Karzai’s Running Mate Poised for Political Return - NYTimes.com

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By CARLOTTA GALL

KABUL, Afghanistan — Once the most powerful man in Afghanistan, Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim sat on the political sidelines for the past five years after being accused of corruption and maintaining an armed militia when he was defense minister.

Now, after President Hamid Karzai drafted him as a running mate, he is poised to take up power again and is re-emerging as an important power broker for Mr. Karzai, despite lingering reservations about him among American officials and others in the West.

In a rare interview last week in his sumptuous home in Kabul, the capital, Marshal Fahim vehemently denied any allegations of wrongdoing, and called for a peaceful resolution of the disputed count from the Aug. 20 election. A partial recount began Monday, with results expected to be announced within days.

Though he acknowledged a substantial element of fraud in the vote, he said he felt confident that it was not enough to reverse Mr. Karzai’s lead.

“I think Karzai can win in the first round,” he said.

If Mr. Karzai is confirmed the winner, Marshal Fahim will become first vice president, and Karim Khalili, another former leader of the resistance against the Soviet invasion, will become second vice president.

Before the election, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and the head of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, tried to warn Mr. Karzai away from Marshal Fahim, saying he would damage the president’s standing with the United States and other countries.

But the embattled Mr. Karzai sought Marshal Fahim’s support anyway, not only for the votes he could attract, but also for the muscle he could provide as Afghanistan’s most powerful former militia commander.

Marshal Fahim’s political rebirth now presents a quandary for Afghanistan’s allies, though he may yet prove critical to Mr. Karzai, both in heading off protests by opponents over the tainted election and in battling a tenacious Taliban insurgency, which he has taken on before.

Marshal Fahim commanded the anti-Taliban forces of the United Front, which fought alongside American forces and toppled the Taliban in 2001.

Although his forces have been disbanded or absorbed into the police and the army, he still commands solid support among the former resistance fighters, the mujahedeen, and so exerts considerable influence over the streets of Kabul and much of northern Afghanistan.

He said he had sided with Mr. Karzai in the election, rather than with his former comrade-in-arms and Mr. Karzai’s main challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, because he believed that Afghanistan needed a strong national government that would unite its two largest ethnic groups, the Tajiks and the Pashtuns.

Mr. Karzai, who is from the Pashtun south, tried to go it alone during the past five years and pushed aside many former allies, especially among former resistance fighters in the north, Marshal Fahim said. But he said the president had learned that he could not manage without them.

“Now he realized that he needs us, and we need him, and to rescue Afghanistan from 30 years of war, we will listen to each other and work together,” he said.

But he acknowledged that Mr. Karzai had to introduce changes if re-elected, in particular in his handling of corruption and improving government practices.

“We need a central government working with a lot of effort, where people see themselves as participants,” he said. “And we should have better coordination with the foreigners on security.”

Marshal Fahim has himself been accused in the past of corruption, particularly related to his distribution of prime real estate to cabinet members and some of his generals while serving as vice president in Mr. Karzai’s absence.

Allegations have emerged recently of his involvement in drug smuggling when he was defense minister, which Marshal Fahim vehemently denied.

“I challenge you: if someone can find one shred of evidence, I will hang myself,” he said in the interview. “It is baseless and a complete insult.”

The accusation was particularly shaming, he said, because when the mujahedeen fought against the Soviet occupation, and later against the Taliban, their leader, the legendary commander of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud, banned drugs and even cigarettes. “Not even a puff or a sniff was allowed,” Marshal Fahim said.

He denied a report in The New York Times in August that said he had use of a Soviet-made cargo plane to transport heroin to Russia and return with cash. Afghanistan had no working planes when he was defense minister, he said.

He visited Russia twice during his time as defense minister, both times as a guest on a Russian government plane, and smuggling drugs on such occasions was out of the question, he said.

He said, as Mr. Karzai has, that the information was propaganda and part of a conspiracy against them before the election.

American officials have indicated that they would like Marshal Fahim sidelined as vice president, but it is not clear how the United States military would regard his return to power and his interest in coordinating what he calls the “fight against terrorism.”

A longtime opponent of the Taliban, Marshal Fahim advocates a tough approach to the insurgency. He said that while it was appropriate for the president to continue to offer peace talks to the Taliban, he did not believe that the Taliban were interested in reconciliation.

“My belief is the time for peace is when we are strong and the Taliban are weak,” he said. “Now would not be a good time for Afghanistan to make peace.”

He said the government and coalition forces should focus on hitting Taliban bases both in Pakistan and in southern Afghanistan, and he endorsed the search for a new strategy in fighting the insurgency.

“The method of fighting should be studied very carefully; there should be a new strategy,” he said. He is not opposed to the presence of foreign troops, describing them as “a reality,” and he would not comment on the proposals of the United States commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, for sending more troops, saying that it was up to the coalition commander to decide what he needed.

He proposed promoting brave and experienced former resistance fighters into critical police and military positions to improve security in areas in the north where the insurgency was spreading.

“They are in the structure already, but you have to appoint them,” he said. “Then you have to clear those areas and make posts and give them to good mujahedeen who have a good reputation in those areas and let them keep the security.”

That may prove controversial, however. Under changes put into place by the Interior Ministry, the emphasis has been on the literacy and training of police recruits, and many former resistance fighters have been sidelined to prevent a return of militias loyal to particular strongmen.

Karzai Wins Afghan Warlords’ Support as Others Fear the Cost

By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.

KABUL, Afghanistan — When Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim was interim vice president and defense minister after the United States invasion in 2001, his tanks overlooked Kabul and he was widely seen as more powerful than the American-backed president, Hamid Karzai.

When Afghans finally got a chance to elect their president for the first time, in 2004, Mr. Karzai cast off Mr. Fahim, a Tajik warlord, winning the election as well as praise from Western governments that were worried Mr. Fahim might order his tanks into the streets and seize power.

Now, in the campaign for the Aug. 20 presidential election, Mr. Karzai has taken a different tack: Over the pleading of Western officials, he picked Mr. Fahim as first vice president on his ticket.

The reversal, critics say, is emblematic of the campaign by Mr. Karzai, who in angling to keep a hold on power has lined up half a dozen warlords who have guaranteed their political support in exchange for back-room deals.

While the precise nature of such deals is not known, Western officials, Afghan politicians and nongovernmental organizations contend that they include promises of protection from prosecution, the awarding of cabinet ministries and governorships, the creation of provinces to benefit one ethnic group, and the freeing of major drug traffickers.

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Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Against Western wishes, Mr. Fahim, center, is running for first vice president on Mr. Karzai’s ticket in the Aug. 20 elections.

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Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Mr. Karzai’s backers include Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf, whose militia killed Hazara civilians in western Kabul in 1993.

This is not the first time that Afghans or their American patrons have cut deals with the warlords — whose widespread looting and killing of civilians in the 1990s helped spur the rise of the Taliban. After the Taliban were driven from power, the American government funneled millions of dollars and military support to the warlords.

But now many Afghans and foreign observers say the ties to warlords may win Mr. Karzai the election, but cost him and his country dearly, leaving him badly compromised and the central government greatly weakened.

“It was necessary from the U.S. point of view to have armed people on the ground” when the focus was toppling the Taliban, said Thomas Ruttig, a veteran United Nations diplomat and now a director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, a nonprofit research group. “But if you are now bringing in warlords and other people who have an interest in leaving things unstable, you are undermining yourself.”

Today Mr. Karzai’s warlord backers include Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek commander whose men are accused of killing hundreds of Taliban prisoners of war in 2001 and who is now vying to regain wider control of northern Afghanistan; Hajji Muhammad Moheqiq and Karim Khalili, warlords from the Hazara Shiite minority ethnic group; and Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf, whose militia killed hundreds of Hazara civilians in western Kabul in 1993.

Another warlord supporter, Gul Agha Sherzai, who has been implicated in drug-related corruption and is now governor of Nangarhar Province, could “possibly” become governor of Kandahar, “or maybe a minister,” said Mr. Karzai’s campaign manager, Hajji Din Muhammad.

“I’m sure that whoever the mujahedeen support will win the election,” Mr. Muhammad said, referring to the warlords.

Western officials are watching closely. “I expect an understanding of the fact that we need fewer warlords and more competent ministers,” said Kai Eide, leader of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan. He said that Western governments were encouraged by reform-minded appointees to several ministries, including interior and finance, and that it had been made clear to Mr. Karzai that the trend must continue. But he declined to say if the president had addressed the warlords’ role after the election.

“If what we expect is not understood and not respected, then I think it will have consequences in terms of the enthusiasm of the international community,” Mr. Eide said. “We have to put the warlord period behind us.”

To many Afghans, serious damage has already been done. They say that the renewed association with warlords — including support by some warlords for one of Mr. Karzai’s challengers, Abdullah Abdullah, a former foreign minister — means that the powerful will not be held to account, particularly those accused of gross human rights abuses.

“It’s very easy to say, ‘I’ll bring reform and justice,’ ” said Dr. Sima Samar, chairwoman of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and a cabinet minister in Mr. Karzai’s first interim government. “But where is the accountability? If you have these people around you, it shows you are not serious about justice.”

More recently, Mr. Karzai has defended his warlord political supporters as national heroes who fought the Russians and the Taliban. And Mr. Muhammad, his campaign manger, said: “Anyone who wants to implement a program in Afghanistan cannot implement it without the support of the mujahedeen. They still have lots of influence in their areas.”

When Mr. Karzai’s warlord strategy emerged this spring, it seemed he had all but secured his re-election. But many analysts now believe he may not gain the 50 percent of the vote he needs to win the election outright and could face a runoff.

The election may demonstrate whether the warlords’ influence has begun to wane. In 2004, when Mr. Karzai won with 55.4 percent of the vote, Mr. Moheqiq and General Dostum won a combined 21.6 percent.

Mr. Moheqiq and Mr. Khalili, who led militias during the civil war and the fight against the Taliban, are believed to have won a promise to carve new provinces from Hazara-dominated districts in Ghazni and Wardak Provinces, Western officials said.

That would bolster the national power of the Hazara leaders and could set off regional conflicts with Hazara rivals. Mr. Moheqiq also said Mr. Karzai promised him control of five ministries.

Mr. Muhammad said he knew nothing about such deals.

But for Western officials, it is the dealings with General Dostum, known for his brutality, that are the most worrisome.

The general, who denies any “intentional massacre” of Taliban prisoners in 2001, had been appointed a senior military adviser by Mr. Karzai. He left the country last year after assaulting a rival, but was declared free to return after announcing support for Mr. Karzai. American officials have sought to delay that return.

General Dostum’s deal with Mr. Karzai could lead to a power struggle in the north. But Mr. Abdullah has claimed recently that he has support from General Dostum, though officials from the general’s party deny that.

American officials were also angered by Mr. Karzai’s pardon in April of five men from Nangarhar Province convicted of smuggling 260 pounds of heroin in 2007. The men had been prosecuted by a special task force, with lawyers tutored by American and NATO counterparts.

The task force is a model for the justice system that Western officials want for Afghanistan, but the pardon sent a signal that even major drug traffickers with the right connections could escape. One pardoned convict is a nephew of Mr. Muhammad, who is also a former Kabul governor.

According to the decree signed by Mr. Karzai and obtained by The New York Times, the men were pardoned “out of respect” for their family members, who dominate politics in a broad section of eastern Afghanistan.

In an interview, Mr. Muhammad said he had never lobbied Mr. Karzai for the pardon.

Abdul Waheed Wafa, Sangar Rahimi and Carlotta Gall contributed reporting.