Corruption, Shortage of Mentors Hinder Afghan Forces, U.S. Says - washingtonpost.com

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By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, October 3, 2009

As the White House weighs a request from the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan for additional troops for combat and training there, a new report from the Defense Department's inspector general attributes shortcomings in the Afghan army and police force to a shortage of U.S. mentors and trainers, corruption and illiteracy among Afghan soldiers and a lack of strategic planning.

"Expansion of the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] beyond currently approved levels will face major challenges," the 224-page report concludes, listing a major one as "time necessary to develop ethical, competent leaders."

Not all of the report is negative. In discussing how $19 billion has been spend so far on the Afghan forces, the inspector general notes that Afghan army units "have demonstrated consistently that they will fight" and now take the lead in 54 percent of operations. In addition, the report says, the Afghan National Police force has reformed pay and promotion procedures, and it is considered more capable in 52 districts.

The report also says that the Defense and Interior ministries, as well as the army and police, "are beginning to make progress in addressing what has been the endemic problem of corruption."

It adds, however, that it will "likely be at least another year before the ANSF would be able to demonstrate measurable progress."

The inspector general reports, for example, that Afghan army leaders are manipulating a new electronic pay system "to extort soldiers' pay." Afghan officers or noncommissioned officers, the report says, take soldiers' identification cards when they leave posts to give their money to relatives or banks and then require them to pay to get the cards back.

An American officer reported that in his area, there was no system for holding Afghan soldiers accountable for their weapons, uniforms, assigned vehicles or other equipment. Another U.S. mentor said that in his area only about 80 or 90 units of a 100-unit supply order would make it to the Afghan company that ordered it. The officer added that "300 percent of the necessary cold weather gear had to be fielded to the 1st brigade, with no explanation for the duplication and no consequences to anyone for the loss and/or theft of the gear."

Officers in Kabul reported that fuel was a "systematic problem" in the national police force, with corruption and hoarding leading to patrols being curtailed in some districts.

The inspector general describes shortages of U.S. trainers and mentors at almost every level of the Afghan operation: "Mentor and Liaison Teams have historically been and still are under-resourced against required personnel levels, which has delayed the development of the Afghan Army and Police."

Expansion of the teams beyond the currently approved ceilings "will require additional U.S., Coalition, and ISAF personnel resources assigned in support of the train and equip mission," according to the report.

As an example, the report says that of 5,688 U.S. trainers required to develop a competent Afghan military force of 134,000 men, only 2,097 were sent to do the job. Of about 103 liaison teams needed for the mission, 70 were available. In one area, embedded training teams, which normally are made up of 16 personnel, were averaging only four, with additional help borrowed from nearby support or security units.

Police training teams have been "impeded" because they are below the necessary personnel strength. In one area, the target was to have 635 teams fully operational, but there were only 90. More broadly, there were to be 2,375 teams, but just 992 were assigned.

The Corps of Engineers, which is responsible for building Army forward operating bases and police headquarters in Afghanistan involving $4 billion in expenditures over two years, had only 411 personnel assigned of 641 that had been authorized.

Overall, the Afghan unit "had 1029 personnel, including contractors, while the U.S. Army Engineer's Gulf Resources Division in Iraq and Kuwait manages approximately $3 billion worth of projects with three districts and 3,326 personnel, including contractors."