Mar 16, 2010

Followers of Sadr Emerge Stronger After Iraq Elections

Muqtada al-SadrImage via Wikipedia

BAGHDAD — The followers of Moktada al-Sadr, a radical cleric who led the Shia insurgency against the American occupation, have emerged as Iraq’s equivalent of Lazarus in elections last week, defying ritual predictions of their demise and now threatening to realign the nation’s constellation of power.

Their apparent success in the March 7 vote for parliament — perhaps second only to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki as the largest Shiite bloc — underscores a striking trend in Iraqi politics: a collapse in support for many former exiles who collaborated with the United States after the 2003 invasion. Although rivals disparaged the Sadrists’ electoral campaign, documents and interviews show an unprecedented discipline that has thrust the group to the brink of perhaps its greatest political influence in Iraq.

The performance completes a striking arc of a populist movement that inherited the mantle of a slain ayatollah, then forged a martial culture in its fight with the American military in 2004.

After years of defeats, fragmentation and doubt even by its own clerics, with Mr. Sadr himself an expatriate in Iran, the movement has embraced the political process, while remaining steadfast in opposition to any ties with the United States. It was never going to be easy to form a new post-election government — and the Sadrists’ unpredictability, along with a new confidence, may now make it that much harder.

“As our representation in Parliament increases, so will our power,” said Asma al-Musawi, a Sadrist lawmaker. “We will soon the play the role that we have been given.”

A worshiper at Friday prayers put it more bluntly.

“Today is our day!” he shouted to hundreds gathered outside the movement’s office in a ramshackle neighborhood that bears its name where electricity wires are tangled like cobwebs and discontent surges forth from a furnace of poverty, anger and frustration.

The results of the election are not yet conclusive, and under a complicated formula to allot seats, the percentage of the vote will not necessarily reflect actual numbers in the 325-member Parliament.

But opponents and allies alike believe the Sadrists may win more than 40 seats. In all likelihood, that would make them the clear majority in the Iraqi National Alliance, a predominantly Shiite coalition and leading rival of Mr. Maliki. If the numbers bear out, the Sadrists could wield a bloc roughly the same size as the Kurds, who have served as kingmakers in governing coalitions since 2005.

In Baghdad alone, whose vote is decisive in the election, Sadrist candidates, many of them political unknowns, were 6 of the top 12 vote-getters.

“They cannot be dismissed,” a Western official said on condition of anonymity under usual diplomatic protocol.

Disregarding the Sadrists has proven a motif of post-invasion Iraq. In the chaotic months of 2003, American officials habitually ridiculed Mr. Sadr as an upstart and outlaw, oblivious as they were to the mandate he had assumed from his father, Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, whose portrait still graces the offices, home and workshops of followers.

That enmity erupted in fighting twice in Baghdad and Najaf in 2004. Four years later, the movement, blamed for some of the war’s worst sectarian carnage, was vanquished by the Iraqi military, with decisive American help, only to rise again in provincial elections last year. Many politicians now see it as part of the political mainstream, albeit with a canny sense of the street and a knack for fashioning itself in the opposition.

Through those years, Mr. Sadr himself has undergone an evolution. In the earliest days of the occupation, he possessed no particular aplomb. His black turban rode a little high on his forehead, somewhat uncomfortably, and he hunched his shoulders over a frame that was squat and pudgy.

In a news conference this month from Iran, where followers say he is studying to become an ayatollah, he struck a much more forceful tone. Confident, now 36, with gray sprinkled in his beard, he spoke deliberately in graceful if simple Arabic, with a casual disregard of journalists’ questions that the imperious can possess.

The movement is renowned for cryptic statements about its intentions, yet it participated in governments in the past while rejecting the political process. This time, in his clearest words yet, insisted that his followers vote.

“This will be a door to the liberation of Iraq, to driving out the occupier and to something else which is important, serving the Iraqi people,” he said.

The success of the Sadrists has added confusion to an already anxious landscape, roiled with speculation over what coalition will form the next government. Mr. Maliki may be the big loser. Though they once backed him, the Sadrists now exude a visceral dislike for Mr. Maliki, whom they blame for the campaign against them in 2008.

“Alarming,” Sami al-Askari, a lawmaker and ally of Mr. Maliki, called them.

“Ignoring them is a problem,” he said. “Taking them with you in the government is another problem. They’re unpredictable, and no one can guess their next move.”They seem certain, too, to eclipse veteran Shiite leaders who returned from exile in 2003 and with whom the Sadrists are nominally allied. In January, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led by another storied clerical family, outpolled the Sadrists. This time, they are believed to have performed so poorly that they may find themselves forced to split the alliance and join Mr. Maliki to preserve their relevance. At the very least, the Sadrists have made clear they believe the alliance’s leadership should be theirs.

“The results are going to require some parties to reconsider the size they deserve,” Asad al-Nasseri, a Sadrist leader, told worshipers Friday, in their stronghold of Kufa.

Since 2003, the Sadrists have refused any contact with the American military or diplomats.

“It would be helpful if they would change their policy,” one American official lamented on Tuesday.

But America’s loss will not necessarily be Iran’s gain. In a vivid illustration of Iranian power here, it cajoled the Sadrists to join the Supreme Council in their electoral coalition, even though the two fought in the streets a few years before. The two still air their feuds in public. But many politicians believe the Sadrists, long seen as more nationalist than other religious Shiite parties, will prove less pliable for Iran.

Mr. Sadr “is not the easiest of customers for Iran to deal with,” the diplomat said.

Perhaps most striking was the prowess the movement demonstrated in mobilizing its followers, the lumpen Shiites, whose poor neighborhoods still go days without running water. In Friday prayers and through leaflets, organizers warned followers against casting ballots for secular candidates. It insisted they not disperse their votes among several lists.

“Don’t forget to vote for one candidate only!” one leaflet declared.

One detailed diagram, drawn up by the Sadrist strategists, broke down a vast slum by precinct. For one candidate, Hakim al-Zamili, a former deputy minister of health widely accused of running death squads during the civil war, voters were organized in 22 locales. So far, he is the sixth biggest vote-getter in Baghdad and seems sure to receive a seat.

“Congratulations!” worshipers said as they greeted him at Friday prayers in Sadr City. “Good luck!” others shouted, surging forward to kiss Mr. Zamili on the cheek.

To each and everyone, he reciprocated with a smile, kiss or handshake.

“We are the masses,” he said afterward. “The rest of the parties rely on individual leaders. We’re the strength and the numbers, and we’ve risen through the election.”

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