Iraqi Sunnis Expect Allegiance Shift to Bear Fruit - NYTimes.com

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By TIMOTHY WILLIAMS and SA’AD AL-IZZI

TIKRIT, Iraq — As he sits in his palatial home’s reception hall, Sheik Munaf Ali al-Nidah denounces the governments of both Iraq and the United States and shakes his head over the vilification of the Baath Party. Above his mantel is a photograph of a smiling Saddam Hussein. A Saddam Hussein watch is wrapped around his wrist.

Mr. Nidah — well known in Tikrit, Mr. Hussein’s hometown — ran in last month’s parliamentary elections but lost to a candidate from the secular party of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. He admits that even most of his cousins did not vote for him.

Mr. Nidah’s poor performance among his own relatives illustrates how thoroughly Mr. Allawi has reordered Sunni allegiances. It might seem odd at first glance that voters in a hard-line Sunni area like Tikrit would support Mr. Allawi, who is not just a Shiite but also an enemy of Mr. Hussein.

But as a strong secularist and with the strength of his biography as a former ranking member of the Baath Party, he managed to convince Sunnis that he could end the sectarianism they said had gripped past Iraqi governments and protect the rights they believed had been impeded.

Sunnis, who live primarily in an arc north and west of Baghdad, are seen as crucial to whether Iraq can avoid the sectarian and violence that consumed it after the 2005 parliamentary elections. A spate of explosions and other attacks since the voting on March 7, including bombs detonated outside the Iranian Embassy, have killed more than 100 people and wounded hundreds more. Many blame the political void created by the elections.

In Tikrit, elements of Mr. Hussein’s Baath Party and Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia remain active, and thousands of unemployed men serve as a recruiting base. There are worries that the ranks of the disaffected men could increase, and so, too, violence, if Sunnis feel disenfranchised.

“The Sunnis are concerned about their own participation in the next government, not Allawi’s, but they tied their fortunes to Allawi’s,” said Joost Hiltermann, deputy program director with the International Crisis Group, an independent, nonprofit organization. “They have seen these elections as a possible turning point, an important reason why they joined the surge in 2007,” he added. “They were promised a chance to re-enter the new political order through these elections. If they fail in this quest, all bets are off concerning their future behavior.”

Negotiations between political parties have yielded little progress because voters split almost evenly between Mr. Allawi’s Iraqiya coalition and Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s State of Law alliance.

There are growing fears among Sunnis, however, that a coalition of Shiite and Kurdish parties could push them to the political sidelines again.

Ibrahim al-Sumydai, an Iraqi political analyst, said that if that happened, the result would be “a great disaster.”

“Insurgents have entered the political process to support Allawi,” Mr. Sumydai said. “If he is not included, the Sunni street will be angry. Things will go back to square one.”

Mr. Allawi’s rise has corresponded with the decline of the Iraq Islamic Party, which has its voting base in Tikrit and other Sunni areas.

In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Islamic Party and its Sunni allies, which had once been a default choice for Sunnis, even those who were not religious, won 44 seats and were given the posts of vice president and speaker of Parliament.

The organization represented Sunni aspirations and controlled patronage in Sunni areas, and its members helped persuade tribal leaders to turn against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia in 2006 and 2007, which together with the American troop surge quelled the insurgency. Since then, the party has been rattled by infighting and defections, including that of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who joined Mr. Allawi’s list.

Now, after winning only six seats in the March elections — even though the total number of seats in Parliament was increased to 325 from 275 — the party has little bargaining power and has been largely absent from talks among the coalitions vying to form a new government.

Some in the party appear ready to write its obituary. Even some leaders acknowledge that many Iraqis have long believed that the organization was corrupt and incompetent and fomented sectarianism, and that Mr. Allawi’s candidacy simply represented a better hope for Sunnis.

“The public has seen us for the past seven years defending them, but not changing anything,” said Rashid al-Izzawi, an Islamic Party leader who was not re-elected.

Still, the support for Mr. Allawi in Sunni areas, which constituted his base, appears tepid — the best choice among lesser options.

And though Mr. Allawi’s coalition won a majority of the votes in Sunni areas, voter participation was generally down from 2005. In Salahuddin Province, of which is Tikrit is the capital, turnout fell to 73 percent this year from 88 percent in 2005. Turnout was also down sharply in heavily Sunni Diyala Province and increased only slightly in Anbar and Nineveh Provinces, which are also predominately Sunni.

In Tikrit, Mr. Hussein’s coffin rests inside a building closed to the public to prevent it from becoming a gathering point for Baathists.

Some people go so far as to say that Mr. Allawi represents the best hope for restoring the sense of pride they lost when Mr. Hussein was deposed.

“I think Allawi has views that are close enough to Saddam Hussein, and a personality that is close to Saddam Hussein,” said Muhammad Majeed, 36, who is unemployed. “He is not sectarian. He’s a tough politician, and he is serious in his work.”

Many others said they turned to Mr. Allawi only after becoming disenchanted with the Sunni religious party.

“ “I know he is Shiite, but he is secular and he will work for us,” said Ziad Atta, 42, a trader. “And I think he will work in our interest.”

Others in Tikrit do not believe that Mr. Allawi is the answer for Sunnis. Machsoud Shahb Ahmed al-Mula, who leads the provincial council, declined even to mention Mr. Allawi by name.

“It’s better to keep our personal views to ourselves,” he said. “This is a dangerous time.”

Duraid Adnan contributed reporting from Baghdad, and an Iraqi employee of The New York Times from Tikrit.

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Ahmed Chalabi's renewed influence in Iraq concerns U.S.

By Ernesto Londoño and Leila Fadel
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, February 27, 2010; A01

BAGHDAD -- Ahmed Chalabi, the onetime U.S. ally, is in the limelight again, and his actions are proving no less controversial than they did years ago.

On the eve of Iraq's parliamentary elections, Chalabi is driving an effort aimed at weeding out candidates tied to Saddam Hussein's Baath Party. Chalabi is reprising a role he played after the U.S.-led invasion -- which many critics believe he helped facilitate with faulty intelligence -- and, in the process, is infuriating American officials and some Iraqis, who suspect his motive is to bolster his own political bloc.

Chalabi, a Shiite, has defended the work of the commission he is leading as legal and crucial during a period of transition to Iraq's first sovereign government. But his reemergence on the political scene has rankled U.S. officials and fueled concerns that Sunnis and other secular Iraqis will be marginalized.

Some Iraqi and U.S. officials think Chalabi might have his eyes on the ultimate prize, however unlikely he can attain it.

"Even if it kills him, he's going to stay in Iraq to try to become prime minister," said Ezzat Shahbandar, a Shiite lawmaker from a competing slate who has known Chalabi for more than 20 years. "This issue is the only tool he has, because he has nothing else going for him."

Chalabi fell out of favor with the Americans in 2004, after they accused him of spying for Iran. The year before, though, he had been appointed to head a U.S.-formed commission to rid the government of officials tied to Hussein's regime.

The hasty, wholesale purge that the commission conducted is now widely seen as a catalyst of the insurgency and Iraq's sectarian war. Today, however, Chalabi remains at the helm of a similar "de-Baathification" panel, the Justice and Accountability Commission, because parliament has not appointed new members.

When the commission recently announced the disqualification of nearly 500 candidates from the March 7 parliamentary elections, critics noted that candidates from Sunni-led and mixed secular coalitions were disproportionately targeted. Many of those ousted were rivals of Chalabi's bloc.

A court impaneled to review the cases carried out a cursory review behind closed doors. Candidates were allowed to submit written appeals but were never told the specific nature of the allegations against them. The court disqualified 145 candidates; most others dropped out or their parties replaced them.

Now the disqualifications are widening sectarian and religious divides in Iraq, even as it continues to reel from decades of authoritarian rule, occupation and bloodshed. This week, in an apparent attempt to allay some of the bitterness, the government said it would reinstate 20,000 former army officers ousted because of their ties to Hussein.

But the political disqualifications threaten to undermine the elections, overshadowing campaign issues such as security, unemployment and basic services.

At the center of it all is Chalabi.

In campaign posters, Chalabi, a onetime Iraqi exile, bills himself as "the Destroyer of the symbols of the Baath." Placards for other candidates on his political slate, the Iraqi National Alliance, are graced with the words "No space for the Baath," written in crimson letters that suggest blood.

The alliance is a Shiite coalition of parties whose most prominent figures are former Iraqi exiles in the current government. Those parties did poorly in provincial elections in January 2009.

"The provincial elections showed the limits of the appeal of sectarianism," a senior Western diplomat said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to offer candid analysis. By fanning fears of the return of the Baathists, the official added, "they may be hoping that Baathism will help them get past that limit."

Chalabi, 65, comes from an elite Baghdad family. He formed the Iraqi National Congress, an opposition group, in the early 1990s with U.S. backing.

He has long had a strong relationship with Iran. But he became close to the CIA and the Pentagon in the run-up to the invasion, as U.S. officials used his group to muster opposition against Hussein. The U.S. government funneled millions to his group, which provided it with intelligence reports that later proved to be erroneous. In 2004, Chalabi was a guest of President George W. Bush at the State of the Union address.

Many Iraqi Shiite politicians have little regard for Chalabi because he left in the late 1950s, avoiding authoritarian rule. Many of his peers were imprisoned, tortured and forced into exile.

Despite his lack of popular support, Chalabi has remained relevant. Even his rivals allow that he has keen political instincts, a sharp mind and a knack for influencing powerful people. He also does not shy from controversy.

This week, his deputy on the commission, Ali Faisal al-Lami, said hundreds of officials in Iraq's intelligence, army and police agencies are subject to dismissal for links to the Baath Party.

"We believe there are thousands of others who will be found," he said in an interview. "These measures will seriously enhance security in Iraq by dismissing any bad elements that carry the Baath ideology."

If that effort gains traction in the weeks ahead, U.S. officials say, political violence could very well follow. U.S. commanders could also suddenly lose key Iraqi officers who they have trained and mentored over the years.

"They will try to get rid of pro-U.S. generals, but more importantly, they are stacking the deck with pro-Iranian officers, which will damage U.S. long-term interests in the long run," a senior U.S. military official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he is not allowed to talk to reporters. "This is why many neighboring Arab countries aren't so happy about us modernizing the Iraqi military with some of the latest equipment."

Chalabi did not respond to calls, e-mails and text messages seeking an interview. In a recent statement, he said his commission was "carrying out its legal, moral and nationalistic duty to protect the political process against infiltration by the Saddamist Baathists."

Ryan C. Crocker, who served as U.S. ambassador to Iraq from 2007 until last year, said Chalabi is no one's "agent."

"He's an opportunist and he's a nationalist," Crocker said, "and he will use whatever vehicle or platform that presents itself to further his own agenda."

Special correspondent K.I. Ibrahim contributed to this report.

Iraq Shia leader dies of cancer

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Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of one of the most powerful Shia Muslim parties in Iraq, has died, his aides say.

Hakim had been suffering from cancer and had been receiving treatment in hospital in the Iranian capital Tehran.

He did not hold any government post in Iraq's elected Shia-led government since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but was an important power broker.

He took control of the Sciri party (later SIIC) after his brother was assassinated in Najaf in 2003.

The cleric, who was in his late 50s, was diagnosed with lung cancer during a trip to the US for tests in May 2007. He chose to receive chemotherapy treatment in Tehran.

The party has several senior cabinet members, and its militia - the Badr Brigade - has at times wielded considerable influence in Iraq's security establishment.

Revered family

Since falling ill, Hakim had cut back his political involvement and his son Ammar gained prominence. He is expected to take over leadership of the party.

ABDUL AZIZ AL-HAKIM

Born circa 1950, died 26 August 2009

Leader of Islamist Shia party Sciri, later SIIC, since 2003

Back by Tehran, but maintaining close ties to its arch-rival Washington

Lost six of his seven brothers and 50 extended family members in resistance to Saddam Hussein

"He died a few minutes ago after battling cancer for 28 months," his son Mohsen announced in Tehran at about midday on Wednesday. He and his brother Ammar were at their father's bedside as he died, he added.

As heir to the leadership of one of the main anti-Saddam Hussein factions in Iraq, Abdul Aziz Hakim managed to keep good ties with both the American authorities and Iran, which strongly backed his group.

His brother and predecessor as party leader was the charismatic Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, who was killed along with about 100 supporters in a massive car bombing in the city of Najaf in August 2003.

The family is revered among Iraq's largest religious community, the Shia, for its tradition of scholarship and its bouts of resistance against Saddam Hussein in its southern Iraqi stronghold.

However, the quietly-spoken Hakim was distrusted by many Sunnis who saw him as too Iranian-orientated and sectarian in his political philosophy.

Some time after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the party changed its name from Sciri - the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq - to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council.

SIIC has been part of Iraq's ruling Shia alliance, the United Iraqi Alliance, led by the Islamic Dawa party of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki.

However, ahead of national elections in January, the SIIC announced last week that it would campaign from within a new Shia Muslim bloc.

Saddam Hussein Said WMD Talk Helped Him Look Strong to Iran

By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, July 2, 2009

Saddam Hussein told an FBI interviewer before he was hanged that he allowed the world to believe he had weapons of mass destruction because he was worried about appearing weak to Iran, according to declassified accounts of the interviews released yesterday. The former Iraqi president also denounced Osama bin Laden as "a zealot" and said he had no dealings with al-Qaeda.

Hussein, in fact, said he felt so vulnerable to the perceived threat from "fanatic" leaders in Tehran that he would have been prepared to seek a "security agreement with the United States to protect [Iraq] from threats in the region."

Former president George W. Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq six years ago on the grounds that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and posed a threat to international security. Administration officials at the time also strongly suggested Iraq had significant links to al-Qaeda, which carried out the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Hussein, who was often defiant and boastful during the interviews, at one point wistfully acknowledged that he should have permitted the United Nations to witness the destruction of Iraq's weapons stockpile after the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The FBI summaries of the interviews -- 20 formal interrogations and five "casual conversations" in 2004 -- were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive, an independent non-governmental research institute, and posted on its Web site yesterday. The detailed accounts of the interviews were released with few deletions, though one, a last formal interview on May 1, 2004, was completely redacted.

Thomas S. Blanton, director of the archive, said he could conceive of no national security reason to keep Hussein's conversations with the FBI secret. Paul Bresson, a bureau spokesman, said he could not explain the reason for the redactions.

The 20 formal interviews took place between Feb. 7 and May 1, followed by the casual conversations between May 10 and June 28. Hussein was later transferred to Iraqi custody, and he was hanged in December 2006.

The formal interviews covered Hussein's rise to power, the Kuwait invasion, and Hussein's crackdown on the Shiite uprising in extensive detail, while the subject of the weapons of mass destruction and al-Qaeda were raised in the casual conversations, after the formal interviews. Blanton said this suggests that the FBI received new orders from Washington to delve into topics of intense interest to Bush administration officials.

The FBI spokesman did not know why those subjects were raised in the later meetings. In an interview last year on CBS's "60 Minutes," George L. Piro, the agent who conducted the interviews, said he purposely put Hussein's back against the wall "psychologically to tell him that his back was against the wall," but he did not use coercive interrogation techniques, because "it's against FBI policy." The interviews released yesterday do not suggest any use of coercive techniques.

During the interviews, Piro, who conducted them in Arabic, often appeared to challenge Hussein's account of events, citing facts that contradicted his recollections. He even forced Hussein to watch a graphic British documentary on his treatment of the Shiites, though that did not appear to shake the former president.

At one point, Hussein dismissed as a fantasy the many intelligence reports that said he used a body double to elude assassination. "This is movie magic, not reality," he said with a laugh. Instead, he said, he had used a phone only twice since 1990 and rarely slept in the same location two days in a row.

Hussein's fear of Iran, which he said he considered a greater threat than the United States, featured prominently in the discussion about weapons of mass destruction. Iran and Iraq had fought a grinding eight-year war in the 1980s, and Hussein said he was convinced that Iran was trying to annex southern Iraq -- which is largely Shiite. "Hussein viewed the other countries in the Middle East as weak and could not defend themselves or Iraq from an attack from Iran," Piro recounted in his summary of a June 11, 2004, conversation.

"The threat from Iran was the major factor as to why he did not allow the return of UN inspectors," Piro wrote. "Hussein stated he was more concerned about Iran discovering Iraq's weaknesses and vulnerabilities than the repercussions of the United States for his refusal to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq."

Hussein noted that Iran's weapons capabilities had increased dramatically while Iraq's weapons "had been eliminated by the UN sanctions," and that eventually Iraq would have to reconstitute its weapons to deal with that threat if it could not reach a security agreement with the United States.

Piro raised bin Laden in his last conversation with Hussein, on June 28, 2004, but the information he yielded conflicted with the Bush administration's many efforts to link Iraq with the terrorist group. Hussein replied that throughout history there had been conflicts between believers of Islam and political leaders. He said that "he was a believer in God but was not a zealot . . . that religion and government should not mix." Hussein said that he had never met bin Laden and that the two of them "did not have the same belief or vision."

When Piro noted that there were reasons why Hussein and al-Qaeda should have cooperated -- they had the same enemies in the United States and Saudi Arabia -- Hussein replied that the United States was not Iraq's enemy, and that he simply opposed its policies.