Showing posts with label Timor-Leste. Show all posts

May 20, 2010

Timor-Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian Border - International Crisis Group

Asia Briefing Nº104 20 May 2010

This overview is also available in Tetum, Portuguese and Indonesian.

OVERVIEW

Indonesia and Timor-Leste have done much to normalise relations ten years after the end to Indonesian rule in the former province, but the goodwill between capitals is not yet matched by full cooperation on the border. The costs are greatest in Oecusse, Timor-Leste’s isolated enclave inside Indonesian West Timor. Negotiators have so far failed to agree on two segments of Oecusse’s border, leaving open the risk that minor local disputes could be politicised and escalate into larger conflicts. Without a final demarcation, steps to improve management of the porous border have stalled. Initiatives that would promote exchanges and lessen the enclave’s isolation remain unimplemented. As the bonds between the two nations grow, they should prioritise this unfinished business. Leaving it unresolved can only promote crime, corruption and the possibility of conflict.

The security threat to Oecusse and its 67,000 inhabitants has sharply decreased since independence. While the unresolved border segments remain a catalyst for occasional tensions, no violence has taken place in recent years. Settlement of the border issue requires both national and local responses. The governments must work with renewed urgency to resolve the remaining disputed segments. Whatever border is agreed will not satisfy everyone. To alleviate this discontent, local arrangements for cross-border activities should be promoted. Without such flexibility, long-standing local disputes will fester and could escalate into active conflict.

Beyond security threats, the two countries face a range of border management challenges over the movement of people and goods. Though the enclave has remained politically distinct for several hundred years, links remain strong between families divided by the border. They cross regularly for marriages and funerals. Some even farm land in the other country. Isolated from the rest of Timor-Leste, residents depend on cheap goods from Indonesia.

Informal arrangements have served to facilitate movement of goods and people in the absence of a sustainable system that would promote rather than criminalise local traffic, but these are often put on hold when border tensions rise, increasing Oecusse’s vulnerability. Both countries are establishing civilian border management agencies that may help accommodate local interests in the medium term, but they are still months, if not years away. Unresolved issues regarding accountability for the violence around the 1999 referendum and the subsequent large-scale displacement across the border pose challenges that are more political than security-oriented. Their resolution is a prerequisite for the enclave’s long-term stability.

While Oecusse’s viability in the years following independence was once questioned – chiefly by foreign observers – such concerns underestimated the strong sense of Timorese identity in the enclave and overestimated the threat from former Indonesia-era militia on the other side of the border. Investment by the central government has increased, sending a message of Dili’s commitment to the enclave. While welcomed by residents, such efforts start from a low base. Infrastructure remains poor, access to information limited and the ability to deliver government services low. Nationwide decentralisation was to have given this district the autonomy to determine some of its own cross-border affairs, but the process has stalled at national level. Timor-Leste’s leadership should consider uncoupling Oecusse’s regional development from the broader process and look for ways to provide means and funds to promote direct cross-border cooperation.

As Indonesia and Timor-Leste work on being good neighbours, they should focus on concrete actions that improve life for the people and lessen the risk of conflict on both sides of the border. While Indonesian doctrine means a significant decrease in security forces on the border is unlikely in the near term, demilitarisation of the frontier should remain on the agenda as a long-term goal that would truly reflect normal relations. Immediate steps that should be taken include:

finalising demarcation of the border as a matter of priority;
formalising arrangements for efficient communications between government and security forces on both sides of the border and at all levels, so as to create avenues for quick de-escalation of future incidents;
increasing cooperation between the two countries’ military and police, including training and exchange of attachés;
introducing the long-discussed border pass system for citizens of both countries and implementing the initiative for joint border markets that would facilitate both commercial and social exchange; and
improving the training, equipment, and facilities of Timor-Leste’s border patrol unit.

May 11, 2010

Development in the shadows : how the World Bank and the Frente Clandestina almost built a new government in Timor-Leste

Image via Wikipedia

Show full item record

Citable URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50109

Preview, non-printable (open to all)	21.44Mb	application/pdf
Full printable version (MIT only)	21.44Mb	application/pdf

Title:	Development in the shadows : how the World Bank and the Frente Clandestina almost built a new government in Timor-Leste
Author:	Totilo, Matthew Alan
Other Contributors:	Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning.
Advisor:	Judith Tendler.
Department:	Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning.
Publisher:	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Issue Date:	2009
Abstract:	The failures of post-violent conflict development projects have so far outweighed the successes. In response, international aid organizations have deepened and broadened their dedication to state-building projects across all aspects of institution-building, to include economic, social and political. I chose to examine the implications of this commitment by looking at Timor-Leste's first local governance project and studying the relationship between its two main actors: the World Bank and the National Council of Timorese Resistance. While largely panned as a failure by NGOs, donor organizations and the government of Timor-Leste itself, this project brought the traditional local leadership closer to having a true role in governance than similar efforts by any other actor working in Timor-Leste. A historical analysis of the application of traditional Timorese relationships with outsiders reveals parallel stories of similar partnerships. When in Timor, local leaders described to me an interesting story in the Frente Clandestina, the resistance movement that formed the core of Timor-Leste's proto-government structure. Counterintuitively, this organization was built on a foundation of weak relationships and distrust in order to function as an effective military logistical operation fighting an occupation government. This challenges the literature on social capital, social cohesion and trust which inadequately describes its relevance to recent events. (cont.) Unfortunately, the collapse of this project demonstrates that divergent agendas, inaccurate assumptions about state-building by the international community, and the misuse of terminology such continues to be a fundamental problem. Outbreaks of violence in recent years have highlighted the problems of ineffective institutional construction. Timor-Leste was hailed as a model state "built from scratch", but those rosy predictions have not endured. Its first 10 years of independence can teach us a lot about the principles of legitimacy, democracy and dignity in the post-violent conflict development experience of building institutions.
Description:	Thesis (M.C.P.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 2009. "June 2009." Includes bibliographical references (p. 95-101).
URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50109
Keywords:	Urban Studies and Planning.

Oct 7, 2009

SSRN-From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine and East Timorese Policy Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front (Mnlf) and Falintil Combatants into the Armed Forces by Rosalie Hall

Image via Wikipedia

Hall, Rosalie A., From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine and
East Timorese Policy Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front
(Mnlf) and Falintil Combatants into the Armed Forces (2009). APSA 2009
Toronto Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450242

Full-text is downloadable free.

Abstract:

The Philippines and East Timor are two countries whose governments have
integrated ex-insurgents into their regular armed forces and police. In the
Philippines, the arrangement to integrate 5,000 rebels came out of the final
peace agreement signed between the government and the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996. The MNLF integrees were mixed into the
regular police and military units deployed in conflict areas in Mindanao.
The East Timorese case, on the other hand, involved the in-take of
ex-Falintil combatants into the newly created state military within the
framework of demobilization and disarmament. Previous studies on security
sector reform point to the shortcomings in training and military
organizational culture for units with ex-rebels in the ranks. Integration
policy both as a peace strategy and a security sector reform initiative is
problematized in view of the gender-blind assumptions behind it and
differential economic benefits it confers. The politicized nature of the
policy itself--that is, the negotiations between international actors and
local stakeholders over the decision to integrate, who to select and the
concomitant consequences of this decision to security force composition and
professionalism invite theorizing. This paper is based on a comparative
research project funded by Toyota Foundation's Southeast Asian Regional
Exchange Program, which examines and compares the policy behind the
selection, training, placement and utilization of rebel-integrees into the
East Timor Defense Force (FDTL) and the Philippine army to respond to
internal security challenges. It probes how international actors (the United
Nations, donors, third parties and neighbors), national/local political
authorities and civil society representatives informed the policies. The
gendered assumptions made by those who crafted the integration policy will
also be looked at. In addition, the research will examine how identity
markers (in the Philippine case, religion; in East Timor, ethnicity) inform
the ways in which the ex-rebels function inside the armed forces. The
implication of the integration policy into the future prospects for peace in
both countries will also be explored.

Keywords: rebel integration, military merger, Falintil, Moro National
Liberation Front

Sep 30, 2009

October 2009Timor-Leste - Security Council Report

Expected Council Action • Key Recent Developments • Human Rights-Related Developments • Key Issues • Options • Council Dynamics • UN Documents • Other Relevant Facts • Additional Useful Sources • Other SCR Reports on Timor-Leste

Expected Council Action
No Council decisions on Timor-Leste are expected in October, but the Council is likely to receive a briefing from the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Timor-Leste, Atul Khare.

At press time the Secretary-General’s progress report on the activities of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was expected by 30 September. As requested in resolution 1867 (which in February extended UNMIT’s mandate until 26 February 2010), the report will update the Council on the transfer of policing responsibility from UNMIT to the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL). Khare may also brief on the village (suco) and sub-village (aldeia) elections for chiefs and councils due on 9 October.
top • full forecast

Key Recent Developments
The 10^th anniversary of the UN-organised referendum that led to Timor-Leste’s independence was marked on 30 August. In remarks to the press, the president of the Council said the Council commended the people and government of Timor-Leste on their efforts towards peace, stability and development. In Timor-Leste Khare said that “in the last 10 years, Timor-Leste had achieved significant progress in the areas of consolidation of the institutions of democracy, respect for human rights”. He noted the development of the police and the local military, but added that “the road ahead is still long.”

In a report released on 27 August, Amnesty International warned the Council that there was a need for a long-term comprehensive plan to end impunity for crimes in Timor-Leste. It proposed that an international criminal tribunal be set up with jurisdiction over all crimes committed in Timor-Leste between 1975 and 1999. There are 400 outstanding arrest warrants issued by the Serious Crimes Unit, originally set up within the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) in 1999.

Timor-Leste President José Ramos-Horta, speaking on the 10^th anniversary of the referendum, rejected the idea of an international tribunal and said it was time for the UN to disband the Serious Crimes Unit.

The impunity issues were highlighted on 30 August with the release of Martenus Bere, who had been indicted in 2003 by the Serious Crimes Unit on charges of crimes against humanity, including the Suai church massacre in September 1999. Bere had been detained in Timor-Leste on 8 August. However, a top Indonesian official invited to participate in the 10^th anniversary celebration refused to enter the country if Bere remained in custody. A spokesperson for the Secretary-General has said Bere’s release is contrary to resolution 1704, which set up UNMIT in 2006, and conflicted with the UN’s position of no amnesty or impunity for crimes against humanity. Timor-Leste’s Supreme Court is investigating the case to determine if Bere’s release violated the constitution.

The gradual resumption of policing responsibilities by the PNTL started in 14 May. It had been halted in 2008 due to the security situation following the dual assassination attempt against the country’s president and prime minister. So far the UN Police have transferred to the PNTL control of three of Timor-Leste’s 13 districts. In September the PNTL took over an UN-supported police training centre in Dili. The criteria that had to be fulfilled included: the PNTL being able to respond appropriately to the security environment; final certification of at least 80 percent of eligible officers; availability of initial operational logistical requirements; institutional stability; and mutual respect between the military and the national police.

Council activities in the first half of the year included an open debate of the Secretary-General’s report on 19 February, the renewal of UNMIT’s mandate on 26 February and a private meeting on 27 May with troop-contributing countries to discuss the updating of the concept of operations and rules of engagement for UNMIT.
top • full forecast

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 13 March the Secretary-General’s Representative on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Walter Kalin, reported to the Human Rights Council on the situation in Timor-Leste (amongst other countries). Kalin commended the government for voluntarily closing the majority of the IDP camps established during the 2006 crisis. The return of IDPs from the Metinaro camp will bring more than 13,500 to the total number of families who have received recovery or reintegration packages under the National Recovery Strategy. This leaves 2,480 individuals remaining in transitional shelters.

Kalin identified a number of ongoing challenges: addressing the underlying causes of violence and displacement, redressing prevailing impunity, adopting a land and property law in order to resolve and prevent further land disputes and adjusting compensation packages to assist the most vulnerable, including those with no place of return.

The UN’s third human rights report on Timor-Leste, covering July 2008 through June 2009, was published on 15 September. The report said that Timor-Leste had made progress in key human rights areas such as the strengthening of the judicial system and adherence to the rule of law, but still had work to do in the area of accountability.

top • full forecast

Key Issues
A key challenge for the Council is factoring the specific needs of Timor-Leste into its overall approach to peacekeeping, represented in its most recent review in an August presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/24).

A related issue is finding ways incorporate more peacebuilding elements into UNMIT’s work in light of paragraph 9 of that statement.

Recent history shows the risks in Timor-Leste of the Council and UNMIT being lulled into a sense of security. Ensuring that UNMIT retains an effective oversight function in the districts transferred to the PNTL may be a key issue.

Developments in the Bere case and the response to the Amnesty International proposal suggest that accountability for past human rights violations will continue to be a serious issue. Bere’s release to the Indonesian government may feed underlying discontent among some sectors of the Timor-Leste population about continuing impunity for crimes committed over the years.
top • full forecast

Options
The most likely option is a general discussion in the Council of the situation in Timor-Leste, particularly progress in the handing over of policing responsibilities to the PNTL.

Possible options include:

initiating expert-level discussions on possible adjustments to UNMIT’s mandate and strength leading to the February 2010 expiry of the mandate;
requesting the Core Group to provide Council members with recommendations on how to better involve UNMIT in peacebuilding as well as peacekeeping; and
issuing a press statement emphasising the need to see concrete progress in developing a national security policy and reminding the Timor-Leste government of its pending accountability and justice obligations.

top • full forecast

Council Dynamics
Timor-Leste struggles to get priority attention from most Council members. The apparently stable security situation again leads most members into feeling that things are moving in the right direction. In the last debate most members welcomed the benchmarks and the positive assessment of the overall situation.

Members are interested in Khare’s assessment of the transfer of policing responsibility to the PNTL in the three districts and the prospects for it to continue smoothly for the next ten. But members are not currently expecting any surprises from the report that would require them to make any immediate decisions.

Japan is the lead country on Timor-Leste.
top • full forecast

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

S/RES/1867 (26 February 2009) extended UNMIT until 26 February 2010.
S/RES/1704S/RES/1704 (25 August 2006) established UNMIT.

Latest Report of the Secretary-General

S/2009/72 (4 February 2009)

Other

S//PV.6086 (26 February 2009) was on the adoption of resolution 1867.
S/PV.6085 (19 February 2009) was the last Council debate on Timor-Leste.

top • full forecast

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Atul Khare (India)

Size, Composition and Cost

Maximum authorised strength: up to 1,748 police and 34 military officers\
Size as of 31 July 2009: 1,582 police and 33 military liaison officers
Civilian staff as of 31 July 2009: 364 international and 880 local, 170 UN Volunteers
Key police contributors: Malaysia, Portugal, Bangladesh and Pakistan
Approved budget (1 July 2009–30 June 2010): $205.94 million

Duration

25 August 2006 to present; mandate expires 26 February 2010

International Stabilisation Force

Size as of 1 July 2008: approximately 920 troops
Contributors: Australia (750 troops) and New Zealand (170 troops)

top • full forecast

Additional Useful Sources

‘We Cry for Justice’, Impunity Persists 10 Years On in Timor-Leste, Amnesty International, August 2009

Sep 27, 2009

"If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die":
How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor
Geoffrey Robinson

Cloth | February 2010 | $35.00 / £24.95
340 pp. | 6 x 9 | 22 halftones.

Shopping Cart | Endorsements | Table of Contents
Chapter 1 [PDF]

This is a book about a terrible spate of mass violence. It is also about a rare success in bringing such violence to an end. "If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die" tells the story of East Timor, a half-island that suffered genocide after Indonesia invaded in 1975, and which was again laid to waste after the population voted for independence from Indonesia in 1999. Before international forces intervened, more than half the population had been displaced and 1,500 people killed. Geoffrey Robinson, an expert in Southeast Asian history, was in East Timor with the United Nations in 1999 and provides a gripping first-person account of the violence, as well as a rigorous assessment of the politics and history behind it.

Robinson debunks claims that the militias committing the violence in East Timor acted spontaneously, attributing their actions instead to the calculation of Indonesian leaders, and to a "culture of terror" within the Indonesian army. He argues that major powers--notably the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom--were complicit in the genocide of the late 1970s and the violence of 1999. At the same time, Robinson stresses that armed intervention supported by those powers in late 1999 was vital in averting a second genocide. Advocating accountability, the book chronicles the failure to bring those responsible for the violence to justice.

A riveting narrative filled with personal observations, documentary evidence, and eyewitness accounts, "If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die" engages essential questions about political violence, international humanitarian intervention, genocide, and transitional justice.

Geoffrey Robinson is professor of history at the University of California, Los Angeles. His books include The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali. Before coming to UCLA, he worked for six years at Amnesty International's headquarters in London. From June to November 1999, he served as a political affairs officer with the United Nations in Dili, East Timor. Robinson lives in Los Angeles with his wife and daughter.

Endorsements:

"Those of us with a special interest in the final frenzy of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor will be deeply grateful to Geoffrey Robinson for the narrative power and depth of insight that makes his book the outstanding treatment of these events. But the value of his book goes far beyond that: as a historian who has thought deeply about political violence, as a human rights practitioner familiar with the ways of states and institutions that perpetrate and condone massive human rights abuses, and as a reflective participant in the UN mission that oversaw the referendum on East Timor's independence, Robinson is uniquely qualified to bring out the wider meanings of what happened in East Timor in 1999, and triumphantly succeeds in doing so."--Anthony Goldstone, coeditor of Chega!: Final Report of the East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation

"In this outstanding book, Robinson provides an authoritative and gripping account of the violence visited upon East Timor by the Indonesian Armed Forces that is unparalleled in documentation, sophistication, and insight. His appraisal of the conditions enabling the belated United Nations intervention in East Timor is likewise unrivalled in its combination of scholarly analysis and insider insights."--John Sidel, London School of Economics and Political Science

"This is the single most important book about the complex and dramatic events of 1999 in East Timor. Combining a scholarly analysis of violence with first-person reporting, it provides a profound and nuanced understanding of recent East Timorese history."--John Roosa, University of British Columbia

Table of Contents:

Preface ix
List of Abbreviations xv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER TWO: COLONIAL LEGACIES 21
CHAPTER THREE: INVASION AND GENOCIDE 40
CHAPTER FOUR: OCCUPATION AND RESISTANCE 66
CHAPTER FIVE: MOBILIZING THE MILITIAS 92
CHAPTER SIX: BEARING WITNESS--TEMPTING FATE 115
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE VOTE 139
CHAPTER EIGHT: A CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE 161
CHAPTER NINE: INTERVENTION 185
CHAPTER TEN: JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 205
CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 229
Notes 249
A Note on Sources 295
Bibliography 297
Index 313

Sep 4, 2009

Archives in Timor-Leste, 2009: Summary update - Timor Archives

Image via Wikipedia

My brief on-the-ground exploration of archival developments in Timor-Leste during August leaves me both encouraged and bewildered.

Encouraged because the interest in archival matters I found in Dili in 2003 continues, unabated, to drive several interesting institutional developments and encouraged by the very strong interest in Timor archival materials being held in Australia.

Bewildered by the funding, building, training and personnel difficulties that all archives in Timor face, the uncertainties of government decision-making processes and what seems, in part, a rather negative competitiveness between some developing archival projects.

More on all that later. For now, here is a taste of what Cecily Gilbert and I managed to learn in a few short days in the very busy run-up to the 10th anniversary of the decisive independence ballot of 30 August 1999.

Arquivo Nacional
The National Archive, created to hold past and current government records, was established in the early years after independence. Since 2003 the Arquivo has been allocated a building, but does not yet appear to be a major government priority. A sizeable collection of Portuguese-era administrative records are held in reasonable storage conditions but the Arquivo does not have sufficient storage space to properly house a large volume of seemingly unexamined Indonesia-era administrative records. Transfers of independence-era government records have just begun. There does not appear to be any available listings of collection holdings and public access to the collection remains in planning stages. A detailed legislative basis for the Arquivo Nacional’s existence and function, in draft form in 2003, has yet to be adopted. It’s too early to know the likely outcome of internal government discussion about possibly co-locating the Arquivo Nacional with the planned National Library; the current Director of the Arquivo doesn’t think much of this idea.

CAVR
Materials collected in Timor as evidence for the monumental ‘Chega’ report form the centre-piece of the archives of East Timor’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). Since CAVR’s wind-up in 2005, the Post-CAVR Secretariat has managed the archive, notably conducting a copy program funded under the British Library’s Endangered Archives Programme whereby digital copies of original materials are held in London for preservation and (later) access purposes. Both paper and audio-visual materials are currently housed in reasonable archival conditions. Preservation copying of a large collection of audio-tapes of victim statements and other interviews is an important future task which will require significant resources. Access to the archives is possible with applications considered on a case by case basis but is somewhat hampered by incomplete documentation on collection content. Planning for a successor institution is well-developed but currently stalled by Parliament’s continued delay in formally considering the recommendations of Chega. The proposed institution includes a human rights documentation centre based on the existing archive and acquisition of related material from abroad.

Centro Audiovisual Max Stahl Timor Leste (CAMSTL)
Currently housed in part of the Independence Memorial Hall in Farol and directed by the inimitable Max Stahl. In addition to holding historical footage from the occupation years, CAMSTL maintains an active program of recording, for the historical record, video of current events and interviews on Timorese experience of occupation. Timorese employees are trained in camera work, editing and archival procedures and work with volunteers to transcribe all spoken words in footage held. CAMSTL has created a number of films for sale on DVD. Max Stahl has recently concluded an agreement with INA, the French national audiovisual institute, to house archival copies of Timor footage for long term preservation and access. Detailed public listings of the content of CAMSTL are not yet available. We did not have time to learn more about the funding structure and long-term administrative and viability planning for CAMSTL.

National Library
The ‘new kid on the block’ in archival terms, a National Library is under very active consideration at the highest levels. Part-funded by an international donor, a building site has been allocated (but not yet made public), books and temporary storage space have been acquired, plans for appointing an international advisor, beginning staff training and conducting an international design competition are in progress. Planning is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, Virgilio Smith. It remains unclear to us what the final form of the National Library will be. The archival aspect arises from a declared interest by ministerial advisers to acquire for the Library Australian and other Timor solidarity archival materials from abroad and discussion about the possible co-location of the Arquivo Nacional (and other smaller archives mentioned here) with the new National Library. We found considerable resistance to this idea from some of the smaller archives.

Timorese Resistance Archive and Museum
Opened in 2005, the Timorese Resistance Archive and Museum (AMRT) is located near the current (temporary) National Parliament building and the National University. The building houses a selection of Falintil weapons, radios and other equipment along with informational posters and displays of resistance documents (copies). The archival centrepiece of the AMRT is a large collection of documents gathered from resistance figures and supporters inside East Timor from 2002 to the present. Many of the collected documents are currently held in Lisbon at the Mario Soares Foundation (FMS) which has digitised the materials. With the exception of some politically sensitive materials, the digitised copies are available internationally on the internet through the AMRT website (managed by FMS) and a dedicated standalone computer in the Museum building in Dili. Aware of some questions in Dili about the ownership and management of the AMRT, along with some disquiet about documents being kept in Lisbon, a Timorese representative board of management is under construction. Also under construction is an imminent expansion of the existing building to add secure, archival standard storage and work areas and commercial seminar, bookshop and cafe facilities to assist AMRT funding for the longer term.

There’s more, much more, to say about these and other archival matters inside Timor-Leste today. Keep an eye on the ‘Timorese Archives’ section of this blog over the coming month.

Sep 1, 2009

A new political generation rises in East Timor - Reuters

Image via Wikipedia

By Sunanda Creagh

DILI, Aug 30 (Reuters) - As a student activist in Jakarta, Avelino Coelho da Silva sought refuge in the Austrian embassy to avoid capture by Indonesian troops. Now as East Timor's Secretary of State for Energy Policy, he installs solar power in villages.

Coelho, 46, is likely to be among the next generation of leaders in the tiny, oil and gas-rich nation which voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia exactly a decade ago.

Both Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, 63, who was imprisoned by Indonesia, and President Jose Ramos-Horta, 59, who campaigned abroad to keep East Timor's struggle in the public eye, are independence heroes.

But a new generation of political leaders, most of whom were children or students during Indonesia's rule, is getting ready to take over.

A former Portuguese colony, East Timor was invaded in 1975 by Indonesia. An estimated 180,000 died during the occupation, and the U.N. estimates about 1,000 East Timorese died in the mayhem that surrounded the 1999 vote for independence.

Since then, Dili has struggled to tackle security, social and economic woes including high unemployment, splits in the army, and poor infrastructure, healthcare and education.

"If you look at other members of cabinet, I tell you, 80 to 85 percent are new generation. People no more than 35-45 years old, who grew up in the era of occupation. This is the new generation running the country. They are the hope of this country," said Ramos-Horta.

Damien Kingsbury, an East Timor analyst from Australia's Deakin University, said there are already several people in East Timor ready to take over the reins from Gusmao and Ramos-Horta.

"It's essentially the student generation, members of the student resistance organisations and expat Timorese who went back from Australia and Indonesia," Kingsbury said.

The next elections are due in 2012.

The challenges the new leaders face remain daunting. Many roads are just dirt and gravel, making communication with remote villages tough.

Almost 30 percent of the adult population is illiterate: the young men who hang around on Dili street corners are evidence of the 40 percent jobless rate in a country where average household monthly income is just $27. In parts of Dili, roadside stalls sell cast-off clothes to people who can't afford to buy them new.

Coelho's Rural Electrification Master Plan has brought electricity to 17 isolated villages in just over a year by installing solar power systems, funded by the government but owned, installed and maintained by community cooperatives.

"Now they have electricity for five to six hours a day. Before, they spent $US1 a day to buy kerosene but now they can save $US30 a month and use it for other things," he said.

Max Lane, a political analyst who covers Indonesia and East Timor, said the electrification project had helped build Coelho's reputation.

"There will be other candidates around when the big guys leave politics but Coelho will definitely be in the race."

NEW KIDS ON THE BLOCK

Ramos-Horta, who survived an assassination attempt in February 2008, said he sees Fernando Lasama de Araujo, the 46-year-old speaker of parliament, as a future leader.

Araujo, who got almost 20 percent of the vote in the 2007 presidential elections, was acting president for several months after Ramos-Horta was shot by disgruntled former soldiers. He was also involved in negotiations with the militants, who eventually laid down their arms.

Araujo, from the Democratic Party, says the government cannot just rely on its $5.1 billion Petroleum Fund, where money from oil and gas deals is collected, to fund development.

"We need to get the money from somewhere to accelerate development. I support foreign loans to achieve this," he said.

"After 10 years of independence, we should have achieved more than we have. Water is a very important one and roads, and schools. Until we build a port we cannot attract investors and tourism."

Finance Minister Emilia Pires, 48, who grew up and studied law in Australia, is another leader carving out a name for herself as she tries to increase spending on education, health and infrastructure. Pires is an independent, like some other cabinet members, and is close to Gusmao.

The economy grew 12.8 percent last year and she expects it to expand 8 percent both this year and next.

(For an interview, click on [ID:nJAK518967] )

Her predecessor, Fernanda Borges, an Australian-educated former credit risk analyst who helped set up the Central Payments Office, the forerunner of the Banking and Payments Authority, or central bank, is also considered a future leader.

Borges, 40, quit as finance minister in 2002 after accusing the government of corruption, and formed her own party, the National Unity Party.

East Timor ranked 145th out of 180 countries in Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index -- on a par with Kazakhstan and below Indonesia.

"I understand my limitations as a member of a small party. I know I don't have the resistance hero image behind me. But with three seats in parliament we can be a voice to say this is wrong and when the government is doing the right thing, we can say this is the right thing too," she told Reuters in an interview.

"We are the new kids on the block but people trust us. (Reporting by Sunanda Creagh in Dili; Editing by Sara Webb and Sanjeev Miglani)

Aug 27, 2009

General health in Timor-Leste: self-assessed health in a large household survey

Image via Wikipedia

Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health

Volume 33 Issue 4, Pages 378 - 383

Published Online: 4 Aug 2009

Jaya Earnest ¹ Robert P. Finger ²

¹ Centre for International Health, Curtin University of Technology, Western Australia ² Centre for International Health, Curtin University of Technology, Perth and Department of Ophthalmology, Bonn University, Bonn, Germany

Correspondence to:
Dr Jaya Earnest, Associate Professor and Postgraduate Research Co-ordinator, Centre for International Health, Curtin University of technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth WA, 6845. Fax: (08) 9266 2608; e-mail: J.Earnest@curtin.edu.au

KEYWORDS

health • Timor-Leste • self-assessed • conflict • displacement • migration

ABSTRACT

Objective: Timor-Leste is one of the world's newest nations and became a democracy in 2002. Ranked 150 out of 177 in the 2007 UNDP Human Development Index, the country has the worst health indicators in the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of this study was to collect and analyse data on subjectively assessed general health, health service use, migration and mobility patterns.

Methods: The data collection involved recording self-reported status of general health using a structured questionnaire. The survey was administered to 1,213 Timorese households in six districts using a multi-stage random cluster sampling procedure. Basic descriptive statistical analyses were performed on all variables with SPSS version 13.

Results: More than a quarter (27%) of respondents reported a health problem at the time of the survey. Only approximately half of respondents assessed their health to be good (53%) or average (38%). Barriers reported in the uptake of healthcare services were no felt needed; difficulty in accessing services and unavailability of service.

Conclusions: Results reveal that Timor-Leste needs a more decentralised provision of healthcare through primary healthcare centres or integrated health services. Trained traditional healers, who are familiar with the difficult terrain and understand cultural contexts and barriers, can be used to improve uptake of public health services. An adult literacy and community health education program is needed to further improve the extremely poor health indicators in the country.

Implications: Key lessons that emerged were the importance of understanding cultural mechanisms in areas of protracted conflict and the need for integrated health services in communities.

Aug 19, 2009

Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste.

Tuesday, 18 August 2009

Reforming the Security Sector :

Facing Challenges, Achieving Progress in Timor Leste
Júlio Tomás Pinto*

The idea to write the present article came about when I read the report by the investigation team assembled by the Government to study the "Maliana Case", the letter dated 3 July 2009 to the Prime Minister by the Representative of the Secretary General of the UN in Timor-Leste, Dr Atul Khare, on human rights violations by PNTL and the F-FDTL, and the report on the unilateral investigation carried out by UNPOL on this matter. My purpose in writing this article is to encourage a reflection on the approach taken by foreign personalities, agencies or countries in Timor-Leste regarding the reform of the security sector. Also, I am often puzzled with the carelessness displayed by many foreign reviewers who assess our work.

I ask the agencies listed in this article to take my words as food for thought rather than negative criticisms. I trust this article will contribute to strengthening cooperation between Timor-Leste and other countries, as well as between Timor-Leste and the UN.

The State of Timor-Leste, through the President of the Republic, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime-Minister, created last year a strictly Timorese team called Group for the Reform and Development of the Security Sector. It is expected that the Reform of the Security Sector will enable the development and consolidation of the existing agencies, so that they may perform their tasks with efficiency, legitimacy and accountability, thereby ensuring safety to all citizens. It would do well to remind that this reform of the Security Sector is directly linked to the Government's policy concerning the development of its Program. This is why the Group for the Reform of the Security Sector was assembled in the first place. As such, the team is coordinated by two Secretaries of State, namely the Secretary of State for Security and the Secretary of State for Defence.

The said team has been doing an excellent job along with the advisor to the President of the Republic, Dr Roques Rodrigues. The so-called High Level Meetings on the Reform of the Security Sector, where issues concerning the Reform of the Security Sector are debated, involve the President of the Republic, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister, in addition to the two Secretaries of State and some advisors. The UN has also put together a team to support Timor-Leste regarding the Reform of the Security Sector, under the cooperation agreement with the Government of Timor-Leste signed in June 2008. Despite positive reviews by some friends who think the program has been developing for the past year, I do believe that they do not have a Security Sector Reform implementation program. I feel that this is due to the fact that the UN only takes part in the context of "assistance" in conformity with is mandate, which would be important to understand in terms of a peacekeeping vs. peacebuilding dualistic analysis. Indeed, during this period the UN team has held a seminar, placed advisors at the Ministry of Defence and Security in a unilateral manner and has been carrying out mentoring and retraining actions in the PNTL. It seems that the mandate of the UN is only to work alongside with the Secretary of State for Security, particularly with the PNTL. Effectively, in the Sector of Defence it seems that they only work alongside us to speak about training in Human Rights, separation between the roles of the Police and of the Military, advisors and Military Liaison officer training. I myself have requested them to provide training to the F-FDTL in terms of Peacekeeping Forces, but so far no plan has been submitted to us.

When I, in my capacity as Secretary of State for the Defence, meet with a representative from the UN or any country, I tell them two things: firstly, that advisors must present me (in my capacity as Secretary of State and Timorese citizen) several options, as well as their negative and positive implications, so that I may make my decision. This means that no advisor can present me a single option and ask me to follow it, claiming it is the only possible choice.

If on one hand we live in the age of globalization, where the classic concept of State sovereignty has become dimmed, as a result of the need for transparency, cooperation and even the right of interference, where the Timorese sovereignty is limited to the Flag and the National Anthem, as well as some gestures of courage to make decisions without pressure by other States, on the other hand Timor-Leste is a small country but is nevertheless a sovereign State. Consequently its position in relation to any issue has the same value as that of any other State. Accordingly, other States must respect Timor-Leste as the sovereign Nation that it is.

Secondly, I always tell them that the development of the Sector of Defence must be based on bilateral cooperation. This is important for Timor-Leste to be able to set the military system format it wants to establish. This format surely does not include a myriad of different training actions provided by various countries. Should this come to pass, I do not know what the Timorese military system would become. This is why the F-FDTL command has decided that presently the basic military training provided is to be based on the Portuguese system, which is in accordance with the NATO standards, with the possibility of specialized training being based on the systems of other countries. The purpose of this is to provide uniform training so as to enable an efficient Timorese military system in the future. This is preferable to having each country implement its system in the F-FDTL, which would create considerable confusion.

Until 2007 Timor-Leste did not have a National Defence Law and there was no legal diploma approving the Organic of the Military Police. These are just two examples within the scope of legislative drafting. In this field, and in relation to the Sector of Defence, the Government is not required to announce what it is doing or to report to the UN. Nevertheless, we can summarize the reforms completed up until now:

Firstly, at a legislative level, we can highlight the Decree-Law approving the Organic of the Ministry of Defence and Security, the Draft National Security Law regulating the cooperation between the PNTL, the F-FDTL and Civil Protection, the revision of the Military Service Law and the Decree-Law on its regulation, the Draft National Defence Law and the Remuneration Regime for the F-FDTL; currently being prepared we have the Legal Regime for the Retirement of Soldiers, the Military Programming Law, the Military Justice Code and the Decree-Law on the Promotion to General in the F-FDTL. This Decree-Law is important because there have not been promotions from lieutenant-colonel to general for nine (9) years. Finally, the Secretariat of State for Defence, according to the Government Program, is preparing the necessary changes to the Defence Policy, in order to enable the implementation of the National Defence Law proposed to the Parliament.

Secondly, at a structural level, we highlight that the organic law of the Ministry of Defence and Security enables a clear distinction between the political level of defence and security, as a structure constituted by the Minister of Defence and Security, from the military level of the F-FDTL, as well as the autonomous structure that is the National Defence Institute (NDI).

Thirdly, at a training level, we highlight the definition of a Training System and Concept and the drafting of the new Employment Concept for the F-FDTL.

Fourthly, at an administrative level, the Secretariat of State for Defence has already achieved some goals, consubstantiating the legislative drafting process, particularly in changing the concept of recruitment from a mandatory to a voluntary one, improving the subsidies to the F-FDTL, improving the promotion regime for soldiers, implementing the Remuneration System for Soldiers and reviewing the size and capacity building required for the human resources of the Secretariat of State for Defence.

Fifthly, we must highlight the importance given by the Government to F-FDTL infrastructures and equipment. This is a relevant aspect, as previously FALINTIL worked in Aileu beneath canvases. Even when they were moved to Dili they continued to work in containers, and after the 2006 crisis they were transferred to Tasi Tolu, where they continued to work in containers. As such, it was considered important to repair the Military Training Centre of Metinaro. Also in relation to infrastructures, the Government requested financial assistance from China in order to construct the Headquarters and the Building for the Ministry of Defence. In conformity with this, the Chinese Government presented six months ago the project for the Headquarters and the Building for the Ministry of Defence to the Secretary of State for Defence, which was approved by the latter. Therefore the Headquarters for the F-FDTL is scheduled for construction in 2010. Furthermore, this bilateral cooperation with China will also include the construction of 100 houses for F-FDTL members starting next September.

Within the scope of infrastructures, the Government of Timor-Leste has already allocated an amount in last year's budget for constructing Warehouses, the Military Police Building and the Metinaro Armoury.

In addition to this, and according to a review made by Timor-Leste in relation to information on the problem caused by the entry of an enormous number of illegal fishermen in the Timor Sea, the Government has decided to acquire two patrol vessels from the Chinese company Poly Technology. In fact, the previous Government already had plans to purchase patrol vessels. In 2006 the Government had allocated a sum of 10 million dollars for purchasing the vessels, one million dollars for training and three hundred thousand dollars for fuel, but these amounts were suddenly removed by the 2006 mid-year budget. In 2007, responding to a letter by the F-FDTL, the then Prime Minister Dr José Ramos-Horta stated in a dispatch that the vessels might be acquired in 2008. The purpose of purchasing the vessels is firstly to provide resources to the F-FDTL, the Naval Component and other bodies. Secondly it seeks to enable control of the Timor Sea along with neighbouring countries, especially in the South Coast. Politically it seems positive for Timor-Leste to buy these two vessels.

In relation to bilateral cooperation, agreements were signed with Portugal and Canada. Timor-Leste is also discussing and reviewing agreements with Australia, Indonesia and other States wishing to cooperate with Timor-Leste.

Portugal and Australia are two particularly important States for Timor-Leste, as the existing reports indicated that they are the ones who invest more in our country's defence. We have always received support from Portugal, even during the Resistance.

The Portuguese support to Timor-Leste is based on a Technical and Military Cooperation Agreement that includes, inter alia, support through the provision of advisors to the Training Centre of Metinaro, the Naval Component in Hera and to the F-FDTL Headquarters. Presently a Portuguese Language Centre is being established in Metinaro. Portugal is also assisting in the assessment for border demarcation and maritime authority system for Timor-Leste. In addition, they are providing funding for the maintenance of the two vessels they previously offered to Timor-Leste. They have also offered training opportunities in Portugal for sergeants and officers.

Military cooperation with Australia is also very good. We should highlight Australia's assistance to Timor-Leste through the DCP (Defence Cooperation Program). A clear example of this is the Military Training Centre of Metinaro, where almost all the investment comes from Australia. On 17 April 2008 Timor-Leste and Australia held a forum called Defence Cooperation Talks, where both countries agreed on assistance to the construction of an armoury for the F-FDTL and to the construction of a Specialized Training Centre in the Training Centre of Metinaro. So far, however, only the latter has been completed.

On 26 June 2009 Timor-Leste and Australia met again within the scope of the Defence Cooperation Talks in order to review the 2008 Project and the new projects for 2010. Speaking for myself, I was happy to see that Australia wishes to continue providing assistance to Timor-Leste.

Cooperation with the United States of America is also clearly positive. On 18 August Dili will host a Military Conference between Timor-Leste and the United States of America, also designated as USA-Timor-Leste Bilateral Military Conference. Cooperation is also favourable with the US Command in the Pacific, and we find some agreement points for working together.

The experience with the United States of America has been a positive one, as almost all their activity in Timor-Leste has been approved by the Government, corroborating the idea that, as a sovereign State, any activity done by a foreign State, including the United States of America, must be authorized by the Timorese Government. Accordingly, the sending of US Navy vessels to carry out training exercises in our territory under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), existing between both countries since 2003, requires authorization by Timor-Leste. As such, and since the US plan foresees that 3,000 US marines will travel to Timor-Leste, it would be desirable for these training exercises to take place in coordination with the F-FDTL, in order to enable transfer of knowledge to the Timorese forces.

Once more, although Timor-Leste is a small State, it is nevertheless a sovereign Nation in the World, as evidenced by the cooperation ties it has built, including with neighbouring Indonesia. Indeed, in addition to the countries listed above, Timor-Leste has also improved its relationship with Indonesia. After the visit by the Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão and his entourage to Indonesia in 2008, this country allowed for the first time F-FDTL officers to attend the SESKO Angkatan Laut TNI in Surabaya. In 2010 the F-FDTL will send a senior officer to Jakarta, in order to attend the LEMHANNAS (National Defence Institute of Indonesia) in Jakarta. Furthermore, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak has already invited the Chief of the Defence Force of Indonesia to visit Timor-Leste later this year.

Regarding this matter, which is a recurrent one since we cooperate with so many countries, it is important to understand that we do not want to become militarily dependent from other States. This is why we believe it is convenient to cooperate with various countries in the World. As such we have a rather positive relationship with Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific islands and the ASEAN countries. We also have healthy relationships with China, the United States of America, Indonesia, Portugal and so many other countries.

Out of the several activities already mentioned, I would like to highlight the importance to Timor-Leste of the National Security Law and the National Defence Law, as they regulate the role of the President of the Republic as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, as well as the connection between the F-FDTL and the Secretary of State for Defence, the Prime Minister, the National Parliament and other holds of high public bodies. This is a particularly important matter as it helps the Government to "prevent anyone from politicizing the F-FDTL and prevent the F-FDTL to interfere in politics". Indeed, it strengthens the constitutional idea that the Armed Forces must be nonpartisan, according to the principle that "the F-FDTL understand politics but must not participate in political meetings or display their political convictions". I should stress that I learned a great deal during my work with the F-FDTL, as the commanders told me "not to give them anything that they were not supposed to do". This expression serves to show in a clear manner the justification for separating politics from the military establishment.

The National Security Law is also indispensible because it regulates cooperation between the F-FDTL, the PNTL and Civil Protection in emergency situations. In fact, the Organic Law of the Ministry of Defence and Security, which has already been approved, foresees an Integrated Crisis Management Centre. Therefore we must be organized to provide assistance to the population in emergency situations, e.g. caused by some natural disaster. Although I have received no such official information, rumours have it that the National Security Law is not appreciated by the UN, as they say it militarizes the police. I hope that this information is not accurate.

After receiving that information from some Timorese citizens, I told them that foreigners always think that what Timor-Leste does is wrong. Only others do things right. There are events from which we can conclude that Timor is always wrong and the UN is always right! Let us consider the crisis caused by the attack on the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. Some of the distinguished gentlemen of the UN conveyed to the media that the Timorese were in charge of security. Perhaps they forgot that so far there are two Police Commanders, one from the PNTL and the other from the UNPOL. And it is the UNPOL Commander who is in charge! It was only recently that responsibility was turned to the PNTL in three districts, namely Lospalos, Oecussi and Mantuto.

Let us consider another situation. When the Joint Command travelled to the airport to receive the petitioners arriving from Oecussi and the F-FDTL showed up with the weapons they had brought from the KKO HQ, the UNPOL drafted a report stating that the F-FDTL had threatened them with large calibre weapons. The inaccuracy of this report indicates that the authors forget that in a situation of martial law the military must always be prepared, in what one might call a "state of readiness".

Let us now consider the review of the recent events in Maliana. UNPOL presented a report stating that the F-FDTL breached human rights and threatened Philippine elements of the UNPOL by pointing weapons at their chests. After the High Level Meeting with the President of the Republic, the Government assembled a team to investigate the Maliana events. The team consisted of two officers from the State Ministry, Lieutenant-Colonel Koliati from the F-FDTL and Lieutenant Niki from the Military Police, international advisor Chandrabaland for the Secretariat of State for Defence, Inspector Domingos from the PNTL and Dr Anacleto Ribeiro from the Secretariat of State for Security. The investigation concluded that there was no indication of F-FDTL members having "pointed weapons at the chests of UNPOL members". As such it would seem that UNPOL presented an inaccurate report of the Maliana events, which can only serve the purpose of bringing discredit to the F-FDTL. However, the negative campaign to damage the image of F-FDTL continues. Notwithstanding the report from the investigation team, an article appeared in the Worldpoliticsreview.com entitled "East Timor: Security Sector Relapse?" in which it stated that "the domestic security situation improves in the months thereafter, but the police remained sub-ordinate to the army, which still involves itself in the internal security. According to eyewitnesses, UN Police attempts to intervene in a public order incident in Maliana in June 2009 near the Indonesian border, resulted in F-FDTL guns being pointed at the multinational Forces".

More recently, there was another case in the bar called "Casa Minha". Let us make a more detailed analysis of the event. Information from the police agent who was the victim and the youths who witnessed the event, affirmed that two drunken GNR members beat up the PNTL agent until he fell and for this reason the PNTL agent shot at the wheels of the GNR vehicle. UNPOL makes a report stating that the PNTL agent carried a pistol into the bar and fails to mention the intoxicated state of the GNRs.

This fact warranted the intervention of the PNTL General Commander, Longuinhos Monteiro, who strongly protested to the UNPOL Commissioner, Luís Miguel Carrilho who is from Portugal. Longuinhos Monteiro affirmed that "I ask that the two GNR members who beat up my agent be investigated thoroughly" (STL, 13 July 2009). What is known is that up until now the GNR members have been listed as unknown. Only more recently has there been an investigation initiated on this case, however, UNPOL has already issued a suspension notice to the victim, Police Agent Fransisco Magno HAU, while on the ather hand the GNR from UNPOL who beat up the victim are still free.

In relation to this case, the Portuguese newspaper Correio da Manha (16 July 2009), published inaccurate information in their article "Xanana's security leads an attack against the GNR" and the newspaper Noticias Lusofonia (16 July 2009) printed an article entitled "Xanana's Security Accused of Attacking Portuguese Military".

This is not the first time the GNR and UNPOL have violated human rights. We have the case of the PNTL agent, Constantino de Carvalho who was beaten up by the GNRs until he fell. We have the case of the Baucau PNTL Commander, Adérito Ximenes, whom the UNPOL accused of committing human rights violations against one of their members, but in the end, the Court of Appeal decided in favour of Commander Adérito and determined that the UNPOL member was wrong. We also have the case of the UIR Commander, Agostinho Gomes, whose intervention was aimed at resolving an incident at Manleuana Dili, however UNPOL accused him of human rights violations. Of course the UN wants to defend its reputation as UNPOL or UN but it forgets that it is not a "perfect" institution. If it had been a PNTL or F-FDTL member who was drunk and had beaten up others, perhaps the UN would have moved heaven and earth to produce a report in which they would have written a great deal on human rights. We always hear that alcohol, women and playing with guns do not go well together as they represent a security threat. On this matter we are all in full agreement as long as it does not apply only to the Timorese. In Australia, the military also apply this principle. But it seems that perhaps it does not apply to the UN! It is necessary to understand the fact that each of the interventions from each of the UNPOL countries has been uncoordinated and each has acted as they wanted.

The PNTL General Commander, Longuinhos Monteiro, is currently working to repair all that. What we do know is that if we compare the character, self-confidence and performance of some PNTL members with some UNPOL members, ours are much better. UNPOL members are controlled by politicians from their countries but they still want to teach our PNTL that they are better professionals than we.

CONCLUSION: We all move according to the principle of "wanting to do what we (Timor Leste) want, rather than what others want". Although Timor-Leste is a small country, we have our own history, conveyed from generation to generation. As such, the Timorese must be able to choose between foreign opinions, since it would be unwise to follow those that merely seek to serve the interests of those countries.

Despite the negative aspects of international cooperation listed above, this cooperation is still extremely important and requires better coordination between Timorese authorities, the UN and foreign experts so that the Security Sector Reform project can move forward. However, this requires honesty by all. The UN and we must think on how we can improve things.

All of us who work on reforming the Security Sector have the strong support of the President of the Republic, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister, seeking to enable the proper reform of the Security Sector of Timor-Leste. Here we should highlight the contributions of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, who have always given us the utmost support in order for us to be able to apply that which is written in the Constitution of the Republic.

Finally, under the principle of "we (Timor Leste) do it because we (Timor Leste) want to follow universal values, not because others tell us to", meaning that "we (Timor Leste) want to do what we (Timor Leste) want, rather than what others want", it is important to understand that the experience of other States should be just a reference to us, rather than trying to reproduce it. If we all want to implement the ideal concept of security sector reform, it is important to understand that it will necessarily take its time, as only so can we find what is good for Timor-Leste.

*Secretary of State for Defence

Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

Posted by TEMPO SEMANAL at 06:43

May 20, 2010

May 11, 2010

Oct 7, 2009

Sep 30, 2009

Sep 27, 2009

"If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die":How Genocide Was Stopped in East TimorGeoffrey Robinson

Sep 4, 2009

Sep 1, 2009

Aug 27, 2009

ABSTRACT

Aug 19, 2009

Tuesday, 18 August 2009

"If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die":
How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor
Geoffrey Robinson