Tense Times in Dili

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The Irrawaddy News Magazine - July 2010, Vol.18, No.7

by Matt Crook

Ozorio Leque stands accused of inciting a riot in Dili, the East Timorese capital, on April 28, 2006, when he publicly berated the government before a mob went on the rampage, attacking the government palace. The crisis that followed over the next two months led to 37 deaths and the displacement of 150,000 people.

One of the leaders of Colimau 2000, a resistance group comprising former freedom fighters, youths and farmers, Leque, 29, insists he was acting merely as an activist and that the real perpetrators of the crisis remain untouched. Meanwhile, frustrations among an increasingly disenfranchised youth demographic are now the country’s biggest social challenge.

“Now it’s more calm and more quiet and peaceful than before, but that does not mean that we don’t have conflict among the youths, among the leaders, that could lead to another social conflict in the future, particularly with martial arts groups,” he said.

In the crisis of 2006, a split in the armed forces over promotions led to clashes in the streets of Dili between the army (F-FDTL), police (PNTL) and martial arts groups. Rivalry between the army and the police remains a source of tension, but with an average age of 22 among the population of 1.1 million, the biggest threats to security are evident among the nation’s troubled young.

“This country is composed mostly of youths, but the major challenge that they are facing at the moment is the lack of skills and job opportunities. This is one of the issues that could lead to another social clash,” said Leque, whose trial at Dili District Court was again delayed on June 8.

The Indonesian military’s illegal occupation of Timor-Leste between 1975 and 1999 led to about 200,000 deaths and culminated in the destruction of much of the country’s infrastructure. Shifting a nation’s mentality from resistance to development is key to maintaining stability, Leque said.

“We were coached to use violence against the Indonesian government to achieve our goal of independence or to demonstrate to international societies that we were refusing the Indonesian presence in our country, and most of these youths who were involved in the conflict in 2006 were involved in the violence against Indonesia,” he said.

“It is time for this generation to think for themselves and then their society, their family and their country. It makes no sense when you talk about development if you don’t start from yourself. Human investment is one of the most important issues,” he said. “Creating job opportunities and facilitating youths is one of the priorities in this post-conflict situation.”

But while the streets of Dili are mostly calm, especially compared to 2006, there are still bust-ups between youths in some parts of the city. The government meanwhile has discounted reports that tension between rival martial arts groups is smoldering to the point of destabilizing the country.

Secretary of State Agio Pereira said in a statement that Timor-Leste has one of the lowest crime rates per capita in the world and that reports of serious crime continue to decrease.

But not all crime is reported and the government’s knee-jerk defenses have drawn flak.

Aniceto Neves of the HAK Association, a human rights organization that works with members of martial arts groups, said a balance between sensationalist reporting and defensive posturing is needed.

“The martial arts situation is not something which is dangerous for the security of Timor-Leste,” he said. “It is about social jealousy. It is about social frustration. It is not really affecting the stability of the situation in Timor-Leste.”

Australian gang specialist James Scambary said in his latest report, “Sects, Lies and Videotape,” that fighting, “sporadic but at times intense, sometimes involving over 300 people at a time, is taking place in eight neighborhoods across the city.”

But Neves said “outsiders” have a tendency to exaggerate.

“You cannot consider most places in Dili as dangerous. You cannot consider most of the youths located in different places as dangerous or threatening to others. It is not true. If there is a threat, then the fighting would be very often,” he said.

Nelson Belo, the director of Fundasaun Mahein, a local NGO focused on security sector issues, said Dili is stable, but the problem of unemployment must be addressed or else it could pose a serious threat.

Gainful employment is hard to come by in Timor-Leste, which has only been formally independent since 2002. Subsistence farming is the norm and half the country remains illiterate.

“The problem is language,” Belo said, adding that many Timorese feel unable to get top jobs in the country because they are unable to speak Portuguese, one of Timor-Leste’s official languages, or English.

“Many Timorese only apply for jobs that are insecure,” he said. “They only apply for jobs as security staff or cleaners, and so many of them are not in the decision level and this creates jealousy.”

The government should review its language policy so that Timorese who are unable to speak Portuguese and English can have the same opportunities as those who can, said Belo.

“Many internationals have good jobs and so people start to feel like they are guests in their own country,” he added.

The key to maintaining stability in Timor-Leste is greater involvement of people at the community level to shape future policies on security and better reflect the needs of the population, he said.

Another significant problem is the lack of coordination between Timor-Leste’s army and police force and the UN Police (UNPOL). The PNTL have been re-assuming policing duties from the UN on a district-by-district basis. To date, six of 13 districts have been handed over.

Cillian Nolan, a Dili-based analyst for the International Crisis Group, reported in February that it remains a “fiction” that the UN is in charge of policing Timor-Leste.

“The reality is a lot murkier. A formal handover of ‘executive policing responsibilities’ is progressing on a district-by-district basis, but response to recent events resembles a collective abdication of responsibility,” he wrote.

Recent allegations of excessive use of force have been leveled at the police over the beating of an unarmed man during a fishing competition and the fatal shooting of an unarmed youth in Dili last year.

In its latest “Security Sector Reform Monitor” for Timor-Leste, the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) warned against the current militarization of the PNTL under police commander Longuinhos Monteiro.

“This situation underscores the need for a review of paramilitary policing and a drastic reduction in the number of PNTL weapons in a country with few illicit firearms.

“Everyday sightings of armed F-FDTL soldiers and PNTL officers, including paramilitary police units with semi-automatic assault rifles and district task force units in riot gear have increased substantially since the 2006 crisis,” according to the CIGI report.

Earlier this year, the police and military launched a six-month joint campaign after unfounded reports surfaced of “ninjas” terrorizing locals in the western districts. The heavy-handed response was widely criticized and cited as Monteiro’s way of justifying the gun-toting Public Order Battalion he created last year.

Monteiro’s show of strength may have had more to do with winning popularity points than hunting ninjas, but the stunt backfired as a torrent of complaints about human rights violations rained in on Monteiro’s men.

Then, in May, reports of a shoot-out between an illegally armed group and police in Ermera District spread through local media and triggered another wave of ninja talk, with Monteiro once again talking up the need for police action.

NGO Fundasaun Mahein on June 7 released a report casting doubt over Monteiro’s claims that there was an illegal group of gun-toting menaces on the loose, citing conflicting police reports and a lack of evidence.

“The alarmism raised by the general commander, Longuinhos Monteiro, is no different from the invention of the ninja situation in Bobonaro and Suai,” the report found.

“The rumors of illegal groups are strongly connected with PNTL’s militarization and have the potential to create competition between PNTL and F-FDTL.”

But for all the criticism, there have been improvements in the country’s police force, said Silas Everett, the country representative of the Asia Foundation in Timor-Leste.

“The police have been undertaking a transformation here, and in terms of community policing, there has been a real growing acceptance of it as an appropriate policing strategy. Officers are going out there and engaging with communities and all of that doesn’t make it into the media,” said Everett.

“In Timor-Leste, stories pick up on the violence, the poverty, and not enough is said about the good things that are happening, especially in regards to the security sector,” he added.

Yet even if security is bolstered, Timor-Leste’s ineffective justice system needs significant investment.

Neves added, “During the crisis in 2006 until present times, there are a number of people who suffered damages, who lost their houses, lost their families, had things stolen—there were people who killed—but what people face now is the absence of justice.”

A lack of qualified prosecutors has led to a backlog of about 5,000 cases at the Prosecutor General’s office.

“There is no responsibility. The ones who are suspected of killing are just free, just going around and walking freely. It makes people frustrated. Very easily they can turn to violence,” he said. “Social frustrations regarding the justice system are provoking people to be angry with each other and then they are fighting.”

'We cry for justice’: Impunity persists 10 years on in Timor-Leste

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Index Number: ASA 57/001/2009
Date Published: 27 August 2009

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In August 1999, the Timorese people voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence from Indonesia in a UN-sponsored referendum. The lead-up to the polls and its aftermath were marred by crimes against humanity and other serious human rights. Most of those suspected of such crimes are still at large in Indonesia. In this report, Amnesty International sets out its recommendations to the governments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia, calling on them to develop and implement strategies that fully address the legacy of impunity for such crimes.

This document is also available in:

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Portuguese:

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Timor-Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian Border - International Crisis Group

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Asia Briefing Nº104 20 May 2010

Full PDF report Media release

International Crisis Group © 2010 | Legal Notice | Contact Us | Site by The Reference

This overview is also available in Tetum, Portuguese and Indonesian.

OVERVIEW

Indonesia and Timor-Leste have done much to normalise relations ten years after the end to Indonesian rule in the former province, but the goodwill between capitals is not yet matched by full cooperation on the border. The costs are greatest in Oecusse, Timor-Leste’s isolated enclave inside Indonesian West Timor. Negotiators have so far failed to agree on two segments of Oecusse’s border, leaving open the risk that minor local disputes could be politicised and escalate into larger conflicts. Without a final demarcation, steps to improve management of the porous border have stalled. Initiatives that would promote exchanges and lessen the enclave’s isolation remain unimplemented. As the bonds between the two nations grow, they should prioritise this unfinished business. Leaving it unresolved can only promote crime, corruption and the possibility of conflict.

The security threat to Oecusse and its 67,000 inhabitants has sharply decreased since independence. While the unresolved border segments remain a catalyst for occasional tensions, no violence has taken place in recent years. Settlement of the border issue requires both national and local responses. The governments must work with renewed urgency to resolve the remaining disputed segments. Whatever border is agreed will not satisfy everyone. To alleviate this discontent, local arrangements for cross-border activities should be promoted. Without such flexibility, long-standing local disputes will fester and could escalate into active conflict.

Beyond security threats, the two countries face a range of border management challenges over the movement of people and goods. Though the enclave has remained politically distinct for several hundred years, links remain strong between families divided by the border. They cross regularly for marriages and funerals. Some even farm land in the other country. Isolated from the rest of Timor-Leste, residents depend on cheap goods from Indonesia.

Informal arrangements have served to facilitate movement of goods and people in the absence of a sustainable system that would promote rather than criminalise local traffic, but these are often put on hold when border tensions rise, increasing Oecusse’s vulnerability. Both countries are establishing civilian border management agencies that may help accommodate local interests in the medium term, but they are still months, if not years away. Unresolved issues regarding accountability for the violence around the 1999 referendum and the subsequent large-scale displacement across the border pose challenges that are more political than security-oriented. Their resolution is a prerequisite for the enclave’s long-term stability.

While Oecusse’s viability in the years following independence was once questioned – chiefly by foreign observers – such concerns underestimated the strong sense of Timorese identity in the enclave and overestimated the threat from former Indonesia-era militia on the other side of the border. Investment by the central government has increased, sending a message of Dili’s commitment to the enclave. While welcomed by residents, such efforts start from a low base. Infrastructure remains poor, access to information limited and the ability to deliver government services low. Nationwide decentralisation was to have given this district the autonomy to determine some of its own cross-border affairs, but the process has stalled at national level. Timor-Leste’s leadership should consider uncoupling Oecusse’s regional development from the broader process and look for ways to provide means and funds to promote direct cross-border cooperation.

As Indonesia and Timor-Leste work on being good neigh­bours, they should focus on concrete actions that improve life for the people and lessen the risk of conflict on both sides of the border. While Indonesian doctrine means a significant decrease in security forces on the border is unlikely in the near term, demilitarisation of the frontier should remain on the agenda as a long-term goal that would truly reflect normal relations. Immediate steps that should be taken include:

• finalising demarcation of the border as a matter of priority;
• formalising arrangements for efficient communications between government and security forces on both sides of the border and at all levels, so as to create avenues for quick de-escalation of future incidents;
• increasing cooperation between the two countries’ military and police, including training and exchange of attachés;
• introducing the long-discussed border pass system for citizens of both countries and implementing the initiative for joint border markets that would facilitate both commercial and social exchange; and
• improving the training, equipment, and facilities of Timor-Leste’s border patrol unit.

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Angola Press - Timor e Moçambique defendem maior difusão do português dentro das suas fronteiras

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Angola Press - Timor e Moçambique defendem maior difusão do português dentro das suas fronteiras

(Use the Quick Google Translator gadget in the sidebar if you can't read Portuguese.)

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Appeal if not happy with Court's decision, says Prosecutor-General while Defence Force Commander condemns conviction of soldiers and the use of Portuguese in Courts

Diario Nacional, March 11, 2010 language source: Tetun - The Prosecutor General Ana Pesoa Pinto has said that the only way for the lawyer for Frederico da Conceicao Oan Ki’ak, a former guerilla fighter, and Alberto da Costa Belo, to challenge the Court's decision is to appeal to the higher court.

Image by Rui Miguel da Silva Pinto via Flickr

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Both Oan Ki’ak and Alberto were armed by the Defence Force to stabilise the country following the dysfunction of the Timorese National Police to maintain law and order in 2006.

“The only legal way is for the lawyer to lodge an appeal and make submission to the court so that the Court will process the case in accordance with the law. It is therefore inappropriate to make comments to the media,” Ms. Pinto said.

Ms. Pessoa made the comment following the statement by the lawyer for Florindo and Belo that he was dissatisfied with the recent decision made by the court to sentence Florindo to eight years and four months and Belo to six years and six months in prison.

Meanhile, in an extraordinary outburst reported by Televizaun Timor-Leste on March 11, 2010, the Timor-Leste Defence Force General (Falintil-FDTL) Commander Major General Taur Matan Ruak has said that members of the Defence Force are being criminalised for defending the country in times of war.

“Our Prime Minister Xanana was in the jungle defending his homeland and the Indonesian court convicted him as a criminal and now we are being criminalised as well for defending Timor,” Matan Ruak said Thursday in Metinaro, Dili.

He added that if defending the nation is a crime, then they would simply run away from defending the country in times of war.

He said that those who have big mouths today should be mindful of the sacrifices of the liberation army which brought good fortune for those who become ministers, presidents, and other important political positions.

“Those who have big mouths today should not forget that because of us defending the country they are now happy and hilarious …. as presidents, ministers, etc,”, said the two-star general.

He said that it is unacceptable for him that even after Timor-Leste gained its hard-fought independence, members of his defence force are still criminalised.

Recently the Dili District Court sentenced Frederico da Conceição Oan Ki’ak, a former guerilla fighter, and Alberto Belo eight and six years in prison respectively for an incident in May 2006.

Both Oan Ki’ak and Alberto were armed by the Defence Force to stabilise the country following the dysfunction of the Timorese National Police to maintain law and order in 2006.

In May 2006, many PNTL members joined F-FDTL deserters whose total was about half of the number of the defense force loyal to the government. The rebels were led by Major Alfredo Reinado Alves, who was then shot in a shoot-out at the resident of President Horta in early 2008.

Matan Ruak went on to harshly criticise the use of the Portuguese language in the Courts of East Timor, calling for the end of Portuguese in the judicial system because it caused difficulties for the people.

“As a General I ask all Timorese to join me in launching a big campaign to end the use of Portuguese in all Timorese courts,” said Matan Ruak.

Matan Ruak made the comment following the decision of the Dili District court where verdicts to sentence Oan Ki’ak and Alberto da Costa were read in Portuguese.

He said that the court should only use Tetun and other native languages in its proceedings.

Matan Ruak added that with the call for language change in the court, international judges, prosecutors, and lawyers should be able to speak Tetun, which is an official language of the country.

He urged that those who cannot speak Tetun should be replaced by Timorese to make the process easy for Timorese to comprehend.

Many Timorese judicial actors like lawyers, judges and public defenders, graduated from Indonesian law schools, making them competent in both Indonesian and Tetun.

Matan Ruak said that those cannot speak Portuguese should not be penalised for this reason as it was part of the history.

The Constitution adopts both Tetun and Portuguese as official languages of Timor while Indonesian and English are used as working languages in the country. Posted by : Voice of East Timor on 12 March 2010

SBY’s Timor History

SBY - top graduate 1973

Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), like many of his generation of former military men, has a Timor history. Australian researcher Ernie Chamberlain shows that, while SBY may not have been in the very first wave of the 7 December 1975 Indonesian military invasion, he was on active duty in Timor in those early years of the occupation which had such catastrophic consequences for the Timorese population and resistance. While the detailed story of SBY’s roles inside Timor is yet to be told, what follows sketches the beginning of his Timor history.

Chamberlain writes:

In his senior year (1973) at the Akabri military academy at Magelang, Bambang Yudhoyono was the Dandivkortar (“top cadet”) – overseeing 3,000 cadets. On graduation in November 1973, as the “top student” among the 987 graduates (Prabowo Subianto, by the way, graduated the following year in third place), he was presented with the Bintang Adhi Makayasa medal personally by then President Soeharto.
From Akabri, he was posted as a platoon commander to Kostrad’s 330 Airborne/Raider Battalion (Commander 3 Platoon, “A” Company) serving in the period “1974-76″. That unit’s history website notes that the battalion saw service in Timor in “1975-1976″.
Indonesian journalist and author Hendro Subroto has written on 330 Battalion’s operations in several of his works. In particular, two battalions of 330 Battalion’s formation – the 17th Airborne Brigade/”Satgas B” – parachuted onto the Baucau airfield on 10 December 1975, but 330 Battalion (commanded by Major Syukur) did not arrive in Baucau from Kupang until 14 December in an airlanded operation utilising civil-type aircraft. Soon after landing, 330 Battalion led the ABRI advance south to Viqueque – meeting quite stiff Falintil opposition led by Sabika in the Lariguto/Ossu area.

SBY’s Timor entrance
But was Yudhoyono with 330 Battalion in Timor in December 1975 ? I think not.
Firstly, Hendro Subroto is an inveterate “name dropper”. In relating operations in Timor, he invariably highlights the presence/role of any later-to-become-senior ABRI officers. He makes no mention of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the Baucau/Viqueque operation of 330 Battalion. Moreover, Yudhoyono reportedly attended English language training at the US military’s Defence Language Institute in Texas in late 1975/early 1976, followed by Airborne and Ranger training at Fort Benning in 1975-1976.
He apparently returned to Indonesia in mid-1976 – deploying to Timor in August 1976 as a platoon commander in 305 Battalion (a month after his marriage to the daughter of Major General Sarwo Edhie Wibowo a renowned/infamous commander of the RPKAD and graduate of the Australian Army’s Staff College at Queenscliff, Victoria). While little is known about 305 Battalion’s activities in Timor in 1976-1977, it reportedly operated principally in Lautem.
Among his medals, Yudhoyono wears the Satya Lencana Seroja, 1976 (Operasi Seroja – Operation Lotus – was the name given to the major Indonesian military campaign in Timor from December 1975 to November 1979)

Other connections
As an aside, over the years, Bambang Yudhoyono has had several koneksi with the Australian military – and was a close friend of Lieutenant General Peter Leahy (former Chief of Army, and now a professor heading the University of Canberra’s National Security Institute). They were in the same class at the US Command and Staff College, Leavenworth in 1990-1991 (Leahy was the “top” foreign student, Bambang Yudhoyono was “No.2″). It was planned that Yudhoyono attend the year-long “one-star” ADF ACDSS course at Weston Creek (Canberra) in 1996 – but in November 1995, Yudhoyono was quite suddenly posted to Bosnia-Herzegovina as the Chief Military Observer of the UN Peacekeeping Force.

Sources:

Subroto, S., Operasi Udara di Timor Timor (Air Operations in East Timor), Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 2005, pp.107-197.

Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susilo_Bambang_Yudhoyono

Military Academy website: http://www.akmil.ac.id

Battallion 330 website: http://www.yoniflinud330.mil.id/

More SBY biographical details: http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/s/susilo-b-yudhoyono/biografi/keluarga.shtml

Ernie Chamberlain is a retired Australian brigadier, having served for 36 years – including as Australian Defence Attache in Jakarta in the mid-1990s. Since retirement in 1998, he has spent some years in Timor – including advising Defence Minister Roque Rodrigues and F-FDTL commander Taur Matan Ruak on defence policy and planning (2004-05).

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Attack on Timorese President Unsolved

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by Lindsay Murdoch

The Age, DILI: Who shot the President and the rebel leader? Three Dili District Court judges have sentenced 24 rebels to jail terms of up to 16 years but their verdicts have raised more questions than they answered about the attacks on East Timor's top two political leaders on February 11, 2008.

The judges said after hearing five months of evidence that Marcelo Caetano, the rebel accused of shooting the President, Jose Ramos-Horta, twice in the back, did not do it.

They accepted the evidence of Australian Federal Police officers who examined bullet fragments were taken from Mr Ramos-Horta during surgery in Darwin that they did not come from Caetano's automatic weapon.

Only hours before the judges delivered their verdicts to a packed court on Wednesday, Mr Ramos-Horta said there was no doubt Caetano was the shooter, although he had earlier insisted he was not.

Mr Ramos-Horta said he had subsequently had a ''flashback'' to that day. He said Caetano had made a tearful confession to him and had apologised, saying he did not intend to kill him. But the judges accepted Caetano's protestation of innocence.

The judges said that all nine of the rebels who went to the President's house, including Caetano, ''acted in concert and collaboration'' to kill Mr Ramos-Horta, for which Caetano was jailed for 16 years. But they said it was not known which one fired the shots that almost killed him.

Buried in a long judgement are the judges' findings that the official version of how the rebel leader, Alfredo Reinado, and one of his men, Leopoldino Eposto, were killed at the President's house did not happen.

They said that based on the evidence, Francisco Marcal, a security guard at Mr Ramos-Horta's house, did not kill the two men from a distance, as he had claimed.

Government ministers still insist that that is what happened. But the court had heard that AFP ballistics tests showed Reinado and Esposto were shot dead by two different weapons.

Forensic analysis pointed to the shots being fired at close range, which suggests execution. Neither of the weapons used was the one that Mr Marcal testified he was carrying.

The judges condemned the rebels who went to the President's home fully armed. All were sentenced to 16 years' jail. They also condemned a second group of 11 rebels that ambushed the Prime Minister, Xanana Gusmao, the same day. They received an average of 10 years' jail.

Lawyers for the rebels intend to appeal against the verdicts and sentences.

THE UNKNOWNS

Who shot Jose Ramos-Horta twice in the back?

Court found Marcelo Caetano, the rebel accused of firing the shots, did not do it.

Who shot Alfredo Reinado and Leopoldino Esposto?

Court found the guard Francisco Marcal did not fire fatal shots at rebels, as he claimed. The rebels were killed with different weapons, neither of which was Marcal's.

Posted by : Voice of East Timor on 06 March 2010

East Timor jails 23 rebels for shooting president

A court in East Timor has convicted 23 rebels over the attempted assassination of the president and prime minister in 2008.

The defendants - most of them former soldiers and police officers - were jailed for up to 16 years.

President Jose Ramos-Horta was shot and seriously wounded in the attack outside his home in the capital Dili.

The Prime Minister, Xanana Gusmao, escaped injury when his motorcade was ambushed on the same day.

A further five defendants were acquitted, including an Australian woman, Angelita Pires, who was the girlfriend of the rebel leader killed in the assassination attempt.

"Today is the most important day of my life. I have rightfully regained my freedom," Ms Pires said outside the court after judges dismissed the prosecutors' argument that she was a key player in the plot.

Coup attempt

Most of the accused were army and police deserters who turned to the rebels after rivalries within East Timor's security forces erupted into violence in 2006, killing dozens and toppling the government.

Analysts said the case had been the biggest test of East Timor's fledgling judicial system since the country gained independence in 1999.

The confused incident, on 11 February 2008, saw guards and rebel soldiers shooting around Mr Ramos-Horta's home.

Rebel leader Alfredo Reinado and one other rebel were killed in the attack, which Mr Gusmao described as a coup attempt.

The shooting of Mr Ramos-Horta provoked a declaration of a state of emergency in East Timor, and heightened fears for the state's stability.

Gastao Salsinha, who took over the rebel leadership on Mr Reinado's death and surrendered to the government in April last year, was sentenced to 16 years in prison. The shortest sentence was nine years and four months.

The rebels had been on the run since violent protests in 2006 that left more than 30 people dead. They had been triggered by plans to sack 600 striking members of the army.

Chaos in the National Parliament as Democratic Party followers attack Fretilin MP's in the Chamber

ETLJB 27/02/2010 - In the wake of a fracas in the East Timor National Parliament, President Jose Ramos Horta has called on members of the Parliament to control themselves during Parliamentary debates.

President Horta made the call following the recent quarrel between the Fretilin and Democratic Party MPs in the Parliament while it was in Plenary Session. Followers of the Democratic Party stormed the Fretilin Bancada and threatened Fretilin members.

President Horta stressed that the MPs should use proper words in the Parliamentary debate recalling that the country is still in a fragile condition and should stop physical confrontation and engage in constructive debate to better develop the country.

Fretilin MP Osorio Florindo demanded that the President of the Parliament, Fernando Lasama de Araujo, who is also the President of the Democratic Party and former student resistance leader , to take the Democratic Party followers involved in the attack in Parliament to the court.

Mr. Florindo said that the attack in the Parliament against Fretilin MP is a crime and should be tried in the court.

Mr. Florindo also said that the constitution guaranteed the right of the MPs to discuss issues faced by the country and people should not wrongfully interfere with the Parliamentary debate.



Sources: Radio Timor Leste 26/02/2010 and Suara Timor Lorosa’e, February 25, 2010 language source: Tetun

Is policing in Timor-Leste a spectator sport?

Cillian Nolan is the International Crisis Group's Dili-based analyst.

The end of February is here, which means it's time for the UN Security Council to renew the mandate of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. Based on the Secretary-General's latest report, released on 18 February, it seems very much like business as usual. The report clings to the fiction that the UN is in charge of policing the half-island state. The reality is a lot murkier. A formal handover of 'executive policing responsibilities' is progressing on a district-by-district basis, but response to recent events resembles a collective abdication of responsibility.

In December, shots fired into the air by the Timorese police (PNTL) outside a late-night party led to the death of a popular musician. The PNTL General Commander soon ordered his officers in Dili to 'step back' and give the UN police the lead.

As Dili residents began to complain about the sudden invisibility of their own police, the Timorese district commander then unilaterally ordered his officers to cease operations altogether. He said the UN police were ineffective, using their guns 'just for show', citing the injury of his officers in a confused joint response to fighting in one of the city's markets.

He also said the PNTL wasn't learning anything from its UN counterparts. After all, the commander asked, isn't the UN technically responsible for security? It was a daring rebuke to the logic of the UN's district-by-district handover. Newspapers quickly filled with calls for the return of the PNTL, seen as faster to respond and less hesitant to bring out its guns. PNTL has since returned to the streets, but the incident hurt the image of the UN police and further weakened the 'democratic policing principles' they are here to promote.

Neither the PNTL senior command nor the Government publicly spoke out against the district commander's move. The General Commander was busy leading a dubious 'mega-operation' against rumoured 'ninja' activity in the border districts — without any UN involvement, even though the international force retains executive authority in the area. (One leading NGO has also raised concerns over possible human rights violations.)

The Secretary-General's report is short on prescriptions to cure the ills of the Timorese police, but provides incisive diagnosis of its problems. Dili is back to 'apparent normalcy' since the 2006 crisis, but it argues the PNTL is not ready to give up UN support. The service remains weak in operational, administrative and management capacity, and lacks basic equipment. There are few clear, enforced policies on fundamentals such as the use of force. There is ample evidence of misconduct with no effective disciplinary mechanism. Police frequently have little understanding of the country's evolving criminal legislation.

Much work thus remains to be done, but the report also acknowledges the 'limited capacity of UNMIT police to contribute to the development of the PNTL', noting consistent difficulties in attracting staff with the right skills. The Secretary-General recommends a limited reduction in police presence by mid-2011. But the question is not how many police will be here but what they will be doing. Much remains to be defined regarding a 'reconfiguration' of roles as the handover proceeds.

Given this inability of UN police to influence outcomes, Crisis Group recommended in December that the UN hand over formal control sooner rather than later. This would bring the mission's mandate into line with the reality of policing in the country and hopefully prompt the Government, and the police, to take further steps toward solving problems only they can fix.

Future support from either the UN, Australia, Portugal, or even Indonesia will only work if the Government can be clear about its needs. It requires a comprehensive plan for the force's future development — a full independent assessment could be a first step. In the meantime, the Government, PNTL and UNMIT need to put aside public rancour and find common ground on 'reconfiguring' the role of the UN police if they are to remain an active player rather than a mere spectator in building the police in Timor-Leste.

East Timor swears in first anti-corruption boss

Image by Rusty Stewart via Flickr

East Timor's first anti-corruption commissioner, Aderito Soares, has been sworn in during a ceremony that was broadcast live around the tiny nation.

Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao and senior legislators welcomed Mr Soares to his new position with a champagne toast outside parliament.

East Timor's government has faced multiple accusations of corruption with senior officials implicated.

The government has denied any wrongdoing.

Mr Soares was confirmed as anti-corruption chief after winning 40 of 65 votes in the parliament on 1 February.

He insisted he had the government's support, although the opposition has accused the prime minister of blocking investigations into alleged corruption within the government.

Mr Soares earlier said that high-profile prosecutions would not be enough to end widespread corruption in East Timor. He said a long public re-education campaign would be needed.

"There are great expectations and it is a huge challenge to get the public trust. We need to handle it prudently," he told Reuters news agency.

Vast potential wealth

East Timor became the world's newest nation in 2002 after voting for independence from Indonesia in 1999, triggering a violent backlash from pro-Jakarta militia groups.

The country remains fragile and hosts a United Nations contingent to support security efforts.

East Timor is one of Asia's poorest nations but vast offshore oil and gas fields in the Timor Sea hold much potential.

Presidential and parliamentary elections in mid-2007 resulted in former Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta winning the presidency and former President, Xanana Gusmao, leading a four-party coalition called the Alliance of the Parliamentary Majority.

But Mr Gusmao's government, which faces re-election in June 2012, has been mired in corruption accusations that have implicated senior officials including Justice Minister Lucia Lobato and Finance Minister Emilia Pires.

It has also been alleged that the prime minister's daughter won a multi-million dollar food-import contract on the back of family connections.

Archives in Timor-Leste, 2009: Summary update - Timor Archives

Image via Wikipedia

My brief on-the-ground exploration of archival developments in Timor-Leste during August leaves me both encouraged and bewildered.

Encouraged because the interest in archival matters I found in Dili in 2003 continues, unabated, to drive several interesting institutional developments and encouraged by the very strong interest in Timor archival materials being held in Australia.

Bewildered by the funding, building, training and personnel difficulties that all archives in Timor face, the uncertainties of government decision-making processes and what seems, in part, a rather negative competitiveness between some developing archival projects.

More on all that later. For now, here is a taste of what Cecily Gilbert and I managed to learn in a few short days in the very busy run-up to the 10th anniversary of the decisive independence ballot of 30 August 1999.

Arquivo Nacional
The National Archive, created to hold past and current government records, was established in the early years after independence. Since 2003 the Arquivo has been allocated a building, but does not yet appear to be a major government priority. A sizeable collection of Portuguese-era administrative records are held in reasonable storage conditions but the Arquivo does not have sufficient storage space to properly house a large volume of seemingly unexamined Indonesia-era administrative records. Transfers of independence-era government records have just begun. There does not appear to be any available listings of collection holdings and public access to the collection remains in planning stages. A detailed legislative basis for the Arquivo Nacional’s existence and function, in draft form in 2003, has yet to be adopted. It’s too early to know the likely outcome of internal government discussion about possibly co-locating the Arquivo Nacional with the planned National Library; the current Director of the Arquivo doesn’t think much of this idea.

CAVR
Materials collected in Timor as evidence for the monumental ‘Chega’ report form the centre-piece of the archives of East Timor’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). Since CAVR’s wind-up in 2005, the Post-CAVR Secretariat has managed the archive, notably conducting a copy program funded under the British Library’s Endangered Archives Programme whereby digital copies of original materials are held in London for preservation and (later) access purposes. Both paper and audio-visual materials are currently housed in reasonable archival conditions. Preservation copying of a large collection of audio-tapes of victim statements and other interviews is an important future task which will require significant resources. Access to the archives is possible with applications considered on a case by case basis but is somewhat hampered by incomplete documentation on collection content. Planning for a successor institution is well-developed but currently stalled by Parliament’s continued delay in formally considering the recommendations of Chega. The proposed institution includes a human rights documentation centre based on the existing archive and acquisition of related material from abroad.

Centro Audiovisual Max Stahl Timor Leste (CAMSTL)
Currently housed in part of the Independence Memorial Hall in Farol and directed by the inimitable Max Stahl. In addition to holding historical footage from the occupation years, CAMSTL maintains an active program of recording, for the historical record, video of current events and interviews on Timorese experience of occupation. Timorese employees are trained in camera work, editing and archival procedures and work with volunteers to transcribe all spoken words in footage held. CAMSTL has created a number of films for sale on DVD. Max Stahl has recently concluded an agreement with INA, the French national audiovisual institute, to house archival copies of Timor footage for long term preservation and access. Detailed public listings of the content of CAMSTL are not yet available. We did not have time to learn more about the funding structure and long-term administrative and viability planning for CAMSTL.

National Library
The ‘new kid on the block’ in archival terms, a National Library is under very active consideration at the highest levels. Part-funded by an international donor, a building site has been allocated (but not yet made public), books and temporary storage space have been acquired, plans for appointing an international advisor, beginning staff training and conducting an international design competition are in progress. Planning is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, Virgilio Smith. It remains unclear to us what the final form of the National Library will be. The archival aspect arises from a declared interest by ministerial advisers to acquire for the Library Australian and other Timor solidarity archival materials from abroad and discussion about the possible co-location of the Arquivo Nacional (and other smaller archives mentioned here) with the new National Library. We found considerable resistance to this idea from some of the smaller archives.

Timorese Resistance Archive and Museum
Opened in 2005, the Timorese Resistance Archive and Museum (AMRT) is located near the current (temporary) National Parliament building and the National University. The building houses a selection of Falintil weapons, radios and other equipment along with informational posters and displays of resistance documents (copies). The archival centrepiece of the AMRT is a large collection of documents gathered from resistance figures and supporters inside East Timor from 2002 to the present. Many of the collected documents are currently held in Lisbon at the Mario Soares Foundation (FMS) which has digitised the materials. With the exception of some politically sensitive materials, the digitised copies are available internationally on the internet through the AMRT website (managed by FMS) and a dedicated standalone computer in the Museum building in Dili. Aware of some questions in Dili about the ownership and management of the AMRT, along with some disquiet about documents being kept in Lisbon, a Timorese representative board of management is under construction. Also under construction is an imminent expansion of the existing building to add secure, archival standard storage and work areas and commercial seminar, bookshop and cafe facilities to assist AMRT funding for the longer term.

There’s more, much more, to say about these and other archival matters inside Timor-Leste today. Keep an eye on the ‘Timorese Archives’ section of this blog over the coming month.

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Life under the Flip-flop

The night before I left, grass fires lined the hills, like bleeding gums.

I had been asking myself over and over again, toying with in my head, how Dili could be this calm, this “ok” only three years after the violence. The calm, at times almost giddy, sense of prosperity.

In 2006, people were pulled out of mikrolets and forced to prove they could count to ten without the wrong accent. Those who failed to effortlessly say “h-at” for four were beaten, or worse dragged away. People lived wracked with fear of their neighbors. Of strangers. They lived in fear of themselves. There was no longer a jackboot, it was a terrifying Timorese shinelo.

All that remains on the city landscape of 2006 is the memorial for the police killed in Caicoli.
But what happened to the dead civilians?

More importantly, the roadblockers? The mask-wearing rock throwers? The rama-ambon makers? The house burners? The civilians who FDTL distributed arms to?

During tours of the city limits of Dili — through Becora, down through Bidau Santana, then out to Cristo Rei, and back out up the back of Delta Comoro, back down through Fatumeta, then up Taibesse’s up and around China Rate and back down Lahane – I wonder how much is stored up there — how is stress and anger contained. Where does it go? Is it swallowed? Is it buried? Is it literally stored away like an unused rama ambon?

I met some young people who have made a conscious decision to leave Dili, to go to Indonesia, to go to England. Dili is too small to contain all of their stress and anger.

It is hard to transmit how it felt in 2006, so it is hard to capture the strange dissonance with today’s Dili.
The mad construction keeps the city busy, and Prime Minister’s spokesman gloats over 12% growth in GDP.
Heaps of carpenters buzzing away making window and door frames with deslokadu money; the massive $400,000+ Civil Society Fund renovation of Motael Church, and the bigger and more expensive work on the Cathedral; the new wooden crocodile heads around the Monument to the Discoveries in front of the Palace of Government (a symbolic encircling of the colonial object); the traditional houses going up like lightening around the new Presidential palace, and in time for the big party in August.

While most people display a dangerous level of distrust in their political leaders, Dili seems perfectly lanu and mosu at the moment.

Have people begun to tell 2006? How can it ever be told?

Can Students Learn Without Books?

It’s hard enough to get through high school. It just became more so in East Timor, where students and teachers often spend valuable class time speaking different national languages. 

“At our public high school in Aileu, that’s what we have--a mix of four languages,” said Maryknoll Sister Julia Shideler.  “Is it a surprise that students are confused, teachers are frustrated, and parents disappointed?” 

Sister Julia teaches full-time in Aileu, a small city not far from the northern coast of this Southeast Asian island the country shares with Indonesia. That country ruled East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, for years until the Timorese voted to oust Indonesia in a UN referendum ten years ago this August.
East Timor is now an independent state. Portuguese, long banned in East Timor, has been declared a new official language. Education is seen as a way out of poverty--and a national literacy rate of only 43 percent. But with all the changes taking place here, how do families find security in daily life following the political violence that took place after the referendum? 

In East Timor, children suffer when schools lack enough resources.

Sister Julia is a calming presence. Her background as a teacher is helping East Timor make the transition to a literate society. Sister Julia mentors a youth group at her school, sings in a teachers' choir, and takes part in children's advocacy, teaching, and pastoral tasks.

Still, can students learn if they don't have the right textbooks?

 “Not only do most Timorese teachers understand and speak Portuguese poorly, they also lack textbooks and materials to facilitate this transition,” Sister Julia said. “So most second- and third-year classes are still using Indonesian textbooks, curriculums, and exams.” 

Some new textbooks in Portuguese are finding their way into East Timor's classrooms, but not enough. Religion and civics classes education are still taught in Tetum, the local language, while English is taught to all. The Indonesian language still dominates in most Timorese schools.

 “For me, I take it all in stride as one of those things to accept, adapt to, and approach positively,” Sister Julia said. In addition to having a college degree in Spanish, Sister Julia also knows French and Tetum, as well as English.

“Many people wondered, knowing I have a background in Spanish, why I’d chosen to mission in East Timor. Little did I know that it would help me learn and teach Portuguese, which resembles Spanish.”

Watch Sister Julia's video and discover the ways children benefit from her ministry.

East Timor: Security Sector Relapse?

Simon Roughneen | 31 Jul 2009

DILI, Timor-Leste -- Security sector reform (SSR) is a vital part of state-building, especially in Timor-Leste, a country that came close to civil war in 2006. Significantly, though, few Timorese political leaders interviewed about the issue wanted to speak about one of the highest priorities for the U.N. Mission in Timor-Leste: completing -- and, by extension, to some degree implementing -- a comprehensive security sector review.

Neither the review nor the overall role of the U.N. in SSR was raised in any of World Politics Review's meetings with politicians in Timor-Leste. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a Dili-based foreign diplomat told WPR, "The Timorese will do SSR the Timorese way."

President Jose Ramos-Horta deflected the issue in a recent interview, focusing instead on the future of the army and police, in light of the imminent departure of resistance-era leaders due to retirement in the coming 2-3 years. Former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri told WPR that SSR proposals to date "are not really a reform," as what is proposed does not "have Timorese ownership."

All of the politicians interviewed spoke about the "resumption" of policing responsibilities by the Timorese police (PNTL) from the U.N. Mission. This is a vital part of SSR, given the police force's implosion in the 2006 violence. Moreover, the police has historically been subordinate to the army, known as the F-FDTL. That disparity was accentuated by the temporary Joint Command for national security set up after assassination attempts on President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao in February 2008.

The domestic security situation improved in the months thereafter, but the police remained subordinate to the army, which still involves itself in internal security. According to eyewitnesses, U.N. police attempts to intervene in a public order incident in Maliana in June 2009, near the Indonesian border, resulted in F-FDTL guns being pointed at the multinational forces.

Some police, meanwhile, are involved in smuggling and extortion, and double up as members of the country's martial arts gangs and clandestine societies. Participants in the 2006 violence are mostly still employed on the force, without any accountability for their actions.

It is estimated that over 100,000 Timorese may be gang members, itself a difficult security challenge. James Scambary, of the Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment (TLAVA), a research project that looks at ways to implement community security initiatives, reminded WPR that "in 2006-7, over 1,300 U.N. police and later the [Australian-led] International Stabilisation Force could not prevent gang fighting," which was an expression of both non-political and political violence.

Draft security laws recently submitted to the Timorese parliament include a civil protection component, featuring a proposed Authority for Civil Protection "to coordinate the civil protection agents at national, district and suco level." This could have the effect of legitimizing or rewarding gangs and past perpetrators of violence with official status. If carried out in tandem with focused community security work, on the other hand, the measure could yield positive results.

It remains a point of discussion whether the influence of international peacekeepers has itself been entirely positive. Shona Hawkes of the NGO monitoring group La'o Hamutuk says that giving the multinational forces immunity from prosecution sets a negative example for local counterparts. There are almost weekly skirmishes between the Portuguese National Republican Guard (GNR) and Timorese security forces, with the most recent one allegedly involving a GNR assault on the prime minister's personal security.

But SSR, in Timor-Leste and elsewhere, means more than fixing the police and army. It
is a wide-ranging concept, often difficult to implement in practice. By most definitions, it means addressing all of the "hard" -- and a good chunk of the "soft" -- parts of state power.
In Timor-Leste, according to a recent paper (.pdf) published by the Center for International Cooperation, that means addressing "important justice and rule-of-law issues, including poor judicial capacity, a long legacy of impunity, a decrepit detention system, parliamentary and civil society oversight of security institutions."

Police reform is just a part of the process and will not work if the wide range of SSR needs are not dealt with. Timor-Leste, for instance, has a backlog of more than 4,000 legal cases, and there are multiple examples of impunity at the highest political levels.

Without the following priority list, by no means exhaustive, SSR will remain elusive in the country:

- Reform of the legal system and an end to impunity;
- Adequate economic growth and development that provides jobs and education for idle youth who proliferate in the gangs;
- Transparent implementation of the proposed Land Law, which aims to clarify land ownership issues that were muddied by cycles of displacement and contradictory legal systems inherited from various occupying powers.

To put the explosive land issue in context, perhaps 50 percent of Dili's houses were "illegally" occupied after 1999. As James Scambary told WPR, "Much of the fighting and displacement in 2006 was over disputed land," with over 100,000 Timorese driven from their homes at the time.

But perhaps the key to SSR is negotiating the political interests that have yet to be untangled, accommodated, or overcome. This is unsurprising, as SSR usually comes after conflict, when politics is either atrophied or compromised by links to armed factions, whether official or otherwise.

The U.N. views SSR as both a post-conflict and a conflict-prevention issue. But as the OECD-DAC handbook on Security System Reform and Governance says, it can be "difficult to find local ownership for SSR, especially where it is most needed, for example where security forces are part of the problem or where SSR may have the potential to change current power relationships."

The U.N. inquiry into the events of 2006 highlighted fragile state institutions, weak rule of law, minimal parliamentary oversight, and deficiencies in the army and the police as contributing factors to the violence. In Timor-Leste, the security sector is characterized by personal relationships, political and regional affiliations, and old-boy networks of comradeships and rivalries built up over decades of resistance to violent foreign occupation.

It seems that whatever the government does, security forces will have considerable autonomy. The draft security laws task the heads of the military and police with proposing each force's rules of engagement, with subsequent approval in both cases by the president and the council of ministers.

Former Prime Minister Alkatiri says SSR is "not only a technical issue, and we have to depoliticize the institutions." His Fretilin government failed to do so, contributing to the 2006 meltdown. Whether its successor, led by an icon of the resistance doubling as both prime minister and defense minister, has the will to address SSR remains to be seen.

Simon Roughneen is a journalist currently in southeast Asia. His chapter on Security Sector Reform in Sudan was published in "Beyond Settlement" (Associated University Press, 2008).

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articlePrint.aspx?ID=4147

Climate Change Worsens Hunger Issues in Western Timor

Climate change is worsening the hunger problem in Indonesia's West Timor province (ed. - NTT), which is already rivalling Africa.

Years of poor harvests mean many children in the region, where the climate can feel more like parts of arid Australia than lush Indonesia, are underweight and malnourished.

A report last year by the Church World Service and other organisations found 91 per cent of West Timor's children suffered from “food insecurity”, meaning they don't have access to regular and affordable nutritious food.

About 50 per cent of infants and young children were either moderately or severely underweight, compared to African countries overall, where 21.9 per cent of children were underweight.

Oxfam's West Timor program manager Aloysius Suratin said there was evidence the problem was growing worse, as farmers were at the mercy of more unpredictable weather patterns.

Mr Suratin said a review of the area's rainfall records for the past 13 years – the limits of available data – showed only 46 per cent fell in the expected rainy season.

”Because this is a dry area, people need water,” he said.

”They ask for rain, but when the rain comes rain creates a disaster. For the farmer, it's difficult to anticipate. The risk in farming is higher now.”

Rice farmer Petronella Baro, whose family was working on this year's harvest, said it was only yielding one or two tonnes per hectare if they were lucky, compared to four tonnes last year.

The mother of six children, aged from 17 down to an infant, agreed the rainy season was getting harder to predict.

This year, the rain came to her village of Desain, about 40km from Atambua, but it was so intense it washed away a nearby bridge.

Adding to the problem is that this family, like many others, relies on traditional farming methods.

The farmers said they waited for a moon “with a rainbow around it” to judge the right time to plant, then waited about a month for the ground to become muddy before sowing the seed.

”We just follow the rain,” Mrs Baro said. “But if it's like this again, it will be a problem for our family.”

Hunger is so common in West Timor that November to March is known as the “hungry season”.

But Mrs Baro said her children had enough to eat, as she was able to grow corn, cassava and beans when the rice began to dwindle, and the children were given priority at meal time.

Oxfam last month studied the village of Tes, 20km from Kefamenanu, where 90 per cent of the population are subsistence farmers.

Mr Suratin said the study aimed to find out how many families were having to sell their assets – usually land, livestock, woven clothes and coconut and teak trees – to survive a failed harvest.

He found the declining crop yield had reduced the village's meagre assets by 58 per cent, and that the district government would have to boost its funding to the village five times over to return residents to their former levels of well being.

Mr Suratin said the situation was the most severe in families headed by women, as they usually gave a share of their harvest to labourers, and were more likely to resort to selling assets.

”This is a clear portrait of the food insecurity condition and why I say it has become worse – not meaning that more people are in hunger conditions – but in the future, the value of their assets is limited ... they have not many options to recover,'' he said.

Oxfam is helping farmers trial basic rain harvesting, but says farmers need practical meteorological advice and an early warning system to help them prepare for dry spells.

The Australian government, through AusAID, has a $6.5 million program to address nutrition in women and children in the Nusa Tenggara Timur area, and also contributes to food programs run by other organisations.

East Timor Resisting Legalized Abortion, UN Committee Calls Current Policies "Discriminatory"

NEW YORK, MAY 25, 2009 Zenit.org - The predominantly Catholic nation of East Timor is under pressure from the United Nations for its laws that penalize abortion, even in the case of rape and incest.

The Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute reported last week that East Timor's policies are being scrutinized by the U.N. committee responsible for overseeing compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which will meet for its 44th session in July.

The country's new penal code, which will take effect at the beginning of June, continues to penalize the practice of abortion, though it adds an exception for cases where the mother's health is in jeopardy.


A report from East Timor to the committee states that abortion is a "sensitive issue" in the country, "especially given the traumatic events of recent years" when a 24-year Indonesian occupation enforced family planning programs that were "widely resented" by the people.

The report notes that in the Timorese culture, contraception is generally unpopular, as both men and women see it as "fueling promiscuity and sexually-transmitted diseases while decreasing the number of children."

The Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute stated that despite general support in East Timor for the continued criminalization of abortion, several non-governmental organizations such as the Alola Foundation and Rede Feto, with the support of the United Nations Population Fund and the United Nations Children's Fund, have been lobbying for more liberalized abortion laws.

It also reports that under the guise of promoting "gender equality," the U.N. committee is pushing for the "modification of customs and practices" regarded by them as "discriminatory."

Additionally, the U.N. body responds with opposition or indifference to Timor's reference to their long-standing customs, distrust of foreign influence, and the "reproductive rights" abuses suffered by Timorese women under Indonesia's rule.

The Timorese report states that the nation values gender distinctions as they help to protect the integrity of the family, as well as the well-being of women.

http://easttimorlegal.blogspot.com/2009/05/east-timor-resisting-legalized-abortion.html