Inside Indonesia - Negotiating the past and looking to the future

Meaningful dialogue about the future of Papua requires that Indonesians and Papuans honestly address the past

Muridan S. Widjojo

Distrust of Jakarta remains deep among Papuans Anonymous

History is one of the main sources of conflict in Papua. The Act of Free Choice in 1969 remains the subject of dispute, both because of the way it was carried out and because of its outcome. Over the last 40 years, conflict over the history of the Act has contributed to the hardening of the positions held by the conflicting parties: the government in Jakarta and the Papuan people. The Jakarta government views the Act of Free Choice as ending all uncertainty about Papua’s status as a part of Indonesia, while most Papuans view the Act as illegal and as beginning a period of suffering and subjugation. These differing views of history have contributed significantly to creating a cycle of violence, to ongoing human rights abuses, the failure of development, marginalisation of and discrimination towards Papuans. More importantly, it has created a high wall of mutual misunderstanding and distrust that divides Jakarta and Papua.

Levels of violence in Papua have increased markedly in the past year, prompting a number of moderate Papuan leaders and a handful of intellectuals and activists in Jakarta to search for ways to bridge the differences between Jakarta and Papua. They promote dialogue as a tool to resolve the Papua conflict comprehensively. Their efforts raise critical questions: to what extent can sensitive historical issues surrounding the integration of Papua into Indonesia become part of the agenda for dialogue? What will it take to find common ground and truth acceptable to both parties?

Competing constructions of history

The interpretation of history propounded by pro-independence Papuan intellectuals and leaders is diverse: one faction believes that Papua proclaimed its independence on 1 December 1961, while another considers that the proclamation occurred on 1 July 1971. Despite such differences, they agree on a number of elements. All use pieces of the history of Papua’s integration into Indonesia, mainly the Act of Free Choice, to question the political status of Papua as a part of Indonesia. They point to the force used in the implementation of the Act and say that Papuans have never been properly consulted about their political status. Consequently, they argue that the Act of Free Choice should be reviewed by the UN. They expect that the UN, if it uses simple logic and looks back carefully at Papua’s history, would agree to pro-independence arguments and eventually endorse the independence of Papua.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Indonesian government believes that Papua, which was part of the Netherlands East Indies, has been an inseparable part of the Indonesian nation-state since the Proclamation of Independence in 1945. The government view is that conflict with the Dutch over the decolonisation of Papua lasted until the Act of Free Choice in 1969 and was the last chapter in Indonesia’s struggle against colonialism. Since 1 May 1963, when the ‘New York Agreement’ (reached with the Dutch in 1962) transferred authority over Papua to the Indonesian government, the Indonesian government has claimed full political authority over Papua.

As a consequence, government officials say Indonesia was well within its rights to select 1026 Papuan representatives to participate in the Act of Free Choice. Indonesia made this choice, they say, because of the difficult geography of Papua and to allow for the Indonesian political culture of forging consensus by mutual deliberation (musyawarah). According to Indonesia, the result is enshrined in UN Resolution No 2504 (XXIV) which endorses the transfer of sovereignty over Papua to Indonesia. Therefore, Indonesia will do anything in its power, including the use of armed force, to defend itself against threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity in Papua.

What ends up being expressed is the anger of the powerless on one side and the arrogance of the powerful on the other

The contrasts in the historical perspectives held in Jakarta and Papua are obvious. But is it possible to fashion a historical truth which is acceptable to both sides? In the context of the Papua conflict, each party tends to employ the past selectively in order to suit its political goals. What ends up being expressed is the anger of the powerless on one side and the arrogance of the powerful on the other. Works of professional historians have only contributed in a limited way to breaking down this binary; they tend to have little effect on firmly held nationalist convictions. Both the marginalised and the powerful retain their versions of history as the truth.

In practice, forging accepted historical facts is a process that is always determined by power relations and interests. The decolonisation of West New Guinea and the political processes which followed it, especially the New York Agreement and the Act of Free Choice, should be understood as political struggles. The players were not only Indonesia and Papua, but also the Dutch, the US, and the Soviet Union. The Cold War and the competition between global powers favoured the Indonesian Republic: the threat that Indonesia might turn to the Soviet Union ensured that Indonesia’s interests were prioritised to ensure that threat did not materialise. Unfortunately, Papuan leaders were in a weak bargaining position and were not given the opportunity to press their interests during the negotiations. The Act of Free Choice was a product of that one-sided contest.

Now, 40 years on, and even as the Indonesian political system grows more democratic, the validity of the Act of Free Choice remains a subject of dispute. For Papuan leaders the key issue is whether the history of the Act of Free Choice can be used to alter the status of Papua and bring about independence. By pointing to the flaws in the way that Papua was integrated into Indonesia, they hope, Indonesian sovereignty over Papua may be discredited or even negated. Obviously, the Indonesian government will never tolerate efforts in this direction. Fears among Indonesians about threats to Indonesian sovereignty are overwhelming, even if they are sometimes hard to explain to Papuans and to outsiders. But because independence is a non-negotiable subject, those raising it are confronted with violence, arrest and human rights abuse.

Peaceful settlement

In the 2001 Law on Special Autonomy for Papua, the Indonesian national parliament does address the issue of history. Article 46 of the law requires the government to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, one of the tasks of which would be to clarify the historical record. There is a catch, however: the Commission is supposed to clarify the historical record with a view to strengthening the integrity of Indonesia. In other words it is not to be employed as a tool to question the political status of Papua.

However, since the law was enacted, this article has been ignored. No Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been established, and there has been no official effort to reopen the historical record even to this very limited extent. Even worse, many of the other crucial provisions of the special autonomy law which try to address the roots of conflict in Papua have been undermined in practice, and conflict has not subsided.

The failure of special autonomy has driven many parties to reconsider the possibilities of opening a process of dialogue to break the political impasse in Papua. A number of researchers from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), collaborating with NGOs and government officials, have striven to gain support for dialogue from important political figures and high officials within the Indonesian government. The proposed dialogue would involve representatives of Papuan pro-independence groups and delegates of the central government, and would be open-ended, covering all issues including the demand of independence and the revision of special autonomy law.Those advocating dialogue in Jakarta have in fact received a sympathetic hearing from many individuals within the parliament and government (except from certain intelligence and security-related bodies).

In Papua, some Catholic priests under the leadership of Dr Neles Tebay of the STFT Fajar Timur (Philosophical and Theological College) in Jayapura, collaborating with other denominations, local NGOs, student leaders, and Adat (customary) groups, have built an understanding with various local actors, including representatives of the armed pro-independence groups, about the necessity of dialogue as a more realistic method to further the interests of the Papuan majority. People are now talking about the possibility of a compromise on the issue of independence. But crucial questions remain. Papuans question the political will of Jakarta, especially given the failure of many aspects of special autonomy. Deep mistrust of Jakarta prevails.

Compensating for the past

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has a chance to launch a dialogue that might help to resolve the Papua conflict, adding to his achievement in bringing about peace in Aceh. But negotiations cannot sidestep the issue of Papuan history. History is important because it is related to the interests and identity of people today and in the future. History should be transformed into a positive and constructive tool to help resolve current troubles. History should not be treated as a fixed position involving absolute truth and determining collective identity. Rather, history should be treated as a negotiable construction involving acceptance and compromise, and providing benefits for both parties rather than being the monopoly of just one side. Otherwise, history in Papua will perpetuate an endless cycle of violence.

Rather than having completely conflicting interpretations of the past, as is currently the case, it should be feasible for both sides to agree to pieces of historical truth. Doing so would allow past mistakes to be repaired and long-held grievances to be addressed. In particular, the government should be prepared to recognise Papuans’ memory of suffering and deliver dignified apologies for past wrongdoings – as it has done recently in the case of East Timor and Aceh. This should include re-examining the events surrounding the Act of Free Choice, and the government should have the confidence to do so without fearing that its entire claim to sovereignty in Papua will unravel.

In the eyes of Papuans, of course, official apologies will not be enough to restore justice. The government should also employ Papuan traditional ideas of justice, in which conflict is traditionally resolved by negotiation leading to payments and concessions to the wronged party. Both parties need to think hard about what kind of concessions and compensation is needed to build a new relationship between Jakarta and Papua.

Muridan S. Widjojo (muridanwidjojo@gmail.com) works at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta and is a coordinating author of Papua Road Map (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 2009).

Inside Indonesia - Listening to Papuan voices

Writing the history of the Act of Free Choice was a controversial endeavour

Pieter Drooglever

The English translation of Professor Drooglever’s book OneWorld Publications, Oxford, 2009

In November 2000, the Dutch Foreign Minister Josias van Aartsen commissioned the Institute of Netherlands History (ING) to write a study on West New Guinea leading up to and including the Act of Free Choice of 1969. The request came in the slipstream of renewed international interest in West Papua generated by the downfall of Indonesia’s President Suharto in 1998. Papuan people were finally able to speak out about their aspirations for greater autonomy or independence. Many of them expressed these aspirations with reference to promises allegedly made in Dutch colonial times. The past proved to be an active force in the present.

The Netherlands has played a large and controversial role in West Papua’s history. In the post-Suharto context many people in the Netherlands felt that an independent account of that role was required. This report was intended to be an independent academic study, rather than an endeavour to re-open a political discussion that had, according to both the Netherlands and Indonesia, been concluded many decades earlier. Instead, Minister van Aartsen and his supporters from the right-wing Protestant parties felt that the public – in the Netherlands, in Papua, in Indonesia and elsewhere – had a right to know what had happened.

The contract between the Institute of Netherlands History and the government explicitly stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would provide all necessary assistance and information, but could not influence the outcome of the study. As a historian and specialist on decolonisation and Dutch-Indonesian relations between 1945 and 1963, I was commissioned to conduct the study, which involved archival research and analysis in the Netherlands, Australia and the United Nations.

The result

The book, entitled Een Daad van Vrije Keuze. De Papoea’s van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht (An Act of Free Choice. The Papuans of western New Guinea and the limits of the right to self-determination), was completed in November 2005. It contains a study on political and cultural developments in West New Guinea covering the period before and after the Second World War, as well as the position of New Guinea in the context of Indonesia’s decolonisation and during the Cold War. In particular, it reviews how the Dutch continued their rule in New Guinea after the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia over the rest of the archipelago in 1950, but were subsequently forced to hand over the territory to Indonesia in 1962. In this context, it also pays attention to the roles of the United States, its antagonists in the Cold War and the United Nations.

The book also outlines the developments within Papuan society, that society’s complicated entry into the ways and means of the modern world and the processes by which this generated a new Papuan identity. It considers the ‘New York Agreement’ reached between the Indonesian and Netherlands government and the surrounding negotiations which laid down the rules for the transfer of the administration to the UN in 1962 and to Indonesia in 1963, as well as events in and around West New Guinea during both the UN interim administration and Indonesian rule in the 1960s. The final chapters discuss the 1969 Act of Free Choice, which confirmed the inclusion of the territory into the Indonesian state, including the problems and flaws in this process.

On the whole, the book attempts to give a balanced view of the policies and actions of each of the parties concerned. It was not geared towards defending or rejecting any particular view, but rather traces the interaction between them. But in assessing these policies, the underlying questions remained the same: on what grounds did the outside world take charge of matters for the Papuans, one of the most underdeveloped people on Earth? What advantages did the international community seek for itself? And what benefits or misery did it bring for the Papuans? For the United Nations, it led to a testing of its principles and its capacity to translate them into policies. As such, it is a book for politicians, historians, legal experts and, above all, for those who want to know about the weight of the weak in the events of the modern world.

An academic study, not a government report

The book was, and had to be, an academic study. Both the author and the Institute of Netherlands History took this requirement very seriously. However, the study’s origins were in politics, and so inevitably it was drawn into the political context from the outset. Academics and politicians alike were suspicious that political intentions lay behind the project and would influence the result. The Indonesian government certainly held this view. Many prominent Indonesians felt that the Netherlands, by initiating this project, was planning to meddle in the controversial New Guinea affair all over again or, even worse, reopen a debate that was closed in 1962. Even some Indonesians who knew this was not the case believed that the book could be interpreted in this way, thereby adding to the unrest already existing in West Papua.

Many prominent Indonesians felt that the Netherlands, by initiating this project, were planning to meddle in the controversial New Guinea affair all over again

Despite Dutch government explanations and assurances that the study was without political motivation and designed only to provide a public record of events, Indonesia was never convinced. I was refused further access to Indonesia, either to do research in the archives in Jakarta, to interview Indonesian administrators and politicians, or to talk to the people in Papua. This was a major setback for the study, but it was no surprise.

I was able to continue my research without the assistance of Indonesia, as I had ample experience with Indonesia before and I was able to interview many of the relevant people outside of the country. Moreover, the richest archival sources were outside Indonesia. For the administration of Netherlands New Guinea and the dispute with Indonesia, the Netherlands archives contain abundant information, now laid fully open in the process of preparing for the documentary editions. For the later episodes, significant information is found in the Australian and US archives. For the Act of Free Choice, valuable information is available from the United Nations in New York. Nevertheless, a more open insight into Indonesia’s positions would have been welcome and it is hoped Indonesia’s views will be better heard in future publications. The Indonesian Institute of Sciences offers the best opportunity for this purpose.

The ramifications

The book was launched in The Hague on 15 November 2005. It did not go unnoticed in Indonesia. In Jayapura and Makassar, Papuans held large demonstrations calling for a new referendum. Many interested groups attended the launch in The Hague, including a strong delegation of the Papua Presidium, members of dissident groups from the Moluccas and Indonesian representatives. Among them was Dr. Astrid Sustanto, an Indonesian academic and parliamentarian, who sought to highlight the positive impacts of the Indonesian administration in Papua.

Dr Sustanto’s presence was certainly needed because in general most of the comments made at the event regarding Indonesia’s past and present administration of Papua were critical and Papuans used this opportunity to bring forward their concerns. The question remained: now that so much time had passed, was there still a right for the Papuans to ask for independence or are they better accommodated within Indonesia? No easy answer was available and opinions differed sharply.

The political reality, tensions and difficulties inherent in this question were reflected by the notable absence of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ben Bot, who had not shown up to accept the book that had been written upon the request of his own ministry. In his stead, his predecessor Josias van Aartsen attended, together with the MP Eimert van Middelkoop, who had first requested the study in parliament. The Dutch government was not prepared to put relations with Indonesia at further risk. The minister’s position was heavily criticised in the Dutch media and in Congress, where it was felt that this was an excellent occasion for the Dutch government to show its continuing interest in the fate of its former colonial subjects. Meanwhile, it must be noted that Minister Bot had, notwithstanding his political aloofness in the matter, continued to facilitate the project until its conclusion, as had been decided by his predecessor in 2000.

Whatever the ensuing discussions, the book was not written to answer the political questions of the moment, though it may help defining the options. First and foremost it was meant as a record of historical fact regarding the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia and the incorporation of West New Guinea in Indonesia. The book will continue to serve as an important resource to aid understanding of the underlying historical context, which continues to drive conflict in West Papua. Previous accounts of this period had focused upon the views of the Netherlands, Indonesia, the US and the UN, and more often than not only upon one of these. Importantly, this book focuses upon Papuan sentiments on the transfer, as well as those of Indonesia and the international community. In this book the voices of Papuans are heard, for a change.

Pieter Drooglever (pieter.drooglever@planet.nl) is author of the Dutch government commissioned study on the Act of Free Choice, Een Daad van Vrije Keuze. De Papoea’s van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht (ING-Boom, The Hague-Amsterdam 2005). The English translation is now available: An Act of Free Choice. Decolonization and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua (Oneworld Publications, Oxford, 2009).

A violation of international law

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Between 14 July and 2 August 1969, the Indonesian government held what it called the ‘Act of Free Choice’ in West Papua. It gathered 1022 Papuan tribal representatives into eight locations – one for each region of West Papua: Merauke, Jayawijaya, Paniai, Fak-Fak, Sorong, Manokwari, Cenderawasih and Jayapura. Some of these Papuans had to walk three days to their designated location. Some had to leave behind their wives and children in the ‘care of the Indonesian government’. These 1022 Papuans were asked to choose between two alternatives, either to remain with Indonesia or to sever ties with Indonesia and become an independent state separate from Indonesia, like Papua New Guinea.

In each region the decision-making process was the same. The head of the West Irian provincial government informed the Papuan group that the peoples of West Papua had already expressed their desire not to be separated from Indonesia and that the right answer was for Papua to remain a part of Indonesia. The Indonesian Minister of Home Affairs informed them that this ‘Act of Free Choice’ would finally safeguard the unity of the Indonesian nation and there was no alternative but to ‘remain within the Republic of Indonesia’. The Papuans were not permitted to vote. They had to reach a decision through the Indonesian system of musyawarah (mutual deliberation) in which discussion continues until everybody agrees. All of this took place under the watchful gaze of the Chair of the West Irian Provincial House of Representatives, the Chief of the Indonesian Information Service, as well as a Brigadier-General in the Indonesian army. One by one each Papuan group declared in favour of remaining with Indonesia.

Ever since that time, Indonesia has represented this ‘Act of Free Choice’ as West Papua’s exercise of its right to self-determination. This is its justification for the integration of West Papua into the Republic of Indonesia.

Self-determination in international law

From its origins as a political principle championed by Lenin and then by Woodrow Wilson, self-determination has evolved into a fundamental human right and a rule of international law. In its 1960 ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, the UN General Assembly stated that ‘the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to world peace and cooperation’. Since then the principle of self-determination has attained quasi-constitutional status within the United Nations and has been reinforced by state practice throughout the world. As a result, millions of people have gained their freedom from the former colonial powers. Self-determination has been entrenched in treaty law and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

The ‘Act of Free Choice’ was an egregious violation of West Papua’s legal right to self-determination

In early 2008, the chair of the UN special committee on decolonisation, who was also the UN representative for Indonesia, H.E. Mr R. M. Marty M Natalegawa (now Indonesia’s foreign minister), declared that ‘decolonisation remains an unfinished business of the United Nations. We must therefore continue to give decolonisation a high priority and seek effective ways to accelerate the process of decolonisation in the remaining Non-Self-Governing Territories’. If he is really serious, His Excellency need look no further than across the Afar Sea to West Papua.

The situation in 1969

In 1969, Indonesia did not have sovereignty over West Papua. It had exercised administration responsibilities over the territory under UN supervision since 1963, after assuming responsibilities from the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, which had in turn taken over administration from the Netherlands, the original colonial power. Indonesia’s obligations towards West Papua were governed by two separate treaties. The first and more important was the UN Charter, Article 73 of which imposed on Indonesia a ‘sacred trust’ to bring West Papua to self-government. The second treaty was the ‘Agreement Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)’ made on 15 August 1962 between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia and commonly referred to as the New York Agreement. This treaty imposed on Indonesia an obligation, as the administering power, to hold an act of self-determination in West Papua in accordance with international practice.

In 1969 ‘international practice’ was well-established. Under Resolution 1541 (XV) ‘Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter’, an historic resolution passed by the UN General Assembly in 1960, there were two fundamental conditions that had to be met before a non-self-governing territory (such as West Papua) could be integrated into another state (such as Indonesia).

Legal commentators have been scathing about the vote ever since, dismissing it as an empty and formalistic exercise, a pseudo-choice and a betrayal of the principle of self-determination

Firstly, the territory should have already attained ‘an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions’. This was necessary, to give its people ‘the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic processes’. Secondly, integration should only proceed once all the people of the territory, fully informed about the consequences, had expressed their wishes through ‘informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage’. These requirements were set out in Principle IX of Resolution 1541 (XV).

No justification in law

Clearly, in the 1969 ‘Act of Free Choice’ these conditions were ignored. Legal commentators have been scathing about the vote ever since, dismissing it as an empty and formalistic exercise, a pseudo-choice and a betrayal of the principle of self-determination.

The ‘Act of Free Choice’ was an egregious violation of West Papua’s legal right to self-determination, a violation of the ‘sacred trust’ under Article 73 of the UN Charter and a breach of Indonesia’s treaty obligations under the UN Charter and the New York Agreement. It cannot justify Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua. The justification for such sovereignty, if it exists, must lie elsewhere in the legal rules governing the acquisition of sovereignty. Otherwise West Papua is a territory that is under alien domination – a status forbidden by international law. ii

Melinda Janki (mmjanki@yahoo.co.uk) is an international lawyer specialising in the environment and human rights, providing legal advice to conservation organisations and to aboriginal and tribal peoples in Asia, Africa and South America. She is also a founding member of International Lawyers for West Papua.

West Papua 40 years on

A Papuan man from the highlands of Papua: the voice of Papuans has long been ignored in the debate of the status of the territory Anonymous

Last August, East Timor celebrated a decade since the United Nations vote which gave it independence from Indonesia. This year, too, many West Papuans have been remembering a UN sponsored vote, but many of them have been mourning how it denied them their independence. In 1969, in an ‘Act of Free Choice’ the UN gave West Papuans the choice between the same two options put before the Timorese in 1999: integration with Indonesia or full independence. But the conduct of the vote could hardly have been more different than that which took place 30 years later in East Timor.

Different histories

Most East Timorese and outside observers hailed the UN administration in East Timor and the conduct of the vote for self-determination as a success. Under threat of violence, but with the world watching, 78.5 percent of the Timorese voted for independence. The subsequent independence ended a bloody 24-year occupation by Indonesian forces.

For many West Papuans, the UN-sponsored vote legitimised the forced takeover by Indonesia in 1962 and the Indonesian annexation that continues today

Few people are aware that 30 years before East Timor, West Papua was the first ever UN administered territory and the first territory granted a UN sponsored vote. But for the Papuans, the process and outcome could not have been more different. The vote, conducted by Indonesia with UN supervision, is now widely acknowledged to have been a sham: only a handful of Papuans were allowed to participate, the few who could vote were forced to do so in public, in full view of Indonesian soldiers and without international observers, under threat of violence. Despite popular support for independence, the Papuans were coerced into voting for integration with Indonesia. Unsurprisingly, the Act of Free Choice is more popularly known to Papuans as the ‘Act of No Choice’. For many West Papuans, the UN-sponsored vote legitimised the forced takeover by Indonesia in 1962 and the Indonesian annexation that continues today.

Remembering 1969

The fortieth anniversary of the Act of Free Choice provides an excellent opportunity for Inside Indonesia to reflect upon the events of that time and their continuing relevance today. The contested histories arising from that fateful vote – in particular concerning Papua’s status as a part of Indonesia – are at the root of ongoing conflict in Papua. Yet, for many years there was little documentation or discussion of the events of 1969.

Inside Indonesia is thus pleased to present over coming weeks a series of articles that consider the Act of Free Choice, its legal consequences and the viewpoints of Indonesians and Papuans on the event and its implications for Papua’s future.

The fortieth anniversary of the Act of Free Choice provides an excellent opportunity for Inside Indonesia to reflect upon the events of that time and their continuing relevance today

International lawyer Melinda Janki writes about the legal consequences of the conduct of the Act of Free Choice. Since 1969, Indonesia has represented the vote as signifying West Papua’s exercise of its right to self-determination, offering it as justification for the territory’s incorporation into the Indonesian state. After setting out the requirements for the legitimate exercise of self-determination in international law, she shows that the Act of Free Choice fell far short of those standards. As a matter of international law, she argues, the Act cannot justify Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua.

Professor Pieter Drooglever, author of an independent study of the Act of Free Choice commissioned by the Dutch government in 2000, provides an overview of his findings about the vote and the political circumstances prevailing at the time, considering the roles of the Netherlands, Indonesia, the US and the UN. He explains how his study focuses on Papuan sentiments on the transfer and gives voice to those views, and he reflects on the intense political controversy caused by his study and the criticisms he received in Indonesia.

The series then presents Indonesian and Papuan views on the Act of Free Choice. Jusuf Wanandi of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta was part of the team that organised the Act of Free Choice and he presents his recollections of and reflections on that period. It is rare for persons involved in these historic events on the Indonesian side to present their views on them to an international audience, and we are very grateful to Mr Wanandi for doing so. Next, Muridan S. Widjojo of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences represents a liberal Indonesian view. While recognising that differing interpretations of the history of the Act are at the root of conflict in today’s Papua, he argues that it is feasible for the Indonesian government and the Papuan people to agree to pieces of historical truth that are acceptable to both sides. He asserts that this will build a foundation for repairing past mistakes and addressing Papuan grievances. Finally, an interview with Papuan leader in exile, Benny Wenda, explains Papuan views about what the vote and its 40 year anniversary mean to the Papuan people.

By offering Papuan, Indonesian and international perspectives on the Act of Free Choice, it is hoped that this series will aid a greater understanding of the conflicting perspectives on the history of Papuan integration in Indonesia, which will in turn assist Inside Indonesia readers to understand the current conflict in Papua and provide some background to the proposed negotiations between Jakarta and Papua over how to resolve that conflict. ii

Jennifer Robinson (jkr.robinson@gmail.com) is an Australian lawyer and Rhodes scholar in London who worked on the first case to be heard through the permanent Human Rights Courts in Indonesia, as well as the trial of then political prisoner, Benny Wenda in West Papua. She is an editor of Inside Indonesia and Secretary of International Lawyers for West Papua.

Papuans demand restriction of migrants - The Jakarta Post

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Nethy Darma Somba , The Jakarta Post , Jayapura, Papua | Fri, 11/13/2009 7:11 PM | National

People migrating to Papua have impacted upon the Papuans’ employment opportunities, thus necessitating further travel restrictions, a seminar hears.

Indigenous community representative Josias Serontouw told an international biodiversity conference in Jayapura on Friday that migrants in civil servant positions in the province outnumbered their native counterparts.

“Migration to Papua must be restricted as migrants are taking jobs from Papuans,” Josias said. “With more unemployed Papuans, trouble may arise.”

He called on the provincial legislative council to pass an ordinance curbing migration. He also called on another bylaw prioritizing to indigenous people in the civil servant recruitment test.

Papua has a population of more than 2 million, with migrant and indigenous numbers roughly the same. Migrants also prevail in the economic sector while many Papuans, particularly those living in remote villages, live below the poverty line.

Agus Sumule, adviser to the governor, said present restrictions had already taken effect.

According to a provincial ordinance, migrants who fail to find jobs after staying in Papua for six months will have to leave the province. The provincial government also issues special ID cards for migrants.

Meanwhile, Bintuni Bay regency in West Papua is drafting a bylaw to restrict migration into the gas-rich region in order to protect indigenous people. However, many say it is discriminatory toward migrants.

Inside Indonesia - A disaster, but not genocide

Migration has caused many problems in Papua, but it is not part of a genocidal master plan

Stuart Upton

In the second of two pieces on demographic change in Indonesian Papua, Inside Indonesia here presents an analysis by Stuart Upton that suggests – in contrast to the first piece written by Jim Elmslie –there is little hard evidence to support claims of genocide in Papua.

Urban areas are where the population is most mixed, and where the best opportunities are Sergio Piumatti http://www.stockimagesnet.com/

The indigenous population of Papua has resisted Indonesian control from the start. Since the Dutch passed sovereignty over Papua to Indonesian hands in 1963 there has been recurrent violence in the territory, resulting from the heavy military presence there. The armed forces have committed many human rights abuses. These are well-documented and indisputable. What is problematic is how these and similar experiences are interpreted. Many people have claimed that this violence, along with attacks on Papuan culture and social structures, constitutes a program of genocide against the indigenous population. This emotive term has been widely used by both indigenous and Western activists in the last few years. However, the case in favour of using the term genocide to describe the Papuan situation is weak. It is also potentially damaging to the cause of positive change in Papua.

Demographic change

One of the common charges is that the Papuans are subject to genocide by stealth, in the form of migration by non-Papuan settlers. Through looking at the figures on lifetime migration and religious affiliation, the broad patterns of demographic change can be discerned. While there were issues with the coverage of the 2000 census, there have not been any substantiated claims that the statistical data have been manipulated for political reasons, and these figures remain our best guide for understanding population trends in Papua (by which I mean the two contemporary provinces of Papua and West Papua).

If there was genocide in Papua, we would expect the number of Papuans to be declining. The 2000 census recorded ethnic composition of the population, showing there were 1,460,000 Papuans in the province, up from 890,000 in 1971. The yearly growth rate of 1.7 per cent is only marginally less than that of Indonesia as a whole of 1.8 per cent. While Papuans made up only two-thirds of the province’s population in 2000, their numbers are only decreasing in relative terms.

The case in favour of using the term genocide to describe the Papuan situation is weak, and it is potentially damaging to the cause of positive change in Papua

Much of the eastern part of the archipelago, of which Papua is one part, has experienced significant economic development over the last three decades, prompting large numbers of migrants to move to these areas of growth using the improving transport system. Between 1971 and 2000, the population of Papua increased from just over 920,000 to nearly 2,440,000. This is a seemingly large increase but it is a population growth of only 3.1 per cent per year over these three decades, this rate being lower than other provinces in eastern Indonesia such as East Kalimantan (4.2 per cent) or Southeast Sulawesi (3.2 per cent). Papua is also not the only province to experience high levels of immigration, with the percentage of lifetime migrants in East Kalimantan in 2000 (35 per cent of the population) being far higher than in Papua (20 per cent). Put in their broader Indonesian context, population changes in Papua don’t look like genocide, they just look like part of the normal pattern of inter-island migration.

Papua is also not the only province to experience high levels of immigration, with the percentage of lifetime migrants in East Kalimantan being far higher than in Papua

Migration was an important factor from the first few years after the Dutch left and the Indonesians took over. Initially there was an influx of Indonesians taking the higher level public service positions. By 1971 there were over one thousand tertiary educated Indonesians in the province (mostly from Java) compared to less than 100 Papuans educated to this level. This was a blow for the Papuan elites because the government was the dominant employer. There were also some transmigrants settled in Papua prior to the so-called Act of Free Choice in 1969 (surely an indication that Indonesia had every expectation that the vote would go the way they intended).

Transmigration and military violence

There were relatively low levels of migration through the 1970s, unsurprising for such a remote part of the nation, with the 1980s bringing settlers from Java due to increasing transmigration projects. The figure of 90,000 migrants in 1980 rose to 260,000 by 1990. The settlement of transmigrants along the PNG border was a government attempt to cement the incorporation of Papua into the nation. Since then, transmigration has ceased to be a major factor in demographic change. The importance of this program diminished in the 1990s with the rising number of self-financed migrants from Sulawesi and Maluku taking advantage of the improving shipping system. It is hard to accurately estimate the proportion of migrants who have arrived through the transmigration program but they probably represent less than a third of migrants overall. The transmigration program was finally halted in 2000.

Instead, the great majority of newcomers were not part of the transmigration program and came to settle in the towns and cities along the coast with little or no government assistance. The chief force bringing them to Papua has not been government policy but instead pull migration for economic reasons, with the migrants mainly coming from eastern Indonesia, particularly Sulawesi and Maluku. In urban areas, migrants from these areas made up 23 per cent of the population compared to 12 per cent from Java in 2000. The impression on the ground is that the proportion of migrants from Eastern Indonesia is rising.

Another common accusation is that the Indonesian military has been responsible for so many attacks on the population that they amount to attempted genocide. But genocidal actions would be expected to lead to gaps in the population statistics such as missing men in particular age groups. My analysis of the figures from all the censuses carried out in the province shows no evidence of such gaps. There are low male-female ratios for the 20-29 year age group but these low ratios do not carry over to older age groups in later censuses. It seems that young men are simply not being counted in the census, possibly due to their avoidance of government agencies or through difficulties in the administration of the census. Similar issues with counting young men were encountered by the statisticians in charge of the latest census in Britain.

Genocidal military actions would be expected to lead to gaps in the population statistics, but my analysis of the figures from all the censuses carried out in the province shows no evidence of such gaps

For particular ethnic groups who have been the victims of violence from the military, such as the highland Dani, the 2000 census did not show evidence of men missing on a large scale. Additionally, there are no large decreases in population figures in particular districts which would point to massacres of whole villages in these areas. All this is not to deny that there have been serious human rights abuses, but it seems they have not been on such a scale as to leave their mark on the population records.

Explaining the charges of genocide

A glimpse of houses in the transmigrant settlement in Babo Bintuni, founded 23 years ago Iskandar Nugraha

The figures show that many of the provinces across Eastern Indonesia have experienced massive demographic change, change that has impacted greatly on the indigenous populations. So why are there suggestions of genocide in Papua but not in East Kalimantan or other eastern provinces? The reasons behind this are complex but involve the lower level of commitment to the Indonesian nation felt by Papuans, partly as a result of the separation of Papua from the new nation of Indonesia following the Pacific War. With the Dutch holding on to this half of New Guinea until 1962, an indigenous elite with an expectation of separate independence was born. The dashing of this hope by the Cold War politics of the time created resentment and little commitment to Indonesian nationalism.

There is also a subtext of racism implicit in much of the discussion of the genocide issue from both sides. Papuans suggest that they could never be part of Indonesia due to differences in skin colour (they are dark, Indonesians are light) or hair type (they have curly hair, Indonesians have straight hair). Such reliance on physical appearance in marking national identity – a racialist assumption of a sort that is repudiated these days in many parts of the world – is itself a response to the negative attitudes, including racist stereotyping, that many Indonesians show towards Papuans.

The charges of genocide also stem from Papuan social disadvantage. Migration patterns have indeed contributed to this disadvantage. The influx of economic migrants has impacted greatly on the indigenous populace, blocking them from gaining better education and employment in the coastal towns. Only one in five migrants in these towns are from another area of Papua, with the rest being migrants from outside the province. With most industries located along the coast, the better-educated migrants settling in these areas have tended to get the jobs in higher status sectors. For example, in the cities non-indigenous people are four times more likely to have jobs as traders than indigenous people. Overall, migrants hold more than 90 per cent of the lucrative jobs in trading.

The figures for rural areas are even more striking, with non-indigenous people being 16 times more likely to work in the trade sector than Papuans. Ethnic connections are important for getting jobs in Indonesia, and in helping migrants to establish themselves in towns. With few indigenous businesspeople, Papuans can’t use ethnic affiliation to obtain employment. The indigenous population continues to work in agriculture in rural areas, with the majority still in subsistence farming and only peripherally engaged with the modern economy.

Along with the majority of employment possibilities, the coastal urban areas have the best education opportunities. Illiteracy is only four per cent in the migrant-dominated capital Jayapura but it is nearly 60 per cent in the rural highlands of Jayawijaya. Migrants are more than twice as likely as indigenous people to have finished secondary school, and five times more likely to have tertiary qualifications. The poor standards of education in the areas where Papuans live, the distances between villages and schools (especially secondary schools), and financial obstacles to regular school attendance mean that many indigenous children do not obtain the education necessary to compete for employment.

The results of all these factors are that indigenous people have little chance of migrating to the towns, are unable to compete in the job market and do not see their children getting an education that will enable them to compete in the future. Rather than simply being the result of human rights abuses in the province, the current sense of a shared Papuan identity is more the result of the marginalisation of the indigenous people, and the understandable resentment and jealousy felt by this group towards the economic success of the newcomers.

With little realistic prospect of independence, working with the Indonesian side to implement policies to reduce corruption and the power of the military in Papua would be a vital first step to create trust in the government among the indigenous population

With little realistic prospect of independence, working with the Indonesian side to implement policies to reduce corruption and the power of the military in Papua would be a vital first step to create trust in the government among the indigenous population. In the longer term, policies to address the poor education standards of Papuans, assist indigenous small-businesses and enable more equality in employment are needed.

The claims of genocide in the province are mistaken and misleading. Such dramatising of the situation in Papua is only likely to result in the alienation of those Indonesian groups who are in a position to implement meaningful change. The ‘Papua Road Map ’ drawn up by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences suggests that some in the Indonesian academic community are willing to embrace such change. Let us hope that there are those in the bureaucracy and the military who can do the same in the future. ii

Stuart Upton (suptons@optusnet.com.au) completed his PhD about migration in Papua at the University of New South Wales in 2009.

HRW Report - "What Did I Do Wrong"

"What Did I Do Wrong?"

Papuans in Merauke Face Abuses by Indonesian Special Forces

June 24, 2009

This 16-page report documents how Kopassus soldiers operating in the town of Merauke, in Indonesia’s easternmost province of Papua, arrest Papuans without legal authority, and beat and mistreat those they take back to their barracks.

Kopassus’ record of human rights violations and its failure to hold the abusers accountable spans its operations across Indonesia, particularly since the 1970s in East Timor, Aceh, Papua, and Java. Human Rights Watch urged the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia to withhold training from Kopassus until serious efforts are made to investigate and hold abusive soldiers accountable.

Read the Press Release

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Table of Contents

• “What Did I Do Wrong?”
• I. Summary
• II. Kopassus: A History of Abuse
• III. Kopassus Beatings and Abuses in Merauke
• IV. Recommendations
• V. Acknowledgments

Southeast Asia Briefs #1

Transforming Timor-Leste for Sustainable Development (upcoming conference organized by Victoria University and Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at UNTL)
http://www.vu.edu.au/sites/default/files/faehd/pdfs/East-Timor-Reg-Form.pdf

Lone Planet East Timor Travel Guide (new edition now on sale)
http://shop.lonelyplanet.com/Primary/Region/ASIA/South_East_Asia/East_Timor/PRD_PRD_1985/East+Timor+Travel+Guide.jsp

East Timor Parliament Approves Law Allowing Emergency Abortions (news)
http://easttimorlegal.blogspot.com/2009/06/parliament-approves-law-allowing.html

Illegal VSAT Antennas Ordered Switched Off by Timor Telecommunications Regulator (news)
http://easttimorlegal.blogspot.com/2009/06/illegal-vsat-antennas-ordered-switched.html

East Timor Government Says Fretilin Has Presented No Social or Fiscal Policies to the Nation (press release)
http://easttimorlegal.blogspot.com/2009/06/east-timor-government-says-fretilin-has.html

Pidato Presiden Barack Obama: Permulaan yang Baru
http://jakarta.usembassy.gov/bhs/siaran-pers/June09/obama_remarks_id.html

Cultural Identity of Buleleng (upcoming conference)
http://northbali.org/

Gramedia Toko Buku Online (the major online bookseller in Indonesia)
http://www.gramediaonline.com/

Indonesia: Stop Prison Brutality in Papua (critical analysis)
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/04/indonesia-stop-prison-brutality-papua

Email Puts Indonesia's Harsh Defamation Laws in Dock (news)
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4370984-5168-11de-84c3-00144feabdc0.html

Sex Trafficking in Singapore (blog)
http://singabloodypore.rsfblog.org/archive/2009/06/05/sex-trafficking-in-singapore.html

PAS Finding Its Way Still (analysis)
http://www.aliran.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=932:pas-

PM Abhisit Calls Urgent Meeting on Southern Unrest (news)
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/145148/pm-to-chair-meeting-on-southern-unrest

Finding It Hard to Explain Southern Arrest Abroad (news)
http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/17919/finding-it-hard-to-explain-southern-unrest-abroad

WhatAils Filipino Education? (analysis)
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2009/june/04/yehey/opinion/20090604opi4.html