Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts

Jan 9, 2010

Obama Takes New Route to Opposing Parts of Laws

power and the mindImage by Will Lion via Flickr

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is lowering the volume in a long-running argument between Congress and the executive branch over when, if ever, a president has the power to bypass federal statutes he has signed into law.

Legal scholars said the administration’s new approach, which avoids repeating claims of executive power that the White House has previously voiced, could avoid setting off fights with lawmakers. But the approach will make it harder to keep track of which statutes the White House believes it can disregard, or to compare the number of laws challenged by President Obama with former President George W. Bush’s record.

In Mr. Obama’s first months in office last year, he followed recent precedent and frequently issued statements, when signing bills into law, that the executive branch could disregard provisions that he considered unconstitutional restraints on executive power.

The Cult of the PresidencyImage by Renegade98 via Flickr

But Mr. Obama has not issued a signing statement since last summer, when one claim set off a bipartisan uproar in Congress. And the administration has decided that Mr. Obama will sometimes sign bills containing provisions it deems problematic without issuing a signing statement that challenges those sections.

Still, the administration will consider itself free to disregard new laws it considers unconstitutional, especially in cases where it has previously voiced objections elsewhere, officials said.

The White House disclosed its shift when asked why it had not put out a signing statement last month, when Mr. Obama signed a $447 billion spending bill for 2010. It contained several provisions that restricted executive power in ways that the administration had previously asserted were unconstitutional — including in signing statements attached to similar bills and in policy statements it issued about the spending bill as lawmakers drew it up.

“The administration’s views about certain provisions in the omnibus spending bill had previously been publicly communicated,” said Ben LaBolt, a White House spokesman, “so it wasn’t necessary to duplicate them in a signing statement.”

Since the 19th century, presidents have occasionally used signing statements to declare that parts of a bill were unconstitutional and need not be enforced or obeyed as written. But the tactic was rare until the second term of President Ronald Reagan, whose legal team developed a strategy of issuing the statements more frequently to increase presidential power.

Reagan’s successors continued that approach. And the practice escalated again under Mr. Bush, who used it to advance expansive theories of executive power. He challenged about 1,200 sections of bills — more than all predecessors combined — including a ban on torture and oversight provisions of the USA Patriot Act.

Mr. Bush’s assertive use of the tactic set off a national debate over its propriety. The American Bar Association declared that signing statements “undermine the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of powers,” and argued that the Constitution gave presidents only two choices: veto a bill, or sign it and obey all of it.

But other scholars said the tactic was appropriate if a president cited only mainstream legal theories. Mr. Obama, whose advisers sided with the latter camp, has characterized Mr. Bush’s use of signing statements as an abuse and pledged greater restraint.

Mr. Obama nevertheless challenged dozens of provisions early last year. The last time was in June, when his claim that he could disobey a new law requiring officials to push the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to adopt certain policies angered Congress. The White House sought to reassure lawmakers that it intended to take those negotiating positions anyway and was merely noting its view that Congress cannot control foreign negotiations. Many lawmakers rejected that theory, and the House quickly voted 429 to 2 to bar officials from disobeying the restrictions.

Although the recent spending bill received no signing statement, it contained a similar provision about World Trade Organization negotiations, as well as several other types the administration had previously challenged. The White House issued several “statements of administration policy” warning that those provisions raised constitutional concerns while the legislation was pending, but Congress did not change them.

Representative Barney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts, who led last summer’s backlash, said the White House risked losing Congressional support for international economic organizations. Mr. Frank also said it was “outrageous” to contend that if Congress disagreed with the administration’s opinion that a provision would be unconstitutional, the president could sign the bill and disobey it.

“They have a legitimate right to tell us their constitutional concerns — that’s different from having a signing statement,” Mr. Frank said. “Anyone who makes the argument that ‘once we have told you we have constitutional concerns and then you pass it anyway, that justifies us in ignoring it’ — that is a constitutional violation. Those play very different roles and you can’t bootstrap one into the other.”

But Peter M. Shane, an Ohio State University law professor, praised the approach as a step toward a return to the “normalcy” of how presidents used signing statements through Reagan’s first term. Mr. Shane has previously criticized the administration over its frequent early use of the device.

Still, Jack L. Goldsmith, a Harvard law professor who led the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel in 2003-04, argued that an approach of issuing fewer signing statements would “not be terribly consequential” in practice because the executive branch could still override a provision that its legal team later pronounces unconstitutional.

Last year the Obama administration disregarded a statute that forbid State Department officials to attend United Nations meetings led by nations deemed state sponsors of terrorism. Congress has included that restriction in several recent bills.

When Mr. Bush signed one such bill, he issued a signing statement instructing officials to view the law as merely advisory, and they attended at least one such meeting on his watch. By contrast, when Mr. Obama signed another bill with an identical provision, he did not specifically single it out for challenge. But his administration later obtained an Office of Legal Counsel opinion pronouncing it unconstitutional, and officials continued to attend such meetings.

Unlike signing statements, opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel are often secret. Mr. Goldsmith said the administration’s approach of issuing fewer signing statements would mean “somewhat less accountability.”

“I think it’s a bad development if they are not going to highlight for the nation in all these new statutes where they think there are problems,” he said.

The White House, however, said it had given clear public notice about its views.

“Each piece of legislation,” Mr. LaBolt said, “is considered on an individual basis to determine whether a signing statement is necessary, and communications regarding the administration’s views on legislation such as Statements of Administration Policy will continue to be publicly available for Congress and all Americans to evaluate.”

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Aug 18, 2009

Overdue Process


The cavernous room in the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., was nearly empty, except for a few journalists holding yellow legal pads. A small parade of government lawyers marched in and rested their briefcases on their desks before approaching the trio of lawyers representing Mohammed Jawad, an Afghan national who was detained in 2002 after being accused of throwing a grenade at an American convoy, injuring several American soldiers. He was between 12 and 17 years old at the time and has been in U.S. custody for seven years. The hearing, held in June, was not related to Jawad's guilt or innocence. Rather, it was his habeas corpus proceeding -- the legal challenge to the government's ability to hold him in the first place.

It is widely believed that Jawad's confession, offered to Afghan authorities shortly after his capture, was coerced through torture. Jawad is illiterate, and the confession was written in a dialect he didn't speak, accompanied by a separate page bearing only his thumbprint. His military defense attorney, Maj. Eric Montalvo, says that as soon as Jawad was asked about the incident in a language he could understand, he denied everything. Then, Montalvo says, Jawad was handed over to American interrogators who tortured him ("They did things that were classified"). After Jawad attempted suicide in his Guantánamo cell in 2003, he was subjected to the government's "frequent flyer" program, in which the detainee is moved from cell to cell every few hours for days or weeks on end, in order to deny him sleep.

Because Jawad was technically captured "on the battlefield," he appeared before a military commission in 2007. At the hearing, the presiding judge threw out the coerced confessions and the original prosecutor, Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld, resigned in disgust, penning a letter in which he denounced the commissions as a travesty. Jawad has been denied a criminal trial, where his culpability might be determined according to the high standards of federal courts. "Under the Bush administration, there was this attempt to blur the criminal-justice system and the military-justice system and create this hybrid system that lacked due-process safeguards," says Stacy Sullivan, a counterterrorism adviser for Human Rights Watch. "We hoped that during the Obama administration we'd be able to put those pieces back where they belong. That doesn't seem to be happening."

At the habeas hearing in June, the Department of Justice was scheduled to submit a series of documents regarding Jawad's detention that had been collected by an Obama administration task force investigating Guantánamo and U.S. detention policy. But Justice Department attorney James Gilligan informed Jawad's lawyers that the department was unable to provide the documents on the grounds that the information was "protected." When Maj. David Frakt, one of Jawad's lawyers, asked when the documents would be ready, Gilligan just chuckled. An uncomfortable silence fell on the group as Frakt stared at Gilligan. "I don't know," Gilligan finally said.

Watching the proceedings, Montalvo, shrugged and said, "The government has no case. They know it. They're stalling."

The story is an old one for Jawad's lawyers -- they believe the government knows it cannot justify holding him, but it doesn't want to let him go. More galling to Jawad's defense counsel is the fact that the government sought to include Jawad's confessions to Afghan authorities, obtained through torture, as evidence against his release. In July, his lawyers filed a motion to suppress the confessions, which made up about 90 percent of the evidence against him. This time, the government chose not to challenge the motion -- but failed to commit to his release. Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle eviscerated the government for having little cause to continue holding him. "This guy has been there seven years -- seven years," Huvelle said. "Without his statements, I don't understand your case. I really don't."

At the core of the dispute over the detention of suspects like Jawad is whether or not there are, as President Barack Obama claims, "detainees at Guantánamo who cannot be prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people." This is the so-called "fifth category" of detainees -- exactly how many there are, the government has yet to determine. (Assistant Attorney General David Kris told Congress in July that half of the Guantánamo detainees' cases had been reviewed, and none had yet been put into the "fifth category.") "There will be some, who we have picked up and who are in Guantánamo ? who for a variety of reasons can't be prosecuted," says former CIA counsel Jeff Smith. "We have convincing intelligence information, but it is not enough to prosecute them."

Frakt isn't buying the administration's assertion about the necessity of preventive detention -- the practice of imprisoning suspected terrorists even in cases where the government cannot prove they have committed crimes. "When you look at the minimal amount of evidence required to convict someone of something like material support for terrorism, and they don't even have that much, how is it that we know that these people are so dangerous?" he asks. Frakt's concerns likely have a great deal to do with the way the government has treated his client -- and not only because it tried to get his coerced confession admitted as evidence.

Montalvo says government officials "believe they have a guilty guy who tried to hurt Americans." But after seven years of failing to justify his detention, the government agreed on July 29 to release Jawad to return home to Afghanistan -- though it implied he might still be subject to criminal prosecution.

In his inauguration speech, Obama declared, "As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals." And in his first weeks in office, he took some important first steps to that end. He outlawed the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" (the Bush administration's euphemism for torture), suspended military commissions, and ordered Guantánamo closed within a year. But when it came to detainees like Jawad, Obama found that Bush had set a precedent that was difficult to break. "It ultimately comes down to a question of risk aversion," says Matthew Waxman, who was the deputy secretary of defense for detainee affairs from 2004 to 2005. "How much risk is the government willing to take in releasing someone who is believed to pose a continuing danger?"

***

In a different era, Mohammed Jawad might have had his day in federal court -- he would have been able to face his accusers, to hear the evidence against him, and to be tried by a jury rather than by a panel of military judges. Prior to September 11, 2001, the federal government's approach to terrorist suspects tasked the CIA with intelligence-gathering, while the FBI's responsibility was to take that intelligence and build prosecutable cases. But the Bush administration, fearing that the FBI's approach was too expensive and time consuming, and therefore unsafe, began relying on the CIA's determinations alone. "For wide swaths of counterterrorism policy that were now being conducted under a law-of-war framework, the FBI's role relative to the Defense Department and the CIA was probably diminished," Waxman says. The administration began apprehending people on the basis of intelligence, and the information implicating the captured, no matter how reliable, would often be inadmissible in court because of its origin.

For Bush administration officials, that didn't really matter; they didn't intend to bring many terrorists to trial. Their new framework treated most terrorist suspects not as criminals, as they had originally been classified, but as "enemy combatants" -- akin to soldiers in a conventional war, in which detainees are released after a peace accord is signed. But because the war against terrorism has no definable end point, the Bush administration asserted the authority to indefinitely detain terrorist suspects -- including those whose confessions had been wrung out of them through torture. The detainees would be tried, the Bush administration announced in 2002, in military tribunals that required less evidence than civilian courts do to convict defendants, therefore increasing the possibility of conviction.

Legal experts declared the administration's actions unconstitutional, and the left set out to prove it in court. In a series of high-profile cases, individual lawyers and groups like the American Civil Liberties Union scored one victory after another in establishing due-process rights for detainees. In 2004, Georgetown law professor Neal Katyal filed a brief on behalf of detainees in Rasul v. Bush, in which the Supreme Court found that U.S. courts had jurisdiction over deciding whether or not detainees were wrongfully imprisoned. In 2005, Congress, prompted by media reports detailing the Bush administration's torture policies, passed the Detainee Treatment Act, which further clarified the government's obligation to abide by prohibitions against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. The following year, Katyal was the lead counsel in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which established that the Bush military tribunals were unconstitutional. The lawsuit also forced the Bush administration to go to Congress for the authority to detain "enemy combatants" and try them in military courts. (That authority was granted by the 2006 Military Commissions Act.) In the series of rulings, the Supreme Court established that the government's obligation to the Constitution did not end at American shores.

Yet these legal victories created few changes for the detainees the government was intent on keeping. Real reform -- a whole new approach to fighting terrorism -- would have to wait for a new administration, one as concerned with preserving the rule of law as protecting the country. For the civil-liberties left, a young senator from Illinois -- a former constitutional-law professor -- seemed like he was just the man for the job. On the campaign trail, candidate Barack Obama was fearless in the face of conservative demagoguery on national security -- he even said that if he managed to capture Osama bin Laden, he would subject him to a jury trial to avoid making him a martyr. He pledged to institute a system for trying detainees based on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which has rules similar to those in federal courts. Some civil-liberties advocates dared to hope that if Obama was elected their fight would be over.

As the Bush years drew to a close, however, a rift began to open on the intellectual left. There was still near-unanimous agreement that torture was deplorable and that detainees had a right to due process, but the coalition was divided on the issue of preventive detention. While some groups, like the ACLU, continue to advocate for a "charge or release" policy in all circumstances, independent legal experts are engaged in a vigorous debate about how -- and when -- it is constitutionally permissible to hold suspects against whom we have scant evidence.

An early sign of the split came in 2007 when Katyal, one of the legal heroes in the fight for detainee rights, co-authored an op-ed in The New York Times with former Bush lawyer Jack Goldsmith, who was responsible for retracting the legal rationale for the "enhanced interrogations." Katyal and Goldsmith argued that Congress should "establish a comprehensive system of preventive detention that is overseen by a national security court composed of federal judges with life tenure." The national-security courts would resemble the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts that grant the government wiretap authority -- they would have access to classified information and be able to grant or reject the government's authority to detain an individual, based on the evidence presented. This, according to Katyal and Goldsmith, would help the executive branch cope with those detainees who are being held on the basis of solid intelligence, while preventing the government from holding others based on tenuous evidence.

Civil-liberties groups criticized Katyal's proposal, saying it resembled the policies they had been fighting against for the past six years. They were even more surprised when, in December 2008, another longtime champion of civil liberties, Katyal's Georgetown University colleague David Cole, published a series of articles calling for a statute permitting preventive detention of members of groups that have declared war against the United States. "Terrorism ? is a crime. Just like murder is a crime, just like rape is a crime. We don't have preventive detention for those crimes. So terrorism ought to have nothing to do with whether you have a preventive detention statute or not," Cole says. "But war should have something to do with it." The government, Cole argues, should be able to indefinitely detain members of al-Qaeda or a similar organization, whether they're captured in a combat zone or not.

"Is this the same David Cole who appeared on panels with me over the last few years and who didn't seem in those years to have any daylight between him and the Center for Constitutional Rights, Human Rights Watch, or Human Rights First on the principle of try-or-release?" asked American University law professor Kenneth Anderson on the legal blog Opinio Juris in December 2008. If preventive detention "is sensible and legal now," he continued, "why wasn't it sensible and legal during the Bush years?"

Others warned that limiting preventive detention to al-Qaeda members would prove impossible. "Al-Qaeda is not like the German army, not like the Japanese army. There are no membership requirements," says Jonathan Hafetz, a lawyer with the ACLU who represented Jawad. "It is a diffuse organization and can spin into or become other organizations."

Some of the debate boils down to where a suspect is captured. Most civil-liberties advocates, including groups like Human Rights Watch, concede that the military has the authority to detain those it captures in a zone of combat, treating them as though they were enemy soldiers. Indeed, that authority is already granted by Congress under the 2001 law that authorized the use of military force in Afghanistan. But they believe that individuals captured away from combat zones should be tried in civilian courts. And suspects like Jawad, who were captured in a combat zone and tortured into implicating themselves, should be released.

Jawad's case is not just a test of how the Obama administration will handle the suspects detained during the Bush era. It's an indication of how the administration intends to detain and try terrorist suspects in the future. The Obama administration has been struggling with a fundamental question that the fractured intellectual left is finding difficult to answer: Is it possible to fight terrorism without abandoning the law?

***

At the American Constitution Society's annual convention in June, Noel Francisco, a former Bush lawyer in the Office of Legal Counsel, appeared on a panel alongside several longtime critics of Bush policy who had recently been hired by the Obama administration. Francisco noted with a hint of smugness that the issues surrounding terrorist suspects were not as simple as the left once implied. "What about the detainees that you really don't have any admissible evidence against, or the ones that frankly, you don't think committed crimes but if you release, you're pretty sure will take up arms against you again? There's not a good answer to that question," he said. "Guantánamo Bay, for better or for worse, was the best thing that we could come up with. And what you're all struggling with now is, what is the best thing you could come up with? And it's not that easy."

In a May speech on national security, Obama declared, "I am not going to release individuals who endanger the American people. Al-Qaeda terrorists and their affiliates are at war with the United States, and those that we capture -- like other prisoners of war -- must be prevented from attacking us again." He then sparked outrage from some civil-liberties advocates when he went on to say that he would revive the Bush administration's military commissions with some modifications -- such as the exclusion of evidence obtained through torture -- to ensure due process.

What makes Obama's embrace of military commissions so strange is that the government hasn't had any trouble trying terrorists in federal courts -- indeed, administration officials have said they will attempt to try most terrorist suspects that way. A Human Rights First study showed that since the 1990s, 91 percent of terrorist suspects tried in civilian courts have been convicted, and the remaining 9 percent were later imprisoned on lesser charges. This is a conviction rate more suited to Vladimir Putin's Russia than to the United States -- something civil-liberties groups would likely be protesting if they weren't so busy trying to get terrorist suspects their day in court in the first place.

With that kind of record, who needs preventive detention? Obama does, his defenders argue, explaining that the president has inherited an untenable situation. Even if he changes the policy so that, in the future, the United States only detains those against whom we have solid evidence, we are still left with the detainees whose cases were bungled by the Bush administration. Those who were tortured into implicating themselves probably can't be tried at all. But at least thus far, the administration has made an effort to treat suspects as if it intends to bring them to trial. After a federal judge issued a ruling in April granting habeas rights to prisoners at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan who were captured away from the battlefield, the administration sent in the FBI to read the prisoners their Miranda rights. "These are cases where they are looking at potential criminal charges," said Gen. David Petraeus, commander of U.S. Central Command. "We're comfortable with this."

Cole says the notion that the Obama administration is simply continuing Bush's counterterrorism policies isn't true. "The important difference is that Obama is saying we will be guided and governed by the rule of law," Cole says. "Bush was saying quite the opposite." The distinction is a legalistic but important one: The Bush administration believed that there were simply no limits to the president's power in wartime. By insisting that its power to detain suspects is granted by Congress, the Obama administration has conceded that such authority is subject to oversight from other branches of government -- and can ultimately be taken away. And unlike the Bush administration's dismissal of civil libertarians and human-rights advocates, the Obama administration has been actively soliciting their views as it figures out how to proceed with the detainees in custody.

The administration has said it is working to come up with a constitutional preventive-detention policy. In the meantime, federal courts have been hashing out the finer points of preventive detention, implicitly accepting that some form of detention is constitutional. Ben Wittes, a scholar at the Brookings Institution, argues that now is the time for civil-liberties advocates to step up and define what a preventive-detention policy should look like. "Human-rights groups are very quick to denounce proposals for what I think of as framework legislation to govern detentions that we are already doing," Wittes says.

As the clock ticks closer to the deadline for closing Guantánamo and deciding the fate of the detainees there, many left-leaning legal and national-security experts have weighed in. Most believe preventive detention should remain confined to the battlefield. "If this is where the administration is headed -- as opposed to seeking some broad new preventive detention authority," Deborah Pearlstein, a national-security expert who teaches at Princeton University, wrote at Opinio Juris, "I'm prepared to wait a few extra months to get there."

In late July, the day after the government agreed to release Jawad, Judge Huvelle's once-empty courtroom was packed with buzzing reporters. Government lawyers refused to say for certain whether Jawad might actually make it home to Afghanistan or whether they would criminally indict him before his transfer. Huvelle seemed to discourage the government from pushing for prosecution, here or in Afghanistan. "Enough has been imposed on this young man to date," she said. "I hope the government will succeed in getting him sent back home."

The lawyers closest to the detainees are still pushing Obama to reject preventive detention entirely. Now that Jawad may have found some small measure of justice, they have a renewed sense of hope in the administration. "The pendulum is swinging back, the rule of law is being restored," Frakt says. "They're trying to make change in a very thoughtful, deliberate way." Pointing out that detainees have won 29 out of the last 34 habeas cases, Frakt is cautiously optimistic that the Obama administration will do the right thing on preventive detention. "If these are the 'worst of the worst' then we were all misled as a country. And I think that's what they're finding."

Jul 14, 2009

Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance System

(PDF; 2.6 MB)

Source: Inspector Generals of the Justice Department, the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (via NY Times)

From New York Times story (U.S. Wiretapping of Limited Value, Officials Report):

While the Bush administration had defended its program of wiretapping without warrants as a vital tool that saved lives, a new government review released Friday said the program’s effectiveness in fighting terrorism was unclear.

The report, mandated by Congress last year and produced by the inspectors general of five federal agencies, found that other intelligence tools used in assessing security threats posed by terrorists provided more timely and detailed information.

Most intelligence officials interviewed “had difficulty citing specific instances” when the National Security Agency’s wiretapping program contributed to successes against terrorists, the report said.

While the program obtained information that “had value in some counterterrorism investigations, it generally played a limited role in the F.B.I.’s overall counterterro"

Jul 3, 2009

U.S. Shifts Strategy on Illicit Work by Immigrants

By JULIA PRESTON

Immigration authorities had bad news this week for American Apparel, the T-shirt maker based in downtown Los Angeles: About 1,800 of its employees appeared to be illegal immigrants not authorized to work in the United States.

But in contrast to the high-profile raids that marked the enforcement approach of the Bush administration, no federal agents with criminal warrants stormed the company’s factories and rounded up employees. Instead, the federal immigration agency sent American Apparel a written notice that it faced civil fines and would have to fire any workers confirmed to be unauthorized.

The treatment of American Apparel, which has more than 5,600 factory employees in Los Angeles alone, is the most prominent demonstration of a new strategy by the Obama administration to curb the employment of illegal immigrants by focusing on employers who hire them — and doing so in a less confrontational manner than in years past.

Unlike the approach of the Bush administration, which brought criminal charges in its final two years against many illegal immigrant workers, the new effort makes broader use of fines and other civil sanctions, federal officials said Thursday.

Federal agents will concentrate on businesses employing large numbers of workers suspected of being illegal immigrants, the officials said, and will reserve tough criminal charges mostly for employers who serially hire illegal immigrants and engage in wage and labor violations.

“These actions underscore our commitment to targeting employers that cultivate illegal work forces by knowingly hiring and exploiting illegal workers,” said Matt Chandler, a spokesman for the Department of Homeland Security.

On Wednesday, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the federal agency known as ICE, said it had sent notices announcing audits of hiring records, like the one it conducted at American Apparel, to 652 other companies across the country. Officials said they were picking up the pace of such audits, after performing 503 of them in 2008.

The names of other companies that received notices have not been made public. American Apparel became a window into the new enforcement tactics because, as a publicly traded company, it issued a required notice on Wednesday about the hiring audit.

The Obama administration’s new approach, unveiled in April, seems to be moving away from the raids that advocates for immigrants said had split families, disrupted businesses and traumatized communities. But the outcome will still be difficult for illegal workers, who will lose their jobs and could face deportation, the advocates said.

Immigration officials have not made clear how they intend to deal with workers who are unable to prove their legal immigration status in the course of inspections, but they said there was no moratorium on deportations.

Executives at American Apparel were both relieved and dismayed after receiving the warning from the immigration agency of discrepancies in the hiring documents of about one-third of its Los Angeles work force. The company has 30 days to dispute the agency’s claims and give immigrant employees time to prove that they are authorized to work in the United States, immigration officials said. If they cannot, the company must fire them, probably within two months.

But no criminal charges were lodged against the company and no workers have been arrested, American Apparel executives and immigration officials said.

The fines followed discussions over 18 months between federal officials and American Apparel, after immigration agents first inspected the company’s files in January 2008, said Peter Schey, an immigration lawyer representing the company. Mr. Schey said a raid had been averted because the company cooperated with the audit and because immigration agents had not found any labor abuses.

“There is no evidence of any exploitation of workers or violation of labor laws,” he said. “And there is not a single allegation that the company knowingly hired an undocumented worker.”

American Apparel and its outspoken chief executive, Dov Charney, have waged a campaign, emblazoned on T-shirts sold across the country, criticizing the immigration crackdown of recent years and calling on Congress to “Legalize L.A.” by granting legal status to illegal immigrants.

Most garment workers in American Apparel’s huge shop in Los Angeles work directly for the company, not for subcontractors, its records show. They earn at least $10 to $12 an hour, well above minimum wage, and receive health benefits.

At a news conference last year, Mayor Antonio R. Villaraigosa of Los Angeles publicly lauded Mr. Charney for helping the city with its faltering economy by providing “the dream of a steady paycheck and good benefits for countless workers.”

While it has been no secret that American Apparel’s largely Latino work force probably included many illegal immigrants, Mr. Schey said the company had been careful to meet legal hiring requirements. Many illegal immigrants use convincingly forged Social Security cards or other fake documents when seeking work.

In a statement, Mr. Charney said that many of his workers cited by the immigration agency were “responsible, hard-working employees” who had been with the company for more than a decade. Mr. Charney, an immigrant from Canada, said he hoped they would be able to prove their legal status. But because of the recession, the company said, it will not be hurt financially if it has to replace them.

Mr. Schey said the hiring audit at American Apparel had been “professionally done.” By contrast, Mr. Schey has brought more than 100 damage claims against the immigration agency on behalf of American citizens who said they were illegally arrested last year in Los Angeles in an immigration raid at a different company, Micro Solutions Enterprises.

Immigration officials, who asked not to be identified because the case is continuing, said the fines to American Apparel so far were about $150,000.

Kelly A. Nantel, a spokeswoman for the immigration agency, said it had taken steps to limit negotiations with employers that in the past had resulted in steep reductions in fines the employers ultimately paid.

Representative Brian P. Bilbray, a California Republican who heads an immigration caucus in the House, said the amount of the fines was crucial.

“If this is a truly conscientious effort to get tough with employers to say the days are over of profiteering with illegal immigrants, that’s fine,” said Mr. Bilbray, who opposes any effort to give legal status to illegal immigrants. “But if the fine will be so low that it’s just part of doing business, there’s no deterrent.”

Angelica Salas, the executive director of the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles, an advocacy group, said she welcomed the end to “showboat enforcement raids.” But in the end, Ms. Salas said, “there is still enforcement of laws that are broken,” adding, “The workers will still lose their jobs.”

Jul 2, 2009

We Still Torture: The New Evidence from Guantánamo

By Luke Mitchell

Luke Mitchell is a senior editor of Harper’s Magazine.

We face the temptation to believe that an election can “change everything”—that the stark contrast between Barack Obama and George W. Bush recapitulates an equally stark contrast between the present and the past. But political events move within a continuum, and they are driven by many forces other than democratic action, including the considerable power of their own momentum. Such is the case with the ongoing American experiment with torture.

The release in April of documents from the International Committee of the Red Cross, from the U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Legal Council, and from the House Armed Services Committee gave further credence to what had long been known about CIA and military interrogation techniques. They are brutal and, despite the surreal claims of the Bush Justice Department, they are illegal. The assumption underlying coverage of “the torture story,” however, has been that U.S.-sponsored torture came to a halt on January 21. The culpability of the previous administration remains to be determined, we are told, and in terms of ongoing criminal liability, the worst Obama himself could do is obstruct an investigation. Regarding the launch of that investigation, we must be patient.

We cannot be patient, though, and not simply because justice must be swift. We cannot be patient because not only have we failed to punish the people who created and maintained our torture regime; we have failed to dismantle that regime and, in many cases, even to cease torturing.

This last charge is the least heard. Although it is true that waterboarding is once again proscribed, it is equally true that the government continues to permit a series of “torture lite” techniques—prolonged isolation, sleep and sensory deprivation, force-feeding—that even Reagan appointee Judge Susan Crawford had to acknowledge amounted to torture when she threw out the government’s case against one accused terrorist. Like waterboarding, these techniques cause extreme mental anguish and permanent physical damage, and, like waterboarding, they are not permitted under international law. But unlike waterboarding, they remain on the books, in detailed prison regulations and field-manual directives, unremarked by anyone except a few activists.

The United States has always tortured. But our approach to torture has evolved over time. In the past, we preferred to keep the practice hidden. During the Cold War, we exported most of our torture projects to client regimes in Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia, while at home we worked to perfect a new form of “no touch” interrogation that would achieve terror and compliance without leaving scars, even as we denounced similar practices employed by our enemies. This was the age of hypocrisy—our secrecy was the tribute war crimes paid to democracy.

The hypocritical period ended, of course, with the attacks of September 11, the national flinch, the chest-thumping of George W. Bush, and the grim pronouncements of Dick Cheney, who loudly advertised his willingness to take the United States to “the dark side.” This, as we have all come to understand, was the time of open torture. It was the “shameful era,” when we put the techniques we had developed during the Cold War to use in the new “war on terror.”

Now we have entered what we may wish to call the post-torture era, except that it is not. Indeed, we cannot even revert to the easy hypocrisy of the Cold War. We have returned to our traditional practice of torturing and pretending not to, but the old routine is no longer convincing. We know too much. We know that we are still imprisoning men who very likely are completely innocent. We know that we still beat them. We know that we still use a series of punishments and interrogation techniques—touch and “no touch”—that any normal person would acknowledge to be torture. And we know that when those men protest such treatment by refusing to eat, we strap them to chairs and force food down their throats. We know all of this because it is well documented, not just by reporters and activists but by the torturers themselves.

It is this very openness that suggests why this new age—let’s call it the era of legitimized torture—is so perilous, not just to the men who are tortured but to liberal democracy. The moment is rapidly approaching when President Obama will cease to be the inheritor of a criminal regime and instead become its primary controlling authority, when the ongoing war crimes will attach themselves to his administration. And when they do attach themselves, Obama’s administration will be forced to defend itself, as all administrations do. And it will defend itself by claiming that what we call crimes are not in fact crimes.

This process has already begun. Rather than end illegal torture, we are now solidifying the steps that we have taken to make these activities legal. By failing to change the underlying problem even as we celebrate its supposed “solution,” we actually further entrench the past, the “bad” Bush era, into the present, the “good” Obama era. We will return to the rule of law, but within that rule will remain a rule of torture, given all the greater authority by our love of the new regime.

We have a tendency in the United States to judge actions not by their intrinsic merit but by the stylishness with which they are executed. Although the ostentatious lawlessness of the previous administration was pleasing to some, it ultimately frightened the majority of Americans. It was far too flamboyant. Obama and the Democrats seem to have rejected ostentation and lawlessness, and are all the more popular for that rejection. But they have not rejected torture itself.

As we learned from the Office of Legal Counsel memos, it is possible to parse “torture” to a considerable degree. What is the allowable incline for a waterboard? How many calories will suffice to avoid starvation? Which insects are permitted to be used in driving a man insane? The correct answer, according to those who parse, is the difference between a war crime and a heroic act of patriotism.

The OLC memos have been discredited but not the thinking behind them. We are still parsing, still weighing, still considering the possibilities. Whereas once we understood torture to be forbidden—something to be hidden and denied—now we understand it to be “complex.” We are instrumental in our analysis, and that instrumentality is held to be a virtue. We don’t torture not because it is illegal or immoral or repugnant to democracy but because “it doesn’t work,” leaving the way clear to torture that does “work.”

The combination of complexity and instrumentality creates the potential for a new inversion. We enter the “complex” realm of torture and draw a new line, and the logical consequence—the unavoidably intended consequence—is that whatever is on the “good” side of that line, the “useful” side, can no longer be called torture. And since it is no longer torture, it must be something else. In this way we arrive at the strangest and most absurd conclusion. What was once a crime becomes a sensible approach to law enforcement. And in becoming sensible it also becomes invisible.

It is our evolving understanding of force-feeding that most clearly demonstrates this process of inversion and invisibility—not because it is the most horrifying form of torture, though it is horrifying, but because it has been so completely mainstreamed. Indeed, as it is practiced at Guantánamo, force-feeding is understood not only to not be torture but in fact to be a form of mercy. It is understood, above all, as a way to “preserve life.”

As of this writing, at least thirty men are being force-fed at Guantánamo. They are being force-fed despite the departure of the administration that instituted force-feeding, despite the current administration’s order to shut down Guantánamo, and despite its even more specific order requiring prisoners there to be treated within the bounds of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which—by every interpretation but that of the U.S. government—clearly forbids force-feeding.11. The conventions forbid “humiliating and degrading treatment,” and doctors who advise the Red Cross, which in turn has considerable oversight in interpreting the conventions, have repeatedly made clear that force-feeding is humiliating and degrading. See, for instance, the judgment of Red Cross adviser Hernán Reyes, in a 1998 policy review: “Doctors should never be party to actual coercive feeding, with prisoners being tied down and intravenous drips or oesophageal tubes being forced into them. Such actions can be considered a form of torture, and under no circumstances should doctors participate in them, on the pretext of ‘saving the hunger striker’s life.’”

Most of these prisoners are not facing imminent death. In fact, force-feeding is itself a risky “treatment” that can cause infections, gastrointestinal disorders, and other complications. The feedings begin very soon after prisoners begin a hunger strike, and continue daily—with military guards strapping them to restraint chairs, usually for several hours at a time—until the prisoners agree to end the strike. This hunger striker is not an emaciated Bobby Sands lying near death after many weeks of starvation. He is a strong man bound to a chair and covered in his own vomit.22. Dr. William Winkenwerder, who served as Bush’s assistant secretary of defense for health affairs and was therefore responsible for the force-feeding policy at Guantánamo, explained this peremptory approach to me three years ago with an almost poignant question: “If we’re there to protect and sustain someone’s life, why would we actually go to the point of putting that person’s life at risk before we act?”

If force-feeding does not save lives, then what does it do? What makes it useful? From the perspective of the prisoner, there can be only one answer: Pain makes force-feeding useful. The pain makes the strike unbearable, and therefore it prevents further protest.

This is not just a logical inference. The first experience many Guantánamo prisoners had with being forced to eat was not when they went on hunger strikes but rather when they underwent interrogations at the secret CIA bases where they were held prior to their arrival at Guantánamo. At these “black sites,” we now know from the ICRC and OLC reports, CIA interrogation teams used “dietary manipulation” as a “conditioning technique” to help gather “intelligence.” These techniques, in other words, were a form of torture, no different from other, more infamous techniques outlined in the same reports, including “walling,” “cramped confinement,” and “water dousing” (now better known as waterboarding).

A 2005 memo signed by Steven Bradbury, then the acting head of the Office of Legal Counsel, explains the method. Dietary manipulation “involves the substitution of commercial liquid meal replacements for normal food, presenting detainees with a bland, unappetizing, but nutritionally complete diet.” The CIA interrogation team would strap the prisoners to chairs and feed them bottles of Ensure Plus—cited by name—for weeks on end. As Bradbury noted, it was hoped that this would cause the prisoners to become compliant.

The interrogation team believed [redacted] “maintains a tough, Mujahidin fighter mentality and has conditioned himself for a physical interrogation.” The team therefore concluded that “more subtle interrogation measures designed more to weaken [redacted] physical ability and mental desire to resist interrogation over the long run are likely to be more effective.” For these reasons, the team sought authorization to use dietary manipulation, nudity, water dousing, and abdominal slap. In the team’s view, adding these techniques would be especially helpful [redacted] because he appeared to have a particular weakness for food and also seemed especially modest.

In imposing dietary control, safety was always a concern. “While we do not equate commercial weight-loss programs and this interrogation technique,” Bradbury wrote, “the fact that these calorie levels are used in the weight-loss programs, in our view, is instructive in evaluating the medical safety of the interrogation technique.” Bradbury even anticipated the almost sentimental patina of caregiving that informs the present-day discussion of force-feeding at Guantánamo, noting that “a detainee subjected to the waterboard must be under dietary manipulation, because a fluid diet reduces the risks of the technique”—by reducing the risk of choking on undigested vomit. The force-feeding, in other words, was for the good of the prisoner.

Forcing a man to drink a diet shake may seem like a minor affront, far removed from the rack or even from waterboarding. But actual prisoner testimony from another set of documents, the Red Cross interviews acquired by Mark Danner and published in The New York Review of Books in April, suggests that the dietary manipulation was traumatizing:

During the first two weeks I did not receive any food. I was only given Ensure and water to drink. A guard would come and hold the bottle for me while I drank. . . .

During the first month I was not provided with any food apart from on two occasions as a reward for perceived cooperation. I was given Ensure to drink every 4 hours. If I refused to drink then my mouth was forced open by the guard and it was poured down my throat by force. . . .

I was transferred to a chair where I was kept, shackled by [the] hands and feet [and] given no solid food during the first two or three weeks, while sitting on the chair. I was only given Ensure and water to drink. At first the Ensure made me vomit, but this became less with time. . . .

That is how we treated prisoners at CIA black sites, back in the shameful era. It is by no means the worst instance of man’s inhumanity to man. But dietary manipulation clearly was not a technique meant primarily to preserve life.

Compare now the shameful and repudiated practice of dietary manipulation under Bush to the sensible, life-preserving practice of “involuntary feeding” at Guantánamo today, in the post-torture era.

In February, Lieutenant Colonel Yvonne Bradley, a U.S. military lawyer representing Binyam Mohamed, the British resident who was recently released from Guantánamo, described a now-familiar situation to the Guardian. “Binyam has witnessed people being forcibly extracted from their cell,” she said. “Swat teams in police gear come in and take the person out; if they resist, they are force-fed and then beaten.”

Bradley continued,

It is so bad that there are not enough chairs to strap them down and force-feed them for a two-or three-hour period to digest food through a feeding tube. Because there are not enough chairs the guards are having to force-feed them in shifts. After Binyam saw a nearby inmate being beaten it scared him and he decided he was not going to resist. He thought, “I don’t want to be beat, injured or killed.”

That same month, Ahmed Ghap pour, an attorney with the human-rights group Reprieve, which represents thirty-one detainees at Guantánamo, told Reuters that prison officials were “over-force-feeding” hunger strikers, who were suffering from diarrhea as they sat tied to their chairs. He said in some cases officials were lacing the nutrient shakes with laxatives. And the situation was getting worse. “According to my clients, there has been a ramping up in abuse since President Obama was inaugurated,” Ghappour said, speculating that guards there wanted to “get their kicks in” before the camp closed.

David Remes, an attorney who represents fifteen detainees at Guantánamo, wrote in an April petition to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that one of his clients, Farhan Abdul Latif, had been suffering in particular. When the nasogastric tube “is threaded though his nostril into his stomach,” it “feels like a nail going into his nostril, and like a knife going down his throat.” Latif had in recent months resorted to covering himself with his own excrement in order “to avoid force-feeding and that, when he was finally force-fed, the tube was inserted through the excrement covering his nostrils.”33. Latif, who is now being held in Guantánamo’s “Behavioral Health Unit,” has quite clearly been broken by his many years of confinement. Remes reports that his client has made several suicide attempts, the most recent of which was in his presence. “Without my noticing, he chipped off a piece of stiff veneer from the underside of the table and used it to saw into a vein in his left wrist,” he said. “As he sawed, he drained his blood into a plastic container I had brought and, shortly before our time was up, he hurled the blood at me from the container. It must have been a good deal of blood because I was drenched from the top of my head to my knees.” Latif survived this attempt as well.

Another prisoner, Maasoum Abdah Mouhammad, told his lawyers at the Center for Constitutional Rights that he and fifteen other men had also refused to eat:

Mr. Mouhammad described that men were vomiting while being overfed. Some of the striking detainees had kept their feeding tubes in their noses even when not being force-fed just to avoid having the tubes painfully reinserted each time. Mr. Mouhammad reported that interrogators were pressuring and coercing the men on hunger strike to eat, making promises that they would be moved to the communal living camp if they began eating. Mr. Mouhammad described these experiences as “torture, torture, torture.”

What was torture at the black sites remains torture today at Guantánamo. It is perhaps ironic that what began as a method for making men talk—in fact, as we are now learning, in order to make them lie, about ties between Al Qaeda and Iraq—is now a method of preventing men from “talking,” of preventing them from registering protest at the injustice of their condition. But that irony should not prevent us from recognizing the simple fact of the torture itself.

Every U.S. institution that could prevent force-feeding has failed to do so. Congress has failed to act, as have the courts, as has the president. Today the American Medical Association refuses even to sanction the doctors employed at Guantánamo, and one of those doctors, William Dudney, actually touts his previous job as the “Chief of Psychiatry, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba” in an advertisement for his “Medical Weight Management” services.

District Judge Gladys Kessler had the opportunity to address force-feeding in February, when lawyers for Mohammed Al-Adahi and four other prisoners at Guantánamo sought an immediate injunction against the practice. Kessler denied the injunction on the unconvincing grounds that her court lacked not just the jurisdiction but the competency to dispense justice. “Resolution of this issue requires the exercise of penal and medical discretion by staff with the appropriate expertise,” she wrote, “and is precisely the type of question that federal courts, lacking that expertise, leave to the discretion of those who do possess such expertise.” Once again, complexity prevents intervention. (Kessler, it should be noted, began her career working for Democrats in Congress.)

The Pentagon, so richly empowered by the circuit court, has failed as well. Dr. Ward Casscells was appointed assistant secretary of defense for health affairs in 2007 and thus far has survived in his role as the Pentagon’s top health official. I asked his spokesperson, Cynthia Smith, why he was continuing the previous administration’s policy of force-feeding even after the new president had ordered prisoners to be treated within the bounds of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. “The policy does save lives,” Smith wrote back (a week later, stipulating that I attribute quotes to her instead of to Casscells). “Idly watching detainees for whose care we are responsible engage in self-starvation to the point of permanent damage to health or death is not required by U.S. law, Common Article 3, or medical ethics.”44. Smith is one-third right. Force-feeding is indeed permitted under U.S. Bureau of Prison guidelines. But as previously noted, the Geneva Conventions are well understood to forbid the practice, and the guidelines of the World Medical Association are even more unambiguous: “Forcible feeding is never ethically acceptable.”

Smith went on to note that some strikers may be protesting because they feel pressured to do so by other prisoners. In such cases, force-feeding was a way to help them resist that pressure. This was a strange argument. Given that the prisoners are separated from one another and are under constant surveillance, such pressure could come only in the form of appeals to conscience. Smith’s logic was reminiscent of the claim by Marc Thiessen, a former Bush speechwriter, in the Washington Post in April: “The job of the interrogator is to safely help the terrorist do his duty to Allah, so he then feels liberated to speak freely”—which itself brings to mind the case of Alvaro Jaume, who was tortured under medical supervision in Uruguay in the 1980s, and who recalled, “These doctors are saving lives, but in a perverse way. The aim of torture is thwarted if the victim cannot support the interminable ordeal. The doctor is needed to prevent you from dying for your convictions.”55. The historian A. J. Langguth recalled some similar thinking many years ago in the New York Times, drawing from the memoirs of a CIA asset in the Uruguayan police force who was trained in the 1960s by Dan Mitrione, of the U.S. Office of Public Safety (which was founded to facilitate the training of officials in states believed to be threatened by Communist subversion).
“Before all else,” Mitrione explained to his Latin American protégé, “you must be efficient. You must cause only the damage that is strictly necessary, not a bit more. We must control our tempers in any case. You have to act with the efficiency and cleanliness of a surgeon and with the perfection of an artist.”
Mitrione was a bureaucrat at heart. “It is very important to know beforehand whether we have the luxury of letting the subject die,” he said, adding that a “premature death means a failure by the technician.”
Compare Mitrione’s claims with the words of the top lawyer at the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center, Jonathan Fredman, at a 2002 strategy meeting (the minutes for which were released in 2008 by Carl Levin as part of an investigation by the Senate Armed Services Committee, which he chairs). Fredman was similarly professional, emphasizing that “techniques that lie on the harshest end of the spectrum must be performed by a highly trained individual. Medical personnel should be present to treat any possible accidents.” He also discussed the strong requirement of a bureaucracy for documentation: “If someone dies while aggressive techniques are being used, regardless of cause of death, the backlash of attention would be severely detrimental. Everything must be approved and documented.” And he brought the same dark, almost humorous, perception of his task to bear, declaring that torture “is basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies you’re doing it wrong.”
Fredman, it should be noted, claims that he was “paraphrased sloppily and poorly.”The prudent degree of specificity may vary from regime to regime, but the mind of the torturer remains the same at all times and in all places. All of which, in any case, suggests that the Pentagon has no intention of changing its policy.

President Obama, to date, has done nothing either. In February, Ramzi Kassem, a Yale law professor who represents one of the hunger strikers, sent a formal letter to Gregory Craig, the new White House counsel, outlining the legal concerns about force-feeding and recommending in detail how to bring the treatment of hunger strikers in line with the Geneva Conventions (for instance, by prohibiting the use of restraint chairs). Obama could simply order these changes, but he has not.

Obama did ask Navy Admiral Patrick Walsh to visit Guantánamo and report back on conditions there. Walsh found the practices in question, including the use of restraint chairs, to be perfectly acceptable. When Reuters asked Walsh about specific incidents of abuse, he was evasive. “We heard allegations of abuse,” he said. “What we found is that there were in some cases substantiated evidence where guards had misconduct, I think that would be the best way to put it.”

Force-feeding is an especially egregious example of legitimized torture, but it is far from the only example. Just one percent of the prisoners held offshore by the United States are held at Guantánamo, and many other techniques remain legally available to their jailers. The Army Field Manual still permits solitary confinement, sensory deprivation, and sleep deprivation, as well as so-called emotional techniques such as “fear up,” which involves terrifying prisoners into a state of “learned helplessness.”

It is difficult to know the degree to which these practices are employed, though, because President Obama has adopted not only much of the Bush Administration’s torture policy but also its radical doctrine of secrecy. The Obama White House has sought to prevent detainees at Bagram prison in Afghanistan from gaining access to courts where they may reveal the circumstances of their imprisonment, sought to continue the practice of rendering prisoners to unknown and unknowable locations outside the United States, and sought to keep secret many (though not all) of the records regarding our treatment of those detainees.

The result is that what would at first seem to be something positive—a “national conversation about torture”—has instead become a form of complicity. We know that torture occurred, and we know that it continues to occur. Yet we allow ourselves to pretend otherwise because we don’t know enough. The secrecy allows us to transform a taboo into an “issue,” and most voters seem to desire, as Judge Kessler did, to leave the resolution of that issue to the “penal and medical discretion” of “a staff with the appropriate expertise.” In one recent poll only 35 percent of Americans called for the closing of Guantánamo, whereas 45 percent wanted to keep it open and 20 percent weren’t sure what we should do.

As ever, Democrats are attempting to split the difference. A major claim by Obama is that he does not want people in the CIA “to suddenly feel like they’ve got to spend all their time looking over their shoulders”—presumably because he does not want to prejudge their “appropriate expertise.” A more persuasive means of preventing torture would be to say precisely the opposite, that people in the CIA should spend all their time looking over their shoulders. But that is not what Obama has said. Now those who would speak against torture in a crisis situation face a strong deterrent. They will be understood as taking a side on an issue—a complex issue—rather than simply upholding well-established legal (and at one time political) precedent.

We have seen too much in the past eight years to pretend any longer that the United States is incapable of criminal abuse or to trust the “experts” to act secretly in what they believe, sincerely or not, to be our best interests. We have seen too much to permit ourselves the luxury of ambivalence. Indeed, now that we have seen what our nation has done in the depths of a panic, we should also be able to recognize the larger, longer-term crimes of our leaders. We have for many years imprisoned a greater proportion of our own people than any other nation on earth, kept many of those prisoners in the kind of prolonged solitary confinement that is shown in study after study to drive people insane, and countenanced the rape of those who aren’t in solitary confinement as part of a system of “rough justice.” We have known this about ourselves for a very long time and done nothing.

Now we have a choice. We can continue our experiment with torture or we can harness the obvious horror of the last eight years to rectify the more discreet horrors of the distant past and the darkening present, and in so doing at last become a nation whose actions embody its pretensions.