Sep 27, 2009

Singapore's Red-Light District Is a Hotbed of Good Food - washingtonpost.com

Night cookImage by JanneM via Flickr

By Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan
Special to The Washington Post
Sunday, September 27, 2009

In the dark, I wended my way through a thicket of hungry-eyed men, brushing off leering looks as I focused on reaching my goal: a fluorescent white beacon coming from a slender alley behind a scruffy-looking motel.

My family and I had come to Geylang, Singapore's best-known red-light district, in search of a good time, but probably of a different sort from what the men around us were after. In the alley, we perched on greasy plastic stools, taking in the smells of wok-fried seafood and tempura eggplant as we waited for our meal to surface at J.B. Ah Meng, a little hawker-stand-style restaurant with tables set up in a grimy passageway.

Soon enough, the sounds of hawkers' flip-flops signaled the arrivals: a bed of slightly crispy glass noodles tossed with bits of cuttlefish, egg and pork, stir-fried in a sweet dark soy sauce; and a platter of crispy, deep-fried fish skins topped with a tart fresh papaya salad. But the truly unusual star of the meal was a dish of shrimp and clusters of corn kernels slathered with a thick coating of salted egg and then deep-fried. The slightly grainy salted egg crust was an intriguing and delicious juxtaposition with the plump, juicy bits of shrimp and corn. Our entire meal of four big platters (including an order of tempura eggplant) cost just under $40. Not a bad price for a few well-conceived and perfectly executed dishes that we'd remember for some time to come.

When people think of Singapore, a few things tend to come to mind: squeaky-clean malls, an iron-fisted government, a ban on chewing gum. There is a seamier side to the country, however, and the pockets where this underbelly flourishes are increasingly where you'll find some of the best meals.

Along Keong Saik Road, in a neighborhood that has housed brothels for more than a century, narrow lanes are dotted with old Chinese coffee shops known as "tze char" places, which are basic stalls that offer a variety of stir-fried dishes such as crab noodles and har jeong gai, a dish of chicken coated with prawn paste and then deep-fried. Near the east coast, Joo Chiat Road is a growing hub of cheap Vietnamese eateries selling pho and shredded duck soup that have popped up to cater to the Vietnamese prostitutes who walk the streets after dark. And in downtown Singapore's Orchard Towers, a shopping center filled with seedy bars and massage parlors whose dank corridors are heavy even at noon with the scent of furtively smoked cigarettes, there is standout Thai food to be had at places that increasingly cater both to food lovers who can afford to order a lemon grass whole fish for $10 and to the young Thai girls in fishnets looking for cheaper sustenance.

Singapore has had red-light districts since its birth: The British established them in the early 19th century to cater to the waves of young businessmen and laborers who came to the country from China, Malaysia, India and Europe, leaving their families behind, according to Mark Emmanuel, an associate professor of history at the National University of Singapore. He notes that prostitution became such a thriving industry that in the 1930s, Singapore earned the nickname "Sin galore" in the region.

In Geylang, a neighborhood that has been a well-known red-light district for decades, Singaporeans have always known that the even-numbered lorongs (which means "small roads" in Malay) are where you'll find the red-lanterned houses, while the odd-numbered ones are for unrelated enterprises. Along those roads, there's been a boom since the 1990s of late-night eating stalls that serve up a variety of fare, from noodles topped with melt-in-your-mouth-tender beef to dishes not for the faint of heart: chopped duck's necks and pig's ears that are cheap, savory and meant to go well with an ice-cold beer sipped while watching the girls walk up and down the road.

"These are the two greatest sins in the world; they go hand in hand," said KF Seetoh, a Singapore-based TV food-show host and author of a guide to the country's hawker food. "These guys who go and hunt down hookers, when they're in that mode, they don't scrimp on food and drinks. It's about eating well and living well."

On a trip to Singapore two years ago, Seetoh took me to Geylang Clay Pot Rice. We called 30 minutes ahead to order the signature dish of piping-hot clay pot rice, filled with waxy Chinese pork sausage, chicken and salted fish, then doused with vegetable oil and sweet, molasses-like soy sauce and tossed bibimbap style. But the dish that I would wax lyrical about for months afterward was the soft-shell crab, which was chopped into pieces, breaded with a mixture of spices, deep-fried and topped with a generous sprinkling of chilli padi, a tiny, flaming-hot, fire-engine-red pepper.

Remembering that meal with great hunger, I asked Seetoh on a recent trip back, "Where to now?" And we drove to Rochor Beancurd House, a place that makes a deliciously comforting dessert of silky-smooth warm bean curd. The Portuguese egg tarts -- which differ from those in most Chinatowns because of their sweet, caramelized topping -- also were a must-try.

The next day, I trekked to Joo Chiat Road for a late lunch. In midafternoon, the food stalls along the several-blocks-long street were slowly waking up. After prowling some somnolent coffee shops, my family and I stopped at the Beef House, a little place whose house-made, springy beef balls have made it a draw. The balls are served with noodles done in the style of the Hakka Chinese who first immigrated to Singapore from Southeastern China in the 19th century. The soup version is similar to Vietnamese pho, while the dry version features noodles and beef balls drenched in a gummy gravy that's both sweet and beefy but also thick with the flavor of spices such as star anise.

Though the noodles were delicious, it was a neighboring food stall, Kway Guan Huat, that stole the show with its popiah, a Chinese summer roll filled with a host of ingredients including crab, sauteed turnip, fish paste, lettuce and chili sauce. The stall has been selling popiah since 1938 and remains a place Singaporeans from all parts of the island are willing to drive to just for a summer roll.

There are drawbacks to dining in such establishments: If you are a woman and you're wearing heels or anything fairly dressy, you're likely to be given the hairy eyeball and perhaps even propositioned. There are dangers for men, too.

Chef Willin Low, who owns the upscale Wild Rocket restaurant in Singapore, said he often eats in Geylang on nights when he's not cooking. On a recent trip, he parked along a particularly dark and seedy road because he couldn't find a space anywhere else. "As I was walking from my car to the main road, this car full of friends from church stopped and said, 'Um, Willin, what are you doing here?' " he said.

Not all stalls are cheap: Sin Huat Eating House, which Anthony Bourdain recently included on his list of "13 Places to Eat Before You Die" for Men's Health magazine, serves up heavenly crab noodles that come with massive claws and legs that will keep you busy for quite a while. But those crab noodles, a main dish that would probably serve a family of three at the most, will set you back nearly $80. The place also has an especially bare-bones setting, even by coffee-shop standards: On the night we went in June, the restaurant's lights would periodically flicker and go dark for several long seconds before coming back on. Our table by the grimy, greenish fish tanks also offered us front-row seats to the sweaty cooks reaching into the tanks up to their armpits to scoop out shellfish whenever a customer placed an order.

It can be hard not to be affected by the plight of your fellow customers. On a recent trip to Cafe Supunsa in Orchard Towers, my friends Jeanette and Eudon and I ravenously attacked garlicky chicken wings, basil chicken, a massive hotpot of deliciously sour tom yum soup and a spicy salad of julienned papaya topped with crackling dried shrimp and roasted peanuts. As the hunger subsided, we suddenly became aware of our surroundings.

The waves of weary young girls wearing too little clothing and too much makeup were ceaseless. Purposefully, they would stop in for a quick meal, a respite in their nightly onslaught. Suddenly we felt a bit guilty about our relative good fortune, and our food euphoria began to wear off.


Avoiding one another's eyes, we quietly paid our bill and left.

Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan is a freelance writer whose food memoir, "A Tiger in the Kitchen," will be published in 2011. She blogs at http://www.atigerinthekitchen.com.

J.B. Ah Meng, No. 2, Lorong 23, 011-65-6741-2677. Open 5 p.m. to 3:30 a.m. Prices $4.25 to $14.

Geylang Clay Pot Rice, 639 Lorong 33, 011-65-6744-4574 or 011-65-6744-3619. Open 11:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., 5 p.m. to midnight. Prices $6 to $21.

Rochor Beancurd House, 745 Geylang Rd., 011-65-6748-3989. Open 24 hours. Drinks and desserts 65 cents to $2.15.

The Beef House, 97 Joo Chiat Rd., 011-65-9472-2601. Open 11 a.m. to 10 p.m. Bowls $2.50 to $4.25, depending on size.

Kway Guan Huat, 95 Joo Chiat Rd., 011-65-6344-2875. Open 10:30 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. Rolls $1.40 or $2.50, depending on filling.

Sin Huat Eating House, 659/661 Geylang Rd., 011-65-6744-9755. Open 6:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. Prices $35 to $85.

Cafe Supunsa, 400 Orchard Rd., #02-36; 011-65-6737-0223. Open 11 a.m. to 6 a.m. Prices $3.50 to $14.

-- C.L.T.


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Inside Indonesia - The right to choose

Terence H. Hull and Ninuk Widyantoro

milashwaiko.jpg
Indonesian women are still waiting for reproductive health rights
Mila Shwaiko

Since 2001 a group of NGOs led by the Indonesian Women’s Health Foundation (YKP) has lobbied the Indonesian government for reform of arcane and confused laws related to abortion. They are motivated by concern about reproductive health rights, and specifically the need to prevent the thousands of deaths associated with septic abortions each year. They were able to persuade a majority of political parties to support their efforts in 2004, and in the dying days of Megawati Sukarnoputri’s presidency, they gained parliamentary approval for a draft amendment to the health law that would have made abortion both safer and more easily available.

To the surprise of activists the amendment was not signed by the outgoing president, and thus lapsed when Susilo Bambang Yudoyono came to power in late 2004. Finding themselves back at square one, the NGOs and their allies in the DPR (People’s Representative Council) brought the amendment back to the legislature in 2005, but found that the politics of the situation had changed dramatically. Islamist politicians who had accepted the earlier change suddenly announced that they were opposed to abortion, and would now fight the amendment. Over the life of the 2004-09 DPR, amendments to the health law and particularly the clauses related to abortion made little progress, to the frustration of both the YKP and their DPR allies. The story of why this legal quagmire persists says a lot about the nature of democratic reform in Indonesia, and about the prospects for efforts to improve the status and health of women.

A contentious history

In Indonesia, as in many other countries, abortion is not simply a public health problem. It is a touchstone political issue, setting up conflicts of identity, morality and social control. Abortion has never dominated political debates, but it has been an irritant to the body politic since Independence. The law against abortion was contained in the Criminal Code (KUHP) passed early in the twentieth century, and that in turn was modelled on the Dutch Criminal Code from the nineteenth century. It was seldom applied, even though abortion was widely carried out by dukun (traditional healers) and was not rare among medical professionals in cities. Rather, the law was applied selectively and usually only when a woman had died during or after the procedure.

The story of why this legal quagmire persists says a lot about the nature of democratic reform in Indonesia, and about the prospects for efforts to improve the status and health of women

In the 1950s contraceptive technologies were crude; there were only a handful of doctors trained to assist women with fertility control. Meanwhile, politicians like Sukarno accepted high fertility rates as a symbol of national potential, in terms of both workforce and identity. A decade later, family planning started to be seen as a priority at the same time that the invention of the oral contraceptive pill made birth control cheaper and more effective. Abortion was still considered to be problematic but in Jakarta groups of doctors campaigned to prevent septic abortion deaths. From the mid-1960s, abortion was firmly on the agenda of the Indonesian Association of Obstetrics and Gynaecology (POGI). In 1974, for the United Nations Population Year, the association published a special issue of its journal on abortion with papers showing the dangers of the procedures done by untrained dukun, and calling for reform of laws to allow doctors to provide safe terminations of pregnancy.

The association showed that hospital maternity wards were straining from the pressure of septic abortions and that doctors struggled with the implications of not offering women a safe alternative. In the absence of protective legalisation from the DPR they sought protection from the courts to avoid prosecution for what was regarded as a vital medical need.

Hospital maternity wards were straining from the pressure of septic abortions and … doctors struggled with the implications of not offering women a safe alternative

Ironically considering later developments, it was the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that provided assistance for abortion services in the early 1970s. The organisation supplied vacuum aspiration equipment for procedures that were called menstrual regulation (MR). The assistance covered training for paramedics and doctors to carry out safe procedures during the first fourteen weeks of pregnancy. This aid was possible because officials in the Indonesian family planning program made a technical distinction between inducing a delayed menstrual cycle and performing an abortion. For doctors carrying out the procedures, it was clear that in most cases a pregnancy was well established. But in the absence of a positive pregnancy test the patient and the doctor could assume that they weren’t terminating a pregnancy but simply bringing on menses, making the Criminal Code provisions irrelevant, at least in their minds. Students in medical schools were taught the new techniques, and over the course of the 1970s it became easier for urban women to find a doctor who would provide a safe abortion as long as it was called an MR.

For the next two decades, it appeared that the stipulations of the criminal code had been overcome by a combination of new technology and assiduous coalition-building. Doctors and lawyers pressed the Attorney General, justices of the Supreme Court and government ministers to accept MR as a medically approved procedure, while maintaining criminal sanctions against abortions carried out by dukun or other unqualified people. Word spread among the medical profession that they were safe from prosecution so long as procedures adhered to high medical standards and no harm was done to patients.

This informal compromise might well have progressed to clear legalisation in Indonesia but for the rise of conservative forces in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, bringing the cancellation of development assistance for MR and the rise in policies actively opposing abortion. Protection for doctors performing medical terminations in Indonesia weakened when the international debate changed direction with the so-called Mexico City Policy introduced by President Ronald Reagan.

This informal compromise might well have progressed to clear legalisation in Indonesia but for the rise of conservative forces in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, bringing the cancellation of development assistance for MR and the rise in policies actively opposing abortion

Anti-abortion forces in Indonesia itself were also gathering momentum, as Islamic groups targeted family planning as a way to oppose the New Order government. These criticisms were muted when Suharto had a firm grip on power but, while they were not strong enough to inhibit the contraception program substantially, they did draw attention to the abortion provisions in the Criminal Code and pushed government ministers and others to condemn routinely the immorality and illegality of abortion. Few people were willing to speak up for what many saw as an extremely problematic procedure.

Dilemmas of reform

Advocates for family planning and safe abortion faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they agreed with many of the criticisms levelled against the authoritarian government. On the other hand, even though many of them shared the religious beliefs and values of the critics, they were even more concerned about the welfare of women. As a result, they embarked on a complicated strategy to coopt the largest Islamic groups in support of the women’s reproductive health agenda while at the same time lobbying government departments to change the legal framework surrounding abortion. Throughout the 1990s, activists pursued a program of workshops, publications and public discussions to promote their aims, often with funding from international NGOs, UN agencies and sympathetic units within the government.

Both these strategies were moderately successful at first. Activists from Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah were enlisted to promote improved reproductive health care for women, including access to safe abortion. Fundamentalist groups remained antagonistic, but the fact that family planning activists were able to show Islamic support for their campaign for access to safe abortion meant that it could not simply be dismissed as a western plot. In this way, reproductive health came to be re-defined as a central issue for socially minded Muslims, and the call for legal change less of a trigger for political conflict.

The first opportunity for reform came in 1991, when the DPR considered a draft law concerning health. While this draft was more aspiration than black letter law, it opened an opportunity for abortion to be shifted from a criminal issue to one of medical regulation. Working with the Department of Health, activists pressed for a statement that would make abortion legal if performed by licensed, trained medical personnel. But at that time, reviews of laws in the DPR’s committee system had become increasingly fractious. When the draft health law was examined by legislators they immediately challenged both the language and the content of the clauses touching on abortion. Transcripts showed arguments from Islamic and military factions questioning the propriety of any steps that would legalise abortion; these groups didn’t even want lawmakers to consider the use of the word. Officials from the Department of Health and advocates of reproductive health were shocked to see the law that emerged from the DPR. The so-called rubber stamp turned out to be a sledgehammer. The word aborsi, used in the Department of Health’s draft, had disappeared completely from the 1992 Health Law and it was clear that the new reference to ‘certain medical procedures’ would not address the problem of unsafe terminations of pregnancy. What these procedures might refer to was unclear, since they were described as being intended to save the life of a mother and/or her foetus – clearly a nonsense when talking about abortion.

… reproductive health came to be re-defined as a central issue for socially minded Muslims

It was only in the wake of this fiasco that a serious attempt was made to estimate the annual number of induced abortions. Along with our colleague Dr Sarsanto Sarwono, we reviewed the numbers of specialist obstetricians, general practitioners, midwives, nurses and traditional midwives. Then we made guesses about how many pregnancy terminations might be made on average by the members of each group, taking into account that many practitioners might not do any procedures, while others were offering abortions as their main mode of practice. This calculation produced an estimate of 700,000 procedures per year for the mid-1990s.

Such a figure was large in comparison with the estimated 5 million births annually at the time, but within months newspapers were quoting experts who took the estimate as a base and inflated the numbers upwards, on the speculation that any estimate would have been conservative and numbers would be rising rapidly. Before long the newspapers were regularly publishing statements that Indonesia had well over one million induced abortions annually.

Whether it was 700,000 or 1.2 million, it was clear that most abortions were provided to married women, not the stereotypical unmarried teenagers. Also, it was likely that large numbers of procedures were conducted by people who had no medical training, sometimes in ways designed simply to provoke bleeding, so women could go to hospital emergency rooms to seek professional help legally to complete the abortion.

A more reliable estimate of abortion numbers was made by Dr Budi Utomo and his colleagues in 2000 and 2001, using an innovative approach to monitor the practices of a sample of service providers in both urban and rural settings. This survey produced a minimum estimate of two million women seeking medical intervention for pregnancy termination in 2000; over half of these procedures were induced abortions, and around 800,000 were alleged spontaneous terminations needing some medical attention. Again, it didn’t take long before experts, including staff of the Department of Health, were quoting much higher figures, and newspapers were misquoting the two million figure as the total number of induced abortions.

Campaigning for change

Fired up by the figures, activists pressing for legal change were increasingly hopeful that lawmakers would reconsider the situation. Prominent among them were the feminist activists inspired by the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development calling for human rights-based reproductive health. They hoped that President Abdurrahman Wahid’s government (1999-2001) and a rejuvenated DPR would embrace these ideas, and they were delighted when the president appointed a young, energetic woman as the Minister for Women’s Empowerment, a portfolio that she insisted must include family planning. At the start of 2001 the Women’s Health Foundation (YKP) was formed with support from all major political parties and a key official from the Ministry of Health. By July this coalition had begun the task of drafting the clauses needed to re-define the position of abortion in the health law.

The so-called rubber stamp turned out to be a sledgehammer

During the New Order, laws had been drafted by government departments or ministries and passed on to the legislature for what was usually very minimal debate and rapid endorsement. After reformasi, the DPR committee responsible for health matters decided to take the initiative and draft a law on reproductive health to be presented to the government. In June 2002 the Minister of Health was approached privately to elicit his support for the draft law. He gave his blessing to the initiative and delegated the Director General for Community Health to assist. But while the director general was a long time supporter of family planning, he was less than helpful, claiming that the department had received threats from conservative religious leaders who were concerned about the moral implications of abortion. If it was easy to terminate a premarital pregnancy, they had argued, immorality would flourish. He found it hard to refute their logic.

The YKP responded by proposing to undertake research on the demand for abortion, which they knew was likely to show that most procedures were sought by married women whose contraceptive methods had failed. This would have been an easy enough task if they had had access to the records of the largest network of abortion clinics in the country, the Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association (PKBI). Ironically, at that time the head of PKBI was none other than the Director General for Community Health, who instructed the clinics not to participate in the research. But the YKP was closely connected to the doctors working for the PKBI, many of whom agreed to participate in the study but without reference to the PKBI name.

While the researchers were in the field, YKP staff then approached parliamentarians to discuss the need for amendments to the 1992 law. They met with Commission VII of the DPR, the committee that had produced the original law, but whose composition had now changed. The commission chair immediately put the amendment on its agenda, but discussions dragged on for two years. In February 2004, commission members finally signed a Letter of Agreement supporting a draft law, including the abortion amendment, to be sent to the full DPR for confirmation. A plenary session of the DPR passed the law and sent it to the president for final endorsement.

With the distraction of the elections that year the draft remained on the desk of President Megawati until August, when she called in members of the YKP to have lunch with her and to discuss the implications of the amendment. The president said she would sign the law as soon as she received a routine letter of support from the minister of health. The relevant paperwork went to the minister, and he passed it on to the legal department of the ministry. In the meantime Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the second round of voting in the presidential elections by a substantial margin. There had been no letter from the minister, despite many reminders from the YKP, so outgoing President Megawati did not sign the bill. When Yudhoyono was sworn in on 24 October 2004, the draft Health Law amendment had expired. The amendment would have to make its way through the DPR again. In the meantime, many strong supporters of health reform had failed in their election attempts or had retired, and the mood of the parliament had substantially shifted.

Whether it was 700,000 or 1.2 million, it was clear that most abortions were provided to married women, not the stereotypical unmarried teenagers

Things changed even more dramatically in August 2005, when the Islamist group Hizbut Tahrir sent a message to the president calling on him to stop any proposal to legalise abortion in any form. While only a very small group, Hizbut Tahrir was able to command public attention with a coordinated media campaign and public protests across the country. Its members claimed that the only possible solution to unwanted pregnancies was a return to Islamic law. Despite the strong language of the attack, Hizbut Tahrir had little influence in parliament. Nonetheless, when the amendment was discussed in the newly formed DPR Commission IX for Population, Health, Labour Force and Transmigration, it was totally revised, introducing many negative references to abortion as a concept, and complex descriptions of conditions under which women might obtain abortions from trained medical staff.

For four years the parliamentarians and advocacy groups argued back and forth about the best way to handle their conflicting preferences. Human rights advocates have called for the legalisation of abortions carried out by trained medical practitioners operating in certified facilities and using safe standard operating procedures, including professional counselling and follow-up provision of effective contraception. Moral arguments put by religious critics focus on the restriction of terminations to women who can be proven to have been raped, and the imposition even in those cases of strict limits in terms of the duration of the pregnancy (often referring to six weeks after the last menstrual period, which would imply only two weeks after the woman might be able to confirm her pregnancy accurately with reference to a missed menstrual period). The draft also stipulated that religious leaders would be required to confirm the need for an abortion. It did not specify if that person would be of the same religion as the woman or her medical practitioner.

In early September 2009 it appeared that history was poised to be repeated, with the draft health law either dying with the retirement of the outgoing DPR, or through the impossibility of ever implementing a poorly drafted law. Remarkably, on the evening of September 14, the near empty chamber of the DPR voted to adopt the proposed Health Law, including somewhat changed clauses on abortion (articles 75-77). The six week stipulation remains, but making exceptions in cases of medical emergencies. Pre and post abortion counselling by a competent provider is required, and procedures require the approval of the woman’s husband, except in cases of rape. Only certified medical practitioners are allowed to carry out abortions. It is unclear what type of medical professionals will be certified; that is up to the Minister of Health.

What does seem likely is that traditional healers, uncertified medical personnel and individual women will continue to use dangerous methods to terminate unwanted pregnancies. Clause 194 stipulates that those caught doing so will be subject to a one billion rupiah (A$130,000) fine and a maximum sentence of ten years in prison. Were that to be applied rigorously to the one million or so cases of abortion each year the legal system would never be able to cope with the trials, or the punishments. The reformed Health Law has again failed to protect or serve the women of Indonesia. ii

Terry Hull (terry.hull@anu.edu.au) is Professor of Demography at the Australian Demographic and Social Research Institute, Australian National University.
Ninuk Widyantoro (Ninuk_who@yahoo.co.id) is a practicing psychologist and women’s reproductive health advocate in Jakarta.

Sep 26, 2009

Jot ASEAN:- Burma: How many political prisoners released? Remain in prison?

The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners in Burma "today confirmed that 127 political prisoners have been released from prisons in Burma." They include:
The AAPP press release continues:
According to AAPP, more than 2,000 political prisoners remain in jail, including at least 124 activists who are in poor health. Since November 2004 there have been a total of six amnesties for prisoners. According to the ruling State Peace and Development Council’s own figures, 45,732prisoners were released under those amnesties. According to AAPP, only 1.3% of them were political prisoners.

The latest amnesty was expected. In mid-July the Burmese permanent representative to the U.N., U Than Swe, said the regime was ‘processing to grant amnesty to prisoners on humanitarian grounds’.
The AAPP provides a breakdown of the political prisoners of the regime who continue to languish in the country's brutal jails where prisoners have reported torture and inhuman conditions. For a description of these conditions, see the interview I conducted at the Thai-Burma border with former political prisoner Zaw Nyein Latt (right). There is no evidence that the terrible conditions have improved. It is incumbent that ASEAN and the international community hold Burma's leadership personally to account for the well-being of its prisoners.
Summary of Current Situation

There are a total of 2,211 political prisoners in Burma.
These include:
CATEGORY
NUMBER
Monks
237
Members of Parliament
16
Students
286
Women
191
NLD members
479
Members of the Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
network
43
Ethnic nationalities
197
Cyclone Nargis volunteers
21
Teachers
26
Media Activists
51
Lawyers
12
In Poor Health
137
Since the protests in August 2007 leading to last September’s Saffron Revolution, a total of 1,122 activists have been arrested and are still in detention.
Update: A new report prompts us to ask why a Burmese-born American citizen is being held against his will in Burma.
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Bangkok Pundit - Prem: Legacy Building

Prem TinsulanondaImage via Wikipedia

Posted by Mr. Wrigley | Saturday, September 26, 2009

Siam Report

Towards the end of August, Bangkok Post reported on Gen. Prem’s wish to set up a new 3rd cavalry division for the Northeast—a plan which could take 10 years and cost tens of billions of baht.

Bangkok Post: Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda's birthday wish from last year looks as if it will come true as the army has approved the set-up of a new cavalry division to take care of the Northeast.

Army Chief Anupong Paojinda has endorsed the proposal to establish the 3rd Cavalry Division and has been pushing for cabinet approval for the plan through Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwon, said an army source.

The 20-billion-baht plan will be presented to Gen Prem as a birthday gift on his 89th birthday party on Monday, said the source. The cavalry division set-up plan also comes as a test for the Democrat Party-led government over how much respect it has for the Privy Council president, the source said.

"I want to see the 3rd Cavalry Division before I die so that I will rest in peace," Gen Prem was quoted as saying to guests at his birthday party last year.

There are currently two cavalry divisions - the 1st Cavalry Division that oversees border areas in the North, and the 2nd Cavalry Division that takes care of the Central region and is usually the main source of forces when it comes to staging a military coup.

Given the high cost of a new cavalry division, the Abhisit Vejjajiva government is expected to approve in principle the proposal and work out the budget to fund it later, the source said. The time frame for setting up the 3rd Cavalry Division is 10 years and the costly purchase of tanks and armored personnel carriers required for the full establishment of the new division will not take place in the first five years.
Now, a month later, Bangkok Post reports that the Ministry of Defense’s screening committee has approved the plan, but it is unlikely to receive funding in the near-term because of economic conditions.

Bangkok Post: Gen Prem has made known his wish to see the division up and running in the Northeast. A Defense Ministry screening committee has approved the plan to set up the 3rd Cavalry Division as proposed by the army. The plan will be proposed to the defense minister and the cabinet, the source said.

According to the army's proposal, the establishment of the cavalry division requires a budget of 70 billion baht. However, during the first three years, the division would spend up to a billion baht to construct buildings and basic infrastructure, the source said.

The bulk of the budget will go to buying tanks.

The source said the huge budget was unlikely to be approved any time soon.It is expected the purchase of the tanks would be possible when the country's economy is in better shape, the source said. The army would soon draft up the division's organizational structure and propose it to the cabinet
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2Bangkok.com - Southern Violence Statistics


(Photo: Mr. John for 2Bangkok.com)

Southern Violence Statistics

The Violence-related Injury Surveillance report - January 2009-June 2009

December 2008

January 2009
February 2009
March 2009
April 2009
May 2009
June 2009
July 2009
August 2009
September 2009 (not yet released)

Source: Deep South Violence-related Injury Surveillance statistics

Statistics on the violent situation in 2008 - 546 died - 1,056 attacks - The reduction of violent attack revealed almost half of the previous year's 2007 record - Raman reportedly hit most by militant attacks - Issara News Center; January 20, 2009

Also: Troubles in the South

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Hazed and confused - Bangkok Post

Severe haze affecting Ampang, Kuala Lumpur, Ma...Image via Wikipedia

Southeast Asia's greatest menace makes an unwanted return

Writer: Luke Hunt
Published: 27/09/2009 at 12:00 AM
Newspaper section: Spectrum

As Singapore geared up for its annual Formula One outing today, the thoughts of race organisers were dominated by three issues. There was the cheating Renault team, which made headlines around the world for rigging a crash on the same course a year earlier. And there's the prospect that ticket sales will be down at least 10 per cent from the 100,000 capacity that crammed into the street circuit stands last year.

Lastly, and making a most unwelcome return, has been the dreaded haze, which potentially will have the dirtiest and biggest impact on the Grand Prix. Health officials in the pristine city-state fear pollution could reach dangerous levels.

The haze has choked Southeast Asia on and off for more than a decade. If Singapore is wincing from an overdose of carbon monoxide, then so too is the entire Indonesian archipelago along with Malaysia, from the tip of north Borneo to southern Thailand and beyond.

"The unplanned or uncontrolled conversion of forest land to non-forest agricultural uses will continue throughout the region for the foreseeable future," said Jack Hurd, the Bangkok-based director of the Nature Conservancy's Forest Trade programme.

He said this was consistent with the economic development paradigm that most countries have followed, and would continue to follow. "Neighbouring nations - most notably Singapore - have very little leverage over the situation because there are not, as of yet, any international norms for controlling air pollution of this nature."

It's a situation that could also get much worse as Southeast Asia is bracing itself for stronger El Nino weather conditions over the next few months.

El Nino is a recurring weather system that results in an abnormal warming of surface ocean waters in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. This can prove disruptive to weather patterns and is often blamed for droughts in Australia.

Typically this will result in worsening dry conditions and increased hotspots in Indonesia, traditionally the chief source of the haze. Peat fires in Indonesia are associated with land clearing for short-term agricultural purposes and logging. In turn, the land is dried and susceptible to fires that can race out of control.

Oscar Venter, a conservationist biologist with the University of Queensland, said the haze from these fires would have a strong impact on people's lives, and their life expectancies - and clearly not enough was being done to prevent them, particularly in light of the global ramifications caused by the fires.

"These fires also have an enormous impact on climate change," he added. "Twenty-five per cent of the carbon released into the atmosphere in 1997 came from peat swamp fires in Indonesia - that's phenomenal."

Malaysia has offered water-dumping aircraft to douse the fires, and Singapore will host a regional ministers' meeting next month to help co-ordinate a strategy to battle the fires and the haze.

One issue that remains unresolved is that both Indonesia and the Philippines have yet to ratify the Asean Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, which was signed in 2002.

Singapore's environment minister Yaacob Ibrahim said that international media scrutiny of the haze was inevitable during the Grand Prix and the November Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) meetings.

"Even though Indonesia has not ratified [the agreement], we have moved forward because we realise that we have other challenges which cannot wait. When the haze outbreak in 2006 came about, we felt it was important for the five Asean countries to come together and deal with it collectively.

"Thus far, Singapore and Malaysia have made progress by collaborating with some of the local provinces. We acknowledge that Indonesia has been trying to implement measures to bring down the hotspots.

"As to whether or not their plan of action is on target will be up to Indonesia to review, but we believe that the Indonesian government remains sincere in combating haze, as it affects the health and quality of life of their citizens as well," Mr Ibrahim said.

Mr Hurd said bilateral discussions would allow a diplomatic expression of concern, and even a commitment of resources and an attempt to regulate and control the burning.

"But my expectation is that this will have a marginal effect on the overall level of haze that materialises from the practice."

He said the real solution was a comprehensive effort on the part of governments to bring land conversion under control and regulate, more forcefully, that which is legal.

This could mean the use of different methods of clearing that do not result in so much air pollution, as the low costs associated with burning-off were derived from the fact that the cost of pollution is passed on to others to absorb.

"For those wood products destined for international markets, emerging requirements for legal or certified forest products, and the changing government structures set up to deal with this, may reduce the amount of illegal forestry activity, including conversion, in places such as Indonesia."

But the costs in enforcing such a code could prove significant.

"The best chance that exists for reducing haze will probably be a global agreement - including policy commitments and market mechanisms - to generate funds for verifiable reductions in emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.

"The financial flows that may become available might be just the incentive required for countries to reduce deforestation and forest degradation and the associated haze from burning. In the absence of such an agreement, haze will continue to be a problem, specifically in El Nino years," Mr Hurd concluded.

Such issues are expected to be raised at the Copenhagen conference on climate change in December when the UN will attempt to broker an international successor to the Kyoto Protocol.

However, Mr Venter is adamant that governments must do more at the national level and ensure fires are no longer used to clear land in Indonesia. In return, Jakarta could see a capital return on the forests that are saved.

"Providing incentives, such as small grants, to help make mechanical clearing of land with bulldozers more affordable, would probably go a long way to reducing fires and haze.

"If successful, it would also help Indonesia reduce unnecessary forest loss from burning, which would help capture carbon payments."

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Sam's thoughts - Good News Malay!

Sakaya Muni Buddha Gaya Temple on Race Course ...Image via Wikipedia

I had a glance at the headlines on the Sunday Times today.

Well, it is not at the sensational headline of the murder of Singaporean-born porn star Felicia Tang, who has perhaps been erroneously tagged as a porn star, even though she has done a few topless shoots. But for Singaporeans, we go the easy route and conflate nudity into pornography. Hey, if you're George Lim Heng Chye, littering will probably be similar to the leprosy of desire that is masturbation and unethical medical practices. So let us just call it porn.

I had a glance at the headlines.

I saw the "good news" reporting of the Muslim community. Conflation. Conflation. Immediately, I thought about the Malay Muslim community in Singapore. Very natural. And I thought to myself, "OMG, yet another good news reporting for the appeasement of our ethnic minority friends."

As my brain processed the image of me palm-smacking my forehead. I realised, amidst the Hougang Taoist smoke lingering in the air, that it was Hari Raya Puasa!

Nevertheless, looking at the headline, I remember a conversation I had with a Malay bunkmate during my reservist training (I'm still in the middle of reservist training by the way).

I told him my impression of Malay politics in Singapore, or rather the PAP government's policy and attitude towards Singaporean Malays. Deep down inside, I had wanted to see to what extent is my view on Singaporean Malays blinkered and shallow (hey, at least I want to know more, right?).

I told him how I, as a non-Malay, rather than a Singaporean Chinese (I seldom think of myself as Chinese until I am reminded of my skin colour or when people speak to me in Mandarin or conjure up the Level 3 Sino Dragon Crusher on my skull), genuinely felt that, in point form:

1) Our government has a "don't piss off the Malays" policy/approach.
2) And as a result of that policy/approach, we get stuff (releases, policies, reports) where Singaporean Malays appear to come first.
3) And that is why I get the impression that the government, for the sake of wanting to stay in power, appears to treat Singaporean Malays better.
4) On a sidenote, I also mentioned that Singaporean Malays are the swing voters. And the PAP is smart enough to secure their vote.

My mate, a diploma holder, now pursuing a part-time degree while working for a regional business, agreed with my observation, but disagreed with my analysis. On the outside, we both saw the same thing. But he told me, "Your perspective is your perspective. You need to see it from our perspective."

And he gave me a lesson on subjectivity!

But first, I'd like to point out that I find it a little more difficult to address me and my "fellow Singaporean ethnic Chinese folks" as a collective, "our". I feel the Chinese community, or rather a collection of yellow-skinned folk, are too fragmented, along the faultlines of language and class.

Any how, he told me he feels that while he believes that there is a "don't piss off the Malays" approach to appeasement adopted by the government, the circumstance is somewhat different from my analysis.

He said that he feels that the government gives too much attention to the Chinese, and it has allowed systems in place that benefit the Chinese more, at the expense of Malays.

Therefore, in his opinion, he believes that the "don't piss off the Malays" approach to appeasement is to make the Malays less sad or angry.

I guess we will never know, unless we knew what is the percentage of Malay vote for the PAP every election. Of course, only the government knows. When they say "your vote is secret", it means that it is only secret to you, but that perhaps does not mean it is secret to others (in positions of power).

To sum up that point, my bunkmate and I agree with the statement that the PAP government has a "don't piss off the Malays" approach to appeasement". I'm repeating this so as to make the point clear any way.

But we are different in our analysis of the circumstance, based on our different positions:
Sam: The government gives special attention to the Malays.
Bunkmate: The government does not give enough attention to the Malays.

He told me more about job applications and stated how it really sucked that the bilingual requirement is a mere euphemism for English and Mandarin language proficiency. Of course, being a racial majority, it is too easy for my Chinese privilege to blind me to these things.

Any way, appeasement does not necessarily mean a minority group will be able to be "part of the team" or "play catch up with the majority". I was thinking, after what my bunkmate said, that there will always be culture-influenced infrastructure and institutions that will impede the integration of ethnic minorities.

When we speak of a multiculturalism and a pluralism, we might get different interpretations, impressions and reactions toward it, depending on our status as a majority or a minority. And when we look at it from a position we live in, or are comfortable with, we take certain things for granted.

For instance, my introspection and degree of reflexivity is somewhat limited, to the point I am (only) able to imagine how a Chinese elite politics of pluralism is merely a means to Chinese elite economic prosperity and continued political stranglehold.

The biggest irony in this Malay-Chinese exchange we had in the bunk was that we totally invisibilise the ethnic Indians! It's quite funny, to put it in a cynical way. When we debate Malay politics/policy in Singapore, we usually engage the Chinese (elite) and of course the Malay folks. We seldom if never invite ethnic Indian Singaporean discourse on Malay policy. Heck, for most Singaporean Chinese, Indian is Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan, Sikh, all Indian. Very sad. But then again, knowing all these has little influence on how we achieve Chinese elite economic prosperity and continued political stranglehold in Singapore, right?

I told my bunkmate that I, as a sandwich class (slightly below middle-class) ethnic Chinese Singaporean, feel left out by the government.

My bunkmate told me, that he as a Malay, and probably in the same income range as my household I believe, feels left out by the government.

Win already, right?

If both of us, as Chinese and Malay respectively, feel left out by the government, what on earth is happening?

It is very important to note that we do not at all represent our respective ethnic communities, as again they are different class and (to some extent) cultural divides within these communities.

I related to him about the time when I spoke to a Malay graduate colleague, who felt that the government should stop giving special attention to the Malays. That colleague provided the analogy "if you give $5 to a beggar, you make him a beggar", somewhere along the lines.

Then my bunkmate said, "Educated Malay, right?" We both laughed, probably aware of the stereotype-fed oxymoron he just spewed out.

He proceeded to explain that not all Malays are the same. And that some Malays really need help, like the poorer ones.

I challenged that point, saying "A poor Chinese is the same as a poor Malay, no?"

He disagreed, and explained something I can't recall. But I realise that a poor Malay and a poor Chinese may live in the same place, but the circumstances they face is different. They may share the lack of literacy in English, for instance, and thus speak their own language. But they live in an economic space dominated by Chinese culture and politics.

Even I, with my education and all, require some reminding of this cultural reality. The reason why I am sometimes unable to immediate think of this is because of the very fact that I live in my Chinese privilege, whether or not I consciously see myself as Chinese. It is a privilege I enjoy, unknowingly or not, for the colour of my skin, access to ethnic Chinese-releated cultural capital and resources and so on, resultant attitudes around me arising from these circumstances, that give me such perspectives, bundled with blinkers blocking out the possibilities for any critical amount of introspection.

I mean, it is like using two mirrors to see what is at the back of your head. We do not do it all the time. At the most, we are able to use one mirror and reflect on the things we see. But we forget about the things we do not see without two mirrors (triple negative, sial!)

I think my fascination with ethnic minority politics (or minority politics and representation in general) stems from several realities I experience as a majority in many aspects. I may qualify as a numerical majority in many instances, but I feel like a minority most of the time. At the same time, knowing more about the realities that minorities face will help me understand my position as a "majority" and the things I take for granted.

Knowing about the things you take for granted is not an end on its own, or for you to feel grateful, so that you can continue voting for the PAP (right?). But at least, when you are in the position to make decisions, influence another person or just develop relationships of any kind with others, you can create stronger bonds and minimise suffering for everyone on the whole.

Any how, I feel there is generally nothing taboo about race or religion so long as we want to find out more. Of course, having extra institutional affiliations, stemming from the institutionalisation (or tribification) of race and religion, gives people an extra reason to be offended. I mean, it's like having a flag, and an extra reason to die for (sorry, I just hate conscription and reservist, especially one that doesn't tolerate conscientious objection).

My bunkmate told me that he feels quite cynical about all these "good news" being featured about the Malay (and Muslim) community. He explained that there are so many Malays in trouble and in need, and they have to feature only the nice, good and happy stories.

Our conversation drifted to the representation of Malaysian politics (simply because my mind keeps drifting). I was telling him how I feel about the representation of Malaysian politics, saying that I observe in the past few years, the Straits Times have been presenting Malaysian politics as something that is vibrant and "very happening", in a very negative sense. I gave him my analysis, that I believe that the local press presents a shitty image of our neighbours just to make us Singaporeans feel lucky we have our PAP government and our PAP government-led stability.

I asked him how is it like in the local Malay papers. His impression is that the Malays papers do not portray Malaysian politics as too "vibrant", because a decent proportion of Singaporean Malays have relatives all across Malaysia, and it is a potentially sensitive thing.

It is really interesting. I am no expert at all in these affairs but I really enjoyed my conversation with my bunkmate. While his and my perspectives are only two of numerous positions on Singapore and Malay politics, I am probably reminded of the certain things I have taken for granted, more so than him.

Both of us were equally surprised at each other, when each of us claimed that we feel forgotten and that it was the ethnic other who got better attention from the government. Of course, to be more specific, while I agree that Chinese folks in general get more attention from the government (simply because they are a numerical majority), 1) there are certain segments of Chinese folks who get proportionately more attention than others, and 2) I still have the impression that Singaporean Malays get proportionately more attention than other ethnic communities.

Our exchange was never an angry one, nor did we feel angry at our positions. It was, for me, more like a "what to do?" position, a bordering-on-sad kind of a feeling, coupled with healthy doses of disempowering helplessness. You know, the kind of disempowering helplessness when you are part of SAF, doing your reservist, cannot get your deferment even though you are on a full-time graduate studies course and when you write to feedback to Teo Chee Hean, the perm sec thinks you still want to defer even though you just want to feedback, indicating that the government only reads what they want to see and not what you actually want to say, so fuck off.

Our exchange offered a sharing of perspectives, and although problems were identified, we didn't and couldn't think of the solutions. Nevertheless, I feel that we should have more of such conversations, at different levels, so that we can make better informed decisions to ensure that "no Singaporean is left behind" is not merely a Chinese elite rhetoric, as are the notions of multiculturalism, pluralism, prosperity, progress, racial harmony, etc. (like how "Asian values", "mainstream values" rhetoric should neither be spearheaded nor monopolised by the Christian right).

And of course, let us involve the ethnic Indian Singaporeans next time okay!
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Malaysian Insider - Selangor gets its first Malay DAP branch

KUALA LUMPUR, Sept 19 — Ibrahim Salleh, a school security guard, proudly displayed his new red DAP membership card which he obtained last week.

ibrahim Ibrahim Salleh, member of DAP cawangan Kampung Lembah Kinrara

He is among 50 Malays from Kampung Lembah Kinrara in Selangor to join the Chinese-based opposition party, forming the state’s first Malay-led branch.

“I have no problem with DAP being led by Chinese. I believe this can bring change to the Malay community,” he told The Straits Times.

There are already four Malay DAP branches in Perak and membership has risen to about 200 after last year’s polls.

Kinrara state assemblywoman Teresa Kok is determined to set up at least three more Malay branches by the end of the year.

Ibrahim, a father of five, believes the DAP will help the Malays to progress, as the democratic party strives for equal opportunity for all.

He pointed out that although Barisan Nasional talked about protecting the Malays and giving them special rights, it was only those in Umno who benefited in the end.

To him, the DAP is a multi-racial party that respects the rights and religions of other races.

“I believe in DAP now. People used to tell Malays that if DAP takes over, we cannot even have azan (call for prayers) but that is not true,” he said.

Opposition leader Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, who is pleased with the development, said: “This shows that DAP has been accepted by the Malays, just like the Chinese and the Indians who accepted PAS and Parti Keadilan Rakyat.” He believes that DAP’s recruitment of Malay members will strengthen his Pakatan Rakyat alliance.

The DAP’s success in drawing Malays is significant for the party, which is generally seen by Malays as stridently championing Chinese interests such as Chinese schools, and fighting for issues like the right to sell alcohol and pork in public places.

The DAP’s motto, Malaysian Malaysia, and its socialist roots have also turned off many Malays who see it as a sidelining of the Malay agenda, and promoting a secular culture.

But the party broke through a psychological barrier when Malays voted for it in droves in last year’s general election after they were disillusioned with Umno.

Political analyst Agus Yusoff of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia said: “Malays used to stay away from DAP but they have changed because it is a different political scenario now.”

The party also received a boost when the well-respected former Transparency International Malaysia president Tunku Abdul Aziz submitted his membership form last year and is now a party vice-president.

For a long time, the only well-known Malay name in DAP was MP Ahmad Nor, who was its vice-president until his death in 2003.

Umno leaders had criticised the new Malay grassroots leaders of DAP as “politically lost” and “ungrateful”.

Umno information chief Ahmad Maslan told Berita Harian that the DAP wanted to attract Malays only to advance its narrow political agenda that will eventually be detrimental to the Malays.

“We ask the Malays not to be taken in by the DAP’s tricks; it’s just to give the DAP a positive image,” he said.

But Haron Wahab, 56, who helped to set up the Kampung Lembah Kinrara branch, disagreed.

“My friends and I are not lost or ungrateful. We want to support DAP because Kok has been helpful to us,” he said. — The Straits Times

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High costs and low wages in Singapore - geraldgiam.sg

An NTUC Fairprice Supermarket.Image via Wikipedia

A comprehensive survey released by UBS has confirmed what economists, academics, opposition politicians and ordinary Singaporeans have known all along: That the Singaporean worker’s wages has decreased over the past 3 years, while the cost of living has shot up.

The Prices and Earnings 2009 survey by the Swiss bank, which the Straits Times did an Insight article on, offers a detailed look at prices for goods and services, and wages and working hours in 73 major cities worldwide. The survey found that:

offers a detailed look
at prices for goods and services, and wages and working
hours for 14 professions in 73 cities worldwide
  • Singapore’s wages after taxes and social security contributions rank us at 41 out of 73;
  • Singapore ranks as the 15th most expensive city, after factoring in the cost of rent (a major expenditure for Singaporeans);
  • Our workers’ purchasing power is ranked 50 out of 73;
  • Three years ago a Singaporean worker had to work 22 minutes to earn enough to afford a Big Mac. Today that same worker has to work for 36 minutes, because his wages have decreased and the cost of living has increased.

The contrast between the ranking of our cost of living (15) and our wages (41) couldn’t be more stark. Yet when asked for their views on these unfavourable survey results, two MPs were dismissive about it.

Mr Seah Kian Peng (Marine Parade GRC) said: “The figures may be right, but the conclusion could be wrong.”

As quoted by the Straits Times, he said that rather than look at prices and wages in isolation, the key considerations should be: Do Singaporeans lead a better life than they did in the past, and are the poor taken care of? If the answer to both is yes, then moving up or down two notches becomes mere semantics.

Mere semantics, Mr Seah?

Tell that to the worker who has had to suffer wage cuts or retrenchment just to keep his company afloat during the recession. Perhaps he needs to teach “semantics” to the housewife who has seen the prices of basic necessities shoot up over the past three years, even though she makes the best effort to purchase the “house brands” from Mr Seah’s supermarkets. (He is the Managing Director of NTUC Fairprice.)

I would have expected a so-called “labour MP” to be calling on the government to take this survey seriously, and look into ways to raise the wages of our workers, and lower the cost of living for the average Singaporean. But I suppose he was speaking with his PAP hat on, not his unionist hat. (I’ve met Mr Seah before. He is a very nice man. But his defence of the indefensible only highlights the lack of value add of ruling party MPs when the debate shifts to fundamental issues of national importance.)

Isn’t it amazing that when there are global surveys that rank Singapore highly, like the corruption or competitiveness indices, the government loves to claim credit for it, but when surveys like this UBS survey put the government’s policies in a bad light, they are dismissed as “mere semantics”?

To rub salt on the wound, we are told to look at the big picture: Compare your life now to 44 years ago. Is it better now than before? If yes, then shut up and stop complaining.

Well if the government wants us to look at things from such a general perspective, then I can also point out that the Taiwanese, South Koreans, Ghanaians and Chileans also have a better life now than 44 years ago. What’s the big deal? We have just been riding on a wave of global prosperity since the 1960s, no?

Another “labour MP” Halimah Yacob (Jurong GRC) questioned the validity of the survey, which has been published every three years for the past 38 years. She wondered whether the indicators include government aid. She claimed that Workfare Income Supplement, rebates and subsidies in health care, education and housing are “significant and help people to cope better”.

I’m not sure if Mdm Halimah really knows what she is asking for. If government aid like a comprehensive social safety net, unemployment benefits, free health care and free education are included, most cities in developed countries would even further outrank Singapore, which provides none of the above.

Causes of the current situation

The current state of affairs of high costs and low wages is not just a by-product of globalization which the government has no control over. This is a cop out and a convenient excuse that this government likes to make.

There is wide agreement among economists and analysts that our low wages, particularly at the bottom rungs, are caused by the flooding of cheap foreign labour into our country. The easy availability of foreign blue collar workers has given our employers little incentive to invest in technology and increase productivity. It has also lowered the bargaining power of local workers who have to compete with them for jobs.

High inflation and high costs too are not just accidental occurrences.

For example, the cost of public housing is directly controlled by the government, which can choose to build more new HDB flats (increase supply) and sell new flats at cost-plus, instead of making such huge profits out of home buyers. This will in turn bring down the prices in the resale market.

The introduction and hikes in the rate of GST has served as a regressive tax on consumers — hitting the low income harder than the wealthy. To date the government has refused opposition MPs’ calls for a GST freeze or reversal.

University tuition fees have risen rapidly in the past decade, yet the government continues to subsidize foreigners’ tertiary education to the tune of $105,600 over a 4-year course, instead of making higher education truly affordable to all Singaporeans.

Instead of just dismissing this survey or nitpicking at its flaws, our government leaders should seriously examine the policies that are causing this dismal state of affairs. They should start listening to the people who really know what’s going on on the ground, instead of brown-nosing “grassroots leaders” or scholar-bureaucrats who rely on charts and statistics to decide which policies will be tolerable for the “median” Singaporean.

Alternatively, they can choose to ignore it at their own peril at the next elections. Ordinary Singaporeans may be paying for the flawed policies now, but come the next election, someone else may be paying.

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Indonesia corruption body under attack: activists - Yahoo! News

It's all about the...Rupiah, Baht, Singapore D...Image by Mikey aka DaSkinnyBlackMan via Flickr

JAKARTA (AFP) – The future of Indonesia's powerful anti-corruption commission has been put under threat by what activists say is a concerted campaign to shut down progress made against entrenched graft.

Lawmakers are expected to pass a law next week that would strip the independent Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) of the authority to prosecute -- a power that has seen it put away high profile politicians and officials.

The law, part of a rash of legislation before the end of the current parliament's term, would leave the KPK solely as an investigator while the corruption-tainted attorney general's office (AGO) would be left to prosecute.

"The grand scenario is the government is trying to weaken the KPK," Indonesia Corruption Watch secretary general Teten Masduki told AFP.

The law is likely a reaction to successes that have seen the KPK-linked Corruption Court achieve a 100 percent conviction rate in a country known as one of the world's most corrupt, Masduki said.

"I think everyone knows the DPR (parliament) is always reluctant to go with the process of anti-corruption. They don't really support the KPK."

The looming legal changes come as the KPK was paralysed by the suspension this week of two of its remaining four commissioners after they were named suspects in a police graft probe.

The suspension of deputy commissioners Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Rianto comes just months after the arrest of KPK chief Antasari Azhar for murder and is the latest chapter in what activists have called a war between the KPK and top police officers.

They have repeatedly denied they are out to weaken the KPK, in spite of reports that senior police officers have been angered by the commission investigating their own members.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has created a team to fill the gaps in the KPK's leadership, but Masduki said it appeared the president had soured on the commission after one of his relatives, former central bank deputy governor Aulia Pohan, was sentenced to a jail term of four-and-a-half years for graft.

"When the police were trying to investigate the KPK, the president didn't try to stop them. I think he pushed the police to investigate the (two) commissioners without enough evidence," Masduki said, adding that it remained to be seen if the selection of replacement KPK heads would be fair.

Political analyst Wimar Witoelar said that while the KPK remains hated by many politicians and police, Yudhoyono -- who goes by the initials SBY and was re-elected this year with a strong mandate thanks in part to the KPK's strides against corruption -- remained committed to tackling graft.

"If SBY really wanted to let the KPK suffer, he wouldn't have intervened with the regulation in-lieu-of-law," he said, referring to the formation of the team to pick replacement KPK commissioners.

Indonesia is ranked the world's 126th cleanest country by Berlin-based watchdog Transparency International, on an equal pegging with countries such as Uganda and Ethiopia.

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