Syria: End Persecution of Kurds

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(New York) - Syrian authorities should end their unlawful and unjustified practices of attacking peaceful Kurdish gatherings and detaining Kurdish political and cultural activists, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.

The 63-page report, "Group Denial: Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria," documents the Syrian authorities' efforts to ban and disperse gatherings calling for Kurdish minority rights or celebrating Kurdish culture, as well as the detention of leading Kurdish political activists and their ill-treatment in custody. The repression of Kurds in Syria has greatly intensified following large-scale Kurdish demonstrations in March 2004. The report is based on interviews with 30 Kurdish activists recently released from prison, as well as 15 relatives of Kurdish activists still in jail. The Syrian government refused to reply to requests for information or meetings with Human Rights Watch.

"At a time when other countries in the region, from Iraq to Turkey, are improving the treatment of their Kurdish minority, Syria remains resistant to change," said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. "In fact, Syria has been especially hostile to any Kurdish political or cultural expression."

Kurds, an estimated 10 percent of Syria's population of 20 million, live primarily in the country's northern and eastern regions. Human Rights Watch found that since 2005, Syrian security forces have repressed at least 14 Kurdish political and cultural public gatherings, overwhelmingly peaceful, and often resorted to violence to disperse the crowds. Not only have the security forces prevented political meetings in support of Kurds' minority rights, but also gatherings to celebrate Nowruz (the Kurdish new year) and other cultural celebrations. In at least two instances, the security services fired on the crowds and caused deaths.

"The Syrian government sees threats everywhere, even in village new year celebrations," Whitson said. "If the government wants better relations with its Kurdish minority, it should address their legitimate grievances instead of trying to silence them."

Syria has obligations under several international treaties to uphold freedom of expression and association, and the associated right to freedom of assembly. In addition, international law requires Syria to protect the identity of minorities and to guarantee them the right to participate actively in public and cultural life, including practicing their language and celebrating their culture in private and public.

Human Rights Watch also documented the arrests and trials of at least 15 prominent Syrian Kurdish political leaders since 2005. Since there is no political parties law in Syria, none of the political parties - let alone the Kurdish ones - are licensed. Accordingly, any member of a party, including all of the Kurdish parties, is vulnerable to arrest for membership in an unlicensed organization, a crime under Syria's penal code. Most recently, on November 15, 2009, the Damascus Criminal Court sentenced three leading members of the Kurdish Azadi Party, which advocates an end to discrimination against the Kurdish minority, to three years in jail for "weakening national sentiment" and "inciting sectarian or racial strife or provoking conflict between sects and various members of the nation."

Of the 30 former Kurdish detainees interviewed by Human Rights watch, 12 said that security forces tortured them. Most of those detained are referred to military courts, where they can be convicted of vaguely defined, overbroad "security charges," most typically the charge of "spreading false or exaggerated information that weakens national sentiment" or committing an act or speech that advocates "cutting off part of Syrian land to join it to another country."

A Kurdish political activist detained in October 2008 for three months at the Palestine Branch of Military Intelligence described the way the investigators treated him:

If the investigator was not convinced by what I said, the guards would take me to the "torture square," where they would make me stand on my feet for long days with my hands tied behind my back and my eyes covered with a black cloth. I was made to stand for 11 days with only brief periods of rest for 10 minutes to eat. If I would fall due to lack of sleep...they would throw cold water on me and beat me with cables. I developed many illnesses because of this torture. Tests I had done after my release showed that I had inflamed joints as well as infections in the stomach, kidneys, and chest.

(For more testimonials, see below)

Harassment of these activists continues even after their release; security forces continue to call them in for interrogation and frequently bar them from traveling outside the country.

The European Union and the United States have been eager to engage with Syria recently. Human Rights Watch urged these governments to communicate their strong disapproval of Syria's treatment of its Kurdish minority and to emphasize that further progress in their relations with Syria will depend on concrete improvements in Syria's human rights situation.

"Ignoring the treatment of Kurds in Syria will not make the problem go away." Whitson said. "The international community has played an important role in improving the treatment of Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and it needs to do the same for Syria's Kurds."

Human Rights Watch called on the Syrian government to:

• Free people being detained for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression, association, or assembly;
• Amend or abolish the vague security provisions under the Syrian penal code that unlawfully restrict free speech;
• Investigate officials alleged to have tortured or mistreated detainees;
• Enact a law recognizing the right of political parties to organize, and establish an independent electoral commission to register new political parties; and
• Form a commission to address the grievances of the Kurdish minority in Syria.

Accounts from "Group Denial":

A participant in a musical event to celebrate women's role in society organized on March 9, 2009 by a Kurdish party in the town of Qamishli described how the security forces dispersed the crowd:

Fifteen minutes after the celebrations had started, the security forces circled the room. They were carrying guns and sticks, and they scared the women and children. They quickly confiscated the [sound system] speakers and the chairs.

An activist who was at a private home attending a talk on the history of the Kurds described the arrest of participants by Military Intelligence on January 29, 2007:

We were 12 people gathered at Yasha's house to attend a cultural talk on Kurds. Suddenly, members of Aleppo's Military Intelligence came in and took all of us to their branch. They kept us for 10 days in Aleppo, and then they transferred us to the Palestine Branch [of Military Intelligence] in Damascus. They released seven of us and kept five in

detention. The five had confessed that they were members in the Yekiti Party.

A member of the Kurdish Future Movement, a political party, described his arrest while he was waiting to board a bus:

The civilian police detained me in the town of `Amuda and immediately transferred me to Political Security in al-Hasakeh. They charged me with belonging to the Kurdish Future Movement. They interrogated me for 12 days. During the investigation I was deprived of everything. Their questions focused on the political program of the party, its internal rules, my role in the party, especially after they had kidnapped Mr. Mesh`al Temmo, the official spokesperson for the party. After the interrogation they referred me on September 1 to a military judge in Qamishli, who ordered my detention for belonging to an unlicensed political party and inciting sectarian strife.

A member of the PYD party, a Kurdish political party, described the torture he endured while detained by Political Security in `Ain `Arab in May 2006:

They tortured me physically and emotionally. The physical torture began from the moment I arrived at the branch. The officer who heads the branch beat me personally. His men tied my legs to a Russian rifle, and the officer beat me on my feet with a whip. The beating covered various parts of my body. He would insult and threaten me and insult the Kurds. He found a notebook in my pocket where I had written the name of the town by its Kurdish name, Kobani, which the regime had changed to `Ain `Arab, so he hit me with more than 100 lashes saying, "Damn you and damn Kobani. Why don't you write `Ain `Arab?" The torture lasted for almost six hours of on-off beatings.

Indonesia: Timber Corruption’s High Costs

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(Jakarta) - Corruption in Indonesia's lucrative forestry industry costs the government US$2 billion annually, detracting from the resources available to meet its obligations on economic and social rights, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Inadequate oversight and conflicts of interest also raise a red flag over whether Indonesia can be a reliable carbon-trading partner. Carbon trading schemes are likely to be an important topic at the United Nation's Climate Change Conference, which begins December 7, 2009, in Copenhagen.

The 75-page report, "Wild Money: The Human Rights Consequences of Illegal Logging and Corruption in Indonesia's Forestry Sector," found that more than half of all Indonesian timber from 2003 through 2006 was logged illegally, with no taxes paid. Unreported subsidies to the forestry industry, including government use of artificially low timber market prices and currency exchange rates, and tax evasion by exporters using a scam known as "transfer pricing," exacerbated the losses. Using industry methods, including detailed comparisons between Indonesia's timber consumption and legal wood supply, the report concluded that in 2006 the total loss to Indonesia's national purse was $2 billion.

Recent challenges to the country's Anti-Corruption Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), including an alleged conspiracy by police and prosecutors to discredit the commission as it began looking into possible police corruption, exemplify the harmful effects of corruption on the country's governance, Human Rights Watch said.

"Widespread corruption in the forest industry is the dirty secret no one wants to talk about," said Joe Saunders, deputy program director at Human Rights Watch. "But until the lack of oversight and conflicts of interest are taken seriously, pouring more money into the leaky system from carbon trading is likely to make the problem worse, not better."

Some reduction in revenue loss has been reported since 2006, attributed to a dramatic increase in plantation timber production, doubling in a single year. But the area of established plantation required to produce the high volumes of timber reported call these new numbers into question, the report says.

The domestic impacts of corruption and revenue loss, especially on the nation's rural poor, are significant, Human Rights Watch said. Indonesia is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the key international treaty under which it has agreed to use maximum available resources to ensure its citizens enjoy their rights to such services as health, education, and housing. Yet, the scale of lost revenue to corruption demonstrates Indonesia is in violation of these obligations.

The roughly $2 billion in annual lost revenue is equal to the country's entire spending on health at national, provincial, and district levels combined. The annual loss is also equal to the amount that the World Bank estimates would be sufficient to provide a package of basic health care benefits to 100 million of the nation's poorest citizens for almost two years. Indonesia has among the lowest per capita health spending in the region, even compared with countries of much lower per capita GDP.

"It's a particularly cruel irony that in many of the rural areas that generate the country's forestry income, basic health care services are among the worst in the country," Saunders said. "People who live next door to the very forests being ravaged to line officials' pockets must travel huge distances to reach the nearest doctor."

Indonesia has one of the largest areas of forest in the world, but also one of the highest deforestation rates. Reported exports from its lucrative timber industry were worth $6.6 billion in 2007, second only to Brazil and more than all African and Central American nations combined.

The individuals who profit the most from illegal logging and the associated corruption are rarely held accountable, the report found, in part because of corruption in law enforcement and the judiciary. Bribes go to the police to manipulate evidence or even to sell seized illicit timber back to illegal loggers; to prosecutors to manipulate indictments (sometimes deliberately using a charge for which the evidence is weak); and to judges for favorable rulings.

Forestry Ministry officials have taken steps to improve timber reporting and tracking systems, the report says, but they have to contend not only with shady dealings in the private sector but with entrenched interests within their own ministry. Reporting of timber production and revenue collection is compromised by conflicts of interest within the forest agencies and unclear jurisdictions between central and local forest authorities. Bribes to officials in exchange for allowing logging without, or in violation of, proper permits create a powerful incentive to neglect accurate data keeping or to fail to make regular reports to the central ministry.

While the government of President President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has taken steps to combat corruption, there is strong resistance from some high-level officials. Increasing tensions between the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) and police and prosecutors led to the arrest and removal of two of the commissioners after the police accused them of extortion and abuse of authority.

In November, a presidential fact-finding team found insufficient evidence for the charges against the commissioners and recommended they be dropped, although it is not clear if the commissioners will be returned to their posts. The team further recommended a full investigation into corruption in the judiciary to eradicate "case brokers" inside the judiciary and police who act as go-betweens to deliver bribes, and a full inquiry into abuse of authority by the police, with sanctions for officers responsible for wrongdoing in the arrests of the anti-corruption commissioners.

"This is a critical juncture," Saunders said. "If Indonesia can curb the corruption, it can be a global forestry leader. As it is, a lot of trees and a lot of money are going missing and the country's poor are bearing the brunt of the losses."

Human Rights Watch called on prosecutors to use the strong sanctions available in anti-corruption and anti-money laundering laws to reduce forestry corruption. The Forestry Ministry should create a mandatory revenue tracking and auditing system for all Indonesian timber from harvest to point of export to ensure legality, and allow for independent oversight.

Indonesia's trading partners should also ensure that they are not complicit in logging corruption. Consumer countries should enact laws to prohibit trafficking in these illicit products, as the US did recently by amending its Lacey Act. The EU should immediately pass pending legislation that would require a certification of legality for wood products to enter European markets, Human Rights Watch said.

"It will take strong action at the top levels of Indonesia's government and international trading partners to halt the corruption in the timber industry," Saunders said. "The stakes are huge for the country's ability to improve living standards for its citizens and its standing in the world."

Afghanistan: No Shortcuts to Security

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Obama Should Commit to Long-Term Strategy for Civilian Protection

December 1, 2009

(Washington, DC) - US President Barack Obama's new Afghanistan plan needs to strengthen civilian protection through ending the impunity and warlordism that have fuelled the insurgency, Human Rights Watch said today.

There is no magic number of US troops that will bring security to Afghanistan," said Rachel Reid, Afghanistan researcher for Human Rights Watch. "What matters is what the troops are there to do, and how they can enhance a long-term strategy to improve Afghans' human rights."

Human Rights Watch said that the recent focus of the US government on corruption and rule of law in Afghanistan is long overdue, and will require sustained institutional reform. Improving governance and rule of law depends upon a clear strategy for combating corruption, removing warlords, and holding rights violators accountable.

"If the US wants Afghans to have a government they can believe in, there needs to be effective mechanisms for bringing human rights abusers to justice," said Reid.

Human Rights Watch said plans to focus on building the capacity of the Afghan army and police are encouraging, but pointed out that expansion ambitions need to be restricted to a force that is sustainably sized with sufficient training to ensure basic rights protections. The police should be capable of fighting crime as well as providing security against insurgents.

Human Rights Watch expressed concern regarding the US military's interest in increasing use of tribal militias through the Afghan Public Protection Force and the Community Defense Initiative. Previous attempts to foster such auxiliary forces in Afghanistan have shown that they can increase insecurity and human rights abuses if recruits have little training, vague rules of engagement, and a weak chain of command.

In November the US Congress agreed to allow the US military to use unspecified sums from a 2010 $1.2 billion fund for "reintegration" programs with insurgent factions, without identifying who or how such programs will be implemented.

A poorly implemented program using large sums of cash to buy the short-term allegiance of fighters has the potential to add to the corruption and empowerment of malign actors," said Reid. "Improving security, governance, and the rule of law will take time - there are no shortcuts."

US: Remote Detainee Lockups Hinder Justice

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Transfers of Detained Immigrants Interfere with Lawyer Access and Right to Challenge Deportation

December 2, 2009

(Washington, DC) - The Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency's increasing practice of transferring immigrants facing deportation to detention centers far away from their homes severely curtails their ability to challenge their deportation, Human Rights Watch says in a report released today. The agency made 1.4 million detainee transfers in the decade from 1999 through 2008, the report says.

The 88-page report, "Locked Up Far Away: The Transfer of Immigrants to Remote Detention Centers in the United States," presents new data analyzed for Human Rights Watch by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) of Syracuse University. The data show that 53 percent of the 1.4 million transfers have taken place since 2006, and most occur between state and local jails that contract with the agency, known as ICE, to provide detention bed space. The report's findings are based on the new data and interviews with officials, immigration lawyers, detainees, and their family members.

"ICE is increasingly subjecting detainees to a chaotic game of musical chairs," said Alison Parker, deputy US director for Human Rights Watch and author of the report. "And it's a game with dire consequences since it may keep them from finding an attorney or presenting evidence in their defense."

Many immigrants are first arrested and detained in major cities like Los Angeles or Philadelphia, places where immigrants have lived for decades and where their family members, employers, and attorneys also live. Days or months later, with no notice, many of these immigrants are loaded onto planes for transport to detention centers in remote corners of states such as Texas, California, and Louisiana (the three states most likely to receive transfers), the report found.

The detained immigrants have the right, under both US and international human rights law, to be represented in deportation hearings by an attorney of their choice and to present evidence in their defense. But once they are transferred, immigrants are often so far away from their lawyers, evidence, and witnesses that their ability to defend themselves in deportation proceedings is severely curtailed, the report found.

"Immigrant detainees should not be treated like so many boxes of goods - shipped to the most convenient place for ICE to store them," Parker said. "We are especially concerned that the transferred detainees may find that their chances of successfully fighting deportation or gaining asylum from persecution have just evaporated."

The federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (which covers Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) has jurisdiction over the largest number of the transferred detainees. Those transfers are of particular concern, Human Rights Watch said, because that court is widely known for decisions that are hostile to non-citizens and because the states within its jurisdiction collectively have the lowest ratio of immigration attorneys to immigration detainees in the country.

Human Rights Watch acknowledged that some detainee transfers are inevitable, but said that ICE and Congress should use reasonable and rights-protective checks on detainee transfers as the best state criminal justice systems do. The report recommends concrete steps to help create such a system.

Although ICE has recently announced plans to revamp its detention system, which may provide an opening for reforms, the agency previously has rejected recommendations to place enforceable constraints on its transfer power.

Human Rights Watch's report is being released on the same day (December 2) as the Constitution Project's "Recommendations for Reforming our Immigration Detention System and Promoting Access to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings," finding that immigration detention is overused and immigrant detainees experience problems in accessing counsel and providing recommendations for reform. Also on December 2, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse will release detailed facility level data on detainee transfers.

***

Testimony from detainees, family members, and attorneys about transfers:

"The transfers are devastating, absolutely devastating. [Detainees] are loaded onto a plane in the middle of the night. They have no idea where they are, no idea what [US] state they are in. I cannot overemphasize the psychological trauma to these people. What it does to their family members cannot be fully captured either. I have taken calls from seriously hysterical family members - incredibly traumatized people - sobbing on the phone, crying out, ‘I don't know where my son or husband is!'" - Rebecca Schreve, immigration attorney, El Paso, Texas, January 29, 2009.

"In New York when I was detained, I was about to get an attorney through one of the churches, but that went away once they sent me here to New Mexico.... All my evidence and stuff that I need is right there in New York. I've been trying to get all my case information from New York ... writing to ICE to get my records. But they won't give me my records; they haven't given me nothing. I'm just representing myself with no evidence to present." - Kevin H. (pseudonym), Otero County Processing Center, Chaparral, New Mexico, February 11, 2009.

"I have never represented someone who has not been in more than three detention facilities. Could be El Paso, Texas, a facility in Arizona, or they send people to Hawaii .... I have been practicing immigration law for more than a decade. Never once have I been notified of [my client's] transfer. Never." - Holly Cooper, immigration attorney and clinical professor of law, University of California Davis School of Law, Davis, California, January 27, 2009.

"Ever since they sent him there [to New Mexico], it's been a nightmare. My mother has blood pressure problems, and her pressure goes up and down like crazy now because of worrying about him and stuff. [His wife] has been terrified. She cries every night. And his baby asks for him, asks for "Papa." He kisses his photo. He starts crying as soon as he hears his father's voice on the phone even though he is only one.... Last week [my brother] called to say he can't do it anymore. He's going to sign the paper agreeing to his deportation." - Georgina V. (pseudonym), sister of detainee, Brooklyn, New York, January 23, 2008.

A detainee who was transferred 1,400 miles away to a detention facility in Texas after a few weeks in a detention center in southern California said that the difference for him was "like the difference between heaven and earth. At least in California I had a better chance. I could hire a[n] attorney to represent me. Now, here, I have no chance other than what the grace of God gives me." - Michael M. (pseudonym), Pearsall Detention Center, Pearsall, Texas, April 25, 2008.

A legal permanent resident originally from the Dominican Republic, who had been living in Philadelphia but was transferred to Texas said, "I had to call to try to get the police records myself. It took a lot of time. The judge got mad that I kept asking for more time. But eventually they arrived. I tried to put on the case myself. I lost." - Miguel A. (pseudonym), Port Isabel Service Processing Center, Los Fresnos, Texas, April 23, 2008.

Burma's 2010 election: New version of Diarchy

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by Dr. Tint Swe


Mizzima News - To answer the frequently asked query - is democracy possible in Burma - is yes. But what democracy is the following question. The officially dubbed “disciplined democracy” is coming soon if everything goes smoothly. Thesaurus plainly tells that disciplined means restricted or closely controlled.

For external observers, an election can be seen as a routine and standard practice in democracy and would perfectly remark that a democrat can’t reject holding of an election. As the government in exile follows the policy and position of the National League for Democracy (NLD) as far as possible, (NCGUB) has neither endorsed nor rejected the 2010 election at this stage.

Not only foreigners but also the people of Burma are divided while commenting on the controversial 2010 election. It is normal that different people have different views on different issues. However the forthcoming election in Burma is abnormal because when it comes to Burma not everything is normal. Look at the election held in 1990, the freely and fairly held election did not lead to formation of a democratic government. It has been 19 years and 6 months and has not materialized. Bluntly speaking supporting an abnormal one is something like marrying a mad fiancée.

There may be people, who think that they are being defeated by the military, and prefer to go along with the military. Some may perceive the election after over 20 years of military rule, as an opening that may give rise to non-military people to play a role.

Optimistically yes. But objectively that election is something like the TV shows. The Parliament after (2010) election would resemble a wrestling match fought in a cage. The iron cage is the 2008 constitution. You can’t come out of the locked doors. Even if you win the match you can’t get the due prize like in the Spiderman movie. Meanwhile Spiderman’s uncle can be shot dead.

New version of Diarchy

The people of India and Burma have experience of Diarchy of British colony. Diarchy is one of the oldest types of government known from ancient Sparta, Rome, and Carthage. Also in 20^th century, the system signified as a breakthrough and was the prototype of India’s full provincial autonomy and then independence. So Indian people had to wait for 28 years while Burmese people for (1948 – 1923) = 25 years. I don’t think the people of Burma of today are supposed to wait for such a long period as they are almost ready for democracy by having had a successful election exercise in 1990, the esteemed leaders who have vision for the future. This is 21st century and no colony at all.

During the Diarchy years the British Governor took 21% of Assembly seats, appointed selected ministries and shared with Burmese, Anglo-Burmese and Indians there. The same will be applied in the Nargis Constitution of 2008. The Chief of the Army will take 25% of the seats, appoint Ministers of Defence, Security/Home affairs and Border affairs, and then in the Parliament will be cronies, and like-minded representatives. So the 5^th step of the roadmap should preferably be called “disciplined diarchy”.

The following categories will favour the 2010 election.

• Those who readily want to collaborate with the military regime such as members of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and members of Union Solidarity Association (USDA) and business cronies


• Those who have no attachment and or no fondness to the 1990 election


• Those who contested and lost in the 1990 election


• Those who are being expelled from the NLD and those who are discredited by the student groups


• Those who are too young and awfully immature


• The opportunists

Why is the 2010 election to be held?

The stakeholders of the Union of Burma precisely highlighted that the country’s problems are twofold: (1) lack of democracy and (2) the question of rights of ethnic minorities. The international community, including the United Nations acknowledged and supported both issues.

Correspondingly the military regime has taken two big steps.

1. The answer to ethnic issues is ceasefire agreement formulated in 1992. Most of the armed ethnic groups reached ceasefire contracts. Years later most of them are not satisfied. Now they are forced to transform to “border guards”, which have no political role.


2. The response to the democracy question is holding an election to be held in 2010. Some of us want to go along. The same conspiracy will follow for the legislators of (2010) election. Maybe a few years later they will become “assembly guards”, who can’t do any politics.

The non-NLD persons and groups have liberty to agree or disagree with NLD’s declaration in April this year. Whatever the justification to support or to participate in the 2010 election the military junta will be happy about it. But emotional observation is not to be concerned. Politically, all have to recollect the people’s determination expressed in the 1990 election. They voted for the NLD because they realized the need to be unified to bring down the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), which had ruled for 26 years. Here again, unity of consciousness is crucial to prevent the perpetual rule of the army. If we are divided and some of us are going along with the deceitful plan of the regime, we are finished.

It is sad that some intellectuals are not intelligent as the people on the street. I am confident the people’s intellect will prevail.

Rangoon shops lose customers due to license order

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by Mizzima News

Friday, 04 December 2009 19:51

New Delhi (Mizzima) - Teashops, restaurants and beauty parlours in Rangoon have started removing television sets from their shops as the Video Association has ordered that those using TV in the shops would have to have a license by paying 45,000 Kyat (US$ 45). According to several shop owners, the new rule was circulated by the Video Association ordering teashops, restaurants and beauty parlours that use television or videos to attract customers, to apply for license within a week. “Normally we use TV or video in our shop, and our family also watches. But since last month we were given a notice asking us to apply for a license. Since we are not using it for commercial purposes, we shifted our TV in to our house from the shop,” a teashop owner in Latha Township of Rangoon told Mizzima. Similarly, a teashop owner in Insein Township said, most shops on the street have removed their TV sets as they do not want to apply for a license. “We do not want to pay for the license, so we removed our TV from the shop,” he added. In Burma, where people often spend their leisure time in teashops and restaurants, many shop owners have a TV set to lure them in and entertain their customers with movies and TV programmes. Besides, with most people unable to afford a TV set, customers often visit teashops in order to watch TV programmes including international football matches. Video license is normally applicable for commercial video parlours. But the new order since the beginning of August requires teashops, restaurants and beauty parlours to apply for license. The order, read out to Mizzima by a shop owner over telephone, states that owners in three categories of shops should apply for video license within a week, and in case of failing to obtain it, the shop owners could be charged under the Television and Video Act resulting in a three year prison term or a fine of Kyat 100,000 (US$ 1000) or both. A teashop owner in Tharmwe Township said since he removed his TV set from the shop, he had lost customers and business has been plummeting. “Earlier, we use to attract customers by showing videos or TV programmes. But after the order, since we have not been making good profit, I do not want to spend money on the license. But since then sales have dropped with fewer customers,” the shop owner added. While most shops do not want to apply for the license and have removed their TV sets, a few, however, have applied for a license. A teashop owner in Bahan Township told Mizzima that she had applied for the license by paying 45,000 Kyat. “I did it as they ordered it,” she added. While licenses for TV, Satellites TV and radio have to be applied for at the Post and Telecommunication Ministry, video screening license applications are made at the Myanmar Movies Association office in Bahan Township. The video association, a department under the Myanmar Movie Association, has its branch offices in all the 44 townships of Rangoon. Editing by Ye Yint Aung

US Teacher Deported from Burma

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December 3, 2009

Irrawaddy News: An American English teacher working for the American Center in Rangoon was deported on Saturday, according to a source close to the US Embassy in Rangoon who spoke to The Irrawaddy on conditions of anonymity.

Christina Peterson was briefly detained at a highway bus station in Rangoon on her way back from the American Consulate in Mandalay, where she had given a talk on environmental issues. Some members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) also participated in the talk, according to the source.

“She just talked about environmental issues in Mandalay. The moment she got off the bus in Rangoon, she was immediately taken to the airport and wasn’t even allowed to go back to her room,” the source said.

Drake Weisert, Assistant Public Affairs Officer of the US Embassy in Rangoon, confirmed the news but declined to give details, citing privacy reasons.

Peterson had been working for the American Center in Rangoon as an English teacher since 2007, and she was also an organizer of an environmental club for the center. The American Center provides English language courses and runs a library popular among young people in Rangoon.

Last May, US citizens Jerry Redfern and his wife Karen Coates, who were teaching feature writing and photography in Mandalay, were also forced to leave the country.

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Than Shwe Confounds His Peers

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by Wai Moe

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Burma's military despot Snr-Gen Than Shwe surprised and confused his fellow generals at a four-monthly military commanders' meeting in Naypyidaw by ignoring pressing political issues and instead devoting his speech to the development of the country's economy in the post-election era, according to military sources in the capital.

Than Shwe reportedly told his fellow generals at the meeting on Nov. 23-28 that Burma is ready for a new government in line with his vision of a “disciplined democracy,” and addressed numerous economic developments and projects for the future.

A source who provided The Irrawaddy with a document on Friday analyzing the proceedings at the closed-door meeting said regional commanders and top-ranking generals were caught off-guard by the dictator's lofty aspirations and apparent far-sightedness, because he normally dwells on petty internal matters, and methods of quelling political dissent and securing power.

Than Shwe instead spoke of establishing solid business foundations in the country in the post-election period, of developing Burma's human resources and of the state's responsibility to promote a solid middle-class in the country.

During the meeting, sources say Than Shwe spoke confidently about the development of the national economy and effused about the prospects of billions of dollars in investment from China, referring to the Sino-Burmese oil-gas pipeline projects and the development of the Kyaukpyu deep sea port off the Arakan coast and related railway systems.

At the meeting, he apparently advocated expanding industry, especially factories related to oil and gas exploration and production. He also alluded to the Dawei deep sea port project in southern Burma, spoke of expanding the shipping industry and services sector, and predicted the Burmese economy would soon be “booming,” the source said.

The military dictator reportedly went on to pledge that Burma will furthermore be immune from electricity shortages because the country's hydroelectric projects would soon produce some 16,000 MW of power per year.

According to the military sources, the fact that Than Shwe did not address the upcoming election and pending political concerns, such as Aung San Suu Kyi's request for a meeting, suggests he is confident that his current strategy is working and that events are playing out in his favor.

EBO Funds to Target Migrants and IDPs

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By SAW YAN NAING

Friday, December 4, 2009

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The Euro-Burma Office (EBO) will focus funding on Burmese migrant workers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in ethnic areas where armed conflicts are active, according to the organization's Executive Director, Harn Yawnghwe.

The decision came after the meeting between the Brussels-based EBO and Burmese opposition, civil society groups and ethnic groups in Chiang Mai in northern Thailand from Dec. 1 to 2.

Yawnghwe said his organization wants to strengthen civil society groups assisting migrant workers and IDPs because such people are in need.

Any group wanting to assist migrant workers or IDPs in armed conflict zones in eastern Burma can submit proposals to the EU donors.

“Euro Burma want to set up committees to assist these groups and want to give funds to them. Those who are interested are asked to submit proposals,” said Dr. Thiha Maung, who attended the meeting and is the director of the National Health and Education Committee's (NHEC) health program.

It is likely that the EBO will secure some funding for exile-based aid groups as funding for cross-border activities is unstable and many Western government donors are not willingly providing further cross-border aid to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in exile, he added.

Founded in 1997, the Brussels-based EBO helps the Burmese democracy movement prepare for transition to democracy and keeps the international community informed about the situation in Burma.

Transparency and accountability of funding among border-based NGOs were also discussed at the meeting.

“International donor countries such as Sweden, Norway, Canada and Australia are hoping for change in Burma in 2010 and want to focus aid directly inside Burma if the situation improves after 2010 election,” Thiha Maung said.

Harn Yawnghwe also said the EBO will provide financial supports to opposition parties or ethnic groups that will contest in the general elections in 2010 if they need support. This should not be misconstrued as EBO support for the Burmese regime 2008's constitution and planned 2010 elections, he said.

The aim of supporting those groups is to let them strive for democracy and ethnic rights within any political space that might be opened up by the Burmese regime, he added.

Observers said international donors indicated they want to focus humanitarian assistance directly inside Burma after they identified problems with cross-border aid.

However, observers said both internally-based aid and cross-border aid are needed since both reach different target populations, whether deep inside Burma or on the Thai-Burmese border.

Due to international donors reducing their funding and distancing themselves from cross-border aid projects, Mae Sot-based Mae Tao Clinic is concerned about funding, which has been cut and reduced.

The number of outpatients coming to the clinic has grown by about 20 percent per year, however.

The clinic, which treats Burmese migrants, refugees and Burmese people who cross the border for medical treat, is struggling with a “major funding crisis.” It faces a predicted shortfall of about US $750,000 in 2010, amounting to 25 percent of its operating budget, according to Dr Cynthia Maung writing on the clinic's Web site on Oct. 27.

Other border-based NGO aid groups are also struggling with the funding crisis, which has resulted in anomalous situations across the border. Schoolteachers in Mon State being provided for by funding from donors such as the NHEC, for example, have been working without salaries since June.

Looking for the Switch to Light Up Burma’s Cities

by William Boot

Efforts by Burma’s military regime to improve the country’s unreliable electricity supply ahead of promised national elections next year face big hurdles.

A new hydroelectric dam near the central city of Mandalay is being tested this month and in theory it could expand Burma’s power generating capacity by over 40 percent.

Additionally, a 150-kilometer pipeline is to be built in the south to carry gas to Rangoon, seemingly to alleviate perpetual power shortages there.

An inadequate and decrepit infrastructure, however, is likely to result in wastage of much of any extra electricity—if it isn’t sold to China anyway.

Chinese developers are this month conducting tests on the 790-megawatt capacity Yeywa hydro dam nearing completion on the Myitnge River.

The project, which has been under construction since 2004 and has reportedly cost more than US $600 million, should raise Burma’s electricity generating capacity by more than 40 percent. However, with so much Chinese involvement—including investment of about $200 million—some of the power might be pumped north into China’s equally hungry Yunnan province, observers believe.

The Yeywa dam, 50 kilometers south of blackout-plagued Mandalay, is about 300 kilometers from the Chinese border.

Burma has one of the world’s worst electricity generating capacities—a mere 1,700 megawatts for a population of around 50 million.

In comparison, neighboring Thailand has about 30,000 megawatts for a population of about 60 million people.

Burma’s power predicament is exacerbated by the fact that more than 25 percent of the electricity generated is lost “in transmission and distribution” through poor cable equipment, according to figures published in a report by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Burmese state-controlled media have said the Yeywa electricity will be pumped into what passes for a national grid via 230-volt cable.

“Burma’s electricity grid system is far from national because it’s concentrated in the central belt between Rangoon and Mandalay,” Bangkok-based energy industries analyst-consultant Collin Reynolds told The Irrawaddy.

“Under half of it has a 230-volt capacity, so even within the limited transmission region much of the cable is probably inadequate for handling a big boost in supply such as might come out of the Yeywa [power plant],” Reynolds said.

Even within the electricity transmission belt, noisy and polluting diesel generators are in daily use as essential backup.

Most of northern and southeast Burma and nearly all border areas have no connection to the grid.

Despite these infrastructure failings, the Burmese military government has approved at least 12 hydro dams across the country.

If they are all built they would have a generating capacity of over 22,000 megawatts. But much of this is earmarked to be pumped into China, India or Thailand.

Many dam projects are still at the drawing board stage and involve Chinese and Indian state engineering companies. China’s Sinohydro Corporation—a principal developer at Yeywa—figures in a number of them.

China is especially interested in using Burma as a proxy for hydro dams because back home it is facing increasingly vociferous opposition from environmentalists. Protests led Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to curtail river dam developments in neighboring Yunnan.

The NGO Burma Rivers Network, a rights and environmental organization that monitors river developments, says dams in Burma lead to “displacement, militarization, human rights abuses, and irreversible environmental damage, threatening the livelihoods and food security of millions. The power and revenues generated are going to the military regime and neighboring countries.”

The Yeywa dam completion coincides with the award of a $77 million contract to Singapore engineering firm Swiber to build a pipeline to carry gas from the Yadana gas field in the Gulf of Martaban to Rangoon.

The contract was issued by the junta-controlled Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which has a stake in Yadana managed by Total of France. MOGE says the gas is to fuel Burma’s largest city and commercial center.

Most of the 780 million cubic feet of gas produced daily by Yadana goes to Thailand, but MOGE says it intends to have 200 million cubic feet a day delivered to Rangoon for domestic use by mid-2010.

Several small gas turbine plants exist in the greater Rangoon area, but wider use of gas to fuel more power plants would require new investment, and there is little backup capacity when problems strike.

In July, for instance, the Myanmar Electric Power Enterprise cut power supply in Rangoon to just six hours a day because of infrastructure damage caused by bad weather.

About 70 percent of Thailand’s electricity is generated by gas, and at least half of it comes from Burma.

But while Burma sits in the blackout dark, neighboring Thailand has a power glut, caused by over-development coupled with a sharp drop in domestic demand for electricity due to a recession triggered by the global financial crisis.

Thailand's surfeit could be good news for Shan communities living along the Salween river near the Thai-Burmese border.

The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand is having second thoughts about its agreements to cooperate in the construction of up to five hydro dams on the Salween, which would produce thousands of megawatts it probably no longer needs.

UN in Malaysia Grants More Burmese Refugee Status

About 11,000 Burmese refugees in Malaysia including Chin, Mon, Shan and Kachin were recognized by the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2009, making them eligible for resettlement in third countries.

Of the total, Chin numbered about 5,000 people; Mon, 1,800; followed by Kachin and Shan at about 1,000 and other ethnic groups. Arakan were not recognized this year.

A young Burmese refugee participates a demonstration outside the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, last year. (Photo: AP)

It was first time the UNHCR recognized such a large number of Burmese refugees. Burmese refugees experienced difficulties earlier this year when Thailand launched a crackdown on illegal Burmese migrants attempting to enter the country from the Malaysia-Thai border, said a member of the Alliance of Chin Refugees (ACR).

According to ACR, about 50,000 Chin currently live in Malaysia. An estimated 20,000 Chin have been granted UNHCR refugees status in Malaysia since 2001.

Nai Roi Mon, an official with the Mon Refugee Office (MRO) in Malaysia, told The Irrawaddy on Wednesday that it processed about 3,000 Mon for UNHCR refugee status.

According to the MRO, no Mon were granted refugee status in 2007, and only 500 were recognized in 2008.

“They have given favorable recognition to children under age 18, especially from families with many children, but no husband. They also favor older men, over 50, as well,” he said.

There are about 20,000 Mon living in Malaysia, many illegally, according to the MRO.

“If you have an UNHCR card, if you are arrested the UNHCR can help you during detention. This is an advantage for people who work here,” he said.

Burmese refugees recognized by the UNHCR may wait for up to one year or longer for resettlement to third countries.

About 500,000 Burmese migrants work in Malaysia, legally and illegally, according to the Kuala Lumpur-based Burma Workers’ Rights Protection Committee.

At the end of October 2009, about 67,800 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with the UNHCR in Malaysia, according to the UNHCR.

Of those, 62,000 are refugees from Burma, comprising 28,100 Chin, 16,100 Rohingya, 3,700 Burmese Muslims, 2,900 Kachin and other ethnic minorities.

The UNHCR said a large number of Burmese refugees remain unregistered. The refugee community estimates that unregistered refugees and asylum-seekers could number 30,000 people.

Burmese refugees living in Thailand continue to relocated to Malaysia to apply for refugee status. Many pay 18,000 Thai baht (US $500) or more to enter the country illegally.

The Malaysian government has cooperated with the UNHCR on humanitarian grounds since 1975 even though Malaysia has not signed the UN Convention Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Burmese refugees have been sent to third countries including the United States, Canada, Australia, France, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway.

Dec 4, 2009 (DVB)–Three men who allegedly leaked information on Burma’s secret tunnel project appeared in a Rangoon court yesterday on spy charges

Dec 4, 2009 (DVB)–Three men who allegedly leaked information on Burma’s secret tunnel project appeared in a Rangoon court yesterday on charges of espionage, which could be punishable by death.

The men, a former army major and two Burmese foreign ministry officials, are also accused of leaking the details of senior governmental visits to North Korea and Russia. Intelligence documents detailing the two visits, as well as North Korean involvement in a project to develop underground military facilities across Burma, have been obtained by DVB. According to the documents, Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has been developing the tunnels since 1996. As well as advanced communication systems and possible weapons factories, the tunnels are being built to accommodate battalions of troops in the event of an invasion. One of the three men, ex-major Win Naing Kyaw, had worked as a personal assistant for late junta secretary-2, General Tin Oo, who died in a helicopter crash in 2001. After retiring from the army, he joined a non-governmental organisation under the UN Development Programme in Burma, and went for training in Cambodia. He was arrested on his return at Rangoon International Airport on 29 July this year. Win Naing Kyaw, along with Thura Kyaw, a senior clerk from the foreign ministry’s European desk, is accused of leaking documents related to a 2006 visit by the SPDC’s second-in command, Maung Aye, to Russia, where he discussed the procurement of a guided missile system with Moscow’s deputy minister of defense, Yury Nikolayevich Baluyevsky. The two are also accused of exposing details of a trip by SPDC number three, Shwe Mann, to North Korea in 2008, where he visited tunnel complexes dug deep into the side of mountains that can hold heavy armoury, including chemical weapons. The information about the two visits was allegedly distributed via former SPDC official Aung Linn Htut, who is now living in exile after government authorities found the documents stored in his computer hard drive. The third defendant, Pyan Sein, is accused of spreading information about Burma’s tunnel project close to Naypyidaw via a woman known only as Ma Sint. The men are facing a raft of charges, including the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, the Emergency Act, the Electronics Act and the Official Secrets Act. The final charge can be punishable by life imprisonment or execution. More army officials have also been detained in connection with the case. One of them, special warrant officer Aung Kyaw Linn from the Myanmar Army (ground force), is currently detained in a military prison under a direct order from the military court. The trial, which began on 3 November, is being held in a closed court inside Rangoon’s Insein prison, where Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi was tried earlier this year. Reporting by Yee May Aung

The Tajik Solution

Image by Brian Harrington Spier via Flickr

A Model for Fixing Afghanistan

George Gavrilis
GEORGE GAVRILIS is Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin and an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

As the Obama administration and the rest of the international community grapple with the challenge of stabilizing Afghanistan, analogies have proliferated as fast as insurgents. Policymakers should learn from experiences in Iraq, one hears -- or Vietnam, or Malaya, and so on. Ironically, the best analogy may lie right next door in Tajikistan.

Soon after gaining its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan collapsed into a devastating civil war. Government forces, Islamists, and local warlords battled one another across its wildly remote and mountainous territory in a prolonged conflict that killed thousands of people, displaced half a million residents, and stranded 80 percent of the population in grinding poverty. Many of the combatants sustained their efforts by taking part in a multibillion-dollar drug trade, while extremists based in lawless frontier provinces launched terror attacks on neighboring states.

Today, Tajikistan is still corrupt and authoritarian, but it is also tolerably stable -- stable enough for the international community to forget about it, which is a striking mark of success. The turnaround was due largely to an intelligently conceived and successfully implemented intervention by a small UN mission and a core of unlikely bedfellows that included Iran and Russia. Rather than forcing free and fair elections, throwing out warlords, and flooding the country with foreign peacekeepers, the intervening parties opted for a more limited and realistic set of goals. They brokered deals across political factions, tolerated warlords where necessary, and kept the number of outside peacekeeping troops to a minimum. The result has been the emergence of a relatively stable balance of power inside the country, the dissuasion of former combatants from renewed hostilities, and the opportunity for state building to develop organically. The Tajik case suggests that in trying to rebuild a failed state, less may be more.

Tajikistan's civil war ended in June 1997, when the various government and opposition factions signed a peace accord. The accord recognized the government's leader, Emomali Rakhmonov, as interim president but mandated elections and key concessions to opposition groups. Thirty percent of political appointments were reserved for the United Tajik Opposition, a loose grouping of opposition figures, Islamists, and local strongmen united only by the fact that each had independently fought against Rakhmonov and his factions. The accord required combatants to demobilize and disarm in exchange for amnesty and salaried positions in the Interior, Defense, and Emergency Situations ministries and the Tajik Border Forces.

The accord was the result of a three-year effort by the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and nearby states such as Iran, Russia, and Uzbekistan. These outside players hosted eight rounds of peace talks, restored multiple failed cease-fires, mediated on behalf of various factions, drafted vital sections of the peace agreement, and formed a Contact Group to monitor and troubleshoot implementation. The United States and European Union remained outside the group but occasionally offered input and assistance.

The members of the Contact Group had different interests, yet, at least with respect to Tajikistan, they also had one thing in common: a desire to prevent a resumption of civil war without spending much money. UNMOT's first operating budget was a paltry $1.9 million. International aid to Tajikistan actually declined the year after the accord. Iran was willing to sponsor cultural and economic exchange but was too strapped to give major grants. The peacekeeping force Russia offered was small. The Contact Group, in short, could afford to give Tajikistan only a basic makeover, and so it set its sights low, not wanting to let the ideal be the enemy of the acceptable. It concentrated on striking a balance across the country's varied political factions and dissuading them from restarting the war.

One thing that went by the wayside was democratic purity. By conventional standards, Tajikistan's first postwar presidential elections, on November 6, 1999, were a disaster. Rakhmonov blocked opposition hopefuls from gathering enough petitions to run. To create the appearance of competition, Tajikistan's Supreme Court ruled that Davlat Usmon, a popular opposition Islamist, must stand for election. On election day, pro-Rakhmonov officials pretended to count ballots, police escorted voters into booths, and ghost polling stations with no registered voters reported landslide results. Rakhmonov won handily.

The peace accord was on the verge of being derailed. Disaffected members of the opposition and warlords in the provinces threatened to take up arms, while the United States and Europe blasted the flawed elections and demanded the government enact democratic reforms. At this point, however, the story took an interesting turn. Rather than focus on procedural fairness, the Contact Group scrambled to ease tensions across the factions and help the opposition. The group brokered dozens of negotiations and cajoled the government to sign a protocol benefiting future opposition candidates. UNMOT refrained from publicly condemning Rakhmonov in exchange for assurances that he would quickly appoint opposition figures to key national and provincial posts. These behind-the-scenes measures saved the peace accord and compelled a government that had stolen elections to be more inclusive.

Warlords are an enduring feature of Tajikistan's political landscape. During the Soviet period, much of rural Tajikistan remained under their influence, and when the Soviet Union collapsed, they -- like other political challengers -- raced to grab abandoned weapons caches and smuggle arms from neighboring states. In the course of the civil war, many warlords fielded substantial security forces, created autonomous hamlets, and bankrolled their authority by taxing farmers, collecting tolls, and trading illicit goods. The strongmen often harassed UNMOT military observers who traveled around the country to monitor the peace accord, and sometimes even took them hostage.

These experiences convinced the Contact Group that the warlords could not be controlled and would pose serious political obstacles if challenged. So it opted for a laissez-faire approach instead, nominally integrating warlords into the political structure while allowing them to retain substantial autonomy. Some received key positions in district and provincial governments, while others were given command of provincial police and military units with formal titles and negligible salaries. A high-level fact-finding mission from UN headquarters blasted UNMOT's arrangement and noted that warlord "units continue to exist separately from governmental units, fully preserving their command structures." Nevertheless, the arrangement has kept warlords happy and the government stable. It has done little to curb corruption, drug trafficking, or abuses of authority but much to reduce the probability of renewed civil war.

The Contact Group also recognized that peacekeepers could help stabilize the situation on the ground but had no interest in, or resources for, a major commitment. So Russia took the lead in organizing a small CIS contingent of peacekeeping troops in and around the Tajik capital of Dushanbe. They were touted as impartial peacekeepers but really provided a secure cordon around the pro-Moscow Rakhmonov government. The Russian military mission was strong enough to prevent opposition groups from seizing Dushanbe but light enough to avoid being seen as an occupation. It provided the Contact Group with essential intelligence and had a pacifying effect on the country.

Russian soldiers were also stationed at strategic points along the Tajik-Afghan border in the south. Evidence surfaced in 2001 that some of these units were trafficking in Afghan opiates, but they still provided Tajikistan with a fairly effective buffer against an estimated 6,000 extremists who had earlier fled to Afghanistan and were now eager to return and derail the accord.

Tajikistan today is hardly a model of democracy or development. Elections are stacked, positions in the government bought and sold, and crucial public goods and services doled out to regime cronies. The country remains an economic basket case dependent on foreign aid, worker remittances, hundreds of UN Development Program projects, and proceeds from an estimated $2-3 billion annual drug trade. Yet Tajikistan has attained a level of political stability such that a return to civil war, extremism, and chaos seems unlikely.

Privately, many U.S. and UN officials in Kabul concede that the best-case scenario for Afghanistan is that in two or three decades it will arrive at the place where Tajikistan and its other Central Asian neighbors are today. Yet in spite of such realistic judgments, the international community has publicly committed itself to a much more ambitious agenda: the transformation of Afghanistan into a prosperous democratic country where rule of law prevails. The problem with this lofty vision is not only that it is unattainable but that in pursuing it, chances to achieve more practical outcomes will be squandered.

How can the Tajik playbook be adapted to Afghanistan? First, policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and Kabul should develop a coordinated backroom strategy to ensure that the opposition is included in key government decisions and positions even after incumbents such as Karzai steal elections.

Second, the International Security Assistance Force should redeploy troops away from the interior to key positions along Afghanistan's international boundaries in order to police the borders against incoming insurgents and arms smugglers.

Third, the international community should give warlords much freer rein so long as they do not take up arms against the government or international forces. However repugnant the warlords may be, the central government simply does not have the ability to displace them, and trying to do so can lead to unpleasant consequences. Until recently, for example, Ismail Khan was a powerful warlord in the Afghan west. He declined a political appointment in Kabul under President Hamid Karzai, refused to disarm his foot soldiers, and withheld millions of dollars in customs revenue from the central treasury. Yet he ran his region with an iron fist, dispersed sorely needed public services, and served as a bulwark against the Taliban and rival warlords. His forced departure in 2004, together with his replacement by inept central government officials, enabled a resurgence of Taliban activities and an expansion of the drug trade in the area.

Fourth, the United States should seriously engage on Afghanistan with Russia and Iran. Given Russia's stinging history in the country, it cannot offer to send troops. But Russian political advisers can transfer valuable insights on the conduct of border-control missions and lessons learned about the corrupting effects of trafficking on soldiers. Iran's role is perhaps even more sensitive, yet Washington and Tehran share interests in defeating the insurgency, suppressing trafficking, and fostering political stability in the Afghan west. And Iranian experience in mediating the Tajik conflict might usefully inform similar initiatives in Afghanistan.

Applying the Tajik model to Afghanistan will not give the United States and its partners the outcome that they want. But if they try it, they just might find they get what they need.

Gerindra and ‘Greater Indonesia'

Gerindra and ‘Greater Indonesia'

Prabowo’s party has deep roots in Indonesian political mythology

Aboeprijadi Santoso

Prabowo dreams of a Greater Indonesia Aboeprijadi Santoso

Grand designs thrive in times of crisis. They are often a part of reinvigorated nationalism and have resulted in populist, authoritarian regimes. Sometimes, as with Hitler, Stalin, or the Khmer Rouge, they have produced humanitarian disasters. Other times they have fizzled out or ended in debacle.

Indonesia has recently witnessed the revival of such grand designs, that of ‘Indonesia Raya’ or Greater Indonesia. Promoted in this year’s elections by the former military general, Prabowo Subianto, this idea dates back to before even the early years of Indonesian nationalism.

Dreaming of greatness

Indonesia’s history is filled with great hopes and dreams. Some it inherited from the scores of kingdoms in the archipelago. Others were born from the ashes of two great imperial powers. The Dutch dreamed romantically of a Girdle of Emeralds (Gordel van Smaragd) draped along the equator. The Japanese incorporated Indonesia in a vast ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’. Both dreams - despite the latter’s much shorter life – had great impacts on the young nation.

The newly born state in the 1940s inherited not just a legacy of colonial oppression, but also a swathe of ideas, both native and modern, that had been debated and nurtured since early in the twentieth century. The Dutch ‘ethical’ spirit from the late nineteenth century inspired the thought of modernisation. At the same time, Japan’s 1905 victory over Russia stimulated a kind of jingoistic euphoria.

Many Indonesian intellectuals in the 1930s saw fascism as a trendy idea. Some considered it a danger that could somehow turn into a ‘new hope’

The pioneering women’s champion R.A. Kartini envisaged the dawning of new hope for an entire people. Young ethnic nationalists discovered they could work together towards one single nation. The lawyer Mohammad Yamin dreamed that this nation might grow beyond the Netherlands Indies - his Yawadwipa Nusantara (Archipelago of Eight) included Peninsular Malaya. The socialist Sutan Sjahrir condemned ‘feudalism’, feared militarism, and worked for a modern democracy. Sukarno spoke of the ‘Golden Bridge’ towards a bright future. Islamists and communists held up their own utopias. Soepomo, a Dutch-educated lawyer who was a key framer of the constitution of 1945, evoked the nation as one great community (Gemeenschap), protected by the State as a benevolent Patron. Villagers, also, seemed eternally to remember the myth of the coming Ratu Adil, ‘the Just Ruler’.

Parindra and the patron state

These were the values the new republic was supposed to bring into being. None had expressed ideas of national greatness as clearly as the medical doctor Soetomo, founder in 1935 of the political party Parindra - Partai Indonesia Raya, the Greater Indonesia Party. This party admired Japan’s revivalist spirit and popularised Hitler’s fascist ideas. Parindra was a split from the movement widely seen as the pioneer of the national awakening, Boedi Oetomo. The spirit of Greater Indonesia was an important asset for the genesis and strengthening of nationhood. But it could also be distorted to provoke anti-democratic emotions.

Soepomo’s idea of the State as Patron was akin to that of Soewardi Soerjaningrat, better known as Ki Hadjar Dewantara, Indonesia’s ‘Father of Education’. Both were Dutch-educated as well as culturally conservative. They were deeply nativist – that is, oriented to Javanese tradition. Both harboured sympathies for Hitler’s leadership style. Many Indonesian intellectuals in the 1930s saw fascism as a trendy idea. Some considered it a danger that could somehow turn into a ‘new hope’. Few stood firmly against it.

Suharto’s generals appropriated Parindra’s and Soepomo’s celebration of the State-as-Great Patron to justify the New Order’s authoritarian rule

Diffuse motifs associated with the idea of Indonesia Raya can be found throughout the post-independent period. Outward-looking and expansive, they sometimes carried a chauvinistic and even megalomaniac spirit. But they were not unchallenged, and indeed they ultimately failed. Sukarno aggrandised his Guided Democracy by trying to create an alliance of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia that he called Maphilindo. He saw himself as a champion of all newly independent states, the New Emerging Forces. All went nowhere. Suharto’s New Order, in turn, aggressively expanded the republic only to shamefully end up in the great fiasco of East Timor. He was also badly mistaken when he went to the International Court of Justice with Malaysia in 1996 over the Sipadan-Ligitan islands. His drive to crush Aceh’s rebellion was characterised by the same spirit. His generals appropriated Parindra’s and Soepomo’s celebration of the State-as-Great Patron to justify the New Order’s authoritarian rule.

Renaissance

Back in the colonial period, the Dutch and educated Indonesians often pictured the communities as idyllic, harmonious and backward. This image was attractive to the populist Parindra. Populism in those days presumed a homogenous society, denying the very existence of rich and poor social classes.

Today another, highly spirited rightwing populist political party has emerged. Its name, Gerindra, Gerakan Indonesia Raya, the Greater Indonesia Movement, signifies its fervour for revitalising the greatness of the nation. Founded on 6 February 2008, the party is linked to ex-general Prabowo Subianto, aged 58, who is also President Suharto’s former son-in-law. Prabowo is a maverick who likes to present himself heroically. Whereas Gerindra’s spiritual predecessors in the 1930s such as Soepomo and Soewardi were strongly oriented to the Dutch and to Europe, Gerindra has a purely local orientation. But it has a rather similar dream. It is a vehicle for “Indonesia’s Renaissance”, Prabowo has said.

Prabowo’s lieutenant in Gerindra is the still-vigorous Sukarnoist Permadi. He calls Prabowo ‘Little Sukarno’. During the recent fracas over ‘cultural items’ allegedly stolen by Malaysia, Permadi aggressively suggested that Indonesia should renew Sukarno’s 1960s ‘Ganyang Malaysia’ (Crush Malaysia) campaign. And Prabowo likes him.

Prabowo’s lieutenant in Gerindra calls Prabowo ‘Little Sukarno’ and suggests that Indonesia should renew Sukarno’s 1960s ‘Crush Malaysia’ campaign

However, the party is not about reviving Sukarno-style leftism. Its core leaders are a group of politicised retired officers whose careers rose under the New Order. Their main ideology is the sacredness of the unitary state and the 1945 constitution. They have denounced the post-New Order constitutional amendments (which were designed to improve protection of human rights). They are also sceptical about the Helsinki peace pact for Aceh. Asked whether he would review the pact, Prabowo replied: “If necessary yes, we’ll see later.”

Paths to power

Prabowo dreams of a Greater Indonesia Aboeprijadi Santoso

A decade ago Prabowo was quoted as saying there were only three paths to power: Islam, the military and being close to Suharto. He had been close to all three for some time. But by the time the collapse of Suharto’s government and the subsequent reformasi intervened he had alienated too many of those forces to achieve his top ambition. Now he is back. In April’s parliamentary elections his new party reached a remarkable five per cent of the total vote. In the presidential elections of July he was running mate to Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri of the nationalist PDIP (Democratic Party of Struggle). They placed second in a three-horse race.

Prabowo adopted a chauvinistic bravado. His campaign appearances co-opted hyper-nationalist symbols, imitating Sukarno’s jargon, body language, and even his safari shirt. ‘Now I’m fighting my last battle,’ he recently said. ‘I want to lay the ground for Indonesia’s Renaissance…We have to return to Indonesia, the true one.’

Besides the red-and-white flag, Gerindra uses the mythical eagle garuda to emphasise its love for the nation and to stimulate proud feelings of unity. Once simply flat, since the New Order the garuda has changed into a three-dimensional symbol that looks bigger and more aggressive.

Prabowo has never referred to his party’s namesake Parindra, but he is undoubtedly aware of its ideas. Like Parindra more than half a century ago, Gerindra places its hope on crisis – even after Prabowo’s defeat in the presidential elections. Nevertheless, Gerindra would do well to remember that Parindra, like other fascist groupings in the Netherlands Indies, did not survive into independence. ii

Aboeprijadi Santoso (‘Tossi’) (aboeprijadi@gmail.com) is Jakarta correspondent for Radio Netherlands Worldwide (http://www.rnw.nl/ ).