanctions on hundreds of other members of the Taliban, paving the way to more productive talks.

Depictions of Peace From Kandahar, Afghanistan...Image by Canada in Afghanistan / Canada en Afghanistan via Flickr

In early January, Kai Eide, the outgoing UN representative in Afghanistan -- who has been all along a consistent advocate for talking to the Taliban -- met with several representatives of the Taliban, although, as the New York Times reported:

"Most of the important details of the meeting were unknown: exactly when and where the meeting took place; what, if anything, was agreed upon; and who represented the Taliban."

And the Times added:

"American leaders have begun to search for a road that could eventually lead to a political settlement with the Taliban's leaders."

Is that true? For any talks with the Taliban to succeed, the United States will not only have to swallow the idea that top- and middle-level Taliban chiefs will be welcomed back in Afghan politics and given a share of power, but Washington will also have to put on the table a plan for withdrawing US forces from the conflict to sweeten the deal. Perhaps, President Obama's pledge to start pulling US forces out of Afghanistan by July 2011 could serve as the opening gambit to get talks with the Taliban going.

According to Arnaud de Borchgrave, the ultraconservative commentator and columnist, Obama is sending General James Jones, the national security adviser, to Pakistan to find out what kind of role Pakistan could play in ending the war. More importantly, he says that during his recent tour of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Gates came to the reluctant conclusion that ending the war means rebalancing the Afghan government in a way that takes both Indian and Pakistani interests into account, which happens to be exactly right. Says de Borchgrave:

"All the talk is how to end the Afghan war, not how to win it. ... For U.S. Defense Secretary Bob Gates, just back from India and Pakistan, a power-sharing compromise in Kabul is the only way to cut short a war that no longer has the support of the American people."

The attitude of Pakistan is, and will be, crucial. Yesterday, General Kiyani, the Pakistani chief of staff -- whose command and its intelligence service, the ISI, have long supported the Taliban -- suggested that Pakistan might be willing to train Afghan security forces in order to help stabilize the country. Reading the intentions of the Pakistani army and ISI are difficult, since they are notorious liars, but it just might be that Kiyani is making a serious offer here. If Pakistan does engage in training Afghan forces, it might create a dynamic in which Pakistan needs to rely less on the Taliban for influence in Afghanistan, and thus Pakistan might be willing to coax the Taliban, or parts of it, to the bargaining table.

Kiyani, speaking to reporters, said:

"We want to have strategic depth in Afghanistan, but that does not imply controlling it. If we have a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan, automatically we will have our strategic depth because our western border will be secure, and we will not be looking at two fronts."

His offer to train Afghan forces is "being considered by US and Afghan officials," according to the Times, which added that "Kiyani's offer appeared to be in part driven by a desire to limit the influence in Afghanistan of India." Well, duh.

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America's Secret Afghan Prisons

Prison AfghanistanImage by Truthout.org via Flickr

January 28, 2010

The research for this story was supported by the Fund for Investigative Journalism. This article also appears online at TomDispatch.com. You can listen to an interview with Anand Gopal here.


One quiet, wintry night last year in the eastern Afghan town of Khost, a young government employee named Ismatullah simply vanished. He had last been seen in the town's bazaar with a group of friends. Family members scoured Khost's dusty streets for days. Village elders contacted Taliban commanders in the area who were wont to kidnap government workers, but they had never heard of the young man. Even the governor got involved, ordering his police to round up nettlesome criminal gangs that sometimes preyed on young bazaargoers for ransom.

But the hunt turned up nothing. Spring and summer came and went with no sign of Ismatullah. Then one day, long after the police and village elders had abandoned their search, a courier delivered a neat handwritten note on Red Cross stationery to the family. In it, Ismatullah informed them that he was in Bagram, an American prison more than 200 miles away. US forces had picked him up while he was on his way home from the bazaar, the terse letter stated, and he didn't know when he would be freed.

In the past few years Pashtun villagers in Afghanistan's rugged heartland have begun to lose faith in the American project. Many of them can point to the precise moment of this transformation, and it usually took place in the dead of night, when most of the country was fast asleep. In its attempt to stamp out the growing Taliban insurgency and Al Qaeda, the US military has been arresting suspects and sending them to one of a number of secret detention areas on military bases, often on the slightest suspicion and without the knowledge of their families. These night raids have become even more feared and hated in Afghanistan than coalition airstrikes. The raids and detentions, little known or understood outside the Pashtun villages, have been turning Afghans against the very forces many of them greeted as liberators just a few years ago.

One Dark Night in November

November 19, 2009, 3:15 am. A loud blast woke the villagers of a leafy neighborhood outside Ghazni, a city of ancient provenance in the country's south. A team of US soldiers burst through the front gate of the home of Majidullah Qarar, the spokesman for Afghanistan's agriculture minister. Qarar was in Kabul at the time, but his relatives were home, four of them sleeping in the family's one-room guesthouse. One of them, Hamidullah, who sold carrots at the local bazaar, ran toward the door of the guesthouse. He was immediately shot but managed to crawl back inside, leaving a trail of blood behind him. Then Azim, a baker, darted toward his injured cousin. He, too, was shot and crumpled to the floor. The fallen men cried out to the two relatives--both of them children--remaining in the room. But they refused to move, glued to their beds in silent horror.

The foreign soldiers, most of them tattooed and bearded, then went on to the main compound. They threw clothes on the floor, smashed dinner plates and forced open closets. Finally they found the man they were looking for: Habib-ur-Rahman, a computer programmer and government employee. Rahman was responsible for converting Microsoft Windows from English to the local Pashto language so that government offices could use the software. The Afghan translator accompanying the soldiers said they were acting on a tip that Rahman was a member of Al Qaeda.

They took the barefoot Rahman and a cousin to a helicopter some distance away and transported them to a small American base in a neighboring province for interrogation. After two days, US forces released Rahman's cousin. But Rahman has not been seen or heard from since.

"We've called his phone, but it doesn't answer," said his cousin Qarar, the agriculture minister's spokesman. Using his powerful connections, Qarar enlisted local police, parliamentarians, the governor and even the agriculture minister himself in the search for his cousin, but they turned up nothing. Government officials who independently investigated the scene in the aftermath of the raid and corroborated the claims of the family also pressed for an answer as to why two of Qarar's family members were killed. American forces issued a statement saying that the dead were "enemy militants [who] demonstrated hostile intent."

Weeks after the raid, the family remains bitter. "Everyone in the area knew we were a family that worked for the government," Qarar said. "Rahman couldn't even leave the city, because if the Taliban caught him in the countryside they would have killed him."

Beyond the question of Rahman's guilt or innocence, it's how he was taken that has left such a residue of hatred among his family. "Did they have to kill my cousins? Did they have to destroy our house?" Qarar asked. "They knew where Rahman worked. Couldn't they have at least tried to come with a warrant in the daytime? We would have forced Rahman to comply."

"I used to go on TV and argue that people should support this government and the foreigners," he added. "But I was wrong. Why should anyone do so? I don't care if I get fired for saying it, but that's the truth."

The Dogs of War

Night raids are only the first step in the American detention process in Afghanistan. Suspects are usually sent to one of a series of prisons on US military bases around the country. There are officially nine such jails, called Field Detention Sites in military parlance. They are small holding areas, often just a clutch of cells divided by plywood, and are mainly used for prisoner interrogations.

In the early years of the war, these were but way stations for those en route to Bagram prison, a facility with a notorious reputation for abusive behavior. As a spotlight of international attention fell on Bagram in recent years, wardens there cleaned up their act, and the mistreatment of prisoners began to shift to the little-noticed Field Detention Sites.

Of the twenty-four former detainees interviewed for this article, seventeen claim to have been abused at or en route to these sites. Doctors, government officials and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, an independent Afghan body mandated by the Afghan Constitution to investigate abuse allegations, corroborate twelve of these claims.

One of these former detainees is Noor Agha Sher Khan, who used to be a police officer in Gardez, a mud-caked town in the eastern part of the country. According to Sher Khan, American forces detained him in a night raid in 2003 and brought him to a Field Detention Site at a nearby US base. "They interrogated me the whole night," he recalled, "but I had nothing to tell them." Sher Khan worked for a police commander whom US forces had detained on suspicion of having ties to the insurgency. He had occasionally acted as a driver for this commander, which made him suspicious in American eyes.

The interrogators blindfolded him, taped his mouth shut and chained him to the ceiling, he alleges. Occasionally they unleashed a dog, which repeatedly bit him. At one point they removed the blindfold and forced him to kneel on a long wooden bar. "They tied my hands to a pulley [above] and pushed me back and forth as the bar rolled across my shins. I screamed and screamed." They then pushed him to the ground and forced him to swallow twelve bottles of water. "Two people held my mouth open, and they poured water down my throat until my stomach was full and I became unconscious," he said. "It was as if someone had inflated me." After he was roused, he vomited uncontrollably.

This continued for a number of days. Sometimes he was hung upside down from the ceiling, other times he was blindfolded for extended periods. Eventually he was moved to Bagram, where the torture ceased. Four months later he was quietly released, with a letter of apology from US authorities for wrongfully imprisoning him.

An investigation of Sher Khan's case by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and an independent doctor found that he had wounds consistent with the abusive treatment he alleges. American forces have declined to comment on the specifics of his case, but a spokesman said that some soldiers involved in detentions in this part of the country had been given unspecified "administrative punishments." He added that "all detainees are treated humanely," except for isolated cases.

The Disappeared

Some of those taken to the Field Detention Sites are deemed innocuous and never sent to Bagram. Even then, some allege abuse. Such was the case with Hajji Ehsanullah, snatched one winter night in 2008 from his home in the southern province of Zabul. He was taken to a detention site in Khost Province, some 200 miles away. He returned home thirteen days later, his skin scarred by dog bites and with memory difficulties that, according to his doctor, resulted from a blow to the head. American forces had dropped him off at a gas station in Khost after three days of interrogation. It took him ten more days to find his way home.

Others taken to these sites seem to have disappeared entirely. In the hardscrabble villages of the Pashtun south, where rumors grow more abundantly than the most bountiful crop, locals whisper tales of people who were captured and executed. Most have no evidence. But occasionally a body turns up. Such was the case at a detention site on a US military base in Helmand Province, where in 2003 a US military coroner wrote in the autopsy report of a detainee who died in US custody (later made available through the Freedom of Information Act): "Death caused by the multiple blunt force injuries to the lower torso and legs complicated by rhabdomyolysis (release of toxic byproducts into the system due to destruction of muscle). Manner of death is homicide."

In the dust-swept province of Khost one day this past December, US forces launched a night raid on the village of Motai, killing six people and capturing nine, according to nearly a dozen local government authorities and witnesses. Two days later, the bodies of two of those detained--plastic cuffs binding their hands--were found more than a mile from the largest US base in the area. A US military spokesman denies any involvement in the deaths and declines to comment on the details of the raid. Local Afghan officials and tribal elders steadfastly maintain that the two were killed while in US custody. American authorities released four other villagers in subsequent days. The fate of the three remaining captives is unknown.

The matter could be cleared up if the US military were less secretive about its detention process. But secrecy has been the order of the day. The nine Field Detention Sites are enveloped in a blanket of official secrecy, but at least the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations are aware of them. There may, however, be other sites whose existence on the scores of US and Afghan military bases that dot the country have not been disclosed. One example, according to former detainees, is a detention facility at Rish-Khor, an Afghan army base that sits atop a mountain overlooking the capital, Kabul.

One night last year US forces raided Zaiwalat, a tiny village that fits snugly into the mountains of Wardak Province, a few dozen miles west of Kabul, and netted nine locals. They brought the captives to Rish-Khor and interrogated them for three days. "They kept us in a container," recalled Rehmatullah Muhammad, one of the nine. "It was made of steel. We were handcuffed for three days continuously. We barely slept those days." The plain-clothed interrogators accused Muhammad and the others of giving food and shelter to the Taliban. The suspects were then sent to Bagram and released after four months. (A number of former detainees said they were interrogated by plainclothed officials, but they did not know if these officials belonged to the military, the CIA or private contractors.)

Afghan human rights campaigners worry that US forces may be using secret detention sites like the one allegedly at Rish-Khor to carry out interrogations away from prying eyes. The US military, however, denies even having knowledge of the facility.

The Black Jail

Much less secret is the final stop for most captives: the Bagram Theater Internment Facility. These days ominously dubbed "Obama's Guantánamo," Bagram nonetheless now offers the best conditions for captives during the entire detention process.

Its modern life as a prison began in 2002, when small numbers of detainees from throughout Asia were incarcerated there on the first leg of an odyssey that would eventually bring them to the US detention facility in Guantánamo, Cuba. In later years, however, it became the main destination for those caught within Afghanistan as part of the growing war there. By 2009 the inmate population had swelled to more than 700. Housed in a windowless old Soviet hangar, the prison consists of two rows of serried, cagelike cells bathed continuously in light. Guards walk along a platform that runs across the mesh tops of the pens, an easy position from which to supervise the prisoners below.

Regular, even infamous, abuse in the style of Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison marked Bagram's early years. Abdullah Mujahid, for example, was apprehended in the village of Kar Marchi in the eastern province of Paktia in 2003. Although Mujahid was a Tajik militia commander who had led an armed uprising against the Taliban in their waning days, US forces accused him of having ties to the insurgency. "In Bagram we were handcuffed, blindfolded and had our feet chained for days," he recalled. "They didn't allow us to sleep at all for thirteen days and nights." A guard would strike his legs every time he dozed off. Daily, he could hear the screams of tortured inmates and the unmistakable sound of shackles dragging across the floor.

Then one day a team of soldiers dragged him to an aircraft but refused to tell him where he was going. Eventually he landed at another prison, where the air felt thick and wet. As he walked through the row of cages, inmates began to shout, "This is Guantánamo! You are in Guantánamo!" He would learn there that he was accused of leading the Pakistani Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (which in reality was led by another person who had the same name and who died in 2006). The United States eventually released him and returned him to Afghanistan.

Former Bagram detainees allege that they were regularly beaten, subjected to blaring music twenty-four hours a day, prevented from sleeping, stripped naked and forced to assume what interrogators term "stress positions." The nadir came in late 2002, when interrogators beat two inmates to death.

According to former detainees and organizations that work with them, the US Special Forces also run a second, secret prison somewhere on Bagram Air Base that the Red Cross still does not have access to. Used primarily for interrogations, it is so feared by prisoners that they have dubbed it the "Black Jail."

One day two years ago, US forces came to get Noor Muhammad outside the town of Kajaki in the southern province of Helmand. Muhammad, a physician, was running a clinic that served all comers, including the Taliban. The soldiers raided his clinic and his home, killing five people (including two patients) and detaining both his father and him. The next day villagers found the handcuffed body of Muhammad's father, apparently killed by a gunshot.

The soldiers took Muhammad to the Black Jail. "It was a tiny, narrow corridor, with lots of cells on both sides and a big steel gate and bright lights," he said. "We didn't know when it was night and when it was day." He was held in a windowless concrete room in solitary confinement. Soldiers regularly dragged him by his neck and refused him food and water. They accused him of providing medical care to the insurgents, to which he replied, "I am a doctor. It's my duty to provide care to every human being who comes to my clinic, whether they are Taliban or from the government."

Eventually Muhammad was released, but he has since closed his clinic and left his home village. "I am scared of the Americans and the Taliban," he said. "I'm happy my father is dead, so he doesn't have to experience this hell."

Afraid of the Dark

In the past two years American officials have moved to reform the main prison at Bagram, if not the Black Jail. Torture has stopped, and prison officials now boast that the typical inmate gains fifteen pounds while in custody. In the early months of this year, officials plan to open a dazzling new prison that will eventually replace Bagram, one with huge, airy cells, the latest medical equipment and rooms for vocational training. The Bagram prison itself will be handed over to the Afghans in the coming year, although the rest of the detention process will remain in US hands.

But human rights advocates say that concerns about the detention process remain. The US Supreme Court ruled in 2008 that inmates at Guantánamo cannot be stripped of their right to habeus corpus, but it stopped short of making the same argument for Bagram (officials say that since it is in the midst of a war zone, US civil rights legislation does not apply). Inmates there do not have access to a lawyer, as they do in Guantánamo. Most say they have no idea why they have been detained. They do now appear before a review panel every six months, which is intended to reassess their detention, but their ability to ask questions about their situation is limited. "I was only allowed to answer yes or no and not explain anything at my hearing," said former detainee Rehmatullah Muhammad.

Nonetheless, the improvement in Bagram's conditions begs the question: can the United States fight a cleaner war? That's what Afghan war commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal promised last summer: fewer civilian casualties, fewer of the feared house raids and a more transparent detention process.

The American troops that operate under NATO command have begun to enforce stricter rules of engagement: they may now officially hold detainees for only ninety-six hours before transferring them to the Afghan authorities or freeing them, and Afghan forces must take the lead in house searches. American soldiers, when questioned, bristle at these restrictions--and have ways of circumventing them. "Sometimes we detain people, then, when the ninety-six hours are up, we transfer them to the Afghans," said one marine who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "They rough them up a bit for us and then send them back to us for another ninety-six hours. This keeps going until we get what we want."

A simpler way of dancing around the rules is to call in the Special Operations Forces--the Navy SEALs, Green Berets and others--which are not under NATO command and thus not bound by the stricter rules of engagement. These elite troops are behind most of the night raids and detentions in the search for "high-value suspects." Military officials say in interviews that the new restrictions have not affected the number of raids and detentions at all. The actual change, however, is more subtle: the detention process has shifted almost entirely to areas and actors that can best avoid public scrutiny--small field prisons and Special Operations Forces.

The shift signals a deeper reality of war, say American soldiers: you can't fight guerrillas without invasive raids and detentions, any more than you can fight them without bullets. Seen through the eyes of a US soldier, Afghanistan is a scary place. The men are bearded and turbaned. They pray incessantly. In most of the country, women are barred from leaving the house. Many Afghans own an assault rifle. "You can't trust anyone," said Rodrigo Arias, a marine based in the northeastern province of Kunar. "I've nearly been killed in ambushes, but the villagers don't tell us anything. But they usually know something."

An officer who has worked in the Field Detention Sites says that it takes dozens of raids to turn up a useful suspect. "Sometimes you've got to bust down doors. Sometimes you've got to twist arms. You have to cast a wide net, but when you get the right person, it makes all the difference."

For Arias, it's a matter of survival. "I want to go home in one piece. If that means rounding people up, then round them up." To question this, he said, is to question whether the war itself is worth fighting. "That's not my job. The people in Washington can figure that out."

If night raids and detentions are an unavoidable part of modern counterinsurgency warfare, then so is the resentment they breed. "We were all happy when the Americans first came. We thought they would bring peace and stability," said Rehmatullah Muhammad. "But now most people in my village want them to leave." A year after Muhammad was released, his nephew was detained. Two months later, some other residents of Zaiwalat were seized. It has become a predictable pattern in Muhammad's village: Taliban forces ambush American convoys as they pass through it, and then retreat into the thick fruit orchards nearby. The Americans return at night to pick up suspects. In the past two years, sixteen people have been taken and ten killed in night raids in this single village of about 300, according to villagers. In the same period, they say, the insurgents killed one local and did not take anyone hostage.

The people of Zaiwalat now fear the night raids more than the Taliban. There are nights when Muhammad's children hear the distant thrum of a helicopter and rush into his room. He consoles them but admits he needs solace himself. "I know I should be too old for it," he said, "but this war has made me afraid of the dark."

About Anand Gopal

Anand Gopal has reported in Afghanistan for the Christian Science Monitor and the Wall Street Journal. His dispatches can be read at anandgopal.com. He is working on a book about the war in Afghanistan.
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Feb 1, 2010

Dubai’s Burj Khalifa, the world’s tallest building

Dubai reaches for the sky.

by Paul Goldberger


The Burj Khalifa, now the world’s tallest building, is two  thousand seven hundred and seventeen feet high—more than a thousand feet  taller than its nearest rival and roughly twice as high as the Empire  State Building. Photograph by Robert Polidori.

The Burj Khalifa, now the world’s tallest building, is two thousand seven hundred and seventeen feet high—more than a thousand feet taller than its nearest rival and roughly twice as high as the Empire State Building. Photograph by Robert Polidori.

The Burj Khalifa, in Dubai—the new holder of the title of World’s Tallest Building—is no less extravagant a media gesture. Unlike Wright’s design, to which it bears a startling resemblance, this building is very real—all one hundred and sixty stories (or two thousand seven hundred and seventeen feet) of it. For decades, skyscrapers have been topping each other in only small increments: Kuala Lumpur’s Petronas Towers (one thousand four hundred and eighty-two feet) are thirty-two feet taller than Chicago’s Sears Tower (or Willis Tower, as it is now called); the Shanghai World Financial Center is about a hundred and thirty feet taller than the Petronas Towers; Taipei 101, in Taiwan, is fifty feet taller than the Shanghai tower; and so on. But the Burj Khalifa represents a quantum leap over these midgets. Even if you put the Chrysler Building on top of the Empire State Building, that still wouldn’t equal its height.

As with most super-tall buildings, function is hardly the point of the Burj Khalifa. Certainly, it’s not as if there weren’t enough land to build on in Dubai, or any need for more office or residential space, after a decade-long construction spree that makes the excesses of Florida look almost prudent. Dubai doesn’t have as much oil as some other emirates, and saw a way to make itself rich by turning an expanse of sand beside the Arabian Gulf into an all-in-one business center, resort, and haven for flight capital. When the tower was first planned, by Emaar Properties, a real-estate entity partly owned by the government, it was called Burj Dubai, which means Dubai Tower—just in case anyone might have missed the fact that the world’s most high-flying, come-from-nowhere city was also home to the world’s tallest building. But, while the building was going up, growth in Dubai ground to a halt, leaving much of the new real estate unoccupied and unsold. This past November, Dubai ran out of money, was unable to make payments on sixty billion dollars’ worth of debt, and had to be rescued by a ten-billion-dollar bailout from Abu Dhabi, the conservative, oil-rich emirate next door. At the building’s opening, Dubai announced that the skyscraper would bear the name of Abu Dhabi’s ruler, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan. It’s as if Goldman Sachs were to rename its new headquarters the Warren Buffett Tower.

Dubai is unlike any other city, but imagine a cross between Hong Kong and Las Vegas that tries to operate as if it were Switzerland, and you begin to get the idea. There are more glitzy glass towers than you can count, many of them put up not so much to house people or businesses as to give to rich Indians, Russians, Iranians, and Southeast Asians a place to park some cash away from nosy local governments. Given the general level of tackiness on display—not to mention the often appalling living conditions of Dubai’s armies of migrant construction workers—the Burj Khalifa should be an easy building to loathe, and the embarrassing way that its completion coincided with the near-meltdown of Dubai’s economy makes it easy to mock as a symbol of hubris. And yet the Burj Khalifa turns out to be far more sophisticated, even subtle, than one might expect. The tower is a shimmering silver needle, its delicacy as startling as its height. You would think that anything this huge would dominate the sky, but the Burj Khalifa punctuates it instead.

The tower was designed by the architect Adrian Smith and the engineer William Baker, both of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill. (Smith left the firm during construction, and Baker and his colleagues George Efstathiou and Eric Tomich saw the project through to completion.) Skidmore has built plenty of iconic skyscrapers before. A generation ago, its architect-engineer team Bruce Graham and Fazlur Khan revolutionized skyscraper design with the “bundled tube” structure of the Sears Tower. The Burj doesn’t use bundled tubes, though to look at it from the outside you might think it did. From a distance it looks like a cluster of variously sized metal rods, the tallest at the center. The building has a Y-shaped floor plan, with three lobes buttressing a hexagonal central core, which houses the elevators. The structure provides a lot of exterior walls with windows overlooking the Gulf and the desert. The first twenty or so floors are fairly bulky, giving the building a wide stance on the ground, but as it rises there is a spiralling sequence of setbacks. By the time you get about a third of the way to the top, the tower has gracefully metamorphosed into a slender building, and it keeps on narrowing until only a central section remains.

One advantage of this configuration is that, because the building’s shape varies at each level, wind cannot create an organized vortex around it, and stress on the structure is thereby reduced. The setbacks, the Skidmore team likes to say, “confuse the wind.” But the design has an aesthetic virtue, too, giving the Burj Khalifa, for all its twenty-first-century ingenuity, a lyrical profile that calls to mind the skyscrapers of eighty or ninety years ago. The defining towers of the New York sky line, at least before the Second World War, were skinny compared with today’s skyscrapers, and their vertical lines gave intense visual pleasure. We’ve sacrificed all that for efficiency: office tenants today want lots of horizontal space, which means huge, open floors and stocky, inelegant towers. The Burj Khalifa has three million square feet of interior space, which sounds like a lot, but in fact it is four hundred thousand square feet less than the Shanghai World Financial Center, which is fifty-nine stories shorter. Even the MetLife Building, less than a third of the height of the Burj, has 2.4 million square feet. The Burj Khalifa can afford not to care about square footage because, notwithstanding a few small, high-priced office suites on the narrow floors at the top, it isn’t an office building. Most of the building is given over to condominium apartments. (At the bottom, there will be a hotel designed and managed by Giorgio Armani.) The decision to make most of the building residential speaks volumes about the extent to which Dubai’s economy has been based on the sale of condominiums to absentee owners for investment. Whether or not the decision to fill the tower with apartments made economic sense, it was certainly the right thing to do architecturally. The profile of the Burj has a magnetism that is lacking in almost every other super-tall building of our time. Furthermore, the tower doesn’t indulge in the showy engineering tricks that have become so common today; it doesn’t get wider as it rises, or lean to one side, or appear to be made of broken shards. There is something appealing about a building that relies on the most advanced engineering but doesn’t flaunt it.

The Burj Khalifa, like most super-tall skyscrapers, looks best from afar, and, certainly, it can’t do much to mitigate the real horror of Dubai, which isn’t the fact that most of the towers look gaudy on the sky line but that they are wretched at street level. This is a city that has grown with utter hostility to the idea of the street. The main commercial thoroughfare, Sheikh Zayed Road, lined with skyscrapers, is a twelve-lane highway. It’s impossible to get anywhere here without a car, and there is no place to walk except inside a mall. The city is completing a transit system, and there are some strikingly handsome, glass-enclosed elevated stations, but it is an idealized version of a Western-style metro, dropped onto an urban plan designed solely for the automobile; it’s hard to believe that it will make much difference. The biggest group of pedestrians I saw in five days was on the promenade outside the Dubai Mall, where people gather to look across an artificial lagoon at the Burj Khalifa while watching fountains dance to Middle Eastern music. To them, the Burj is a backdrop for a show.

Then again, almost everything in Dubai is a kind of visual spectacle intended to make you gawk. You can’t justify the Burj Khalifa by the standards that apply to most commercial buildings. But that’s nothing new. Buildings put up to garner titles like “the world’s tallest” or “the world’s second-tallest” are usually erected in cities that have reached a critical juncture in their maturity, and which want to assert their position for the first time on the world stage. The Woolworth Building, the Chrysler Building, and the Empire State Building, each of which was the world’s tallest for a time, were all put up to announce the primacy of their city to the world, and they succeeded. That’s just what Asian and Middle Eastern countries are trying to do now. You don’t build this kind of skyscraper to house people, or to give tourists a view, or even, necessarily, to make a profit. You do it to make sure the world knows who you are.

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Obama’s confident State of the Union speech

February 8, 2010

by Hendrik Hertzberg


President Obama’s first State of the Union address came at the end of the most harrowing nine days of his young Administration. On January 19th, a Republican won the Massachusetts seat that had been held for nearly half a century by Edward M. Kennedy, thereby depriving the Senate Democrats of the sixtieth vote they need to pass legislation. A headline on the Web site of the Village Voice summarized the situation tartly and smartly: “SCOTT BROWN WINS MASS. RACE, GIVING GOP 41-59 MAJORITY.” In the aftermath, as the Brookings scholar Henry J. Aaron wrote in National Journal, “the White House and many Congressional Democrats seemed almost as shattered psychologically as the Haitians were physically after their catastrophic earthquake.”

The President doesn’t do shattered, but he was plainly discombobulated. When he was asked by George Stephanopoulos about the fate of health-care reform, he shilly-shallied. “The Senate certainly shouldn’t try to jam anything through until Scott Brown is seated,” he said. “People in Massachusetts spoke. He’s got to be part of that process.” He added, feebly, “I would advise that we try to move quickly to coalesce around those elements of the package that people agree on.” (Perhaps he had momentarily forgotten that it’s the Senate that’s supposed to advise, if not necessarily to consent. A President is supposed to lead.) A few days later, he proposed a three-year “freeze,” beginning in 2011, on discretionary, non-entitlement, non-national-security spending—about one-eighth of the federal budget. Aides quickly explained that the freeze would not be “across-the-board”—that funds would be shifted from ineffective programs to effective ones. Even so, just about everyone outside the Republican congressional caucus recognizes that, with unemployment at ten per cent, the near-term need is for more public spending—more stimulus, not less. The proposal had the look of a political gimmick and the smell of political fear.

By the time he glided into the House chamber on January 27th, Obama had recovered his balance, and then some. He looked and sounded like a trillion bucks—surplus, not deficit. He appeared to be in an unusually relaxed, even bouncy mood. He exuded confidence. The speech he delivered was no literary masterpiece (though by State of the Union standards it was downright Nabokovian), but it was a small triumph of tone and subtle theatrics. Despite the grandiosity of the setting—the curlicued proscenium, the massed dignitaries, the absurd aerobics of the endless standing ovations—the President managed to create a surprisingly intimate, almost conversational effect, as if the well of the House were a fireside and he was having a chat. With humor, reasonableness, and a touch of sarcasm, he invited the Republican grandees in the audience to play the role of straight man, so to speak, and they obliged: row upon row of pale, middle-aged white men, unmoving and unmoved, frowning or smirking at every Presidential request for coöperation.

The bulk of Obama’s speech was devoted, rightly, to job creation. But its most telling and important moment may have been the relatively brief section on health care, the problem that has consumed much of the Administration’s first year. He invited Republicans to suggest “a better approach that will bring down premiums, bring down the deficit, cover the uninsured, strengthen Medicare for seniors, and stop insurance company abuses”—knowing full well, of course, that they have no such approach. But he did not surrender, and he did not repeat his suggestion that reform be pared down to “elements” that “people” like. He explained why his plan would be “a vast improvement over the status quo” and issued this demand, framed as a challenge to the whole Congress but aimed squarely at his fellow-Democrats:



Don’t walk away from reform. Not now. Not when we are so close. Let us find a way to come together and finish the job for the American people. Let’s get it done. Let’s get it done.

So, so close. By the beginning of this year, both the House of Representatives and the Senate had passed comprehensive, broadly similar health-care bills. By mid-January, Democratic negotiators had nearly reached agreement on melding the two bills into one. All that remained was putting the finishing touches on the combined bill and, in both Houses, the formality of a final vote.

Post-Massachusetts, the Democratic caucus claims “only” fifty-nine senators out of a hundred—still the largest majority either party has held in thirty years and, as a percentage, precisely the same size as the Democrats’ majority in the House. But, thanks to the filibuster and to the great stone face of the monolithic Republican No, any new health-care bill that requires a standard floor vote in the Senate—indeed, any effort at health-care reform, however pared down, that could be interpreted as an accomplishment for Obama and his party—is out of the question. At this point, there is only one way to “get it done,” and only the Democrats can do it. That way is (a) for the Democrats of the House to ratify the Senate’s already-passed bill and (b) for the Democrats of the Senate to ratify whatever elements of the defunct compromise can qualify for action via a well-established procedure—“reconciliation” —under which legislative provisions that have more than “merely incidental” effects on government outlays or revenues cannot be filibustered. Reconciliation is arcane but effective, and thoroughly “bipartisan”: the Republicans used it to enact tax cuts for the comfortable, the heart of George W. Bush’s domestic program as surely as health-care reform is the heart of Barack Obama’s.

On Friday, President Obama went to Baltimore, where the House Republicans were having their annual retreat, and led them in what turned out to be, amazingly, a relatively civilized, relatively substantive discussion, mostly about health care. His passion for comity appears to be genuine. But so does his commitment to do everything he can, in the face of America’s increasingly dysfunctional governmental mechanisms and increasingly rancorous political culture, to bring about the kind of change he was elected to pursue. The discussion in Baltimore was pleasant. The day before, however, the Senate had taken a vote on extending the federal debt limit. All the Republicans voted no. That is to say, all of them voted for the United States to repudiate its obligations and go into default. That was not so pleasant.

If the President and the Democrats of Congress fail to enact health-care reform while they still have a real chance to do so, it’s hard to see how they will be able to do anything else. The damage to their ability to govern—the damage to the ability of the country to govern itself—will be severe. “I would remind you,” the President said Wednesday night, admonishing the members of his own party, “that we still have the largest majority in decades, and the people expect us to solve problems, not run for the hills.” The President made stirring music on Capitol Hill, but those other hills are alive with the sound of doom.

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How Nadia François survived the earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

by Jon Lee Anderson

February 8, 2010


Nadia François walks miles to town from a ravine in the hills in  search of supplies. Photograph by João Pina.

Nadia François walks miles to town from a ravine in the hills in search of supplies. Photograph by João Pina.

On the morning of Monday, January 18th, I set out with Frantz Ewald, a Haitian-born painter, to drive into Port-au-Prince from the hilltop suburb of Pétionville, where I was staying. It had been six days since the earthquake struck, and the city was still in chaos. As rescuers hacked at the rubble, looking for survivors, residents were out on the streets searching for water, for food, and for fuel. In Pétionville, a gas station had opened for business, and that morning a long line of cars formed; mixed among them were men and women on foot, holding plastic jerricans and waiting anxiously for their turn at the pump. An elderly woman came up to the people in line and asked politely for help. The charred corpse of a man, said to be a thief, lay at the curbside across the street, in front of a bank. His head was crushed and his legs were strangely folded behind him, and a small pile of rubbish was gathering around him. As people walked past, they cupped their hands over their noses and mouths because of the smell. A few feet away, young touts sold scratch cards for a mobile-phone company to passing motorists.

Frantz and I were in his black Toyota pickup truck, and we had not gone far when we braked to allow a group of teen-agers to cross the street in front of us. They were being led by a tall young woman in a white tunic and a long black skirt. They trailed behind her as if she were some kind of Pied Piper. As they passed in front of us, she gave us a sidelong glance of polite recognition, and we carried on.

Four or five hours later, in the flatlands at the edge of the Port-au-Prince airport, we saw the young woman and her followers again. She was standing amid a scrum of onlookers outside the gates of the airport, where U.N. and American planes were landing on the airstrip beyond the little terminal building. We stopped and hailed her, and she spoke to us, surprisingly, in English, with a Southern drawl. She said that her name was Nadia François and she was from Delmas 75—a neighborhood five miles back up into the hills. She had come down, she said, in representation of some three hundred people there who were in need of help. She handed us a paper with a handwritten message that attested to her mission, signed and stamped by a Protestant pastor. Nadia had led her group down to the airport after hearing that the U.S. military was handing out food.

We told Nadia and her companions—there were nine of them—to hop into the back of the truck, and we set off to look for food. Despite the rumors, which had attracted several hundred Haitians to the road by the airport, to gather and stare hopefully, no food was being given out there. We drove onto a nearby field where there were tent camps and aid supplies, demarcated with a dozen or more national flags, but it was a bivouac, not a food-distribution point. We asked a U.N. peacekeeper where to find aid; he said he didn’t know. Someone told us that food was being handed out at a factory nearby, where the Dominicans had set up a base, and so we drove there.

The earliest and most visible relief presence in Haiti had come from the neighboring Dominican Republic. When I first entered Haiti, in the early morning of January 15th, I had been waved across the border with a long stream of vehicles carrying relief supplies. There was also a convoy of trucks, driven by soldiers, that were inscribed with messages that the relief had been dispatched as a personal gesture by the Dominican President, Leonel Fernández.

Now a vast international aid effort was beginning to establish itself. Humanitarian assistance and rescue teams were appearing daily from all over the world—from Spain, France, Russia, Israel, Venezuela, and Cuba, as well as the United States. A team of yellow-shirted Scientologists showed up, as did one from the order of the Knights of Malta. Countless tons of supplies had been flown in or were on their way. But the distribution of food was scattershot, and every outlet was swamped with desperate crowds. All over the city, banners and signs painted on sheets asked for aid. Only the patient and motivated seemed to be getting it.

Nadia said she had grown up in Miami with her family. She was thirty-six, “going on thirty-seven,” she said, and had been back in Haiti for only the past two years. I asked her why she had returned. She gave a rueful smile and said she had “been bad” and had had “immigration difficulties.” In the past week, she had become a principal means of support for her community. Every day, she’d come into the center of town and tried to return with food and other essentials.

At the Dominican food depot, a detail of Peruvian U.N. peacekeepers nervously clutched acrylic shields and assault rifles as they tried to hold back a large crowd of Haitians who had gathered at both sides of the gated entrance. The soldiers were harried and flushed, and they yelled when we pulled up to talk to them, as if they had been deafened by the noise of the crowd. We persuaded them to let us through, and inside we found a tumultuous scene: trucks came and went, and civilians who had slipped through the cordon mingled with Haitian police, Dominican soldiers, and dozens of yellow-T-shirted volunteers for Haiti’s Ministry of the Feminine Condition—a legacy of the populist Presidency of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. An official from the ministry was standing in the loading bay of the warehouse, where relief supplies were being piled haphazardly onto trucks.

The aid consisted of plastic bags with the essentials to sustain a single family for a day: rice, cornmeal, beans, sardines, and Vienna sausages. The official wore a decorative print dress with a matching head scarf and large sunglasses, and she spoke intently and continuously on a cell phone. Around her, arguments erupted as unauthorized people tried to sneak through the final barrier to get to the food in the loading bay. A fierce-looking woman wearing a bandanna came in and began screaming that she wanted food. A soldier pushed her. She yelled at him, and he shoved her again. He protested that the woman had been there the day before and was making off with the supplies to sell them.

A hapless-looking Dominican Army colonel was trying to oversee the proceedings. He gave Nadia’s group permission to take some food, and then added, a little apologetically, that he was under orders to distribute food through the Haitian government, and therefore could not take it directly to the people in the city. He led us to the ministry official, who removed her cell phone from her ear and listened as we pled the case. She looked sternly at Nadia, nodded in assent, and went back to her phone.

We loaded the pickup with seventy or eighty bags and secured them with yellow plastic cargo webbing, and then made for the gates. Outside, the throng was bigger, and the soldiers had grown agitated. They yelled at us to go fast and not to stop for anything, because the people would overwhelm our vehicle in order to get the food. We gunned the pickup and made it past the crowd; on the way into the hills, we drove cautiously through back streets. After a few miles, we stopped on a middle-class street, fringed with shade trees, where there was a gap between houses at a bend in the road. A crude patchwork awning of sheets and tarps stretched across the gap, and underneath were a large number of women and children, living on mats that had been laid over the pavement.

At the far edge of the awning, the street ended, and the ground fell sharply away. Below, in a ravine twenty or thirty feet deep and about a hundred feet across, was Nadia’s community, Fidel—named after Fidel Castro, she said—where she and three hundred other people normally lived. (Delmas 75, I realized, corresponded to the street that ran past the ravine and appeared on city maps; Fidel itself was off the grid.) It was a dry, stone-filled riverbed, filled with a geometry of cinder-block and tin-scrap dwellings, one of which was her house, a twelve-foot-square cinder-block structure that she rented for the equivalent of about three hundred U.S. dollars a year.

Most of the residents of Fidel had moved up to the street to sleep under the awning. They were frightened by the continuing aftershocks, and did not want to be caught in the ravine if there was another earthquake. Nadia pointed to a broken section of rock-and-block wall on the far cliff edge; I could see the outlines of an unfinished residential development there. Nadia said that the residents of Fidel had asked the developer not to put the wall so close to the edge of the cliff, but he had ignored them. During the earthquake, a section of the wall had collapsed on top of Nadia’s neighbor, hitting her on the head and killing her.

Beside the truck, Nadia called out for help, and soon a group of young men and boys began to carry the bags of food down into a small rudimentary Protestant church, the Église Pancotista Sous Delovy. The church, built into the side of the cliff, was made of sheets of salvaged corrugated tin, painted blue and pink. The altar and benches were down a steep concrete staircase, at the bottom of what seemed almost like a well. As Nadia called out orders to the youths, the pastor, Jean Vieux Villers, vowed that he would see that the food was fairly distributed; everyone seemed happy with this arrangement.

Fidel was settled thirty-two years ago, according to Verner Lionel, a neighbor of Nadia’s, when the area above the ravines was developed. Lionel was considered a leader in Fidel, because, at fifty-two, he was the oldest man there. Like many other men in Fidel, he was an itinerant construction worker and jack-of-all-trades. He had come there in the nineteen-seventies, as a worker for a developer, a woman he called Prosper, who allowed him to build a shack for himself in the ravine. “Mine was the first house,” he said. Friends and relatives of Lionel from the countryside followed him to the ravine, and then others came. Today there are some eight hundred and sixty people living there, according to Nadia’s calculations. Haitians have big families; international-aid agencies tend to estimate five or six people per family, and some have many more. Nearly half the country’s nine million people are under eighteen.

Nadia waved to the many mothers and babies and children on the tarp and said something had to be done for them. “The thing is,” she said with a tone of fond disparagement, “these Haitians don’t know what to do.” The immediate problem was that the people of Fidel ordinarily bought their water from a cistern truck, but it hadn’t appeared since before the quake on January 12th, and so there was no longer any easy access to water. (This problem was widespread; even before the earthquake, half of the people in Haiti couldn’t reliably get water.) There was no food or medicine, either, since there was no work, and no one had any money saved. These people were poor; like many of their countrymen, Nadia included, they were living below the poverty line and had been since long before the earthquake.

Haiti has been in a state of persistent struggle since it won its independence from France, in 1804. It is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with seventy-eight per cent of its people living on less than two U.S. dollars per day and fifty-four per cent on half that. Its traditional exports, coffee and sugar, have collapsed, and manufacturing has been in decline for decades. It has suffered riots and hideous violence and depressingly regular political upheavals, led by a succession of despots and cheats: Papa Doc, Baby Doc, the priest Aristide.

Amid all this, Haiti seems almost uniquely victimized by nature. From June to October, it has severe storms and hurricanes. In the span of just two months in the summer of 2008, it was walloped by Tropical Storm Fay, Hurricane Gustav, Tropical Storm Hanna, and Hurricane Ike, which together left eight hundred thousand people homeless and the country’s infrastructure severely damaged.

Haiti relies heavily on foreign aid, but little of that money contributes to sustained development, and it has often been withdrawn for political reasons. Most of the jobs are in agriculture; as exports have dipped, nearly a hundred thousand Haitians a year have made their way from the country to Port-au-Prince. There they work largely in the “informal” sector: as bellboys, day workers, shoe shiners, and street venders. Now even those jobs are gone.

One day, Frantz and I drove past the Port-au-Prince cemetery, on our way from the small cinder-block judicial police headquarters, near the airport, that had become the provisional seat of Haiti’s government. Bodies were everywhere in the city—lying on street corners and sometimes dumped in the middle of avenues—and, at the office, the mayor of Port-au-Prince and the director of the Ministry of Health had both informed me that they were doing what they could to clean them up. Disposing of bodies was, for all intents and purposes, now the extent of the Haitian government’s capabilities. The Prime Minister, Jean-Max Bellerive, had told me that seventy thousand bodies had been collected by bulldozers and dump trucks and buried in four mass gravesites, in town and outside. One of those places was the main cemetery.

As we approached, I saw three bodies lying face down on the dirt in a gap in the wall. Two of them appeared to be women, one very young. The other bodies I had seen in Port-au-Prince were distended and blistered from the heat. These were fresh, with no visible injuries. They reminded me of photographs I had seen of victims of death squads in El Salvador. An overwhelming stench permeated the air, even inside the truck.

Lying next to the cemetery wall was a young man, drenched from head to foot in blood; more blood had pooled around him on the sidewalk. He lay on his side, with an elbow propped up on the ground so that he could cup his head in his hand. There was a bright-red advertisement for Nino cell phones painted on the wall just above him, and next to it a crucifix embossed within a circle. Frantz said, “I think he’s still alive.” Several people gathered on the median strip to stare down at him. One of them said, “He’s a thief. The police executed him and dumped him here. And those people, too”—he indicated the fresh bodies. “They are thieves.”

During the earthquake, hundreds of prisoners had escaped from the national penitentiary, just a few blocks from the Presidential Palace and the cemetery. The fugitives included hardened criminals and some of Port-au-Prince’s most violent gang leaders. Looters—thousands of them, by some reports—had overrun the Grand Rue, the main commercial area, and other places in the city. The police were hard pressed to respond, having lost half their force around Port-au-Prince. I had heard reports of police shooting thieves and of looters killed by vigilantes. There was gunfire at night in the neighborhood where I was staying, and at one point rumors spread of nocturnal kidnappers who were stealing people’s babies to sell for adoption, supposedly abducting them as they slept in the streets outside. One day, I saw a man tied to a pole, hacked up by machetes and beaten to death with rocks.

The man on the sidewalk twitched; his chest rose and fell slowly a couple of times. A yellow bulldozer came up the street, and a rough-looking man, walking in front of it, directed it toward the three bodies lying inside the cleft in the wall. The bulldozer, amid great noise and fumes, scraped them up into its iron beak and then, in several violent motions, rolled them into a mound of yellow dirt that rose some fifteen feet inside the broken wall. Within a minute, the bodies had vanished. The bulldozer came along the sidewalk and lowered its beak. Before it could scoop up the wounded man, though, the worker directing operations walked over. Seeing that the man was still alive, he waved the bulldozer away. As it roared off, we asked him what he planned to do about the wounded man. He said, “I am only responsible for the dead,” and walked away.

When the quake hit, Nadia had tried to run out of the ravine. She was halfway up the crude concrete steps that led to the street when she heard screaming from near her house. She ran back, and saw her neighbor lying dead under the pile of cinder blocks. The neighbor had a seven-month-old boy. “I said, ‘Where’s the baby, where’s the baby?’ and we saw him lying there on the ground.” She had managed to toss the child clear just as she was buried by the blocks. “A woman picked him up and gave him to me,” Nadia said. “He was covered with blood, and there was also blood on his socks. One arm looked dislocated, and one of his legs, too, and he had a swelling on his head. I was scared he would die in my hands. He kept trying to go to sleep, and I was trying to wake him up.” Nadia went looking for his relatives and found his aunt, who lived in Ravine 75, a few blocks away from Fidel. “After, I went outside and sat, and I was crying, because I didn’t know what happened to my boyfriend.” Her boyfriend, a young man named Kesnel Jean, had left earlier in the day on a bus for Jacmel, a town on the southern coast of Haiti. He had not been heard from.

That night, “after it stopped,” Nadia said, she walked down to Delmas 36, about thirty-five blocks away, to see if her cousin and his family had survived. They had, but what she saw of the city—“a lot of houses down,” and people dead and wounded everywhere—saddened her. Nadia recalled that a rumor had begun circulating after the disaster struck. “The Haitians started saying that it was the U.S. doing an experiment that caused it, because they wanted to take over Haiti. But I know it’s God’s work, because if it was the U.S. that did it, then did they also do the earthquake in California a few years ago? I tried to tell them it don’t make no sense.”

In the next days, she continued roving out of Fidel. “On Wednesday, I walked all the way to downtown and back up, looking for my boyfriend. I saw dead people lying around,” she said. “I saw one kid who had tried to run out of a building, and it smashed down on him, and all you could see was his face and one of his arms. I saw looters taking things and throwing them down from one building that was destroyed, and I took off running, because I didn’t want to get taken by the police.”

It was in those initial sorties of hers, looking for Kesnel and for her relatives, that Nadia had started searching for food. She told me, with a kind of fierce pride, “I never suffered in the U.S. for things like food and water, so I don’t think I should have to in Haiti.” She brought the food she found to Pastor Villers, to be stored in the little Pancotista church until it could be handed out.

It wasn’t until two days after Kesnel went missing that he arrived back in Fidel, injured in one leg but otherwise unharmed. When the earthquake had struck, his bus had crashed; a U.N. vehicle was also in a wreck nearby. Many passengers had been killed, he told Nadia, but he had been pulled to safety by the U.N. people. He had managed to hire a motorcycle to get partway back to Port-au-Prince, and had hitched a ride the rest of the way.

On the coastal road leading west out of Port-au-Prince to Léogâne—an old plantation town that had been almost entirely destroyed in the quake—I stopped one day at the home of Max Beauvoir, Haiti’s preëminent houngan, or vodou priest. Beauvoir’s rambling complex was situated in a shady glade of tropical trees—an unusual sight in this part of the country, which, like much of Haiti, has been largely deforested. The coral-rock wall in front had partly collapsed in the earthquake. A section of his temple and an open-air kitchen had been damaged, too, but his home was intact. Several statues of vodou gods overlooked the garden from the parapets of the buildings.

Beauvoir, seated at a round table beneath the trees behind his house, greeted me graciously. A tall, handsome man with deep-set, intense eyes, he had a pair of huge Rottweilers at his feet and a pack of Marlboro Lights on the table, which he drew from as we talked. He said he was upset about remarks made by the American evangelical preacher Pat Robertson, who had blamed Haiti’s tragedy on a pact with the Devil. “I feel that Pat Robertson missed a very good opportunity to close his mouth,” Beauvoir said. “What is needed most in Haiti now is certainly compassion. A tragedy like this is the fault of nobody, and to look for fault is ridiculous, and it seems to me that was not very intelligent. It would have been more intelligent on his part if he had simply shut up.” Beauvoir was also upset about the mass burials of the earthquake victims. Tens of thousands of unidentified human bodies a day were being bulldozed into the ground without any ceremony, and he wished for a way to bring greater dignity to the process. “We all have a part of God in us, and our bodies should be disposed of in a decent way. The way they are doing it, picking them up and putting them in holes, it’s undignified.”

I told Beauvoir about the bodies I had seen dumped at the cemetery, and he nodded. On January 16th, he said, he had been summoned by Haiti’s President, René Préval, to an emergency cabinet meeting, along with the Prime Minister, the police chief, and the surviving heads of the Catholic and Protestant churches. At the meeting, the leaders had discussed the unravelling security situation in Port-au-Prince. “We decided we had to deal with them in an emergency way,” he said. “Beginning on the seventeenth and for the next two weeks,” criminals were to be treated “as in an emergency.” I asked him if this meant capital punishment, and he said it did: “Capital punishment, automatically, for all bandits.” Some of the looters were taking what they desperately needed, and from places where it wouldn’t be missed. And some of them must have been supplying those too sick or badly injured to fend for themselves; Nadia couldn’t have been the only one tending to a community. Others, of course, were stealing out of greed and opportunism. But this seemed an impossible distinction to make, especially for a beleaguered and diminished police force.

I asked if such license could extend to the killing of a young girl, and mentioned the girl whose body was among those dumped at the cemetery.

Beauvoir nodded. “It could include anybody.” He seemed to think of such harsh treatment as a lamentable necessity. “I personally regret this,” he said. “I regret all death. I regret the many calls I have received asking for help. I regret that people are still trapped in their houses. I regret the earthquake we had this morning.” (Earlier that day, an aftershock registering 6.1 on the Richter scale had rattled Port-au-Prince.) I told him about the young man I had found shot and left for dead, and how it had been American soldiers, in the end, who had taken him away for medical treatment. I told Beauvoir that I had tried to follow up on his case but had been unable to find him. This, too, he said, was regrettable. “But if you want to look for him, I can tell you, go and look in the graves.”

The Haitian government has denied ordering the police to use extrajudicial means to deal with looters. But when I told Nadia what Beauvoir had said, she wasn’t surprised. A few days earlier, a policeman who lived in Fidel had told her and her neighbors, “If you catch a thief, kill him.”

Nadia spoke English and Spanish and Creole, but, she told me, she felt more American than Haitian. When I asked her what her favorite television programs were, she laughed and said, “Oh, ‘The Dukes of Hazzard’ and ‘Punky Brewster’!” Her mother took her and her siblings to the U.S. when she was six, on a boat with other Haitian illegal immigrants, going first to Cuba and then to Florida. Her father was in prison in the United States, and joined them when Nadia was fourteen. Soon afterward, she caught him sniffing cocaine in the house, and he had tried to beat her. Her mother threw him out. When she was still in high school, he shot someone and escaped to Port-au-Prince. Not long afterward, she heard, he was shot dead after a drug deal in Delmas 33—about thirty blocks from where she lived now.

As a child in Miami, she had wanted to be a marine or a model. “My mother kept promising to take me to Barbizon, but she lied, she never did.” Nadia smiled. Life had been difficult. Her older brother, she explained, had fallen ill after a vodou curse was put on him. Her mother had returned to Port-au-Prince to nurse him, but he had died. Nadia’s mother had brought the illness back with her, and died soon afterward. That was in Nadia’s senior year of high school. She graduated, but after her mother’s death she and her sister had had to move out of their rented house.

For a time, she said, she studied “H.R.S.” at Tallahassee Community College. When I asked what that meant, she said, “Human resources services,” uncertainly, as if she couldn’t quite remember what the initials stood for. She had also studied cosmetology, and got a certificate for call-center work. She had three children, two by one man and one by another.

In 1992, she was arrested and spent five and a half years in prison. The charges were for forging a Treasury check and for armed robbery. She told me at first that she had been arrested in a car that had a gun in it which didn’t belong to her. Then she looked at me and said, “I fell in with the wrong people.” After prison, she was deported. In 1999, she returned to the U.S., hoping to see her daughter, who she said was being abused in foster care. She was picked up by police for entering the country illegally, and spent seven years and one month in the federal correctional institution at Tallahassee. In June, 2007, together with other detainees, she was sent by special plane back to Port-au-Prince. They were greeted by Haitian policemen, whose faces were hidden by masks, and placed in detention. “I was afraid, because I didn’t know what to expect,” she said with a shudder. “I don’t know why they had to wear masks.” After a couple of weeks, a cousin came to fetch her. Not long after, she rented the small house in Fidel and had been there ever since, earning a little income by cutting women’s hair.

Nadia hadn’t seen any of her children since her last arrest. Her youngest had been a baby when she went to prison. All three had ended up in different foster homes. Nadia’s greatest wish was to return to the States with her nephew (the son of the brother who had died in Haiti), to be reunited with her children, and to have a job. “I can work at anything, I don’t mind what,” she said. “They say that if you pay your dues you’re supposed to be given a second chance. Isn’t that right?”

When I arrived to see her one morning, Nadia was on the street, talking heatedly with the woman who sold water, sugarcane, and soda from a hole-in-the-wall shop at the end of the street, where everyone from the ravine congregated. Nadia was loudly admonishing her in Creole. It went on for some time. The day before, Nadia explained, the woman had taken receipt of some boxes of Chinese rice that had been intended for her. The donor was a Canadian man whom she had stopped as he was driving by; she had persuaded him to bring food for her and her neighbors, but he had apparently returned while Nadia was away. The shopkeeper said she had already handed it out. “So she claims,” Nadia muttered disgustedly.

When I asked Nadia how the people of Fidel had come to regard her as a leader, she said that it was because she spoke English. Then, harshly, she added, “And because I’m the one searching for help while they’re sitting on their sorry behinds.”

Fidel was not especially hard-hit by the earthquake; other than Nadia’s neighbor and a couple of women farther down the gulch whose house crumbled and injured their legs, it experienced none of the ravages that destroyed so much of the city. But, in the absence of a viable economy and national infrastructure, it was still a hopeless place, a symbol of Haiti’s deep and persistent problems. Many of the men in the neighborhood seemed to sit around most of the day. Some played dominoes to pass the time. There was no work for them, and would not be until the aid money for reconstruction created jobs. Lionel Verner hasn’t had construction work for a long time, he said; he sells cell-phone scratch cards to make a living. He has eight sons and no wife, and he makes twenty to thirty gourdes—something less than one U.S. dollar—a day. Nadia explained that before the earthquake a small bag of beans sufficient for a family meal cost twenty-seven gourdes, a bag of rice about fifty. By now, prices had risen substantially. Verner said that he and his sons usually ate one meal a day: spaghetti or rice, and sometimes cornmeal mash with beans. Since the earthquake, Nadia and a large group of others from Fidel—those sleeping under the awning—had begun cooking a collective evening meal in a large pot over a charcoal fire, right on the street. They wasted nothing. Some of the blocks that had fallen on Nadia’s neighbor had been repurposed as a base for a washtub. Nadia had stored the baby’s disassembled crib.

On January 25th, twelve days after the earthquake, Nadia asked me to go with her to the Pétionville Country Club, a nine-hole golf course studded with flamboyant orange trees. There was a displaced-persons camp there, she said, and the American Army was giving out food. Nadia said she had found the camp after she noticed U.S. military helicopters and followed them “to see where they were going.”

At the golf course, we walked onto an incongruously clipped lawn at the second tee. Ahead of us, spreading out over the slopes of the hillside, were thousands of shelters, made out of every conceivable material: bedsheets, sacking, plastic, and in one case, a greenish plastic printed with the words “Caution: Contains Infectious Biological Waste.” Small tent-shops had sprung up, including one that sold wigs and hair weaves, and another in which a young man with a tiny generator was recharging cell phones.

The aid was being dispensed by Catholic Relief Services, and Nadia stopped a C.R.S. worker as he trotted through the crowd, an Irishman named Donal. Although he looked busy and exhausted, he listened patiently as Nadia made her appeal. He explained that he could do nothing for her until she first went to their office, in Delmas. A team would be sent to survey the ravine, and if her claim was accepted then food could be given. The camp had at least twenty-five thousand people in it already, Donal said, and the number was swelling by the day. Because there were no latrines, everyone was defecating in the open, a major health hazard. There had been three rapes, and he was worried about fires. C.R.S. was trying to cope, but it was on the verge of being overwhelmed.

Nadia nodded sympathetically, but she was relentless. “So what do I have to do?” she asked. Before she let him go, Donal had told her where to get help and supplied her with his own cell-phone number.

At the C.R.S. office, Nadia found a tall, amiable Oregonian of thirty-five, Lane Hartill, who got her a chair and a bottle of drinking water and listened intently as she described the situation in Fidel. C.R.S. wanted to help as many people as it could, he told Nadia; the agency had already brought in sixteen hundred tons of food, and it planned to put people back to work by hiring them to clear rubble.

Hartill offered to come with Nadia to survey Fidel himself. When he arrived, he was amazed that there were people living in the ravine. “What do they do in the rainy season?” he asked. “They get wet,” Nadia said.

Back at the office, a waybill was drawn up that authorized Nadia to go to the C.R.S. compound across town and collect a hundred and fifty buckets of food, a hundred and fifty hygiene kits (buckets containing towels, soap, sanitary napkins, and detergent), and fifty cases of drinking water. Nadia went off on a motorbike that belonged to a young man who lived nearby and soon returned with four small pickup trucks.

While the trucks were being loaded at the C.R.S. compound, Nadia cracked jokes and flirted with a contingent of Nepalese U.N. soldiers who were on guard there. She was overjoyed at the supplies. When she returned to Fidel, Pastor Villers threw open his church doors, and soon there was a stream of boys and girls and men going to and from the trucks, carrying the C.R.S. buckets and water and stockpiling them on the church floor.

Nadia moved back and forth, issuing orders. She told people to line up, and, using a list of names she had compiled in girlish handwriting, she began to call them forward.

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