In the New Order era, soldiers dominated all aspects of the country—from private life to politics. Subjected to a wave of reform, the domination was eroded. Ten years ago, the Cilangkap military headquarters announced its preparedness to leave politics. This story marks the 12-year downfall of the authoritarian regime.
IN the Gatot Subroto hall, Cilangkap headquarters, Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander in Chief, Admiral Widodo Adi Sutjipto made history. On Wednesday, April 19, 2000, he declared that the military had abandoned its sociopolitical function, which “has departed from the TNI’s identity as the defender of the state”.
All the military top brass were present in the room, including three chiefs of staff. Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono and State Minister of Regional Autonomy Ryaas Rasyid also attended. The first TNI commander from the Indonesian Navy continued, “Functionally, the TNI has now focused itself on the execution of defense duties.”
Widodo, lastly Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal & Security Affairs in United Indonesia Cabinet I, at the time said the TNI was no longer fully accountable for public order, which had become the responsibility of the police. It was an important chapter that ended the military moves in various facets of life of the state through the dual-function doctrine.
Starting from the “middle path” concept of Abdul Haris Nasution in 1958, the dual function served as soldiers’ entry gate to politics. Basically it gave an opportunity to the military—as one of the political forces—to play a role in the government based on the principle of collective duty. This concept was created to prevent a military coup, which could feasibly recur. Nasution’s “middle path” was completed through the doctrine named Tri Ubaya Cakti, resulting from the Army Seminar I (1965) and II (1966) in Bandung.
President Suharto really benefited from the military dual function to support his power for over three decades. For the sake of “political stability and security”, he named military officers to be ministers, governors and regents. At the rural level, soldiers also became subdistrict or village heads. With the dual function, they also obtained free tickets to the House of Representatives.
As a result, development proceeded stably—though later found out to be fragile and corrupt. According to Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, TNI Commander in Chief replacing Widodo, Suharto prioritized people’s “stomach” matters. He ignored transparency—something that later was demanded by the public at large.
Endriartono related an anecdote to describe the atmosphere at the time. One day, Suharto was angling and failed to catch any fish. In fact, many other people had their catch. Asked about it, a fisherman answered, “In the face of Bapak, even men dare not open their mouths, let alone fish.”
On May 21, 1998, Suharto’s power tumbled. Soldiers’ role was challenged. Gradually, Cilangkap transformed itself despite the tug-of-war between various interests. In his book, Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwifungsi (The Growth and Ruin of Dual Function), Salim Said sees Widodo’s speech in Cilangkap as the military’s official divorce from the dual function.
ACCORDING to Agus Widjojo, former TNI Territorial Chief of Staff, besides abandoning the double function, soldiers still had a choice: doggedly maintaining Suharto. But part of the top brass considered the time opportune to open the path to democracy. “If Pak Harto had been defended, the National Monument (Monas) would have been bloody,” he said.
By the fall of Suharto, Jakarta and several other cities were chaotic and in a mess. In the capital, tanks and armored vehicles barricaded city corners and the vicinity of the Presidential Palace. Roads leading to Monas and the Palace were blocked. Chinatown was guarded by armed troops. All shops and houses in the zone were closed. Some of their owners fled abroad.
The House of Representatives and People’s Consultative Assembly building was clamorous. Tens of thousands of students controlled the building. They urged Suharto to step down. The masses also planned to stage a mass rally of a million people at Monas Square, right in front of the Palace, on National Awakening Day, May 20, 1998.
The movement failed. Soldiers set up barbed wire around Monas. Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Reserve Command Kivlan Zein threatened to shoot Amien Rais, then Central Board General Chairman of Muhammadiyah, if he organized the rally. “Troops prepared tanks and ammunition to drive out protesters,” says Kivlan in the book, Konflik dan Integrasi TNI-AD (Conflict and Integration of the TNI/Army).
On May 21, 1998, Suharto was unable to resist the wave of protests. He made a speech declaring his resignation. The challenge to the double function persisted, even strengthening. From then on, Cilangkap introduced some changes.
Gen. Fachrul Razi, former TNI Deputy Commander, said public pressure was not the only factor affecting the military reform. “Despite being under pressure, if we’d rejected, no change would have happened,” said Fachrul, now Chairman of the People’s Conscience Party. He added the desire for reform had arisen before 1998. Some officers thought that TNI had become a super institution.
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, former Sociopolitical Chief of Staff, stated the public denunciation of the military role completed and hastened the transformation. “The reform awareness had appeared before Suharto stepped down,” says Yudhoyono, now President, in the book, SBY Sang Demokrat (SBY the Democrat).
Indeed, the military made minor changes in the concluding years of the New Order. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edi Sudradjat, for instance, offered the idea of getting back to basics. In his view, soldiers should be professional, prioritizing the state defense duty.
In the term of Armed Forces Commander Gen. M. Jusuf, soldiers entering the civilian domain were put in order. He banned active soldiers from trading. Those violating the rule were dismissed or pensioned off earlier. M. Jusuf also banned companies set up under military units. Suharto in 1981 issued a warning to the military. Functional assignments should not lead to the placement of military personnel in non-military sectors.
Still, such statements eventually served as slogans. If implemented, they were not steadily observed for being ignored by successors. In 1997, Gen. R. Hartono, Army Chief of Staff since two years earlier, even wore a yellow jacket when attending a campaign held by the Golkar Party.
The reform began to be seriously handled as Cilangkap formed a team of 32 generals and six colonels. A number of officers known as reformists joined as members, like Agus Widjojo, Yudhoyono, and Agus Wirahadikusumah. Soon after the fall of Suharto, the team released four new TNI paradigms. First, soldiers must not always be in front. Second, soldiers already occupying civilian posts should only exert influence for good purposes. Third, soldiers should change their way from exerting direct influence to affecting indirectly. Fourth, soldiers should be ready to share political roles with the nation’s other components.
The four new paradigms were actually just toning down the dual function, already seen as deadwood by Cilangkap at the time. Agus Widjojo believed it took time for the military to be really rid of the political role. “The new paradigm concept was finished only two months after Pak Harto resigned,” noted Agus.
There were also radical officers. Led by Agus Wirahadikusumah, the group strongly voiced military reform. When he was Wirabuana Regional Military Commander, he even said territorial commands should be dissolved. In fact, territorial development had virtually been a “religion” for soldiers. Agus proposed the dissolution in phases, starting from the lowest territorial command of noncommissioned officers in villages known as babinsa.
Agus Widjojo and other progressive officers also suggested the transfer of territorial fostering function to regional administrations. The military function should be limited to defense only. Territorial commands are not authorized to cover society. “There’s a clear limit between military and civilian domains,” he said. Under the New Order, the commands of military precincts, districts, zones, and babinsa were involved in mobilizing public forces in general elections and nominations of regents, district heads, or village chiefs.
The radical idea was opposed by the conservative group, like Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, Army Chief of Staff, 1999-2000, and Jakarta Military Commander Djaja Suparman. Tyasno said the reform had considerably deviated. According to him, the reform tended to be oriented to the US and other advanced countries.
Tyasno added American soldiers really stayed in barracks because they had been formed by the state. “In Indonesia, soldiers set up the state,” he stressed. For this reason, Tyasno deemed it unnecessary to end the dual function.
At last, soldiers had to submit to the times. They were powerless to resist the reform ‘tsunami’. The dual function has been part of history since the speech of Admiral Widodo in the Gatot Subroto hall, Cilangkap.
10 YEARS TNI REFORM SPECIAL REPORT TEAM
Team Leader: Budi Setyarso
Coordinator: Sunudyantoro
Writers: Sunudyantoro, Wahyu Dhyatmika, Philipus Parera, Yandi M.R., Dwidjo Utomo Maksum, Oktamandjaya Wiguna, Cheta Nilawaty
Contributors: Mahbub Djunaidy, David Priyasidharta (Jember)
Research: Evan Koesumah
Editors: Budi Setyarso, Arif Zulkifli, Nugroho Dewanto, Idrus F. Shahab, Amarzan Loebis, M. Taufiqurohman, Hermien Y. Kleden, Wahyu Muryadi
Language Editors: Uu Suhardi, Dewi Kartika Teguh
Photographers: Mazmur A. Sembiring, Suryo Wibowo, Jacky Rachmansyah
Visual Design: Gilang Rahadian, Eko Punto P., Hendy Prakasa, Kendra H. Paramita, Kiagus Auliansyah, Aji Yuliarto, Agus Darmawan S., Tri Watno Widodo.
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