Tempo - Appointing Unknowns

All high-ranking officials, including prospective regional heads, required the consent of Suharto. It was a “business” opportunity for his close circles.

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ONE day, in September 1968.

SOEMITRO was summoned by Suharto—while in his early years in power.

+ “You should get prepared to replace Kartakusuma,” said the President.

Kartakusuma held the office of Defense and Security Chief of Staff with the rank of lieutenant-general. Soemitro was dazed and turned down the offer. Suharto had earlier talked to him about this. At the time Soemitro proposed three names: Lt. Gen. Mokoginta, Vice Admiral Sudomo, and Maj. Gen. H.R. Dharsono.

But Suharto insisted.

+ “No. You should be the one to replace Kartakusuma. Be prepared.”

In March in the following year, Soemitro was installed as chief of staff, his rank promoted to lieutenant-general.

Twelve years later, in 1994, Soemitro launched his autobiography entitled Soemitro. He writes, whenever somebody was wanted to occupy a position, President Suharto would make sure it was realized.

Suharto wanted loyal people around him, loyal to himself and to the dual function. Therefore, he always wanted to choose his “representatives” in various fields of operation himself. Most of them were active soldiers.

The same was true in selecting regional heads. According to former TNI Deputy Commander Fachrul Rozi, in practice, regional heads were actually selected by the TNI Commander in Chief. But the final decision remained in Suharto’s hands. “I don’t know much about the standard mechanism, perhaps the TNI Commander offered names to Pak Harto,” Fachrul told Tempo.

It was said that if Pak Harto replied “yes”, the names were accepted. But if Suharto promptly spoke of something in Javanese that meant more or less: “Well, I haven’t heard of the names yet, ‘A’,” it implied the commander had to find others.

Former TNI Territorial Chief of Staff Agus Widjojo said the implementation of the dual function by Suharto shifted considerably from the concept envisioned by Gen. Nasution. Originally, the dual function was designed as a security and social defense force. However, under Suharto, it became a security and sociopolitical defense force. “The reason was that without controlling politics, the TNI could not do much through policies considered good for the people,” added Agus.

Still, Fachrul Rozi saw the appointment of regional heads by Suharto—mostly being active soldiers—as good enough. At least, in his view, there were no bad leaders. “The persons named must have been good as they came from a long selection,” he continued. “If they later turned out to be bad, they would be replaced by their superiors,” Fachrul noted.

The TNI’s political line in the Suharto era, said Fachrul, remained unchanged: state politics. The problem was its contrary application. The public officials were not chosen by society but instead named by Suharto. “If I said there used to be positive leadership, it’s because the men were good compared with some bad ones elected today,” he indicated.

Trying to understand Suharto’s “thought,” Fachrul assumed that it was purposely done to ensure stability that became the main point of the President’s political guideline. “The development trilogy was stability, growth and equity. Stability came first,” he pointed out.

Undermining civil sovereignty, Suharto’s power to name regional heads also allowed his close circles the opportunity to do “business.” An example many people still remember is the bribery case of the Bantul Regent. It’s the case that allegedly led to the death of a journalist of the Bernas daily in Yogyakarta, Fuad Muhammad Syafruddin, on August 16, 1996.

Reportedly, for his reelection as regent, Sri Roso Sudarmo, then an army artillery colonel, bribed Dharmais Foundation owned by Suharto with Rp1 billion. This story circulated in an anonymous letter in the Bantul regency council at the time. Syafruddin wrote the story in his paper.

During the dual-function practice in the Suharto period, said Fachrul, many TNI officers disagreed and deemed it excessive. Nonetheless, as Suharto was too strong, none of them dared to oppose.

Moreover, Suharto knew very well how to “muffle” those attempting to shake him. He unhesitatingly threatened the circles regarded as undermining his power: in September 1989, in a flight aboard a DC-10 to Yugoslavia, Suharto replied to journalists’ questions about the succession of national leadership, which was then controversial in the country. And Suharto stated on the plane that he would beat up those trying to replace him unconstitutionally. “If it’s done unconstitutionally, by political leaders as well as generals, I say, I’ll beat them up,” he said laughingly.

The power of Suharto to bring the “green uniform” to the government was not limited to regional heads. The military also controlled executive positions of lucrative enterprises, like Pertamina and Bulog, besides strategic departments. The “military corps” filled various posts from minister, director-general, inspector-general, to ambassador. In the early New Order period, 22 of the 26 governors were soldiers. Starting 1967, soldiers were given 47 free seats in the House.

Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) seats were also dominated, though in some cases very disproportionally. For instance, the seven DPRDs in East Timor had all their speakers coming from the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), with nobody from the region, and the principle of representation was least realized.

But what did Suharto say about the dual function? In his state address before the House, August 16, 1980, Suharto stressed that ABRI was purposely involved in politics for the reform of political life in the country. “Particularly to create stable and dynamic political life and development implementation,” he said.

Suharto once might also be aware that he had by far gone off course. On March 23, 1981, he affirmed ABRI’s functional assignments should not lead to the placement of ABRI personnel to non-ABRI sectors. But this affirmation was not followed up by concrete improvements.

The statement about the “ABRI functionaries” turned out to be only realized seven years later. Gen. Rudini, as Minister of Home Affairs during 1988-1993, finally reduced the percentage of regional executives coming from the military. Yet the number discounted was very slight, from 50 percent to 41 percent.

Only after Suharto stepped down did the government’s political role fully return to civilians. The TNI voluntarily assumed the part only two years after Suharto toppled from the presidency.

Fachrul may be right that in fact many TNI officers were against the outrageous dual function and wished to introduce a change. But they were scared of Suharto.