Militia Commander Dostum Campaigns for Karzai in Afghanistan

By Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, August 18, 2009

KABUL, Aug. 17 -- One of Afghanistan's most notorious militia commanders took to the campaign trail for President Hamid Karzai on Monday, another sign of Karzai's dependence on Afghanistan's old guard of political musclemen as he seeks reelection this week.

After months spent living in Turkey to avoid arrest after an altercation with a rival commander, Gen. Abdurrashid Dostum, the leader of an Uzbek militia, held a rally on the last day of the campaign in the northern Afghan city of Shebergan to urge his followers to vote for Karzai. The endorsement from Dostum, who remains popular among Uzbeks despite a record of human rights abuses, could provide a significant late boost to Karzai as he tries to secure a majority in Thursday's first round of voting.

But Karzai's reliance on regional commanders such as Dostum has concerned U.S. officials and others who fear that Karzai is too willing to legitimize people with poor human rights records in order to secure votes. Among other allegations, Dostum is accused of allowing hundreds of Taliban prisoners to suffocate in shipping containers in 2001.

"We're obviously going to be encouraging Karzai to not let Dostum have a formal role in the government," said one U.S. official familiar with Afghanistan policy. "Until he came back, we were still saying: 'We don't think he should come. Don't bring him back.' Karzai, of course, is making his own calculations."

Analysts estimate that Dostum, who won 10 percent of the vote when he ran for president in 2004, could deliver Karzai 400,000 to 600,000 votes, perhaps more than any other regional or ethnic strongman backing Karzai.

Sayed Noorullah Sadat, a leader of Dostum's political party, said that Karzai has not offered Dostum a specific job in a future government but that it is possible Dostum could serve as a governor or cabinet minister. Before being placed under house arrest in Kabul and seeking exile in Turkey, Dostum held a largely ceremonial position in the Afghan military. Afghan political observers speculate Dostum is interested in serving as governor of the northern province of Balkh, home to the city of Mazar-e Sharif. The current governor, a longtime Dostum rival, has backed Karzai's main challenger, former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah.

Karzai has dismayed U.S. officials and human rights activists by steadily gathering around him regional commanders in his campaign for president, including his running mate, Mohammed Fahim. The possibility that such leaders could play a larger role in the next government "does undermine a fair, transparent democratic process in Afghanistan," said Ahmad Nader Nadery, a member of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.

"It's mainly a question of political survival for these leaders who feel there is no other way for them. Through a democratic process they may not be able to hold on to power, so that's why they try to make these deals," he said. "Of course Afghans want to move on -- they don't want to go back to the same old structures."

Afghan officials say they expect that the commanders will demand payback from Karzai if he wins, asking for such things as government jobs or pardons for their jailed associates.

"Everybody who is campaigning for Karzai will ask something from Karzai," said Roshanak Wardak, a parliament member who opposes Karzai but said she will not vote Thursday because of poor security in her native Wardak province. "They will not campaign freely. I knew these people from before. They are corrupt, thieves, criminals."

Also on Monday, an American civilian working with the military was killed when a patrol was attacked in eastern Afghanistan, and a roadside bomb in the south killed an American military serviceman. At least 22 U.S. troops have been killed in Afghanistan in August as Taliban violence continues to rise.

Special correspondent Javed Hamdard contributed to this report.

Karzai Wins Afghan Warlords’ Support as Others Fear the Cost

By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.

KABUL, Afghanistan — When Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim was interim vice president and defense minister after the United States invasion in 2001, his tanks overlooked Kabul and he was widely seen as more powerful than the American-backed president, Hamid Karzai.

When Afghans finally got a chance to elect their president for the first time, in 2004, Mr. Karzai cast off Mr. Fahim, a Tajik warlord, winning the election as well as praise from Western governments that were worried Mr. Fahim might order his tanks into the streets and seize power.

Now, in the campaign for the Aug. 20 presidential election, Mr. Karzai has taken a different tack: Over the pleading of Western officials, he picked Mr. Fahim as first vice president on his ticket.

The reversal, critics say, is emblematic of the campaign by Mr. Karzai, who in angling to keep a hold on power has lined up half a dozen warlords who have guaranteed their political support in exchange for back-room deals.

While the precise nature of such deals is not known, Western officials, Afghan politicians and nongovernmental organizations contend that they include promises of protection from prosecution, the awarding of cabinet ministries and governorships, the creation of provinces to benefit one ethnic group, and the freeing of major drug traffickers.

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Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Against Western wishes, Mr. Fahim, center, is running for first vice president on Mr. Karzai’s ticket in the Aug. 20 elections.

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Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Mr. Karzai’s backers include Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf, whose militia killed Hazara civilians in western Kabul in 1993.

This is not the first time that Afghans or their American patrons have cut deals with the warlords — whose widespread looting and killing of civilians in the 1990s helped spur the rise of the Taliban. After the Taliban were driven from power, the American government funneled millions of dollars and military support to the warlords.

But now many Afghans and foreign observers say the ties to warlords may win Mr. Karzai the election, but cost him and his country dearly, leaving him badly compromised and the central government greatly weakened.

“It was necessary from the U.S. point of view to have armed people on the ground” when the focus was toppling the Taliban, said Thomas Ruttig, a veteran United Nations diplomat and now a director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, a nonprofit research group. “But if you are now bringing in warlords and other people who have an interest in leaving things unstable, you are undermining yourself.”

Today Mr. Karzai’s warlord backers include Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek commander whose men are accused of killing hundreds of Taliban prisoners of war in 2001 and who is now vying to regain wider control of northern Afghanistan; Hajji Muhammad Moheqiq and Karim Khalili, warlords from the Hazara Shiite minority ethnic group; and Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf, whose militia killed hundreds of Hazara civilians in western Kabul in 1993.

Another warlord supporter, Gul Agha Sherzai, who has been implicated in drug-related corruption and is now governor of Nangarhar Province, could “possibly” become governor of Kandahar, “or maybe a minister,” said Mr. Karzai’s campaign manager, Hajji Din Muhammad.

“I’m sure that whoever the mujahedeen support will win the election,” Mr. Muhammad said, referring to the warlords.

Western officials are watching closely. “I expect an understanding of the fact that we need fewer warlords and more competent ministers,” said Kai Eide, leader of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan. He said that Western governments were encouraged by reform-minded appointees to several ministries, including interior and finance, and that it had been made clear to Mr. Karzai that the trend must continue. But he declined to say if the president had addressed the warlords’ role after the election.

“If what we expect is not understood and not respected, then I think it will have consequences in terms of the enthusiasm of the international community,” Mr. Eide said. “We have to put the warlord period behind us.”

To many Afghans, serious damage has already been done. They say that the renewed association with warlords — including support by some warlords for one of Mr. Karzai’s challengers, Abdullah Abdullah, a former foreign minister — means that the powerful will not be held to account, particularly those accused of gross human rights abuses.

“It’s very easy to say, ‘I’ll bring reform and justice,’ ” said Dr. Sima Samar, chairwoman of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and a cabinet minister in Mr. Karzai’s first interim government. “But where is the accountability? If you have these people around you, it shows you are not serious about justice.”

More recently, Mr. Karzai has defended his warlord political supporters as national heroes who fought the Russians and the Taliban. And Mr. Muhammad, his campaign manger, said: “Anyone who wants to implement a program in Afghanistan cannot implement it without the support of the mujahedeen. They still have lots of influence in their areas.”

When Mr. Karzai’s warlord strategy emerged this spring, it seemed he had all but secured his re-election. But many analysts now believe he may not gain the 50 percent of the vote he needs to win the election outright and could face a runoff.

The election may demonstrate whether the warlords’ influence has begun to wane. In 2004, when Mr. Karzai won with 55.4 percent of the vote, Mr. Moheqiq and General Dostum won a combined 21.6 percent.

Mr. Moheqiq and Mr. Khalili, who led militias during the civil war and the fight against the Taliban, are believed to have won a promise to carve new provinces from Hazara-dominated districts in Ghazni and Wardak Provinces, Western officials said.

That would bolster the national power of the Hazara leaders and could set off regional conflicts with Hazara rivals. Mr. Moheqiq also said Mr. Karzai promised him control of five ministries.

Mr. Muhammad said he knew nothing about such deals.

But for Western officials, it is the dealings with General Dostum, known for his brutality, that are the most worrisome.

The general, who denies any “intentional massacre” of Taliban prisoners in 2001, had been appointed a senior military adviser by Mr. Karzai. He left the country last year after assaulting a rival, but was declared free to return after announcing support for Mr. Karzai. American officials have sought to delay that return.

General Dostum’s deal with Mr. Karzai could lead to a power struggle in the north. But Mr. Abdullah has claimed recently that he has support from General Dostum, though officials from the general’s party deny that.

American officials were also angered by Mr. Karzai’s pardon in April of five men from Nangarhar Province convicted of smuggling 260 pounds of heroin in 2007. The men had been prosecuted by a special task force, with lawyers tutored by American and NATO counterparts.

The task force is a model for the justice system that Western officials want for Afghanistan, but the pardon sent a signal that even major drug traffickers with the right connections could escape. One pardoned convict is a nephew of Mr. Muhammad, who is also a former Kabul governor.

According to the decree signed by Mr. Karzai and obtained by The New York Times, the men were pardoned “out of respect” for their family members, who dominate politics in a broad section of eastern Afghanistan.

In an interview, Mr. Muhammad said he had never lobbied Mr. Karzai for the pardon.

Abdul Waheed Wafa, Sangar Rahimi and Carlotta Gall contributed reporting.

A Karzai Victory Is Just the Ticket for Regional Commanders

By Griff Witte
Washington Post Foreign Service
Wednesday, June 17, 2009

MAZAR-E SHARIF, Afghanistan -- President Hamid Karzai is considered a strong favorite to win reelection when Afghans go to the polls this summer. But here in northern Afghanistan, one of the country's most peaceful regions, there is little doubt who will be in control when the elections are over, and it's not Karzai.

Rather, it is the same men who have ruled this territory off and on for decades, regional commanders who have divvied up the land into personal fiefdoms and transformed central government institutions, including the police, into instruments of their will.

With two months to go until the vote, most of these commanders -- critics call them warlords -- are lining up to endorse the president's reelection bid. Analysts say that if Karzai secures another term, the commanders who supported the president are likely to be rewarded with a guarantee of continued power.

The enduring influence of these strongmen reflects the fragility of the U.S.-backed government, which remains a government in name only across vast stretches of the country, even those not beset by Taliban insurgency. Indeed, the commanders' loyalty to the president seems to owe less to Karzai's strength as a leader than to his weakness.

"Who else would they support? They've lived a life of luxury under his government," said Golalai Nur Safi, a member of parliament who represents an area just outside Mazar-e Sharif, a desert metropolis on the Central Asian plains. "They see personal advantage in supporting him."

Safi is backing Karzai's reelection because she thinks he "is a good man who has a bad team" and because she sees no viable alternative. She is an outspoken critic of the commanders and of Karzai's pattern of caving in to their demands whenever he wants to shore up his position.

It was clearly illustrated this spring when Karzai picked two regional strongmen to serve as his running mates. The selection of one in particular, Mohammed Fahim, rankled critics. It was a direct reversal of Karzai's decision before the 2004 election to dump from his ticket the much-feared Tajik commander, who was then considered so power-hungry that U.S. officials worried he would launch a coup.

At the time, purging Fahim from the government was hailed as a watershed decision by the president to take a stand against Afghanistan's decades-long tradition of warlordism. Now, it strikes many observers as a rare moment of courage amid a much longer record of appeasing a rogues' gallery of human rights abusers.

"Where we stand today with the political landscape is not much different from where we started, and in some respects it's looking even worse," said Ahmad Nader Nadery, head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. "These so-called leaders are able to tell the disillusioned people that there's no other way, that 'we have access to the president, and you have to listen to us.' "

A Karzai spokesman, Hamid Zada, defended his leader's vice presidential picks as a way of bringing reconciliation to the long-fractured country. In a nation bitterly divided by ethnicity, Karzai's ticket includes a Pashtun (himself), a Tajik (Fahim) and a Hazara (Karim Khalili). "The president makes all his decisions based on the national unity of Afghanistan," Zada said.

The selections, he added, are also intended to pay tribute to the millions of Afghans who resisted Soviet occupation during the 1980s. "Fahim and Khalili represent a significant group of Afghans who fought the Soviets and paid the price," he said.

Karzai himself has never been a commander. Before his selection to lead Afghanistan in December 2001, he was a tribal chief and a diplomat who was known for his ability to mediate conflicts, not order men into battle.

In Afghanistan, where anyone younger than 30 has known only war and where the man with the most guns usually calls the shots, Karzai's lack of military bona fides is considered a liability. His Western backers -- the United States most particularly -- have encouraged his ties to the regional commanders to bolster his rule as the government combats a vicious Taliban insurgency.

The logic is that commanders who support the government and who inspire fierce loyalty among their followers can be useful in maintaining the security of areas that might otherwise be vulnerable to instability. By some measures, the strategy may have worked: Afghanistan's north and west, where the commanders are strongest, have also been the safest regions of the country.

But Karzai's reliance on the commanders has undeniably stunted the government's development, limiting its ability to extend its reach beyond Kabul, the capital. Afghanistan's central government has struggled throughout history to assert itself, with little success. The result has been a power vacuum filled by local leaders, most of whom are heavily subsidized by foreign governments that need vehicles through which to exert their influence in Afghanistan.

The enduring strength of the commanders has bred resentment among Afghans who see their government favoring the interests of the powerful. That has happened before: When the Taliban swept to power in the 1990s, deep disillusionment with the commanders' reign was a major reason why.

Ashraf Ghani, the technocratic former finance minister who is running against the president, said Karzai's choice of allies would backfire, arguing that after three decades of subjugation by men who have delivered no improvement in people's lives, Afghans have grown tired of the warlords.

"These people are not what they used to be," he said.

Many of the commanders are notorious for their brutality: One Karzai backer, the Uzbek strongman Abdurrashid Dostum, once ordered hundreds of prisoners packed into metal shipping crates, then left them to suffocate under the hot desert sun, human rights groups have reported.

Dostum has been in Turkey for six months but is not expected to stay away. Despite vocal criticism of Karzai over the years, Dostum has endorsed the president and is widely thought to be angling for control over Mazar-e Sharif after the election. This city, one of Afghanistan's largest, used to be Dostum's territory. He was pushed out by a rival commander, Attah Mohammed, several years ago and has wanted to get back in ever since.

The election could be his ticket. Mohammed is thought to be backing a Karzai challenger, former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, a gamble that could cost him the governorship of this province if Abdullah loses.

Technically, Mohammed is a Karzai appointee who represents the central government. In reality, locals say, Mohammed takes few cues from Kabul. Although all private militias were supposed to be disarmed years ago under an internationally mandated program, Mohammed retains an arsenal of tens of thousands of weapons, according to officials here.

Dostum and others have also maintained their arsenals, according to Gen. Mohammed Ali Razai, deputy police commander for northern Afghanistan.

"The people who had weapons in the past, they didn't hand them over. They still have their weapons, and they use them to their advantage," Razai said.

The internationally trained and funded Afghan National Police, he indicated, is still too small and is ill-equipped to challenge the commanders' power.

Residents say that the police are a problem and that many have been co-opted by Mohammed.

A local Pashtun tribal elder, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he said his life is under threat, accused Mohammed of using the police to silence critics and to persecute ethnic minorities, especially Pashtuns. The elder said the police have killed Pashtun leaders who challenge the authority of Mohammed, who is Tajik. He said the police then falsely claim that the dead Pashtuns were Taliban.

"These warlords have killed thousands of Muslims. Their hands are covered with the blood of innocent people," the elder said. "We have suffered for 30 years under these warlords, and we are suffering still."