Showing posts with label Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Show all posts

Jul 3, 2010

Super Size Cabinet

indonesia batikImage by FriskoDude via Flickr

The President appoints three more deputy ministers, making his cabinet the largest since the New Order era.


DIRECTOR-General of Higher Education Fasli Jalal picked up the phone in his office, Thursday two weeks ago. On the other end of the line was Minister/State Secretary Sudi Silalahi, who asked Fasli to report to President Yudhoyono. “I was told to bring along my CV,” he said. Monday afternoon, last week, Fasli drove to the Presidential Palace after reporting to his superior, Muhammad Nuh. At the Palace, this alumni of Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA, received word from the President that he was about to become Deputy Minister of Education.

Fahmi’s inauguration took place at the State Palace, Wednesday last week. Aside from Fahmi, President Yudhoyono also inaugurated the Deputy State National Development Planning Minister for the Funding Division Lukita Dinarsyah Tuwo, and Secretary-General of the Defense Department Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, each serving as deputy minister in their corresponding government bodies. The deputy ministers’ inauguration was held at the same time with the inauguration of Dipo Alam—Deputy of the Coordinating Minister for the Economy—as the Minister/Cabinet Secretary, a position which had previously been left vacant ever since Sudi Silalahi, moved to the State Secretariat.

Minister of Education Muhammad Nuh warmly welcomed Fasli, his new deputy. “He would surely help me in doing my work,” said the former Minister of Communication & Information. Fasli has been around in the Education Department for a while. He joined the department a decade ago, as a senior staff who served under Minister Yahya Muhaimin during Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency, leading a number of directorates general. When drafting began for the United Indonesia Cabinet II, Fasli was one of the most favored candidates nominated to replace the predecessor, Bambang Sudibyo.

Like Nuh, Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro was delighted with Sjafrie’s appointment. “In my opinion, there has to be a deputy minister because we have lots of work and budget,” said this Minister of Energy & Mineral Resources from 2000-2009. According to him, Sjafrie will deal with matters related to the army and police, including foreign affairs whenever the minister is unavailable. Former Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono considers Sjafrie as the right man for the job due to his knowledge of military techniques.

Following the president’s announcement of his cabinet members last October, Nuh and Purnomo were among the ones who received the most attention because they were considered as not having enough experience to be placed in their positions. Politics observer Arbi Sanit thinks that Nuh’s experience—despite he once became a dean—is still insufficient. “He was chosen due to his closeness to SBY, he has no outstanding qualities,” said Arbi. While Jaleswari Pramowardhani, a military observer from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, thinks that Purnomo has a technocratic tendency and lacks military knowledge. “He did serve as deputy chair of the National Resilience Institute in 1998, but things are different now,” she said.

Deputy appointments for these two ministers raises suspicion that the president wants to provide some cover for his less capable cabinet members. However, the president has come up with his own answer. President Yudhoyono said the deputy minister appointment for some departments was based on the consideration of the heavy workload and the target of his current cabinet. According to SBY, he expects the Deputy Minister of Defense to help formulate policies and defense strategies, as well as modernize the defense system primary tools. As for the Deputy Minister of Education, SBY expects him to help with the education reforms.

Deputy minister appointment is the president’s privilege as mentioned in the State Department Law No. 39/2008. Its Article 10 says, “In case of heavy workloads which require special treatment, the president may appoint deputy ministers for corresponding deprtments.” Member of the House of Representatives (DPR) Agun Gunandjar Sudarsa said that the deputy minister appointments might actually help with the overgrown bureaucracy in several departments. “There are departments that have more than ten Echelon 1 officers,” said the Chairman of the State Department Law Special Committee.

Last week’s three deputy ministers appointment was the third wave of similar actions. Triyono Wibowo, appointed as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in September 11, 2008, was the first. Slightly different from the two following appointments, Triyono—then the Ambassador for the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Slovenia, and also acted as a UN Representative in Vienna—was appointed by Minister Hassan Wirajuda in the Department’s office at Pejambon, Central Jakarta.

In the second wave in November 11, 2009, more deputy ministers were appointed: Bayu Krisnamurti (Deputy Minister of Agriculture), Bambang Susantono (Deputy Minister of Transportation), Mahendra Siregar (Deputy Minister of Trade), Alex Retraubun (Deputy Minister of Industry), and Hermando Dardak (Deputy Minister of Public Works). That time, the President also appointed Gita Wirjawan as Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board. It means the United Indonesia Cabinet II now has nine deputy ministers.

According to plan, the number should have grown to 11, had the President inaugurated Fahmi Idris as Deputy Minister of Health and Anggito Abimanyu as Deputy Minister of Finance. Appointments for the 2006-2009 Chairman of the Indonesian Medical Association and Chairman of Fiscal Policy Board of the Department of Finance were cancelled due to administrative reasons. According to the Minister/State Secretary Sudi Silalahi, the two candidates have not met the requirement of occupying an Echelon 1-A structural position. “If that has not been fulfilled, we cannot proceed. We do not want to break the rules,” he said. Sudi offered no explanation on when the two would be inaugurated either.

Even as it is only an administrative one, politics observer Eep Saefulloh Fatah said the mistake is serious and fatal. “The president is reckless when taking such important policies,” he said. A day before the intended appointments, presidential spokesperson Julian Aldrin Pasha revealed the appointment plans to reporters. Although he mentioned no specific name, Julian nodded when Tempo asked him whether Fahmi Idris and Anggito Abimanyu were amongst the list. According to Julian, the deputy minister candidates have signed their performance contracts and integrity pacts.

On the deputy minister appointments, Eep thinks of it as a proof of the president’s lack of commitment towards bureaucracy reforms. “This is the most overcrowded cabinet in the reform era. It even has more people than the entire New Order cabinets,” he said. This deputy minister appointment is a different matter compared to when Suharto appointed his junior ministers. Junior minister was a position formed in preparation of a new department. For example, Cosmas Batubara was appointed Junior Minister of Public Housing before he occupied the position as minister in the next period.

According to Eep, there are some positions which actually require deputy ministers, like the Department of Defense and the Department of Finance. The many deputy ministers today shows that there is no clear criteria as to which department requires one. He further added that if such notion continues, soon there would be no reason not to appoint deputy minister in every department. “This is a fatal political mistake, one which clearly shows the President’s terrible imagination. His creativity is questionable,” he said.

As Eep said, the president is facing multiple choices. Included in his array of choices are the options to select between a competent, but non-partisan individual, a partisan individual who is also competent, or whether to adopt accommodation politics. “But the President could not decide between the three options,” he said. It later resulted in an overcrowded cabinet.

Constitutional law expert Irman Putra Sidin said that an overcrowded cabinet goes against the spirit of decentralization. “An officer who finds little to do in Jakarta will be looking for work, like getting his hands on something which should have been the portion of the regional administration,” he said.

Adek Media, Gunanto, Cornila Desyana

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Palace Mouthpiece

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of IndonesiaImage via Wikipedia

From the outset the newspaper was to be pro-Yudhoyono. No news or photos of demonstrations were featured.


IT was a Tuesday night in February last year, in the personal library of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in Cikeas, West Java. Ramadhan Pohan, the editor in chief of Jurnal Nasional newspaper was having a casual discussion with his host. It was a serious talk, even though there was much joking. For five hours, SBY, Chairman of the Democrat Party Board of Trustees spoke with this journalist who went on to become a member of the House of Representatives from the Democrat Party.

When night fell, the two moved to another room in the house. First Lady Ani Yudhoyono was busy in the kitchen. The President took his own dinner that night, and even went back for seconds. Ibu Ani prepared the rice and mixed vegetables.

That night was the first time Yudhoyono granted an interview about the issue of him being nominated to run for a second term of office in the 2009 Presidential Election. Jurnal Nasional was given the first opportunity to interview him.

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ONE day in mid-2005. Three men from the Blora Center agreed to establish a media company. They were: Taufik Rahzen (an artist), Rully Charis Iswahyudi (a businessman), and Ramadhan Pohan (a former reporter for Jawa Pos). The Blora Center is a think tank which did the groundwork for Yudhoyono to step forward in the 2004 Presidential Election. Along the way the Blora Institute was formed, led by Taufik Rahzen—who later became a senior editor at the newspaper he formed.

This trio was helped by a team from the Brighten Institute—an institution where Yudhoyono sits as Chairman of the Board of Trustees. This team consisted of Joyo Winoto, Daddi Heryono, and Asto Sunu Subroto. On 1 June 2006, Jurnal Nasional was born.

The first general manager of Jurnal Nasional newspaper was Asto Sunu Subroto. A year later he was replaced by D.S. Priyarsono, who only held the position for a few months. The job then fell to N. Syamsuddin Ch. Haesy, who still presides over the paper today.

Image of Ramadhan Pohan from FacebookImage of Ramadhan Pohan

Jurnal’s close relationship with Yudhoyono has been thrown into the spotlight. It has been said that this paper received funds from a famous cigarette industry, the Sampoerna Group. This was denied by Ramadhan. However, Ramadhan did not deny that Jurnal is affiliated with Yudhoyono. “Jurnal Nasional does indeed defend SBY,” he said. From the outset, Jurnal was designed to be in alignment with the thinking of Yudhoyono, who wanted the media to publish positive news. “This is why there is news or photos of demonstrations in this newspaper.”

Hamid Dipo Pramono, the editor in chief of Jurnal Nasional after Ramadhan Pohan, denied the charge that Yudhoyono intervenes in the editing of the paper. According to him, the President has never given any special directions. “It is wrong if Jurnal is considered to be some sort of public relations body, and even more so if it [is said it] only takes orders from the Palace.”

Although the President does not intervene, according to some editorial staff at the paper, former Presidential Spokesman Andi Alifian Mallarangeng often interferes. Although he has never personally attended an editors meeting, he makes requests by telephone. Andi did not completely deny this. “I have a relationship with all editors in chief. If there is news which is inaccurate, I correct it,” he said.

Andi has been a regular writer for Jurnal from the beginning. His column, “From Kilometer 0.0”, has been routinely published since 29 May 2006. In addition to him, others from the Palace who write regularly are Anas Urbaningrum (currently Chairman of the Democrat Party faction in the DPR) and Denny Indrayana (a special staff member of the President in the legal field).

Ninin Damayanti

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May 18, 2010

Tempo - A Decade after the Downfall

In the New Order era, soldiers dominated all aspects of the country—from private life to politics. Subjected to a wave of reform, the domination was eroded. Ten years ago, the Cilangkap military headquarters announced its preparedness to leave politics. This story marks the 12-year downfall of the authoritarian regime.


IN the Gatot Subroto hall, Cilangkap headquarters, Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander in Chief, Admiral Widodo Adi Sutjipto made history. On Wednesday, April 19, 2000, he declared that the military had abandoned its sociopolitical function, which “has departed from the TNI’s identity as the defender of the state”.

All the military top brass were present in the room, including three chiefs of staff. Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono and State Minister of Regional Autonomy Ryaas Rasyid also attended. The first TNI commander from the Indonesian Navy continued, “Functionally, the TNI has now focused itself on the execution of defense duties.”

Widodo, lastly Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal & Security Affairs in United Indonesia Cabinet I, at the time said the TNI was no longer fully accountable for public order, which had become the responsibility of the police. It was an important chapter that ended the military moves in various facets of life of the state through the dual-function doctrine.

Starting from the “middle path” concept of Abdul Haris Nasution in 1958, the dual function served as soldiers’ entry gate to politics. Basically it gave an opportunity to the military—as one of the political forces—to play a role in the government based on the principle of collective duty. This concept was created to prevent a military coup, which could feasibly recur. Nasution’s “middle path” was completed through the doctrine named Tri Ubaya Cakti, resulting from the Army Seminar I (1965) and II (1966) in Bandung.

President Suharto really benefited from the military dual function to support his power for over three decades. For the sake of “political stability and security”, he named military officers to be ministers, governors and regents. At the rural level, soldiers also became subdistrict or village heads. With the dual function, they also obtained free tickets to the House of Representatives.

As a result, development proceeded stably—though later found out to be fragile and corrupt. According to Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, TNI Commander in Chief replacing Widodo, Suharto prioritized people’s “stomach” matters. He ignored transparency—something that later was demanded by the public at large.

Endriartono related an anecdote to describe the atmosphere at the time. One day, Suharto was angling and failed to catch any fish. In fact, many other people had their catch. Asked about it, a fisherman answered, “In the face of Bapak, even men dare not open their mouths, let alone fish.”

On May 21, 1998, Suharto’s power tumbled. Soldiers’ role was challenged. Gradually, Cilangkap transformed itself despite the tug-of-war between various interests. In his book, Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwifungsi (The Growth and Ruin of Dual Function), Salim Said sees Widodo’s speech in Cilangkap as the military’s official divorce from the dual function.

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ACCORDING to Agus Widjojo, former TNI Territorial Chief of Staff, besides abandoning the double function, soldiers still had a choice: doggedly maintaining Suharto. But part of the top brass considered the time opportune to open the path to democracy. “If Pak Harto had been defended, the National Monument (Monas) would have been bloody,” he said.

By the fall of Suharto, Jakarta and several other cities were chaotic and in a mess. In the capital, tanks and armored vehicles barricaded city corners and the vicinity of the Presidential Palace. Roads leading to Monas and the Palace were blocked. Chinatown was guarded by armed troops. All shops and houses in the zone were closed. Some of their owners fled abroad.

The House of Representatives and People’s Consultative Assembly building was clamorous. Tens of thousands of students controlled the building. They urged Suharto to step down. The masses also planned to stage a mass rally of a million people at Monas Square, right in front of the Palace, on National Awakening Day, May 20, 1998.

The movement failed. Soldiers set up barbed wire around Monas. Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Reserve Command Kivlan Zein threatened to shoot Amien Rais, then Central Board General Chairman of Muhammadiyah, if he organized the rally. “Troops prepared tanks and ammunition to drive out protesters,” says Kivlan in the book, Konflik dan Integrasi TNI-AD (Conflict and Integration of the TNI/Army).

On May 21, 1998, Suharto was unable to resist the wave of protests. He made a speech declaring his resignation. The challenge to the double function persisted, even strengthening. From then on, Cilangkap introduced some changes.

Gen. Fachrul Razi, former TNI Deputy Commander, said public pressure was not the only factor affecting the military reform. “Despite being under pressure, if we’d rejected, no change would have happened,” said Fachrul, now Chairman of the People’s Conscience Party. He added the desire for reform had arisen before 1998. Some officers thought that TNI had become a super institution.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, former Sociopolitical Chief of Staff, stated the public denunciation of the military role completed and hastened the transformation. “The reform awareness had appeared before Suharto stepped down,” says Yudhoyono, now President, in the book, SBY Sang Demokrat (SBY the Democrat).

Indeed, the military made minor changes in the concluding years of the New Order. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edi Sudradjat, for instance, offered the idea of getting back to basics. In his view, soldiers should be professional, prioritizing the state defense duty.

In the term of Armed Forces Commander Gen. M. Jusuf, soldiers entering the civilian domain were put in order. He banned active soldiers from trading. Those violating the rule were dismissed or pensioned off earlier. M. Jusuf also banned companies set up under military units. Suharto in 1981 issued a warning to the military. Functional assignments should not lead to the placement of military personnel in non-military sectors.

Still, such statements eventually served as slogans. If implemented, they were not steadily observed for being ignored by successors. In 1997, Gen. R. Hartono, Army Chief of Staff since two years earlier, even wore a yellow jacket when attending a campaign held by the Golkar Party.

The reform began to be seriously handled as Cilangkap formed a team of 32 generals and six colonels. A number of officers known as reformists joined as members, like Agus Widjojo, Yudhoyono, and Agus Wirahadikusumah. Soon after the fall of Suharto, the team released four new TNI paradigms. First, soldiers must not always be in front. Second, soldiers already occupying civilian posts should only exert influence for good purposes. Third, soldiers should change their way from exerting direct influence to affecting indirectly. Fourth, soldiers should be ready to share political roles with the nation’s other components.

The four new paradigms were actually just toning down the dual function, already seen as deadwood by Cilangkap at the time. Agus Widjojo believed it took time for the military to be really rid of the political role. “The new paradigm concept was finished only two months after Pak Harto resigned,” noted Agus.

There were also radical officers. Led by Agus Wirahadikusumah, the group strongly voiced military reform. When he was Wirabuana Regional Military Commander, he even said territorial commands should be dissolved. In fact, territorial development had virtually been a “religion” for soldiers. Agus proposed the dissolution in phases, starting from the lowest territorial command of noncommissioned officers in villages known as babinsa.

Agus Widjojo and other progressive officers also suggested the transfer of territorial fostering function to regional administrations. The military function should be limited to defense only. Territorial commands are not authorized to cover society. “There’s a clear limit between military and civilian domains,” he said. Under the New Order, the commands of military precincts, districts, zones, and babinsa were involved in mobilizing public forces in general elections and nominations of regents, district heads, or village chiefs.

The radical idea was opposed by the conservative group, like Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, Army Chief of Staff, 1999-2000, and Jakarta Military Commander Djaja Suparman. Tyasno said the reform had considerably deviated. According to him, the reform tended to be oriented to the US and other advanced countries.

Tyasno added American soldiers really stayed in barracks because they had been formed by the state. “In Indonesia, soldiers set up the state,” he stressed. For this reason, Tyasno deemed it unnecessary to end the dual function.

At last, soldiers had to submit to the times. They were powerless to resist the reform ‘tsunami’. The dual function has been part of history since the speech of Admiral Widodo in the Gatot Subroto hall, Cilangkap.


10 YEARS TNI REFORM SPECIAL REPORT TEAM
Team Leader: Budi Setyarso
Coordinator: Sunudyantoro
Writers: Sunudyantoro, Wahyu Dhyatmika, Philipus Parera, Yandi M.R., Dwidjo Utomo Maksum, Oktamandjaya Wiguna, Cheta Nilawaty
Contributors: Mahbub Djunaidy, David Priyasidharta (Jember)
Research: Evan Koesumah
Editors: Budi Setyarso, Arif Zulkifli, Nugroho Dewanto, Idrus F. Shahab, Amarzan Loebis, M. Taufiqurohman, Hermien Y. Kleden, Wahyu Muryadi
Language Editors: Uu Suhardi, Dewi Kartika Teguh
Photographers: Mazmur A. Sembiring, Suryo Wibowo, Jacky Rachmansyah
Visual Design: Gilang Rahadian, Eko Punto P., Hendy Prakasa, Kendra H. Paramita, Kiagus Auliansyah, Aji Yuliarto, Agus Darmawan S., Tri Watno Widodo.

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Sep 25, 2009

Indonesia’s rainforests recover from deforestation due to illegal logging - Trends Updates

Orangutan.Image via Wikipedia

More than 70 percent of Indonesia’s original forest cover has been lost. Logging, which is mostly illegal, is estimated to destroy over 2.4 million hectares per year.

Re-elected Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) gets international praise for leading the fight against deforestation in his country. All Indonesian presidents in the past have pledged to preserve Indonesia’s rainforests. What makes Yudhoyono different is that, unlike his predecessors, he has taken strong steps to keep his promise. One of his flagship projects is Operation Sustainable Forestry which was launched in 2005.

According to one veteran travel organizer, “Illegal logging decreased rapidly the first year SBY was in power. Powerful people, including government officials, were sent to jail for their roles in deforestation.”

Indonesia’s military has long been suspected of having ties with illegal loggers. Yudhoyono, a former general, has asserted greater civilian control over the military, particularly regarding illegal logging.

Logging concessions in Sebangau National Park, one of Kalimantan’s most infamous illegal logging areas, ended in 1990, yet there were 147 sawmills still operating as late as 2001. Illegal logging requires heavy investments in Indonesia. Loggers had also built extensive networks of canals to transport cut timber, making the lowland peat forest area more susceptible to burning.

Staunch environmentalist groups such as the WWF have always kept watch over deforestation in Indonesia. WWF has begun reforestation with corporate partners in 850 hectares of the worst hit areas of Sebangau, located just 45 minutes by speedboat from Central Kalimantan’s provincial capital Palangka Raya and believed to have one of world’s largest wild orangutan populations.

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Aug 27, 2009

Forget Politics and Just Make New Ministers Professional, Survey Says - The Jakarta Globe

The Yudhoyonos in a family outing, from left: ...Image via Wikipedia

It is often said that politics and religion are subjects to avoid at all costs. And it seems that most believe the two should also be avoided in government, according to the results of a poll by the Indonesian Survey Institute released on Thursday.

Upon being asked which were the most important criteria for selecting ministers in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s new government, respondents overwhelmingly avoided politicians and religious figures.

In the poll of 1,270 people, 78.3 percent of respondents said professional qualifications were the most important factor for selecting ministers, rather than their political, religious, ethnic or regional affiliations.

Only 22.7 percent of respondents said they believed ministers should be selected based
on their political leanings, according to Dodi Ambardi, the director of the institute, also known as the LSI. The survey was conducted from July 18 to 28 among respondents selected using multistage random sampling techniques. The margin of error was 2.8 percentage points.

Nearly 74 percent of respondents who live in provincial villages and 85.2 percent of residents in urban areas and cities wanted professionals to sit in the next cabinet. Only 11.5 percent of respondents said it was acceptable if ministers came from certain political parties or religious groups.

“This has proven that the people of Indonesia expect Yudhoyono to choose qualified professionals in forming his cabinet,” Dodi said.

He said that even respondents from Java, home to about half of the country’s population, viewed professional qualifications as more important than adhering to the traditional model, which has seen proportional numbers of Javanese and non-Javanese ministers appointed.

J Kristiadi, a political analyst from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said candidates should have expertise in the government ministry they were nominated for, strong ethics and social responsibility.

He said that even if cabinet seats had to be divided among political parties that were part of Yudhoyono’s coalition, the candidates should still have professional skills in their nominated field.

“We demand Yudhoyono, who won more than 60 percent of the vote in the election, use his [mandate] to choose the right people,” Kristiadi said.

Ichsan Mojo, an economist from the Institute for the Development of Economics and Finance, said it would be virtually impossible for the president to choose a cabinet without having representatives from political parties.

However, he said he hoped that two key ministerial posts, industry and agriculture, would be given to qualified, apolitical professionals.

“Those posts are in the real sectors, so if it’s not a professional who holds the position, we can’t expect much from them in terms of handling problems like economic growth, poverty and unemployment,” he said.
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