Jul 27, 2009

Unsettled - In West Bank Settlements, Sign of Hope for a Deal

MODIIN ILLIT, West Bank — Seen from afar, this fast-growing settlement embodies everything that the Obama administration wants to address through its demand for a freeze on settlement building: it sits on land captured by Israel in the 1967 Middle East war and, with 45,000 residents and 60 births a week, it is the largest and fastest-growing Jewish community in the West Bank.

If, as is widely believed abroad, “natural growth” by Israeli settlers is blocking the creation of a viable Palestinian state, this community should show why.

But appearances are deceiving. Modiin Illit and its sister community, Beitar Illit, are entirely ultra-Orthodox, a world apart, one of strict religious observance and study. They offer surprising potential for compromise.

Unlike settlers who believe they are continuing the historic Zionist mission of reclaiming the Jewish homeland, most ultra-Orthodox do not consider themselves settlers or Zionists and express no commitment to being in the West Bank, so their growth in these settlement towns, situated just inside the pre-1967 boundary, could be redirected westward to within Israel.

Their location also means it may be possible, in negotiations about a future Palestinian state, to redraw the boundary so the settlements are inside Israel, with little land lost to the Palestinians. And the two towns alone account for half of all settler growth, so if removed from the equation, the larger settler challenge takes on more manageable proportions.

“If I thought this was a settlement, I would never have come here,” said Yaakov Guterman, 40, the mayor of Modiin Illit and a grandfather of three, his Orthodox fringes hanging from his belt, his side locks curled behind his ears. Asked about the prospect of a Palestinian state rising one day on his town line, he said: “We will go along with what the world wants. We have gone through the Holocaust and know what it means to have the world against us. The Torah says a man needs to know his place.”

Whether or not Mr. Guterman will be as pliant as he says, Middle East peace negotiators on all sides — Israeli, Palestinian and American — have long viewed small border adjustments and land swaps as key to a deal that would include a solution to the hundreds of thousands of Jews who have settled in the West Bank over the past four decades.

This week, three senior American officials will be in Jerusalem for talks that will include settlements: the Middle East envoy, George J. Mitchell; the White House Middle East adviser, Dennis Ross; and the national security adviser, Gen. James Jones. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates will also be in talks in Jerusalem.

Break With Settler Movement

The ultra-Orthodox inhabitants often express contempt for the settler movement, with its vows never to move. The people here, who shun most aspects of modernity, came for three reasons: they needed affordable housing no longer available in and around Jerusalem or Tel Aviv; they were rejected by other Israeli cities as too cult-like; and officials wanted their presence to broaden Israel’s narrow border.

Yet they are lumped with everyone else. The settler movement and the Israeli government point to ultra-Orthodox settlements, with their large and ever-increasing families, to argue that there is no way to stop “natural growth” without imposing acute human suffering. Those seeking a freeze use the settlements as evidence that growth is so out of control that drastic action must be taken. More broadly, opponents say the settlements violate international law, legitimize force by armed messianic Jews and ruin the chance of establishing a viable Palestinian state.

But even those who strongly favor a complete freeze acknowledge that the annual settler growth rates of 5 and 6 percent owe a great deal to these two towns that have little to do with the broader settler enterprise.

Dror Etkes of Yesh Din, an antisettlement group in Israel, noted that half of all construction in West Bank settlements was taking place in these two ultra-Orthodox communities, adding that given their location next to the boundary, it was highly likely they would be in Israel in a future deal through a redrawn border. “From a purely geographic point of view, construction there is not as destructive as elsewhere,” he said.

But he does not want building to continue in Modiin Illit or Beitar Illit without a deal for a Palestinian state, nor does he mean to imply that these settlements have been a benign force. “Land has been taken from Palestinians, in some cases from private landowners, for the building in these settlements, and there are many other issues like sewage flow into Palestinian villages that must be addressed,” Mr. Etkes said.

Settler leaders reject any distinction. The fact that the ultra-Orthodox came to the West Bank to solve their housing problems is “completely O.K. with me,” said Dani Dayan, chairman of the Yesha Council, the settlers’ political umbrella group. “They are an integral part of our endeavor and our achievement.”

The Palestinian View

But even in Bilin, the Palestinian village that abuts Modiin Illit and has become a symbol of Palestinian resistance against Israel’s West Bank separation barrier, the settlers over the fence are viewed as different from the Jewish nationalists in, say, Hebron.

Abedallah Abu Rahma, a teacher from a farming family and a leading activist in the village, pointed toward the settler high-rise buildings visible across the valley from his living room window and said: “They tell us, ‘We are poor, the apartments here are cheaper and we did not know it was a settlement.’ Many told us, ‘Give us our money back and we will leave.’ ”

The Palestinians, who hold weekly demonstrations against the barrier, have even joined forces with some of the settlers. Two years ago, Bilin won a major Supreme Court case that forced a change in the route of the barrier, and some of the documents the victorious villagers used, Mr. Abu Rahma said, had been secretly passed to them by ultra-Orthodox settlers feuding with their own municipal leaders.

Still, none of that lessens the harm to the villagers caused by the very existence of Modiin Illit and the contest over its land. Mr. Abu Rahma said he would respect any agreement reached between the Palestinian leadership and Israel, including one that had Modiin Illit standing in Israel. But noting the village’s reliance on agriculture, its own housing needs and the settlement’s encroachment on Bilin’s territory, he insisted, “We need our land.”

Moreover, protecting the settlements from attack has meant construction of numerous barriers, checkpoints and bypass roads that impair economic development and disrupt daily life.

Across the West Bank and excluding East Jerusalem, there are nearly 300,000 settlers living on scores of settlements among 2.3 million Palestinians. And while some say they will fight to stay put, a third are the reluctant ultra-Orthodox, known in Israel as Haredim, Hebrew for the fearful ones, or those who tremble in awe of God.

They believe it important to live in the land of Israel, because certain commandments can be performed only here. But some Haredim actively reject the formation of a Jewish state before the arrival of the Messiah, while others are ambivalent. They also say that protecting life trumps holding territory. Very few serve in the military because the ultra-Orthodox say they do more good for the nation by studying the Torah and praying than fighting.

Until his death in 2001, Rabbi Eliezer Schach was the religious authority of the Haredim of European origin. He opposed building Jewish settlements that extended over the 1967 line into territory Israel seized in the war, once calling them “a blatant attempt to provoke the international community” and complaining that they endangered Jewish lives. In fact, when first offered housing for his followers in Beitar Illit, he took it as an insult, according to Yitzchak Pindrus, a former mayor of the settlement.

“Our people live around their families and rabbis, and they were terrified of the idea,” Mr. Pindrus recalled. But with thousands of new couples marrying every year, and the traditional ultra-Orthodox communities expensive and crowded, the Haredim needed homes.

Because few ultra-Orthodox men work, because on average their families have eight children and because they do not integrate easily into the larger community, Teddy Kollek, who was mayor of Jerusalem in the late 1980s, wanted to keep down their numbers. Other cities rejected them. Yitzhak Rabin, as both defense minister and then prime minister, championed the creation of large settlements around Jerusalem to fortify Israel’s hold on the capital, in line with his Labor Party’s strategic plan, so he and the Haredim struck a deal for Beitar Illit in the early 1990s.

For those wanting to remain closer to longstanding Haredi communities in the center of the country, Modiin Illit was an alternative. Private Israeli developers bought tracts of Palestinian land as its base, although the legitimacy of those sales has been challenged. Mr. Guterman, the mayor, said Mr. Rabin “gave his blessing to the city,” telling Rabbi Schach’s disciples that its strategic location on the first rise above Israel’s international airport guaranteed that it would not be given back.

There are smaller pockets of Haredi settlement deeper in the West Bank, where the arm’s-length attitude toward Zionist settlement has shifted toward a more distinctly right-wing ideology. Zvi Kastelanitz, of the Immanuel settlement, who produces silver-inlaid Jewish handicrafts, for example, said he had no objection to two states for two peoples, “but not here.” Still, the Haredi settlers even there remain distinct. After Palestinians ambushed two buses on the road to Immanuel, southwest of Nablus, in 2001 and 2002, killing a total of 20 people, the Haredi settlers did not react like their nationalist counterparts, defiantly setting up another settlement outpost. Instead, about a third of Immanuel’s 4,000 residents left.

Shunning Secular World

The Haredi world is all about being together and apart from secular temptations, an intricate patchwork of groups with allegiances to different rabbinic dynasties and courts. In the new cities, Haredi rules apply. At the entrance to Beitar Illit, a sign warns visitors to dress modestly. The streets are all named for rabbis and sages from Poland to Yemen. There is Internet access, officially intended for professional use only. Televisions are allowed, but nobody admits to having one. And there is poverty: about 40 percent of wives support their large families because their husbands do not work. There are few cars, lots of buses and baby strollers.

Dov Fromowitz, a father of nine who moved to Beitar Illit from the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn 12 years ago, runs a central charity fund that collects money from better-off residents and distributes it to the poor, while connecting them with other social welfare services outside the settlement. He says he has 1,200 needy families on his books.

Without most Israelis noticing, Modiin Illit and Beitar Illit have turned into the Haredi towns of the future, cleaner and saner versions of their often decrepit and densely packed neighborhoods elsewhere. They contain open space, even some greenery, and apartments with lots of bedrooms. Their young are shielded from secular Israel, and secular Israelis never see them, thereby reducing the tensions found in Jerusalem over driving on the Sabbath and sexy advertising at bus stops.

The Question of Coexistence

Even if the ultra-Orthodox appear to be less ideologically committed to the West Bank, the longer they live here, the more invested some have become.

In Modiin Illit, Mayor Guterman has ambitions to build what he calls “the largest Haredi residential community in Israel.” Over the past three years, he has set up a business center that he considers the wave of the future. Now 1,000 women, mostly mothers in their 20s, sit at work stations providing phone services to Israeli credit card clients and paralegal research for real estate businesses in the United States. It is outsourcing that seeks to take advantage of the educational level and work ethic of Haredi women.

The question of coexistence with Palestinians hovers, however. In Beitar Illit, farmers from the village of Husan enter daily in cars and on donkeys to work their lands in the valleys among the settlements’ built-up hills. The new mayor, Meir Rubinstein, is proud of the city’s cooperation with local Palestinians, whom he calls “the neighbors.”

“We very much want there to be peace here,” he said. “We pray for it three times a day.” But the question of peace at what price remains.

Avraham and Riva Guttman, who arrived in Beitar Illit 15 years ago from Toronto and have seven children, look out from their street at Palestinian villages. They believe strongly in living in the land of Israel, they say, and they are happy for the parks and space lacking in traditional Haredi areas of Israel. But they do not insist that it is there or nothing. “We are not here for political reasons,” Mr. Guttman said. “Ninety percent of the people are here for the affordability, not for ideology. Haredim don’t fight with Arabs.”

Perhaps not, but his wife, Riva, bristled at the idea of moving. “If you told me to move elsewhere because Arabs needed a place to live, it would not sit quietly on my conscience,” she said. “I am a Jew in the Jewish homeland.”

And increasingly, the Haredim have vested interests over the 1967 line. Yaron and Sara Simchovitch arrived in Beitar Illit from Jerusalem 13 years ago with a group led by their rabbi. The couple now have a thriving butcher shop.

Yoseph Shilhav, an expert on the ultra-Orthodox at Bar-Ilan University, said that almost every Haredi family now had a member beyond the 1967 border, subtly shifting their attitudes about settlement and withdrawal. The Haredim make up 10 percent of Israel’s population and are a fast-growing electoral force. The Chabad movement and Sephardic or Middle Eastern-origin Shas party have increasingly adopted the nationalist agenda.

The rocket fire into Israel that resulted after its withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 has also taken its toll on Haredi views. “In general, Haredim are very practical people,” said Mr. Pindrus, the former Beitar Illit mayor. “We are not right or left. If we get up in the morning and see that leaving Gaza means missiles, then no, we’re not leaving another centimeter.” He added, “We want to live, and our children not to blow up.”

Still, a surprising number do not oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state if safety can be guaranteed. Since housing is the No. 1 Haredi concern and they feel no need for it to be in the West Bank, redirecting the building of their new homes inside Israel could go a long way toward a solution.

“If the Americans can convince us there will really be peace and we won’t be living in fear of rockets, we’ll bring a recommendation to our rabbis,” said Mr. Guterman, the mayor of Modiin Illit. “Our rabbis want peace. We are not against withdrawing from territory. But life is above all.”

In Niger Delta, Uneasy Peace as Rebel Disarmament Date Nears

By Karin Brulliard
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, July 27, 2009

PORT HARCOURT, Nigeria -- Signs of harmony seem to be budding in Nigeria's conflict-plagued Niger Delta region amid a government offer of amnesty to rebels and a leading militant group's halt to its attacks and kidnappings. But here in the swampy heart of the oil-rich but impoverished delta, many analysts and observers warn that the calm could be a prelude to all-out war.

Two weeks before the government is set to begin disarming as many as 10,000 militants in a 60-day amnesty program, it has revealed little about how it will reintegrate participants into society or address the demands for increased development and oil revenue that Niger Delta militants say drive their campaign of attacking oil installations and holding foreigners hostage.

The offer's vagueness is fueling fears that it will fail to lure militants and instead trigger a full-scale military offensive that could ensnare civilians living on the remote creeks where militants keep their camps.

"This is a window of opportunity," said Ogbonna Nwuke, a government commissioner in one of the Niger Delta states. "But the alternative, in my view, will be increased military operations by the Nigerian government. When that happens, ordinary men, women and children will be at risk . . . these are the things that happen at war."

The fate of this restive region, its lush land crisscrossed with creeks and oil pipelines, is of vital importance to stability in West Africa and to U.S. energy security. Sabotage by a web of militant groups has cut Nigeria's oil production by nearly one-half since 2006, but the nation remains the fifth-greatest oil supplier to the United States, which is turning more to Africa as it seeks to decrease its dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, the principal militant group known as MEND, launched a guerrilla-style battle three years ago. It attacks oil facilities and kidnaps foreign oil workers in what it calls a crusade to bring development to a region whose residents have enjoyed few of the riches from 50 years of oil production.

But the militants also steal and sell oil, and many began their careers as thugs hired by corrupt Niger Delta politicians to ensure electoral victory through intimidation. Most analysts regard them more as cash-hungry gangs -- often in cahoots with politicians and military members -- than freedom fighters.

"None of these people, not MEND, not the military leaders, not the politicians . . . none of them really represents the interests of the people in the delta," said a Western diplomat in Nigeria's capital, Abuja. "Too many people don't have an interest in settling" the crisis.

Starting Aug. 6, the government says it will give cash, job training and pardons to militants who turn in weapons. Earlier this month, officials granted one MEND demand by releasing the group's leader, Henry Okah, who was jailed on treason and weapons-trafficking charges.

Okah's release prompted MEND to declare a 60-day cease-fire and, on Monday, to free its last six hostages. But the group, which wants a military-led security task force to withdraw from the delta, has shunned the amnesty offer.

The developments followed shows of force by the government and the militants in a conflict that has grown increasingly bloody and aggressive. In May, after rebel attacks killed one soldier and left 18 missing, the task force bombed militant camps in an offensive it says scattered fighters. Human rights groups said the bombings displaced and killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of civilians. Those claims have not been substantiated.

Two weeks ago, MEND attacked an oil installation several states away, near Lagos, the nation's largest city, in a brazen display of power that killed eight guards. The group said this week that it would "revisit" any facilities it destroyed if they were repaired.

"The current offer does not make any reference whatsoever to the root issues," Jomo Gbomo, a MEND spokesman, said in an e-mail, adding that the group expects renewed military offensives. "The African adage that when two elephants fight it is the grass that suffers will ring true when the oil industry suffers a total collapse should such an attack on us occur."

Nigeria, which derives 90 percent of its foreign export earnings from oil, insists that its amnesty offer is a sincere peace effort. But it has also said that it would not cede to rebel demands and that it was prepared to take necessary action to curb the conflict, comments, some observers say, that show the military is eager to prove its might.

"These people are not real agitators. They are just bandits, criminals," Col. Rabe Abubakar, a spokesman for a Niger Delta military task force, said in an interview in the delta city of Warri. "For how long would this kind of thing go on in a normal country? I say no, we cannot allow this thing to continue."

Abubakar declined to speculate on the response if militants do not take the amnesty offer, which he insisted would work.

Previous government attempts to end the crisis have resulted in more bureaucracy than action, analysts say. Last fall, the government convened a "technical committee" on the Niger Delta, which recommended an amnesty and disarmament program facilitated by a third party, as well as increased oil revenue allocation and boosted infrastructure in delta states.

But the committee's leader, human rights activist and attorney Ledum Mitee, said he had to seek outside funding to even print the report, which he said he is not even sure government officials read.

In Port Harcourt, residents are wearily hoping that this attempt at peace succeeds.

"We pray it works, because the militants have disturbed us greatly," said Anthony Ejirimuo, a driver who said he lost clients as nervous oil companies pulled out foreign workers. "They say they are representing the people. Who sent them? They are only representing their own pockets."

U.S. 'Money Weapon' Yields Mixed Results

By Ernesto LondoƱo
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, July 27, 2009

BAGHDAD, July 26 -- Shortly after the U.S. Army turned over control of the business center and a restaurant of a multimillion-dollar hotel it built near Baghdad's airport to the Iraqi government last year, flat-screen television sets, computers and furniture vanished.

The looting unwittingly kept the military in the hotel business because officers were concerned that the rest of the hotel would be stripped bare. As the U.S. government is ceding control of hundreds of projects and facilities to the Iraqi government, the conundrum raised questions about the sustainability of billions of dollars worth of projects funded through the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) that encourages commanders to think of "money as a weapon."

U.S. lawmakers and the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, which has released a report about the Caravan Hotel, are increasingly scrutinizing the use of CERP and urging the Pentagon to be more vigilant in its selection and oversight of projects.

The success stories and cautionary tales of CERP initiatives in Iraq are shaping the way commanders in Afghanistan use the program as they place greater emphasis on counterinsurgency and keeping the civilian population safe.

Since 2003, the U.S. Congress has appropriated more than $10 billion in CERP funds for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"CERP was meant to be walking-around money for commanders to achieve a desired effect in their battle space," said the office's deputy inspector general, Ginger Cruz. "Slowly, it has become a de facto reconstruction pot of money."

Earlier this month, Rep. John P. Murtha (D-Pa.), chairman of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee, asked the Pentagon for a list of all pending projects worth more than $1 million. Murtha said the Pentagon has failed to fully explain how it is using CERP. He added that the military is taking on too many large-scale projects that should be handled by civilian agencies with reconstruction expertise.

"A fundamental review of CERP, its purpose, use and scope, is overdue," Murtha wrote in the July 15 letter to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. Murtha said he was disturbed by reports from Iraq suggesting commanders were in a "rush to spend" hundreds of millions of dollars by the end of the fiscal year. Murtha himself has come under scrutiny for backing projects important to constituents that critics call wasteful.

U.S. military officials say CERP has been invaluable in helping commanders get things done quickly, with little red tape. In recent years, they have used it to put insurgents on payroll, award micro-grants to business owners, compensate families of civilians killed in combat, and build schools and clinics.

"We think we've been pretty successful," said Brig. Gen. Peter Bayer, the chief of staff of the U.S. command that oversees CERP projects in Iraq. He said commanders in Iraq have approved few large CERP projects this year.

One of the most notable CERP-funded initiatives was the Sons of Iraq program started in 2006, under which the U.S. military put tens of thousands of insurgents on payroll and mobilized them to fight hard-line extremist groups. Last year the government spent $300 million on Sons of Iraq salaries, but it stopped paying them this year and turned over the program to the Iraqi government, which has often failed to pay the fighters on time.

As the U.S. military has withdrawn from the cities, several CERP-funded projects, such as neighborhood parks, civic centers and swimming pools, have not been successfully adopted by local or national government entities because they either don't have the capacity or interest to keep them running, U.S. and Iraqi officials say. For example, an outdoor performance hall built in Sadr City that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and was completed several months ago has never been used, according to U.S. officials.

As U.S. troops have largely left the cities, U.S. officials say they have been more judicious in the number and types of CERP projects they approve.

U.S. commanders in Iraq were given $747 million in CERP funds this year, down from $1 billion allocated in 2008. So far this year, the military has spent $235 million of its CERP allocation in Iraq. Realizing they couldn't spend the remaining funds responsibly by the end of September, when the fiscal year ends, U.S. commanders decided to return $247 million.

"Our application has been deliberate and judicious," Bayer said.

The Caravan Hotel, a $4.2 million project, was completed in August 2008. U.S. military officials deemed it a worthwhile investment because there are few hotels in Baghdad that foreign investors would consider safe enough.

After the equipment was looted shortly following the Caravan's inauguration, the military hired a contractor to operate the $225-a-night hotel, fearing that officials at the Ministry of Transportation, which is run by members of the Sadr political block, would shut it down and steal valuables, inspector general officials said.

A spokesman for the ministry said he was not familiar with the hotel project or the allegations of looting. Bayer said the military considers the project successful and is working on a plan to hand it over to the Iraqis.

"Ultimately when you transfer a property to someone, it's theirs and they use it for their purposes," Bayer said. "That's a decision the government of Iraq makes."

Special correspondent Qais Mizher contributed to this report.

Cleric With Taliban Ties Is Arrested In Pakistan

Associated Press
Monday, July 27, 2009

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, July 26 -- Pakistani police arrested an influential pro-Taliban cleric on Sunday who had brokered a failed peace deal in northern Pakistan's troubled Swat Valley, an indication that the government will no longer negotiate with militants.

Authorities accused Sufi Mohammad -- father-in-law of Swat's notorious Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah -- of encouraging violence and terrorism.

The peace deal in February imposed sharia, or Islamic law, in the valley in exchange for an end to two years of fighting. But it was widely seen as handing over control of Swat, once a popular tourist destination, to the Taliban.

The deal collapsed in April when the Taliban advanced south out of Swat, triggering a military offensive and retaliatory attacks by militants in the northwest and beyond. About 2 million people fled the region, and although hundreds of thousands have returned in the past two weeks as the military operation winds down, sporadic fighting continues.

"At this critical juncture, we cannot allow, we cannot let a person walk free, a person who has supported terrorists," said Mian Iftikhar Hussain, information minister for North-West Frontier Province.

"Instead of keeping his promises by taking steps for the sake of peace, and speaking out against terrorism, he did not utter a single word against terrorists," Iftikhar said in a news conference in Peshawar.

Mohammad leads a pro-Taliban group known as the Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law. He was jailed in 2002 but was freed last year after renouncing violence.

Mohammad was not in control of armed militants in Swat. The Taliban's ability to bounce back from the recent offensive will depend on the leaders, including the cleric's son-in-law. Despite rumors to the contrary, none has been captured or is known to have been killed.

Pakistani Pledge to Rout Taliban In Tribal Region Is Put on Hold

By Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, July 27, 2009

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan -- Soon after Pakistan launched its offensive against the Taliban this spring, President Asif Ali Zardari declared that the mission would go beyond pushing the Islamist militia out of the Swat Valley. "We're going to go into Waziristan," he said.

More than two months later, that still has not come to pass. Instead, the planned invasion of South Waziristan, a Taliban and al-Qaeda sanctuary along the Afghanistan border, has been delayed by the refugee crisis spawned by fighting in Swat, an overstretched military unwilling to let its guard down with India and the difficulty in isolating the Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud, according to Pakistani and American officials.

Pakistan's military has blockaded the tribal district and bombed it from the air, and it insists that the ground assault will proceed. But as the clock ticks, military analysts worry that fighting in the mountains will be more difficult as the weather turns cold in the fall. The delay has raised questions about Pakistan's commitment to waging war against Taliban fighters the state has nurtured in the past.

"It's an insane dream to expect anything different from the Pakistani government," said Ali Wazir, a South Waziristan native and a politician with the secular Awami National Party. "The Taliban are the brainchildren of the Pakistan army for the last 30 years. They are their own people. Could you kill your own brother?"

Mehsud is believed to be responsible for the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, as well as many of the recent suicide bombings in Pakistan. American officials, however, said they have not urged Pakistan to launch the operation because of the scope of problems in the Swat Valley, where 2 million refugees were displaced by the ongoing military operation there.

"Baitullah Mehsud is a dreadful man, and his elimination is an imperative. However, the first imperative is to secure the areas the refugees are going back into," Richard C. Holbrooke, the U.S. envoy to the region, said in an interview.

Although Holbrooke said it could be beneficial to have simultaneous offensives -- the U.S. Marines on the Afghanistan side of the border and the Pakistani army in the tribal regions to the east -- the greater concern is unfinished business elsewhere. "Why would I push them to start an offensive when they have 2 million people they have to protect first?" Holbrooke said.

The Pakistani military operation against the Taliban was planned to unfold in three phases, starting in April with the Frontier Corps paramilitary force moving into areas around the Swat Valley, the former tourist destination where the Taliban seized control. The following month, two Pakistani divisions, or about 40,000 soldiers, led a ground operation into the valley. They have since regained control, although fighting continues and the Taliban leadership there remains largely intact. The third and most difficult phase was to be a ground operation into South Waziristan.

But the offensive in Swat pushed some 2 million people from their homes, and the fighting damaged hundreds of schools, homes and businesses. The military now must orchestrate the return of thousands of refugees each day along with rebuilding and trying to prevent the Taliban from returning, as it has done in the past. The Taliban overwhelmed the police before the operation and residents are skeptical about whether the military can keep control.

American officials are concerned that the Pakistani military might not stay in Swat long enough to ensure residents' safety. "Failing to hold in Swat would be a calamity," said a U.S. official in Pakistan, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "I hope they're thinking about it in terms of a plan and not on a timetable."

One Pakistani diplomat said American officials are not happy with the level of coordination involved in providing money and services to the returning refugees. "In their heart of hearts, I think they feel that Pakistan will mess up the repatriation," the diplomat said. "They feel . . . probably they'll go overboard, they won't resettle them, and you'll have a potential quicksand where you'll breed another strand of terrorist resistance."

Pakistani officials insist that they are focused on the refugees and that they do not want to rush into opening new fronts against the Taliban. Pakistan has already launched two operations into South Waziristan in recent years that failed to dislodge the Taliban. Since 2007, more than 2,200 Pakistani soldiers, police and intelligence officers have been killed in Swat and the tribal areas, and more than 5,300 have been injured.

"We would not like to do anything haphazardly. If you open so many fronts at the same time, then the danger is you will not achieve success on any front. So we would like to move with utmost circumspection," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit. The tribal areas are "a different ballgame and we need to understand how difficult it is."

Part of the reason the Pakistani government is wary about launching the Waziristan operation is that there is little appetite to remove more troops from the 140,000-strong force that mans the eastern border with India. Two brigades have already left to join the Swat operation. "That leaves us very little," a Pakistani intelligence official said.

Fighting in South Waziristan also poses a much greater challenge than in Swat. More than 400,000 people live in the tribal district, which is a bit larger than Delaware. Baitullah Mehsud commands about 10,000 to 12,000 fighters, including 4,000 foreign fighters, according to Pakistani intelligence officials. He pays his foot soldiers $60 to $80 a month, higher than the average local policeman's salary. Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, has increased its focus on uniting the Taliban and other radical Islamist groups in the fight against Pakistan, betting its success on the survival of the Taliban, according to intelligence officials.

"It will be longer and bloodier," another intelligence official said of the fight against Baitullah Mehsud. "He's been made into someone 10 feet tall."

Mehsud's stature has grown in part because of recent decisions by other Taliban commanders, such as Maulvi Nasir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who once cooperated with Pakistan but have announced their intention to fight security forces. Their representatives said they have been outraged by missile strikes from unmanned American aircraft. Instead of being able to rely on rival Taliban commanders to assist the army, the drone attacks have unified them against the state, intelligence officials said.

To add to the tactical problems, it is unclear whether the army would be greeted in South Waziristan with the same degree of public support it enjoyed in Swat. The government there has angered Mehsud tribesmen by arresting people and shutting down businesses under regulations that allow punishment based on tribal affiliation.

The initial stages of the South Waziristan operation have begun. Pakistani aircraft, along with unmanned American planes, have attacked Mehsud's territory in recent weeks. Soldiers have deployed into neighboring North Waziristan and have imposed an economic blockade, trying to withhold food and supplies from the Taliban, said a U.S. defense official in Washington.

The official said Pakistan likely wants "to make sure they have everything working in their favor before they actually pull the trigger on a ground assault."

"It's the hardest nut to crack," the official said. "There's no doubt about that."

Staff writer Karen DeYoung in Washington and special correspondent Haq Nawaz Khan in Islamabad contributed to this report.

Two Ministers Forced to Leave Iran's Cabinet

By Thomas Erdbrink
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, July 27, 2009

TEHRAN, July 26 -- Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad fired his intelligence minister and his culture minister resigned under pressure Sunday as further rifts emerged in his camp with just days to go until his controversial inauguration for a second term.

Although Ahmadinejad has frequently replaced his cabinet members over the past four years, Sunday's firing and resignation were significant because both Intelligence Minister Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei and Culture Minister Mohammad Hossein Saffar Harandi are especially close to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, analysts say.

"All ministers are close to him," said Amir Mohebbian, a political analyst who shares Ahmadinejad's ideology but has been critical of his actions. "But these two are closer to the leader."

Taken together, the moves suggest deep unhappiness within Ahmadinejad's inner circle at a time when the government is still reeling from the impact of a weeks-long campaign by the opposition to overturn the results of June's disputed election, in which Ahmadinejad was declared the winner in a landslide.

While Khamenei openly supported Ahmadinejad in the weeks after the disputed election and the two were tightly aligned with one another during the protests and the subsequent crackdown, some divisions between the men have emerged in recent days.

Sunday's cabinet firing and resignation came just a day after Ahmadinejad was criticized by both the head of the armed forces and an influential ally in parliament for his delay in complying with an order from Khamenei to drop his pick for vice president. Ahmadinejad withdrew Esfandiar Rahim Mashai's name for the position Saturday, a full week after the supreme leader's order. Ahmadinejad subsequently gave Mashai an influential gatekeeper position as head of his presidential office.

The timing of Sunday's departures from the cabinet appeared to be related to Ahmadinejad's decision on Mashai -- both ministers sided with the supreme leader in believing Mashai was not fit for office. Mashai faced criticism last year from Khamenei for saying that Iran was friendly with people of all nations, including those of archenemy Israel.

Mohebbian, the analyst, said the president felt weakened over the forced dismissal of Mashai, and reacted Sunday by forcing out the two cabinet members. "Ahmadinejad is now trying to counter this and wants to show himself as a strong leader," he said. "However, such actions will deal a heavy blow to his position among his supporters."

In another move bound to anger critics, Ahmadinejad appointed the highly controversial Ali Kordan as special inspector Sunday, according to the Mehr news agency. Last year, Kordan was impeached as interior minister after his Oxford law degree turned out to be fake. In his new job, Kordan will investigate cases of corruption and fraud within the government.

The two departures from the cabinet on Sunday mean that 12 out of Ahmadinejad's original 21 cabinet members have either resigned or been fired since 2005. Under the constitution, Ahmadinejad is required to submit his cabinet to a new vote of confidence from the parliament if he has replaced more than half its members. That is unlikely to happen, however, because Ahmadinejad is being sworn in for a second term Aug. 5, and he will have to submit a new cabinet for confirmation by Aug. 28.

In the meantime, Iranian political observers say Ahmadinejad's government will have trouble functioning. The deputy head of the parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, told Mehr that any cabinet meeting would be illegal until the new cabinet is sworn in.

The culture minister's resignation came hours after reports, widely carried by state media but later denied, that Ahmadinejad had fired him. In a statement, he acknowledged Ahmadinejad had tried to force him out.

Members of Iran's opposition expressed indifference to the cabinet moves because they deem the government illegitimate. Morteza Alviri, an aide to defeated candidate Mehdi Karroubi, said the upheaval over Ahmadinejad's cabinet was a plot to divert attention from the disputed election result.

"In order to mask the main point, which is the illegal election result, spectacular side events are created to make people's minds busy," Alviri said in an interview.

Demonstrators faced off with police Sunday after they gathered near the entrance of a mosque in Tehran, witnesses reported. The demonstrators were trying to attend a service in honor of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died in prison after participating in recent protests, but the service was canceled at the last minute.

"We sat in the car and saw people being beaten by a crowd of over 200 members of the security forces," said a witness who declined to give her name. "A plainclothes man and a policeman smashed the windows of another car and took the number plate. It was very scary."

Poor Neighborhoods Key in Income Difference, Study Finds

By Alec MacGillis
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, July 27, 2009

Researchers have found that being raised in poor neighborhoods plays a major role in explaining why African American children from middle-income families are far more likely than white children to slip down the income ladder as adults.

The Pew Charitable Trusts Economic Mobility Project caused a stir two years ago by reporting that nearly half of African American children born to middle-class parents in the 1950s and '60s had fallen to a lower economic status as adults, a rate of downward mobility far higher than that for whites.

This week, Pew will release findings of a study that helps explain that economic fragility, pointing to the fact that middle-class blacks are far more likely than whites to live in high-poverty neighborhoods, which has a negative effect on even the better-off children raised there. The impact of neighborhoods is greater than other factors in children's backgrounds, Pew concludes.

Even as African Americans have made gains in wealth and income, the report found, black children and white children are often raised in starkly different environments. Two out of three black children born from 1985 through 2000 were raised in neighborhoods with at least a 20 percent poverty rate, compared with just 6 percent of white children, a disparity virtually unchanged from three decades prior.

Even middle-class black children have been more likely to grow up in poor neighborhoods: Half of black children born between 1955 and 1970 in families with incomes of $62,000 or higher in today's dollars grew up in high-poverty neighborhoods. But virtually no white middle-income children grew up in poor areas.

Using a study that has tracked more than 5,000 families since 1968, the Pew research found that no other factor, including parents' education, employment or marital status, was as important as neighborhood poverty in explaining why black children were so much more likely than whites to lose income as adults.

"We've known that neighborhood matters . . . but this does it in a new and powerful way," said John E. Morton, who directs Pew's economic policy unit. "Neighborhoods become a significant drag not just on the poor, but on those who would otherwise be stable."

Patrick Sharkey, the New York University sociologist who wrote the report, said researchers still need to pinpoint which factors in neighborhoods matter most, such as schools, crime or peer groups. But overall, he said, the impact of the contrasting surroundings for black and white children was indisputable.

"What surprises me is how dramatic the racial differences are in terms of the environments in which children are raised," he said. "There's this perception that after the civil rights period, families have been more able to seek out any neighborhood they choose, and that . . . the racial gap in neighborhoods would whittle away over time, and that hasn't happened."

The Pew researchers argue that the report buttresses President Obama's agenda, which includes proposals for "promise neighborhoods" that would replicate the Harlem Children's Zone, where an intensive array of investments -- beginning with prenatal care -- is meant to transform an entire area. Such an approach, Pew says, holds more promise than dispersing poor families into middle-class neighborhoods by giving them housing vouchers, a strategy that has had mixed results and could be difficult to implement on a large scale.

Sharkey and Morton said policymakers can take heart in one finding: Black children in neighborhoods in which poverty fell by 10 percent had higher incomes as adults than those who grew up in areas where the poverty rate stayed the same. This is a sign, they said, that simply improving the overall economy and quality of a given neighborhood can have beneficial effects on those growing up in it.

The report does not address whether middle-income blacks should move to low-poverty areas for the sake of their children's future prospects. It is a thorny question -- many middle-income blacks have remained in high-poverty areas partly because of segregated housing patterns. And if they were to move elsewhere, the poverty rates in the areas left behind would rise.

Ideally, said several scholars who read the report, investments in struggling neighborhoods would improve them to the extent that the middle-income families would not feel the need to leave.

"These findings do suggest that those with the means or resources should try to escape these neighborhoods," said Harvard sociologist William Julius Wilson. "But . . . the exodus of middle-class families from poor black neighborhoods increases the adverse effects of concentrated poverty."

Worries About A Kurdish-Arab Conflict Move To Fore in Iraq

By Anthony Shadid
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, July 27, 2009

QARAQOSH, Iraq -- Louis Khno is a city councilman whose city is beyond his control. In his barricaded streets are militiamen -- in baseball caps and jeans, wielding Kalashnikov rifles, with the safeties switched off. They answer to someone else. Leaders of his police force give their loyalty to their ethnic brethren -- be they Kurd or Arab. Clergy in the town pledge themselves to the former. Khno and his colleagues to the latter.

"We're far from the conflict, but now we've become the heart of the conflict between Kurds and Arabs," Khno said. "We're now stuck in between them."

Khno called the town "the line of engagement," one stop along an amorphous frontier in northern Iraq shaped by contested history, geography and authority. Dividing the Kurdish autonomous region from the rest of the country, that frontier represents the most combustible fault line in Iraq today, where Arab and Kurd forces may have come to blows last month along hills of harvested wheat. Kurdish officials suggest that another confrontation is inevitable, with halfhearted negotiations already stalled, and U.S. officials acknowledge that only their intervention has prevented bloodshed.

Since 2003, when U.S. forces barreled into Baghdad, toppling Saddam Hussein, inspiring a Shiite revival and unleashing a Sunni insurgency that drew on a communal sense of siege, the war in Iraq has been in large part a sectarian conflict that pitted Sunni Arab against Shiite Arab. That war has subsided, even if bitterness remains.

For months, there were fears that the sectarian battle might reignite, as the United States withdrew its combat forces. Today, that looks less likely. Rather, U.S. officials say, the biggest threat to Iraq in the years ahead is the ethnic conflict, Kurds in the north against the Arab-dominated government in Baghdad, a still-unresolved struggle that has helped shape Iraq's history since the British inherited the land after World War I.

Already, the conflict has redrawn alliances, helping bring a Shiite prime minister into the arms of a powerful Sunni sheik in Anbar province, once the cradle of the insurgency. It has stoked long-standing Kurdish fears of a resurgent government in Baghdad bent on curbing the power of its regional government, which held an election Saturday for a president and new parliament. And it has plunged border towns like Qaraqosh into an increasingly nasty struggle that some fear may end in bloodshed.

"There may not be war. We're tired of wars," said Atheel al-Nujaifi, the Sunni Arab governor of northern Iraq's Nineveh province. "But there will definitely be clashes and fights here and there."

Animosity in Sunni Anbar

It was not so long ago when talk in Anbar, the sprawling province west of Baghdad, dwelt on lynching Americans, smiting infidels and driving Shiite politicians and their Iranian sponsors from Baghdad. Talk there is anything but subtle.

These days, there is a new refrain.

"The Kurds are most dangerous because they live among us as Iraqi citizens," declared Raad al-Alwani, a blunt-speaking sheik in Ramadi whose fondness for scotch competes with his affection for two $20,000 falcons tethered in his front yard. "They should remember that someday there will be a strong government in Baghdad again."

"In the old days, one policeman would have kicked all the Kurds out," added his cousin, Khalid Abdullah al-Fahad, dragging on a cigarette and sipping tea.

Another cousin, Skander Hussein Mohammed, chimed in.

"Our children will kick them out if we can't," he vowed.

With an ear tuned to Iraqi politics, along with the legacies that shape them, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has cultivated those resentments to fashion himself into a nationalist leader. He has staked out an identity as a defender of Iraq's unity and its Arab identity. He has insisted on a strong central government and changes in the constitution that are anathema to Kurds who see that document as their bulwark against an emboldened Baghdad. Since last year, he has dispatched the Iraqi army to the disputed border areas, many of them -- not incidentally -- home to potentially vast reserves of oil and gas.

That has played well in Anbar, where Maliki, a Shiite, has proposed an alliance with Ahmed Abu Risha, perhaps the most powerful Sunni sheik in the province, whose brother led the fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq until he was assassinated in September 2007.

"He's someone who wants a united Iraq," Abu Risha said of the prime minister. "Our points of view, our perspectives are very close."

To call Iraqi politics transparent is to suggest Abu Risha's Rolex is imitation. It's not. And the parlor game in Baghdad these days is discerning Maliki's true motivations. Is he the nationalist strongman so many here desire, bent on defending the territorial integrity of Iraq from the reach of Kurdish ambitions? Or is he covertly sectarian, trying to stoke Arab fears to distract from his imposition of Shiite hegemony in Baghdad?

In Anbar province, Alwani insisted that Maliki's tough line on the Kurds was a gambit to gather Arab votes for parliamentary elections in January. Another sheik, Hamid al-Hais, praised Maliki's stand on the Kurds but insisted he must be tougher. To the nods of fellow tribesmen, Hais offered his own solution to Kirkuk, a city contested by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens: "If they try to take it, we wipe it off the face of the map."

Suspicions Among Kurds

There is a suspicion that colors almost every conversation in the Kurdish autonomous region, a majestic stretch of ranges, interspersed with rivers and fertile valleys. It is fostered by a fight with Baghdad that dates to the British era, and reinforced by the massacres Hussein unleashed at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.

"Is their policy of procrastination and delay for the sake of [allowing] them to get stronger to impose their will on us?" asked Falah Mustafa Bakir, a Kurdish minister.

Maliki has dispatched two delegations to Irbil, the Kurdish capital, ostensibly to break the deadlock in relations between the Baghdad government and the Kurdish government. But he has not spoken with Massoud Barzani, the Kurdish president, in a year, a clear sign that their once amiable relationship has fallen apart.

As one official termed it, "there's a lot of poison in the air."

U.S. officials acknowledge that the disputed boundary has become the most pressing issue in a slew of unresolved conflicts in Iraq -- from national reconciliation to an oil law on sharing revenue and managing the country's enormous reserves.

For years, that boundary was known as the Green Line, drawn as Iraqi forces withdrew from northern Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. It served as the border until 2003, when Kurdish forces, known as pesh merga, crossed the frontier with U.S. approval. Since last year, Maliki has pushed back, sending the Iraqi army to confront pesh merga in the border town of Khanaqin, which has a Kurdish majority, and deploying thousands more troops in Kirkuk. Fearing tension, the U.S. military has bolstered its presence in Kirkuk.

For months, though, the U.S. Embassy has abdicated the lead role in resolving the border issue to the United Nations, which has made little headway. Timing is bad, too. These days, Kurdish attentions are focused on the results of Saturday's election for a regional president and parliament, in which opposition parties did surprisingly well. Forming a government may take until September. With the campaign for national elections beginning in November, little time is left for real negotiation.

As in Arab Iraq, some are also suspicious of the motivations involved in fanning the conflict.

"Internal consumption," said Muhammad Tofiq, a Kurdish opposition politician. To him, the dispute is a way to divert attention from the corruption and failures of the region's ruling parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. "To them, an oil well is more important than Sinjar and Khanaqin," two contested cities.

But old suspicions die hard here, as evidenced by a confrontation between Iraqi army and Kurdish forces that probably would have erupted last month in Makhmur, a disputed town controlled by Kurds, had U.S. forces not been present.

A round of late-night calls by the U.S. military and others averted a clash. "But when will it happen again?" asked Nechirvan Barzani, the Kurdish prime minister. "There is still the logic of who is powerful and who is weak."

Town of Divided Loyalties

The first question at the checkpoint on the edge of Qaraqosh, the Christian town along the disputed border, was standard. "Where are you coming from?" barked a militiaman in street clothes, armed and paid by a benefactor loyal to the Kurds.

The questions that followed weren't.

"Are you Christian?" he asked. "Are you Kurdish? Are you Arab?"

These days in Qaraqosh, it matters.

Residents seem to resist the idea of being joined to Kurdistan, as the Kurds refer to their autonomous region. Many of the Christians here pronounce a pride in belonging to an ancient community of Mesopotamia. Others resent the heavy-handedness of Kurdish security, which residents say has hauled away scores of people in the past few years to prisons in Irbil and, farther north, in Aqrah.

"When they return," one politician said, "they have to keep their mouth shut."

Qaraqosh is consumed in a claustrophobic conflict over space and borders, a grinding attempt to lay claim -- politically, psychologically and socially -- to everything from the authority of the police to the rebuilding of a church.

The native language of the deputy police chief is Kurdish. So is his loyalty, critics say. His boss speaks Arabic. Members of the city council pledge loyalty to Gov. Nujaifi's Arab-dominated government in Mosul, which provides Qaraqosh meager water and electricity. More generous is the money that has poured in from a benefactor, Sarkis Aghajan, a wealthy Christian who once served as Kurdish finance minister. Credited to him are buses for students, renovations of orphanages and monasteries, and even generators for electricity. Officials say he is behind the militia, too, which numbers 1,200 fighters in Qaraqosh and two other Christian towns.

"We have an order from the state," said Ghadeer Salem, one of the commanders.

Baghdad? he was asked.

"No," he replied. "Kurdistan."

Special correspondent Dlovan Brwari contributed to this report.

Baloch Separatists Attack Traders

One person has been killed in an attack in Pakistan's Balochistan province, the latest in a spate of attacks against non-Balochi people in the region.

Police said three others were also injured when a group of rice traders from Punjab province were attacked.

An armed separatist group, the Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF), has claimed responsibility.

Officials say nearly 40 people have been killed by Baloch separatists in the province since the start of 2009.

The killings are part of a campaign by armed groups to drive non-Balochi people out of the province, according to officials.

The traders had come from Punjab province to sell rice at a weekly market in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province, police said.

They were shot near the market on Sunday by assailants on two motorbikes.

Six people have been killed since Friday in similar targeted killings, police said.

After Sunday's attack, police arrested dozens of suspects in overnight raids.

'Political autonomy'

Balochistan accounts for nearly 40% of the country's area but it has less than 10% of its population.

The province is rich in natural resources but has almost no representation in the central bureaucracy or the army, the two groups that have for the most part ruled Pakistan, says the BBC's Ilyas Khan in Islamabad.

As a result, Balochistan remains a province steeped in poverty and with an undeveloped infrastructure, our correspondent says.

Since 2001, armed groups have been conducting a violent campaign to prevent the army from setting up garrisons in the province and to discourage major development projects that they believe would benefit businesses and workers in other provinces.

They have been demanding political autonomy and greater provincial control over their natural resources.

Hundreds of Baloch political activists have been detained in "undeclared custody" and activists claim that a number have been tortured and killed.

Officials say the targeted killings are part of a strategy on the part of these groups to drive non-Balochi settlers out of the province and to discourage people of other provinces from taking up jobs or setting up businesses in Balochistan.

Initially, it was mainly Punjabi's - Pakistan's biggest ethnic group - who were targeted.

But in recent months armed separatists have also targeted ethnic Sindhis and Pashtuns from the North West Frontier Province, police say.

Three Convicted for Mumbai Blasts

A court in India has convicted three people of carrying out bombings that killed more than 50 people in the city of Mumbai (Bombay) in 2003.

Haneef Sayyed, his wife Fahmeeda and Ashrat Ansari had pleaded not guilty to murder and conspiracy charges.

The explosions at the famous Gateway of India landmark and a busy market shocked the country and caused carnage.

They were said to be in retaliation for the deaths of Muslims during riots in Gujarat state the year before.

Hundreds have been killed in attacks in Mumbai in recent years.

'Links with militants'

The double car bombing in August 2003 left devastation at the Gateway of India and the Zaveri Bazaar market near the Mumba Devi temple in central Mumbai.

About 180 people were injured.

The three defendants, all of them from Mumbai, were charged under India's Prevention Of Terrorism Act, which has since been repealed.

Two others were accused - Mohammed Ansari and Mohammed Hasan. They were discharged after a review by the special court last year.

The three defendants were convicted of plotting the bombings in co-ordination with the Pakistan-based Islamic militant group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

LeT is also accused of carrying out other attacks in India in recent years, including the gun and bomb assault on Mumbai last November.

The judge said all three defendants were members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, which they denied.

Sentencing is due on 4 August and the prosecution is expected to demand the death penalty. The defence plan to appeal.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/8169876.stm

Published: 2009/07/27

Talk to Taliban, Miliband Urges

David Miliband has urged the Afghan government to talk to moderate members of the Taliban as part of efforts to bring stability to the country.

In a speech to Nato, the UK foreign secretary said those insurgents willing to renounce violence should be included in a broad-based political coalition.

His comments came as it was confirmed the first phase of the UK-US offensive in southern Afghanistan has now ended.

The Tories said ministers must focus on a limited number of clear objectives.

'Heavy toll'

July has been the deadliest month for the UK and Nato after they launched Operation Panther's Claw - designed to take and secure land in Helmand province ahead of next month's presidential elections.

Mr Miliband said the operation had resulted in a "heavy toll" in terms of British deaths but "significant gains" had been made.

The Ministry of Defence said the first phase of the operation - which led directly to ten British deaths - is now over and that Nato troops would now be focusing on holding onto territory gained ahead of next month's elections.

Mr Miliband said the objectives of the UK's mission were clear but accepted the public "wanted to know whether and how we can succeed" in Afghanistan.

He said a viable political solution, alongside the military offensive, was essential to securing Afghanistan's future.

As part of this, Mr Miliband said current insurgents should be reintegrated into society and, in some cases, given a role in local and central government.

In doing so, he said a distinction should be drawn between "hard-line ideologues" and Jihaddist terrorists who must be fought and defeated from those who could be "drawn into a political process".

Switching sides

Those who had either been coerced or bribed into joining the insurgency could play a constructive role if they disowned violence and respected the Afghan constitution, he said.

"These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course."

Denying the approach marked a change of strategy, he added: "That means in the long term an inclusive political settlement in Afghanistan - separating those who want Islamic rule locally from those committed to violent jihad globally - and giving them a sufficient role in local politics that they leave the path of confrontation with the government."

HAVE YOUR SAY They have goals, we have goals. If we can both respect each other it is possible but depends on who is willing to give what Wayne, Lancashire, UK

The BBC's diplomatic correspondent Bridget Kendall said the UK was clear the responsibility was on the Afghan government to show commitment to this process.

But the Conservatives said there was nothing new in Mr Miliband's speech, saying dialogue between Kabul and parts of the Taliban had taken place for years.

Shadow foreign secretary William Hague said the UK must focus on clear objectives such as building up of the Afghan army and "ensuring that the gains won by British forces on the battlefield are swiftly followed by reconstruction".

For the Lib Dems, former leader Sir Menzies Campbell said Nato's evident lack of confidence in Afghan President Hamid Karzail could be a major stumbling block to reconciliation efforts.

"President Karzai shows no inclination for the kind of engagement with the Taliban that David Miliband envisages," he said.

"If Britain and America want to promote dialogue they will have to do it by working round Karzai and presenting him with a fait accompli."

Earlier, International Development Secretary Douglas Alexander compared the move to the talks that brought an end to the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Mr Alexander, who is in Afghanistan, conceded it was a "challenging" message for politicians to suggest when British troops were being killed in action but said he had "confidence in the good judgement of the British people" that such a move would ultimately be beneficial.

'Terror chain'

British commanders say key objectives have been achieved on the ground and Prime Minister Gordon Brown has paid tribute to the professionalism and courage of British troops involved in the mission.

"What we have done is make the land secure for about 100,000 people, push back the Taliban and start to break the chain of terror linking the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan to the streets of Britain," he said.

Although troops from other Nato members have been drawn into offensive action, Mr Miliband has called for other countries to contribute more.

He said the policy of burden-sharing must work in "practice" not just in theory.

So far in July, 67 international troops have been killed, bringing the number of coalition deaths in 2009 to 223.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8169789.stm

Published: 2009/07/27

Nigerian Islamist Attacks Spread

Dozens of people have been killed after Islamist militants staged three attacks in northern Nigeria, taking the total killed in two days of violence to 150.

A BBC reporter has counted 100 bodies, mostly of militants, near the police headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State, where hundreds are fleeing their homes.

Witnesses told the BBC a gun battle raged for hours in Potiskum, Yobe State and a police station was set on fire.

Some of the militants follow a preacher who campaigns against Western schools.

ANALYSIS
By Caroline Duffield, BBC News, Nigeria

Tensions are never far from the surface in northern Nigeria. Poverty and competition for scarce resources, along with ethnic, cultural and religious differences have all fuelled sudden violence.

But the latest violence is not between communities, it involves young men from religious groups, arming themselves and attacking local police.

Fringe religious groups in Nigeria have claimed links to the Taliban before - individuals have also been accused of links to al-Qaeda. But Nigeria is very different to countries like Mali or Algeria, where groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb operate.

The idea of radical Islamist militants gaining a serious foothold in Nigeria is usually dismissed, because of the strength of local identities and traditions.


  • The preacher, Mohammed Yusuf, says Western education is against Islamic teaching.

    There has also been an attack in Wudil, some 20km (12 miles) from Kano, the largest city in northern Nigeria.

    A curfew is in force in Bauchi, the scene of Sunday's violence.

    Sharia law is in place across northern Nigeria, but there is no history of al-Qaeda-linked violence in the country.

    Nigeria's 150 million people are split almost equally between Muslims and Christians and the two groups generally live peacefully side by side, despite occasional outbreaks of communal violence.

    Militants chanting "God is great" attacked the Potiskum police station at about 0215 local time (0115 GMT) - the same time as the raid was launched in Maiduguri.

    The police station and neighbouring buildings in Potiskum have been razed to the ground, eyewitnesses say.

    Two people have been confirmed dead and the police have made 23 arrests.

    Fringe group

    The corpses of civilians are scattered around the streets of Maiduguri, after being pulled from their cars and shot, eyewitnesses say.

    The police and army are patrolling, firing into the air, apparently trying to clear civilians from the area.

    There are unconfirmed reports of a jailbreak in the town.

    In Wudil, three people have been killed and more than 33 arrested. The senior police officer in Wudil has been wounded.

    Security is said to have been beefed up in Plateau State, to the south of Bauchi, where hundreds were killed in clashes between Muslims and Christians last year.

    Mr Yusuf's followers in Bauchi are known as Boko Haram, which means "Education is prohibited".

    They attacked a police station on Sunday after some of their leaders were arrested.

    Correspondents say the group is seen locally as a fringe group and has aroused suspicion for its recruitment of young men, and its belief that Western education, Western culture and science are sinful.

    Iran: The Tragedy & the Future

    By Roger Cohen

    The least that could be said, in the sunny morn after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's emphatic reelection as president of Iran, was that festivities of the kind associated with a victory by two thirds of the vote were on hold, discarded in favor of a putsch-like lockdown. Baton-wielding riot police in thigh-length black leg guards swarmed from the shuttered Interior Ministry in the early hours of June 13. They went to work beating people. Voting had closed the previous night in Iran's tenth presidential election of the revolutionary era. Within hours, the national news agency, IRNA, had announced a landslide first-round victory for Ahmadinejad. Tehran was changed, changed utterly, and there was no beauty to the terror born.

    A festive city awash in revelers and agog at the apparent vibrancy of democratic debate in the thirty-year-old Islamic Republic had morphed overnight into a place of smoldering eyes, insidious fear, and rampaging state-licensed thugs. People looked dazed, as anyone would, so thrust into desolation from delight. All the preelectoral freedom and debates suddenly looked like cruel theater controlled by a perverse puppeteer. "It's a coup, a coup d'Ć©tat," people whispered.

    Outside the already upended campaign headquarters of Mir Hussein Moussavi—the opposition candidate whose campaign had blossomed late in great thickets of green banners and bandannas—whining phalanxes of police, two to a motorbike, swept up and down. To loiter was to be targeted. "Throw away your pen and notebook and come to our aid," a sobbing woman shouted at me, before vanishing into the eddying crowd.



    I was still using a notebook then. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, had not yet pronounced foreign correspondents "evil" agents, thus granting heavenly sanction to their manhandling, expulsion, or arrest, which duly followed. Like everyone that morning I was perplexed. The Iranian government proceeds with cautious calculation. The revolution's survival has not been based on caprice. Had this government really invited hundreds of journalists to a freedom fest only to change its mind? I lingered when I could, ran when I had to, bumping into another railing young woman in tears. As we stood talking, a middle-aged man approached. "Don't cry, be brave and be ready," he told her.

    I will call him Mohsen. He showed me his ID card from the Interior Ministry, where he said he'd worked for thirty years. He'd been locked out, he said, as had other employees, many of whom had been fired in recent weeks. We ducked into a cafĆ©, where patriotic songs droned from a TV over images of soldiers and devout women in black chadors—had we just witnessed an election or the imposition of martial law?—and Mohsen talked about his brother, a martyr of the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war, and how he himself had not fought in that war, nor endured a sibling's loss, to see "this injustice against the Revolution, conscience, and humanity."

    Iran's dignity had been flouted, he said, the alleged election results emerging from the Interior Ministry plucked from the summer air. Why, I asked, had he admonished the young woman? "Because the best decisions are needed in the worst of conditions and crying is not the answer." Mohsen told me he'd also admonished the police: "I asked them: if Ahmadinejad won, why is such oppression needed?"

    His inquiry was reasonable in the face of unreasonable numbers. In great clumps of two to five million votes they emerged throughout the morning, without attribution to region. (A full geographic breakdown took ten days to emerge, presumably because reverse engineering takes time.) Throughout the unmonitored process Ahmadinejad's share scarcely wavered, showing a near-perfect consistency across areas of vast social and ethnic diversity, and ending at 24,527,516 votes (62.63 percent), or almost 20 million more than the 5,711,696 he won in the first round in 2005.

    This staggering gain was trumpeted after a campaign in which the incumbent's record—of rising inflation, growing unemployment, squandered oil revenue, and, in Moussavi's words, a "provocative and adventurous" foreign policy—had come under critical scrutiny from Iranians not insensitive to their pocketbooks or to proud Persia's place in the world. Khamenei himself called the result "divine," a miracle.

    An insulting farce was the general verdict in Tehran, where, it is true, foreign correspondents were largely confined in ever more restrictive conditions (although my colleague Bill Keller went to Esfahan four days after the vote and found himself in the midst of a pitched battle between protesters and security forces). It is also true that Ahmadinejad allotted countless hours and handouts to winning over small-town folk, who may have been susceptible to what they heard in local mosques about his fast-forwarding of Iran's nuclear program, transformed by the President into a patriotic symbol as potent as the nationalization of oil.

    But it was in cities, not rural areas, that Ahmadinejad secured his triumph in 2005, a pattern for conservatives since 1997. That he built his landslide in the countryside is far-fetched. Even the twelve-member Guardian Council—empowered to oversee legislation and elections—which is stuffed with the President's men, found irregularities in fifty towns and with more than three million votes, or over 7.5 percent of the total. This did not prevent the council, after cursory inquiry, from pronouncing the election "healthy" on June 30.

    It looked sclerotic. The plunge in support for the reformist cleric Mehdi Karroubi, from more than five million votes in 2005 to just over 300,000, or 0.85 percent of the vote, was just one of many details as preposterous as Ahmadinejad's surge. Too many printed ballots, some 14,000 movable ballot boxes, and a dearth of observers—Moussavi's were pushed out of most precincts—prepared fertile ground for fraud. Is there a smoking gun? Not quite. Was this a free and fair election by the United Nations standards to which Iran itself subscribes? No, emphatically not.

    I'd talked on the eve of the election to Kavous Sayed-Emami, a respected political scientist who had done some polling. He was sure of only one thing. "Given the 180-degree turnabout from a month ago, when the election was dead and I expected a 55 percent turnout against the 80 percent I expect now, it's become impossible for Ahmadinejad to win 50 percent in the first round. And that means a second round."

    He proved conservative: 85 percent of the electorate voted. Another week of campaigning, however, would have meant more freewheeling debate and green waves redolent of the "color revolutions" in Ukraine and Georgia. A statement four days before the election from Yadollah Javani, the head of the Revolutionary Guard political office, should have drawn more attention: if Moussavi had a velvet revolution in mind, he would see it "quashed before it is born."

    The quashing, on that first topsy-turvy morning, was vicious. Anyone there knew something was rotten in the state of Iran. The fraud was in the air. That evening, on Vali Asr, the handsome, plane tree–lined avenue that cuts north to south across the city, I ran into a trembling Majr Mirpour, a raw welt across his back, wounds on his upper arm and thigh, and he told me how he'd been beaten "like a pig" as he bent to help a wounded woman. I was shocked and in truth, over the ensuing ten days, that shock never entirely abated as I saw the clubbing of women, usually by a Basij militiaman, who had been given a shield and a helmet and a stick and told to do his worst.

    Weeks later I am still shaken. Iran lurched. The lurching was violent. Still, certain truths have emerged with some clarity from the enduring opacity of the country's revolutionary power structure. The Islamic Republic, always beset by the clerical–liberal tension implied by its very name—one that has existed in Iran since its people first demanded a constitution in 1905—will never be the same.

    Millions of Iranians have moved from reluctant acquiescence to a system over which they believed they had some limited, quadrennial influence into outright opposition to a regime they now view with undiluted contempt. The clerical and political establishment is more split—and more volatile—than at any time since the bloody postrevolutionary years, when scores were settled as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini outmaneuvered those who had fought for democracy rather than theocracy.

    Khomeini's successor as supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has undermined the core concept of Velayat-e faqih, or the guardianship of the Islamic jurist. He has forsaken his role as divine arbiter—a man standing in for the occulted twelfth imam until his expected reappearance—in favor of a partisan role at the flank of Ahmadinejad. This carries none of his former aura—the French translate his title as le Guide —or former plausible deniability. No longer a representative of heaven, Khamenei is now implanted in the trenches.

    There he finds himself alongside his second-born son, the cleric Mojtaba Khamenei, whose role in the violent repression appears to have been significant, not least in the control of the marauding militias. "Death to Khamenei" was the most extraordinary protest cry I heard, a measure of just how taboo-shattering recent events have been. At the same time, the Revolutionary Guards, led by Major General Mohammed Ali Jafari, have moved to center stage in what Jafari himself has called "a new phase of the revolution and political struggles," where his elite force "took the initiative to quell a spiraling unrest."

    In short, a more fragile, contested, fissured, and militaristic Iran—its recent regional ascendancy undermined by falling oil prices, rising dissent, and more flexible and probing American leadership—has emerged. It begs many questions. Will solidarity outweigh friction among the mullahs? How will greater instability affect the country's onrushing nuclear program? Can Moussavi organize effective political opposition? And might Ahmadinejad, now the most divisive political figure in the Islamic Republic's short history, prove expendable in the name of compromises to shore up a shaken system? Given the political, religious, and social chasms now apparent, I would not rule out the President's eventual defenestration. Nor, however, should anyone, least of all American policymakers, bank on it.

    The Alborz Mountains soar above the north side of Tehran, their peaks arousing dreams of escape in people caught by the city's endless bottlenecks. For young Iranians—and 65 percent of a population that has more than doubled since the revolution to 75 million is under thirty-five—the mountain trails are a physical escape but also a mental one: from self-censorship, from monochrome dress, and from the morality police ever alert for a female neck revealed or hair cascading from a headscarf.

    Toward the end of a three-week visit earlier this year, in January and February, I hiked in the Alborz and found that frustration—about female dress codes, scarce jobs, and rising prices—was paramount in several conversations that depicted Iran as engaged in an elaborate game of cat-and-mouse: a clerical superstructure sitting atop a society that has in many ways become secular, with repressive laws straining to hold back women emancipated by the education the revolution brought. Today, 60 percent of university students are women. It took ayatollahs to tell traditional Shia families that they should educate their daughters.

    At the time, Nasser Hadian, a political scientist, told me: "I say to my students, it's hard to wait but you should be patient. The laws of the country cannot forever lag behind the reality, and Iran's reality today is that women have been empowered and secularism has spread." Nor, I thought, in an election year, could politics forever lag behind these facts.

    The June 12 election offered a potential bridge between this youthful Iran in rapid evolution, curious about the world and increasingly connected to it online, and revolutionary institutions that had veered in a conservative direction under Ahmadinejad. Presidential votes have served as safety valves in the past. They have provided modest course corrections that have made the term "Republic" not altogether meaningless. Iran was distinguished in a despotic region by its unpredictable elections, as when the reformist Mohammad Khatami won in a landslide in 1997.

    Khatami, who ended up changing more tone than substance, said he would stand again this year, before desisting in favor of Moussavi, a former prime minister of impeccable revolutionary credentials, a distant relative of Ayatollah Khamenei, a staunch nationalist, and seemingly the very embodiment of unthreatening change. Khamenei, as president, had worked with Moussavi in the war-ravaged 1980s. Their relationship was uneasy but survived eight years. Allergic to another Khatami presidency, the supreme leader appeared to have made his peace with Moussavi, even if his preference for Ahmadinejad was clear.

    But Khamenei's acquiescence was to the Moussavi of early May: drab, detached, and dutiful. By early June, he had become the energized anti- Ahmadinejad. Apathy among Iranians had yielded to the activism that would produce the 85 percent turnout. Moussavi had been propelled in part by his charismatic wife, Zahra Rahnavard, whom I saw just before the election at a big Tehran rally where, in floral hijab, she began with a resounding "Hello Freedom!" and proceeded to warn that "if there is rigging, Iran will have a revolution."

    Green ribbons and banners were everywhere as she warmed to her theme: "You are looking for a new identity for Iran that will bring you pride in the world, an Iran that is free, developing, and full of vitality. We seek peaceful relations with the rest of the world, not senseless attacks and uncalculated friendships." This was heady stuff. But those were heady days, and nights, marked by charges and countercharges in presidential debates watched on television by tens of millions of people. Opacity, on which the regime had depended, appeared to have evaporated with giddying abruptness.

    There was Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, no less, long the Ć©minence grise of the regime, the head of the Assembly of Experts that oversees the supreme leader's office, fulminating in a letter to Khamenei that Ahmadinejad could face the same abrupt downfall as the Islamic Republic's first president, Abolhassan Bani Sadr, because he had "lied and violated laws against religion, morality, and fairness." Ahmadinejad had accused Rafsanjani and others in the clerical hierarchy of enriching themselves. None of the rabid electioneering would have been out of place in Chicago.

    So what happened to this pluralistic gale gusting across the republic until the night of June 12? We may not know exactly for a long time, if ever. But this much is clear. A fundamental battle between nationalist-revolutionaries and reform-minded internationalists played out, stirred by President Obama's overtures. At its core lay the issue of Iran's self-confidence.

    Thirty years after the revolution, would the country continue to stand apart from the forces of economic and political globalization—indeed position itself as a revolutionary counterforce in the name of a new "social justice"—with the aim of preserving its Islamic theocracy? Or was it confident enough of its Islamic identity, its security alongside a now Shia-dominated Iraq, and its firmly established independence from America (another revolutionary achievement), to drop the tired nest-of-spies vitriol of Great Satanism and a self-defeating isolation?

    The answer, in the end, was unambiguous. I think back to the severely disabled intellectual and journalist Saeed Hajjarian standing bravely beside Zahra Rahnavard at that rally—now thrown in jail and grievously ill. I think of the economist Saeed Leylaz, whom I saw the day before—now thrown in jail—and of Muhammad Atrianfar, another reformist I spoke to, also in jail. I think of Newsweek's Maziar Bahari, whom I saw at Ahmadinejad's postelectoral press conference devoted to ramblings on Iran's "ethical democracy," now imprisoned.

    Most of the reformist brain trust has been rounded up. Anyone who, like Rafsanjani, believes strongly in a "China option" for Iran—the possibility of opening to America and the world while preserving the Nezam (system)—has been beaten back for now. Mistrust of opening, and of the very rapid social developments brought about by the revolution, won at the last.

    I say "at the last" because I believe it was a close-run thing. The Moussavi wave came very late, and it was colored green, setting off alarm about color-revolution at the headquarters of the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij militia. It also came with an unsettling offer of dialogue from Obama sitting unanswered on the table. As a conservative cleric and Ahmadinejad supporter, Mohsen Mahmoudi, told me a week after the election, "We would never allow Moussavi or Khatami to restore relations, because they would then have heroic status."

    America is popular with most Iranians, who would welcome a now remote normalization. So Iran's New Right, gathered around Ahmadinejad, discerned two specters—velvet rumblings and a rapprochement with Washington over which it might lose control. It opted, probably in the last seventy-two hours, for the sledgehammer.

    Everything looked clumsy and improvised in the days after the vote: the top-down way the outrageous results were announced; Khamenei's appeal to Ahmadinejad to be the president of all Iranians, followed immediately by a radically polarizing speech from his disciple dismissing all those who didn't vote for him as hooligans worthless as "dust"; the unpersuasive bussing-in of Ahmadinejad supporters who made a lot of noise but were outnumbered.

    On June 15, three days after the vote, the ire of Iranians coalesced in the most dignified demonstration of popular will I have ever witnessed. Seldom has silence been deployed with such force. From Enqelab (Revolution) Square to Azadi (Freedom) Square, over several miles, some three million people formed a sea of green. With cell phones and texting blocked, and Internet access spotty, they had gathered through word of mouth in a city of whispers.

    Slowly they marched, students and shopkeepers, old and young, with arms raised to signal a "V" for victory sign. "Sokoot "—"Silence"—they said if even a murmuring arose. "Raise your hands," they whispered to the police. "Where is the 63 percent?" asked one banner. A young woman, Negar, told me, "We were hoping that after thirty years we might have a little choice." From beside me, an insistent male voice: "We are dust, but we will blind him."

    In that moment, the crowd seemed irresistible, too large to be harmed, too strong to be cowed, and it was as if the whole frustrated centennial Iranian quest for some form of democratic pluralism, some workable compromise between clericalism and secularism that denies neither the country's profound Islamic faith nor its broad attraction to liberal values, had welled onto that broad avenue.

    The immense tide was pushed back. Every day crowds gathered, but never again in quite such numbers. Moussavi, confined, was neither visible enough nor vehement enough to seize the moment. At a big demonstration on June 18, he and his wife passed four feet from where I stood. He waved to the crowd but said nothing, a leader constrained. Obama, too, was constrained, rightly mindful of poisonous history, but still perhaps two days behind the curve with each of his escalating denunciations of the violence.

    At Friday prayers a week after the election, Khamenei showed no such constraint, explicitly aligning himself with Ahmadinejad and saying street protests must cease or the resultant bloodshed would be on Moussavi's hands. I watched blood get duly shed the next day, beaten women limping, tear gas swirling, screams rising, as pitched battles erupted between security forces now acting with divine endorsement and tens of thousands of protesters defying the Guide. That evening the murder by a single shot of twenty-six-year-old Neda Agha-Soltan, caught on video that went global, defined the reckless brutality of the moment: the image of eyes blanking, life abating, and blood spilling over her face will forever undercut Ahmadinejad's talk of "justice."

    He is a weakened president. Force got the upper hand, at least temporarily, but at a heavy price. Ahmadinejad canceled trips to the city of Shiraz and to Libya as pressure mounted. Ali Ardeshir-Larijani, the influential speaker of the Majlis, the Iranian parliament, and Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, the mayor of Tehran, attacked his suppression of opposition. Both men are moderate conservatives close to Khamenei. Larijani, who has presidential ambitions, will, I suspect, be a useful barometer of political sentiment in the coming months. Within the Majlis, criticism has also been severe. A majority of members opted not to attend a celebration party. Rafsanjani's comparison of Ahmadinejad to Bani Sadr—the first postrevolutionary president who was ousted by clerics—still hovers in the air and, of course, Rafsanjani still holds powerful positions.

    If political opposition has been clear, religious disquiet has been even clearer. In Qom, the country's religious center, two important associations of clerics have denounced the election as fraudulent. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri—who fell out with Khomeini and, later, with Khamenei in part over the concept of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist—called the election result one "that no wise person in their right mind can believe" and dismissed Iran's rulers as "usurpers and transgressors." Ayatollah Sayyed Hossein Mousavi Tabrizi, who was chief prosecutor under Khomeini, said protesters had the right to demonstrate. "The Shah also called the demonstrating people rioters," Tabrizi said. "It was due to such reasons that the Shah's regime was illegitimate."

    Ahmadinejad, a volatile radical, thrived on the radical Bush White House. Consigned to the axis of evil, he proved nimble at fighting back, identifying himself with the disinherited of the earth against the "arrogant power." But damaged by the violence at home, facing a black American president of partly Muslim descent who has reached out to the Islamic world, and irretrievably discredited in the West through his Holocaust denial, he may now prove more of a liability than an asset. If Obama is able to coax Syria, Iran's chief Arab ally, into an Arab–Israeli peace process, Tehran's regional position could begin to look a lot less powerful, especially with oil at $60 a barrel, the economy in a downward spiral, and resistance stiffening in Iraq to Iranian interference. I heard the example of Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani invoked several times after the election as an instructive example of powerful Shia religious leadership that respects the democratic process.

    But of course Ahmadinejad's victory reflects a harsh reality: the ascendancy of a hard-line coterie that is now fighting for its life and wealth, the latter sustained in part by the President's channeling of no-bid contracts in oil drilling and construction to the Revolutionary Guards. A couple of days after the election, a member of Rafsanjani's inner circle took me into an elevator and told me that the four men behind the fraud and repression were Hassan Taeb, the commander of the Basiji militia; Mujtaba Khamenei, the leader's son; Saeed Jalili, the head of the National Security Council and Iran's chief negotiator on nuclear issues; and Khamenei himself. He did not mention Jafari, the Revolutionary Guard commander, but the centrality of that 125,000-strong elite to the regime's structure is evident. The clerical backing for these forces comes chiefly from Ahmad Janati, the secretary-general of the Guardian Council, and Mohammad Mesbah Yazdi, a former head of the judiciary and Ahmadinejad's spiritual leader.

    A central question over the coming months will be whether this group is able to tough it out. Or will it seek to co-opt moderates into a new Ahmadinejad government in a bid to calm popular ire and signal conciliation to the world? Moussavi, Khatami, and Karroubi have all continued to denounce the violence used against continuing street protests, and Moussavi has hinted at the formation of a new political party. But his real room for maneuver in an atmosphere of near martial law remains unclear.

    In fact, flux is the new state of Iran. The ricochets from June 12 are far from over. They are impacting an alienated society and a divided regime. Nationalist business people who talked up the pliability of the Islamic Republic to me in February now download manufacturing manuals for Molotov cocktails. An enraged popular push for a recount or rerun of the fraudulent election has expanded into something broader. This volatility was underscored when street demonstrations attended by thousands resumed on July 9, the tenth anniversary of the suppression of student protests in 1999. One student was killed then; at least several dozen have been killed since this year's disputed election. Martyrdom is a powerful force in Shia Iran, with its three-, seven-, and forty-day mourning cycles for the dead, and its parade of ceremonies commemorating in self-flagellating grief the death of members of the Prophet's family. It is certain that the martyrs of this ballot-box putsch will live and reverberate in Iran's collective memory.

    Meanwhile the centrifuges spin. There are close to seven thousand of them now, and Iran has produced about a ton of low-enriched uranium. Israeli officials have stated that their red line is close and indicated more than once that Israel is prepared to bomb Iranian facilities to prevent the country becoming a nuclear, or virtual nuclear, power. Joe Biden said this is Israel's sovereign right, but Obama appeared to distance himself from the vice-president, saying that the US wanted to resolve the nuclear issue "in a peaceful way." Little would be left of the American president's pivotal outreach to the Islamic world if Israeli bombs rained down on Natanz: the distinction between Israel and the United States would be lost on hundreds of millions of Muslims from Cairo to Tehran and beyond.

    Obama says his overture still stands. A path to normalization exists if Iran is willing to compromise on its nuclear program. But the whole putative process has clearly become more difficult: the Iranian government is of very dubious legitimacy, has blood on its hands, and is under destabilizing pressures that could prove explosive. Obama and leaders of the major industrial powers have now demanded an Iranian response on nuclear talks by September, moving up a loose deadline that had been set for the end of the year. There's official international "impatience" with Iran. But nobody can control or time the fallout from Ahmadinejad's power grab, and business as usual is clearly impossible as long as people are being clubbed in the streets.

    The strategic imperative for engagement with Iran remains, evident from Iraq to Afghanistan and Gaza. The moral imperative to stand with democracy-seeking Iranians being beaten for protesting peacefully is also clear. This double, and conflicting, imperative argues for a period of coolness that could increase Ahmadinejad's vulnerability. Obama is good at cool.

    Iran overwhelms people with its tragedy. At night, I would go out onto a small balcony off my bedroom or onto rooftops with friends, and listen to the sounds of Allah-u-Akbar and "Death to the Dictator" echoing between the high-rises. Often, Iran's brave women led the chants. Tehran is not beautiful, but spread out in its mountainous amphitheater, it is a noble and stirring city. Unrequited longing is a Persian condition. I've felt it in the Iranian diaspora—Iranians were globalized by Khomeini—and I feel it in the many Iranians I know who still quest for the freedom that their country has sought since people rose to demand a constitution from the Qajar dynasty in 1905.

    A great desire and a great rage inhabited those rooftop cries. I hear them still. Iran, thanks in part to the revolution, now has many of the preconditions for democracy, including a large middle class, broad higher education, and a youthful population that is sophisticated and engaged. If Khamenei and the revolutionary establishment deny that, as they did with violence after June 12, they will in the end devour themselves. When that will be I do not know, but Iran's government and people are marching in opposite directions. I do know that if the hard-liners maintain their current tenuous hold, the one way they will lock it in for a long time would be if bombs fell on Iran. Offers of engagement have unsettled the regime. Military confrontation would cement it.

    —July 16, 2009