Feb 14, 2010

Inside Indonesia - Women and work

Review: Written in an accessible style and admirably free of jargon, Women and Work in Indonesia is a valuable resource for understanding how work shapes the identities and lived experiences of specific sets of women in Indonesia

Teri Caraway
carawayford.jpg

According to World Bank data, only about half of women in Indonesia are in the labour force. One might infer from this statistic that about half of women in Indonesia do not work. Such a conclusion would be incorrect. As Michele Ford and Lyn Parker argue in their excellent introductory chapter to Women and Work in Indonesia, statistics that count only income-generating activities as work both underestimate and undervalue women’s contributions to the economy, their families and the communities in which they live. Ford and Parker also insist that representations of Indonesian women as housewives overlook the increasing engagement of women in waged work and the important contributions that their earning activities make to family welfare. This volume understands ‘work’ very broadly and pays careful attention to the interrelationships between the different kinds of work that women juggle on a daily basis.

No other book on women and work in Indonesia has the breadth of this volume. The contributors analyse many different types of work that women do in Indonesia – farming; midwifery; hotel, factory, media, mining and sex work – as well as work that Indonesian women do as migrant workers in Malaysia and Singapore. The volume also examines women and work in a variety of regions of Indonesia, including West Sumatra, Riau, Southeast Sulawesi, Lombok, Banten, East Kalimantan and the Riau Islands.

Edited volumes with such a broad scope inevitably sacrifice some depth for breadth. Yet the individual chapters, though concise, provide rich accounts of the challenges and trade-offs that women face in their daily lives. The authors also illuminate the multiple ways that women negotiate their identities in relation to the various kinds of work that they do. Evelyn Blackwood’s study of Minangkabau rice farmers, for example, carefully maps out the complexity of women’s farm labour, noting how ownership of land, the quantity of land owned and kin relationships shape the kinds of work that women do and how they interpret their identities. Women who own some land might oversee workers in their fields one day but on the next they may work in someone else’s rice field, perhaps even alongside the women who worked for them the day before. Yet some women frame their farm work not as wage labour, or as a job, but as domestic labour – an interpretation that allows them to define themselves as housewives and essentially hides from view the economic value of their work.

No other book on women and work in Indonesia has the breadth of this volume

Each chapter also makes the experiences of women a central focus of the analysis, in order both to understand better the meaning of work for women and to avoid narratives of victimisation. The authors do not sugar-coat the discrimination, exploitative relationships and low pay that many women experience at work, but the editors are certainly justified in arguing that portraying women as victims denies them agency and that any understanding of women and work in Indonesia requires researchers to value how women understand the meaning of their work.

Image of Teri Caraway from FacebookImage of Teri Caraway

Discussions of sex work are particularly prey to overly simplistic generalisations about victimisation and exploitation. The Ford and Lyons chapter counters the stereotypical tale of sex workers as victims. Some of the sex workers they studied in Karimun in the Riau Islands exercised a great deal of autonomy over their work lives and moved out of sex work and into the middle class by marrying foreign clients. Remittances to parents, who cared for their children, allowed the women to combine sex work with being ‘good mothers and dutiful daughters’. Yet the moral stain of sex work remained; they did not tell their parents that they were sex workers, and they vigilantly maintained the divide between their work life and family life. Ford and Lyons are careful to state that these workers do not represent all sex workers, and call for more careful and contextualised studies that document the widely varying experiences of sex workers both in Indonesia and elsewhere.

Each chapter makes the experiences of women a central focus of the analysis, in order both to better understand the meaning of work for women and to avoid narratives of victimisation

Mere descriptions of women’s experiences can, of course, lapse into vignettes that use specific voices to represent a certain viewpoint, or that present these voices independently of the historical, social and political context in which they are produced. Fortunately, the chapters in this volume endeavour to use the experiences of particular women, doing certain kinds of work in specific places, to illuminate broader issues of women’s status in the family, labour market, local community and nation. The contributors also set these selected voices within a wider political–economic context that illuminates not only the scope that women have to negotiate work relationships but also the real constraints that they face. As such the chapters are essentially thick descriptions nested in broader understandings of the historical, political, economic and social forces that shape women’s lives.

Gaynor Dawson’s chapter on transmigrants in Riau, for example, nicely shows how the transmigration policy of the Indonesian government, which relocated families from heavily populated regions to less populated and remote areas, placed tremendous burdens on women. Plagued by infertile soils, long distances to markets and a paucity of flexible jobs nearby, women found it very difficult to fulfil their responsibility for domestic work and also contribute to the family’s welfare through farm or waged work. Even men had difficulty finding regular jobs, leading many to search for work outside the transmigration settlement. The absence of husbands left women wholly responsible for farming the family’s land, fulfilling community work obligations, and providing domestic labour; women also became more vulnerable to unexpected interruptions of income if their husbands did not regularly remit money. At the same time, Dawson shows how government development policies based on male headship of households both fortify the man’s status as head of the household and systematically close off opportunities for women to participate in certain economic activities in the transmigration settlement.

The breadth, depth, thematic coherence and quality of the individual contributions in Women and Work in Indonesia make it a valuable addition to the growing body of research on gender, women and work in the archipelago.

Michele Ford and Lyn Parker (eds), Women and Work in Indonesia. Routledge: London, 2008.

Teri Caraway (caraway@umn.edu) teaches political science at the University of Minnesota. Her book, Assembling Women: The Feminization of Global Manufacturing (ILR Press 2007), examines the feminization of the manufacturing workforce in Indonesia during the Suharto era.

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Feb 12, 2010

As Obama bets on Asia, regional players hedge

Manmohan Singh, current prime minister of India.Image via Wikipedia

By Jim Hoagland

Friday, February 12, 2010;

NEW DELHI

Asia forms the crossroads of success or failure for Barack Obama's grandest foreign policy designs. This impression has crystallized over a year in which the president has shown himself indifferent to Europe, sentimental and somewhat conflicted about Africa, perplexed by the Middle East and largely oblivious to Latin America.

Obama's choices about China, India, Japan and Pakistan loom at least as large as the urgent challenges of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The president has outlined the need for the United States to shed burdens abroad to help repair the badly damaged American economy. That means that Obama must settle discarded U.S. burdens -- and power -- across a range of international organizations in which Asian nations are becoming increasingly influential.

The president consigned the Group of Eight industrial countries to leadership oblivion in his recent State of the Union message, omitting any mention of it while singling out the G-20 forum of developed and developed nations. This was no oversight: His administration hopes to shift climate change negotiations out of the unmanageable U.N. format that doomed the Copenhagen summit in December and place these talks in the G-20 process, according to U.S. officials.

Asia's giants, India and China, present differing and opposed models of international cooperation. A G-20 world needs at its center a dynamic U.S.-Indian relationship to help bridge that organization's divides between haves and have-nots and their different political systems. But here in New Delhi, Indian officials increasingly fear that the Obama team does not see it that way.

Indians are flattered that the only state dinner Obama hosted last year was given for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, whose remarkable intelligence and gracious manner would make him a welcome guest anywhere. But they also detect an air of ambivalence blowing their way from Washington -- and are reacting by hedging against a quick U.S. pullout from Afghanistan that would bring greater U.S. reliance on China and Pakistan, at India's expense.

Romanced by the Bush administration to balance China's inexorable rise in military and economic power, India finds itself out of sync with the Obama administration on some key issues. There is no open conflict. But neither is there the air of excitement and innovation about the U.S. relationship that I found on my last trip here 18 months ago.

Since then, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has explicitly rejected balance-of-power politics as a relic of the past. Yet India, Japan and other Asian states fear that without a supportive U.S. hand on the scales, they will be swamped by China's growing military capabilities and its increasingly aggressive, and effective, diplomacy.

The somewhat fanciful notion of a G-2 directorate in which the United States and China collude to determine global economic and political direction is increasingly colliding with reality. Tensions over Taiwan, trade and Tibet make the G-2 unworkable, as recent events have again shown. But the specter lingers for Asians as well as Europeans that Obama will be tempted to try -- even though a failed G-2 would be the worst possible outcome for everyone.

"The G-2 carries the implication that the United States would leave Asia to China to run," says B.J. Panda, a rising young political star here. Adds another Indian strategist: "We have to balance the Chinese, irrespective of what the U.S. and others do."

Obama's emphasis on setting an initial date for withdrawal from Afghanistan in his Dec. 1 policy speech, even as he sent additional U.S. troops, stirred doubt here about U.S. strategic patience. So have the frequent U.S. military visits to and overblown praise for Pakistan's army leadership, despite credible evidence of high-level Pakistani involvement in cross-border terrorism directed at India.

The dominant impression from three days of informal conversations organized here by the Aspen Strategy Group with Indian officials and analysts is that Pakistan has become a second-tier problem for India, even as it increasingly preoccupies Washington. What one Indian analyst described as "Obama's nuclear alarmism" also gives Pakistan increased leverage over Washington.

India has recently moved troops away from the Pakistan frontier while increasing deployments into border areas that China is claiming in pugnacious and offensive rhetoric. In a break with its past opposition to foreign bases in the region, India has secured military transit and stationing rights at an airbase in Tajikistan. And Singh's government lavishly welcomed Japan's new prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, on a recent three-day visit that included publicity about plans for joint military maneuvers in the Indian Ocean.

These are clear signs of Indian hedging: seeking allies for worst-case scenarios while accommodating China on economic matters. The Obama administration's failure to reaffirm clearly that India's rise is in U.S. strategic interests has contributed to this hedging. That is a mistake the president should quickly correct, in the interests of his own vision of a new world order centered on the Pacific and Indian oceans.

The writer is a contributing editor to The Post.

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Feb 5, 2010

Jordan: Stop Withdrawing Nationality from Palestinian-Origin Citizens

Authorities Arbitrarily Withdraw Nationality From More Than 2,700; Hundreds of Thousands at Risk
February 1, 2010

"Jordan is playing politics with the basic rights of thousands of its citizens. Officials are denying entire families the ability to lead normal lives with the sense of security that most citizens of a country take for granted."

Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director

(Amman) - Jordan should stop withdrawing nationality arbitrarily from Jordanians of Palestinian origin, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Authorities stripped more than 2,700 of these Jordanians of their nationality between 2004 and 2008, and the practice continued in 2009, Human Rights Watch said.

The 60-page report, "Stateless Again: Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of their Nationality", details the arbitrary manner, with no clear basis in law, in which Jordan deprives its citizens who were originally from the West Bank of their nationality, thereby denying them basic citizenship rights such as access to education and health care.

"Jordan is playing politics with the basic rights of thousands of its citizens," said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. "Officials are denying entire families the ability to lead normal lives with the sense of security that most citizens of a country take for granted."

Jordanian officials have defended the practice, as a means to counter any future Israeli plans to transfer the Palestinian population of the Israeli-occupied West Bank to Jordan.

Allenby Bridge/King Hussein BridgeImage by michaelramallah via Flickr

Jordan captured the West Bank in 1949 following the first Arab-Israeli war, and in 1950 extended sovereignty there, granting all residents Jordanian nationality. In 1988, however, King Hussein severed Jordan's legal and administrative ties to the West Bank, relinquishing claims to sovereignty there and withdrawing Jordanian nationality from all Palestinians who resided in the West Bank at the time.

Other Jordanians of West Bank origin, but who were not living in the West Bank at the time, were not affected and kept their Jordanian nationality. Over the last decade and more, though, Jordan has arbitrarily withdrawn its nationality from thousands of these citizens of West Bank origin. Those at particular risk include the quarter of a million Jordanians of Palestinian origin who Kuwait expelled in 1991 and returned to Jordan.

Jordanian officials have withdrawn their nationality ostensibly for failing to possess a valid Israeli-issued residency permit for the West Bank. But this condition for citizenship has no clear basis in Jordanian law. Such permits are notoriously difficult - if not impossible - to obtain given Israel's restrictive policies on granting West Bank residency rights to Palestinians.

Jordanians affected by this policy have learned they had been stripped of their nationality not from any official notice, but during routine procedures such as renewing a passport or driver's license, or registering a marriage or the birth of a child at the Civil Status Department. Withdrawal of nationality appears to be as random as it is arbitrary. In four of the cases Human Rights Watch reviewed, one person's nationality was withdrawn involuntarily, while that of a sibling in identical circumstances was not.

Human Rights Watch found that the Interior Ministry provided no clear procedure to appeal these decisions, and that most of those interviewed feared that recourse to the courts would finalize their loss of nationality.

"High-handed officials are withdrawing nationality in a wholly arbitrary manner," Whitson said. "One day you're Jordanian, and the next you've been stripped of your rights as a citizen in your own country."

Without nationality, individuals and families find it difficult to exercise their citizenship rights, including obtaining health care; finding work; owning property; traveling; and sending their children to public schools and universities. With no other country to turn to, these Jordanians have become stateless Palestinians, in many cases for a second time after 1948.

Accounts

Fadi

"I was born in 1951 in Nablus, and came to the East Bank of Jordan with my mother in 1968, after my father had died. Both my father and I had Jordanian passports. I obtained mine in 1969, when I finished school in Zarqa. That year, I went to Basra in Iraq to attend engineering college, graduating in 1974. In 1974 I went to Kuwait for work.

"In 1969, my mother went back to Nablus in the West Bank and applied to the Israelis for a family unification permit granting residency for me, and received it. Once a year, therefore, I went to the West Bank. In August 1984 I went to the West Bank for the last time. In August 1984 the Israelis changed the rules. Before, you had to renew the permit every year in person.

"Now, you could be absent for at most six years to retain a valid family unification permit [granting legal residency] before it would be canceled. You had to renew it once a year, but this could be done remotely. However, once every six years at least, you had to be physically present in the West Bank. By that calculation, August 1990 was the latest that I had to be present in the West bank to retain validity of my Israeli family unification permit.

"Between 1974 and 1984, the Jordanian embassy in Kuwait routinely renewed my passport. Therefore, I applied for leave from work on August 2, 1990, but Saddam [Hussein, Iraq's president] invaded Kuwait that same day and I couldn't leave. In January 1991 I left for Jordan.

"In late April 2007 I went with two of my children, born in 1990 and 1991, to get their identity documents, which are required in Jordan for those over 16 years of age. The older ones, born in 1983 and 1986 already had theirs. The official told me that I had a yellow [bridge crossing] card from my 1984 visit to the West Bank and that I should go to the Follow-up and Inspection Department. There, I was told that in order not to lose my Jordanian nationality, I had to renew my Israeli permit.

"In 1991 I had sent my permit [tasrih] to the Israelis in the West Bank to have it renewed, but the Israelis rejected this. I have tried through lawyers to get it renewed since 2007. Right now, we are all stateless."

Abbas

"In 1980 I graduated high school and moved from the West Bank to Kuwait. I had an Israeli-issued residency permit [tasrih] that I renewed every year. The last time I renewed it, its validity expired in 1986.

"Two weeks before its expiration, I traveled from Kuwait to Amman and from there to the West Bank. At the crossing bridge, I gave the Israeli soldier my permit, and copies of the previous renewals. A while later, she came back and said, "You did not renew your permit." She had lost the last renewal form. She returned the other ones to me, and sent me back to the East Bank. At the Jordanian crossing, I received a yellow card, for the first time.

"I went back to Kuwait, and in 1990, with the Iraqi invasion, I came back to Jordan. In 2005 my wife renewed her passport, and was sent to the Follow-up and Inspection Department, which sent her to the Ministry of Interior's Legal Department. There, they told her that she had to add our six children to my Israeli permit and that we had to renew it. This is despite her being fully Jordanian. They made me sign an undertaking that I would renew my Israeli permit within six months or pay a fine of 500 dinars. Whether I pay or don't pay, that changes nothing. It is simply fraud. I did not pay.

"In 2007 I received a call from an official at the stock market. He told me I had to go to the Civil Status and Passports Department in the Ministry of Interior and renew my Israeli permit. A parliamentarian went on my behalf, and confirmed that our nationality had been withdrawn from all of us, with the exception of my wife.

"At that point I engaged an Israeli lawyer and paid him US$3,000 to retrieve the identity card and permit stored in Beit Il [the settlement in the West Bank that is the seat of the occupation administration]. He did not manage [to] and asked [for] more money. In the end, I have paid $12,000 with no result.

"I have a Jordanian ID, which expires in 2017. I have a passport that expires at the end of June 2009. After that I will be de facto stateless."

Abbas said he quit his job at a bank just before his passport with his national number expired, explaining that he "can access a better severance package and other benefits," by resigning, while he is still a Jordanian. "I do not want them to find out I lost my national number when my passport expires," he told us.

Abbas provided more details about the differences between Jordanians, foreigners, and stateless persons regarding retirement benefits: If you are Jordanian, and have worked 18 years and are over 45 years of age, you can claim social security benefits. If you are a foreigner, you can take the amount you paid in with you when you leave Jordan. But as a stateless person without a foreign passport and without a Jordanian national number, I can do neither.

Zahra

"My father's been here [in Jordan] forever and we were born here. We never even had a yellow card. Then, last year, suddenly, he was informed when we returned on a flight from the United States that his national number had been withdrawn. We, his children, are adults, but our numbers were also withdrawn nonetheless."

"I am a lawyer, and without [Jordanian nationality] I couldn't practice. To practice, you need to be a member of the lawyers' professional association, and for that you need to be Jordanian."

She said that, although she is a lawyer, her family only considered using connections to restore their nationality: "It was shocking to lose the nationality, but my father is well-connected in the palace," she said. "It took two weeks to return the national number to me through connections."

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Colombia: Stop Abuses by Paramilitaries’ Successor Groups

Image of united self-defense forces of Colombia.Image via Wikipedia

Government must Protect Civilians, Prosecute Groups’ Members and Accomplices
February 3, 2010

(Bogotá) - Colombia needs to respond effectively to the violent groups committing human rights abuses that have emerged around the country in the aftermath of the flawed demobilization of paramilitary groups, Human Rights Watch says in a report released today.

AUC recruitment posterImage via Wikipedia

The 122-page report, "Paramilitaries' Heirs: The New Face of Violence in Colombia," documents widespread and serious abuses by successor groups to the paramilitary coalition known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC). The successor groups regularly commit massacres, killings, forced displacement, rape, and extortion, and create a threatening atmosphere in the communities they control. Often, they target human rights defenders, trade unionists, victims of the paramilitaries who are seeking justice, and community members who do not follow their orders. The report is accompanied by a multimedia presentation that includes photos and audio of some of the Colombians targeted by the successor groups.

"Whatever you call these groups - whether paramilitaries, gangs, or some other name - their impact on human rights in Colombia today should not be minimized," said José Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at Human Rights Watch. "Like the paramilitaries, these successor groups are committing horrific atrocities, and they need to be stopped."

Based on nearly two years of field research, the report describes the successor groups' brutal impact on human rights in Colombia, highlighting four regions where the groups have a substantial presence: the city of Medellín, the Urabá region of Chocó state, and the states of Meta and Nariño. The successor groups pose a growing threat to the enjoyment of human rights in Colombian society. The most conservative estimates, by the Colombian National Police, put the groups' membership at over 4,000, and assert that they have a presence in 24 of Colombia's 32 departments. The groups are actively recruiting new members and despite arrests of some of their leaders, they are moving quickly to replace their leadership and expand their areas of operation.

The rise of the groups has coincided with a significant increase in the national rates of internal displacement from 2004 at least through 2007. Much of the displacement is occurring in regions where successor groups are active. In some areas, like Medellín, where the homicide rate has nearly doubled in the past year, the groups' operations have resulted in a dramatic increase in violence.

Mounted Carabineros in Medellín.Image via Wikipedia

The report documents multiple examples of successor group abuses, including the following:

  • While a human rights defender was providing assistance to a victim of the paramilitaries at the victim's home in Antioquia, members of a successor group calling themselves the Black Eagles broke into the house, raped both women, and warned the rights defender to stop doing human rights work. She eventually had to flee town due to continued threats from the group.
  • More than 40 people from the Pablo Escobar neighborhood of Medellín were forced to flee their homes between late 2008 and early 2009 as a result of killings and threats by the local armed group, which is partly made up of demobilized paramilitaries.
  • In the southern border state of Nariño, most residents in three communities in the coastal municipality of Satinga were displaced after one of the successor groups (then using the name Autodefensas Campesinas de Nariño, or Peasant Self Defense Forces of Nariño) went into one of the towns, killed two young men, and reportedly caused the forced disappearance of a third.

The emergence of the successor groups was predictable, Human Rights Watch said, largely due to the Colombian government's failure to dismantle the paramilitary coalition's criminal networks during the demobilization process, between 2003 and 2006. The government's inadequate implementation of the demobilizations also allowed paramilitaries to recruit civilians to pose as paramilitaries for the demobilization, while keeping portions of their membership active. The report describes, for example, the North Block demobilization, where there is substantial evidence of fraud ordered by AUC leader Rodrigo Tovar (known as "Jorge 40").

The report also expresses concern over alleged toleration of successor groups' activities by some state officials and government security forces. Both prosecutors and senior members of the police said that such toleration was a real obstacle to their work. And in each of the cities and regions Human Rights Watch visited it heard repeated allegations of toleration of successor groups by security forces.

In Nariño, for example, one man complained that "the Black Eagles interrogate us, with the police 20 meters away... [Y]ou can't trust the army or police because they're practically with the guys." In Urabá, a former official said the police in one town appeared to work with the successor groups: "It's all very evident... The police control the entry and exit [of town] and ... they share intelligence." In Meta, an official said he received "constant complaints that the army threatens people, talking about how ‘the Cuchillos' [the main successor group in the region] are coming... In some cases, the army leaves and the Cuchillos come in."

Human Rights Watch said that the Colombian government has legal obligations to protect civilians from harm, prevent abuses, and ensure accountability for abuses when they occur.

But the government has failed to ensure that the police units charged with combating the groups, or the prosecutors charged with investigating them, have adequate resources. It has dragged its feet on funding for the Early Warning System of the Ombudsman's Office, which plays a key role in protecting the civilian population. State agencies have at times denied assistance to civilians who reported being displaced by successor groups. And the government has failed to take effective measures to identify, investigate, and punish state officials who allegedly tolerate the successor groups.

"The Uribe administration has failed to treat the rise of the successor groups with the seriousness the problem requires," Vivanco said. "The government has taken some steps to confront them, but it has failed to make a sustained and meaningful effort to protect civilians, investigate these groups' criminal networks, and go after their assets and accomplices."

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In the World of Facebook

Cover of "The Accidental Billionaires: Th...Cover via Amazon

By Charles Petersen

The Accidental Billionaires: The Founding of Facebook, A Tale of Sex, Money, Genius, and Betrayal
by Ben Mezrich

Doubleday, 260 pp., $25.00

Stealing MySpace: The Battle to Control the Most Popular Website in America
by Julia Angwin

Random House, 371 pp., $27.00

Facebook, the most popular social networking Web site in the world, was founded in a Harvard dorm room in the winter of 2004. Like Microsoft, that other famous technology company started by a Harvard dropout, Facebook was not particularly original. A quarter-century earlier, Bill Gates, asked by IBM to provide the basic programming for its new personal computer, simply bought a program from another company and renamed it. Mark Zuckerberg, the primary founder of Facebook, who dropped out of college six months after starting the site, took most of his ideas from existing social networks such as Friendster and MySpace. But while Microsoft could as easily have originated at MIT or Caltech, it was no accident that Facebook came from Harvard.

What is "social networking"? For all the vagueness of the term, which now seems to encompass everything we do with other people online, it is usually associated with three basic activities: the creation of a personal Web page, or "profile," that will serve as a surrogate home for the self; a trip to a kind of virtual agora, where, along with amusedly studying passersby, you can take a stroll through the ghost town of acquaintanceships past, looking up every person who's crossed your path and whose name you can remember; and finally, a chance to remove the digital barrier and reveal yourself to the unsuspecting subjects of your gaze by, as we have learned to put it with the Internet's peculiar eagerness for deforming our language, "friending" them, i.e., requesting that you be connected online in some way.



Facebook was successful early on because it didn't depart significantly from how its audience interacted, and because it started at the top of the social hierarchy. Zuckerberg distinguished his site through one innovation: Facebook, initially at least, would be limited to Harvard. The site thus extended one of the primary conceits of education at an elite university: that everyone on campus is, if not a friend, then a potential friend, one already vetted by the authorities. Most previous social networks, such as MySpace and Friendster, had been dogged by the sense that, while one might use them with friends, they were to a substantial degree designed for meeting strangers. But nobody is a stranger in college, or at least that's the assumption at a school like Harvard, so nobody would be a stranger on Facebook.

The site's connection to collegiate social codes could be seen most clearly in its name, which, unlike that of every previous social network—Friendster and MySpace, but also SixDegrees, Bebo, Orkut, etc.—actually came from a preexisting, even highly traditional item, the freshman "facebook" that many colleges distribute to incoming students, with a photo of each classmate and a few identifying details. Zuckerberg's Web site would retain the exclusivity of its namesake through one requirement: to join, you would need a Harvard e-mail address.

By starting at Harvard, Facebook avoided another problem that had afflicted previous social networks: those with many friends had little reason to sign up. Zuckerberg got the initial idea from two members of the Porcellian, Harvard's most prestigious "final club," who would later sue him for stealing their plan (the case was settled out of court for a reported $85 million). The importance of the site's Ivy League founding is the primary revelation of Ben Mezrich's dramatic, narrative account of Facebook's early days, The Accidental Billionaires. When Zuckerberg launched the site, as Mezrich observes in one of the book's more accurate moments, he e-mailed the announcement to the Phoenix, a final club. A month later, the site expanded to Princeton and Stanford. Facebook, unlike every previous social network, was at the start a very exclusive club.

If a social network profile was an online "home," then a Facebook page, in the early days, looked like a room in a recently constructed dorm: you might put up a raunchy poster or fill the shelves with favorite books, but the layout and the furniture remained exactly the same for everyone. One acquired this home in much the same way one acquired a freshman roommate—by sending a picture and filling out a form. Here are a few details you were asked to provide:

Name, Gender, Birthdate, Academic Major, Residence Hall, College Mailbox, High School; Email, Phone Number, Current Address; Political Views, Collegiate Activities, Interests; Favorite Music, Favorite TV Shows, Favorite Movies, Favorite Books, Favorite Quotations.

Not a few budding sociology majors must have been reminded of the work of Pierre Bourdieu, the French scholar best known for using surveys of social class and preferred artworks to argue that aesthetics is largely a matter of social distinction and "position taking." But Zuckerberg was less interested in sociology than sex, as the most prominent questions on the form showed. These were multiple choice:

Interested In: Men; Women. [You could always choose both.]
Looking For: Friendship; A Relationship; Dating; "Random Play"; "Whatever I Can Get." [Or all five!]
Relationship Status: Single; In a Relationship; Engaged; Married; "It's Complicated"; "In an Open Relationship." [A list Zuckerberg considered expansive enough that he made members pick just one.]

Finally, if you hadn't managed to convey the complete essence of yourself with the above, you could type something insightful "About Me."

The way students responded to these queries was often amusing: many listed themselves as "married" to their best friends or roommates; some who were in long-term relationships claimed to be interested only in "Random Play." Instead of photos of themselves, early members often chose works of art or album covers or portraits of writers; those who included a personal picture rarely chose the most attractive, attempting, through a drunken photo or a candid shot, to convey an attitude of nonchalance. The list of "Favorites" was the occasion for particular anxiety and comedic juxtaposition, as Beethoven might share space with contemporary pop groups like OutKast or, more ironically, commercial schlock like Celine Dion.

The site was a lark. For all that it reduced personality to a series of "position takings" and changed the word "friend" from a noun, something defined by duration, to a verb—"I friended him," a one-off event—the early Facebook nonetheless appeared as a natural extension of the atmosphere of college, where everlasting friendship often seems as simple as making another late-night dorm-room acquaintance, and whether one names Jane Austen among one's favorite authors, or removes Charlotte Brontë from the list, can seem enormously important, deeply representative of one's shifting personality.

What was college if not a series of "position takings"? Much more, of course, but the early Facebook couldn't be faulted for failing to embody the complete college experience. It even became something of a norm to greet a friend in the dining hall by declaring, for example, "I see you added Trotsky to your list of favorite authors—but dropped Marx!" The site contributed in some small measure to what Thoreau, a student at Harvard two centuries before Zuckerberg, judged the unacknowledged but most significant part of the curriculum: "Tuition, for instance, is an important item in the term bill, while for the far more valuable education which [the student] gets by associating with the most cultivated of his contemporaries no charge is made."

The first sign that Facebook might cause trouble came, for many, when a few unexpected members showed up—those who didn't attend your college, or at least one of the same caliber. Especially for students who had graduated from a public high school and then gone on to an elite private college, the addition of state universities marked a turning point, as former classmates joined the site and started asking to be "friends." A major attraction of the early Facebook, it was suddenly apparent, came from its snob appeal—the fact that some had been kept out, and only a highly selective few let in.

The mechanics of these "friend requests" are worth describing in some detail. Within a single college, in the early days of the site, everyone could see everything. You "friended" a fellow student not to see her page but to add her name and picture, like a trophy, to your list of friends; this "friend list" then appeared not far from your lists of favorite books and favorite music, more evidence of your discriminating tastes, or proof of your popularity. If a college acquaintance wanted to look at your page, she could simply type in your name—just as she might glance your way on the quad, or eavesdrop on your conversation in the dining hall.

Zuckerberg, however, cordoned off each college from all others. The "friend request" then took on a new function, becoming the means of authorizing people at other schools to see your page. The only way someone at a state university, for instance, could access the page of a student at a private college was by asking to become "friends." But unlike when a student at a private college might run into an old acquaintance on winter break, it was impossible to politely respond to such a request while giving little away. You had to say yes or no.

Bourdieu, it now appeared, might have been right. When Facebook had been limited to a few elite schools, listing Beethoven among one's "favorite music" could easily stand as a statement of aesthetic discovery. This was due to that other salutary fiction of an elite meritocratic education: that class distinctions disappear, to be replaced by pure judgment and analytic reason. But beneath the gaze of one's former classmates, such a claim might well come off as a pose. It was no longer possible to treat the site as an extension of an elite college—the private haunt of one's "most cultivated" contemporaries.

The class basis of Facebook's early success is most evident in comparison with its greatest rival: MySpace. To join Facebook, you needed a college e-mail address; for everyone else—once Friendster, for various reasons, became less popular—there was MySpace. The result, as David Brooks observed in 2006, was a "huge class distinction between the people on Facebook and the much larger and less educated population that uses MySpace."

Even after Facebook opened its membership, successively, to high schools, corporations, and the world at large—trying to capitalize on the site's early success, which, Zuckerberg and his inventors hoped, was due to more than mere exclusivity—class distinctions re- mained important. Danah Boyd, a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society who is one of the best- informed academics studying social networks, wrote a much-discussed essay in 2007 that laid out, in broadly stereotypical terms, the preferred sites of many high school students:

The goodie two shoes, jocks, athletes, or other "good" kids are now going to Facebook. These kids tend to come from families who emphasize education and going to college.... MySpace is still home for Latino/Hispanic teens, immigrant teens, "burnouts," "alternative kids," "art fags," punks...and other kids ...whose parents didn't go to college, who are expected to get a job when they finish high school.

One of the most notable examples of class distinction, as Boyd noted, came from the US military, which permitted soldiers to use Facebook but banned MySpace in 2007:

Facebook is extremely popular in the military, but it's not the [social network] of choice for 18-year-old soldiers, a group that is primarily from poorer, less educated communities. They are using MySpace. The officers, many of whom have already received college training, are using Facebook.

MySpace remains banned within the military to this day, while Facebook, despite security concerns, is still available to American troops.

The importance of class was also evident in the sites' aesthetics. Facebook has always been praised for its "clean" design, as opposed to the "lascivious, spam-ified, knife-wielding clutter of MySpace" (New York), with its "shrieking typography and clamorous imagery" (The Chronicle of Higher Education). But as Julia Angwin documents in her book Stealing MySpace, the site's aesthetic came from its members. MySpace early on tried to impose fairly severe restrictions on how pages could be constructed; these restrictions, however, were easily circumvented, and MySpace's engineers, who were not particularly competent programmers, declined to repair the holes revealed by hackers.

While MySpace listed details similar to if less sophisticated than Facebook—"Education," but also "Body Type" and "Zodiac Sign"—a MySpace page could otherwise look like almost anything else online. Every Facebook page, by contrast, was laid out in exactly the same way, painted in an inoffensive if antiseptic palette of pastel blues on bright white. Facebook's engineers, much abler than their counterparts at MySpace, quickly stifled any attempts to break these rules. To call MySpace "ugly" would be roughly equivalent to categorically denouncing graffiti—to praise Facebook for its "clean" design, akin to celebrating tract housing.

MySpace's more permissive atmosphere and working-class aesthetic help explain why Rupert Murdoch paid $580 million for the site in 2005. The surprise came when Facebook, an apparently elitist Web site, caught on with members of all classes and succeeded MySpace in early 2009 as the most popular social network in America. Facebook now has more than 350 million members worldwide, with over 100 million in the United States. Facebook managed to beat MySpace—while Fox TV and Fox News ruled the airwaves—by appealing to what has become the largest new market for social networking: parents.

Most parents avoided MySpace, ironically, for the same reasons that drew Murdoch to the site to begin with: its central place in the media category euphemistically known as "urban culture," which dominates contemporary American broadcasting, despite the fact that more than half of Americans now live in the suburbs. The best MySpace pages showed all the flair of MTV Cribs, the notorious TV show profiling the mansions of rappers, film stars, and other artists of "bling" and excess. Parents, unsurprisingly, were put off: a MySpace page was not simply something you sat back and watched, like the "urban" reality shows that fill American TV programming, or listened to, like the hip-hop music that pipes through American stereos; a MySpace page constituted one's digital home, its basic "outside" version seen by everyone, its more revealing "inside" reserved for one's friends, whom one has approved to see personal information. While many teenagers may prefer to decorate their rooms with the paraphernalia of hip-hop and drugs—and still continue to use MySpace in huge numbers—their parents have chosen to live in the suburbs for safety, privacy, quiet, and architectural uniformity, qualities that Facebook alone was prepared to provide.

As Facebook expanded from colleges to the rest of the public, always retaining tight control over how every page appeared, the site's aesthetics thus began to seem less comparable to the dorm room design principle of in loco parentis and more akin to the authoritarian building codes of a planned community. Facebook did allow members to begin personalizing their pages with elements built by outside programmers. But the basic layout of one's page couldn't change; each new addition had to be slotted into Facebook's rigid design. This was the predominant mode of what might be called Facebook's "suburban period," which began in September 2006 and continues, in many ways, into the present. We can pinpoint the start date so precisely because at the same time that Zuckerberg opened Facebook to anyone who wanted to join, he launched a function that has since come to dominate the site: the "News Feed."

The News Feed, as the name suggests, resembled a personalized wire service. "Imagine a device that monitors the social marketplace the way a blinking Bloomberg terminal tracks incremental changes in the bond market," The New York Times described the new feature at its debut. But I would propose an alternate metaphor: the suburban backyard fence. Facebook, when restricted to colleges, had relied on the typically intense social lives of students in the dorm room and at the dining hall. It was possible to obsessively check the pages of a few good friends or a cute girl in your class, but you could easily ignore everyone else.

The News Feed, by contrast, made everyone and everything an object of gossip by automatically sending the minutest changes to a wide circle of "friends." Along with the pleasure of learning that a crush had added Godard to her list of favorite filmmakers, you had to endure image after image of the drunken escapades of people you hadn't seen in years. New features were supposed to screen out some "friends," but these settings barely worked.

Hundreds of thousands of members would subsequently join Facebook "protest groups" to complain about the News Feed, as they have with each new redesign. But Facebook only reversed course after the most egregious mistakes (e.g., a program that broadcast a person's online purchases to hundreds of "friends," ruining many surprise presents as well as revealing a few prurient tastes). Instead, Zuckerberg handed down each new redesign by assuring members that they would learn to appreciate the changes in time. As he reportedly bragged to employees last spring: "The most disruptive companies don't listen to their customers." Although Zuckerberg is here parroting Clayton Christensen, the Harvard business professor who coined the term "disruptive innovation" to describe many technological changes, it's not hard to hear an echo of Robert Moses.

The result of these changes, especially as Facebook expanded and more and more parents, employers, and teachers signed up, was to induce a chilling and puritanical atmosphere. Few members actually quit—the ability to check up on everyone you knew, whenever you wanted, had grown too addictive, and MySpace and later Twitter offered even less privacy—but much of the playfulness of the early Facebook disappeared. Many students can recount the story of an aunt, say, who joined Facebook, looked up her nephew, and, even without sending a formal "friend request," discovered, among the limited information available to every member, that little David was listed as "married" to someone of the same sex. And his mother hadn't even told her he was gay—let alone invited her to the wedding!

The more typical problems arose because of compromising photos. Shortly after the site launched, Facebook began allowing members to upload entire albums; today it hosts more photos than any other site. If an employer happened to have attended the same college as a young job candidate, and used an alumni e-mail address to create an account on Facebook, a huge number of photos could easily be discovered. Alumni were automatically considered part of their college, and thus could see the pages of most current students, another sign that the site's founding principle was exclusivity, not, as Zuckerberg and others so often claim, privacy. A Times story from mid-2006 gives a classic example:

Ana Homayoun runs Green Ivy Educational Consulting.... Curious about [a] candidate, Ms. Homayoun went to her page on Facebook. She found explicit photographs and commentary about the student's sexual escapades, drinking and pot smoking, including testimonials from friends. Among the pictures were shots of the young woman passed out after drinking.

Facebook provided a way to dissociate yourself from incriminating photos, but by the time you did so it might well be too late. My favorite story may be that of the young banking intern who informed his boss he had to miss work because of a "family emergency." Before the intern could hide the evidence, his coworkers discovered the true nature of his emergency—he showed up on the News Feed in photos from a Halloween party, dressed as a woodland fairy, with a can of Busch Light in his hand.

These are the by now shopworn anecdotes of the "Facebook Generation," the stories that make those born before the Internet revolution wonder whether today's "digital natives" will ever know the true sweetness of privacy. What has been less widely reported is the way many young members responded to these scandalous episodes: by manicuring their profiles and privacy settings as carefully as a suburban front lawn. The ironic marriages amicably ended; the bragging about drug use, or even a taste for bad music, was erased; the site removed "Random Play" and "Whatever I Can Get" from the options of what members were "Looking For"—to be replaced by "Networking."

Six years after its founding, Facebook still hasn't made it possible for users to approve what pictures others may "tag" with their names. One solution: set your privacy options so that no one could see your photos at all—a decision whose wisdom would be confirmed every time a drunken picture of a friend showed up on the News Feed, only to disappear a few hours later, like a Cheeveresque husband seen momentarily wandering, naked, down his front drive.

Given the common fatalism about the "death of privacy," I find it encouraging that Facebook's problems have resulted not from a complete lack of privacy, but rather from widespread paranoia about whether the site's privacy system could be trusted. Before the site launched in 2004, an insistence on online privacy had come to seem, at least in cutting-edge quarters, like a kind of snobbery. Facebook, precisely thanks to the elitist nature of its founding, was able to show millions of college students—those who use the Internet most—that excluding the wider world actually expanded what you could do online. As we have known offline for centuries, and as these students learned on the Web, there are many things, from party photos to Marquis de Sade quotes, that one might comfortably pin over a desk or hang on a wall, but that would best not be made visible to just anyone online.

Over the past year, though Facebook continued blundering its way through each new update—recently encouraging members to make their profiles more public than many might like—it also began to show the first indications of a robust privacy system. If Facebook doesn't continue to improve its privacy options, members may well leave for a site that will. As Facebook's privacy settings grow ever more sophisticated, and especially as members become more adept at using them, a new era in privacy on social networks will begin.

One little-reported effect of the latest settings, for instance, was their ability to effectively deal with divorce. In the past, many estranged parents, who perhaps hadn't communicated in years, often found their comments yoked together in a "conversation" beneath a child's posts. Now, in what might be taken for a sign that the site has moved beyond its early "suburban period," it has become possible for users to effectively break a family into groups, each receiving different pictures and posts. These advances in privacy will soon be accompanied by advances in aesthetics: many social networks, including Facebook, have begun to allow members to stop using the sites themselves, with their stifling visual restrictions, and to construct digital "homes" of their own, making use of the basic services of the old social networks as if they were public utilities.

But Facebook doesn't want to simply branch out onto a few more Web pages; the site hopes, in a somewhat sinister but potentially very useful (and profitable) way, to begin following us around the entire Web. This is the ambition of "Facebook Connect," a special service that members may activate, and that has enabled many popular Web sites, such as Netflix, YouTube, and the Huffington Post, to tie activity elsewhere on the Internet back to Facebook profiles. If you leave a response on a Huffington Post story, for instance, it can, via Facebook Connect, automatically be shared with your friends on Facebook; subsequent responses by Facebook friends could eventually appear both on your Facebook page and on the original Huffington Post story.

If Facebook Connect is widely adopted—and the service has been quite successful so far, with Yahoo and even MySpace signing up—we may begin to see changes to many of our basic assumptions about the Internet. Once a commenter knows that a vitriolic statement will be shared with a large and personal social circle—appearing more like a letter to a small-town newspaper than an anonymous outburst—the typically venomous atmosphere of online comments, for example, may well diminish.

Facebook Connect could also have a strong effect on politics. The widely celebrated MyBarackObama.com was in some ways only an early sign of how social networking may yet affect campaigning. The site, while quite popular, with over two million members during the campaign, suffered from several inherent problems. To join, you had to go through the process of signing up for yet another online account, with a new name and password, easily forgotten; and what you did there—whether watching a speech, calling voters, or signing up for canvassing—was shared only with your connections on the new private network, who you would have to go to the trouble of finding and "friending" once again. Members could send out separate e-mails about each campaign event they planned to attend, but these are precisely the small social "friction points" that social networking is supposed to eliminate.

The Obama campaign made use of Facebook by creating a campaign page for the candidate, which attracted over 2.2 million supporters, all of whom received daily updates from the campaign. But one of the primary uses of Facebook has always been for discovering events—such as concerts or literary readings—that friends plan to attend. If you could see on Facebook which campaign events your friends have volunteered for, many members, particularly those interested in politics but not heavily committed, may be more likely to get involved. MyBarackObama added Facebook Connect in October 2008, but the service was still new and few used it. Therefore, much as online fund-raising was pioneered by Howard Dean in 2004, only to be perfected by Barack Obama in 2008, I would suggest, the role of social networking in 2008 may look rather minor from the perspective of 2012.

We can see the potential effect of Facebook on politics in the way the site has already begun to change another kind of campaign: advertising. A business can now create its own "Fan Page," which looks much like any other Facebook page, except instead of a home it acts as a storefront. Members can then click to become "fans" of the product or, in the case of public figures, person: whether of The New York Review (12,000), the Metropolitan Opera (30,000), Paris Hilton (160,000), Coca- Cola (four million), or Barack Obama (seven million).

Once members have signed up as "fans," they receive updates from these companies and public figures, just as they receive updates from their friends. The result is about as close to word-of-mouth as marketing can get. While it may seem surprising that so many people would sign up for the privilege of receiving advertisements, the information that companies and organizations share doesn't differ that much from old-fashioned newsletters—Renée Fleming is at the Met! Paris Hilton is running for president! Barack Obama is giving a speech on Haiti!

The more disturbing aspect of Facebook's involvement with advertising can be seen in the site's plans to generate revenue. Rather than charging businesses for "fan pages," Facebook sells advertising that then appears elsewhere on the site, as a way for businesses to build brands and solicit more "fans." Because of its unparalleled demographic information, Facebook can sell ads that will appeal only to carpenters in one small town in Vermont, or to graduates of the Harvard Business School, or to residents of Manhattan who list "opera" as an interest. The site could also provide the most highly targeted political ads in history. Google can sell ads that will appear in a particular locality, as Scott Brown showed by buying up much of the online ad space for Massachusetts during the final days of his successful bid for the Senate. With Facebook Connect, it may be possible to show ads specifically targeted to Massachusetts residents who use words such as "Irish," "Italian," or "black" in their profiles, or who list their religion as Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish. So far, however, advertising has only provided enough revenue for the site to barely break even, and many believe the site can only claim to be profitable because of creative accounting.

Facebook Connect, if it becomes widely used across the Internet, would enable Facebook to sell ads not just on its own pages but elsewhere as well. Google makes its largest profits through "search advertising," where a query for "insurance" will result in ads for companies such as Geico or Allstate. But Google has never been as successful at "display advertising," the name for the ads that show up beside everything online—from party photos to news stories—where it's not clear what, if anything, users want to buy. Facebook, with much more precise information about its members, will likely be able to sell far more effective display advertising than Google. Whether members will be disturbed by this expansion of targeted ads—a person who lists her religion as "Jewish" may see Jewish-themed advertising not just in Commentary magazine but on every Web site she visits—and whether ever more targeted advertising will turn members off the site—does listing a love for the Marquis de Sade mean you want ads for leather?—remains to be seen.

If Facebook Connect spreads through the rest of the Internet, it will begin to produce even more radical effects. Google, the dominant force on the Web for the past decade, explicitly stated its goal at the company's founding: "To organize the world's information and make it universally accessible." But there are some things that many would rather not make universally accessible—and not just books under copyright. Facebook, with the private information of over 350 million members, now constitutes what Wired magazine has called a "second Internet." By encouraging members to bring their Facebook settings with them onto the rest of the Web, Zuckerberg hopes to take this new Internet, with its pretensions to privacy, and place it at the foundation of the old one.

While Zuckerberg's ambition to reduce the experience of the Internet to a more human scale should be applauded, his site, despite its recent openness, prevents users from transferring their information to other social networks—a restriction, considering the huge time and effort many members put into their profiles, akin to prohibiting homeowners from packing up their houses and moving elsewhere. Moreover, with the site's huge database of personal information and its hopes to profit from highly targeted ads, Facebook creates its own surveillance problems. If anything, Zuckerberg looks, in some distant but discernible way, like the Robert Moses of the Internet, bringing severe order to a chaotic milieu. While several efforts have been made to create more open versions of social networks, none has found much success. We are still waiting for the Jane Jacobs of online "urban planning" to appear.

What many find most enticing about Facebook is the steady stream of updates from "friends," new and old, which sociologists refer to as "ambient awareness." This is not a new phenomenon: everyone from our Cro-Magnon ancestors to Jane Austen has known how it feels to be surrounded by the constant chatter of other people. Facebook's continuing attraction comes from its ability to reduce the Internet's worldwide chatter to the size of a college, or a village, or a living room. But it is this very old form of sociability, transferred into the electronic age, that, rather than targeted ads or aesthetic monotony, some members find troubling about the site. As the writer William Deresiewicz, by far the most eloquent critic of Facebook, recently argued in The Chronicle of Higher Education:

We have turned [our friends] into an indiscriminate mass, a kind of audience or faceless public. We address ourselves not to a circle, but to a cloud.... Friendship is devolving, in other words, from a relationship to a feeling.

It's true that Facebook can lead to a false sense of connection to faraway friends, since few members post about the true difficulties of their lives. But most of us still know, despite Facebook's abuse of what should be the holiest word in the language, that a News Feed full of constantly updating "friends," like a room full of chattering people, is no substitute for a conversation. Indeed, so much of what has made Facebook worthwhile comes from the site's provisions for both hiding and sharing. It is not hard to draw the conclusion that some things shouldn't be "shared" at all, but rather said, whether through e-mail, instant message, text message, Facebook's own "private message" system, or over the phone, or with a cup of coffee, or beside a pitcher of beer. All of these "technologies," however laconic or verbose, can express an intimacy reserved for one alone.

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Feb 3, 2010

Assessing Thai Coup Rumors

English: National Emblem of Thailand, depictin...Image via Wikipedia

By SIMON ROUGHNEEN Wednesday, February 3, 2010

BANGKOK—Coup-mongering is nothing new to Thailand, but speculation about an impending putsch was revved-up last week when a column of more than twenty armored vehicles was seen on the streets of Bangkok.

The column was on its way from Bang Sue railway station to their barracks in Pathum Thani. Apparently the vehicles are being readied for deployment to Darfur, a dusty and desolate terrain vastly different from anything in Thailand. Thai troops are serving as part of the joint UN-African Union peacekeeping force in the vast western Sudan province.

It usually takes more than a few armored trucks to mount a coup, however, and, unexpected as the sight may have been, it takes more than a lone armored column on city streets to suggest that a coup is looming.

But with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in Europe at the Davos World Economic Forum, and an upcoming February 5-14 visit to the US by Army Chief Gen Anupong Paochinda, the coup gossip has gathered steam over recent days, suggesting that elements in the army could move in the absence of either man.

As University of Wisconsin academic Professor Thongchai Winichakul told The Irrawaddy, “The rumors were based on reasonable analysis” of political developments, along with the fact of “tanks running in the streets.”

Thaksin Shinawatra was deposed by a coup in September 2006 while he was in the US at a United Nations assembly. Although neither he nor his supporters are now in power, his Red-shirts/United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) have been pushing the conspiracy theories, and Natthawut Saikua, a UDD leader, has warned that a coup could take place during Gen Anupong's absence.

Deputy Army Chief Gen Prayuth Chan-Ocha has been the focus of UDD/Red-shirt allegations, with the successor-designate to Gen Anupong portrayed as the puppet master of any would-be putsch.

On the other hand, Thaksin's opponents are stirring the pot, suggesting that a coup could be for the exiled businessman's benefit.

Depending on viewpoint, the Red-shirts have been trying to cause splits in the army and trying to “buy a coup,” or disgruntled pro-Thaksin army officers have had enough of the politicized interventions by their superiors, which have to their mind been in favor of the Yellow-shirt People's Alliance against Democracy (PAD) and in turn the current Democrat-led government.

Paul Chambers, a political researcher at the University of Heidelberg, has written on the role of the military in Thai politics. In an email to The Irrawaddy, he downplayed the possibility that a Red-shirt-oriented coup is in the offing, saying that “Thaksin's military allies haven't the ability to carry out a coup.”

Noting that partisan splits in the military are nothing new, Chambers added that he believes the anti-Thaksin majority in the military looks set to be ascendant for some time to come.

Tensions have been heightened by the Jan. 15 attack on the army headquarters, with allegations that Maj-Gen Khattiya Sawasdipol, a Thaksin supporter known as “Seh Daeng,” was involved.

Another of Thaksin's allies with strong links to the military is Pheu Thai Party Chairman Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, a former army commander and Prime Minister. He poured cold water on coup rumors, implying that these were side-effects of heightened political tensions in the lead-up to the February 26 verdict on Thaksin Shinawatra's 76 billion baht (US $2.3 billion) in impounded assets.

"I believe normalcy will resume after the completion of the judicial review on this case," he said, adding that he was confident Thaksin supporters would accept the outcome even if the former Prime Minister's assets are seized for good by the state.

This placid acceptance would undermine the need for a coup to those in the military who think such a verdict could enrage the Red-shirts and bring renewed street violence in Bangkok, destabilizing the country even further.

While the army is not exactly divided along red or yellow lines, as Winichakul reminded The Irrawaddy, elements in the army may want to act before existing divisions widen and the political temperature goes up in coming weeks. Red-shirt protests are set to take place in several locations in the run-up to the February 26 ruling.

Dr Federico Ferrara, a teacher at Singapore's National University and author of the forthcoming book "Thailand Unhinged: Unraveling the Myth of a Thai-Style Democracy,” says the Red-shirts hope to harness “parts of the military in their revolutionary struggle or at least undermine the military's ability to repress it.”

If either scenario is true, and if the Red-shirts intend to intensify protests in the coming weeks, the army may want to nip this in the bud, according to Ferrara.

However, there are also reasons for the army not to act.

Chambers believes that anti-Thaksin army leaders have no reason to act: “the anti-Thaksin Queen's Guard faction that currently dominates the military has no reason to carry out a coup against an Abhisit government that agrees in many ways with it.”

But with the government looking shakier after the failure to agree on constitutional reform, anti-Thaksin elements in the army want to stall the election that would ensue if the governing coalition led by Abhisit's Democrat Party falls apart.

However the army had a chastening experience the last time it ruled directly in 2006-7. It may not have the inclination to rule once more after being subjected to scorn and ridicule, even from coup backers, for its governing record, Ferrara said.

In the meantime, the 2008 Internal Security Act gave the military increased scope to intervene in civilian affairs, reducing the need for a more overt political role. It may be that dominant factions in the army see their optimum role “under a very weak coalition government through which they can exert quite a bit of power,” according to Chambers.

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Philippine Poll Shows Aquino Rival Catching Up

Noynoy AquinoImage via Wikipedia

By OLIVER TEVES Wednesday, February 3, 2010

MANILA— Lavish campaign spending has allowed the Philippines' wealthiest politician to close in on the son of democracy icon Corazon Aquino in the latest opinion poll ahead of May presidential election, analysts said on Tuesday.

Sen. Manny Villar's aggressive media campaign mainly accounts for his eight-point gain from December to January in one poll, leaving him only seven points behind front-runner Sen. Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III in the survey, said public administration professor Prospero de Vera.

The respected Social Weather Stations' January survey has Aquino as the top choice of 42 percent of respondents, down from 46 percent in early December. Villar, who made his fortune in real estate, was up to 35 percent from 27 percent.

The survey, commissioned and published on Monday by The Business World daily, interviewed 2,100 adult respondents nationwide and had a margin of error of 2 percentage points.

The presidential race is shaping up as a two-pronged battle between Aquino and Villar, both senators from sharply different backgrounds but with a similar message—uplifting the lives of a third of the population who live in abject poverty and cracking down on widespread corruption and political violence.

Aquino, 50, has anchored his campaign on running a clean government and restoring the credibility of the judiciary and Congress, which he says has been seriously eroded during President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's nine years of tumultuous rule.

He said he took the cue from his mother, who fought dictator Ferdinand Marcos and was swept to power in the 1986 "people power" revolt. Corazon Aquino's death from cancer in August led to a massive outpouring of grief, which analysts credit for her son's popularity.

Villar, 60, who portrays his rags-to-riches life in his colorful political advertisements, is promising to end poverty in the country. Appealing to mostly poor voters, from whose ranks he rose, Villar vows to create jobs and provide housing—his main source of income as a leading property developer.

But Villar is also facing censure by his colleagues in the Senate for his alleged role in the rerouting of a highway so that it passes close to his real estate developments. He said the charges are trumped up.

Aquino is being criticized by his rivals as an underachieving legislator with no track record who is riding on his mother's reputation.

Ramon Casiple, head of the Institute for Political and Electoral Reform, said Aquino has been delivering "motherhood statements ... all visions, but no strategy." He said Aquino needs to step out from the shadow of his family's name and connect with voters, letting them know who he is as person.

The three-month campaign period officially kicks off Feb. 9, but candidates are already allowed to put out radio and television ads.

The amount candidates spend is not disclosed until after elections, but already Villar has the most number of ads. A 30-second prime-time TV ad costs up to 220,000 pesos (US $4,700).

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Burma's Internet Slows to a Stop

By WAI MOE and MIN LWIN Tuesday, February 2, 2010

Internet connections have slowed down recently across Burma with the country's two providers, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) and Myanmar Teleport, telling users that the Internet backbone is temporarily down.

The Internet backbone refers to the principal data routes between large, strategically interconnected networks and core routers.

Two Buddhist monks go online at an Internet cafe in Rangoon where owners are required to keep records of all users. (Photo: AFP)

However, several IT technicians in Rangoon told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday that the slowdown was due to a transfer of computer hardware from the providers' offices in the former capital to Yadanabon Cyber City near Mandalay.

“For the past two days, I have been unable to log on to any Web site,” said a staffer with an international nongovernmental organization in Rangoon. “We can only use Google Talk. We cannot access any other Web site or use e-mail.”

Several other Internet users in Rangoon, including students, travel agents, journalists and Internet café owners, confirmed that they could not work or study because they were unable to access the Internet.

“I cannot even get into my own homepage,” bemoaned a travel agent. “This is affecting business terribly. These months are our high tourist season.”

Many Internet cafes have closed their doors for business while the service is so poor, sources said.

There are only two Internet service providers in the country, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) and Myanmar Teleport, formerly known as Bagan Cyber Tech, a private company run by businessmen known to be well-connected with the ruling generals.

The Irrawaddy was unable to get confirmation from the providers on Tuesday as the lines were constantly engaged.

The Burmese military government has one of the most draconian approaches to the Internet in the world. Much information is censored and many international or exiled news agencies, such as The Irrawaddy, are officially banned in Burma.

Burmese citizens face long prison terms if caught sharing information or photos that the military authorities deem sensitive or subversive under Section 33(a) of the Electronics Act.

Several prominent members of the 88 Generation Students group, famous comedian Zarganar, some journalists and various bloggers have been arrested and jailed for breaking the Electronics Act in the past two years.

Last week, a young man named Soe Naing Lin was jailed for 13 years with hard labor by a special court set up inside Insein Prison. One of the charges against him was the Electronics Act. He was arrested at an Internet café in Rangoon in June 2009 accusing of sending information to the Oslo-based Democratic Voice of Burma.

Although state policy limits and controls the public's use of the Internet, the military junta has simultaneously attempted to show the world that they want to advance Burma’s information technology as a part of a modernization drive.

In 2006, the junta tried to establish the Burmese version of Silicon Valley––Yadanabon Cyber City near Pyinoolwin in Mandalay Division––with concessions allotted to military cronies' companies such the Htoo Group, owned by tycoon Tay Za.

With the aid of Chinese companies and technicians, Yadanabon Cyber City has been assigned the task of handling surveillance of Burma’s flow of information.

The junta allowed companies and technicians on Jan. 23-24 to hold an IT forum which was called “BarCamp Yangon,” attracting many young Burmese IT enthusiasts.

BarCamp Yangon, held at Hlaing University Campus in Rangoon, was attended by 2,500 IT technicians and students. During the two-day forum, Burmese telecommunication authorities temporarily allowed an assessment of blogs for Internet users in the country. However, after the forum, the limits on information technology returned to normal.

“A real BarCamp means describing freedom of information as well as open discussion,” said a Rangoon-based blogger who spoke on condition of anonymity. “But the BarCamp in Rangoon cannot fully demonstrate what freedom of information is unless the junta allows a free flow of information.”

Bloggers have complained that the military authorities have refused to permit them to hold a bloggers' conference for the last two years.

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