Starting Points: elections

Showing posts with label elections. Show all posts

Jul 4, 2010

Than Shwe's Shakeup Has His Subordinates Shaking

Image by thomaswanhoff via Flickr

By BAMARGYI

Saturday, July 3, 2010

Snr-Gen Than Shwe is facing a mutiny among his subordinates. Although no rebellion is expected, there are growing signs of discontent among his cabinet ministers. The reason—they have been betrayed by their boss.

Than Shwe quietly ordered his uniformed cabinet ministers to resign from their army posts. In Burma, shedding the uniform means losing protection, security and livelihood. Like it or not, army uniforms are a symbol of authority in Burma. Those who wear them always get priority over those who don't; they are respected and can expect easy cooperation from others. Suddenly, they will lose that privilege.

Another reason Than Shwe's cabinet ministers are upset is that the army chief is holding the cards for the one-quarter of representatives in the People's Assembly who will be drawn from the ranks of the military. They wanted to be in that 25 percent to secure a place for themselves in the parliament. Now, they are on their own. They will have to contest the election, and unless Than Shwe supports them with some dirty deals from behind the scenes, they are sure to lose. Once this happens, they will be down the drain.

These are people who reached high positions through loyalty to their army bosses, nothing else. They are almost completely devoid of professionalism. Look at what happened to our country under their rule for more than four decades. Their track record reflects their total lack of creativity. But those who keep quiet about what is happening are rewarded with many privileges that are unthinkable in any transparent society. These privileges have made them very rich, and they want to keep their stolen goods forever. Now, however, they can only watch helplessly as they are quietly kicked out of their positions.

Furthermore, if they intend to run for parliament, they will have to declare their assets to the Election Commission. But that would be suicidal, because it would immediately reveal the extent of their corruption. No minister would ever dare to disclose what he actually owns. Even their houses are worth far more than they could ever afford on their official salaries. How could they ever account for the 10 luxury cars that are the bare minimum for anyone in a position of power to possess?

They can smell danger. They know that Than Shwe can easily find ways to put them in jail indefinitely. Look at what happened to Gen Khin Nyunt and his cronies. So they know they're in a very precarious position right now. But they also know that if they show any signs of rebellion, they're doomed.

But there is also some peril in this situation for the senior general himself. For every step of the election process, the Election Commission has the final say, subject only to the orders of Than Shwe. But this means that he has to instruct the commission to rig the vote in such a way as to ensure that all of his lieutenants get their assigned places. If he doesn't go about this very carefully, he could be hoisted by his own petard.

To change the system without changing people is a dangerous game. Late dictator Gen Ne Win tried it, with disastrous results. Unless Than Shwe can put a truly democratic system in place before he leaves the scene, his future is not safe at all. His deputies are the same fish in the same ponds; but if they ever find themselves in positions of real power someday, they may think nothing of turning on their old master. After all, these are people who have risen to high positions by concealing the depths of their ambition, much as Than Shwe himself did through most of his career. Treachery would be second nature to them.

More immediately, Than Shwe faces a few other obstacles if he plans to proceed with his rigged election.

On the ethnic front, his efforts to convince the armed cease-fire groups to transform themselves into border guard forces has met with a coordinated rejection from all the major ethnic armies. Moreover, China has said that it won't turn a blind eye if the Burmese army launches an offensive against armed groups based along the border between the two countries. In any case, the Burmese army is in no state to wage a major war with anybody. If they fight, they will lose.

Despite the forced dissolution of the National League for Democracy, Than Shwe's attempts to silence the democratic opposition once and for all are also faring rather poorly. Aung San Suu Kyi remains a hugely charismatic presence, with or without her party. The US, EU and now Asean have all indicated that Than Shwe's carefully orchestrated “democratic” transition will lack credibility without her participation. In other words, if he really wants to move on, he will need Suu Kyi's blessings.

The economy is something else that Than Shwe can't afford to ignore forever. Corruption is rampant and is only likely to get worse if the same old crooked generals and their cronies continue to control the country's assets. Chronic mismanagement of Burma's resources could become a flashpoint for social unrest, and could even weaken Than Shwe's hold over the military. No patriotic citizen, soldier or civilian, can be happy to see the country falling ever deeper into poverty while a handful of dirty officials become obscenely wealthy.

To our wild guess, the election will be held in October, during the school holidays, with schoolteachers as poll watchers. They are presently being trained in various places. An election law stipulates that representatives of candidates will be watching during the vote count. In other words, if the election is fair as it was in 1990, the ex-minister candidates will lose. If their dismissal from army positions was a deliberate move to eliminate them once and for all, Than Shwe is moving in the right direction. The next step we should see is the release of political prisoners and Suu Kyi. If we see Suu Kyi’s involvement in the next ruling council, Than Shwe will be remembered as a true national hero.

We hope the senior general will seize this opportunity for the sake of our country.

Jun 30, 2010

Myanmar elections mute ethnic voices

Image by Rusty Stewart via Flickr

The Morung Express, Nagaland

Brian McCartan | Source: AsiaTimes

Elections slated for later this year in Myanmar seem increasingly unlikely to democratically empower the country's various ethnic minority groups, which combined account for over 30% of the population.

While the ruling generals have touted the inclusiveness of their tightly controlled democratic transition, critics say the new constitution ignores ethnic demands for federalism while junta-drafted election laws prohibit the participation of the largest ethnic parties, some of which are attached to armed insurgent groups who for decades have fought for greater autonomy. The ruling junta has yet to announce a date for the elections, but many observers believe they will he held sometime in October. They will be the first polls held in Myanmar since 1990, when the opposition led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) swept to victory against military-sponsored parties, only to see the results annulled by the military before they could take power.
The generals have made clear their intention to hold new polls and that the participation of the NLD and ethnic ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups is not essential to their credibility. The NLD announced on March 29 that it would not re-register under the new election laws, which it considered unfair because of regulations that bar Aung San Suu Kyi, the party's detained leader, from contesting the polls. A number of NLD party leaders and other members have argued that non-participation plays into the regime's hands by not providing an alternative to the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the National Unity Party (NUP).

At least 39 other political parties have so far applied for registration with the newly formed election commission. Of those, only 15 are considered national parties, while many of the rest aim specifically to represent the interests of ethnic groups, including the Kachin, Kayin, Mon and Shan. The question of whether to participate in the elections has been as contentious an issue among ethnic political groups as it was with the NLD. Some see the electoral process as a sham for perpetuating military rule under the guise of democracy and advocate a boycott of the polls. Others believe the elections offer an unique chance to work from within the system and an alternative to the confrontation and armed struggle that has plagued Myanmar politics since independence from the UK in 1948.

The second and third most successful parties in the 1990 elections after the NLD, the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Arakan League for Democracy, have both supported the NLD's stand and opted not to re-register their parties for the upcoming election. The SNLD's decision was also based on the junta's refusal to free its two top leaders, who were both arrested on political charges in 2005.

Local contests

Significantly, many of the ethnic-based parties are looking to contest seats in local legislatures rather than at the national level. With their relative small sizes, the high cost of party registration and their lack of a national voice, many aspiring ethnic politicians feel that their chances of success and ability to effect change are better on the local level. Parties representing larger ethnic groups, such as the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), are seeking to contest the elections at all levels within their own states. Still other parties representing ethnic groups with much wider geographic coverage, such as the Kayin People's Party (KPP) and the Shan Nationals Democratic Party (SNDP), intend to contest the election for both local legislatures and at the national level across several states and divisions.

Competing for seats on state legislatures may have some real, if limited, advantages for ethnic aspirations. The new legislatures mandated by the 2008 constitution are a departure from the military-dominated "Peace and Development Committees" that currently decide policy in ethnic minority areas and are often a direct arm of the central government. Ethnic politicians hope that the local legislative bodies will be more representative of local communities and give them more say over affairs that matter to their ethnic constituents. With popular representation, there may be more opportunities for the promotion of local cultures and languages though influence over the media and education. Also important is to gain more influence and scrutiny over the exploitation of natural resources in ethnic minority areas.

According to a recent report on the elections by the Transnational Institute, "Nevertheless, many ethnic leaders point out that they will have a legitimate voice for the first time. This will allow ethnic grievances, in the past too easily dismissed as the seditious rumblings of separatist insurgents, to be openly raised." Without ethnic participation, the government backed, and largely ethnic Myanmar USDP and NUP will be calling the shots not only nationally, but also in the regional legislatures. While a far cry from the federalism that many ethnic leaders aspire for, the local legislatures offer the first forms of local autonomy since the post 1962 coup government of General Ne Win abolished ethnic councils established under the 1947 constitution. A post-independence federal system was promised as a result of a conference held at the town of Panglong in northern Myanmar between independence leader General Aung San and representatives of several ethnic groups. Federal principles agreed to at the conference were enshrined in the 1947 constitution, but by the late 1950's many felt they had not been adequately implemented. Agitation for a more truly federalist system was a major cause of the 1962 military coup, which was carried out in the name of preserving national unity.

Myanmar's 2008 constitution keeps the seven ethnic states and creates seven new self-administered zones for less numerous ethnic groups such as the Pa-O, Kokang and Wa. However, it makes few other concessions to ethnic aspirations for federalism and power sharing between ethnic groups and the majority Myanmar population. During the 1993-2008 National Convention that drafted the constitution, calls by ethnic representatives for a federal union were ignored. There is growing evidence that the generals are seeking to undermine and split the ethnic vote at the upcoming elections. This is being done largely through the junta's mass organization, the United Solidarity Development Association (USDA), and its newly formed political party, the USDP.

Many members of the USDP are former military officers and current members of government who have resigned their ranks to participate in the polls. They have actively courted ethnic minorities to join the junta-backed USDP. In the case of the disenfranchised Muslim Rohingya in western Myanmar, that has taken the form of offering identity cards granting them formal citizenship in exchange for their votes. According to the exile-run media group Shan Herald Agency for News, USDP members have used the USDA and local government officials to canvass for votes and to pressure villagers in Shan State to sign their names on the party's rolls. Shan leaders in Mandalay Division, where there are significant Shan populations, were approached in March to run as part of the USDP.

The junta has also effectively blocked several of the major ethnic political players from taking part in the elections due to an impasse over the transformation of armed ceasefire groups into army-controlled border guard units. The regime's seven-step "roadmap to democracy" had originally envisioned that the groups would either hand over their weapons or join the border guard force as a prelude to forming political parties and contesting the election.

Pre-election tension

That step was supposed to be accomplished before an election date was announced. Instead tensions have spiked between the junta and the ethnic militias as several deadlines have passed - the latest on April 28 - and the issue still remains unresolved. Over 20 ethnic insurgent groups have agreed to ceasefires with the junta since 1989 and have since largely run their own affairs. They consider retaining their weapons as a necessary protection until the generals can prove the sincerity of their political promises.

Only a few, mostly small groups have agreed to the junta's terms, including the National Democratic Army - Kachin (NDA-K) and the Kachin Defence Army (KDA). However, their political leaders have resigned and are now seeking to register respectively as the Union Democracy Party (Kachin State) and the Northern Shan State Progressive Party. The Kokang only agreed after a short offensive by the army drove out the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in August 2009 and brought in new leadership. The new leadership quickly declared its support for the 2010 elections and formed a political party.
Larger groups such as the United Wa State Party (UWSP), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have not been allowed to register parties for the election. Instead the regime has threatened to revoke the ceasefire status of groups and declare them illegal. Most recently tensions have increased in Mon State, where the NMSP has refused to meet with the military's intelligence head Lieutenant General Ye Myint to discuss the border guard issue. The junta has threatened to use force if the Mon does not agree to a meeting. Keeping the ceasefire groups out of the polls may work to the generals' electoral advantage. A June 2010 report by the Transnational Institute on the ethnic political situation described the ethnic ceasefire organizations, "in terms of history, membership, finance, and territorial control, the ceasefire forces far outweigh electoral parties in their ability to operate independently and, with an estimated 40,000 troops under arms, their existence was a continued reminder of the need for conflict resolution."

Both the Wa and the Kachin have said that they would like to support ethnic parties in the polls and negotiate the decommissioning of their armed wings with the new government after the elections. After two decades of unresolved political issues and disappointment in the 2008 constitution, they want to see proof of real political reform before agreeing to hand over their weapons. Indeed, the election commission has so far refused to accept the registration of three Kachin political parties. While two of the parties represent former ceasefire groups who have now become border guards, the KSPP has several former KIO members, including its leader, former KIO vice chairman Tu Ja. Some observers believe the party's registration has yet to be approved because of these links.

There is also a fear that the government will declare a state of emergency in the ceasefire areas, which would prohibit people standing for elections and voting. Already areas of southern Shan State and Karen State are unlikely to be allowed to vote due to a legal provision that says elections can only be held in areas free of conflict. This would mean that large portions of Myanmar would not be allowed to elect representatives to local or national legislatures.

Border-based ethnic political organizations, many of which are attached to armed insurgent groups still fighting the government, will not be able to take part in the elections. Although they have seemingly declined in strength and influence in recent years, their message of equal rights and justice still resonates with many people who see the newly formed parties as junta stooges. Peace talks with the government will also have to wait until a new government is formed following the elections. A section of the Political Parties Registration Law prohibits registration to any party that is involved with groups engaged in armed rebellion or involved with groups declared as "unlawful associations". The generals will be hard-pressed to prove the legitimacy of the elections without the participation of ethnic opposition parties or adequate ethnic representation. Should the ethnic groups continue to feel disempowered and a democratically elected pro-military government maintain the junta's current confrontational policies, further conflict will be almost unavoidable and hinder the country's supposed democratic transition.

Apr 2, 2010

Ali Karimli - In Azerbaijan, voices for democracy strive to be heard - washingtonpost.com

Image by PanARMENIAN_Photo via Flickr

By Ali Karimli
Friday, April 2, 2010; A19

Many Americans may know my country, Azerbaijan, for its oil wealth or for its conflict with Armenia over the territory of Nagorno Karabakh. A March 5 article in The Post portrayed a nation whose ruling family appears to own $75 million worth of luxury villas in Dubai. Few of us in Azerbaijan were surprised by a report that President Ilham Aliyev's family apparently invests assets abroad. What else should be expected from a leader who inherited power from his father through fraudulent elections?

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Aliyev's brutal crackdown on the opposition and independent media began with his election in October 2003. Thousands of Azeris protesting the transfer of power -- more succession than an election -- were arrested and beaten. As opposition supporters languished in jail, then-deputy U.S. Secretary of State Richard Armitage phoned Aliyev to congratulate him on his "landslide" victory. Democratic voices of protest were stifled by the blows of police batons. Western powers were eager to work with a new leader they viewed as young and progressive.

Nearly two years later, on the eve of the 2005 parliamentary elections, Azeri democrats inspired by the support Western nations had given to the Rose and Orange democratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine decided to again challenge Aliyev's authoritarian regime. Events unfortunately played out along now-familiar lines: The government falsified election results; opposition protests were crushed; yet Washington praised the work of Azerbaijan's Constitutional Court, which had just approved false election results.

Aliyev apparently interpreted the international community's silence as carte blanche to turn a country with long-standing democratic traditions into a fiefdom. The government evicted major opposition parties from their centrally located headquarters. Independent media also felt the wrath. One outspoken editor of an opposition magazine was fatally shot in March 2005; several others received harsh prison sentences on trumped-up charges.

There was a time when Azerbaijan's future looked promising. In the 1980s, Azerbaijan was at the forefront of the democratic movements that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1992, we held our first democratic elections. Abulfaz Elchibey, leader of the Popular Front, won 59 percent of the vote. Elchibey viewed himself as a political heir to the founders of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918. Azerbaijan was the first nation in the Muslim world to establish a parliamentary democracy that granted universal suffrage, preceding many Western countries.

But these days, the only vote that counts is that of Ilham Aliyev. After "winning" his second presidential term last year, in an election with no viable opposition alternative, Aliyev and his rubber-stamp parliament conspired to change the constitution, through a referendum, to lift term limits on the presidency.

The next parliamentary elections are to be held in November. The democratic opposition is once again preparing to challenge the regime. While there are no indications that the government's behavior will differ from that of years past, we have decided to participate in the election process because we recognize that this is our chance to fight for our ideals.

Our platform is simple: We intend to establish a functional democracy in our country. Azerbaijan has a resourceful populace, and we can and must decrease our nation's dependence on oil. We must break the economic monopolies controlled by corrupt officials. Our goal is to establish a free, market-based economy. We want Azerbaijan to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community of nations, ending its status as a satellite of autocratic Russia.

As we continue our struggle for freedom, it is vital that the United States pursue appropriate action with regard to the largest nation in the South Caucasus. Bilateral relations have long been based on cooperation on energy, security and democratic development. Sadly, many Azeris see U.S. policy as driven by energy interests and the global war against terrorism. To us, it seems that democracy gets short shrift. We hope the Obama administration will make clear to Azerbaijan's leader that democratic reforms and human rights are a priority in U.S.-Azeri relations.

American policymakers should have learned from countries in the Middle East and other areas that authoritarian, corrupt regimes do not make reliable allies. Nor is their "stability" based on the consent of the governed. The democratic opposition in Azerbaijan does not seek intervention or financial assistance from the United States. What we need is the moral support of an America that stands by its own values.

Ali Karimli is chairman of the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan and co-founder of Azadlig (Freedom) Political Bloc of Opposition Parties.

Apr 1, 2010

Afghan President Harshly Rebukes West and U.N. - NYTimes.com

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By ALISSA J. RUBIN

KABUL, Afghanistan — Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, delivered an extraordinarily harsh criticism Thursday of the Western governments fighting in his country, the United Nations and the Anglo-American press, accusing them them of perpetrating the fraud that denied him an outright victory in last summer’s presidential elections.

He said they risked being seen as invaders rather than saviors of the country after eight years of war against the Taliban.

In a 50-minute speech given at the Independent High Election Commission, which oversaw the presidential election, and later broadcast on national television, Mr. Karzai used nationalist rhetoric and accusations of conspiracy against him and his country just two days after President Barack Obama had come for his first visit as president.

The speech seemed more a measure of Mr. Karzai’s mood in the wake of Mr. Obama’s visit, in which Mr. Obama rebuked the Afghan’s president for his failure to reform election rules and crack down on corruption. At points in the speech, Mr. Karzai used inflammatory language about the West.

“There is no doubt that the fraud was very widespread, but this fraud was not committed by Afghans, it was committed by foreigners. This fraud was committed by Galbraith, this fraud was committed by Morillon and this fraud was committed by embassies,” said Mr. Karzai. He was referring to Peter Galbraith, the deputy United Nations special representative to Afghanistan at the time of the election and the person who helped reveal the fraud, and Philippe Morillon, the chief election observer for the European Union.

Later in the speech he accused the Western coalition fighting here to shore up his government of being on the verge of becoming invaders—a term usually used by insurgents when they refer the American, British and other NATO troops. And, if they came to be seen as that they would be encouraging the insurgency, he said.

“In this situation there is a thin curtain between invasion and cooperation-assistance,” said Mr. Karzai, adding that if the perception spread of the west being invaders and the Afghan government being their mercenaries, the insurgency “could become a national resistance.”

Compounding his anger was a political defeat in the lower house of Parliament on Wednesday when his revision of the election law was rejected. Under the revised version the United Nations would have little input over the Election Complaints Commission, the agency that investigates election irregularities.

The American Embassy and the United Nations Mission in Kabul had no comment on Mr. Karzai’s speech. Both are involved in trying to persuade Mr. Karzai to make election reforms that better safeguard against a repeat of the fraud since without them western countries are unlikely to want to help pay for the parliamentary elections scheduled for September. While negotiations are ongoing, diplomats have said privately that they would rather not discuss the latest developments.

Contacted afterward, Mr. Galbraith ridiculed Mr. Karzai, calling his speech “so absurd that I considered it an April Fools day joke.” He also said Mr. Karzai’s speech “underscores how totally unreliable this guy is as an ally.”

Mr. Morillon of the European Union could not immediately be reached.

Republicans Move Ahead in 2010 Vote for Congress

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Republicans Move Ahead in 2010 Vote for Congress

Mar 16, 2010

Followers of Sadr Emerge Stronger After Iraq Elections

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By ANTHONY SHADID

BAGHDAD — The followers of Moktada al-Sadr, a radical cleric who led the Shia insurgency against the American occupation, have emerged as Iraq’s equivalent of Lazarus in elections last week, defying ritual predictions of their demise and now threatening to realign the nation’s constellation of power.

Their apparent success in the March 7 vote for parliament — perhaps second only to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki as the largest Shiite bloc — underscores a striking trend in Iraqi politics: a collapse in support for many former exiles who collaborated with the United States after the 2003 invasion. Although rivals disparaged the Sadrists’ electoral campaign, documents and interviews show an unprecedented discipline that has thrust the group to the brink of perhaps its greatest political influence in Iraq.

The performance completes a striking arc of a populist movement that inherited the mantle of a slain ayatollah, then forged a martial culture in its fight with the American military in 2004.

After years of defeats, fragmentation and doubt even by its own clerics, with Mr. Sadr himself an expatriate in Iran, the movement has embraced the political process, while remaining steadfast in opposition to any ties with the United States. It was never going to be easy to form a new post-election government — and the Sadrists’ unpredictability, along with a new confidence, may now make it that much harder.

“As our representation in Parliament increases, so will our power,” said Asma al-Musawi, a Sadrist lawmaker. “We will soon the play the role that we have been given.”

A worshiper at Friday prayers put it more bluntly.

“Today is our day!” he shouted to hundreds gathered outside the movement’s office in a ramshackle neighborhood that bears its name where electricity wires are tangled like cobwebs and discontent surges forth from a furnace of poverty, anger and frustration.

The results of the election are not yet conclusive, and under a complicated formula to allot seats, the percentage of the vote will not necessarily reflect actual numbers in the 325-member Parliament.

But opponents and allies alike believe the Sadrists may win more than 40 seats. In all likelihood, that would make them the clear majority in the Iraqi National Alliance, a predominantly Shiite coalition and leading rival of Mr. Maliki. If the numbers bear out, the Sadrists could wield a bloc roughly the same size as the Kurds, who have served as kingmakers in governing coalitions since 2005.

In Baghdad alone, whose vote is decisive in the election, Sadrist candidates, many of them political unknowns, were 6 of the top 12 vote-getters.

“They cannot be dismissed,” a Western official said on condition of anonymity under usual diplomatic protocol.

Disregarding the Sadrists has proven a motif of post-invasion Iraq. In the chaotic months of 2003, American officials habitually ridiculed Mr. Sadr as an upstart and outlaw, oblivious as they were to the mandate he had assumed from his father, Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, whose portrait still graces the offices, home and workshops of followers.

That enmity erupted in fighting twice in Baghdad and Najaf in 2004. Four years later, the movement, blamed for some of the war’s worst sectarian carnage, was vanquished by the Iraqi military, with decisive American help, only to rise again in provincial elections last year. Many politicians now see it as part of the political mainstream, albeit with a canny sense of the street and a knack for fashioning itself in the opposition.

Through those years, Mr. Sadr himself has undergone an evolution. In the earliest days of the occupation, he possessed no particular aplomb. His black turban rode a little high on his forehead, somewhat uncomfortably, and he hunched his shoulders over a frame that was squat and pudgy.

In a news conference this month from Iran, where followers say he is studying to become an ayatollah, he struck a much more forceful tone. Confident, now 36, with gray sprinkled in his beard, he spoke deliberately in graceful if simple Arabic, with a casual disregard of journalists’ questions that the imperious can possess.

The movement is renowned for cryptic statements about its intentions, yet it participated in governments in the past while rejecting the political process. This time, in his clearest words yet, insisted that his followers vote.

“This will be a door to the liberation of Iraq, to driving out the occupier and to something else which is important, serving the Iraqi people,” he said.

The success of the Sadrists has added confusion to an already anxious landscape, roiled with speculation over what coalition will form the next government. Mr. Maliki may be the big loser. Though they once backed him, the Sadrists now exude a visceral dislike for Mr. Maliki, whom they blame for the campaign against them in 2008.

“Alarming,” Sami al-Askari, a lawmaker and ally of Mr. Maliki, called them.

“Ignoring them is a problem,” he said. “Taking them with you in the government is another problem. They’re unpredictable, and no one can guess their next move.”They seem certain, too, to eclipse veteran Shiite leaders who returned from exile in 2003 and with whom the Sadrists are nominally allied. In January, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led by another storied clerical family, outpolled the Sadrists. This time, they are believed to have performed so poorly that they may find themselves forced to split the alliance and join Mr. Maliki to preserve their relevance. At the very least, the Sadrists have made clear they believe the alliance’s leadership should be theirs.

“The results are going to require some parties to reconsider the size they deserve,” Asad al-Nasseri, a Sadrist leader, told worshipers Friday, in their stronghold of Kufa.

Since 2003, the Sadrists have refused any contact with the American military or diplomats.

“It would be helpful if they would change their policy,” one American official lamented on Tuesday.

But America’s loss will not necessarily be Iran’s gain. In a vivid illustration of Iranian power here, it cajoled the Sadrists to join the Supreme Council in their electoral coalition, even though the two fought in the streets a few years before. The two still air their feuds in public. But many politicians believe the Sadrists, long seen as more nationalist than other religious Shiite parties, will prove less pliable for Iran.

Mr. Sadr “is not the easiest of customers for Iran to deal with,” the diplomat said.

Perhaps most striking was the prowess the movement demonstrated in mobilizing its followers, the lumpen Shiites, whose poor neighborhoods still go days without running water. In Friday prayers and through leaflets, organizers warned followers against casting ballots for secular candidates. It insisted they not disperse their votes among several lists.

“Don’t forget to vote for one candidate only!” one leaflet declared.

One detailed diagram, drawn up by the Sadrist strategists, broke down a vast slum by precinct. For one candidate, Hakim al-Zamili, a former deputy minister of health widely accused of running death squads during the civil war, voters were organized in 22 locales. So far, he is the sixth biggest vote-getter in Baghdad and seems sure to receive a seat.

“Congratulations!” worshipers said as they greeted him at Friday prayers in Sadr City. “Good luck!” others shouted, surging forward to kiss Mr. Zamili on the cheek.

To each and everyone, he reciprocated with a smile, kiss or handshake.

“We are the masses,” he said afterward. “The rest of the parties rely on individual leaders. We’re the strength and the numbers, and we’ve risen through the election.”

Mar 11, 2010

Arab neighbors cast a wary eye on Iraq election results

With the first Iraq election results coming in, Middle East countries are watching close and gauging what the vote means for their influence on the oil-rich state.

Iraq election: Electoral workers sort through ballots cast in the national election in Baghdad, Iraq, Wednesday. Iraqi and UN officials say the first results from this week's parliamentary elections are likely to be released on Thursday.
(Karim Kadim/AP)

By Kristen Chick Correspondent, and Tom A. Peter Correspondent
posted March 11, 2010 at 4:08 pm EST

Cairo and Amman, Jordan —

As the first Iraq election results started to trickle in Thursday, many countries in the Middle East were watching closely for clues to how the outcome will shape regional dynamics.

A victory by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s coalition, which initial results show leading a tight race, would likely ensure the continued presence and influence of Iran in Iraqi politics.

But majority Sunni nations are watching for a surge from Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya coalition. Mr. Allawi, a secular Shiite and former member of Saddam Hussein's Baath party, is seen as an Arab nationalist whose policies would tilt toward his Arab neighbors, rather than to Iran.

Under Mr. Hussein, Iraq was a bulwark for Arab states against the regional ambitions and influence of Iran, a Shiite regime long feared and often hated by its Sunni neighbors. Arab leaders are concerned that oil-rich Iraq could become part of an expanding sphere of Iranian influence.

"The issue here will be the reaction of Iran and the Sunni countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia," said Emad Gad, a political analyst at Cairo's Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, a government-financed think tank. "Iran is dealing with Iraq today as a region of Iranian influence, so Iran will refuse any Iraqi government that doesn’t deal with Iran as a big brother." Saudi Arabia would likely try to isolate a new Maliki government to counter Iranian influence, says Dr. Gad.

A new phase

Many in the region are watching the election with trepidation, and wondering what kind of regime will be left behind when US forces withdraw.

"We might be moving into a new phase where as the US takes a bow the other regional players step up their own presence, but it’s difficult to tell for now," says Peter Harling, the International Crisis Group’s project director for Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. "That’s one of the question marks for the period to come, how the US withdrawal and the vacuum that it entails will play out regionally."

In largely Sunni Arab Jordan, home to the second-largest population of Iraqi refugees after Syria, grocer Majdi Hijazin says he worries about what will happen if Shiites or Kurds gain more power. Mr. Hijazin says that he, like most Jordanians, hopes the Sunnis will be the big winners in the election. If not, he fears Iran may further influence Iraq, which could negatively affect Jordan in terms of both security and business opportunities.

"Of course it will have an effect on us Jordanians, but it’s very hard to know how exactly this election will affect us," he says. "Jordanians don’t know what the Shiites will do if they come into power."

Western enthusiasm 'premature'

Others across the region were more disinterested than worried, viewing US praise of the election as somewhat naïve and saying one election will not cause a huge political shift, or even much of a difference at all.

"Right now, the Egyptians are not interested in Iraq," said Ahmed Khalifa, a newspaper seller in Cairo. "The important things are Palestine, Gaza. Iraq doesn't affect us."

Samir Al Taqi, director of the Orient Center for International Studies in Damascus, called Western enthusiasm over the elections "premature." Before observers come to any conclusions about the election, he says they must first see if the new government is representative of Iraq’s different ethnic groups. If not, violence and instability are likely to continue.

"The Iraqi elections were a decisive step in Iraq’s path towards nation building. But we can’t yet judge whether they were a success and will move Iraq forward," he says.

And even if the election is proved a relative success, it will not mean an end to the country’s problems, says Ahmad Said Nufal, a political science professor at Yarmouk University in Irbid, Jordan. He predicts that his country and others such as Syria and Turkey will likely be hosting Iraqi refugees for years to come.

"I don’t think the election in Iraq will change anything. The problems between the parties will continue and at the same time terrorist attacks in Iraq will continue,” says Mr. Nufal. “We need two or three years to be sure before we say that [displaced] people can return back to Iraq."

Jordanians, Syrians want stability

Some Jordanians are hoping Iraq is stabilizing, providing business opportunities in the sprawling nation next door.

"If after the elections everything goes smoothly, it will affect us positively. People will start to do more business with Iraq and it will be more open between the two countries," says Georgette Fattaleh, a pharmacist in Amman. "But no one in Jordan thinks the elections will change Iraq. Now at the White House they are very happy about these elections, but it will not help."

In Syria, some hope a positive outcome to the elections will bring more stability to the region.

Amer Kasser, a telecommunications professional in Damascus, said it was positive to see a democracy emerging in the region and he hoped the government that emerges from the election would be strong enough to bring stability to Iraq.

Haifa Mohammad Said, a translator and editor at the Syrian Arab News Agency, also said she hoped the elections would be a positive step for the region, and allow Syria and Iraq to resolve border and refugee issues.

"The elections will hopefully help to do that," she says. "Whether this will happen or not depends on the results and whether there have been clean elections. Even so, Iraq still has a long way to go to get back on its feet."

Sarah Birke contributed to this report from Damascus, Syria.

Opponents File Challenges as Maliki Is Said to Hold Early Edge in Iraq Vote

Image by hbushra via Flickr

By ANTHONY SHADID and TIM ARANGO

BAGHDAD — Iraq’s major coalitions were locked in a surprisingly close race Thursday, in initial results from elections that deepened divisions across a fractured landscape. Candidates were quick to charge fraud, heightening concerns whether Iraq’s fledgling institutions are strong enough to support a peaceful transfer of power.

The day was the most tumultuous since Sunday’s vote for Parliament, with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s office saying he underwent surgery, officials with his chief rival complaining their ballots were dumped in the garbage, and a leading Shiite coalition claiming they had challenged the popular mandate Mr. Maliki needed to return to power.

The turmoil deepened both anticipation and uncertainty over an election to choose a government that will rule Iraq as the United States begins its military withdrawal in earnest next month.

“It is a very close race,” said a Western official, who viewed the early results but spoke on condition of anonymity since Iraqi officials were designated to release them. “Whatever the end results, we know it will be a fierce struggle to form a government.”

The initial returns, according to officials who have seen tallies from across the country, suggested a very tight race between Mr. Maliki’s coalition; Ayad Allawi, a secular Shiite and the leader of the Iraqiya coalition; and a Shiite coalition known as the Iraqi National Alliance. The Kurds, though divided, appeared poised to finish strongly as well, they said, leaving Iraq’s political map far more ambiguous than just weeks ago.

Although officials said Mr. Maliki appeared to have a plurality in returns so far, his rivals in the Shiite coalition and Mr. Allawi’s alliance trumpeted their gains — Mr. Allawi in Sunni regions and the Shiite coalition in rural southern provinces. And the early indications suggested Mr. Maliki fell short of the mandate he might have needed to guide negotiations over a coalition government that he could lead. At the very least, the showing could weaken his caretaker government during the months of negotiations that will follow the final results, which electoral officials expect by the end of March.

Mr. Maliki has not appeared in public since the election. He entered the hospital on Wednesday for a two-hour surgery to remove a cyst in his stomach, officials said. The government confirmed the operation on Thursday, saying he had returned to work.

After the last parliamentary election in December 2005, political leaders clashed for more than five months in an effort to form a new government, a period of indecision and confusion that allowed insurgents to gain strength and religious tension to worsen. Tens of thousands were killed in the sectarian fighting that followed, and many have worried that while Iraq is more peaceful, any transition will prove fraught with danger.

“We may witness long months of problems and bargaining,” said Hazim al-Nuaimi, a political analyst. “This is the bad face of liberalism.”

Nearly everyone had expected jockeying after Sunday’s vote, Iraq’s second parliamentary election, but the frenetic feel to the deliberations was striking. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, an ally of Mr. Allawi, held meetings with rivals, with or without Mr. Allawi’s blessing. Shiite politicians said the followers of a radical cleric, Moktada al-Sadr, had performed surprisingly well, giving them a greater voice. Already, party leaders were suggesting alternatives to Mr. Maliki if his alliance entered a coalition.

In past days, Iraqi newspapers have speculated about every possible combination, and the muddled atmosphere has exacerbated divisions that have plagued Iraq since the American-led invasion. Some Sunni politicians have insisted a Sunni Arab succeed President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd. Kurdish officials themselves have worried that the entry of a dissident movement into national politics might weaken their hand in negotiations.

“Any government, to be successful, should consider the Kurds and include them in a coalition,” said Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish lawmaker. “That would be the logical thing, I think.” But he added, “We look to be weaker in this parliament, this time.”

Coalitions themselves already seemed to be fraying, with several politicians claiming that talks had begun this week to persuade candidates to leave their alliances.

“Many small blocs and figures will split,” said Safaauddin al-Safi, a minister and candidate with Mr. Maliki in Basra. “We are in dialogue with several of them.”

The United Nations had hoped preliminary results would be released Thursday morning, but by nightfall, only partial results from five of Iraq’s 19 provinces were made public. Electoral officials blamed the sheer logistics of the process, saying computers used to compile data were overloaded Wednesday and crashed for several hours. By early next week, electoral officials said they hoped to have 80 percent of the returns tallied.

A Western official said they had no reports of significant fraud, though some reports were being investigated. In fact, the official said, there were fewer complaints than in the provincial elections in January 2009, despite the far larger number of votes.

Since the day of the vote, several parties have complained of tampering in the count, with the Shiite coalition going as far as saying it might question the legitimacy of preliminary returns if its demands for more transparency weren’t met. But the charges by Mr. Allawi’s officials were the most extensive and almost sure to aggravate suspicions by Sunni Arabs, who have long accused religious Shiite parties of monopolizing power.

At a news conference, his representatives came armed with visual aids, including pictures and ballots, some of which they said were abandoned in a schoolyard in Kirkuk.

“Votes for the Iraqiya list are in the garbage,” said Adnan al-Janabi, a candidate from Baghdad with Mr. Allawi’s coalition. He said he did not know the extent of the alleged fraud. “One or one million, we don’t know,” he added.

In addition to claiming to have found abandoned ballots in the garbage, and boxes in some homes, the representatives also struck at the heart of Iraq’s election process, claiming that workers at the election commission, who have been entering data in to the computer systems, were caught fiddling with the tally for Mr. Allawi’s coalition.

The questions over the vote’s legitimacy, along with the uncertainty over the negotiations for a new government, have given rise to unease that violence could grow, as politicians seek leverage or as insurgents try to exploit the transition of power.

In Anbar Province, once the cradle of the insurgency, a candidate, Sheik Aiffan Saadoun al-Aiffan, said three of his men were killed by insurgents posing as policemen on Wednesday. One of them, Mr. Aiffan said, was beheaded.

“The violence is going to escalate against us,” he said. “But we’ll face them.”

Marc Santora, Riyadh Mohammed, and Zaid Thaker contributed reporting.

Mar 8, 2010

In a Reversal, Sunnis Vote, to Retain a Voice in Iraq

Image by Kurdistan KURD كوردستان كردستان ا via Flickr

By ANTHONY SHADID

FALLUJA, Iraq — In this town, nicknamed the City of Mosques, the scratchy loudspeakers of muezzins that once preached resistance to the American occupation implored Sunni Arabs to defy bombs and vote Sunday. They did, in a landmark election that demonstrated how far Iraq has come and perhaps how far it has to go.

The droves of Sunni Arab residents casting ballots in towns like Falluja — the name itself synonymous with the cradle of the insurgency, where relatively few voted in the last election five years ago — promised to redraw Iraq’s political landscape. The turnout delivered Sunnis their most articulated voice yet on the national stage, seven years after the American-led invasion ended their dominance.

Yet the act of their empowerment Sunday may make that landscape even more combustible, possibly even risking a revival of sectarian conflict. The demands of Sunni voters, from securing the presidency for a Sunni to diluting Iran’s influence, could make the already formidable task in Iraq of forming a coalition government even more difficult.

At polling stations near cratered buildings, past blast walls that still bore the pockmarks of bullets, the sentiments of voters who largely boycotted Iraq’s national elections in 2005 illustrated that divide.

Even as many cast ballots for the slate of Ayad Allawi, a secular Shiite and former prime minister, they condemned religious Shiite parties. With the invective once reserved for Americans, voters now attacked Iran, seen here as the patron of Iraq’s Shiite-led government.

“There’s no more war, it’s true, but we’re still not free,” Riyadh Khalaf, 47, a laborer, said as he stood near a polling station in the neighborhood of Andalus, where distant bombings reverberated through the morning. “We have an American occupation and an Iranian administration.”

A civil defense worker, Raad Mustafa, shouted, “We have to save our country.”

Ammar Ali, a police officer, interrupted them.

“We want someone who lives with us, someone who is from Iraq,” he said, carrying his rifle. “We don’t want the politicians who spend the night in Iran.”

In a day of remarkable images, none may have been more startling than those in Anbar Province, where just 3,375 people voted in January 2005, out of fear of insurgent threats or in protest of the occupation. People often cast the boycott then as a matter of survival, refusal to participate in an order that disenfranchised them. Similar words in another context were heard Sunday; failure to vote would amount to surrender.

“I voted for the sake of the generations to come,” said Yunus Adel, 22, a student. “My vote is going to determine my destiny. We have to have a voice.”

In another neighborhood, Mohammed Hatem walked past Martyrs School where, on April 28, 2003, American soldiers, saying they had been shot at, fired on a protest and killed 15 people, a seminal moment in unleashing an insurgency that would not end for five years. The school, on this day, was a polling station.

“The memories remain,” Mr. Hatem said. “But if you have the right, you have to exercise it.”

Voters in the Jolan neighborhood, the scene of some of the most intense fighting in 2004, barely flinched at blasts, which killed no one. Mosques that once served as refuge for insurgents blared messages imploring voters to defy the bombings.

Politics in Anbar are not for the faint-hearted. They tend toward the nasty, brutish and loud, where even nuances are conveyed as shouts. The governor lost his hand in an attack in December. A candidate near Falluja talked of the 11 attempts on his life as he might about car wrecks. Unfortunate, but they happen.

Nevertheless, in Anbar, as in predominantly Sunni regions elsewhere, politics have become far more diverse since the days when the Iraqi Islamic Party, a descendant of the venerable Muslim Brotherhood, dominated the regions. Since 2009, the province’s other currents — neo-Baathist and tribal — have rallied around lists loyal to Mr. Allawi and Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani, another secular Shiite.

“Everyone in Anbar — no, in Iraq — knows that the Islamic Party is lying,” said Sheik Aiffan Saadoun al-Aiffan, a tribal leader and candidate on Mr. Bolani’s list. “They deal with Iran, they steal money and they’ve lost the support of the people.”

Mr. Aiffan is part of a new breed of politician here, as traditional as he is worldly, with a kinetic energy that helped him, on a recent day, hit the campaign trail in the afternoon, greet a procession of relatives wearing what amounts to Anbar chic — headdress, sunglasses and bandolier — at night, then run an hour on the treadmill until 3:40 a.m.

He speaks with the entitlement of inherited power. “I’ll win, sure,” he said, with a touch of humor. “People like me, and God is with me.” And in a province where conversation, hours and hours of it, is the favorite pastime, he understands a constituency that deems politics’ ambiguous grays as effeminate.

Mr. Aiffan called the surrender “of even an inch of territory” in the border disputes with Kurds a sacrilege. (“This is our faith,” he said.) He threatened to fight the Islamic Party with guns if there was a hint of vote stealing. (“It could happen.”) And he insisted that the presidency was the right of a Sunni Arab, not a Kurd — someone like his ally, Ahmed Abu Risha, another tribal leader here who leads Mr. Bolani’s list.

“This time, the decisions will be different,” he said. “We can vote for what’s right, who’s good. We’ll make the right choices.” He looked at his computer, next to three cellphones, one of which got 150 text messages in an hour.

“The problem is,” he asked, “who will be with us in Baghdad?”

Even before the voting ended, politicians and voters speculated about the fragility of coalitions, in particular Mr. Allawi’s, which seemed to enjoy a groundswell of support as the one force that could counter Iraq’s religious Shiite parties. Some speculated that Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi’s candidates might leave it and return to the Iraqi Islamic Party, from which they split.

Others wondered whether Mr. Allawi, with his reputation for high-handedness, could keep the loyalty of emerging Sunni figures like Saleh al-Mutlaq, a member of Parliament banned from the election for ties to the Baath Party, and Rafea al-Issawi, a deputy prime minister who hails from one of Anbar’s biggest tribes.

“We won’t have a war, but it will be a conflict,” predicted Mohammed Zaal, an engineer in Falluja. “It will be a political conflict of Sunni against Sunni and Shiite against Shiite. Once they lose power, they’ll look for other ways to keep their influence.”

“I’m still optimistic,” he added, “but even in the civil war, I was optimistic.”

Mar 7, 2010

Democratic activists channel anger into Arkansas Senate race

Image by tsweden via Flickr

By Perry Bacon Jr.
Sunday, March 7, 2010; A03

Democratic activists flooding money into a primary challenge against Sen. Blanche Lincoln (D-Ark.) say the race isn't simply about defeating the incumbent. It is also about rebuking a Democratic-controlled Congress that they say isn't pursuing an aggressive, populist agenda.

After Arkansas Lt. Gov. Bill Halter announced Monday that he would challenge Lincoln, liberal donors from groups such as MoveOn.org poured more than $1 million into his campaign, an unusually high sum for the first two days of campaigning. Liberals blasted Lincoln with anti-Washington rhetoric that sounded more like the conservative tea party movement. The groups are particularly critical of her opposition to the public option, as it is known, in the health-care bill and her support in 2008 for a Wall Street bailout.

The primary contest illustrates the challenge Democrats face in trying to please activists who worked hard to elect President Obama and congressional Democrats and now want to see results. They also want to lure independent voters who helped the party win the 2006 and 2008 elections but now express wariness about the Democratic agenda.

"As Bill Halter says, Washington is broken. It's really remarkable when you have a strong Democratic majority in both the House and the Senate and a Democratic president and still not get a lot of things passed," said Charles Chamberlain, political director for the activist group Democracy for America, which has encouraged its members to donate to Halter. "Some of that blame rests on Republicans, but the Democratic Party is not standing up to lead."

Support in high places

The White House and congressional Democratic leaders are lining up behind Lincoln, who they say has the strongest chance of winning in Arkansas. And Lincoln, who was first elected to the Senate in 1998, is trying to turn the fury among liberal activists into an asset.

In a commercial that began airing just after Halter announced his candidacy, Lincoln touts her opposition to the public option and the climate-change bill, issues popular among Democratic activists. "I don't answer to my party, I answer to Arkansas," she says.

"She's pretty much fighting for the freedom to be a moderate Democrat," said Steve Patterson, her campaign manager.

That strategy could be risky in the two-month blitz to the May 18 primary, for which more partisan Democratic activists are likely to turn out. Lincoln, who received 56 percent of the vote in 2004, has seen her approval ratings plunge in the past several months. Liberals attribute the decline to her changed position on the public option, which she supported last summer then distanced herself from a few months later. Conservatives say her numbers reflect dissatisfaction over her support for a health-care bill that is unpopular in the state.

Halter's approach

Seeking to keep the buzz among online activists, Halter appealed to liberals after launching his candidacy and touted his support for the public option and other liberal causes.

At the same time, his campaign commercials sound the kind of anti-Washington themes that could unite liberal activists outside of Arkansas and voters in his state. He criticizes Lincoln for her bailout vote, saying, "Washington is not working for Arkansas families."

"He's not a liberal, he's not a conservative, he's an Arkansan," said Bud Jackson, an adviser to Halter, illustrating the campaign's attempt to make sure he is not simply cast as the spokesman of liberal groups and their causes.

The GOP could have as many as eight contenders in its primary, but party officials are confident the winner will be the favorite in the general election. Two House Democrats in the state already have decided to retire rather than face potentially difficult races in a state where Obama won just 39 percent of the vote in 2008.

In some ways, Halter's candidacy is a perfect marriage of activists and candidate. Once the head of the Social Security Administration, Halter had been exploring how to run for higher office. Labor unions in Arkansas and nationally have pledged to put $3 million into his effort, largely because they are furious over Lincoln's opposition to the Employee Free Choice Act, which would make it easier for unions to organize workers.

Tension in the party

Party activists, both in unions and on liberal blogs, have been angry for months that Democrats haven't pushed on some progressive causes, such as for the public option and climate-change legislation.

Some activists have publicly suggested that Obama do more to promote these policies, but they have generally targeted their anger at centrist politicians such as Lincoln.

"When you have a country with 10 percent unemployment and you see all of that money going to banks, that discontent will manifest itself in different ways," said Jane Hamsher, founder of the liberal blog Firedoglake. She hosted an event for Halter at her Washington home in December, where liberal activists encouraged him to run.

That intraparty tension could turn the Lincoln-Halter race into the Democratic version of the Florida GOP Senate race between conservative insurgent Marco Rubio and Gov. Charlie Crist that has become a proxy for larger questions about the direction of the Republican Party.

"The larger message being sent to the administration and Congress is: You are with us or you are against us," said Patterson, Lincoln's campaign manager. "The left feels frustrated after eight years [of President George W. Bush] their agenda should be at the forefront and should be passed in its entirety in the first year. That didn't happen and that anger, some of that is being magnified in our race."

As Iraq votes, U.S. content to keep its distance

Image by Getty Images via Daylife

By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, March 7, 2010; A01

As Obama administration officials tried in recent weeks to anticipate what could go wrong in Sunday's elections in Iraq, they realized with some relief that they are largely powerless to control what happens.

In twice-daily meetings leading up to the vote and in a final preelection videoconference Thursday with the U.S. ambassador and military commander on the ground, officials contemplated the possibilities. Violence, intimidation or fraud might limit turnout or mar the legitimacy of the vote. Post-election political jockeying could delay the formation of a government for months and leave a dangerous power vacuum. Iran could create mischief, or worse.

But beneath the last-minute activity in Washington, officials have recognized that the electoral contest and its aftermath are in the hands of the Iraqis. Nearly seven years after U.S.-led troops took over Iraq, the administration appears content with its changing role there.

Committed to halving the contingent of nearly 100,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by summer's end as he escalates a red-hot war in Afghanistan, President Obama has set a high bar for intervening -- or even acknowledging serious concern about the future.

In a briefing at the White House last week, senior advisers who spoke on the condition of anonymity hammered home two messages: "We can't and we will not tell them how to conduct their affairs," an official said of the Iraqis. "That's up to them." In addition, he said, "we see nothing that would divert us from the track we're on . . . to end the combat mission in August," even in the face of sectarian violence.

Iraq's last national elections, in December 2005, took place under U.S. occupation; political discord and a five-month delay in forming a government led to an explosion of sectarian violence and a surge in American troop levels that then-Sens. Barack Obama and Joseph R. Biden Jr. opposed. Two years later, the George W. Bush administration began negotiations with the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on agreements to gradually withdraw all U.S. forces and establish a long-term strategic relationship.

The pullout agreements -- including a July 2009 deadline for turning urban security over to the Iraqi military and the departure of all U.S. military forces by December 2011 -- were signed two months before Obama's inauguration. In one of his first major foreign policy decisions, Obama inserted an interim withdrawal date, pledging to remove all designated U.S. "combat" forces by August this year, with 50,000 troops remaining to carry out training, diplomatic security and select counterinsurgency missions with Iraqi counterparts for 16 months.

Democrats and Republicans alike have a vested interest in declaring today's Iraq a democratic success unprecedented in the region and claiming credit for it. "This could be one of the great achievements of this administration," Vice President Biden, Obama's designated point man in Iraq, said last month. "You're going to see a stable government in Iraq that is actually moving toward a representative government."

Former vice president Richard B. Cheney took issue with Biden's assertion, calling it "a little strange" because both Biden and Obama had opposed the troop surge. Any credit to Obama, Cheney said, "ought to go with a healthy dose of 'Thank you, George Bush.' "

Biden, who had the last word against Cheney in dueling, mid-February talk-show appearances, accused the Bush administration of leaving a "mess" in Iraq. The U.S. military may have succeeded in "settling things down," he said, but it was the Obama administration that developed a plan to guide the Iraqis toward true democracy.

In four trips there as vice president, Biden said, "I have met with every single solitary one of the players in Iraq -- Sunni, Shiite, Kurd, Christian. And we have been able to be a catalyst for them, moving . . . from the battlefield to the political arena" to settle their differences.

Although some U.S. officials, including Gen. Ray Odierno, the military commander in Iraq, have voiced concern about what they call Iranian dirty tricks and politically motivated violence, the dominant attitude has been laid-back: "That's just Iraq."

"Certainly there is a lot of wrangling over power and influence and who gets to do what," Odierno's predecessor, Gen. David H. Petraeus, told television interviewer Charlie Rose last week. "But again, some of that is Iraqi politics. It's 'Iraqracy,' we say sometimes."

Even if the elections proceed with minimal disruption, however, significant challenges lie ahead. Of the five major political groups participating, none is expected to win a majority, or perhaps even a plurality, of the vote. Getting a government in place will be arduous and time-consuming at best. The Iraqi constitution allows lengthy challenges to the vote count before the new parliament convenes to choose a president. After that, it could take months for a coalition to amass enough seats to form a government, which the parliament must approve.

Regardless of whether Maliki is reelected, his government will remain as caretaker during the transition, a time when the U.S. presence in Iraq will be shifting. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, already the largest in the world, will take over many functions now performed by the military, including training Iraq's police force.

Administration officials insist that the United States will retain significant influence with the new government, no matter who forms it. "Iraqis will continue to want our help in resolving their outstanding problems," including constitutional reform, disputes over internal boundaries and distribution of oil revenue, a senior administration official said in an interview.

"There are also things they want from us," the official noted. Under the Bush-era strategic agreement, the United States is committed to helping Iraq remove remaining U.N. restrictions on its oil revenue, as well as reparations to Kuwait for Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion, and to encouraging U.S. investment, trade and educational exchanges.

Despite the prospects of sectarian violence and Iranian influence, the administration is counting on Iraqis to pull back from potentially destructive detours out of self-interest. "If Iraq were to fall backward into some kind of chaos," the administration official said, "in the first instance it would be bad for the Iraqis."

"Given the huge investment that was made in troops and treasure over the years, I imagine some would say we need to do something to prevent it," he said, adding that there are contingency plans for slowing or reconfiguring the U.S. withdrawal. "But I don't think there'd be any great appetite for going back in."