Showing posts with label legislative elections. Show all posts
Showing posts with label legislative elections. Show all posts

Jul 14, 2009

Enter Laughing: Al Franken Joins the Senate

by John Colapinto July 20, 2009


The interminable suspense became “the new normal.” Photograph by Steve Pyke.

The interminable suspense became “the new normal.” Photograph by Steve Pyke.

At 8 A.M. on July 8th, the day after he was sworn in as the junior senator from Minnesota, Al Franken arrived at the Hart Senate Office Building, in Washington, D.C., for an informal breakfast with constituents and new staff members. Some fifty or so people crammed into a small chamber within the complex of offices that used to be occupied by Norm Coleman, Franken’s predecessor. A central table was loaded with coffee urns, pitchers of juice, and a chafing dish filled with wild-rice porridge. Franken, a short, sturdily built man, made the rounds of the room. His hair—which he used to wear in a huge fuzzy nimbus in his “Saturday Night Live” days (“You mean my Jewfro?” he said to me)—has long since been tamed into a short-back-and-sides cut. He wore tortoiseshell horn-rims and a gray summer-weight suit. When he smiled—a huge, toothy smile—his eyes disappeared into slits. Because he is short, he was often hard to see in the crowd, but he was never hard to find, owing to a raucous laugh that cut cleanly, and often, through the hubbub.

More than eight months had passed since the general election, on November 4th, when the race between Franken, a Democrat, and Coleman, a Republican, ended up too close to call. Finally, on June 30th, after a record-setting marathon of recounts and legal proceedings, Franken was declared the winner. This gave Coleman the distinction of having twice lost elections to candidates with unusual résumés: in 1998, he lost a run for governor against the wrestler Jesse (the Body) Ventura. Now he has lost to a man who starred in the movie “Stuart Saves His Family,” as a simpering self-help guru who mewled the daily affirmation “I’m good enough, I’m smart enough, and, doggone it, people like me!”

The mood at the breakfast was lively. Franni, Franken’s wife of thirty-three years, a thin, animated woman with wire-rimmed glasses, stood near the porridge table. “It’s so wonderful,” she said. “As soon as he was sworn in, I just felt as light as air. Just so joyous and relieved. It’s ‘Finally, Franken can get started!’ ” Franken’s chief of staff, Drew Littman, a Capitol Hill veteran who had been the policy director for Senator Barbara Boxer, of California, was talking about how Franken loves events like this breakfast. “We have to drag him out of these things,” Littman said. “Also, he’s introduced himself to every security guy and maintenance worker. We did a walk-through of the swearing-in on Monday before the Senate opened. He stopped everyone who was pushing a cart, pushing a broom—shakes hands and introduces himself. Most senators just avert their eyes and walk as quickly as they can.”

Franken’s daughter, Thomasin, a dark-haired twenty-eight-year-old with her father’s deep dimples, had retreated next door, into Franken’s new Senate office, a large room that was, as yet, undecorated except for a small snapshot of Franken’s family, which sat on a bureau behind the desk, along with a framed photograph of his close friend Paul Wellstone, the liberal Democratic senator who held this seat from 1991 until his death, in 2002. Thomasin sat on the edge of the desk. She was talking with Jess McIntosh, Franken’s press secretary, about the reaction of reporters when Franken was introduced to the public, two days earlier, by the Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid. Everyone, from the Times to Politico, had expressed disappointment that Franken had failed to be funny and, instead, had acted solemnly senatorial, vowing to work as hard as he could for Minnesotans.

“Like he would ever, under any circumstances, come out to be introduced by the Majority Leader and crack jokes!” McIntosh said.

“Yeah,” Thomasin said. “They criticize: ‘He’s a comedian, and it’s going to be very inappropriate if he’s funny.’ And then it’s ‘Oh, he wasn’t funny!’ ”

Like Hillary Clinton in 2001, Franken enters the Senate as someone both blessed and burdened with the kind of celebrity that can summon a press scrum at a moment’s notice but can also create resentment among colleagues; also like Clinton, he has been reviled by Republicans. The day the Minnesota Supreme Court declared him the winner, Senator Jim Inhofe, Republican of Oklahoma, called him “the clown from Minnesota.” Senator John Cornyn, Republican of Texas, had previously declared that any effort to seat Franken prematurely would result in “World War III,” and he had suggested that a federal challenge could keep Coleman fighting in the courts for “years.” Such rancor, however, seemed to have vanished, at least for the moment. At his swearing-in, Franken was welcomed by repeated rounds of applause from his fellow-senators—including Republicans—who had shown up in force for the ceremony. Orrin Hatch, Republican of Utah, gave him a bear hug on the Senate floor, and, later, in the hallway outside, Franken received a similar embrace from none other than Inhofe. He was still glowing from the reception.

“Yesterday was a magnificent day,” Franken said at the breakfast. He went on, in a telltale deadpan, “And my feeling is that, um, if we can just make every day—” The room exploded in laughter.

“I did my first vote yesterday,” he said. “It was a little odd, because I discovered something about the Senate. Which is that you don’t get as much notice as I would normally want to have to evaluate the value of a program that I’m voting on the funding of.” (Franken had voted nay on an amendment, sponsored by John McCain, that would have eliminated funding for an anti-terrorism bus-safety program in Minneapolis—“an easy call,” as McIntosh put it, from a constituents’ perspective. Still, Franken was startled that he had had less than half an hour to study the bill; McIntosh, new to the Senate herself, acknowledged that a bill that was not an easy call would have been “scary.”)

“But I’ll learn the ropes here,” Franken continued. “I need all your help to do that. And those of you whose job it isn’t to help me do that—who are just visiting?” He cracked a wide grin. “Don’t worry about it!”

Franken was born in New York in 1951, the younger of two boys. (His brother, Owen, is a photojournalist.) When Franken was four, his father, Joe, moved the family to a small town in southern Minnesota to run a quilting factory owned by his father-in-law. The business failed, and two years later the family moved to the Minneapolis suburb of St. Louis Park. Joe became a printing salesman; Franken’s mother, Phoebe, got a real-estate license and began selling houses.

About twenty per cent of St. Louis Park’s residents were Jewish. They had moved there from the inner city, attracted by cheap housing and a lack of redlining restrictions, which kept Jews out of other suburbs. “Not exactly a shtetl,” Franken has written, “but by Minnesota standards, a lot of Jews.” The Times columnist Thomas Friedman, the political scientist Norm Ornstein, and the moviemakers Joel and Ethan Coen all grew up in St. Louis Park, within a four-block radius of one another. Some years ago, the ex-neighbors were asked by former Vice-President Walter Mondale why St. Louis Park produced so many notable people. Franken suggested runoff from a nearby creosote plant. The Coen brothers grandly equated the place with a small area of Hungary that had produced several nuclear physicists. Friedman suggested a solar-lunar eclipse. Miriam Kagol, who taught journalism at St. Louis Park Senior High School (Friedman was one of her students), offered another opinion, in a piece about the suburb in the Jewish Daily Forward, where she spoke about the migration of Jews to St. Louis Park in the forties and fifties: “It was at the time that all the political ferment had reached the Midwest and people were just full of ideas and protests, opinions, speaking their minds, finding ways to be free and anti-establishment.”

The Franken family talked about politics at the dinner table. Phoebe Franken was a Democrat. Joe had always voted Republican, but in 1964 he switched parties, “disgusted,” Franken has written, “with Goldwater’s opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” and voted Democratic in every election until his death, in 1993. But his primary influence on his son was not political. He loved comedy and comedians, and, with his sons, watched comedy shows for hours on television. It took Franken a while to make the connection with his own career. “I didn’t get it,” he told me. “And then suddenly one day I said, Oh, I know why I went into comedy!” Franken insists that comedy and politics are not as far apart as they might seem. Politics, he says, is about helping other people, making their lives better. Comedy does the same thing. “I actually think that making people laugh makes their lives better,” he told me. “You can’t underestimate that.”

In 1968, at the Blake School, a private high school, Franken met Tom Davis, and they formed a comedy-writing partnership. They remained a team for twenty years. “I’m not at all surprised that he has become a politician,” Davis told me. “I think what attracted him to comedy was that he wanted to do political satire. We started right in with Nixon stuff.” He went on, “He’s always had this amazing work ethic, an infinite amount of energy and intelligence and concentration, and now he’s finally bitten into something that’s really substantial.”

In 1969, Franken went to Harvard, where he majored in behavioral sciences. There he met Franni, a student at neighboring Simmons College. Their relationship was founded in part on a shared passion for politics. She was from Maine. Her father, a Second World War veteran, died in a car accident when she was seventeen months old, and her mother brought up Franni and her four siblings on Social Security survivor-benefit checks, supplemented by a job at a grocery store. Four of her children attended college on Pell grants and other scholarships. The experience made Franni a lifelong Democrat and a passionate defender of social programs for the poor. During the Senate campaign, Franken often told audiences, “Conservatives like to say that people need to pull themselves up by their bootstraps—and that’s a great idea. But first you’ve got to have the boots. And the government gave my wife’s family the boots.” (The two married in 1976, and have a second child, Joe, who works in finance.)

After graduating, Franken spent two years in Los Angeles, doing mostly politically oriented standup with Davis. In 1975, Lorne Michaels hired the pair to join the writing staff of “Saturday Night Live,” which was about to début. They got off to a slow start. Then, with the writer Jim Downey, they worked on a parody Presidential debate between Gerald Ford (Chevy Chase) and Jimmy Carter (Dan Aykroyd). “We worked with Chevy and Danny very closely on those debates,” Davis said. “So we stood out, and they discovered that Franken and Davis had this political-satire thing for real.” During that first season, Franken briefly joined his brother, Owen, who, working as a photographer, was covering the New Hampshire primary. They attended an event featuring President Gerald Ford. Franken asked Ford’s press secretary, Ron Nessen, to appear as a guest host on “Saturday Night Live.” Nessen performed in an Oval Office sketch in which Ford, played by Chase, stumbled over a wastebasket, stapled his ear, and shouted “Roll over, Liberty!” to a stuffed dog. (Nessen later received a reprimand from Ford’s son Jack.) In another first-season sketch, written by Franken and Davis, Aykroyd, as a despairing Richard Nixon, weeps as he talks with Henry Kissinger, played by John Belushi, on the eve of announcing his resignation:



NIXON: I’m telling you, Henry: I had nothing to do with the bugging of Watergate! I had nothing to do with the cover-up! With the break-in to Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office! Or with the man who was killed in Florida!
KISSINGER: Vhat man was killed in Florida, Mr. President?
NIXON: You don’t know about the little Cuban who . . . ah . . . never mind. Henry, get down on your knees and pray with me.
KISSINGER: Mr. President, you’ve got a big day tomorrow, why don’t ve get in our pajamas und go sleepy?
NIXON: Don’t you want to pray, you Christ-killer?

Franken wrote for “Saturday Night Live” from 1975 to 1980, and from 1985 to 1995. During his second stint, he was a more frequent onscreen performer, both as Stuart Smalley, the self-help guru, and as himself, in a recurring bit in which he announced the eighties as the “Al Franken decade.” (“Vote for me, Al Franken. You’ll be glad you did!”) But he left the show when Michaels refused to let him anchor “Weekend Update.” He concentrated on writing movies. Among them was the Andy Garcia and Meg Ryan drama “When a Man Loves a Woman,” about a husband helping his wife overcome alcoholism, which was in part autobiographical. Early in their marriage, Franni had successfully battled alcoholism—during his Senate campaign, Franken spoke publicly about this—and he later helped organize an intervention for Davis, who was abusing various drugs. (Franken has himself acknowledged cocaine use in his “S.N.L.” days.) The insights that Franken gleaned about twelve-step programs also informed his creation of Stuart Smalley.

In 1988, Franken attended the Democratic Convention, in Atlanta, where he approached his old St. Louis Park neighbor Norm Ornstein. They had not known each other in Minnesota, but Franken had watched Ornstein’s appearances as a commentator on C-SPAN and on the “McNeil-Lehrer News Hour,” on PBS. The two became friends. “I knew from the beginning that this was not the typical show-business person who in stereotype thinks he or she knows everything but in fact knows very little,” Ornstein told me. “This is a guy who has been a policy wonk for his adult life, not only interested in what’s going on but really keeping up with it—and he’s smart as hell.”

When Franken was asked to anchor Comedy Central’s coverage of the 1992 general election, he invited the owlish Ornstein to act as his pollster and straight man. After Bill Clinton’s victory in that election, Franken and Ornstein frequently joined the Clintons and other politicians and pundits at the annual Renaissance Weekends, on Hilton Head Island. Franken once declared himself an unabashed fan of President Clinton, calling him, “without a doubt, our best postwar President, and, if not for Roosevelt, the greatest of this century,” and adding, “Do I feel this way because I played touch football with him? Maybe.” Franken wrote comedic material for the President and the First Lady to deliver at Gridiron dinners and other functions. “I was his point person for the White House,” Mandy Grunwald, a former adviser to Clinton, says. “I was the person who would say, ‘Al, you can’t say that—he’s the leader of the free world!’ ”

Then came the midterm revolution of 1994, in which the Republicans captured fifty-four seats in the House and eight in the Senate—a victory produced in part by the belligerent rhetoric of Newt Gingrich, who became Speaker of the House, and by Rush Limbaugh, who roused millions of listeners. “Nobody was talking back to those guys,” Davis says. “That was a turning point,” Franni Franken says. “That’s when Al started writing his books.”

“I just got more and more sort of upset,” Franken says. His first book, “Rush Limbaugh Is a Big Fat Idiot” (1996), included “S.N.L.”-like parodies of the major Republican players. (A chapter titled “Operation Chickenhawk” imagined the warmongering Vietnam avoiders Limbaugh, Dan Quayle, Pat Buchanan, George Will, and Clarence Thomas being led, terrified, into battle by Oliver North.) But the book also gave free rein to Franken’s policy aspirations. To rebut Limbaugh’s assertions that under Ronald Reagan the poor received greater tax relief than the rich, he quoted from the Congressional Budget Office’s 1992 Green Book. He also wrote knowledgeably about the debates on health care, legal reform, and the environment.

The book went to No. 4 on the Times best-seller list. Franken followed it, three years later, with another politically themed book; this one was less successful commercially but hinted at his subsequent transformation from pundit to politician. Titled “Why Not Me?,” it was a meticulously researched fictional history of a successful Franken campaign for the Presidency in 2000 (and his eventual impeachment and removal from office). While sketching out the narrative, Franken held brainstorming sessions with Ornstein, Grunwald, and the Newsweek columnist and editor Howard Fineman. “We had a lot of discussions along the way just about the nature of electoral politics,” Ornstein says. “How do you run? What do you do? What are the rules?”

If Franken had designs on a real political career, however, he kept them secret for a few more years. “Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right” (2003) provoked even greater animus among Republicans. It mocked the Bush Administration’s pre-9/11 anti-terrorism strategies (“Operation Ignore”), conservative commentators (“Ann Coulter: Nutcase”), and Bill O’Reilly’s boasts of a working-class background. At BookExpo America that year, in Los Angeles, Franken was on a panel with O’Reilly, who repeatedly yelled at him to “shut up.” (Their set-to was broadcast live on C-SPAN.) O’Reilly’s bosses at Fox News sued Franken and his publisher for using its “Fair and Balanced” slogan in his book’s subtitle; the suit was dropped after Fox failed to win an injunction against the book, but the publicity helped drive it to No. 1 on the Times best-seller list.

In 2004, to counter right-wing talk-radio celebrities, Franken began hosting his own program on Air America. “It was a political thing,” Franken told me. “That was the point of that, to not cede the radio. Not cede the dialogue.” In early 2006, he moved the show from Manhattan to Minneapolis—the first outward sign that he was contemplating a run for the Senate. He placed less emphasis on comedy and spent more time on substantive policy issues. But it was not, he says, until December, 2006, while on a U.S.O. tour in Iraq, that he “pulled the trigger” on the decision to run for the Senate. “I’d been thinking about it,” he says. “I was thinking, God, do I want to put my family through this? Do I want to take a couple of years off from working and earning an income? Do I want to work eighteen hours a day on this? And I’m in Iraq, and I just look around me and I go, ‘Are you kidding? Here are men and women on their third or fourth tour of duty. It’s horrible on their families, they’re in danger, for goodness sake. I mean, how can I not do this?’ ”

In February, 2007, he announced that he would challenge Senator Norm Coleman.

Like Franken, Coleman is originally from New York. He celebrated his twentieth birthday at Woodstock (a college-yearbook picture shows him with center-parted hair falling well below his shoulders), and he entered politics as a Democrat. He moved to Minneapolis in 1976, after earning a law degree, and worked as a prosecutor in the Minnesota Attorney General’s office. In 1993, he was elected mayor of St. Paul, and served two terms. He also supported the 1996 Senate reëlection campaign of Paul Wellstone. But shortly after Wellstone’s victory Coleman became a Republican, and in 2002 Karl Rove and George W. Bush urged him to make a bid for Wellstone’s seat. Wellstone was slightly ahead of Coleman in the polls when, eleven days before the election, Wellstone, his wife, their daughter, and five others died in a plane crash. Former Vice-President Mondale ran in Wellstone’s place but lost narrowly to Coleman. Franken, who had campaigned for Wellstone in all three of his Senate races, was devastated. Grunwald, who also worked on Wellstone campaigns, says that bitterness over that election was still being felt during this year’s recount battle. “In a way,” she says, “this all started when Paul died.”

Franken raised more than twenty million dollars for his campaign against Coleman, exceeding every other Senate challenger in the country. Coleman was equally well funded. The campaign quickly got ugly. Coleman portrayed Franken as an unserious, and even unstable, candidate. Franken promoted a plan for renewable energy, proposed a retirement plan that could be carried from job to job, called for fully funding the Veterans Administration, urged a five-thousand-dollar tax credit for students, and advocated trade agreements that included labor and safety standards. But he also played rough. Speaking of Democrats, he once wrote, “Our attack dogs are a scrawny, underfed pack of mutts that spend half the time chasing their own tails and sniffing each other’s butt.” Now he ran a series of ads that accused Coleman of taking trips paid for by special interests, accepting money from big oil and drug companies, and “living almost rent free in a million-dollar home of a Washington insider.” (Coleman sued over that one, but the suit was dismissed.) Three days before the election, the Minnesota Star Tribune reported that a lawsuit filed in Texas against Nasser Kazeminy, a businessman and Coleman supporter, contained allegations that Kazeminy had funnelled seventy-five thousand dollars to Coleman’s wife through her employer, a Minneapolis insurance broker. (Coleman and Kazeminy denied the charges.) “It was intense,” Grunwald says. “Right up until the last second.”

Election Day returns showed Coleman and Franken virtually tied. “I remember I went to sleep knowing it was just extremely close, and not knowing in the morning when I woke up whether I’d be ahead or behind and by how much,” Franken told me. “After a couple of hours of sleep, I heard we were behind by seven hundred votes or something.” He was crushed. “What happens is that the campaign becomes about, kind of, you know, the hopes and dreams of people riding on you,” he said. “Not just the people supporting you but the people you meet along the way.”

Several days later, when the tally was complete, Coleman’s lead had shrunk to two hundred and six votes—less than a hundredth of a per cent. By Minnesota law, a margin of less than one-half of one per cent requires a recount. Anticipating a close race, Franken’s campaign manager, Stephanie Schriock, had had lawyers on standby in case of a recount, and had begun recruiting and training volunteers to help oversee the sorting and counting of ballots across the state. “I knew going into Election Day we would be ready for whatever happened,” Schriock said. “And, thank God, we were.”

The recount began on November 19th. Minnesotans vote by filling in a bubble beside the candidate’s name on a paper ballot, which is then run through an optical scanning machine. In a recount, Minnesota law requires that every ballot be counted by hand. At more than a hundred recount stations in the state’s eighty-seven counties, representatives from both campaigns observed the sorting and counting of almost three million ballots. Secretary of State Mark Ritchie put up a Web site that kept a running tally of the count, which took seventeen days. The newspapers and television news faithfully kept track of the horse race, but these published totals were not an accurate reflection of the count, since each campaign’s representative could challenge ballots where there was doubt about the voter’s intent—ambiguous scribbles, areas where the voter seemed to have signed or initialled the ballot (which disqualifies the vote under Minnesota law), and other irregularities. These challenged ballots were placed in a separate pile, and left uncounted until they could be examined by the State Canvassing Board. The Coleman campaign ran up hundreds of challenges in every precinct, temporarily—and artificially—lowering Franken’s totals. But at every recount table Schriock had installed a volunteer to write down the original call by the neutral election judge—“on the assumption that most of the challenges would not stand,” she says. That way, the Franken organization was able to keep track of what the actual recount totals might look like. “This was critical,” Schriock says. “The most important thing for us was to make sure you got the right information all the time, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.”

When the first phase of the recount ended, on December 5th, the official totals gave Coleman a lead of almost two hundred votes. However, the Franken campaign’s internal count suggested that Franken was ahead by somewhere between thirty-five and fifty votes.

The State Canvassing Board, made up of Ritchie and four judges chosen from across the political spectrum, met to consider the challenged ballots on Tuesday, December 16th. By this time, Franken was feeling hopeful about his prospects for victory. “There is a subset of Democrats who tend to mis-fill out ballots,” he told me. “The way you mark the ballot is like an S.A.T.—you fill in the circle. And the subset of people who tend to, like, put a check there instead, or an X, or fill it out wrong, tend to be people who didn’t take S.A.T.s, or first-time voters, or people with English as a second language. So it seemed like we had a very good chance of prevailing.”

Each challenged ballot was projected onto a large screen visible to a roomful of observers from the public and the press. The members of the Canvassing Board scrutinized and debated the markings on each ballot to decide the voter’s intent, and their deliberations were videotaped and streamed live over the Internet. Minnesotans found the process mesmerizing.

Some ballots presented little difficulty; in one instance, a voter had clearly filled in the bubble beside Coleman’s name but had accidentally, or in a moment of indecision, touched his pencil tip in Franken’s bubble, leaving a small dot. The judges gave the vote to Coleman. Other ballots provoked long, absurdist exchanges. One ballot—from Beltrami County—became locally famous. The voter had filled in the bubble for Franken but had printed “Lizard People” in the write-in area. After a few minutes of discussion, Marc Elias, a lawyer for Franken, spoke up. “My argument would be that ‘Lizard People’ is not a genuine write-in,” Elias said. “In other words, is not a person.”

“Do we know that for sure?” one of the judges asked.

Another asked, “If it said ‘Moon Unit Zappa,’ would you say, ‘Oh, no, there is no such person as Moon Unit Zappa?’ ”

“I would say that that would be permissible,” Elias said.

“Well, but you don’t know that there’s not someone named Lizard People. You don’t!”

The judges voted to have the ballot tossed out.

On December 30th, the Canvassing Board finished adjudicating the challenged ballots, and added the tallies to the earlier vote totals. Franken pulled ahead by forty-nine votes.

The election now hung on a set of absentee ballots that had not been counted on Election Night. Some three hundred thousand absentee ballots had been cast in the general election, considerably more than in previous elections. Of these, twelve thousand had been rejected without being opened by election officials, because they failed to meet one or more of the state’s strict criteria: that they be notarized or witnessed by a registered voter, for instance, or that the signatures and addresses on the outer envelope match the voter’s absentee-ballot application. The Coleman campaign had initially fought hard to keep all rejected absentee ballots out of the count. Ordinarily, absentee ballots are cast by older voters who cannot get to the polls and by overseas military personnel. Both groups tend to vote Republican. But the Franken people, noting that the Obama campaign’s national drive for early voting had spurred record numbers of Democrats to the polls before November 4th, suspected that many Democrats had used absentee voting as a way to cast their ballot ahead of Election Day.

The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the rejected ballots be reviewed, and ordered the candidates and election officials to coöperate in identifying ballots that were improperly rejected. This allowed for some gamesmanship. The envelopes bore return addresses, which led the campaign representatives to try to guess what was inside. “The Coleman people were extra hard on St. Louis County, which is Duluth,” Schriock says. Duluth tends to vote heavily Democratic. “And we were probably extra hard on really red Republican counties.” Ultimately, both campaigns came up with nine hundred and thirty-three envelopes that they could agree had been rejected improperly.

On January 3rd, a Saturday, the ballots were opened in a room in the basement of the state legislature building. Secretary of State Ritchie, with representatives of both campaigns standing over him and a video camera live-streaming the event, opened the envelopes one at a time. As he opened ballot after ballot and called out “Franken,” Schriock says, “I realized it was going to be O.K. In fact, it was going to be really good.”

When the count was over, Franken’s lead had grown from forty-nine votes to two hundred and twenty-five. On Monday, the Canvassing Board certified the results. Having kept out of the public eye since the election, Franken called a press conference that afternoon. Standing at a lectern on the snowy street outside his house, Franni beside him, he struck a conciliatory tone toward Coleman, and thanked his campaign staff. “Now I am in the business of serving the people of Minnesota,” he said. “For our state, today marked the end of a long process that will forever be a part of Minnesota history.”

Minnesota election law, however, grants the loser in a recount a chance to challenge the tally, in a so-called Election Contest: a court trial, with testimony and evidence, before a specially selected three-person panel of Minnesota Supreme Court justices—an expensive and time-consuming procedure. “I actually thought there was a good chance that he would not contest it,” Franken told me. “Because we had so transparent, so complete, so meticulous a recount.”

The Election Contest of Coleman v. Franken began on January 26th, in the Minnesota Judicial Center, in St. Paul. Coleman needed to get more votes. The only place to find them was in the still unopened absentee-ballot envelopes that had been rejected on Election Night, in accordance with Minnesota law. To get some of those opened, the Coleman team needed to persuade the judges to relax the state’s legal standards. They settled on a risky strategy to do that: invoking the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the 2000 recount in Florida, in Bush v. Gore—a ruling so unusual that even the Justices responsible for it suggested at the time that it be limited to “present circumstances” and not taken as precedent.

In 2000, Bush’s lawyers put a stop to the recount in Florida by arguing that the “equal protection” clause of the Constitution, which guarantees that all citizens have the right to have their vote counted equally, was being violated, because Florida lacked a uniform standard in determining what constituted a legal vote. The Supreme Court agreed. The recount was stopped, Election Day totals stood, and Bush was handed the Presidency.

Coleman’s lawyers had discovered that on Election Night, in some Democrat-heavy urban precincts, election officials had opened and counted a number of absentee ballots that did not strictly conform to the rules—ballots whose envelopes had been signed in the wrong place, for example. Coleman’s lawyers were now demanding that similar rejected absentee ballots from other counties be opened and counted. His campaign claimed to have discovered some forty-four hundred such rejected absentee ballots—ballots that, Franken’s lawyers, and the local press, noted, were drawn largely from rural precincts that tended to vote heavily for Coleman. The judges ultimately permitted the counting of three hundred and fifty-one rejected ballots, which increased Franken’s lead by eighty-seven votes.

Coleman’s team put more than twenty election officials on the stand, hoping to convince the justices that there had been significant differences in how absentee ballots were handled across the state, and that these differences violated voters’ equal-protection rights. In turn, Franken’s lawyer Kevin Hamilton argued that any discrepancies among the counties were the result of the routine errors that occur in every election—and did not rise to the level of an equal-protection violation. “No election is perfect; imperfections, precinct-level math errors, and paperwork confusion occur in every election and they occur in every county in the state and every state in this nation,” Hamilton said. “Our democracy doesn’t demand machinelike, antiseptic perfection.”

On April 13th, the contest panel unanimously rejected Coleman’s equal-protection argument and declared Franken the winner. Coleman announced that he would appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court.

During the seven weeks between the end of the Election Contest and the Supreme Court hearing, Franken tended to avoid the press, but on May 31st, the day before the oral arguments, he invited me to visit him and Franni at their condominium apartment, in a semi-detached brick town house with castle-like corner turrets, a ten-minute walk from downtown Minneapolis.

Franken was clearly using all his actor’s experience to seem measured and senatorial, but his frustration was palpable. Perched on the edge of a settee, his elbows on his knees, he said, of the Senate, “I definitely would love to be there now—I would love to have been there for a while.” Of the endless suspense, he said, “It’s been so long that, in our lives, it’s sort of become the new normal.” He let out a loud but mirthless cackle.

Franni, who had curled up in a nearby armchair, said, “Yeah, for us the campaign never ended!”

Franken said that in early January he had decided to conduct himself as if his eventual seating were simply a matter of time, and had been duly meeting in Washington with people who could teach him about Senate procedure, and travelling around Minnesota, talking to constituents. He had been reading the newspaper very thoroughly. Mostly, though, he had been fund-raising, in order to pay his lawyers. So far, the recount battle had cost his campaign more than ten million dollars.

At nine o’clock the next morning, the justices filed in and took their seats. Many believed that the jurist most likely to be sympathetic to Coleman’s equal-protection argument was Justice Christopher Dietzen, who had been appointed in 2008 by the Republican governor, Tim Pawlenty, and who previously had given thousands of dollars to G.O.P. candidates, including Coleman. But it was Dietzen who opened up the most persistent line of questioning, zeroing in on the Coleman team’s “offer of proof”—a stack of hundreds of photocopied absentee-ballot envelopes. The photocopies purported to show that lax standards for rejection had been used in the cities, strict standards in the rural and suburban precincts—and that the discrepancy was so widespread as to require the remedy of now opening thousands of illegal ballots. But the Coleman team had included ballots from less than half of the state’s eighty-seven counties, had provided no voter testimony to explain the circumstances under which they were cast, and no specific testimony from election officials as to why they were accepted or rejected. (In some instances, an absentee ballot might not have been counted because the voter was able to make it to the polls.) Dietzen did not appear impressed, saying, “In my experience, I’ve never seen an offer of proof like this.”

On June 30th, the court ruled unanimously for Franken. Two hours later, Coleman conceded. He also called Franken, who later told reporters, “I thought, This is nice. This is a nice way to end this.”

It was getting past 9:30 A.M. and Franken’s staff-and-constituents breakfast was winding down. But Franken was lingering. A female staff member who will be based in Franken’s Minnesota office told him that her husband was on the phone and just wanted to say a quick hello. Franken took her proffered cell phone.

“Hey, Rick,” Franken said. “I was thinking of you.” He listened for a moment. “O.K., I wasn’t. I just tell everyone that. They feel good for a second and then I tell them I wasn’t. Then they laugh.” He let out his own noisy laugh. They talked for a couple of minutes, then he said, “O.K., I’ll give you back to your wife. And, really, I was thinking about you.”

McIntosh appeared and pointed across the room. “You have new guests,” she said.

They were a family from Wisconsin, a middle-aged woman, her husband, and their two teen-age kids. Franken invited them to try the wild-rice porridge. “We have bowls,” he said. “We have spoons. Just try it.” The woman agreed to take a bowl.

“So where in Wisconsin are you from?” Franken asked her.

“Green Bay.”

“I’ve heard of it,” Franken said, and the woman laughed.

She said that she loved his work on “Saturday Night Live,” and asked where she could see more of it.

“YouTube,” Franken said. He seemed ready to continue talking for as long as the woman liked, but Littman, who had been pacing nearby, suddenly appeared at his elbow. “I’ve got to pull you into your office,” he said, “and start going over the votes. O.K.?”

“O.K.,” Franken said.

He excused himself, and the two men disappeared into Franken’s office and closed the door.

Jul 5, 2009

Chaos and Consolidation

The April 2009 legislative polls exposed weaknesses in Indonesia’s electoral management, but the results will help to strengthen the democratic polity

Marcus Mietzner

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Reason to party: supporters of President SBY and his Democrat Party campaigning in Yogyakarta
Danu Primanto

Indonesia’s parliamentary elections, which were held across the archipelago on 9 April 2009, were an important litmus test for the maturity of its post-1998 democracy. To begin with, the quality of Indonesia’s electoral management had been questioned before the polls, with many observers predicting that the ballot’s legitimacy could be at risk. Whereas both the 1999 and 2004 elections had been widely praised as being free, fair and competitive, there were serious doubts about how professionally managed the 2009 polls would be. Second, Indonesians were curious as to whether Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party would become the first government party since Suharto’s fall to win a national election. In the two previous ballots, neither Habibie’s Golkar nor Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDI-P (Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle) had managed to turn incumbency into electoral victory.

Finally, commentators also speculated about the possible impact of important electoral reforms – most notably, the introduction of a parliamentary threshold and of a fully open party list – on the stability of Indonesia’s party system. This article discusses the outcome of the elections against the backdrop of the three pre-election concerns, concluding that while a slight decline in the quality of democratic procedures did take place, other trends indicate a further consolidation of Indonesia’s 11 year old democracy.

The quality of elections: satisfactory but declining

As the third election after the end of authoritarianism in 1998, the 2009 ballot has been of particular importance to Indonesia’s democratisation. While the 1999 and 2004 polls were supported by high levels of post-autocratic enthusiasm and many millions of dollars of foreign aid, the 2009 election occurred in a much less dramatic political environment. Accordingly, the elections were a test case for Indonesia’s ability to hold high-quality elections as a routine procedure rather than as the climax of historic political change.

The elections were a test case for Indonesia’s ability to hold high-quality elections as a routine procedure rather than as the climax of historic political change

The preparations for the elections didn’t augur well in this regard. First of all, the newly appointed KPU (General Election Commission) consisted of largely unknown bureaucrats who had some experience in organising district-level elections, but lacked the expertise to run one of the largest electoral operations in the world. Significantly, the KPU recruitment committee had disqualified several respected academics and NGO activists in the first round of the selection process, basing its decision on an arguably irrelevant psychological test rather than on screening the candidates’ knowledge of electoral issues. As a result, the KPU’s inauguration and electoral planning were accompanied by much public cynicism, with many analysts forecasting the failure of the elections before the Commission had even begun its work.

The KPU was only partially to blame for the weaknesses in electoral preparations, however. Arguably, the government and the legislature were at least equally responsible for the many shortcomings. Most importantly, they had contributed to the organisational chaos by driving an initiative to reduce the costs of general elections. In 2004, the total budget for the elections had been 56 trillion rupiah (US$5.3 billion), which was drawn from both national and local budgets. By contrast, the new electoral laws stipulated that the 2009 elections had to be funded exclusively by the national budget. Consequently, the KPU submitted a budget request for 48 trillion rupiah (US$4.6 billion), triggering widespread public anger over this ‘outrageous’ demand. Led by Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, who had always argued that elections in Indonesia are too costly, the political elite began to cut the budget for the 2009 ballot.

Final numbers have not been released yet, but the KPU eventually planned its operations based on a budget of 14 trillion rupiah (US$1.3 billion), while asking regional administrations to contribute additional funds. Therefore, many crucial budget items were reduced – the allocation for computer-based tabulation of votes, for example, was only a third of what had been provided for in the 2004 budget. Not surprisingly, the tabulation proceeded much more slowly than five years earlier.

The combination of inexperienced KPU members and reduced electoral budgets was most manifest in the problems surrounding the voter registration process. According to the law, the KPU had to verify the government’s civil registry lists by going door to door in order to rectify mistakes in the official documents. However, only a very small budget was granted for this activity, forcing the KPU to largely rely on the government data provided to it without verifying it independently. For that reason, the voter lists issued by the KPU were ridiculously outdated. Many voters had moved residence since the last election in 2004, but their names were still included in the voter lists compiled at their previous locations. When these voters subsequently tried to vote in their new neighbourhoods, they found that they were ineligible.

Voter turn-out dropped from 84 per cent in 2004 to 71 per cent in 2009

Partly because of these problems, voter turnout dropped from 84 per cent in 2004 to 71 per cent in 2009. This decline, in turn, was exploited by parties with poor results to dispute the legitimacy of the elections. Arguing that tens of millions of voters had been deliberately kept away from the ballot booths, they threatened to boycott the presidential elections in July 2009 if their demands for revotes were not heeded. Unable to collect credible evidence for their claims, however, most parties quickly dropped their protests.

The speed with which challenges to the elections’ legality were abandoned indicates that even most of the losing parties and candidates accepted the general fairness of the ballot. To be sure, they did not have much choice. Before the elections, most polling organisations had predicted a result similar to that finally announced by the KPU. In addition, four ‘quick counts’ published by Indonesia’s most respected pollsters on election night differed only slightly from the official end result. Given these numbers, dissatisfied party leaders found it difficult to argue that the elections did not reflect the overall will of the electorate.

Hence, the Constitutional Court received far fewer official complaints than initially feared. The Court had prepared itself for a flood of lawsuits, calculating that – like in 2004 – it would be handed an average of 20 challenges by each participating party. This would have resulted in 880 cases; however, the number of cases it eventually received was ‘only’ 595, with an additional 28 complaints filed by candidates for the DPD (Regional Representatives Council).

There is no doubt that the overall quality of the ballot was lower than in 1999 and 2004. In almost all areas of electoral management, the level of professionalism, transparency and consistency declined

While the elections did not end in the organisational and political disaster that many had envisaged, there is no doubt that the overall quality of the ballot was lower than in 1999 and 2004. In almost all areas of electoral management, the level of professionalism, transparency and consistency declined. Given that the 2009 polls were expected to signal the routinisation of electoral democracy in Indonesia, this should be a source of concern. Apparently, both Indonesian policymakers and international aid agencies have begun to take the continuation of Indonesia’s democratic consolidation for granted, leading them to reduce their political and financial support for the elections.

Foreign donors, for example, have gradually cut their electoral assistance budgets for Indonesia from US$100 million in 1999 and US$85.4 million in 2004 to only US$15 million in 2009. Similarly, Indonesian politicians have constantly complained that the money used to fund elections could be better spent on health, education or infrastructure programs. These are early warning signs that awareness of the importance of credible elections in Indonesia is waning, both domestically and abroad. Clearly, a reinvigorated commitment to high-quality ballots – and the budgets necessary to conduct them – is necessary to avoid further slides in Indonesia’s electoral professionalism.

Yudhoyono’s victory and democratic consolidation

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Women folding up ballot papers for the local and national parliamentary elections in Yogyakarta. For each paper, they are paid 75 rupiah (just under one Australian cent). About 900 million ballot papers were produced for
the 2009 parliamentary elections
Danu Primanto

Despite the decline in the technical quality of the elections, the results have in fact helped to consolidate Indonesia’s democratic polity. For the first time, an incumbent government party was able to come first in a post-Suharto legislative election, indicating significantly increased levels of public satisfaction with the effectiveness of governance. Whatever one thinks of President Yudhoyono and his party, after two defeats for incumbents in 1999 and 2004, a third successive loss would have seriously questioned the ability of Indonesia’s governing elite to meet the expectations of voters.

The success of President Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party, which almost tripled its 2004 result to 20.9 per cent and became the largest party in parliament, was therefore an important milestone in Indonesia’s democratisation.

Yudhoyono’s victory demonstrates that Indonesian voters not only enjoy punishing unpopular incumbents, but also like to reward those they see as successful and trustworthy administrators

The Democrat Party’s victory was all the more remarkable since only one year earlier, Indonesia had witnessed an unprecedented outpour of nostalgia for the authoritarian but effective rule of former long-time autocrat Suharto. While many Indonesians mourned the death of their former president in January 2008, the popularity of Yudhoyono had plummeted. Opinion polls revealed that most Indonesians viewed Suharto as the most successful president in the country’s history, raising doubts as to whether democracy would be able to sustain itself. Yudhoyono’s victory has mitigated these doubts, demonstrating that Indonesian voters not only enjoy punishing unpopular incumbents, but also like to reward those they see as successful and trustworthy administrators.

The strong support for Yudhoyono’s moderate Democrat Party – as well as for other parties representing the political mainstream – has further strengthened democracy as ‘the only game in town’ in Indonesia. Voters have overwhelmingly backed parties that unambiguously defend the current democratic system – much in contrast to Indonesian elections in the 1950s, when the electorate opted mostly for anti-system parties that promoted alternatives to Western-style parliamentarism. In 2009, not a single party publicly declared that it intended to establish a different political system if it came to power.

However, some of the parties that participated in the election were suspected of hiding non-reformist agendas behind the mask of their pro-democracy rhetoric. For example, former general and Suharto son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, who heads Partai Gerindra (Party of the Great Indonesia Movement), has paid lip-service to democratic principles, but most observers believe that his election as president would lead Indonesia onto the path of neo-authoritarianism. (See article by Dirk Tomsa in this edition). Similarly, the ex-commander of the armed forces, Wiranto, has pledged his loyalty to the democratic system, but leaders of his Hanura Party (People’s Conscience Party) have privately stated their ambition to roll back democratic reforms achieved since 1998.

Whatever their intention, the election results were a clear rebuttal for the two ex-generals. After their parties only received 4.5 and 3.8 per cent of the votes respectively, Prabowo grudgingly entered the presidential race as running-mate to Megawati Sukarnoputri, while Wiranto agreed to run as vice-presidential candidate to Golkar’s Jusuf Kalla. Neither ticket stands a realistic chance of winning, however, further reducing the likelihood of a neo-authoritarian turn in Indonesia in the foreseeable future.

Despite helping to consolidate the political centre, the 2009 election results also exposed some less promising trends. Most significantly, Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party partially owed its victory to a large-scale cash handout to millions of poor citizens prior to the elections. These payments had initially been presented in mid-2008 as compensation for rising fuel prices, but were continued even after the cost of fuel declined substantially later in the year. In addition, the government increased its operational payments to schools, asking them to no longer charge parents registration fees and other surcharges. Similarly, free health services were offered to poor Indonesians.

None of these initiatives – which cost the state more than US$2 billion – were introduced as part of long term economic development or poverty eradication programs. Instead, they appeared to be timed specifically to coincide with the pre-election period as a crude attempt to buy the support of poorer voters. While the 20 million Indonesian families benefiting from the assistance were obviously enthusiastic about the unexpected windfall, economists and civil society activists were mostly unsupportive. Economists did not believe that the measure would stimulate growth or reduce poverty, and anti-corruption groups disapproved of the use of state funds for electoral purposes.

Despite these criticisms, Yudhoyono’s short-term introduction of populist, pro-poor policies before the 2009 elections is almost certain to serve as a strategic model for future Indonesian ballots. With the Democrat Party’s support rising dramatically after the cash payments began in June 2008, Indonesia’s political elite will want to replicate this ‘success’ next time around – regardless of its consequences for the overall state of the economy.

Impacts of electoral reform

One of the most anticipated outcomes of the parliamentary ballot was the extent to which newly introduced electoral reforms would lead to changes in the socio-political composition of the legislature. In particular, observers were eager to ascertain whether these revisions to the election laws would increase the number of women in parliament or help to marginalise entrenched party elites in favour of political newcomers.

Initially, the new regulations had stipulated that seats would be allocated based on both party ranking and majority vote, and that every third candidate on party lists had to be female. However, in December 2008 the Constitutional Court declared this system unconstitutional, ordering the KPU to distribute seats only to those candidates with the most votes, regardless of party ranking or gender. This decision angered women’s groups, who argued that without affirmative action female candidates would find it difficult to get elected. Conversely, some civil society groups praised the court for throwing the electoral race wide open, threatening party leaders who in the past had exclusively relied on their rankings to win seats.

The number of women in the legislature rose from 10.7 per cent in 2004 to 18 per cent

Eventually, however, all societal groups could be satisfied with the result of the elections. For instance, 65.1 per cent of members of the 2009 parliament are newcomers, indicating a healthy balance between novices and experienced party leaders. The number of parliamentarians under 50 years of age increased from 49 per cent in 2004 to now 63.2 per cent, disproving the widespread view that Indonesia faces serious problems with its political regeneration. Similarly, the number of women in the legislature rose from 61 (10.7 per cent) in 2004 to 101 (18 per cent), and while this is less than women groups had hoped for, it nevertheless demonstrates that female candidates were not as disadvantaged by the fully open party list as initially feared.

Another much-discussed aspect of the elections was the alleged rise of television celebrities as a new political class in Indonesia. Prior to the elections, it was widely believed that the electoral reforms would mostly benefit actors, models and news anchors who had decided to run for parliament. With their high levels of name recognition and likeability it was assumed they would find it easy to gain the most votes in their electoral districts. Some observers even talked about the imminent Philippinisation of Indonesian politics, partly referring to the very prominent role of celebrities in politics there.

But the eventual results for the celebrities were much less compelling than the pre-election hype had suggested. Out of the 61 stars and starlets standing for election, only 15 gained seats. The party with the most celebrity candidates, PAN (National Mandate Party), saw only two of its 18 celebrity nominees winning office. Accordingly, while so-called ‘artis’ will be more influential in Indonesian politics than they were in the past, they are still far away from having the political significance their counterparts in the Philippines enjoy.

The most important impact of the changed electoral laws has been the remarkable concentration of the Indonesian party system. Due to the newly introduced parliamentary threshold of 2.5 per cent, by which only parties gaining above that portion of the vote are awarded seats in the national parliament, the number of political parties represented in the national legislature has dropped from 17 in 2004 to only nine.

With only nine parties competing for support, Indonesia is now steadily moving away from the atomised multi-partyism it has practised so far

Most importantly, the threshold will create a significant disincentive against the formation of splinter parties in the future. Previously, many internal conflicts in larger parties had been ‘resolved’ by the transformation of one of the quarrelling factions into a new party. These tiny parties would then be content with winning one or two seats in the national parliament, plus a few dozen more at the provincial and district levels across Indonesia. While the thresholds for local parliaments will only be imposed gradually in 2014 and 2019, the additional hurdle to gaining seats in the national legislature is certain to reduce the number of political parties in the longer term. This consolidation of the Indonesian party landscape will shorten the decision-making process in the legislature and simplify the organisation of elections. With only nine parties competing for support, Indonesia is now steadily moving away from the atomised multi-partyism it has practised so far. From the perspective of Indonesia’s democratic consolidation, this is certainly a welcome development.

The elections and democratic consolidation

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Voters making their choices in Yogyakarta
Danu Primanto

The 2009 legislative elections have left a mixed legacy for further democratic consolidation in Indonesia. On the one hand, the quality of electoral management has declined, leading to lower voter turnout and challenges to the legitimacy of the ballot. With international attention declining, Indonesia is at risk of taking elections for granted and thus neglecting the careful preparations and significant investments needed to run them credibly. While there is little doubt that the 2009 results reflected the overall will of the voters, Indonesia can’t afford a further deterioration in the quality of elections if it wants to maintain its international image as a successfully consolidating democracy.

But despite the slump in electoral professionalism, the 2009 polls also exhibited some encouraging features. For the first time, an incumbent government party has won a post-Suharto election, voters have shunned parties with neo-authoritarian platforms, the elected parliament is arguably Indonesia’s youngest and most gender-balanced ever, and the party system has undergone a healthy process of concentration. Given that some observers had predicted chaos, violence and institutional breakdown as a result of the polls, these mixed consequences of the elections are a welcome outcome. ii

Marcus Mietzner (marcus.mietzner@anu.edu.au) lectures in Indonesian and Southeast Asian politics and security at the Australian National University


Inside Indonesia 97: Jul-Sep 2009