Bangkok’s Insurgency Blunder

Bangkok’s Insurgency Blunder:

by Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Wall Street Journal, 25 April 2012
Pacifying rebels is harder when you appoint a peace negotiator they hate.

Violence has re-erupted in Thailand’s restive southern provinces. Suspected Muslim insurgents on March 31 staged the most deadly coordinated attacks in years, killing 14 people and injuring 340 others with car bombs that targeted shoppers and a high-rise hotel frequented by foreign tourists. This is a tragedy for the victims, and also a slap at Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, whose government had seemed to be on track to finally pacify the region. Clearly Bangkok’s program isn’t working and it’s time for a rethink.
Separatist conflict has festered in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat for decades. Successive Thai governments have been preoccupied with politics in Bangkok as power has shifted between the military and various civilian administrations, leaving the south virtually unattended.



Ms. Yingluck’s Pheu Thai government seemed to offer the best chance in years of settling the conflict. First, she appointed Thawee Sodsong, a former policeman, as the secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center. Immediately after his appointment, Mr. Thawee resurrected the idea of devolving a measure of self-rule to the southern provinces. The government also planned to abolish the emergency decree implemented in the area that permits the detention of suspects up to 30 days without any charge and also grants officials immunity from prosecution.
Second, Ms. Yingluck redoubled efforts to improve economic conditions and promote business opportunities by planning to set up a “special economic zone” in the three southern provinces to stimulate more domestic and international investments. Third, in the process of granting some autonomous power to Pattani, the Thai government recognized a distinguished identity of the Malay Muslims, and more broadly, the ethnic diversity in the Kingdom.
Ms. Yingluck, a native of the north, was convinced that these policies would lead to a breakthrough in the southern crisis. And on the surface, they should have been effective. They de-militarized the conflict and, more importantly, offered a wider political space to the Malay Muslims.
But as good as Ms. Yingluck’s approach sounds in theory, the terrorist attacks suggest it’s not working. The problem, as always, has been in the execution.
Ms. Yingluck’s single biggest mistake may be her apparent decision to assign her brother, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, to negotiate with the insurgents. Although Mr. Thaksin has repeatedly denied that he is involved in the peace process—describing himself as “just an unemployed man”—local media have credibly reported otherwise. Thailand’s The Nation reported that exiled Malay Muslim leaders from Thailand recently met with Mr. Thaksin in Malaysia. In the past year, Mr. Thaksin also has made numerous visits to Malaysia, meeting with both Prime Minister Najib Razak and former premier Mahathir Muhammad.
If those reports are accurate, Mr. Thaksin’s involvement could go a long way toward explaining why Ms. Yingluck’s strategy is failing. Mr. Thaksin’s tenure in office from 2001 to 2006 witnessed an aggravation of the southern conflict as a result of his hard-nosed policy toward Malay Muslims. He is also an odd choice as a liaison with Kuala Lumpur, having once accused Malaysia of providing shelter to Muslim terrorists. His hostile policy created a deep friction in Thai-Malaysian relations.
Mr. Thaksin reportedly is trying to mend these fences now. At his meeting with Malay Muslims, he is said to have apologized for his earlier harsh measures. Before leaving, he gave each exiled leader a hug.
But that might not be enough. The elders of one critical group, the Barisan Reolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) refused to take part in the meeting, according to The Nation, announcing they “could never forgive [Mr.] Thaksin for what he has done to the Malays of Patani” when he served as prime minister.
Meanwhile, Ms. Yingluck is failing to build political support back in Bangkok for elements of her program, and especially devolution of power. The idea of transforming Pattani into an autonomous unit has long been contentious because it could debunk the concept of Thai nationhood which is underpinned by the myth of national homogeneity. Also, for several decades, several Thai governments had insisted on recreating a Buddhist state, despite the constitution clearly indicating the people’s freedom to practice any religion. Greater autonomy for southern Muslims grates on this Buddhist chauvinism.
To maintain its popularity, and indeed legitimacy, the Yingluck government has chosen to follow the public sentiment on the supremacy of Buddhism. The government has refused to persuade the majority Thais that they must come to terms with the country’s religious diversity.
This lack of consensus is egging on the opposition Democrat Party, for whom the south has always been a stronghold. Fearing a loss of influence in the region, the Democrats are only too happy to undermine the Pheu Thai party’s peace overtures. Prasert Pongsuwansiri, a Democrat member of parliament from Yala, invoked the secret gathering between Mr. Thaksin and the insurgents in a parliamentary session, condemning him for interfering in the complicated southern crisis. Mr. Prasert noted that the March 31 bombing in the south followed the unsuccessful talk and symbolized the rejection of the role of Mr. Thaksin by the Malay Muslims.
Unfortunately, this suggests the cycle of violence is likely to continue. Ms. Yingluck at least settled on a strategy with some hope of success. But until she can implement it properly—including pushing aside her brother and building a stronger consensus in Bangkok for change—the south will remain an intractable problem.
Mr. Pavin is associate professor at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, and associate fellow at Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.