Junta briefs KIO on Kokang war - Mizzima

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Monday, 31 August 2009 20:55
Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – The Burmese military junta has taken pains to explain to the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) that its recent war on the Kokang armed group was to nip in the bud production of narcotic drugs and arms and ammunition by the ethnic ceasefire group.

A junta delegation led by Col. Thet Pone from Northern Military Command Military Affairs Security (MAS) met ethnic Kachin leaders on August 29 in Laiza Hotel in KIO’s headquarter in Laiza. Col. Thet Pone told them that the Kokang ethnic group led by Peng Jia Xing was into manufacturing arms and traded in drugs.

On the KIO’s side, the Strategic Command Commander Brig. Gen. En Banla, Vice Chief-of-Staff Col. Guan Mau and Secretary Dr. Laja attended the meeting.

"They made out that the Kokang group led by Peng Jia Xiang fired first at them, when they wanted to inspect their arms manufacturing unit and search for narcotic drugs. After which they had no option but to occupy the area," a Kachin officer said on condition of anonymity.

The military government's mouthpiece the 'New Light of Myanmar' reported that in the three-day clashes between the junta's forces and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), 11 were killed and 31 injured on the Burmese Army’s side. Besides 15 policemen were killed, 13 injured and eight bodies of Kokang soldiers were also found, the news paper reported.

But according to a statement issued by Peng Jia Xiang's, about 200 civilians were killed in the two-day battle and three Chinese civilians were killed in artillery fire from government troops.

The statement added that the junta had threatened ethnic armed groups which had rejected the 2008 constitution. The regime was trying to divide and weaken them.

Military observers in the region said that about 800 Kokang troops were still moving along the Sino-Burma border. Some of them crossed into China and surrendered their arms to Chinese authorities.

A KIO officer felt that the junta had deliberately created a rift among Kokang troops.

"The SPDC (junta) launched the war, while rival Kokang groups were fighting for power, which was created by SPDC. As soon as the new administrative body was formed they set up the Border Guard Force (BGF). If Peng Jia Xiang had gone to that meeting, the junta would certainly have arrested him for interrogation," he said.

The junta backed the breakaway group led by Vice-Chairman Bai So Cheng leading to the clashes.

The SPDC has been putting pressure on all ceasefire ethnic armed groups to disarm and transform into the Border Guard Force. There is concern that there would be similar war against other ceasefire groups which refused the junta's proposal on BGF.

Four ceasefire groups the 'United Wa State Army' (UWSA), 'Kachin Independence Organization' (KIO), 'Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army' (MNDAA) and Maila group or 'National Democracy Alliance Army' (NDAA) formed a military alliance.

The allies, however, did not pitch in, in the war against the Kokang group. The Kachin people are concerned with the clashes between junta’s forces and Kokang forces.

The local military command in Kachin State, the Northern Command, has tightened security in the region.

The military command has restricted movement near Bala Min Htin bridge in Sitapu Ward, Myitkyina August 29 night and announced that all those who violate the restriction will be dealt with.

It has ordered closure of the Myitkyina night market after 10 p.m.

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VOA News - Burma Refugees in China Head Home as Fighting Dies Down

By Daniel Schearf Bangkok 31 August 2009

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Refugees that fled to China to escape fighting in Burma are beginning to head home after Burmese authorities said the situation has returned to normal. But analysts say more fighting could break out as Burmese forces try to consolidate control ahead of next year's elections.

Kokang refugees walk with their belongings after returning to the China-Burma border town of Yanlonkyaing, Burma, 29 Aug 2009

Hundreds of refugees left China's Yunnan province Monday for home in Kokang, the mainly ethnic Chinese region of Burma's northeastern Shan state.

More than 30,000 people from Kokang had fled across the border to China to escape weeks of fighting between Burma's government forces and a local militia that controls the region.

Burma's state media reported more than 30 people were killed in the clashes but that the fighting in Kokang, which broke the region's 20-year ceasefire, had stopped.

Ian Holliday is dean of social sciences at the University of Hong Kong and researches Burma politics. He says Burma's military government is looking to take back control of the country's several militia-controlled areas in time for the 2010 elections.

"Ahead of that election, the junta is extremely keen to really pacify the entire territory and bring it under political control," said Holliday. "So, instead of having this rather gray area of a ceasefire deal which enables ethnic militias to control parts of the territory, the government now wants to make sure that its control extends across all of Burma. And, to do that, the government is upping the ante in its long standing struggle with these militias."

In June, Burmese forces attacked Karen rebels, who control territory on Burma's border with Thailand, forcing thousands of villagers to flee into Thailand.

Holliday says more fighting is possible in the coming weeks in other areas of Burma that are outside of government control.

But, he says the fighting in the Kokang region should stay quiet as China, one of Burma's few backers, is very concerned about stability on its western border.

"We are talking about something which goes right into Chinese security on a border which the Chinese themselves are very worried about," he said. "We have seen Tibet last year, we have seen Xinjiang this year... So, the last thing that they want is anything that might be destabilizing on a frontier like that.

Holliday says China has more leverage on Burma than any other country in the world and that it will use every means to prevent the spread of the conflict. But, he adds Beijing is facing an extremely nationalistic military government in Burma that does not like to take orders from anybody.

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The West's Sanctions on Burma Aren't Working

By Thant Myint-U
Sunday, August 16, 2009

Twenty years of sanctioning and lecturing Burma's military regime have failed. The West needs to engage with Burma's leaders, increase humanitarian aid and reopen commercial relations with the country. If it doesn't, not only will positive change remain as elusive as ever, but the country will turn quickly and irreparably into an economic vassal of China.

In a sign of just how impervious the regime is to Western pressure, last week, opposition leader and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to her fourth spell of house arrest. Two thousand political prisoners remain locked up. And a transition to democracy appears nowhere in sight.

I was born in the United States in 1966 to Burmese parents. My grandfather, U Thant, was then serving as the United Nations' third secretary general. I witnessed repression in Burma firsthand when I was 8, during the violent unrest surrounding my grandfather's funeral.

In 1989, just after college, I spent a year in Thailand and along the Thai-Burmese border, working with dissidents and trying help the first wave of Burmese refugees. Thousands had been killed during a failed anti-government uprising. Suu Kyi had just been placed under house arrest. And the ruling junta, after losing relatively free elections, was refusing to hand over power. Later in Washington I argued with members of Congress and others that maximum sanctions were the best way to topple the dictatorship. It was an easy argument to make.

By the early 1990s nearly all Western aid to Burma had been terminated, and development assistance through the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had been blocked. A decade later, embargos and boycotts had cut off nearly all economic ties with the United States and Europe. None of the senior Burmese government officials or their children (these are the only international sanctions targeting children) are allowed to travel to the West.

But as the regime not only survived but began to seek trade, investment and tourism, I started having doubts. My feeling was that the West should use the opening and find a back door to change while the front door remained firmly shut.

In 2006 I published a book, "The River of Lost Footsteps," in which I argued for a shift in the West's approach. Even when, in 2007, new protests were violently crushed, I still believed greater engagement was the right way. I felt that many policymakers and journalists were missing the bigger picture.

Few seemed aware, for example, that Burma was just emerging from decades of civil war. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the government and more than a dozen different ethnic insurgent armies hammered out cease-fires, a breakthrough that went virtually unnoticed in the West. (Today, though the cease-fires remain, there is no permanent peace.) And few seemed concerned by the country's grinding poverty, the result of decades of economic bungling as well as embargos, boycotts and aid cutoffs.

In 1991, UNICEF's country director warned of a humanitarian emergency among Burma's children, arguing that more aid couldn't wait for the right government. Eighteen years later, Burma still receives less than a tenth of the per-capita aid handed out to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Tens of thousands die needlessly from treatable diseases.

These challenges have been ignored in the hope that sanctions and tough talk would lead to political change. But that hasn't happened.

Part of the reason is that the people who fashioned the sanctions didn't consider how the rise of Asia's giants -- China and India -- would transform Burma. As American businesses pulled out in the mid-1990s, Chinese and other Asian companies poured in. Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of natural gas have been discovered offshore, and massive hydroelectric and mining projects are being signed. Within two years a 1,000-mile oil and gas pipeline will stretch across Burma, connecting China's inland provinces to the sea. The U.S. trade embargo led to the near-collapse of the garment industry in the late 1990s, throwing tens of thousands of people out of work, but for the regime this has meant little.

Burma today is in no danger of economic disintegration. Without Western engagement, however, Burma's 55 million people risk becoming a virtual colony of their 1.3 billion Chinese neighbors to the east. There is no nefarious Chinese takeover scheme, but the vacuum created by Western policy is being filled.

The old Burmese generals will soon retire, and a new generation will rise to the top. Gen. Than Shwe, Burma's powerful autocrat, is 77 and ailing. Any chance for change requires support from at least some military leaders. Yet we've done nothing to try to influence the worldview of Than Shwe's possible successors. The upcoming generation of officers will be the first never to have visited Europe or America.

Last winter the Obama administration announced a review of Burma policy. I hope it will reconsider the United States' long-standing reliance on sanctions. It's not just that they don't work, but that they've been hugely counterproductive, taking away the one big force -- American soft power -- that could have played a role in reshaping the landscape.

Asia has experienced many successful democratic transitions, and none came about because of the sanctions and lectures that Western powers and advocacy groups seem to think will work in Burma. Generals don't negotiate away their power in the face of threats. You have to change the ground beneath them.

Engagement is not just about talking -- it's about dealing with the powers that be enough to get a foot in the door and create new facts on the ground, especially through economic contacts with the Burmese people. Nor is it based on the notion that economic development will automatically produce democracy, but that we must tackle simultaneously Burma's political and economic ills.

Many in America and worldwide are again outraged by goings-on in Burma. But without new thinking, 20 more years will pass and the dream of a prosperous, democratic Burma will be more distant still.

thant@post.harvard.edu

Thant Myint-U is the author of "The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma."