Starting Points: Iraq War

Showing posts with label Iraq War. Show all posts

Jun 1, 2010

Iraq's Sunni insurgent groups gather to plot comeback amid political crisis

By Ernesto Londoño
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, June 1, 2010; A05

BAGHDAD -- Seven years after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, dozens of Iraqis representing various insurgent groups checked into a five-star hotel in Istanbul this spring to plot a comeback. Days later, members of the outlawed Baath Party held a public meeting in Damascus, Syria, to hail the party's rebirth.

The unusual anniversary gatherings rankled Iraqi and American officials. Although the groups don't have large constituencies in Iraq, officials worry that their appeals could gain traction amid a political crisis in Iraq that has weakened the government and left the Sunni Muslims who were dominant under Hussein feeling newly disenfranchised.

Attendees at the Istanbul meeting included representatives of the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the al-Rashideen Army, which were among the Sunni insurgent groups formed to fight the U.S. occupation. Leaders of the loosely connected groups have tried unsuccessfully to band together in the past. The creation of U.S.-backed Sunni paramilitary squads in 2007 deflated the insurgency, driving some leaders into exile and forcing others to pledge to help the Americans.

As the U.S. military draws down, many Iraqi Sunnis who aligned themselves with the United States say they feel abandoned and vulnerable in a country run by Shiites. Until recently, insurgency leaders had kept a relatively low profile from exile in countries such as Syria and Jordan.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki condemned Turkey and Syria for allowing the gatherings, and in an interview he accused them of helping to destabilize Iraq.

"The only ones benefiting are al-Qaeda and the terrorist organizations," Maliki said. "Thus, our advice to our friends and brothers: Terror does not know borders, religion or ethnicity. They are now attacking Iraq because there are suitable circumstances, and tomorrow they will attack Turkey and others."

Feeling shut out

The groups could find receptive audiences in Iraq if the next government is widely seen as having insufficient Sunni representation. Many Sunnis accuse the Shiite-led Iraqi government of being sectarian, pointing to factors such as the disproportionate number of Sunni detainees and efforts to weed out Sunnis from government jobs.

Sunnis made a strong showing in the March 7 parliamentary elections, propelling the largely secular Iraqiya bloc to a first-place finish. The bloc did not win enough seats to secure the majority needed to form a government, however, making it likelier that an alliance of two Shiite groups will appoint the new prime minister.

"There is no doubt that Sunnis will feel excluded, disenfranchised and marginalized if they are not given a significant share in government," said Joost Hiltermann, an Iraq expert at the International Crisis Group. "After all, it is with this expectation that they agreed to abandon the insurgency during the surge in 2007."

The Sunni insurgency sprang up after the United States disbanded Iraq's armed forces and a large share of its government workforce following the March 2003 invasion. The groups attacked U.S. troops and sought to sabotage their efforts to install a parliamentary system that empowered the majority Shiites.

The indigenous Iraqi insurgent groups were eclipsed in 2006 by the foreign-led organization al-Qaeda in Iraq, which came to control key parts of the capital and large areas in the west and north. Many members of the original insurgency surrendered or joined forces with the U.S. military to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Aside from al-Qaeda in Iraq and its affiliates, the insurgent groups that remain have maintained a relatively low profile of late. In the past, they often were divided by rivalries. "It remains unclear how serious a threat to the security of the state they could pose," Hiltermann said. "The Sunnis' greatest liability is their own internal divisions and lack of popular leadership."

Common ground

The key purpose of the April 10 conference in Istanbul was to find common ground, said Rabih Haddad, one of the organizers. He said group leaders were heartened by the possibilities ahead as the U.S. military withdraws amid the political impasse. "The general mood was one of optimism," he said via phone from Beirut.

Haddad said that nearly 250 people representing 20 groups attended the conference. It was held in Turkey, he said, because it is an "open, democratic" country.

U.S. officials have expressed dissatisfaction to the Turkish government, which made clear it played no role in holding the event. American officials tried unsuccessfully last year to have discussions with political representatives of the Sunni extremist groups to persuade them to participate in the political process.

"These groups at that meeting in Turkey had an opportunity to participate in the electoral process here, had they been playing by the rules," said Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey D. Feltman, the top U.S. diplomat for the Middle East.

Sunni insurgent groups have said the United States will remain the primary target of their violence. But they have also picked fights with the Iraqi government.

"We are not in favor of using force with the government or any Iraqi," Harith al-Dhari, an exiled Sunni activist who heads the Iraqi Muslim Scholars Association, said in a phone interview from Jordan. "But if the Iraqi government continues using force against the resistance and if they don't take meaningful steps toward reconciliation, we will be obliged to defend ourselves."

Correspondent Leila Fadel and special correspondent Jinan Hussein contributed to this report.

Apr 8, 2010

A Withdrawal Plan for Afghanistan

Image via Wikipedia

April 7, 2010

Two key antiwar critics, Senator Russ Feingold and Representative Jim McGovern, are expected to introduce legislation as early as next week calling for a "flexible timetable" for the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. The proposal, now in final stages of preparation, was confirmed by McGovern and by Feingold's office.

The coordinated effort, the first of its kind during the Afghanistan war, is reminiscent of similar House-Senate proposals that eventually succeeded in winning majority support during the Vietnam War. During the Iraq War, resolutions calling for a timetable steadily advanced as well, until they became Obama's platform in 2008.

The new initiative will challenge the Obama administration and offer an organizing vehicle for the peace movement. The recent sixty-five votes for Representative Dennis Kucinich's antiwar resolution is not a true measure of antiwar sentiment in the Congress, McGovern told me, adding, "We haven't had our full debate on the war." Congressional restlessness is climbing over sacrificing American lives and dollars for a corrupt and recalcitrant Karzai government, he argues.

A Congressional letter from Feingold and McGovern questioning the current policy is expected shortly, to be followed by introduction of the legislation. McGovern also will introduce an updated version of last year's resolution requesting an exit plan from the administration. Last year's version had 100 House sponsors.

Image by Jayel Aheram via Flickr

Congressional attention will soon turn to the Pentagon's requests for $33 billion to fund the current Afghan escalation and $159 billion for Iraq-Afghanistan war funding in fiscal year 2011. Obama has spoken against open-ended funding and pledged to "begin" troop withdrawals from Afghanistan by summer 2011. Yet he has refused to agree to a date by which all troops will be withdrawn as he did during the Iraq war in 2008.

The Feingold-McGovern proposal could challenge the president if it achieves debate and a substantial, though minority, vote in favor. But it also will reveal a lack of Democratic unity in both houses. According to one ranking insider, "the mood...seems to be granting the administration some additional time as the new troops deploy. It may not be the right strategy but it suits most people politically."

A troop withdrawal deadline is seen by peace advocates as an incentive to draw the Taliban into peace talks, directly and indirectly. There are behind-the-scenes debates already underway over providing safe-passage documents which would enable Taliban leaders to enter Kabul or a third country for political negotiations, which Karzai favors. Former United Nations envoy Kai Eide supports negotiating with the Taliban too, but the US State Department and Pentagon are so far opposed both to negotiations and safe-passage documents.

Meanwhile, some Congressional staff and peace advocates are evaluating a menu of demands to make as possible amendments fleshing out an exit strategy in the budget battles ahead, among them:

§ ending the Iraq War according to agreements already supported by the Obama administration. Currently, existing Congressional budget language supports the timelines of (1) a US-imposed deadline of this August 3 for all US combat forces to be withdrawn, and (2) the US- Iraq pact's official December 31, 2011, deadline, when all remaining troops and contractors must leave Iraq, and bases shut down or handed over to the Iraqi government;

§ requiring all-party talks in Afghanistan leading to new internationally supervised elections, including elements of the Taliban, as a condition of funding;

§ conditioning further humanitarian and educational aid on protections for Afghan women's rights, and recognized human rights standards for detainees;

§ replacing ISAF troops in Afghanistan with peacekeepers from non- aligned countries, particularly from Islamic-majority ones;

§ challenging drone attacks as pre-emptive invasions of Pakistan's sovereignty to perform of secret extra-judicial killings, which result in large-scale civilian deaths and alienate the population.

The strongest peace movement argument would seem to be about budgetary impacts in a time of chronic recession. According to Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, Iraq alone will become a three-trillion-dollar war. The Congressional Research Service says that the direct costs now reach $1.08 trillion, including $748 billion for Iraq, $340 billion for Afghanistan and $29 billion for "enhanced security."

As McGovern points out, "there is a price to be paid, in roads falling apart, emergency rooms closing down, finite resources that should be invested in putting people to work, but instead going to two wars."

That will be weighed against Democratic concerns about opposing the president during an election year.

But the measure floated by Representative Barbara Lee to cut funding for the escalation may receive support from as few as fifty or sixty members. Spending taxpayers' money without end on unfunded wars of unknown duration doesn't sound like fiscal wisdom, but when it comes to the Long War, both parties are loaded with big spenders.

About Tom Hayden

Tom Hayden, a former California state senator, is the author, most recently, of The Long Sixties: From 1960 to Barack Obama (Paradigm)

Apr 6, 2010

What changed between 1991 and 2003 Iraq invasions? « Adonis Diaries

Cover via Amazon

Posted by: adonis49 on: April 4, 2010

What changed between 1991 and 2003 Iraq invasions? (Apr. 3, 2010)

The Morocco author Fatema Mernissi wrote in 1991 “Islam and democracy” after the first invasion of Iraq by President Bush the father or senior. In 2002, she wrote an introduction to the English edition. In 2010, the French editor Albin Michel asked Mernissi a fresh introduction to the updated French edition. Mernissi suggested that the English introduction should be fine and Michel replied: “Do you think that nothing happened between 2002 and 2010 that young Europeans might be interested in knowing?”

After a good night sleep Mernissi realized that among the many changes, apart that Islamic/Arabic youth are double the Western rate, one change stands out grandly: In 1991, the Arabs were terrified of Western supremacy in technology (smart bombs for example that CNN kept showing their devastating effects in collateral damages on civilians); in 2003 invasion it was clear that the American and British soldiers were the most scared of Islam virulence. Mainly, Islamic/Arab States had acquired the numeric information technology for disseminating instant news in sound, pictures, and videos and had begun rational communication discussions (jadal) on points and counter points to the benefit of every Arab/Moslems living in European States and the USA.

The unilateral monopoly in the diffusion and dissemination of information and “intelligence” was eroded: Moslems and Arabs could now enjoy 36 satellite channels broadcasting everywhere, including the most popular Al Jazeera channel that even the Western Medias watched for current and impartial news. Moslems in China were able to keep up with the rest of Islamic World events.

This information victory scared the Western civilization after it realized that the new Islamic/Arabic generations are no longer attuned to their local monopoly Medias run by dictators and monarchs: it is internet age and youth want changes and to discourse rationally. In 1991, Arabs had practically the CNN to cover the war in Iraq as direct source of information and it was biased toward showing the effects of “smart bombs” and Iraqi soldiers being shoveled alive under in the dune bunkers. Arab people got familiar with the term “collateral damages” and CNN failed to inform on the casualties. In 2003, Arab/Moslem masses had Al Jazeera channel to cover the war among 32 other satellite channels viewed for free. It is estimated that by 2012, Islamic/Arab States will have over 1,200 free channels as option for the world to watch information and discussion sessions.

For example, since 1948, Israel has devoured all Palestine and waged countless major pre-emptive wars and the Arab masses had to rely on American Medias for totally biased information; the pickiest watchers occasionally selected the BBC. Things have changed in this numeric information age. In 2003, Al Jazeera was offering as bonuses well targeted discussion panels with many foreign figures. For example, in 2001 and before the September attack on the Twin Towers, Al Jazeera ridiculed Taliban for bombing the ancient giant Buddhist idols in Bamyan (Afghanistan) while Richard Keller of the giant oil multinational UNOCAL was proclaiming “Taliban is good thing for us”

Western humanists grabbed the successes of the Islamic/Arabic satellite channels to become regular guest stars. For example, Dany Schechter of “Plunder: Investigating our economic calamity and the subprime scandal”; Adam Hochschild of “Burry the chains: Prophets and rebels in the fight to liberal”; and Chris Hedges of “War is a force that gives us meaning” are regular guests on Arab satellite channels.

Most ironic, it is the USA and a few European States that have been pressuring the obscurantist Arabic State dictators and monarchies to suppressing freedom of opinions and to shut down “controversial” Arabic channels. In France a few city mayors ordered Arabic channels banned for dissemination because the Arabs and Moslems living in these cities were hooked to Arabic channels and their mind being “poisoned” away from France patriotic indoctrination and inclusion programs.