Starting Points: East Timor

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May 20, 2010

Timor-Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian Border - International Crisis Group

Asia Briefing Nº104 20 May 2010

This overview is also available in Tetum, Portuguese and Indonesian.

OVERVIEW

Indonesia and Timor-Leste have done much to normalise relations ten years after the end to Indonesian rule in the former province, but the goodwill between capitals is not yet matched by full cooperation on the border. The costs are greatest in Oecusse, Timor-Leste’s isolated enclave inside Indonesian West Timor. Negotiators have so far failed to agree on two segments of Oecusse’s border, leaving open the risk that minor local disputes could be politicised and escalate into larger conflicts. Without a final demarcation, steps to improve management of the porous border have stalled. Initiatives that would promote exchanges and lessen the enclave’s isolation remain unimplemented. As the bonds between the two nations grow, they should prioritise this unfinished business. Leaving it unresolved can only promote crime, corruption and the possibility of conflict.

The security threat to Oecusse and its 67,000 inhabitants has sharply decreased since independence. While the unresolved border segments remain a catalyst for occasional tensions, no violence has taken place in recent years. Settlement of the border issue requires both national and local responses. The governments must work with renewed urgency to resolve the remaining disputed segments. Whatever border is agreed will not satisfy everyone. To alleviate this discontent, local arrangements for cross-border activities should be promoted. Without such flexibility, long-standing local disputes will fester and could escalate into active conflict.

Beyond security threats, the two countries face a range of border management challenges over the movement of people and goods. Though the enclave has remained politically distinct for several hundred years, links remain strong between families divided by the border. They cross regularly for marriages and funerals. Some even farm land in the other country. Isolated from the rest of Timor-Leste, residents depend on cheap goods from Indonesia.

Informal arrangements have served to facilitate movement of goods and people in the absence of a sustainable system that would promote rather than criminalise local traffic, but these are often put on hold when border tensions rise, increasing Oecusse’s vulnerability. Both countries are establishing civilian border management agencies that may help accommodate local interests in the medium term, but they are still months, if not years away. Unresolved issues regarding accountability for the violence around the 1999 referendum and the subsequent large-scale displacement across the border pose challenges that are more political than security-oriented. Their resolution is a prerequisite for the enclave’s long-term stability.

While Oecusse’s viability in the years following independence was once questioned – chiefly by foreign observers – such concerns underestimated the strong sense of Timorese identity in the enclave and overestimated the threat from former Indonesia-era militia on the other side of the border. Investment by the central government has increased, sending a message of Dili’s commitment to the enclave. While welcomed by residents, such efforts start from a low base. Infrastructure remains poor, access to information limited and the ability to deliver government services low. Nationwide decentralisation was to have given this district the autonomy to determine some of its own cross-border affairs, but the process has stalled at national level. Timor-Leste’s leadership should consider uncoupling Oecusse’s regional development from the broader process and look for ways to provide means and funds to promote direct cross-border cooperation.

As Indonesia and Timor-Leste work on being good neighbours, they should focus on concrete actions that improve life for the people and lessen the risk of conflict on both sides of the border. While Indonesian doctrine means a significant decrease in security forces on the border is unlikely in the near term, demilitarisation of the frontier should remain on the agenda as a long-term goal that would truly reflect normal relations. Immediate steps that should be taken include:

finalising demarcation of the border as a matter of priority;
formalising arrangements for efficient communications between government and security forces on both sides of the border and at all levels, so as to create avenues for quick de-escalation of future incidents;
increasing cooperation between the two countries’ military and police, including training and exchange of attachés;
introducing the long-discussed border pass system for citizens of both countries and implementing the initiative for joint border markets that would facilitate both commercial and social exchange; and
improving the training, equipment, and facilities of Timor-Leste’s border patrol unit.

May 18, 2010

Twitter / Search - 18 May 2010 before 5 pm Tweets by johnamacdougall

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May 11, 2010

Development in the shadows : how the World Bank and the Frente Clandestina almost built a new government in Timor-Leste

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Citable URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50109

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Title:	Development in the shadows : how the World Bank and the Frente Clandestina almost built a new government in Timor-Leste
Author:	Totilo, Matthew Alan
Other Contributors:	Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning.
Advisor:	Judith Tendler.
Department:	Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning.
Publisher:	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Issue Date:	2009
Abstract:	The failures of post-violent conflict development projects have so far outweighed the successes. In response, international aid organizations have deepened and broadened their dedication to state-building projects across all aspects of institution-building, to include economic, social and political. I chose to examine the implications of this commitment by looking at Timor-Leste's first local governance project and studying the relationship between its two main actors: the World Bank and the National Council of Timorese Resistance. While largely panned as a failure by NGOs, donor organizations and the government of Timor-Leste itself, this project brought the traditional local leadership closer to having a true role in governance than similar efforts by any other actor working in Timor-Leste. A historical analysis of the application of traditional Timorese relationships with outsiders reveals parallel stories of similar partnerships. When in Timor, local leaders described to me an interesting story in the Frente Clandestina, the resistance movement that formed the core of Timor-Leste's proto-government structure. Counterintuitively, this organization was built on a foundation of weak relationships and distrust in order to function as an effective military logistical operation fighting an occupation government. This challenges the literature on social capital, social cohesion and trust which inadequately describes its relevance to recent events. (cont.) Unfortunately, the collapse of this project demonstrates that divergent agendas, inaccurate assumptions about state-building by the international community, and the misuse of terminology such continues to be a fundamental problem. Outbreaks of violence in recent years have highlighted the problems of ineffective institutional construction. Timor-Leste was hailed as a model state "built from scratch", but those rosy predictions have not endured. Its first 10 years of independence can teach us a lot about the principles of legitimacy, democracy and dignity in the post-violent conflict development experience of building institutions.
Description:	Thesis (M.C.P.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 2009. "June 2009." Includes bibliographical references (p. 95-101).
URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/50109
Keywords:	Urban Studies and Planning.

Jan 21, 2010

Ready to be anything

by Larry Teo

WILL Timor Leste be freed of all foreign controls and stand proudly one day among the countries of Asean and the world?

Or will its economy go down once the United Nations, or even Australian assistance, pulls out?

Whatever social occasion I was in — except at the birthday party of Timor Leste's president — these same questions about Asia’s newest country were always put to me by a non-Timorese midway in a get-to-know-you conversation.

President Horta (left) and Prime Minister Gusmao in mutual bantering guests at the former's birthday party on Dec 26 at the presidential residence.
ST PHOTO: Larry Teo

I flew in to Dili a day after Christmas as one of eight Singaporeans or PRs invited to President José Ramos-Horta's party and I must say the first sight of Timor Leste’s international airport was depressing.

Though I had been to less developed places, they were for vacation. Presidente Nicolau Lobato Airport is in such rudimentary state, including having to pen down my particulars at the Immigration, that I believed Timor Leste would have little to interest a media person.

After all, the mechanics of building a nation from scratch could never be more exciting than the tales of independence struggles. And those tales stopped in 2002.

The repeated failures to set up a private interview with the president sealed the feeling that nothing substantive would get done here.

First, a presidential lunch specially arranged for the Singapore guests did not materialise as we missed the appointed location by more than 100 kilometres after being chauffeured eastward along the coast to the wrong venue — Mr Ramos-Horta's recreational villa.

That was due to some miscommunication. Thankfully, the breathtaking coastal and mountain views more than compensated for the roller-coaster journey that ended with some self-paid village fare for lunch instead of a sumptuous feast.

Reminder of Timor Leste's Portuguese origin, although this huge statue of Jesus Christ that looks over the Timorese in Areia Branca in Dili was ordered built by President Suharto after Indonesia seized the former Portuguese colony in 1975. It resembles the one in Rio de Janeiro. Areia Branca, a sheltered cove, is where the best-known beaches of Timor Leste can be found.

More incredible was that the president's villa had been demolished for some time. What greeted us were the stumps of some pillars on a virtually empty yard filled with charred remains.

Then while travelling back to Dili, we ran into the president, his family and his escort on a narrow desolate path next to a cliff.

Mr Ramos-Horta came down from his car to shake our hands and said earnestly he would meet us at dinner. That did not work out too, probably because he could not make it in time back to Dili.

The next morning I was wakened from a deep sleep to be told the president had sent for me and others for a media chat. Even though I washed up with boot-camp speed, I was still too slow for the president's men, who left impatiently without me.

For someone from Singapore, all this must seem unbelievable, for which statesman at home would be so immoderately casual towards the media to the point of being, yes, slipshod? They are wary of incurring bad press.

But soon it hit me that I had been too harsh on this place. After all, Timor Leste was still ruled as a remote backwater by Jakarta some ten years ago.

Since then it has been struggling to become a modern state, but without a sound governmental framework such as that we inherited from the British to start with.

My enlightenment came from the Chinese, Japanese and Singaporean businessmen who came here in hopes of grabbing a fortune home.

These are admirable souls, braving the political uncertainties of this former Portuguese colony and later subdued land of the Indonesians.

For now they have only inefficiency to contend with, not competitors, but they are ready to roll with the punches.

"This place would be superb for investment if it could be more generous and open like Singapore and China," said Singapore businessman Steven Ong with enthusiasm.

"You can't attract long-term investments if foreign businesses can only plan on a year-by-year basis. That point has yet to dawn on the officials here," added the machine dealer.

"Timor Leste ought to reduce its dependence on UN and Australian assistance and diversify their options. As things stand now, it would certainly sink if these slip away overnight," said a Japanese engineer surnamed Akatsuka.

Enterprising spirits like Mr Ong and Mr Akatsuka are vigorous reminders that under Timor Leste's languid surface lurk boundless opportunities that could make or break many a venture. And how its history would unfold forward depends on the government's policies and character.

The presence of the Chinese is another reminder. No Singaporean would not be struck by the Chinese embassy building with its grand facade and the numberless Chinese restaurants, karaoke and mini-marts that line some parts of downtown Dili.

As hotel manager Li Mengxi, from Fujian Province of China, put it: "This is a place which could go up or down, and the bolder among the Chinese would think it’s worth a bet."

At the president's party, the 60-year-old birthday "boy" cut a spunky and burly figure although just 22 months ago he was badly injured in an assassination attempt.

Under the rain-filled canvas, the president, who is of Portuguese descent and has sharp South European looks, was mobbed not just by dignitaries, but also apparently indigent Timorese of all ages.

You may call that populism, but the informality did not look faked and newcomers might guess, rightly or wrongly, that egalitarianism is ingrained in the Timorese culture.

To my mind the intermingling sincerely reflects the sociopolitical agenda of the president and his even-more-famous prime minister Xanana Gusmão.

That this half of an island nation where many could speak Bahasa Indonesia, Portuguese, English and the native tongue of Tetum with different levels of efficiency, is to be forged into a harmonious multi-ethnic, multi-lingual polity with few class differences.

Another turbo-charged South-east Asian economy in the making?

Or destined to be trapped in the slumbers of the South Pacific?

Or a Latin remnant with equal affections for the Pope and the likes of Che Guevara?

Timor Leste can be any or all.

Who will say this land of many faces is uninteresting, if prejudices are left behind at its uninspiring airport?

Dec 8, 2009

Handing Back Responsibility to Timor-Leste’s Police

Asia Report N°180
3 December 2009

This executive summary is also available in Tetum, Portuguese and Indonesian.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Click here to view the full report as a PDF file

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The United Nations should hand over formal control of the Timor-Leste police as soon as possible. A protracted process that began in May has taken a bureaucratic approach to assessing whether they are ready to take charge, but the reality on the ground is that the Timorese police have long operated under their own command. Without an agreed plan for reforming the country’s police after the 2006 crisis, the UN and the government have made a poor team for institutional development. A longer handover may further damage relations between the UN’s third-largest policing mission and the Timor-Leste government, which has refused to act as a full partner in implementing reforms. The UN has a continued role to play in providing an advisory presence in support of police operations. For this to work, the government must engage with the UN mission and agree upon the shape of this partnership. To make any new mandate a success, they need to use the remaining months before the current one expires in February 2010 to hammer out a detailed framework for future cooperation with the police under local command.

Timor-Leste still needs the UN and stepping back is not the same as leaving too early. There is domestic political support for a continuing albeit reduced police contingent, at least until the planned 2012 national elections. A sizeable international deployment can no longer be left to operate without a clear consensus on the task at hand. Any new mandate should be limited, specific and agreed. The UN can provide units to underwrite security and support the Timorese police in technical areas such as investigations, prosecutions and training. These would best be identified by a comprehensive independent review of police capacity, and matched with key bilateral contributions, including from Australia and Portugal. In return, the Timorese should acknowledge the need to improve oversight and accountability mechanisms. The UN and its agencies must continue to help build up these structures and in the interim monitor human rights.

The UN took a technocratic approach to the highly politicised task of police reform. Sent in to restore order after an uprising in 2006, the UN police helped shore up stability in the country but then fell short when they tried to reform the institution or improve oversight. They are not set up to foster such long-term change and were never given the tools to do so. The Timorese police were divided and mismanaged at the top; the UN misplaced its emphasis on providing hundreds of uniformed officers to local stations across the country. It neglected the role played by the civilian leadership in the 2006 crisis and the need to revamp the ministry overseeing the police as part of a lasting solution. The mismatching of people to jobs, short rotations as well as the lack of familiarity with local conditions and languages clipped the ability of international police to be good teachers and mentors. Without the power to dismiss or discipline officers, the mission could not improve accountability. The government declined to pass laws in support of the UN role, sending a defiant message of non-cooperation down through police ranks.

In the absence of a joint strategy, structural reform has been limited. The government appointed a commander from outside the police ranks, compromising efforts to professionalise the service. It has promoted a paramilitary style of policing, further blurring the lines between the military and police. The skewed attention to highly armed special units will not improve access to justice, and the ambiguity it creates risks planting the seeds of future conflict with the army. Timorese leaders are attuned more than any outsider to the deadly consequences of institutional failure. To avoid this, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, an independence hero, now heads a joint defence and security ministry. Political quick fixes based on personalities may keep the police and the army apart in the short term, but they add little to more lasting solutions that respect for rule of law might provide.

For the international community, this struggle over command of the police between the UN and one of its member states contains many lessons. The slow drawdown of UN police in Timor-Leste is not the prudent exit strategy it may appear. The mission has been neither a success nor failure. Unable to muster consensus on a long-term police development strategy, it leaves behind a weak national police institution. The mission’s most enduring legacy might be in the lessons it can teach the Security Council not to over-stretch its mandates. The UN should think carefully about stepping in and taking control of a local police service, particularly, as in the case of Timor-Leste, when large parts of it remain functioning. Complex reforms of state institutions cannot be done without the political consent of those directly involved.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Timor-Leste:

1. Take steps to support the rapid resolution of as many pending police certification cases as possible, including passing any necessary legislation, and ensure that those with outstanding or future criminal convictions are removed from the Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL).

2. Develop a strong, independent oversight capacity for the police, either through overhauling the police’s internal disciplinary functions by making its operations fully transparent and public or, if necessary, developing a separate police ombudsman body.

3. Implement the proposed new police rank structure to improve professionalisation and decrease potential for political manipulation of the police service.

4. Avoid the militarisation of policing and clearly demarcate in law and policy the role of the police and army as well as the conditions and procedures by which soldiers can aid civilian authorities in internal security or other situations.

To the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and the Government of Timor-Leste:

5. Ensure that executive policing responsibilities are handed over to the Timorese police as soon as possible, spelling out the steps to hand back formal authority to the PNTL, maintaining a limited advisory and support presence for the UN police in operational areas identified as priorities by the government.

6. Reorient future mission mandates towards maintaining a limited advisory presence for the UN police in those operational areas identified by the government and bolstering security in advance of the next elections in 2012, and clarify the conditions necessary before a future full withdrawal of the international policing contingent.

7. Focus the future mission, bilateral efforts and government programs on solving existing training needs, equipment shortfalls, and fixing administrative processes identified in the joint assessments from the national to sub-district level.

8. Commit to a fully independent review of policing capacity in Timor-Leste to be performed before the final withdrawal of the UN police contingent.

To the UN Security Council:

9. Set realistic goals for a future mandate extension for UNMIT and recognise the limited capacity of UN police to play an ongoing development role with their Timorese counterparts.

To Bilateral Donors, including Australia and Portugal:

10. Support an independent review of policing capacity commissioned by the Government of Timor-Leste and UNMIT, and commit to linking future development efforts to needs identified in the review under a common framework.

11. Insist on a long-term capacity-building strategy centred on building institutional values of rule of law, professionalism and human rights.

To the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations:

12. Conduct a thorough lessons learned exercise on UNMIT’s executive policing mandate, UN police’s development role, and the incomplete security sector review in order to inform future missions.

Dili/Brussels, 3 December 2009

Nov 1, 2009

East Timor May Use Its Struggle as Tourist Lure - NYTimes.com

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DILI, EAST TIMOR — East Timor’s struggle against Indonesian occupation may soon become a money maker. The government is considering plans to promote major sites of the 25-year fight for independence as part of a tourism campaign.

East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, was invaded in 1975 by Indonesia, but a secessionist movement soon emerged, led by Xanana Gusmão, who is now the country’s prime minister, and José Ramos-Horta, its president.

Mr. Gusmão spent much of the occupation either in jail or on the run, often hiding with guerrilla fighters in East Timor’s mountainous terrain; Mr. Ramos-Horta lived in exile, campaigning for independence.

An estimated 180,000 people died during the occupation, including 1,000 the U.N. said were killed during a 1999 vote for independence.

But tourists regard East Timor’s turbulent past as an attraction, a Japanese tour guide, Noriko Inaba, said as she escorted a Japanese tour group to Dili’s Santa Cruz cemetery. More than 200 East Timorese were killed there in 1991, when Indonesian troops fired on mourners, an event known as the Dili massacre.

“It’s an historical place because of the tragedy,” she said. “This is one of the things we came to see here.”

The cemetery’s caretaker, João da Costa, said tourists often visited the site and took photos.

“If more people came from overseas, maybe we could develop faster,” he said.

East Timor’s tourism minister, Gil da Costa Alves, said the government wanted tourism to contribute more to economic growth in a country that is one of the poorest in Asia and dependent on oil and natural gas revenues for the bulk of state finances.

While there are serious obstacles, including poor infrastructure and a shortage of hotel rooms, he sees an opportunity to promote the historic sites, beaches and wildlife.

“We have this opportunity for historical tourism, for people who are interested in those sites that are part of our history,” he said.

“Even the cave where Xanana was in hiding — this is a place we can promote, and other places around the country where our leaders were hiding up in the hills.”

About 19,000 people visited East Timor last year, up from about 12,000 in 2006, when tourists stayed away because of political strife.

Mr. Alves said he hopes that East Timor can attract as many as 200,000 tourists a year within five years.

However, Loro Horta, an East Timor analyst based at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, was skeptical.

“The entire country has less than 700 rooms. Right now it’s already difficult to get rooms in Dili,” said Mr. Horta, who is also the son of the president.

“So 200,000 a year — that’s something like 700 a day. How exactly are they flying there and where are they going to stay?”

Mr. Horta said more affordable flights to Dili, a bigger airport and a more reliable power supply were also needed before East Timor could compete with Bali in Indonesia as a tourist destination.

“I really hope I’m wrong, but we will be lucky if we can get 50,000 a year by 2014,” he said.

Mr. Alves said a new infrastructure plan — including a $600 million redevelopment of the airport, the construction of boutique hotels and the improvement of basic infrastructure like roads — would increase tourism.

He said a broader tourism campaign would be aimed at the Australian and Japanese markets and would involve advertising and competitions like a recently opened fishing tournament and the Tour de Timor bicycle race, which took place earlier this year.

Last year, the government opened the Nino Konis Santana National Park in an effort to protect many of its animal and plant species while providing a new attraction for tourists.

“Our strategy is to focus on the things that make East Timor different to surrounding destinations,” Mr. Alves said.

Reuters

Oct 7, 2009

SSRN-From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine and East Timorese Policy Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front (Mnlf) and Falintil Combatants into the Armed Forces by Rosalie Hall

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Hall, Rosalie A., From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine and
East Timorese Policy Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front
(Mnlf) and Falintil Combatants into the Armed Forces (2009). APSA 2009
Toronto Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450242

Full-text is downloadable free.

Abstract:

The Philippines and East Timor are two countries whose governments have
integrated ex-insurgents into their regular armed forces and police. In the
Philippines, the arrangement to integrate 5,000 rebels came out of the final
peace agreement signed between the government and the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996. The MNLF integrees were mixed into the
regular police and military units deployed in conflict areas in Mindanao.
The East Timorese case, on the other hand, involved the in-take of
ex-Falintil combatants into the newly created state military within the
framework of demobilization and disarmament. Previous studies on security
sector reform point to the shortcomings in training and military
organizational culture for units with ex-rebels in the ranks. Integration
policy both as a peace strategy and a security sector reform initiative is
problematized in view of the gender-blind assumptions behind it and
differential economic benefits it confers. The politicized nature of the
policy itself--that is, the negotiations between international actors and
local stakeholders over the decision to integrate, who to select and the
concomitant consequences of this decision to security force composition and
professionalism invite theorizing. This paper is based on a comparative
research project funded by Toyota Foundation's Southeast Asian Regional
Exchange Program, which examines and compares the policy behind the
selection, training, placement and utilization of rebel-integrees into the
East Timor Defense Force (FDTL) and the Philippine army to respond to
internal security challenges. It probes how international actors (the United
Nations, donors, third parties and neighbors), national/local political
authorities and civil society representatives informed the policies. The
gendered assumptions made by those who crafted the integration policy will
also be looked at. In addition, the research will examine how identity
markers (in the Philippine case, religion; in East Timor, ethnicity) inform
the ways in which the ex-rebels function inside the armed forces. The
implication of the integration policy into the future prospects for peace in
both countries will also be explored.

Keywords: rebel integration, military merger, Falintil, Moro National
Liberation Front

Sep 30, 2009

October 2009Timor-Leste - Security Council Report

Expected Council Action • Key Recent Developments • Human Rights-Related Developments • Key Issues • Options • Council Dynamics • UN Documents • Other Relevant Facts • Additional Useful Sources • Other SCR Reports on Timor-Leste

Expected Council Action
No Council decisions on Timor-Leste are expected in October, but the Council is likely to receive a briefing from the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Timor-Leste, Atul Khare.

At press time the Secretary-General’s progress report on the activities of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was expected by 30 September. As requested in resolution 1867 (which in February extended UNMIT’s mandate until 26 February 2010), the report will update the Council on the transfer of policing responsibility from UNMIT to the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL). Khare may also brief on the village (suco) and sub-village (aldeia) elections for chiefs and councils due on 9 October.
top • full forecast

Key Recent Developments
The 10^th anniversary of the UN-organised referendum that led to Timor-Leste’s independence was marked on 30 August. In remarks to the press, the president of the Council said the Council commended the people and government of Timor-Leste on their efforts towards peace, stability and development. In Timor-Leste Khare said that “in the last 10 years, Timor-Leste had achieved significant progress in the areas of consolidation of the institutions of democracy, respect for human rights”. He noted the development of the police and the local military, but added that “the road ahead is still long.”

In a report released on 27 August, Amnesty International warned the Council that there was a need for a long-term comprehensive plan to end impunity for crimes in Timor-Leste. It proposed that an international criminal tribunal be set up with jurisdiction over all crimes committed in Timor-Leste between 1975 and 1999. There are 400 outstanding arrest warrants issued by the Serious Crimes Unit, originally set up within the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) in 1999.

Timor-Leste President José Ramos-Horta, speaking on the 10^th anniversary of the referendum, rejected the idea of an international tribunal and said it was time for the UN to disband the Serious Crimes Unit.

The impunity issues were highlighted on 30 August with the release of Martenus Bere, who had been indicted in 2003 by the Serious Crimes Unit on charges of crimes against humanity, including the Suai church massacre in September 1999. Bere had been detained in Timor-Leste on 8 August. However, a top Indonesian official invited to participate in the 10^th anniversary celebration refused to enter the country if Bere remained in custody. A spokesperson for the Secretary-General has said Bere’s release is contrary to resolution 1704, which set up UNMIT in 2006, and conflicted with the UN’s position of no amnesty or impunity for crimes against humanity. Timor-Leste’s Supreme Court is investigating the case to determine if Bere’s release violated the constitution.

The gradual resumption of policing responsibilities by the PNTL started in 14 May. It had been halted in 2008 due to the security situation following the dual assassination attempt against the country’s president and prime minister. So far the UN Police have transferred to the PNTL control of three of Timor-Leste’s 13 districts. In September the PNTL took over an UN-supported police training centre in Dili. The criteria that had to be fulfilled included: the PNTL being able to respond appropriately to the security environment; final certification of at least 80 percent of eligible officers; availability of initial operational logistical requirements; institutional stability; and mutual respect between the military and the national police.

Council activities in the first half of the year included an open debate of the Secretary-General’s report on 19 February, the renewal of UNMIT’s mandate on 26 February and a private meeting on 27 May with troop-contributing countries to discuss the updating of the concept of operations and rules of engagement for UNMIT.
top • full forecast

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 13 March the Secretary-General’s Representative on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Walter Kalin, reported to the Human Rights Council on the situation in Timor-Leste (amongst other countries). Kalin commended the government for voluntarily closing the majority of the IDP camps established during the 2006 crisis. The return of IDPs from the Metinaro camp will bring more than 13,500 to the total number of families who have received recovery or reintegration packages under the National Recovery Strategy. This leaves 2,480 individuals remaining in transitional shelters.

Kalin identified a number of ongoing challenges: addressing the underlying causes of violence and displacement, redressing prevailing impunity, adopting a land and property law in order to resolve and prevent further land disputes and adjusting compensation packages to assist the most vulnerable, including those with no place of return.

The UN’s third human rights report on Timor-Leste, covering July 2008 through June 2009, was published on 15 September. The report said that Timor-Leste had made progress in key human rights areas such as the strengthening of the judicial system and adherence to the rule of law, but still had work to do in the area of accountability.

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Key Issues
A key challenge for the Council is factoring the specific needs of Timor-Leste into its overall approach to peacekeeping, represented in its most recent review in an August presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/24).

A related issue is finding ways incorporate more peacebuilding elements into UNMIT’s work in light of paragraph 9 of that statement.

Recent history shows the risks in Timor-Leste of the Council and UNMIT being lulled into a sense of security. Ensuring that UNMIT retains an effective oversight function in the districts transferred to the PNTL may be a key issue.

Developments in the Bere case and the response to the Amnesty International proposal suggest that accountability for past human rights violations will continue to be a serious issue. Bere’s release to the Indonesian government may feed underlying discontent among some sectors of the Timor-Leste population about continuing impunity for crimes committed over the years.
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Options
The most likely option is a general discussion in the Council of the situation in Timor-Leste, particularly progress in the handing over of policing responsibilities to the PNTL.

Possible options include:

initiating expert-level discussions on possible adjustments to UNMIT’s mandate and strength leading to the February 2010 expiry of the mandate;
requesting the Core Group to provide Council members with recommendations on how to better involve UNMIT in peacebuilding as well as peacekeeping; and
issuing a press statement emphasising the need to see concrete progress in developing a national security policy and reminding the Timor-Leste government of its pending accountability and justice obligations.

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Council Dynamics
Timor-Leste struggles to get priority attention from most Council members. The apparently stable security situation again leads most members into feeling that things are moving in the right direction. In the last debate most members welcomed the benchmarks and the positive assessment of the overall situation.

Members are interested in Khare’s assessment of the transfer of policing responsibility to the PNTL in the three districts and the prospects for it to continue smoothly for the next ten. But members are not currently expecting any surprises from the report that would require them to make any immediate decisions.

Japan is the lead country on Timor-Leste.
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UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

S/RES/1867 (26 February 2009) extended UNMIT until 26 February 2010.
S/RES/1704S/RES/1704 (25 August 2006) established UNMIT.

Latest Report of the Secretary-General

S/2009/72 (4 February 2009)

Other

S//PV.6086 (26 February 2009) was on the adoption of resolution 1867.
S/PV.6085 (19 February 2009) was the last Council debate on Timor-Leste.

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Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Atul Khare (India)

Size, Composition and Cost

Maximum authorised strength: up to 1,748 police and 34 military officers\
Size as of 31 July 2009: 1,582 police and 33 military liaison officers
Civilian staff as of 31 July 2009: 364 international and 880 local, 170 UN Volunteers
Key police contributors: Malaysia, Portugal, Bangladesh and Pakistan
Approved budget (1 July 2009–30 June 2010): $205.94 million

Duration

25 August 2006 to present; mandate expires 26 February 2010

International Stabilisation Force

Size as of 1 July 2008: approximately 920 troops
Contributors: Australia (750 troops) and New Zealand (170 troops)

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Additional Useful Sources

‘We Cry for Justice’, Impunity Persists 10 Years On in Timor-Leste, Amnesty International, August 2009