- JohnAMacDougall #Burma #Monitor: #Water #shortage returns to crisis-hit regions: http://bit.ly/cNRNyJ via @addthis #DVB
- JohnAMacDougall #Burma #Monitor: #Rangoon #bombing #suspect put in solitary confinement: http://bit.ly/aK4KmF via @addthis #dvb
- JohnAMacDougall #Burma #Monitor: How Do You Spell Hope?: The Story of #Rochester's #Burmese #Refugees (Part Three): http://bit.ly/bTj7By via @addthis
- JohnAMacDougall #Burma #Monitor: How Do You Spell Hope?: The Story of #Rochester's #Burmese #Refugees (Part Two): http://bit.ly/blsLp3 via @addthis
- JohnAMacDougall #Burma #Monitor: How Do You Spell Hope?: The Story of #Rochester's #Burmese #Refugees (Part One): http://bit.ly/bcpUfh via @addthis
- JohnAMacDougall WXXI: How Do You Spell Hope?: The Story of Rochester's #Burmese #Refugees (Part One) (2010-07-07): http://bit.ly/bo7XQV via @addthis
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Jul 9, 2010
First Tweets from My New Burma Blog
Jul 6, 2010
NLD transfers 2.55m Kyats for political prisonsers
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Wednesday, 07 July 2010 00:45 Myint MaungNew Delhi (Mizzima) – The National League for Democracy party headquarters has transferred about 2.55 million Kyats to its state and division branches yesterday for distribution to families of 605 political prisoners.
The funds donated by ordinary citizens were being distributed under the party’s social aid programme for poor family members of some political prisoners, among the more than 2,100 serving sentences across the country, party vice-chairman and leader of the programme, Tin Oo, said.
“There are more than 200 such families across the Burmese states and divisions and the rest are families in Rangoon Division,” he said. “The money will be distributed to appropriate prisoners [via their families] from their townships of origin.”
Recipients would also comprise human rights activists, those who took part in protests over fuel-price increases in 2007, political activists, students and young people, without them necessarily being affiliated with the NLD, Tin Oo said.
NLD central executive committee member Win Tin added that, “Previously headquarters managed this work but it has now been delegated to party branches in the states and divisions … We give this money not only to our party members but to other prisoners as well.”
“In the new programme, the fund-raising and distribution of money will be carried out by each branch office,” he said.
Since 1996, the party has assisted family members of political prisoners at the rate of 5,000 Kyats per month per prisoner, to enable them to visit their loved ones in jail. The party had spent more than 3 million Kyats each month, it said.
The scheme was suspended temporarily on May 6, the deadline for the party to re-register or be annulled under the junta’s electoral laws, but it has now resumed. Apart from the financial assistance for prison visits between political prisoners and their families, the NLD has since 1996 also given annual donations to students from these families towards education.
Former USDP organiser forms Kachin party
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Tuesday, 06 July 2010 11:32 PhanidaChiang Mai (Mizzima) – Members of the Kachin ethnic minority who belonged to the junta’s nationalist social organisation applied to the Burma’s electoral watchdog in Naypyidaw to form a new political party last Friday.
Duwa Khet Htein Nan, originally nominated as a candidate for the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) party in the upcoming election, will serve as chairman of the Unity and Democracy Party for Kachin State (UDPKS), sources close to him said.
He also served as an organiser for the USDP in Naug Nan village, eight miles (13 kilometres) north of Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State.
But the relationship between the USDP led by serving Prime Minister Thein Sein and the UDPKS remains unclear. The new party has emerged as the electoral watchdog, the Union Election Commission, has been deliberately rejecting applications from other Kachin groups that sought to form political parties.
The total number of ethnic Kachin parties has reached four and include the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), led by former Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) leaders; the United Democracy Party (Kachin State); and the Shan State (North) Progressive Party.
Other leading office holders of the UDPKS, formed in the middle of last month, are also former USDP members: vice-chairman Fowler Gham Phan, lawyer Dwe Bu, lawyer La Mya Gam and adviser Madein Zone Teng, who is also chairman of the Kachin Cultural Organisation. They formed their party in middle of last month.
Dwe Bu attended the junta-sponsored “National Convention” held in Nyaunghnapin, representing Kachin State as an elder and eminent person, Mizzima was told.
Fowler Gan Pham, a party nominee to contest in the Mansi Township constituency, Bamao District, said it was premature to answer questions on party policies.
“It’s a bit premature to answer these questions. We will represent all 18 townships in Kachin State in the upcoming elections and will become the major party to represent all people in Kachin State”, he told Mizzima.
Kachin Cultural Organisation central committee member Duwa Khet Htein was unreachable for comment. Local residents speculated that he would also campaign in Kachin State. He owns the Aung Shwe Kabar gold and jade mining company and is part owner of the My Gin Dai gold mine, a source close to him says.
A local resident in Myitkyina who is close to him said that he had won the respect and trust of Kachin people as he had served four times as head of the Kachin traditional Manau dance festival, which commemorated Kachin State Day. He had also led the 62nd Manau dance festival last year.
“Under his leadership, we are well organised and united. He knows well he is being exploited by the military regime,” the resident told Mizzima. “He is well known and a crucial person for organising the people.”
Observers said that the new Kachin party had entered the fray after the visit to the state last month by Communications, Post and Telegraph Minister Brigadier General Thein Zaw and Ministry of Industry No. 1 Minister Aung Thaung, who had urged participants to form a new ethnic Kachin party.
Jul 5, 2010
Oil Companies Fueling Nuclear Proliferation in Burma Complicit in Targeted Killings and Forced Labor | EarthRights International
EarthRights International released an explosive new report Energy Insecurity: How Total, Chevron, and PTTEP Contribute to Human Rights Violations, Financial Secrecy, and Nuclear Proliferation in Burma (Myanmar) on July 5, 2010 in Paris. The report describes how the oil companies Total (France), Chevron (US), and PTTEP (Thailand) have generated over US $9 billion dollars in military-ruled Burma (Myanmar) since 1998, making their Yadana Natural Gas Project the single largest source of revenue for the country’s notoriously repressive dictatorship.
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The report documents how over half the total project revenue — nearly $5 billion — went directly to the Burmese military junta, and examines recent refusals from the Yadana companies to disclose their payments to the Burmese military regime. The report alleges the funds have enabled the country’s autocratic junta to maintain power and pursue an expensive, illegal nuclear weapons program while participating in illicit weapons trade in collaboration with North Korea, threatening the domestic and regional security balance.In the report, EarthRights International further asserts that gas revenues are stored in private offshore bank accounts, where the money “could be used for many purposes, including the illicit acquisition of nuclear technology and ballistic weaponry.” This follows a report by ERI in 2009 that exposed two offshore banks in Singapore as repositories of the Burmese generals’ ill-gotten gains from foreign investment including the gas project. Both named banks – the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) and DBS Group – previously denied the allegations.
The report also reveals on-going, serious human rights abuses associated with the Yadana project, including the recent extra-judicial killing of two ethnic Mon villagers in the pipeline area confirmed by EarthRights International in February of this year. The report goes on to analyzes how both Total and Chevron remain liable for these and other serious human rights abuse in their home countries.
EarthRights International previously sued Unocal Corporation (now Chevron) for complicity in murder, rape, torture, and forced labor in connection to the same gas pipeline. In 2005, Unocal paid Burmese plaintiffs a confidential settlement before the company was acquired by Chevron.
Jul 4, 2010
Than Shwe's Shakeup Has His Subordinates Shaking
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By BAMARGYI | Saturday, July 3, 2010 |
Snr-Gen Than Shwe is facing a mutiny among his subordinates. Although no rebellion is expected, there are growing signs of discontent among his cabinet ministers. The reason—they have been betrayed by their boss.
Than Shwe quietly ordered his uniformed cabinet ministers to resign from their army posts. In Burma, shedding the uniform means losing protection, security and livelihood. Like it or not, army uniforms are a symbol of authority in Burma. Those who wear them always get priority over those who don't; they are respected and can expect easy cooperation from others. Suddenly, they will lose that privilege.
Another reason Than Shwe's cabinet ministers are upset is that the army chief is holding the cards for the one-quarter of representatives in the People's Assembly who will be drawn from the ranks of the military. They wanted to be in that 25 percent to secure a place for themselves in the parliament. Now, they are on their own. They will have to contest the election, and unless Than Shwe supports them with some dirty deals from behind the scenes, they are sure to lose. Once this happens, they will be down the drain.
These are people who reached high positions through loyalty to their army bosses, nothing else. They are almost completely devoid of professionalism. Look at what happened to our country under their rule for more than four decades. Their track record reflects their total lack of creativity. But those who keep quiet about what is happening are rewarded with many privileges that are unthinkable in any transparent society. These privileges have made them very rich, and they want to keep their stolen goods forever. Now, however, they can only watch helplessly as they are quietly kicked out of their positions.
Furthermore, if they intend to run for parliament, they will have to declare their assets to the Election Commission. But that would be suicidal, because it would immediately reveal the extent of their corruption. No minister would ever dare to disclose what he actually owns. Even their houses are worth far more than they could ever afford on their official salaries. How could they ever account for the 10 luxury cars that are the bare minimum for anyone in a position of power to possess?
They can smell danger. They know that Than Shwe can easily find ways to put them in jail indefinitely. Look at what happened to Gen Khin Nyunt and his cronies. So they know they're in a very precarious position right now. But they also know that if they show any signs of rebellion, they're doomed.
But there is also some peril in this situation for the senior general himself. For every step of the election process, the Election Commission has the final say, subject only to the orders of Than Shwe. But this means that he has to instruct the commission to rig the vote in such a way as to ensure that all of his lieutenants get their assigned places. If he doesn't go about this very carefully, he could be hoisted by his own petard.
To change the system without changing people is a dangerous game. Late dictator Gen Ne Win tried it, with disastrous results. Unless Than Shwe can put a truly democratic system in place before he leaves the scene, his future is not safe at all. His deputies are the same fish in the same ponds; but if they ever find themselves in positions of real power someday, they may think nothing of turning on their old master. After all, these are people who have risen to high positions by concealing the depths of their ambition, much as Than Shwe himself did through most of his career. Treachery would be second nature to them.
More immediately, Than Shwe faces a few other obstacles if he plans to proceed with his rigged election.
On the ethnic front, his efforts to convince the armed cease-fire groups to transform themselves into border guard forces has met with a coordinated rejection from all the major ethnic armies. Moreover, China has said that it won't turn a blind eye if the Burmese army launches an offensive against armed groups based along the border between the two countries. In any case, the Burmese army is in no state to wage a major war with anybody. If they fight, they will lose.
Despite the forced dissolution of the National League for Democracy, Than Shwe's attempts to silence the democratic opposition once and for all are also faring rather poorly. Aung San Suu Kyi remains a hugely charismatic presence, with or without her party. The US, EU and now Asean have all indicated that Than Shwe's carefully orchestrated “democratic” transition will lack credibility without her participation. In other words, if he really wants to move on, he will need Suu Kyi's blessings.
The economy is something else that Than Shwe can't afford to ignore forever. Corruption is rampant and is only likely to get worse if the same old crooked generals and their cronies continue to control the country's assets. Chronic mismanagement of Burma's resources could become a flashpoint for social unrest, and could even weaken Than Shwe's hold over the military. No patriotic citizen, soldier or civilian, can be happy to see the country falling ever deeper into poverty while a handful of dirty officials become obscenely wealthy.
To our wild guess, the election will be held in October, during the school holidays, with schoolteachers as poll watchers. They are presently being trained in various places. An election law stipulates that representatives of candidates will be watching during the vote count. In other words, if the election is fair as it was in 1990, the ex-minister candidates will lose. If their dismissal from army positions was a deliberate move to eliminate them once and for all, Than Shwe is moving in the right direction. The next step we should see is the release of political prisoners and Suu Kyi. If we see Suu Kyi’s involvement in the next ruling council, Than Shwe will be remembered as a true national hero.
We hope the senior general will seize this opportunity for the sake of our country.
Jul 2, 2010
ILO aids child soldier but many march on
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Friday, 02 July 2010 18:00 Perry SantanachoteChiang Mai (Mizzima) – Young Thu Zin Oo made his daily trip across the Pun Hlaing River from his village in North Okkalapa Township to the Sinmalite dock in Rangoon on December 15 last year. He and his family sold pork rinds for a living and needed to replenish their supply.
He never arrived at Sinmalite and failed to make the trip home that day either. Instead, he ended up in the Burmese army at the age of 17.
Thu Zin Oo’s story is all too common in Burma, which the UN has repeatedly cited as one of the world’s worst perpetrators of child recruitment to its army. Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimated that Burma had “enlisted” 70,000 child soldiers in 2002. The rights watchdog has yet to report a drop in this figure, despite the regime’s purported attempts to curb underage recruitment. On that ominous day in December, Thu Zin Oo became another statistic.
His bus trip required a transfer at Bayintnaung Junction. As Thu Zin Oo waited for his connection he noticed a man beckoning him from a distance. Curious, he went to him.
The man asked how he was earning his wage and Thu Zin Oo told him he made 1,500 Kyats a day selling pork rinds. The mystery man suggested he could make more as a mechanic and that he would help him get a job.
“I was really interested in what he’d said and agreed to follow him,” Thu Zin Oo said. “At that time I was thinking I would be able to make a better life for my parents.”
The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma’s self-styled ruling clique of generals, has repeatedly stated that its policy prohibits recruitment of anyone under the age of 18 but the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers names Burma as the only Asian country where government armed forces forcibly recruit and use children as young as 12 years old.
The US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report released this month, also listed Burma as a top offender. The report said: “The regime’s widespread use of and lack of accountability in forced labour and recruitment of child soldiers is particularly worrying and represents the top causal factor for Burma’s significant trafficking problem.”
It also chided Burma’s leaders for failing to not making significant efforts to eliminate the problem.
Under international pressure, Burma’s government officials agreed to comply with international standards and publicly vowed to crack down on the recruitment of children to the army, especially after the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1612 in 2005 to monitor the use of child soldiers. Working with the UN workers’ right body, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the government created a complaint system in 2007 to provide a way for victims to seek redress.
Yet reports of forced child recruitment, mostly of boys aged between 14 and 16, remain.
“The army at the senior level has passed military orders saying that no child under the age of 18 should be recruited,” ILO liaison officer in Rangoon, Steve Marshall, said. “I think the problem exists at a lower level where there are some conflicting pressures placed on personnel in the military.”
Marshall said senior level commanders had required battalion commanders to meet ambitious recruitment quotas amid high-desertion and low-enlistment rates.
There is also a disparity between the penalties for failing to meet the quota and the crime of underage recruitment. The UN reported in 2008 that punishments for recruiting a child included official reprimands and monetary fines, whereas battalion commanders faced loss of rank if they failed to meet recruitment quotas.
The quota in turn made recruitment a profitable business in which brokers or police are compensated for new recruits. Marshall estimates that recruiters pay around 30,000 Kyats (about US$4,700) for each boy.
According to HRW, unaccompanied and poor children are often targeted because they are easily lured with the promise of compensation, food or shelter. The ILO estimates that roughly one-third of child soldiers are recruited in this manner. If they refuse, recruiters use force or threaten to arrest them on some frivolous charge. One-third volunteer for the army and another third are simply abducted.
“Often a broker will say to a kid, ‘Hey, I can find you a job that pays money’,” said Marshall. “They think they’ll get a job in a tea shop or something and the next thing they know they’re in the army.”
With the promise of a good job, Thu Zin Oo went with the man from the train station but realised his grave mistake when they arrived the Danyingone Soldier Collection Centre. It all happened so quickly, he said, and before he could process what was going on, he was branded “Soldier Number TA/427438”. Later that night he was loaded into a locked train car with other boys in the same situation.
“In that carriage I saw about 100 young guys like me,” Thu Zin Oo said. “We were never allowed to use the toilet so the guy next to me urinated on the floor. As punishment he was badly beaten by some sergeants.”
Through the night the train transported the boys north to Pegu (Bago) Division. The camp was in the Yaytashay Township of Taungoo District.
During his 18 weeks of basic training, Thu Zin Oo was forced to cut and carry sugar cane while bullied by superiors. He recalled one instance of a group of trainees being beaten about the head with wooden poles for singing the national anthem too softly.
The Coalition reports that child soldiers are forced required to perform tasks that include combat, portering, scouting, spying, guarding camps and cooking. Escape attempts are punishable with up to five years in prison for “desertion”.
Near the end of his basic training, Thu Zin Oo was allowed to call his parents. “I told them I wanted to go home as I wasn’t happy,” he said.
His parents, relieved to find their son, contacted the ILO for help. The ILO investigated Thu Zin Oo’s case and compiled proof-of-age documentation. He was discharged from the army on June 8.
The ILO received 128 child soldier complaints between last April last and this April – a dramatic increase on previous years, with 50 complaints between 2007 and last year.
“The number of complaints that we have received has definitely increased,” Marshall said. “However, we believe it is a reflection of people’s understanding of the law and awareness of their right to lodge a complaint.”
Marshall said the government and the ILO had been working to increase awareness in Burma. The government has undertaken awareness workshops for military personnel, and the ILO with the Ministry of Labour have started conducting awareness-raising programmes targeted at local authorities. The former started distributing government-approved flyers this month that detail people’s legal rights and how to file a complaint.
“Progressively, we have been in a position where we’re in agreement with the government and an increased number of children have been discharged from the military,” he said.
The ILO had been able to aid in the release of all but three children whose parents had filed complaints. One has yet to be found and two claimed they wanted to stay in the military, Marshall said.
“The reality is that if the parents lodge a complaint and we’re able to obtain their proof of age, the success rate is extremely high,” he said. “The government, I must say, is very co-operative when the evidence is placed in front of them.”
On the other hand, obtaining the evidence can be difficult. It is a process that can take anywhere from a few weeks to several months. To prove that the person was recruited at an age below 18, the ILO must find official proof-of-age documentation.
“In Myanmar [Burma] that is not always easy. A lot of families do not have birth certificates and in many poorer families the kids are not in the formal schooling system,” Marshall said.
Before the ILO, Marshall said a lot of citizens thought child recruitment was a fact of life and did nothing. Others knew it was wrong but were too scared to raise the issue.
Advocacy group Human Rights Education Institute of Burma (HREIB) director Aung Myo Min said that this fear of reprisal was still deeply rooted, which was why the number of cases reported to the ILO failed to reflect the true extent of the problem. He recalled instances in which individuals were arrested, harassed or intimidated by officials for reporting the existence of child soldiers in the past.
“The ILO’s rate is successful but think about the hundreds of cases that are never reported to the ILO,” Aung Myo Min said.
He added his concern that the military regime’s newfound enlightenment on the issue may be disingenuous.
“They just want to save face because of international attention on the use of child soldiers by the army,” he said. “If they really wanted to change it, blaming their own army is not enough. They have the power and the responsibility to actually stop the use of child soldiers, prevent the children from entering into the camps and take legal action against those who recruit the children into the army.”
Burmese rebels in India plea bargain
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By JOSEPH ALLCHINA group of Burmese ethnic rebels currently held in an Indian jail will next week enter into a plea bargain in what could be a momentous final stretch in a marathon 12-year fight for justice.
The group, composed of 10 fighters from the Karen National Union (KNU) and 24 from the now-defunct National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA), were lured in 1998 to the Indian Andaman Islands by an Indian intelligence officer named Colonel Grewal, who offered them a safe haven. He has since disappeared, and evidence suggests he may have been a double agent working for the Burmese military.
On arriving on Indian soil the group were accused of weapons smuggling; six of the men were murdered by Indian security forces and the rest placed in detention, in what has come to be known as Operation Leech.
Their trial lawyer, Akshay Sharma, speaking exclusively to DVB in Delhi yesterday, said that use of the plea bargain – a predominantly western legal concept – was exceptionally rare in India, but was beneficial to all parties.
Moreover, human rights lawyer and chief advocate on the case, Nandita Haksar, said that “the Indian intelligence community are on trial here”. Indeed an intelligence officer, speaking under condition of anonymity, was quoted in the Indian press several months after the incident as saying that defense authorities were “deliberately adopting dilatory tactics”.
The implications of guilt for the Indian security services appeared in court after a 10-year wait for a single charge sheet to be produced, with evidence that Sharma said was “full of discrepancies”.
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Key evidence such as the serial numbers of the supposedly smuggled weapons did not match, whilst “security reasons” stopped the Indian security services from bringing the explosives that the accused were charged with possessing to the Kolkata trial.Lawyers have therefore suggested that the 12-year wait for a verdict and the “grey areas” have likely induced both prosecution and defence to for the plea bargain. One of the most telling of these “grey areas” was the failure by India’s own Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to produce key witnesses, such Colonel Grewal, the initial contact person for the freedom fighters. This was despite requests by the Indian state’s primary investigative bodies to produce this witness.
While the acquittal of the weapons smuggling charges has been “beneficial”, Haksar claimed that they conceal an ugly truth; a “hypocrisy” at the heart of Indian democracy. For whilst the 34 may soon walk free, it is now corroborated that the Indian security services have the blood of at least six Burmese rebels on their hands, while two more who were under custody “disappeared” during the course of the trial.
Their disappearance appears to be a misnomer when one considers the severity of the initial charges the Burmese were accused of. The charge of ‘waging war against the Indian state’ – a similar indictment to one brought on the Mumbai bombers – carries the maximum penalty of death, but they still managed to disappear, and no-one seems able to divulge their whereabouts, or indeed whether they are still alive. Moreoever, one of the early trial lawyers, T. Vasnatha, was murdered in what Sharma believes was an act of the Indian intelligence services.
Jun 30, 2010
Myanmar elections mute ethnic voices
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Image by Rusty Stewart via Flickr
The Morung Express, NagalandBrian McCartan | Source: AsiaTimes
Elections slated for later this year in Myanmar seem increasingly unlikely to democratically empower the country's various ethnic minority groups, which combined account for over 30% of the population.
While the ruling generals have touted the inclusiveness of their tightly controlled democratic transition, critics say the new constitution ignores ethnic demands for federalism while junta-drafted election laws prohibit the participation of the largest ethnic parties, some of which are attached to armed insurgent groups who for decades have fought for greater autonomy. The ruling junta has yet to announce a date for the elections, but many observers believe they will he held sometime in October. They will be the first polls held in Myanmar since 1990, when the opposition led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) swept to victory against military-sponsored parties, only to see the results annulled by the military before they could take power.
The generals have made clear their intention to hold new polls and that the participation of the NLD and ethnic ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups is not essential to their credibility. The NLD announced on March 29 that it would not re-register under the new election laws, which it considered unfair because of regulations that bar Aung San Suu Kyi, the party's detained leader, from contesting the polls. A number of NLD party leaders and other members have argued that non-participation plays into the regime's hands by not providing an alternative to the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the National Unity Party (NUP).
At least 39 other political parties have so far applied for registration with the newly formed election commission. Of those, only 15 are considered national parties, while many of the rest aim specifically to represent the interests of ethnic groups, including the Kachin, Kayin, Mon and Shan. The question of whether to participate in the elections has been as contentious an issue among ethnic political groups as it was with the NLD. Some see the electoral process as a sham for perpetuating military rule under the guise of democracy and advocate a boycott of the polls. Others believe the elections offer an unique chance to work from within the system and an alternative to the confrontation and armed struggle that has plagued Myanmar politics since independence from the UK in 1948.
The second and third most successful parties in the 1990 elections after the NLD, the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Arakan League for Democracy, have both supported the NLD's stand and opted not to re-register their parties for the upcoming election. The SNLD's decision was also based on the junta's refusal to free its two top leaders, who were both arrested on political charges in 2005.
Local contests
Significantly, many of the ethnic-based parties are looking to contest seats in local legislatures rather than at the national level. With their relative small sizes, the high cost of party registration and their lack of a national voice, many aspiring ethnic politicians feel that their chances of success and ability to effect change are better on the local level. Parties representing larger ethnic groups, such as the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), are seeking to contest the elections at all levels within their own states. Still other parties representing ethnic groups with much wider geographic coverage, such as the Kayin People's Party (KPP) and the Shan Nationals Democratic Party (SNDP), intend to contest the election for both local legislatures and at the national level across several states and divisions.
Competing for seats on state legislatures may have some real, if limited, advantages for ethnic aspirations. The new legislatures mandated by the 2008 constitution are a departure from the military-dominated "Peace and Development Committees" that currently decide policy in ethnic minority areas and are often a direct arm of the central government. Ethnic politicians hope that the local legislative bodies will be more representative of local communities and give them more say over affairs that matter to their ethnic constituents. With popular representation, there may be more opportunities for the promotion of local cultures and languages though influence over the media and education. Also important is to gain more influence and scrutiny over the exploitation of natural resources in ethnic minority areas.
According to a recent report on the elections by the Transnational Institute, "Nevertheless, many ethnic leaders point out that they will have a legitimate voice for the first time. This will allow ethnic grievances, in the past too easily dismissed as the seditious rumblings of separatist insurgents, to be openly raised." Without ethnic participation, the government backed, and largely ethnic Myanmar USDP and NUP will be calling the shots not only nationally, but also in the regional legislatures. While a far cry from the federalism that many ethnic leaders aspire for, the local legislatures offer the first forms of local autonomy since the post 1962 coup government of General Ne Win abolished ethnic councils established under the 1947 constitution. A post-independence federal system was promised as a result of a conference held at the town of Panglong in northern Myanmar between independence leader General Aung San and representatives of several ethnic groups. Federal principles agreed to at the conference were enshrined in the 1947 constitution, but by the late 1950's many felt they had not been adequately implemented. Agitation for a more truly federalist system was a major cause of the 1962 military coup, which was carried out in the name of preserving national unity.
Myanmar's 2008 constitution keeps the seven ethnic states and creates seven new self-administered zones for less numerous ethnic groups such as the Pa-O, Kokang and Wa. However, it makes few other concessions to ethnic aspirations for federalism and power sharing between ethnic groups and the majority Myanmar population. During the 1993-2008 National Convention that drafted the constitution, calls by ethnic representatives for a federal union were ignored. There is growing evidence that the generals are seeking to undermine and split the ethnic vote at the upcoming elections. This is being done largely through the junta's mass organization, the United Solidarity Development Association (USDA), and its newly formed political party, the USDP.
Many members of the USDP are former military officers and current members of government who have resigned their ranks to participate in the polls. They have actively courted ethnic minorities to join the junta-backed USDP. In the case of the disenfranchised Muslim Rohingya in western Myanmar, that has taken the form of offering identity cards granting them formal citizenship in exchange for their votes. According to the exile-run media group Shan Herald Agency for News, USDP members have used the USDA and local government officials to canvass for votes and to pressure villagers in Shan State to sign their names on the party's rolls. Shan leaders in Mandalay Division, where there are significant Shan populations, were approached in March to run as part of the USDP.
The junta has also effectively blocked several of the major ethnic political players from taking part in the elections due to an impasse over the transformation of armed ceasefire groups into army-controlled border guard units. The regime's seven-step "roadmap to democracy" had originally envisioned that the groups would either hand over their weapons or join the border guard force as a prelude to forming political parties and contesting the election.
Pre-election tension
That step was supposed to be accomplished before an election date was announced. Instead tensions have spiked between the junta and the ethnic militias as several deadlines have passed - the latest on April 28 - and the issue still remains unresolved. Over 20 ethnic insurgent groups have agreed to ceasefires with the junta since 1989 and have since largely run their own affairs. They consider retaining their weapons as a necessary protection until the generals can prove the sincerity of their political promises.
Only a few, mostly small groups have agreed to the junta's terms, including the National Democratic Army - Kachin (NDA-K) and the Kachin Defence Army (KDA). However, their political leaders have resigned and are now seeking to register respectively as the Union Democracy Party (Kachin State) and the Northern Shan State Progressive Party. The Kokang only agreed after a short offensive by the army drove out the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in August 2009 and brought in new leadership. The new leadership quickly declared its support for the 2010 elections and formed a political party.
Larger groups such as the United Wa State Party (UWSP), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have not been allowed to register parties for the election. Instead the regime has threatened to revoke the ceasefire status of groups and declare them illegal. Most recently tensions have increased in Mon State, where the NMSP has refused to meet with the military's intelligence head Lieutenant General Ye Myint to discuss the border guard issue. The junta has threatened to use force if the Mon does not agree to a meeting. Keeping the ceasefire groups out of the polls may work to the generals' electoral advantage. A June 2010 report by the Transnational Institute on the ethnic political situation described the ethnic ceasefire organizations, "in terms of history, membership, finance, and territorial control, the ceasefire forces far outweigh electoral parties in their ability to operate independently and, with an estimated 40,000 troops under arms, their existence was a continued reminder of the need for conflict resolution."
Both the Wa and the Kachin have said that they would like to support ethnic parties in the polls and negotiate the decommissioning of their armed wings with the new government after the elections. After two decades of unresolved political issues and disappointment in the 2008 constitution, they want to see proof of real political reform before agreeing to hand over their weapons. Indeed, the election commission has so far refused to accept the registration of three Kachin political parties. While two of the parties represent former ceasefire groups who have now become border guards, the KSPP has several former KIO members, including its leader, former KIO vice chairman Tu Ja. Some observers believe the party's registration has yet to be approved because of these links.
There is also a fear that the government will declare a state of emergency in the ceasefire areas, which would prohibit people standing for elections and voting. Already areas of southern Shan State and Karen State are unlikely to be allowed to vote due to a legal provision that says elections can only be held in areas free of conflict. This would mean that large portions of Myanmar would not be allowed to elect representatives to local or national legislatures.
Border-based ethnic political organizations, many of which are attached to armed insurgent groups still fighting the government, will not be able to take part in the elections. Although they have seemingly declined in strength and influence in recent years, their message of equal rights and justice still resonates with many people who see the newly formed parties as junta stooges. Peace talks with the government will also have to wait until a new government is formed following the elections. A section of the Political Parties Registration Law prohibits registration to any party that is involved with groups engaged in armed rebellion or involved with groups declared as "unlawful associations". The generals will be hard-pressed to prove the legitimacy of the elections without the participation of ethnic opposition parties or adequate ethnic representation. Should the ethnic groups continue to feel disempowered and a democratically elected pro-military government maintain the junta's current confrontational policies, further conflict will be almost unavoidable and hinder the country's supposed democratic transition.
Jun 29, 2010
Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant by Benedict Rogers
CHIANG MAI - When Myanmar military dictator General Ne Win was still alive, foreign pundits often postulated that the country would change for the better once he passed from the scene. The country would still be ruled by the military, they predicted, but by a younger generation of more reform-minded officers that would bring Myanmar, also known as Burma, out of the Dark Ages.
Ne Win relinquished formal power in the late 1980s and pulled strings from behind the scenes leading up to his death in 2002. Did Myanmar change after that? Yes - but arguably for the worse. Repression intensified, with the number of political prisoners reaching into the thousands. Economic reforms put more money
in circulation, but intensified already rampant corruption. The government spent even less on health and education while ramping up military spending.
Today, the Myanmar military is more firmly entrenched in power than at any time since Ne Win's coup d'etat in 1962, which ended a 14-year period of weak but functioning parliamentary democracy. Now the era of Myanmar's current strongman, General Than Shwe, is drawing to an end. The 77-year-old general will soon retire and he has promised the country's first democratic elections in 20 years to mark the transition.
A new generation of pundits has predicted hopefully that Myanmar is on the cusp of positive change. They believe a hitherto unknown generation of Young Turks and other supposed closet liberals within the military will come to the fore and push the country in a more democratic direction. Elections, they predict, will at long last give civilian leaders some say over the country's governance.
In all likelihood, however, foreign pundits will be proven wrong yet again. Benedict Rogers' highly readable new book shows why Myanmar's military, even with Than Shwe's imminent retirement, has no intention of giving up power any time soon. After this year's polls Than Shwe may no longer be Myanmar's de facto head of state, but he has ensured through that he and his by now immensely wealthy family will be well protected when the next generation of soldiers assume power.
"Motivated by power and a determination to hold onto it," Rogers writes, "Than Shwe will use any tool necessary, from detention, torture and violence against his opponents, to lies, deceit, delay and false promises to the international community, or the manipulation of astrology and religion to convince his own people."
There is scant evidence that the next generation of military officers will be any more liberal in their outlook than their predecessors - in the same way as Than Shwe's generation certainly was no more broadminded after taking over from Ne Win. After half a century of wielding absolute power, the Myanmar military has developed its own ways of dealing with internal dissent and external criticism.
And democratic reforms, even minor and gradual ones, are not part of that mindset, as Rogers' book thoughtfully illustrates. Ne Win set the repressive agenda when he and the army seized power 48 years ago, and those ways have survived him through several of his successors.
To be sure, Rogers does not feign objectivity in his assessment of Than Shwe's life and times. As a member of Christian Solidarity Worldwide, a human-rights organization that specializes in religious freedoms, he has been a Myanmar activist for many years and openly declared his support for the country's pro-democracy opposition. But that does not detract from this well-researched book.
To the contrary, it is the first thorough study of Myanmar's undisputed strongman. It chronicles with detail how Than Shwe rose from a lowly position as a junior postal clerk to the most powerful soldier in the military-run country. Joining the military as a teenager, he was always immensely loyal to his commanders, a trait the book argues was a key to his eventual success. Those who questioned their superiors and official policies were ruthlessly purged under the new military order that Ne Win introduced after 1962.
Despite claims in his own official glorified biography, Than Shwe did not see as much combat as other top army officers who fought in jungle battlefields against ethnic insurgent groups. Rather he was attached to the military's Psychological Warfare Department and, later, the grandly named Central School of Political Science, where officers and other soldiers were taught Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Socialism" ideology.
Rogers quotes one of his inside sources as saying that Than Shwe "never talked about the country and its prospects with me. He seemed only focused on pleasing the higher officers and leaders. He always praised the leaders and never showed any ambition. He was certainly proud of being a soldier. He followed orders ... very carefully."
Rogers traces Than Shwe's rise through Myanmar's post-World War II period, the short-lived democratic era in the 1950s, and the disastrous years of austere socialism in the 1960s and 1970s which brought on the 1988 popular uprising and its bloody suppression. In 1992, Than Shwe became chairman of the ruling junta, known then as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC. He was promoted following the resignation of his predecessor General Saw Maung, who had become increasingly erratic.
Once in a position of absolute power, the postman-cum-tyrant, to use Rogers' description of Than Shwe, was surprisingly durable. Over the years he displayed an unprecedented megalomania among Myanmar military leaders. Few could have guessed that the often sullen and always taciturn soldier would endeavor to build a new capital city, Naypyidaw, or "the Abode of Kings", from an obscure patch in the jungle.
Nor did many foresee that he would replace Myanmar's original national philosophy of "unity in diversity" with a new concept of a unitary state in honor of the country's ancient warrior kings and empire-builders, Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya. Many believe his construction of the new capital city aims to leave behind a "Fourth Myanmar Empire" as a legacy of his rule.
It is unclear how Than Shwe's promised democratic transition fits with those kingly designs. Whether Myanmar holds elections this year, next year, or never, all the structures he put in place signal that the military is geared to remain in power for the foreseeable future. Rogers correctly portrays Than Shwe and his military henchmen as modern-day "tyrants" - and history shows that from a position of power tyrants have seldom negotiated their own demise.
Anyone who believes that a post-Than Shwe Myanmar is headed in a democratic direction should read this valuable book.
Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant by Benedict Rogers with a foreword by Vaclav Havel. Silkworm Books (May 2010). ISBN - 978-974-9511-91-6. Price US$20, 256 pages.
Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.
A light won’t go out in Burma
Published 28 June 2010
Her party has been dissolved, and she is banned from taking part in this year’s Burmese elections. But Aung San Suu Kyi, at the age of 65, remains the most potent force fighting to preserve the opposition in her country.
Suddenly she has begun to look her age. Aung San Suu Kyi was nearly 45 when her party won a landslide victory in Burma's historic general election of 1990, but she looked 15 years younger. Despite years of privation and isolation inside her disintegrating lakeside villa on University Avenue in Rangoon, she continued to look far younger than she was. But last November, when she was photographed arriving for a meeting at a Rangoon hotel with President Obama's assistant secretary of state Kurt Campbell, she looked a woman of a certain age.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi - daw is the Burmese honorific for an older woman - turned 65 on 19 June. If it was a less dismal occasion than her 64th, which she spent in Rangoon's huge, British-built Insein Prison, while awaiting trial for allowing a deluded American called John Yettaw (who had swum across Lake Inya using home-made wooden flippers) to spend two nights in her home, her personal and political prospects were scarcely less gloomy.
The good news: the military regime, led by Senior General Than Shwe, is committed to holding a general election before the end of the year. It will be the first since 1990, when Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won the vote by an overwhelming margin - a victory that the regime ignored. The bad news: there is no chance of that result being repeated this time. The NLD, the most important organised opposition force in Burma, will not be participating.
One of the rules of this election is that parties whose membership includes political prisoners are barred from registering. The NLD was faced with the obligation of expelling its leader and more than 400 members who are still in prison. Aung San Suu Kyi made it clear that taking part on such terms was unthinkable. She wanted party members to know that, should they participate in the election, "the party would have no dignity", her lawyer and spokesman Nyan Win said. After a painful debate, the NLD agreed with her assessment. When the 6 May deadline passed, it became a non-party, a political phantom.
Since her victory in Burma's first multiparty elections in 30 years in 1990, and particularly since she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize the following year, Aung San Suu Kyi has become, to the west, the symbol of opposition. Now the caprice of the regime has robbed her of that automatic primacy. Inside Burma, too, many are said to be puzzled and confused by the NLD's decision not to compete.
Like the constitutional referendum of 2008, which the regime claimed to have won with the support of more than 90 per cent of voters, the election will probably be rigged. But that does not mean it is without significance. "Despite the very obvious flaws in the process," says the international think tank Transnational Institute in a new report anticipating the poll, "it represents the most significant political transformation for a generation."
Senior General Than Shwe, now almost 80, is likely to retire, along with other high-ranking colleagues. "New leaders and a new political landscape will emerge," the institute writes, "giving rise to opportunities to press for change, as well as a new set of challenges."
It is tempting to see Aung San Suu Kyi as one of the elders who will now shuffle off into the shadows, to be replaced by vigorous new champions of democracy, the generational shift sweeping her away as surely as her nemesis Than Shwe. But this is to misunderstand the situation in Burma. First, the electoral process has been fiendishly designed to make it almost impossible for figures critical of the regime, even if they succeed in getting elected, to make their voices heard. There is no provision in the parliament for an opposition - only for the government, which must be led by a former army man. The election will not be accompanied by any loosening of the rigid controls on the media; on the contrary, the regime has recently invested millions of dollars in a hi-tech system for censoring newspapers and magazines. It will be a criminal offence, punishable by a jail sentence, for any MP in the new national assembly to criticise the constitution - and anything he or she says on the subject will be erased from the record. The regime clearly has no intention of allowing new MPs the sort of holiday from government control that Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues enjoyed during the democratic spring of 1988-89.
The second reason she will not be fading away is that Aung San Suu Kyi remains an immensely potent force. That is why the regime has gone to such extravagant lengths to marginalise her. Three times before - in 1990, 1995 and 2002 - it made the mistake of underestimating her appeal. The first time, the NLD humiliated the regime's proxy, the National Unity Party, by winning 80 per cent of the seats in parliament. The second time, when she was released from her first spell of house arrest, thousands risked jail every week to squat outside the gates of her home and listen to her speak. The third time, when, after months of delay, she was at last allowed to travel outside Rangoon, peasants walked through the jungle for days for a chance to see her.
Seven years have now passed since her convoy was attacked by regime goons on 30 May 2003 and she again disappeared from view. Her latest spell in detention is the longest to date, and in March the UN's working group on arbitrary detention condemned it as being in contravention of Articles 9, 10, 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - the sixth time it has published such a view.
This has been not only the longest spell of house arrest she has endured, but also the most restrictive. The regime has rigidly limited her access to foreign diplomats, senior members of her party and, for a while, even her doctor. A year ago, Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary general, was barred from seeing her at Insein jail. She has been photographed only a handful of times in the past seven years, most recently on 10 May, when she and Assistant Secretary of State Campbell held a conference under umbrellas in the garden of a government guest house to avoid having their conversation bugged. As recently as 2007, rebel monks succeeded in paying a visit to her home, but today the whole of University Avenue is barricaded off, and the only view of her house is from the other side of Lake Inya.
The tight control on her comings and goings is matched by a ban on all but the most dismissive and hostile mentions of her in the state-controlled press. The time in 1994 when she was welcomed amid the gleaming varnish and antimacassars of a government reception room by Generals Than Shwe and Khin Nyunt, both smiling fit to bust (the photo was splashed across the front page of New Light of Myanmar), seems to belong to an altogether different era.
Aung San Suu Kyi seems to have disappeared from the consciousness of ordinary Burmese people. There are no photos of her on display; there are no books by or about her in the bookshops (though titles about Nelson Mandela and other democratic heroes are plentiful); her name is never mentioned by tour guides or taxi drivers or hotel staff. It is as if she had never existed. However, she has not been forgotten, but is locked away in people's hearts and minds and interior rooms as securely and invisibly as she is locked in her own house.
At the home of an intellectual in Mandalay, an oil portrait of her hangs on the wall of his shabby kitchen. Another presides over a small private library in the same city that has somehow escaped the regime's attentions. Htein Lin, an artist who spent years in jail and who now lives in exile in London, contrived to paint portraits of her secretly in his cell and get them smuggled to the outside world. In Rangoon, we were given an introduction to a beaming elf of a man in his seventies, living with his family in a shack near a rubbish dump on the city's northern outskirts. He had spent years in jail for petty political offences, as had his son. A small photo of Aung San Suu Kyi in her 1989 prime was pinned to the wall of their home. It is not surprising that Suu the Unyielding should continue to be the icon of activists. But her appeal extends more widely, as became clear during the nationwide rebellion of September 2007 when, in reaction to a steep increase in fuel prices, tens of thousands of monks marched through Burma's towns and cities.
In the most poignant of these processions, a line of monks persuaded soldiers guarding Aung San Suu Kyi's house to let them through. They made it to the gate of her home; she came out in tears to greet them. The meeting was captured on a mobile-phone camera. Two days later, the bloody crackdown began.
The encounter had a special significance that was not readily appreciated outside Burma. In this overwhelmingly Buddhist country, the great majority of boys are inducted as monks while they are still children, and spend weeks or months learning the disciplines of the monastery. For centuries, the monks have had a special relationship with power in the land, and specifically with the king: by recognising his right to rule, they conferred religious legitimacy on him, while for his part the king provided funds for monasteries, pagodas and images of the Buddha. This symbiotic relationship was destroyed when the British sent Burma's last king, Thibaw Min, into exile in 1885, which helps explain why monks were prominent among Burmese rebels against British rule from early on. It was they, deprived of patronage, who most keenly felt the downfall of the monarchy.
Burma's post-independence prime minister, U Nu, was a pious Buddhist and was quick to restore the relationship with the clergy, but when General Ne Win seized power in a coup d'état in 1962, he brushed aside the Sangha, the organisation of monks, as an archaic irrelevance. Into the patronage vacuum stepped pious laypeople who, over the years, set up meditation centres and supported charismatic monks who, in return, instructed them in dharma (the teachings of the Buddha) and the techniques of meditation. By the time Ne Win realised what he had done, the lay meditation organisations had established strong ties with the monks - ties that persist to this day. On the face of it, there is nothing political about these organisations; but just as the Sangha, numbering close on half a million monks and nuns, is the only organisation in Burma that rivals the army, the existence of these lay organisations is a passive but ominous menace to the army's monopoly on power.
Aung San Suu Kyi has taken her own daily meditation practice very seriously since her first years of house arrest. "It has helped to strengthen me spiritually," she told Alan Clements, author of a book of interviews with her entitled The Voice of Hope. "What you do when you meditate is you learn to control your mind through developing awareness." She confided to a friend that meditation had "saved me from depression in the worst moments of my life . . . It's what enabled me always to hold my head high." So when, in 2007, the monks came to her gate to greet her, it was an acknowledgement by the Sangha of the power that she had won through the ballot box in 1990 but of which she had been deprived ever since. And millions of Burmese would have recognised the significance of the meeting.
With its innumerable spies, the regime is surely well informed about the extent to which Aung San Suu Kyi still enjoys the silent but overwhelming support of her people, which is why it remains loath to grant her any space. But how, despite nearly 15 years of house arrest and enforced silence and invisibility, has she been able to hang on to this support? And what difference has it made?
In the first place, it was necessary for her to be who she is: the daughter of Aung San, the father of the army and creator of independent Burma, the young firebrand who managed to hop from the Japanese to the Allied side in the middle of the Second World War and, at the end of it, persuade Lord Mountbatten that he was his nation's best hope. He negotiated Burma's independence in London but was assassinated in 1947 before his work could be crowned with success - and was thereby untainted by all the mess that followed, becoming the new nation's one radiant, immaculate hero.
At the start, in 1988, the name was everything: if Aung San Suu Kyi's elder brother Aung San Oo, an engineer who lives in the US, had chosen to rise to the challenge, he would have enjoyed just as strong a following as she did, but he had no interest in politics. As with Benazir in Pakistan, Indira in India and all the other widows and daughters in post-colonial southern and south-east Asia, the blood was crucial. It guaranteed popular legitimacy and gave the uprising its figurehead.
Yet she became much more than that, and is still there - still fighting - over 20 years later. This is the product of her own extraordinary strength of will and purpose. Her name and fame have so far deterred the regime from killing her, though on at least two occasions
it seems to have come close to it. At any time since she was first locked up, she could have decided to put her own life and that of her family first and fled the country, never to return. Instead, she threw herself into Burma's struggle, and for all the regime's efforts to thrust her into the shadowy margins, she is still in the thick of it. Because, to quote her hero Gandhi: "The combat itself is the victory."
So, what difference has she made? A generation ago, the regime's opponents saw their only hope of changing the country in joining one or other of the insurgencies raging on the borders. Taking up arms was seen as the only option. Aung San Suu Kyi's courage and commitment have changed that. For the first time since Ne Win's 1962 coup d'état, Burma had a plausible alternative ruler - and one who insisted that the struggle against the regime must be a peaceful one.
Her critics argue that this commitment condemns her movement to failure: non-violence may have enjoyed some success as a strategy against the Raj in India, but it is bound to fail against a regime as ruthless and as little concerned about its foreign reputation as Burma's. In response, her supporters point out that the revolution she is seeking to ignite is as much moral and spiritual as political. And if it has not yet had any appreciable softening effect on the generals, it has changed the attitudes of a generation of Burmese activists.
As long as she is still there among them, and still fighting, it gives them hope.
Peter Popham is on the staff of the Independent and is writing a biography of Aung San Suu Kyi, to be published by Rider in 2011.