Thadar Del village in Phapun district burnt down by army
Report by Nan Htoo San
Saturday, 24 July 2010 11:38 - Last Updated Saturday, 24 July 2010 21:59
The Burmese Army in an inhuman act burnt down Thadar Del village in Lu Thaw Township, Phapun district. The village was set on fire by a column of the army at 2:30 pm on July 23 afternoon, a local said.
"Troops arrived at the Thadar Del village and set on fire the whole village at 2:30 pm. Before entering the village, they fired mortar shells into the village. Villagers escaped the shelling," a villager said.
Burmese Army soldiers and battalions under KNU Brigade 5 had running gun battles around the village area on July 23. After the clash, junta’s forces fired mortar shells into Thadar Del village. Because of the shelling, villagers fled from the village, Maj. Saw Kaleldo of KNU Brigade 5 said.
"We exchanged gunfire with junta’s forces yesterday. Then they fired mortar shells into Thadar Del village. Villagers fled and nobody was left in the village. The army column came to the village and burnt it down," Maj. Saw Kaledo told KIC.
The military column, which set fire to the village, is yet to be identified as to which battalion it belongs to. Locals believe the column could belong to a battalion under the junta’s Military Operation Command (MOC) 21 because these forces were patrolling the area.
Junta forces have patrolled the area in an unusually special military operation this month. A medical in-charge in this area said that burning down the village could be part of the special military operation.
Villagers are now heading for the jungle. It's learnt that the backpack health worker’s team (BPHWT) is preparing to provide medicines to the villagers fighting for survival in the jungle during the rainy season.
Thadar Del village is near the Burmese Army military camp and also on the patrol route of the military column. The military column was in the village till last information received this evening.
Thadar Del village had about 50 houses with 500 people. Thadar Del village is located 40 miles north of Phapun town. The village is in the controlled area of KNU as well as in the patrol area of Burmese Army battalions under MOC 21.
Three Thadar Del villagers were killed by junta forces without reason in the paddy field near the village in 2006.
When the first movie in the "Rambo" series, "First Blood" (1982), was released, the "Rocky" series was already in its third offering, "Rocky III" (1982). It became increasingly clear that each sequel in the two series was worse than its predecessor. Over the years, the characters of "Rambo" and "Rocky" became fodder for countless parodies. Weird Al Yankovic´s "UHF" (1989) poked fun at "Rambo" by copying Rambo´s action sequences and his dialogue delivery style that now has its own cult following. No doubt by the late Eighties: "Rambo" and "Rocky" were shunned and renounced by critics and moviegoers. Then in 2008, Stallone decided to resurrect his American Hero, John Rambo, in "Rambo," perhaps for the last time. The movie was well received by audiences and became a decent earner at the box office.
In the story, John Rambo (Sylvester Stallone) now lives in Thailand in an area close to the Burmese border. He makes his living by hunting snakes and selling them in a nearby local region. Soon, a missionary, Michael (Paul Schulze), approaches Rambo and asks him to take a group of missionaries to a region in Burma so they can provide the needy with food and medicines. Initially, Rambo refuses to take the job, but at the insistence of Sarah (Julie Benz), he decides to help the missionaries. Along the way, Rambo´s boat is stopped by pirates. After getting rid of the pirates, the group arrives at the destination, and Michael tells Rambo that their group will travel by road for rest of the journey.
Upon reaching the village, Michael´s group is attacked by an opposition military leader who later kidnaps the missionaries. The pastor soon comes back to Rambo and informs him that the missionaries have been missing for the last ten days. He asks Rambo to lead a group of mercenaries that will eventually rescue the missionaries. Meanwhile, Sarah and the other members are rescued, but the group is again attacked by the Burmese army. Rambo engages the entire army and saves the group.
I was actually surprised how much I enjoyed this movie in my second viewing. "Rambo: First Blood Part II" and "Rambo III" were downright miserable, and I had no hopes from "Rambo." Surprisingly, I was pleasantly entertained by Stallone´s latest Rambo movie. One thing that struck me about "Rambo" was its serious tone, which connects at an emotional level. Stallone fabricates Rambo´s character in a manner that is, in fact, a continuity of his character from the first movie. Here, Rambo is disillusioned and angry with the world just as he was in the beginning of "First Blood." He retreats to a quite village in Thailand away from his home in the U.S. All these years, he has become emotionally cold and rigid. Considering his past, Rambo´s behavior is completely understandable and realistic. In addition, "Rambo" deals with a similar theme about war and its harmful effects on the community, as seen in the previous Rambo sequels.
"Rambo" succeeds because of the prevailing on-screen tension between the characters, which was also evident in "First Blood." Sarah´s persistence in getting Rambo onboard and Michael´s disapproval of Rambo´s maverick ways inject adequate drama to the story. The action occurs much later in the film, and the buildup to the action is carefully planned and executed. The editing is superior, and the movie breezes fast in its nine-nine-minutes of duration. As an action movie, "Rambo" erases our memory of its dreadful sequels and comes very close in the entertainment value to "First Blood."
Nonetheless, "Rambo: First Blood Part II" and "Rambo III" were both criticized heavily due to the filmmakers´ propensity to show out-of-context and overextended action sequences along with sloppy stories. "Rambo" is no less in this aspect, but the action has a place in the context of the overall story. Then again, the action is overly stylized with a high body count, in which people are blown to bits, not once, but on numerous occasions.
Mustaqim Adamrah, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Mon, 07/05/2010
To quell public confusion on the state of Indonesia’s military relations with the US, the Defense Ministry confirmed that the world’s largest weapons-maker has completely lifted an embargo banning weapon sales to the Indonesian Military (TNI).
In its first clear statement on the embargo’s end, a Defense Ministry spokesman said that Indonesia could procure any type of weapon from the US because there was no longer an embargo.
“The US embargo on the sale of any type of weapon to Indonesia ended completely in 2005,” Indonesian Defense Ministry spokesman I Wayan Midhio said over the weekend.
“After the embargo ended, there were no more distinctions to be made between lethal or non-lethal weapons sales,” he said.
Indonesia can now purchase lethal weapons from the US and there is no “partial prohibition” of arms sales to Indonesia, as was previously reported, he added.
Many observers — even those well-informed on bilateral military relations — said they did not know if Indonesia could buy lethal weapons from the US or not, even after military ties resumed in 2005.
Indonesia recently proposed a plan to purchase American-made F-16 jet fighters, which are categorized as lethal weapons, and C-130H Hercules cargo jets, which are not considered lethal, if the US lifted its embargo, as previously reported.
Wayan said Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro expressed the government’s intent to buy the aircraft in a bilateral meeting with US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.
The US Congress imposed an embargo that banned international military education and training (IMET) and military equipment sales to Indonesia almost two decades ago.
The embargo was imposed in response to repeated human rights abuses committed by the Indonesian Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus) in West Papua and Timor Leste (then East Timor), which killed more than 100 unarmed civilians, including two US citizens, and injured dozens.
Some experts maintain that the US encouraged Indonesia’s use of lethal force against civilians in East Timor.
Padjadjaran University international relations expert Teuku Rezasyah said history shows that former US president Gerald Ford and former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger gave the Indonesian government a “green light” to send Kopassus to East Timor and ignored reports of violence during official US government visits to Indonesia.
The US Congress said it would lift the ban entirely only if the US government could ensure that Indonesia addressed human rights violations.
An Indonesian government delegation led by former president Megawati Soekarnoputeri, visited the US in 2001 in an attempt to soften the policy.
The meeting between Megawati and former US president George W. Bush resulted in a US commitment to provide US$400,000 in extended IMET and to lift the embargo on non-lethal military weapon sales.
The US Congress has not approved joint military trainings between Kopassus and the US military due to alleged Kopassus human rights abuses.
Snr-Gen Than Shwe is facing a mutiny among his subordinates. Although no rebellion is expected, there are growing signs of discontent among his cabinet ministers. The reason—they have been betrayed by their boss.
Than Shwe quietly ordered his uniformed cabinet ministers to resign from their army posts. In Burma, shedding the uniform means losing protection, security and livelihood. Like it or not, army uniforms are a symbol of authority in Burma. Those who wear them always get priority over those who don't; they are respected and can expect easy cooperation from others. Suddenly, they will lose that privilege.
Another reason Than Shwe's cabinet ministers are upset is that the army chief is holding the cards for the one-quarter of representatives in the People's Assembly who will be drawn from the ranks of the military. They wanted to be in that 25 percent to secure a place for themselves in the parliament. Now, they are on their own. They will have to contest the election, and unless Than Shwe supports them with some dirty deals from behind the scenes, they are sure to lose. Once this happens, they will be down the drain.
These are people who reached high positions through loyalty to their army bosses, nothing else. They are almost completely devoid of professionalism. Look at what happened to our country under their rule for more than four decades. Their track record reflects their total lack of creativity. But those who keep quiet about what is happening are rewarded with many privileges that are unthinkable in any transparent society. These privileges have made them very rich, and they want to keep their stolen goods forever. Now, however, they can only watch helplessly as they are quietly kicked out of their positions.
Furthermore, if they intend to run for parliament, they will have to declare their assets to the Election Commission. But that would be suicidal, because it would immediately reveal the extent of their corruption. No minister would ever dare to disclose what he actually owns. Even their houses are worth far more than they could ever afford on their official salaries. How could they ever account for the 10 luxury cars that are the bare minimum for anyone in a position of power to possess?
They can smell danger. They know that Than Shwe can easily find ways to put them in jail indefinitely. Look at what happened to Gen Khin Nyunt and his cronies. So they know they're in a very precarious position right now. But they also know that if they show any signs of rebellion, they're doomed.
But there is also some peril in this situation for the senior general himself. For every step of the election process, the Election Commission has the final say, subject only to the orders of Than Shwe. But this means that he has to instruct the commission to rig the vote in such a way as to ensure that all of his lieutenants get their assigned places. If he doesn't go about this very carefully, he could be hoisted by his own petard.
To change the system without changing people is a dangerous game. Late dictator Gen Ne Win tried it, with disastrous results. Unless Than Shwe can put a truly democratic system in place before he leaves the scene, his future is not safe at all. His deputies are the same fish in the same ponds; but if they ever find themselves in positions of real power someday, they may think nothing of turning on their old master. After all, these are people who have risen to high positions by concealing the depths of their ambition, much as Than Shwe himself did through most of his career. Treachery would be second nature to them.
More immediately, Than Shwe faces a few other obstacles if he plans to proceed with his rigged election.
On the ethnic front, his efforts to convince the armed cease-fire groups to transform themselves into border guard forces has met with a coordinated rejection from all the major ethnic armies. Moreover, China has said that it won't turn a blind eye if the Burmese army launches an offensive against armed groups based along the border between the two countries. In any case, the Burmese army is in no state to wage a major war with anybody. If they fight, they will lose.
Despite the forced dissolution of the National League for Democracy, Than Shwe's attempts to silence the democratic opposition once and for all are also faring rather poorly. Aung San Suu Kyi remains a hugely charismatic presence, with or without her party. The US, EU and now Asean have all indicated that Than Shwe's carefully orchestrated “democratic” transition will lack credibility without her participation. In other words, if he really wants to move on, he will need Suu Kyi's blessings.
The economy is something else that Than Shwe can't afford to ignore forever. Corruption is rampant and is only likely to get worse if the same old crooked generals and their cronies continue to control the country's assets. Chronic mismanagement of Burma's resources could become a flashpoint for social unrest, and could even weaken Than Shwe's hold over the military. No patriotic citizen, soldier or civilian, can be happy to see the country falling ever deeper into poverty while a handful of dirty officials become obscenely wealthy.
To our wild guess, the election will be held in October, during the school holidays, with schoolteachers as poll watchers. They are presently being trained in various places. An election law stipulates that representatives of candidates will be watching during the vote count. In other words, if the election is fair as it was in 1990, the ex-minister candidates will lose. If their dismissal from army positions was a deliberate move to eliminate them once and for all, Than Shwe is moving in the right direction. The next step we should see is the release of political prisoners and Suu Kyi. If we see Suu Kyi’s involvement in the next ruling council, Than Shwe will be remembered as a true national hero.
We hope the senior general will seize this opportunity for the sake of our country.
U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Mark O’Donald/NATO
By Michael Hastings
Jun 22, 2010 10:00 AM EDT
This article appears in RS 1108/1109 from July 8-22, 2010, on newsstands Friday, June 25.
'How'd I get screwed into going to this dinner?" demands Gen. Stanley McChrystal. It's a Thursday night in mid-April, and the commander of all U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan is sitting in a four-star suite at the H̫tel Westminster in Paris. He's in France to sell his new war strategy to our NATO allies Рto keep up the fiction, in essence, that we actually have allies. Since McChrystal took over a year ago, the Afghan war has become the exclusive property of the United States. Opposition to the war has already toppled the Dutch government, forced the resignation of Germany's president and sparked both Canada and the Netherlands to announce the withdrawal of their 4,500 troops. McChrystal is in Paris to keep the French, who have lost more than 40 soldiers in Afghanistan, from going all wobbly on him.
"The dinner comes with the position, sir," says his chief of staff, Col. Charlie Flynn.
McChrystal turns sharply in his chair.
"Hey, Charlie," he asks, "does this come with the position?"
The general stands and looks around the suite that his traveling staff of 10 has converted into a full-scale operations center. The tables are crowded with silver Panasonic Toughbooks, and blue cables crisscross the hotel's thick carpet, hooked up to satellite dishes to provide encrypted phone and e-mail communications. Dressed in off-the-rack civilian casual – blue tie, button-down shirt, dress slacks – McChrystal is way out of his comfort zone. Paris, as one of his advisers says, is the "most anti-McChrystal city you can imagine." The general hates fancy restaurants, rejecting any place with candles on the tables as too "Gucci." He prefers Bud Light Lime (his favorite beer) to Bordeaux, Talladega Nights (his favorite movie) to Jean-Luc Godard. Besides, the public eye has never been a place where McChrystal felt comfortable: Before President Obama put him in charge of the war in Afghanistan, he spent five years running the Pentagon's most secretive black ops.
"What's the update on the Kandahar bombing?" McChrystal asks Flynn. The city has been rocked by two massive car bombs in the past day alone, calling into question the general's assurances that he can wrest it from the Taliban.
"We have two KIAs, but that hasn't been confirmed," Flynn says.
McChrystal takes a final look around the suite. At 55, he is gaunt and lean, not unlike an older version of Christian Bale in Rescue Dawn. His slate-blue eyes have the unsettling ability to drill down when they lock on you. If you've fucked up or disappointed him, they can destroy your soul without the need for him to raise his voice.
"I'd rather have my ass kicked by a roomful of people than go out to this dinner," McChrystal says.
He pauses a beat.
"Unfortunately," he adds, "no one in this room could do it."
With that, he's out the door.
"Who's he going to dinner with?" I ask one of his aides.
"Some French minister," the aide tells me. "It's fucking gay."
The next morning, McChrystal and his team gather to prepare for a speech he is giving at the École Militaire, a French military academy. The general prides himself on being sharper and ballsier than anyone else, but his brashness comes with a price: Although McChrystal has been in charge of the war for only a year, in that short time he has managed to piss off almost everyone with a stake in the conflict. Last fall, during the question-and-answer session following a speech he gave in London, McChrystal dismissed the counterterrorism strategy being advocated by Vice President Joe Biden as "shortsighted," saying it would lead to a state of "Chaos-istan." The remarks earned him a smackdown from the president himself, who summoned the general to a terse private meeting aboard Air Force One. The message to McChrystal seemed clear: Shut the fuck up, and keep a lower profile
Now, flipping through printout cards of his speech in Paris, McChrystal wonders aloud what Biden question he might get today, and how he should respond. "I never know what's going to pop out until I'm up there, that's the problem," he says. Then, unable to help themselves, he and his staff imagine the general dismissing the vice president with a good one-liner.
"Are you asking about Vice President Biden?" McChrystal says with a laugh. "Who's that?"
"Biden?" suggests a top adviser. "Did you say: Bite Me?"
When Barack Obama entered the Oval Office, he immediately set out to deliver on his most important campaign promise on foreign policy: to refocus the war in Afghanistan on what led us to invade in the first place. "I want the American people to understand," he announced in March 2009. "We have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan." He ordered another 21,000 troops to Kabul, the largest increase since the war began in 2001. Taking the advice of both the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also fired Gen. David McKiernan – then the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan – and replaced him with a man he didn't know and had met only briefly: Gen. Stanley McChrystal. It was the first time a top general had been relieved from duty during wartime in more than 50 years, since Harry Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur at the height of the Korean War.
Even though he had voted for Obama, McChrystal and his new commander in chief failed from the outset to connect. The general first encountered Obama a week after he took office, when the president met with a dozen senior military officials in a room at the Pentagon known as the Tank. According to sources familiar with the meeting, McChrystal thought Obama looked "uncomfortable and intimidated" by the roomful of military brass. Their first one-on-one meeting took place in the Oval Office four months later, after McChrystal got the Afghanistan job, and it didn't go much better. "It was a 10-minute photo op," says an adviser to McChrystal. "Obama clearly didn't know anything about him, who he was. Here's the guy who's going to run his fucking war, but he didn't seem very engaged. The Boss was pretty disappointed."
By Ellen Nakashima Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, June 4, 2010; A02
The U.S. government is seeing "hints" that adversaries are targeting military networks for "remote" sabotage, the head of the Pentagon's recently launched Cyber Command said in his first public remarks since being confirmed last month.
"The potential for sabotage and destruction is now possible and something we must treat seriously," said Gen. Keith B. Alexander, who also heads the National Security Agency, the nation's largest intelligence agency. "Our Department of Defense must be able to operate freely and defend its resources in cyberspace."
In remarks afterward, Alexander said he is concerned about the safety of computer systems used in war zones. "The concern I have is when you look at what could happen to a computer, clearly sabotage and destruction are things that are yet to come," he said. "If we don't defend our systems, people will be able to break them."
James A. Lewis, director of CSIS's Technology and Public Policy Program, said advanced militaries are capable of destroying U.S. computer systems. "That wasn't true four years ago, but it's true now and Cyber Command will have to deal with it," he said.
The Cyber Command, launched last month at Fort Meade, was created by Defense SecretaryRobert M. Gates to streamline the military's capabilities to attack and defend in cyberspace, supported by NSA's intelligence capabilities.
Alexander stressed that the Command will focus on protecting the U.S. military's 15,000 computer networks under oversight of the special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Congress and the administration. His remarks were aimed at assuaging concerns over the NSA's role in helping to protect civilian and private-sector networks, as well as fears of a "militarization" of cyberspace.
"We spend a lot of time with the court, with Congress, the administration, the oversight committees to ensure they know what we're doing and why we're doing it," Alexander said.
This is done in classified settings, he said, including before the surveillance court, set up as part of the effort to protect Americans from unwarranted government surveillance.
"The hard part is, we can't go out and tell everybody exactly what we did or we give up capability that may be extremely useful in protecting our country and our allies," he said.
Alexander's confirmation was delayed for months by congressional concerns over the command's role and scope of action, how its operations would affect Americans' privacy, and a lack of clarity over rules of the road in cyber warfare.
The rules are still being debated and formulated, he said. So are the rules of engagement for working with the Department of Homeland Security and private industry in protecting the private sector's systems, which is perhaps the most difficult challenge.
But Alexander has his hands full just hardening the military's systems. DOD systems are probed by unauthorized users more than 6 million times a day.
"While our front-line defenses are up to this challenge, we still have to devote too much of our time and resources to dealing with relatively mundane problems," such as poorly engineered software and missing patches, he said.
The Obama administration frowned upon the idea of singling out Israel, and US officials announced they would not allow the next NPT conference in two years ...
... trip to the United States, in wake of the deaths of at least 10 people after Israeli Navy troops boarded a flotilla of ships heading to the Gaza Strip. ...
A secret military directive signed last September 30 by General David Petraeus, the Centcom commander, authorizes a vast expansion of secret U.S. military special ops from the Horn of Africa to the Middle East to Central Asia and “appears to authorize specific operations in Iran,” according to the New York Times.
If President Obama knew about this, authorized it, and still supports it, then Obama has crossed a red line, and the president will stand revealed as an aggressive, militaristic liberal interventionist who bears a closer resemblance to the president he succeeded than to the ephemeral reformer that he pretended to be in 2008, when he ran for office. If he didn’t know, if he didn’t understand the order, and if he’s unwilling to cancel it now that it’s been publicized, then Obama is a feckless incompetent. Take your pick.
If Congress has any guts at all, it will convene immediate investigative hearings into a power grab by Petraeus, a politically ambitious general, and the Pentagon’s arrogant Special Operations team, led by Admiral Eric T. Olson, who collaborated with Petraeus. And Congress needs to ask the White House: what did you know, and when did you know it?
Drop what you’re doing and read the whole piece, by Mark Mazzetti[1], in the Times, which ran it on page 1 as the lead story in today’s paper. (Critics of the “mainstream media” take note: the Times broke this story fearlessly, even though it apparently redacted certain operational details at the behest of the administration.)
Here’s the Cliff’s Notes version: In September, Petraeus signed the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order providing for a “broad expansion of clandestine military activity” in the region of Centcom’s responsibility, the Middle East and South Asia. Reports Mazzetti:
“The secret directive, signed in September by Gen. David H. Petraeus, authorizes the sending of American Special Operations troops to both friendly and hostile nations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa to gather intelligence and build ties with local forces. Officials said the order also permits reconnaissance that could pave the way for possible military strikes in Iran if tensions over its nuclear ambitions escalate.…
“The seven-page directive appears to authorize specific operations in Iran, most likely to gather intelligence about the country’s nuclear program or identify dissident groups that might be useful for a future military offensive.”
And:
“Officials said that many top commanders, General Petraeus among them, have advocated an expansive interpretation of the military’s role around the world, arguing that troops need to operate beyond Iraq and Afghanistan to better fight militant groups.”
The Times story raises a million questions: Is this how the United States intends to carry out the order to assassinate Anwar al-Awlaqi, the Yemen-based U.S. citizen who is reportedly an Al Qaeda operative? Does the revelation of this order have anything to do with the abrupt resignation of Dennis Blair, the departed Director of National Intelligence? What sorts of “dissident groups” in Iran might the military connect with, and might they include paramilitary forces associated with rebellious Kurds in western Iran, several of whom were just put to death by Tehran, or the Pakistan-linked Baluchistan rebels in southeast Iran?
For decades, the military has tried to elbow the Central Intelligence Agency into a subordinate role. Even as the intelligence budget ballooned (since the 1990s) to enormous proportions, the Pentagon has gobbled up most of it and tried to force the civilian CIA into a subordinate role. (According to Mazzetti, the CIA supports the Petraeus directive, even though it is explicitly aimed at “break[ing] its dependence on the Central Intelligence Agency,” but we’ll see.) The gung-ho Special Ops folks at the Pentagon have been pushing hard to become a kind of uniformed covert operations unit of the U.S. government, even though military operations aren’t governed by the same sort of restrictive Congressional oversight that the CIA operates under. And, according to Mazzetti, the Petraeus order is intended to accomplish things that the CIA “will not” do:
“The order, which an official said was drafted in close coordination with Adm. Eric T. Olson, the officer in charge of the United States Special Operations Command, calls for clandestine activities that ‘cannot or will not be accomplished’ by conventional military operations or “interagency activities,” a reference to American spy agencies.”
Petraeus, along with General McChrystal, should have been fired long ago by Obama, if for no other reason because of their insubordination in 2009 is trying to force Obama's hand in pushing for a series of escalations of the Afghanistan war. Obama can still redeem himself by firing them now.
REFORMS marginalized the military that was dominant during the New Order era. The climax took place 10 years ago when TNI Commander in Chief, Admiral Widodo A.S., affirmed the military’s willingness to abandon politics. Thereafter, various reforms of the military institutions have been carried out.
Governance During the New Order, military personnel on active duty were appointed as cabinet ministers. Only during the Habibie days were ministers from the military given two options: retire from the military to remain a member of the cabinet or return to their units. Here is the number of ministers from the military.
Development Cabinet I: 8 (all on active duty) Development Cabinet II: 6 (all on active duty) Development Cabinet III: 15 (14 active + 1 retiree) Development Cabinet IV: 17 (4 active + 13 retirees) Development Cabinet V: 14 (4 active + 10 retirees) Development Cabinet VI: 10 (4 active + 6 retirees)
During the New Order, at least 83 people from the military were appointed governors.
Pelita I (1969-1974) 19 persons Among others West Java Governor Solihin G.P. and Jakarta Governor Ali Sadikin
Pelita II (1974-1979) 20 persons Among others Jakarta Governor H Tjokropranolo and Bali Governor Soekarmen
Pelita III (1979-1983) 16 persons Among others West Java Governor Aang Kunaefi Kartawiria and Central Java Governor Supardjo Rustam
Pelita IV (1983-1988) 14 persons Among others Central Java Governor Muhammad Ismail and East Java Governor Wahono
Pelita V (1988-1993) 12 persons Among others East Java Governor Soelarso, Central Java Governor Muhammad Ismail, and West Java Governor Yogi S. Memed
Pelita VI (1993-1998) Among others Jakarta Governor Soerjadi Soedirdja and Sutiyoso
DPR The number of “free” seats for the military in the DPR was slashed following the reforms. The breakdown:
1960: 35 seats from 283 seats in the DPR-GR 1966: 36 seats from 283 seats in the DPR-GR 1966: 39 seats (16%) from 242 seats in the DPR-GR 1967: 43 seats (12%) from 350 seats in the DPR-GR 1968: 75 seats (16%) from 460 DPR seats 1972: 75 seats (16%) from 460 DPR seats, 155 in the MPR 1977: 75 seats (16%) from 460 DPR seats, 155 in the MPR 1982: 75 seats (16%) from 460 DPR seats, 155 in the MPR 1987: 100 seats (20%) from 500 DPR seats, 51 in the MPR 1992: 100 seats (20%) from 500 DPR seats, 50 in the MPR 1997: 75 seats (15%) from 500 DPR seats, 38 in the MPR 1999: 38 seats (7%) from 500 DPR seats, 14 in the MPR
The Nature of Palace-Cilangkap Relations
Four presidents after Suharto took different policies toward the military. Radical changes were made during the administration of Abdurrahman Wahid who was in power for only one and a half years.
HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION He made the initial policy to separate the military from the police. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) is changed into the Indonesian Military (TNI). The military also severed organizational ties with Golkar and affirmed neutrality during the 1999 General Elections.
ABDURRAHMAN WAHID ADMINISTRATION He separated the post of Defense Minister from ABRI Commander’s post and appointed civilian academic Juwono Sudarsono as Defense Minister. He carried out the separation of the National Police from the TNI.
During the Abdurrahman Wahid administration the Coordinating Agency to Support the Strengthening of National Stability (Bakorstanas) and the Special Research Institute (Litsus) are abolished. The army domination over the TNI Commander post is abolished by appointing Admiral Widodo A.S.
MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI ADMINISTRATION She had no clear direction in putting the military in order, as seen from, among other things, the appointment of Matori Abdul Djalil who was not capable of becoming the Defense Minister. The post was left vacant for a long time after Matori suffered a stroke. The military had considerable influence over Megawati’s decision-making process, especially in attempts to solve the Aceh conflict.
SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO ADMINISTRATION There have been no radical changes in matters of reorganizing the military. Attempts to settle the TNI business issues have not been finalized either.
1999
Cilangkap expresses the New Paradigms on TNI’s Sociopolitical Roles:
Changing its position and methods; the military should not necessarily be at the forefront at all times
Changing its concept from occupying into influencing
Changing the direct influencing method into indirect influencing method
Willing to act together when making important state and government decision-making efforts
Abolishment of Central and Regional Sociopolitical Council
Changing the Sociopolitical Staff into Territorial Staff. Chief of Sociopolitical Staff is changed into Chief of Territorial Staff
Liquidating ABRI Functionalism Staff, ABRI Community Security and Order, and ABRI Functionalism Development Board
Abolishing ABRI Functionalism through retirement decision or change in status
Assignment of soldiers outside their structural or functional positions in the Defense and Security Department/ABRI shall be designated as a change in status into civilian civil servants or retirees
Severance of organizational ties with Golkar and keeping the same distance with all the existing political parties
TNI commitment and neutrality consistency during the general elections
2000 Separation of the National Police from the Armed Forces, and ABRI becomes TNI by virtue of President Abdurrahman Wahid’s Decree No. 89/2000
2004
Abolishing TNI/National Police factions in the House of Representatives (DPR)
Commitment to terminate military business activities: within five years, the government should take over all the business activities directly and indirectly owned and managed by the TNI
The TNI gave up its dual function. The TNI/Police Faction left earlier than the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) deadline.
... The words dual function make no more sense. Once again we’re back to defense/security duties. The TNI/Police are returning to professions...
THE verses marked the end of assignments of generals in Senayan. The poem entitled Pamit (Goodbye) was read out by Maj. Gen. Kohirin Suganda Saputra in the House of Representatives (DPR)/MPR building. Kohirin acted as spokesman for the TNI/Police faction in the September 24, 2004 session. All members of the MPR promptly rose from their seats and warmly applauded.
In the final session of MPR members for the 1999-2004 term, the TNI/Police faction was present in Senayan for the last time. The divorce between the military/police and Senayan was based on the Decree of the MPR No. VII/2000 on the role of the TNI and Police. The decree was endorsed on August 18, 2000. In the same year, the MPR also applied the separation between the military and police.
Pursuant to the MPR decree, TNI and police members no longer have the right to vote and be elected as of the 2004 General Elections. In compensation, the TNI/Police faction was still allowed to remain until 2009 so it could take part in policy making through the MPR. And this faction seemed to leave sooner than the deadline set in the decree. The TNI/Police said goodbye a week after the second phase of the 2004 presidential election.
In his speech, Kohirin said the decision meant the military’s determination to abandon practical politics. Soldiers would specialize themselves in their profession as apparatus of the state and executor of state defense and security. “It’s not due to pressure from any party,” assured Kohirin.
The faction of TNI and Police appeared on June 25, 1960 according to Presidential Decree No.156/1960 on the membership of the Mutual Assistance House of Representatives and the package of political legislation. The military and police always got “free” MPR/DPR seats until 2004.
When the New Order was born, the DPR provided 100 seats for the Indonesian Armed Forces faction. The number of seats in the DPR was reduced to 75 based on the decree of the 1993 MPR General Assembly. In the debate over the bill on structures and positions of the MPR, the DPR, and the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) in 1999, the soldiers’ free seats were again questioned by some factions.
The government in the draft debate proposed 55 seats. The TNI/Police faction in the same discussion offered 40 seats. The United Development Party faction recommended 2 percent soldiers in Senayan or 10 of the total of DPR members. The Development Functionaries faction allotted 25 seats for soldiers.
The book SBY Sang Demokrat (SBY the Democrat) says Territorial Chief of Staff Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono held an internal meeting to deal with seat allocation. They agreed to reduce the seat number by 50 percent or 38 seats.
Yudhoyono, also a spokesman for the TNI/Police faction, lobbied several factions for the 38 proposed. Finally, the MPR approved the total of 38 as stipulated in Law No. 4/1999 on the structures and position of the MPR, the DPR, and the DPRD.
Outside Senayan, the pressure for military reform was mounting. At a meeting in Ciganjur in 1998, Amien Rais, Akbar Tandjung, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati suggested that the presence of generals in Senayan should be until 2004. Public demos also earnestly demanded that the military return to barracks.
At a hearing with the Ad Hoc Committee of the MPR Working Body in February 2000, TNI Commander Admiral Widodo A.S. stated the military was ready to withdraw from Senayan in 2004. The TNI staff meeting on April 19-20, 2000 at last decided the military exit from politics by eliminating the dual function. Commander Widodo reported the meeting’s seven-point conclusion to President Abdurrahman Wahid.
The conclusion created a new military paradigm that led to a more pronounced departure from politics. The clear-cut statement of military leaders was not directly proportional to the consensus in Senayan. The MPR draft decree on the role of the military and police still allowed soldiers the opportunity to sit longer in Senayan.
Article 5 of the draft specified the military’s participation in policy determination through the MPR. In the plenary session in August 2000, the provision in the article was added by “no later than 2009”. It was meant as compensation because the military would have no more right to vote and be elected.
The grace period for soldiers faced no significant constraint in Senayan. At the plenary session to endorse the article, only one member lodged a protest. Hartono Marjono (deceased) from the Crescent Star Party faction presented a note of objection and rejected the extension of military assignments until 2009.
In his view, the reform demanded that the TNI’s assignment term be terminated in 2004. Harjono said the article in the decree was mistaken and unresponsive to public aspirations. “I can’t accept it if the TNI/Police later become a target of public denouncement,” he stated as he read out his objection.
The MPR decree kept going. Interruptions, said Speaker Amien Rais, would not in the least reduce the provision already agreed upon. “It’s surprising,” said former TNI/Police faction member Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo. “The political elite even maintained the TNI until 2009.”
At an annual session in 2002, the TNI/Police faction sped up the divorce from Senayan. In a faction internal lobby, Agus Widjojo talked to Commander in Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto. Agus said the military should hasten the withdrawal from Senayan. “If we do it now, we will depart honorably,” added Agus. Gen. Sutarto agreed and asked for the maintenance of TNI’s honor.
The hastened decision was considered too abrupt. Former Army Chief of Staff Tyasno Sudarto said the attempt to withdraw soldiers from the MPR/DPR was urged by foreign forces. According to him, the military should have remained in the MPR as group delegates. “What happened was the domination of external forces through globalization,” he added.
The military was determined to return to barracks and become professional. In the 2004 annual session, the TNI/Police faction did say goodbye. Kohirin read the verse: …we say goodbye with 10 fingers on the chest....
The military headed Jember University for two decades. The intention was to absorb campus political upheavals.
THOUSANDS of people thronged the main roads and town square of Jember, East Java. Crowds of demonstrators were yelling “Hang Utrecht!”. In the middle of 1964, they protested against Secretary of the Dean of the Law School of Brawijaya University, Jember Branch, Dr Ernst Utrecht, who instructed the dissolution of the Islamic Students Association (HMI) in his school.
The stance of the chief adviser of the Indonesian National Students Movement (GMNI) was seen as a way of strengthening the domination of GMNI at the college that was later rechristened Jember University. A senior lecturer of the campus, Sumaryono, 73, related that the mass protest known as the Utrecht Incident was an explosion of the strong friction between students’ organizations. “These organizations were suspicious of each other,” said the 1964 law graduate of Jember University.
Sumaryono indicated that Utrecht was then referred to as an Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) cadre sympathizing with the Indonesian Communist Party. He was even said to be a patron of the leftist Indonesian Students Movement Center. According to Sumaryono, noticing a lecturer like Utrecht, Tawang Alun Foundation as university founder promptly invited soldiers to enter the campus after the September 30, 1965 Movement broke out for the elimination of communist sympathizers.
Tawang Alun Foundation sponsored by Jember Regent R. Soedjarwo set up a private college, Tawang Alun University. In January 1963, Tawang Alun became a state university after being turned into the Jember branch by Brawijaya University. In fact the central government appointed Jember District Military Commander Lt. Col. Winoto as rector, but foundation executives silently urged their member, R. Achmad, to abandon the post of University Presidium Chairman and give up his seat to Winoto.
The removal of Achmad was inseparable from the changing political constellation, when PNI was declining and the army dominating. “Achmad was a PNI member,” said Sumaryono. However, entering the New Order, the military was not leaving Jember University. After Winoto, the campus in Tegalboto was for two decades headed by soldiers: Lt. Col. Soedi Hardjo Hoedojo, Lt. Col. Soetardjo, and Lt. Col. Warsito. “Only Winoto was still active while the other three were retirees,” he added.
The military rectors made little academic change. But in campus political affairs, their moves were very apparent particularly with the introduction of the Campus Normalization policy. They banned the activities of organizations like GMNI and HMI on campus and programs of a political nature. “Students’ activities required the consent of university leaders,” said Assistant Rector for Student Affairs of Jember State University Andang Subahariyanto.
Andang, a 1983 alumnus of Jember University, also remembered how the campus library was rid of books blacklisted by the government, including the works of Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Arif Wibowo, a GMNI activist now a House member from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle faction, added lecturers once active in both organizations were mostly also removed.
After 20 years under the military, lecturers demanded university management be returned to civilians. “The era has changed and we have also had good human resources with some doctors,” said Sumaryono. Col. Warsito was the last military rector on Jember campus. In 1987, Dr Simanhadi replaced Warsito. Andang noted the numbers of schools and departments had since increased, lecturers sent abroad for studies, and students allowed to discuss latest issues.
Jember was only one of several state campuses with military rectors. Brig. Gen. Eri Soedewo in 1966 was named coordinator of state colleges in East Java. At the same time, he served as Presidium Chairman of Brawijaya University, Malang; Acting Rector and Dean of the Law School of Airlangga University, Surabaya; Presidium Chairman of the Teachers’ Training Institute (IKIP), Malang; and of IKIP Surabaya.
The same was true of Diponegoro University, Semarang. Based on the university’s official website, in 1965 Col. Soewondo held the post of assistant rector for student affairs, in cooperation with Semarang City Military Commander Col. Munadi. They were assigned to sterilize the campus from those seen as having a communist slant.
Historian Asvi Warman Adam recorded the September 30, 1965 incident indeed became soldiers’ entry gate to campuses. “They argued there were many arrests so various campus positions were vacant,” he said. Actually not all soldiers joining campuses were active officers, as some academics also became soldiers after compulsory military training. But they had the same mission. “It was to purge campuses of leftist people,” he added.
Image by TZA via Flickr
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