Hezbollah's relocation of rocket sites to Lebanon's interior poses wider threat

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By Howard Schneider
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, January 23, 2010; A06

BEIRUT -- Hezbollah has dispersed its long-range-rocket sites deep into northern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, a move that analysts say threatens to broaden any future conflict between the Islamist movement and Israel into a war between the two countries.

More than 10,000 U.N. troops now patrol traditional Hezbollah territory in southern Lebanon along the Israeli border, and several thousand Lebanese armed forces personnel also have moved into the area. A cross-border raid by Hezbollah guerrillas in summer 2006 triggered a month-long war that prompted the United Nations to deploy its force as part of a cease-fire.

The United Nations is confident that the dense presence of its troops in the comparatively small area is helping lower the risk of conflict and minimizing Hezbollah's ability to move weapons across southern Lebanon, but analysts in Lebanon and Israel say the U.N. mission is almost beside the point.

Hezbollah's redeployment and rearmament indicate that its next clash with Israel is unlikely to focus on the border, instead moving farther into Lebanon and challenging both the military and the government. The situation is important for U.S. efforts in the region, whether aimed at curbing the influence of Hezbollah's patrons in Iran or at persuading Syria to moderate its stance toward Israel and its neighbors.

Hezbollah "learned their lesson" in 2006, when vital intelligence enabled the Israel Defense Forces to destroy the group's long-range launch sites in the first days of the conflict, said reserve Gen. Aharon Zeevi Farkash, a former head of IDF intelligence. In effect, he said, "the 'border' is now the Litani River," with Hezbollah's rocket sites possibly extending north of Beirut.

In a December briefing, Brig. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, the IDF head of operations, said some Hezbollah rockets now have a range of more than 150 miles -- making Tel Aviv reachable from as far away as Beirut. The Islamist group has talked openly of its efforts to rebuild, and Israel estimates that Hezbollah has about 40,000 projectiles, most of them shorter-range rockets and mortar shells.

The group "has been fortifying lots of different areas," said Judith Palmer Harik, a Hezbollah scholar in Beirut. With U.N. and Lebanese forces "packed along the border," she said, "we are looking at a much more expanded battle in all senses of the word."

Just a matter of time?

The border has been relatively quiet since the 2006 war, a fact that officials with the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon attribute at least partly to the 400 or so patrols they send out each day to search for weapons stores and prevent border violations.

Armored U.N. vehicles sit at the entrance to southern Lebanon, alongside Lebanese army and intelligence checkpoints; blue-flagged U.N. troops occupy mountaintop posts that Hezbollah used as firing sites in 2006.

"We are covering every square inch," said Maj. S.K. Misra, a spokesman for the battalion of India's 3/11 Gurkha Rifles corps that patrols southeastern Lebanon. "It's impossible for anything to move."

At the same time, debate is raging in political and military circles between those who argue that the damage to each side in 2006 has created a sort of respectful deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah and those who say it is only a matter of time before violence erupts again.

Hezbollah lost hundreds of fighters in the conflict and was put on the defensive in Lebanon, where some questioned whether the group's vow to continue "resistance" against Israel was worth letting an unregulated paramilitary organization effectively make decisions about war and peace.

With Iran backing and supplying Hezbollah and the United States backing and supplying Israel, "the battlefield is Lebanon," said Marwan Hamadeh, a Lebanese member of parliament and supporter of a government coalition that is trying to curb Hezbollah's arms and limit Syrian and Iranian influence in the country. "This is where the Iranian missiles sit, and this is where the Israeli air force can reach."

Israel, meanwhile, lost more than 100 troops and uncharacteristically large numbers of tanks, helicopters and other equipment -- prompting it to rewrite its war doctrine and adjust its perception of Hezbollah's militia. Military analysts now see Hezbollah not as primarily a guerrilla force but as an organization that practices "hybrid war," mixing classic guerrilla tactics with the strategy, equipment and capability of a standing army.

In a 2008 report for the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, analysts Stephen D. Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman concluded that Hezbollah had performed more effectively in 2006 than any of the Arab armies from Egypt, Syria or Jordan that had fought conventional wars with Israel over the years, and better in some ways than the Iraqi army in its two wars with the United States.

A wider struggle

In Beirut, politicians and analysts agree that the group has only grown stronger since 2006. As they hear Hezbollah's secretary general, Hasan Nasrallah, speak of a conflict that will "change the face of the region," many assume that the IDF will not allow the organization to rearm, recruit and train much longer before striking.

In Israel, Hezbollah is seen as part of a wider struggle for regional influence between Iran and U.S.-allied moderate Arab states, given the group's ties to Iran and Syria and arms supplies assumed to run through both countries.

There is no reason the current calm cannot continue, said retired Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland, a former Israeli national security adviser who is now a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies.

But if a conflict does break out, "Israel will not contain that war against Hezbollah," Eiland said. "We cannot."

Given Hezbollah's capabilities, he said, "the only way to deter the other side and prevent the next round -- or if it happens, to win -- is to have a military confrontation with the state of Lebanon."

Hariri's struggles in Lebanon show limits of U.S. influence

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By Howard Schneider
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, January 11, 2010; A08

BEIRUT -- The victory by a pro-U.S. faction in last June's parliamentary election has given way to a situation in which Hezbollah will keep its large arms stockpile and a veto over major government decisions, while efforts are underway to repair relations with neighboring Syria.

The compromises made by new Prime Minister Saad Hariri as he assembled a governing coalition are seen by supporters as unavoidable in a country in which complex internal politics and the influence of outside powers can make governing difficult. But they also show the practical limits of the Obama administration's overture to the Islamic world.

The June election victory by Hariri's coalition came just after Obama delivered a major speech from Cairo and just before violent street demonstrations rattled the government in Iran, considered an important influence in Lebanon because of its support for Hezbollah. Some Obama advisers went so far as to attribute Hariri's success to the mood of reform the president had brought to the region.

But victory at the polls did not translate so smoothly on the ground. Hariri spent six months trying to form a government, and could do so only after accepting key Hezbollah demands and giving up on a main aim of his coalition: to curb the Islamist group's influence.

He also agreed to visit Damascus and meet with Syrian President Bashar Assad, a difficult symbolic step because of Syria's suspected involvement in the 2005 assassination of Hariri's father, former prime minister Rafiq Hariri. A United Nations tribunal is still investigating the killing. It is one of a number of political assassinations that led to a U.N. resolution and other outside pressure, prompting Syria to end its longstanding military presence in Lebanon.

"We won the election, but it looks like we lost," said Marwan Hamadeh, a member of parliament and supporter of the "Cedar Revolution," which has aimed to curb the influence of both Syria and Iran in the country at a time when other power brokers, especially the United States, want to talk with both nations. "There has been a lot of realism and a lot of frustration. The Cedar Revolution forces were convinced: Why look for a fight when everyone is trying to negotiate with Iran and Syria?"

The shape of Hariri's coalition is not seen by U.S. officials as a major setback; they view it instead as far preferable to a coalition dominated by Hezbollah and its allies. Hezbollah maintains a militia that it justifies as necessary for potential conflict with Israel, despite a U.N. resolution ordering the group to disarm. The United States regards Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The group's opponents in Lebanon argue that its arms stockpile puts the country at risk of another war, such as the one in 2006 in which Israel maintained that all of Lebanon would be held accountable for Hezbollah's actions.

U.S. military and economic aid to Lebanon is continuing, largely to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces and other state institutions and undermine Hezbollah's argument that the country can't defend itself. The United States has contributed about $400 million to Lebanon's military since 2006, a level expected to continue in the form of supplies that range from armored personnel carriers to new boots.

"It's glass half empty, glass half full," Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said as he toured the country last week. "Does Hariri's visit to Damascus mean you have to beg for Damascus's dispensation, or does it mean that Bashar wants a new relationship? It remains to be seen."

It is a question central to the discussion here and connected to U.S. efforts to turn Syria away from Iran, derail Iran's nuclear program, and limit Iran's influence through proxies like Hezbollah here and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Hariri's visit to Damascus, according to his supporters and others, was brokered by Saudi Arabia, which has been taking its own steps to repair relations with Assad. What's less clear -- and under debate here -- is whether the Saudis were hoping to weaken Syria's long-standing alliance with Iran by making amends or were hedging against the possibility that Obama will fail in his efforts to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons technology.

The White House has its own policy of engagement with Syria, though progress has been fitful. The expected return of a U.S. ambassador to Damascus has not occurred, and there is still U.S. dissatisfaction with Syrian efforts to control its border and halt the flow of insurgents into Iraq.

Hariri's meeting with Assad did produce some concessions, including an expectation that the countries will work more closely on defining borders and other issues that are considered a source of instability inside Lebanon and between Lebanon and Israel. Diplomats and analysts also regarded Assad's willingness over the past year to exchange ambassadors with Lebanon as an important acknowledgment of Lebanon's sovereignty.

But there is still worry here that the momentum of the Cedar Revolution has been lost, and skepticism that U.S. efforts to engage Syria and Iran will change the behavior of either. The shape of the new government has only added to those concerns.

"Everybody is waiting to see if the Syrians will deliver, and if the Iranians win or lose their battle" both internally and with the United States, said Ghattas Khoury, a former member of parliament who is close to Hariri. "I think everyone reached the conclusion that these were not things you can do much about."

Lebanon Drama Adds Act With Leader’s Trip to Syria

By ROBERT F. WORTH

BEIRUT, Lebanon — In any other part of the world, a new prime minister’s visit to a neighboring country would be a fairly routine event. But Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s trip to Syria over the weekend has been treated here as a kind of Lebanese national drama, the subject of almost endless commentary in newspapers and television shows.

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It is not that anything really happened. Mr. Hariri and President Bashar al-Assad of Syria exchanged some thoroughly forgettable diplomatic banter and posed for photographs.

Instead, the trip epitomized a national story with anguished, almost operatic dimensions: a young leader forced to shake hands with the man who he believes killed his father. And it served as a reminder of this region’s deep attachment to political symbolism.

For many Lebanese, the visit was a measure of Syria’s renewed influence over Lebanon after years of bitterness and struggle since the Syrian military’s withdrawal in 2005. That withdrawal came after Mr. Hariri’s father, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, was killed in a car bombing that many here believe to have been ordered by Syria.

The withdrawal was a blow to Syrian prestige, and afterward Saad Hariri seemed to have the entire Western world at his back as he built a movement for greater Lebanese independence and pushed for an international tribunal to try his father’s killers.

But since then, the United States and the West have chosen to engage with Syria, not isolate it. And Saudi Arabia, which has long backed Mr. Hariri and competed with Syria for influence here, reconciled with the Syrians earlier this year, leaving them a freer hand to guide politics in Lebanon as they once did.

Image by Getty Images via Daylife

All this has been known for months, but it was still tremendously important for Mr. Hariri to actually cross the mountains — in his first visit since before his father’s killing — and pay his respects in Damascus.

“The image of Syrian soldiers retreating was a huge blow to them,” said Elias Muhanna, a political analyst and the author of the Lebanese blog Qifa Nabki. “So the image of Hariri coming over the mountains means they’ve come full circle. It demonstrates to all the power centers in Damascus that Bashar has restored Syria’s position of strength vis-à-vis Lebanon.”

The visit also has vivid historical echoes for many Lebanese. In 1977, the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt visited Damascus just weeks after his own father was killed in an attack that is believed to have been arranged by Syria. Like Mr. Hariri, he had little choice: he had to reconcile with Syria if he wanted to continue playing a political role.

“The stability of Lebanon always depends on its environment, and basically this environment is Syria,” Mr. Jumblatt said in an interview on Sunday. “For the sake of Lebanese stability, we have got to put aside personal animosity.”

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It is difficult to say exactly what Mr. Hariri’s visit portends in terms of Lebanese-Syrian relations. By one measure, he has already achieved his most important goals: the Syrian Army is gone, and no one expects it to return. The two countries restored diplomatic relations this year. The international tribunal that was formed in 2005 under United Nations auspices to try the elder Hariri’s killers continues its work here and in the Netherlands, where it is based. It could still indict high-ranking Syrians, although most analysts say that seems less likely than it did four years ago.

But most agree that Syria will once again have a powerful, undisputed voice here on issues ranging from cabinet positions to the militant Shiite movement Hezbollah, which Syria supports. The influence is not likely to be as crude as it was during the 1990s, when Syrian officers strutted through Beirut and were accused of raking profits from Lebanese industries. To some here, that is improvement enough. To others, Mr. Hariri’s trip across the mountains was a tragic concession.

“Whether Saad Hariri admits it or not, it was a severe setback to everything that happened starting in 2005,” said Michael Young, a Lebanese columnist who has long been critical of Syria’s role here. “I think he did it reluctantly, but he never had a choice.”

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Lebanon: Deadly Month for Domestic Workers - Human Rights Watch

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(Beirut) - The Lebanese government should investigate the deaths of eight migrant domestic workers during October 2009, as well as the reasons for the disproportionately high death rate among this group of workers, Human Rights Watch said today. An estimated 200,000 domestic workers, primarily from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Ethiopia, work in Lebanon.

Four of the deaths are classified by police reports or by the workers' embassies as suicides, three as possible work accidents, and one as a heart attack. Six of the deaths occurred when migrant domestic workers either fell or jumped from high places. One woman committed suicide by hanging herself from a tree. The dead include four Ethiopians, two Nepalis, and two Malagasies.

"The death toll last month is clear evidence that the government isn't doing enough to fix the difficult working conditions these women face," said Nadim Houry, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch. "The government needs to explain why so many women who came to Lebanon to work end up leaving the country in coffins."

In August 2008, Human Rights Watch published a study showing that migrant domestic workers were dying at a rate of more than one a week in Lebanon.

A diplomat at the consulate of the country from which one of the dead women came told Human Rights Watch: "These women are under pressure, with no means to go away. Their passports are seized and they are often locked away in their employer's house. It is like they are living in a cage. Human beings need to mingle with others; otherwise they lose their will to live."

An official steering committee created in early 2006 and led by the labor ministry has taken some steps to improve the treatment of migrant domestic workers. In January 2009, the labor ministry introduced a standard employment contract that clarifies certain terms and conditions of employment for domestic workers, such as the maximum number of daily working hours, as well as a new regulation for employment agencies that aims to improve oversight of their operations. However, these workers are still excluded from the country's labor law, and there are still no enforcement mechanisms for the current rules governing domestic employment.

"As long as Lebanon does not appoint labor inspectors to ensure compliance with the new rules, these rules will exist on paper only," Houry said.

Human Rights Watch urged the official steering committee that works to improve the status of domestic workers to begin tracking deaths and injuries, to ensure that the police properly investigate them and to develop a concrete strategy to reduce these deaths. This strategy should include combating the practice of forced confinement, providing a labor ministry hotline for the workers, appointing labor inspectors, and improving working conditions and labor law protections.

Human Rights Watch also urged governments of the migrant workers' countries of origin to increase the services at their embassies and diplomatic missions in Lebanon by providing counseling and shelter for workers in distress.

Details about Deaths of Migrant Domestic Workers in October 2009

On October 8, Sunit Bholan of Nepal, 22, reportedly committed suicide.

On October 16, Kassaye Etsegenet of Ethiopia, 23, died after reportedly jumping from the seventh floor of a building on Charles Helou avenue in Beirut. Etsegenet left a suicide note in which she states that her decision was based on personal reasons, in particular, a fight with another member of her family.

On October 21, Zeditu Kebede Matente of Ethiopia, 26, was found dead in the town of Haris hanging from an olive tree.

On October 23, Saneet Mariam of Ethiopia, 30, died after falling from the balcony of her employer's house in the town of Mastita.

On October 23, Mina Rokaya, of Nepal, 24, died after being transferred from her employer's house in Blat to a hospital. The police report says that she died from a heart attack.

On October 28, Tezeta Yalmoya of Ethiopia, 26, died after falling from the third floor of the apartment building where she worked in `Abra, next to Saida. According to reports in local papers, she fell while cleaning the balcony.

Newspapers in Madagascar reported the deaths of two Malagasy women in Lebanon in October. The first worker, identified as Mampionona, reportedly fell from the third floor while cleaning the balcony. She had arrived in Lebanon on September 1. The other, identified as Vololona, died after reportedly jumping from the fourth floor.

Lebanon’s Shadow Government | Foreign Affairs

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How Hezbollah Wins by Losing

Mohamad Bazzi
MOHAMAD BAZZI is an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a journalism professor at New York University.

On July 14, a mysterious explosion rocked the southern Lebanese town of Khirbet Silim, destroying a building. United Nations peacekeepers later claimed that the building was a Hezbollah weapons depot that had accidentally blown up. Hezbollah, a Shiite militia with close ties to Iran, has remained silent about the blast's cause, but the group made clear that it does not appreciate the renewed international attention focused on its arsenal.

Under the Security Council resolution that ended the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, blue-helmeted UN troops are responsible for intercepting illegal weapons shipments and shutting down storage sites south of the Litani River. But when UN troops tried to raid another suspected weapons cache in Khirbet Silim a few days after the explosion, hundreds of villagers surrounded the soldiers, pelted them with rocks, and forced them to withdraw. Peacekeepers fired warning shots in the air as they cleared a path out of town. Ever since, black-capped Hezbollah men have stood guard outside the house.

Since the June 7 Lebanese parliamentary elections, an alluring but simplistic narrative has emerged in the West: because Hezbollah and its allies were defeated at the polls, the militant group would lose some of its luster and a pro-American political coalition would rule Lebanon. In fact, Hezbollah remains the country's dominant military and political force. Moreover, it holds the key to both domestic and external stability -- its actions will determine whether there is another war with Israel or if Lebanon will once again be wracked by internal conflict. By losing the election, Hezbollah also avoided being held accountable by Lebanon's other sects -- without power, there is little responsibility.

Under the Saudi-brokered Taif Accord that ended Lebanon's 15-year civil war, all of the country's militias were disarmed. But Hezbollah was allowed to keep its weapons as a "national resistance" against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, which ended in May 2000. When the Israelis withdrew, many Lebanese asked why Hezbollah did not give up its arms and become a strictly political movement. Hezbollah insisted that because Israel was still occupying a tiny strip of land -- called Shebaa Farms -- at the murky intersection of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, its mission of resistance was not over. The UN later determined the area to be Syrian, not Lebanese, territory.

The last war began after Hezbollah fighters crossed the border and abducted two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006. Hezbollah miscalculated, and Israel launched its most intense attack since its 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The offensive crippled the country's infrastructure, displaced one million people, cut Lebanon off from the world, and killed more than 1,000 Lebanese -- the majority of them civilians. Hezbollah, in turn, fired nearly 4,000 rockets at Israel, killing 43 civilians. During 34 days of fighting, 120 Israeli soldiers were killed, many of them by Hezbollah's potent arsenal of antitank rockets. Throughout the war, the Lebanese army remained on the sidelines. Today, it is still as ill-equipped and ill-trained as it was in 2006, and it is unlikely to be involved if another war breaks out. The main difference now is that the army is deployed in southern Lebanon, alongside 13,000 UN peacekeepers.

In recent weeks, Hezbollah officials have ratcheted up their rhetoric, pledging that they are ready for war with Israel and warning against UN attempts to seek out Hezbollah's weapons and rockets. Hezbollah leaders boast that the group now has an even larger and more potent stash of missiles than it did three years ago. Israeli officials -- who are also escalating their war rhetoric -- estimate Hezbollah's arsenal at between 40,000 and 80,000 rockets.

On August 10, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that his administration would hold the Lebanese government responsible for any attacks on Israeli targets by Hezbollah. "It should be clear that the Lebanese government, as far as we are concerned, is responsible for every attack -- every attack -- launched from its territory against Israel," Netanyahu told Israel Radio. "It cannot hide and say, 'Well, that's Hezbollah, and we don't control them.'"

Some political leaders and analysts in Lebanon interpreted Netanyahu's comments as a signal that Israel would no longer distinguish between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah, especially while the group has a sizable bloc in parliament and seats in the cabinet. Other Israeli officials have suggested that Israel would retaliate against Lebanon if Hezbollah makes good on its promise to avenge the February 2008 assassination of its military commander, Imad Mughniyah, in Damascus -- an act of revenge that Israel worries could take the form of an attack on Israeli tourists, embassies, or other targets outside Israel.

A few days after Netanyahu's comments, Israeli President Shimon Peres tried to calm tensions by once again drawing a distinction between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah. "There was not in the past nor is there now any reason for Lebanon to be Israel's enemy or for Israel to be Lebanon's enemy," Peres said. But Netanyahu's warning is more representative of the Israeli military and political establishment, which both view Hezbollah as a significant danger.

Despite the increasing threats, neither side has an immediate interest in launching a war. Israel is more concerned about Iran than Hezbollah, although if Israel attacks Iran's nuclear facilities, it is likely that the militia would be part of the Iranian retaliation. Aside from an Iranian-Israeli confrontation, Hezbollah is absorbed in internal Lebanese politics and cannot afford to be seen as instigating another war with Israel. The Shiite group's other main backer, Syria, is trying to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia and the United States, and Damascus would likely frown upon renewed conflict in the region. But the danger of heightened rhetoric and a military buildup is that the situation could get out of control.

Not surprisingly, Hezbollah's response to the Israeli threats has been defiant. At a rally in southern Beirut on August 14, marking the third anniversary of the war's end (what Hezbollah calls its "divine victory"), the group's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, laid out his new military strategy. Speaking from an undisclosed location, he warned Israel, "If you launch another war on south Lebanon, imagining that you can bomb any city or village in Lebanon, I will tell you this: today we are capable of shelling any city or town in your usurping entity." Nasrallah, who appeared on giant television screens before a crowd of tens of thousands, also vowed to order missile strikes on Tel Aviv if Israel bombs Hezbollah's base of support: the southern suburbs of Beirut. This is an important shift, because during the 2006 war, Israel largely avoided bombing central Beirut, and Hezbollah refrained from firing missiles on Tel Aviv.

In his speech, Nasrallah advanced the idea that Hezbollah's weapons buildup and overall military capability is a deterrent to Israel -- trying to convince the Lebanese that a stronger Hezbollah will prevent a war. "You might ask, 'Do we have the power to prevent a war?' I will reply, 'Yes, there is a very real possibility that, if we cooperate with one another as Lebanese, we will be able to prevent Israel from launching a war against Lebanon,'" Nasrallah told the crowd, which included members of most Lebanese political factions. "I stress to you that there will be surprises in any new war with Israel, God willing. By saying this to the Israelis, we can deter and prevent them. Let them think a million times before waging a war on Lebanon. Let them look for other ways to confront us, but not war."

This is a dangerous assumption on Nasrallah's part because the Israelis have shown that they are not willing to live indefinitely with a well-armed Hezbollah. Nasrallah's argument is also intended to justify the arms buildup to the Sunnis and Christians of Lebanon -- who, due to the militia's recent takeover of West Beirut, are far more worried today about Hezbollah's weapons than they were in 2006.

In May 2008, Hezbollah ignited the worst internal fighting since the end of Lebanon's civil war. Huddled at home in front of their televisions during the weeklong battle, the Lebanese relived one of their worst memories: masked gunmen demanding people's identity cards. The image of gunmen stopping civilians at checkpoints to sort -- and often murder -- them on the basis of religion is perhaps the most enduring symbol of the country's civil war. In response to Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's orders outlawing Hezbollah's underground fiber-optic communication network and dismissing a Hezbollah-affiliated security chief at the Beirut airport, the militia dispatched hundreds of heavily armed fighters into the largely Sunni areas of West Beirut. They quickly routed Sunni militiamen, seized their political offices, and shut down media outlets owned by the Sunni leader Saad Hariri (son of the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri). On May 15, Siniora's government rescinded its orders, Hezbollah pulled its fighters off the streets, and leaders of the two factions headed to Qatar to negotiate under the Arab League's auspices. That led to a deal for a national unity government, which remains in place today and forms the basis of the next cabinet.

But three months after the parliamentary elections, the pro-Western coalition that won the vote is floundering in the morass of Lebanon's peculiar sectarian politics. The coalition chose Saad Hariri as its prime minister-designate, but he struggled for months to form a cabinet and finally withdrew in frustration on September 10. Lebanese President Michel Suleiman will now consult with legislators on naming a new prime minister -- although Hariri could be asked once again. This political vacuum gives Hezbollah free rein to continue building up its military and escalating its rhetoric of war. In the absence of a strong central state, Hezbollah will remain the most powerful force in Lebanon -- and its weapons will guarantee its dominance.

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'Girl Taxi' Service Offers Haven to Beirut's Women

By DON DUNCAN

BEIRUT -- In Beirut, you don't hail a cab, it hails you, with a raucous honk. The city's ubiquitous, banged-up Mercedes-Benz taxis -- with their hissing engines, torn upholstery and smoking drivers -- are icons in Lebanon.

Pink Taxis Hit Lebanon Streets

A pink taxi car service, for women and by women, is seeing great success in Beirut, Lebanon. As WSJ's Don Duncan reports, some women feel safer in the pretty pink cars.

But these days the city's transport staple is facing some serious competition from a growing army of female taxi drivers, dressed in stiff-collared white shirts, dark shades, pink ties and small pink flowers tucked into their flawlessly coiffed hair.

All of them drive for Banet Taxi, or "girl taxi" in Arabic. It is Lebanon's first cab service for women, by women. You can't miss the company's signature candy-pink cars.

"I chose pink because the first idea that comes to mind when you see pink is girls," says Nawal Fakhri, 45 years old, founder of Banet Taxi.

Ms. Fakhri cut her teeth in business running a pink- and pastel-hued beauty salon in east Beirut. The aesthetic legacy of that experience is clear in her current venture.

She launched Banet Taxi in March with just three cars and three drivers. Her fleet of late-model Peugeots has grown five-fold since then with enough drivers to provide 24-hour service. She is hoping to double her fleet this summer, to 24 cars.

The company is part of a regional trend. Entrepreneurs across the Middle East have recognized the business potential in offering secure transportation options for women. Banet Taxi follows on the heels of successful women-only transportation models in Dubai, Tehran and Cairo.

In Beirut, the growing company is a sign the private sector is succeeding where the politically volatile public sector fails.

"I like being one of the few female taxi drivers in Lebanon," says Maya Buhaidai, 34, as she takes a sharp turn on a windy road in the mountains overlooking Beirut. "And I like the work. It's easy, it's fun and I get to talk and laugh with my passengers."

As the sun sets, Ms. Buhaidai drives passenger Lamia Samaha, 37, from a suburb on the mountain slope to the busy central Beirut district of Hamra. Along the way, they chat about the news, TV shows and children.

"I am at ease because I am accompanied by a woman. I sometimes find men hard to handle," says Ms. Samaha, causing her and her driver to laugh heartily.

But, as with many of the pink fleet's passengers, Ms. Samaha is also serious about her choice.

"One of my daughters is 15 years old and I send her in this taxi all the time, especially at night ... and not have to worry."

It is the promise of a safe and uneventful ride that attracts a wide range of female passengers: older women who want a quiet drive, young women out partying until late at night, and even preschoolers put in the cars by their teachers.

Passengers' reasons for choosing Banet are based, in part, on their cultural and religious backgrounds. Beirut's population breaks down roughly into thirds, Christian, Sunni and Shiite. Conservative Muslim women might take Banet Taxi to accommodate rules against traveling with unknown men. Others just want to put comfort and safety first.

"I studied Lebanese society well and my first customer is the Lebanese woman," says Ms. Fakhri. "I am well aware that I could be making a lot more money with this if I also accepted male customers, but to me it is clear that in Lebanon, women need a service like this."

Lebanon has no shortage of women who are skittish about taking regular taxis. Reporting of sexual harassment remains low in a country with much taboo surrounding abuse and victimhood.

Yasmine Hajjar, a 23-year-old student in Beirut, says most of her female friends have a story about being harassed in a taxi. In one extreme example, she says she narrowly escaped being abducted by a taxi driver when she was 15 years old -- by pulling out her knife and holding it to the driver's throat.

"I think the pink taxis are a good thing," says Ms. Hajjar. "It's the safest way to go."

Banet Taxi is positioned to reap the benefits of the summer tourist season, an estimated $1.7 billion industry, with about 30% of revenues coming from conservative Muslim visitors from Gulf states.

Once the summer bump in business is over, Ms. Fakhri expects demand for her fleet to remain as strong as it has been in her first quarter of business. That will put her on target to bring in at least $200,000 in sales for 2009 -- a full return on her initial investment, she says.

Muslim World Briefs #3

Rural Iran May Shift Its Loyalty (Iran)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/06/AR2009060602177.html

A High-Priced Media Campaign That Iraqis Aren't Buying (Iraq)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/06/AR2009060602144.html

Lebanon Confirms Hariri Election Win (Lebanon)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8089285.stm

Inside Iran (text, video, Iran)
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31156949/

A Relative Unknown Leads Challenge in Iran (Iran)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/07/AR2009060702542.html

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In Lebanon Vote, Stark Options, Complex Choice

Bryan Denton for The New York Times

Supporters of the pro-Western governing coalition at a rally in Achrafieh in East Beirut on Wednesday

New York Times, Robert Worth, Beirut, June 5 - On the surface, the choice does seem stark: on one corner of Lebanon's most competitive parliamentary race in decades stands the Shiite militant group Hezbollah and its allies; in the other corner, a pro-American political alliance led by a man often described as a playboy.

"It's your choice between peace and war," said Sami Gemayel, a Christian candidate who opposes Hezbollah, during a recent television appearance. "The choice is between Gaza and a developed, civilized Lebanese state."

But the political realities of this small, chronically divided Mediterranean country are far less drastic, and far more complex. Hezbollah, which the United States considers a terrorist group, is already part of the Parliament and cabinet. It is almost certain to win the same number of Parliament seats — 11 out of 128 — as it now holds. If Hezbollah and its allies win a majority for the first time — and the race is likely to be very close — there will be concern in Washington and Tel Aviv. But the Lebanese government will not fall into the hands of armed Islamists.

Instead, the election turns on the votes of Lebanon's Christians, who are divided between the two main political camps. The real beneficiary of an opposition victory would not be Hezbollah but its main electoral partner, the Free Patriotic Movement, led by the retired Christian general Michel Aoun. His parliamentary bloc is already more than twice as large as Hezbollah's, and a clear electoral victory could propel him into a dominant position.

To his critics, Mr. Aoun is a political opportunist and traitor whose alliance with Hezbollah, reached in 2006, threatens to draw Lebanon into the sphere of Syria and Iran, and to bring more ruinous wars with Israel. Historically, Lebanon's Christians have identified more with the West.

To his supporters, Mr. Aoun is a reformer who has the will to change Lebanon's entrenched culture of corruption, patronage and sectarian division. They say allying with Hezbollah is the only way to ultimately disarm it, and to move past the bitter history of Christian-Muslim tensions that has nurtured so much deadly conflict here. A policy of confrontation, such as the one the United States seemed to be advocating, is a recipe for renewed civil war, the Aounists say.

"We are born in American hospitals, we wear American clothes, we go to American schools, but don't ask us to commit suicide," said Ziyad Abs, 38, a member of the Aounist movement's political bureau.

In a sense, it is a debate over the wisdom of pressuring Hezbollah openly or trying to tame it through political inclusion. As always with Lebanon, the debate has been profoundly influenced by the changing political winds across the region.

Lebanon's last elections, in 2005, took place in the aftermath of the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafiq Hariri. That killing — widely believed to have been carried out by Syria — shocked the world and led to Syria's withdrawal after three decades of military presence here. An anti-Syrian coalition led by Mr. Hariri's son and political heir, Saad Hariri, swept to power, and with the backing of the United States, hoped to push Hezbollah to give up its formidable arsenal.

But that ambition has crumbled under the weight of regional political realities. A brutal 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah enhanced the Shiite group's domestic political standing, and made disarming it more difficult. Several anti-Syrian political figures were assassinated, forcing their colleagues — including Mr. Hariri — to take shelter behind closed doors and bulletproof windows.

A political showdown between the opposition and the governing majority provoked an 18-month political crisis that ended only when Hezbollah briefly took control of west Beirut in May 2008. A political settlement reached shortly afterward granted the opposition the veto powers it had been seeking.

Now, with the Obama administration reaching out to Syria and Iran, it seems clearer than ever that the pro-American majority in Lebanon cannot expect Western military support in its goal of disarming Hezbollah. That recognition has energized the Aounist movement, whose leaders say their close, trusting relationship with Hezbollah is the best foundation for a move toward greater civil peace.

The consequences of a victory by Mr. Aoun and Hezbollah are the subject of much anxious speculation here and abroad. Vice President Joseph R. Biden, who briefly visited Lebanon in late May, echoed earlier hints by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton that future American military support to Lebanon might suffer if the opposition were to win. The European Union and Russia have taken a more neutral approach, saying they will work with whoever wins.

The financial consequences could be even more important. Saudi Arabia, which supports the current government majority, has provided tremendous support to Lebanon, including at least $2 billion to Lebanon's central bank since 2006. It is not likely to withdraw money in any damaging way, but Mr. Hariri and others in the current parliamentary majority have warned that an opposition victory could scare off investors. Even Hezbollah officials seem concerned, and say they want to make sure Lebanon's financial prospects are not harmed.

But the election may not yield a victory for either side, at least not right away. In all likelihood, any result would be followed by a resumption of the current "national unity" government, in which the loser is granted veto powers so as to preserve civil peace.

A three-way electoral split is also possible, with a small group of independents emerging as mediators between the two camps, election observers say. The current political camps could also change shape after the vote. In recent weeks, Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader who is known as the weather vane of Lebanese politics, has begun criticizing his colleagues in the current pro-Western majority. Some political analysts say he smells an electoral defeat for his team, and is preparing the ground for a post-election rapprochement with Hezbollah and its Syrian allies.

In the meantime, the election campaign churns on here as though political principle were all that mattered. It has been Lebanon's freest and most competitive election in decades, with a record number of candidates taking part. Like all Lebanese elections, it is also a profoundly international affair, with foreign governments paying for their preferred candidates, and political parties flying expatriate voters in from across the globe.

"All of us for the nation!" proclaims a huge campaign sign in downtown Beirut, in words taken from the Lebanese national anthem. Not long ago, a new sign emerged with a provocative variation: "All of us for which nation?"

Source - http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/06/world/middleeast/06lebanon.html?_r=1&ref=global-home