Iraqi Sunnis Pin Their Hopes on Elections

By MARC SANTORA

BAQUBA, Iraq — Here in Diyala, a quarter of provincial council members, all Sunnis, have warrants against them. Most don’t show up for votes, fearing they will be jailed. The leading Sunni candidate was arrested this month on what supporters call trumped-up terrorism charges. Crushing poverty is the norm. So is mistrust of a central government and the Shiite-dominated security forces.

Yet Sunnis here say they are determined to participate in the March 7 national parliamentary elections. Even after a call last week by a national Sunni political party to boycott — a call it later rescinded — Sunnis continued to hang banners of their preferred candidates, including those barred from running.

In some ways, it is an inspiring measure of progress in Iraq that Sunni Muslims, the minority that long ran Iraq under Saddam Hussein, are trusting in the ballot box to improve their fortunes.

But the hope they place in politics also reflects weakness: how sharply Sunnis’ choices have narrowed after nearly seven years of war. Past boycotts denied them electoral positions they might have won and deprived them of the spoils of power. Violence drew deadly retribution, from both American soldiers and Shiite death squads. Now elections seem the only way to forge a more formal and enduring political role.

Interviews in this once restive area make clear that Sunni expectations from these elections are high, and that renewed violence may not be far behind electoral disappointment.

“If the government does not change, there will be a problem between the Sunni and the Shia, and it will not be good,” said Sami Dawoud Salman, a local leader of a branch of the Sunni militia that allied with the Americans to do battle with Al Qaeda.

Without a change, he said, “I think the government will hunt down every Sunni person, and the Sunnis will have no choice but to hold their own weapons and defend themselves.”

He plans to vote in any case.

Across Diyala Province, about 17,000 square miles stretching from Baghdad to the Iranian border, the conditions that existed as the fighting subsided have hardened in place. Once mixed villages have either been razed or remain in the control of one sect. Few of those displaced from their homes have returned. Lingering blood feuds bring daily reports of violence.

Shiite towns, like Khalis, bustle with commerce. In Sunni neighborhoods, the shops are fewer, the tension is higher and the uncertainty palpable.

Shiites dominate both the local police and the Iraqi Army in the region, making up about 90 percent of the forces, American officials say, although the population is more than 50 percent Sunni. Sunnis see reminders of Shiite ascendancy and intimidation all around. For instance, during a recent Shiite holiday, nearly every police checkpoint was decorated with portraits of Imam Hussein and Ali, two revered Shiite martyrs.

The mistrust has deepened in recent months as government security forces have staged a series of arrests.

Over three days in December, 101 people were arrested, predominantly Sunni, according to an American intelligence briefing paper.

“Continued, pervasive, and biased targeting by the Iraqi Security Force” raised the possibility militants might have more success in recruiting fighters, according to the report. In recent weeks, there has been evidence that those networks have stepped up their recruitment efforts, American military commanders say.

In the provincial elections last year, Sunnis took control of the local government, which helped ease tensions. However, 7 of the 29 provincial council members have arrest warrants against them. The arrest in early February of Najim al-Harbi, the Diyala leader of the important Sunni political bloc that won six seats, was considered the most recent provocation.

Mr. Harbi, who gained widespread support for his role battling Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, has been the frequent target of assassination attempts, and 23 members of his family have been killed by militants. Six months ago, his 6-year-old son was kidnapped by Al Qaeda and killed. His arrest on terrorism charges, with no evidence made public, stirred anger and was viewed as politically motivated, because his slate of candidates poses a serious challenge to both Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s alliance and the candidates of other Shiite parties.

“Of course the sectarian nature of the politics will be reflected on the street,” said Rasam Esmael Hamud, a member of Mr. Harbi’s party. “If we fail to control the politics, then we will fail to control the street.”

There has been hope that the elections would be a step toward reconciliation. But as the campaign has heated up, so has the oratory, with distinct sectarian overtones. The fiery campaign speeches have been coupled with actions by the government security forces and political leaders that are viewed by Sunnis as an attempt to diminish their standing.

For months, Mr. Maliki, who once hoped to court a substantial alliance with powerful Sunni political blocs but was largely rebuffed, has repeatedly raised the specter of the Baath Party to justify a crackdown on Sunni and secular leaders.

Mr. Maliki’s rival, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, a secular Shiite who has been joined by powerful Sunni blocs to pose a serious electoral challenge, has accused the Shiite dominated blocs and the prime minister of being beholden to Iran.

When the Iraqi government pressed ahead with its anti-Baath campaign by seeking to bar more than 500 candidates from running in the election, Mr. Allawi suggested that such heavy-handed tactics could lead to civil war.

With only a little more than a week until the election, though, Sunnis still view the voting booth as the best place to secure influence in Iraq, according to American and Iraqi officials and dozens of interviews with residents.

“We are always facing pressures by the security forces, which are dominated by the Shiite parties,” said Baqir Jalalaldin al-Khashali, a 24-year-old employee of the Education Department in Baquba. “I think that the pressures will be useless, because there is a great desire of Sunnis to participate in the election.”

How they will react once the votes are counted, especially if there is a perception of fraud, is uncertain.

“We have spent a lot of time studying the question: What is the Sunni breaking point?” said Col. David Funk, commander of the Third Stryker Brigade, Second Infantry Division, which has responsibility for Diyala Province. “It won’t likely be a single event. It will be the slow erosion over time of the belief that they have a role in this country.”

An Iraqi employee of The New York Times contributed reporting from Diyala Province.