Showing posts with label security sector reform. Show all posts
Showing posts with label security sector reform. Show all posts

Aug 19, 2009

Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste.

Tuesday, 18 August 2009

Reforming the Security Sector :
Facing Challenges, Achieving Progress in Timor Leste
Júlio Tomás Pinto*


The idea to write the present article came about when I read the report by the investigation team assembled by the Government to study the "Maliana Case", the letter dated 3 July 2009 to the Prime Minister by the Representative of the Secretary General of the UN in Timor-Leste, Dr Atul Khare, on human rights violations by PNTL and the F-FDTL, and the report on the unilateral investigation carried out by UNPOL on this matter. My purpose in writing this article is to encourage a reflection on the approach taken by foreign personalities, agencies or countries in Timor-Leste regarding the reform of the security sector. Also, I am often puzzled with the carelessness displayed by many foreign reviewers who assess our work.


I ask the agencies listed in this article to take my words as food for thought rather than negative criticisms. I trust this article will contribute to strengthening cooperation between Timor-Leste and other countries, as well as between Timor-Leste and the UN.

The State of Timor-Leste, through the President of the Republic, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime-Minister, created last year a strictly Timorese team called Group for the Reform and Development of the Security Sector. It is expected that the Reform of the Security Sector will enable the development and consolidation of the existing agencies, so that they may perform their tasks with efficiency, legitimacy and accountability, thereby ensuring safety to all citizens. It would do well to remind that this reform of the Security Sector is directly linked to the Government's policy concerning the development of its Program. This is why the Group for the Reform of the Security Sector was assembled in the first place. As such, the team is coordinated by two Secretaries of State, namely the Secretary of State for Security and the Secretary of State for Defence.

The said team has been doing an excellent job along with the advisor to the President of the Republic, Dr Roques Rodrigues. The so-called High Level Meetings on the Reform of the Security Sector, where issues concerning the Reform of the Security Sector are debated, involve the President of the Republic, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister, in addition to the two Secretaries of State and some advisors. The UN has also put together a team to support Timor-Leste regarding the Reform of the Security Sector, under the cooperation agreement with the Government of Timor-Leste signed in June 2008. Despite positive reviews by some friends who think the program has been developing for the past year, I do believe that they do not have a Security Sector Reform implementation program. I feel that this is due to the fact that the UN only takes part in the context of "assistance" in conformity with is mandate, which would be important to understand in terms of a peacekeeping vs. peacebuilding dualistic analysis. Indeed, during this period the UN team has held a seminar, placed advisors at the Ministry of Defence and Security in a unilateral manner and has been carrying out mentoring and retraining actions in the PNTL. It seems that the mandate of the UN is only to work alongside with the Secretary of State for Security, particularly with the PNTL. Effectively, in the Sector of Defence it seems that they only work alongside us to speak about training in Human Rights, separation between the roles of the Police and of the Military, advisors and Military Liaison officer training. I myself have requested them to provide training to the F-FDTL in terms of Peacekeeping Forces, but so far no plan has been submitted to us.

When I, in my capacity as Secretary of State for the Defence, meet with a representative from the UN or any country, I tell them two things: firstly, that advisors must present me (in my capacity as Secretary of State and Timorese citizen) several options, as well as their negative and positive implications, so that I may make my decision. This means that no advisor can present me a single option and ask me to follow it, claiming it is the only possible choice.

If on one hand we live in the age of globalization, where the classic concept of State sovereignty has become dimmed, as a result of the need for transparency, cooperation and even the right of interference, where the Timorese sovereignty is limited to the Flag and the National Anthem, as well as some gestures of courage to make decisions without pressure by other States, on the other hand Timor-Leste is a small country but is nevertheless a sovereign State. Consequently its position in relation to any issue has the same value as that of any other State. Accordingly, other States must respect Timor-Leste as the sovereign Nation that it is.

Secondly, I always tell them that the development of the Sector of Defence must be based on bilateral cooperation. This is important for Timor-Leste to be able to set the military system format it wants to establish. This format surely does not include a myriad of different training actions provided by various countries. Should this come to pass, I do not know what the Timorese military system would become. This is why the F-FDTL command has decided that presently the basic military training provided is to be based on the Portuguese system, which is in accordance with the NATO standards, with the possibility of specialized training being based on the systems of other countries. The purpose of this is to provide uniform training so as to enable an efficient Timorese military system in the future. This is preferable to having each country implement its system in the F-FDTL, which would create considerable confusion.

Until 2007 Timor-Leste did not have a National Defence Law and there was no legal diploma approving the Organic of the Military Police. These are just two examples within the scope of legislative drafting. In this field, and in relation to the Sector of Defence, the Government is not required to announce what it is doing or to report to the UN. Nevertheless, we can summarize the reforms completed up until now:

Firstly, at a legislative level, we can highlight the Decree-Law approving the Organic of the Ministry of Defence and Security, the Draft National Security Law regulating the cooperation between the PNTL, the F-FDTL and Civil Protection, the revision of the Military Service Law and the Decree-Law on its regulation, the Draft National Defence Law and the Remuneration Regime for the F-FDTL; currently being prepared we have the Legal Regime for the Retirement of Soldiers, the Military Programming Law, the Military Justice Code and the Decree-Law on the Promotion to General in the F-FDTL. This Decree-Law is important because there have not been promotions from lieutenant-colonel to general for nine (9) years. Finally, the Secretariat of State for Defence, according to the Government Program, is preparing the necessary changes to the Defence Policy, in order to enable the implementation of the National Defence Law proposed to the Parliament.

Secondly, at a structural level, we highlight that the organic law of the Ministry of Defence and Security enables a clear distinction between the political level of defence and security, as a structure constituted by the Minister of Defence and Security, from the military level of the F-FDTL, as well as the autonomous structure that is the National Defence Institute (NDI).

Thirdly, at a training level, we highlight the definition of a Training System and Concept and the drafting of the new Employment Concept for the F-FDTL.

Fourthly, at an administrative level, the Secretariat of State for Defence has already achieved some goals, consubstantiating the legislative drafting process, particularly in changing the concept of recruitment from a mandatory to a voluntary one, improving the subsidies to the F-FDTL, improving the promotion regime for soldiers, implementing the Remuneration System for Soldiers and reviewing the size and capacity building required for the human resources of the Secretariat of State for Defence.

Fifthly, we must highlight the importance given by the Government to F-FDTL infrastructures and equipment. This is a relevant aspect, as previously FALINTIL worked in Aileu beneath canvases. Even when they were moved to Dili they continued to work in containers, and after the 2006 crisis they were transferred to Tasi Tolu, where they continued to work in containers. As such, it was considered important to repair the Military Training Centre of Metinaro. Also in relation to infrastructures, the Government requested financial assistance from China in order to construct the Headquarters and the Building for the Ministry of Defence. In conformity with this, the Chinese Government presented six months ago the project for the Headquarters and the Building for the Ministry of Defence to the Secretary of State for Defence, which was approved by the latter. Therefore the Headquarters for the F-FDTL is scheduled for construction in 2010. Furthermore, this bilateral cooperation with China will also include the construction of 100 houses for F-FDTL members starting next September.

Within the scope of infrastructures, the Government of Timor-Leste has already allocated an amount in last year's budget for constructing Warehouses, the Military Police Building and the Metinaro Armoury.

In addition to this, and according to a review made by Timor-Leste in relation to information on the problem caused by the entry of an enormous number of illegal fishermen in the Timor Sea, the Government has decided to acquire two patrol vessels from the Chinese company Poly Technology. In fact, the previous Government already had plans to purchase patrol vessels. In 2006 the Government had allocated a sum of 10 million dollars for purchasing the vessels, one million dollars for training and three hundred thousand dollars for fuel, but these amounts were suddenly removed by the 2006 mid-year budget. In 2007, responding to a letter by the F-FDTL, the then Prime Minister Dr José Ramos-Horta stated in a dispatch that the vessels might be acquired in 2008. The purpose of purchasing the vessels is firstly to provide resources to the F-FDTL, the Naval Component and other bodies. Secondly it seeks to enable control of the Timor Sea along with neighbouring countries, especially in the South Coast. Politically it seems positive for Timor-Leste to buy these two vessels.

In relation to bilateral cooperation, agreements were signed with Portugal and Canada. Timor-Leste is also discussing and reviewing agreements with Australia, Indonesia and other States wishing to cooperate with Timor-Leste.

Portugal and Australia are two particularly important States for Timor-Leste, as the existing reports indicated that they are the ones who invest more in our country's defence. We have always received support from Portugal, even during the Resistance.


The Portuguese support to Timor-Leste is based on a Technical and Military Cooperation Agreement that includes, inter alia, support through the provision of advisors to the Training Centre of Metinaro, the Naval Component in Hera and to the F-FDTL Headquarters. Presently a Portuguese Language Centre is being established in Metinaro. Portugal is also assisting in the assessment for border demarcation and maritime authority system for Timor-Leste. In addition, they are providing funding for the maintenance of the two vessels they previously offered to Timor-Leste. They have also offered training opportunities in Portugal for sergeants and officers.

Military cooperation with Australia is also very good. We should highlight Australia's assistance to Timor-Leste through the DCP (Defence Cooperation Program). A clear example of this is the Military Training Centre of Metinaro, where almost all the investment comes from Australia. On 17 April 2008 Timor-Leste and Australia held a forum called Defence Cooperation Talks, where both countries agreed on assistance to the construction of an armoury for the F-FDTL and to the construction of a Specialized Training Centre in the Training Centre of Metinaro. So far, however, only the latter has been completed.

On 26 June 2009 Timor-Leste and Australia met again within the scope of the Defence Cooperation Talks in order to review the 2008 Project and the new projects for 2010. Speaking for myself, I was happy to see that Australia wishes to continue providing assistance to Timor-Leste.

Cooperation with the United States of America is also clearly positive. On 18 August Dili will host a Military Conference between Timor-Leste and the United States of America, also designated as USA-Timor-Leste Bilateral Military Conference. Cooperation is also favourable with the US Command in the Pacific, and we find some agreement points for working together.

The experience with the United States of America has been a positive one, as almost all their activity in Timor-Leste has been approved by the Government, corroborating the idea that, as a sovereign State, any activity done by a foreign State, including the United States of America, must be authorized by the Timorese Government. Accordingly, the sending of US Navy vessels to carry out training exercises in our territory under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), existing between both countries since 2003, requires authorization by Timor-Leste. As such, and since the US plan foresees that 3,000 US marines will travel to Timor-Leste, it would be desirable for these training exercises to take place in coordination with the F-FDTL, in order to enable transfer of knowledge to the Timorese forces.

Once more, although Timor-Leste is a small State, it is nevertheless a sovereign Nation in the World, as evidenced by the cooperation ties it has built, including with neighbouring Indonesia. Indeed, in addition to the countries listed above, Timor-Leste has also improved its relationship with Indonesia. After the visit by the Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão and his entourage to Indonesia in 2008, this country allowed for the first time F-FDTL officers to attend the SESKO Angkatan Laut TNI in Surabaya. In 2010 the F-FDTL will send a senior officer to Jakarta, in order to attend the LEMHANNAS (National Defence Institute of Indonesia) in Jakarta. Furthermore, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak has already invited the Chief of the Defence Force of Indonesia to visit Timor-Leste later this year.

Regarding this matter, which is a recurrent one since we cooperate with so many countries, it is important to understand that we do not want to become militarily dependent from other States. This is why we believe it is convenient to cooperate with various countries in the World. As such we have a rather positive relationship with Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific islands and the ASEAN countries. We also have healthy relationships with China, the United States of America, Indonesia, Portugal and so many other countries.

Out of the several activities already mentioned, I would like to highlight the importance to Timor-Leste of the National Security Law and the National Defence Law, as they regulate the role of the President of the Republic as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, as well as the connection between the F-FDTL and the Secretary of State for Defence, the Prime Minister, the National Parliament and other holds of high public bodies. This is a particularly important matter as it helps the Government to "prevent anyone from politicizing the F-FDTL and prevent the F-FDTL to interfere in politics". Indeed, it strengthens the constitutional idea that the Armed Forces must be nonpartisan, according to the principle that "the F-FDTL understand politics but must not participate in political meetings or display their political convictions". I should stress that I learned a great deal during my work with the F-FDTL, as the commanders told me "not to give them anything that they were not supposed to do". This expression serves to show in a clear manner the justification for separating politics from the military establishment.

The National Security Law is also indispensible because it regulates cooperation between the F-FDTL, the PNTL and Civil Protection in emergency situations. In fact, the Organic Law of the Ministry of Defence and Security, which has already been approved, foresees an Integrated Crisis Management Centre. Therefore we must be organized to provide assistance to the population in emergency situations, e.g. caused by some natural disaster. Although I have received no such official information, rumours have it that the National Security Law is not appreciated by the UN, as they say it militarizes the police. I hope that this information is not accurate.

After receiving that information from some Timorese citizens, I told them that foreigners always think that what Timor-Leste does is wrong. Only others do things right. There are events from which we can conclude that Timor is always wrong and the UN is always right! Let us consider the crisis caused by the attack on the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. Some of the distinguished gentlemen of the UN conveyed to the media that the Timorese were in charge of security. Perhaps they forgot that so far there are two Police Commanders, one from the PNTL and the other from the UNPOL. And it is the UNPOL Commander who is in charge! It was only recently that responsibility was turned to the PNTL in three districts, namely Lospalos, Oecussi and Mantuto.

Let us consider another situation. When the Joint Command travelled to the airport to receive the petitioners arriving from Oecussi and the F-FDTL showed up with the weapons they had brought from the KKO HQ, the UNPOL drafted a report stating that the F-FDTL had threatened them with large calibre weapons. The inaccuracy of this report indicates that the authors forget that in a situation of martial law the military must always be prepared, in what one might call a "state of readiness".

Let us now consider the review of the recent events in Maliana. UNPOL presented a report stating that the F-FDTL breached human rights and threatened Philippine elements of the UNPOL by pointing weapons at their chests. After the High Level Meeting with the President of the Republic, the Government assembled a team to investigate the Maliana events. The team consisted of two officers from the State Ministry, Lieutenant-Colonel Koliati from the F-FDTL and Lieutenant Niki from the Military Police, international advisor Chandrabaland for the Secretariat of State for Defence, Inspector Domingos from the PNTL and Dr Anacleto Ribeiro from the Secretariat of State for Security. The investigation concluded that there was no indication of F-FDTL members having "pointed weapons at the chests of UNPOL members". As such it would seem that UNPOL presented an inaccurate report of the Maliana events, which can only serve the purpose of bringing discredit to the F-FDTL. However, the negative campaign to damage the image of F-FDTL continues. Notwithstanding the report from the investigation team, an article appeared in the Worldpoliticsreview.com entitled "East Timor: Security Sector Relapse?" in which it stated that "the domestic security situation improves in the months thereafter, but the police remained sub-ordinate to the army, which still involves itself in the internal security. According to eyewitnesses, UN Police attempts to intervene in a public order incident in Maliana in June 2009 near the Indonesian border, resulted in F-FDTL guns being pointed at the multinational Forces".

More recently, there was another case in the bar called "Casa Minha". Let us make a more detailed analysis of the event. Information from the police agent who was the victim and the youths who witnessed the event, affirmed that two drunken GNR members beat up the PNTL agent until he fell and for this reason the PNTL agent shot at the wheels of the GNR vehicle. UNPOL makes a report stating that the PNTL agent carried a pistol into the bar and fails to mention the intoxicated state of the GNRs.


This fact warranted the intervention of the PNTL General Commander, Longuinhos Monteiro, who strongly protested to the UNPOL Commissioner, Luís Miguel Carrilho who is from Portugal. Longuinhos Monteiro affirmed that "I ask that the two GNR members who beat up my agent be investigated thoroughly" (STL, 13 July 2009). What is known is that up until now the GNR members have been listed as unknown. Only more recently has there been an investigation initiated on this case, however, UNPOL has already issued a suspension notice to the victim, Police Agent Fransisco Magno HAU, while on the ather hand the GNR from UNPOL who beat up the victim are still free.


In relation to this case, the Portuguese newspaper Correio da Manha (16 July 2009), published inaccurate information in their article "Xanana's security leads an attack against the GNR" and the newspaper Noticias Lusofonia (16 July 2009) printed an article entitled "Xanana's Security Accused of Attacking Portuguese Military".

This is not the first time the GNR and UNPOL have violated human rights. We have the case of the PNTL agent, Constantino de Carvalho who was beaten up by the GNRs until he fell. We have the case of the Baucau PNTL Commander, Adérito Ximenes, whom the UNPOL accused of committing human rights violations against one of their members, but in the end, the Court of Appeal decided in favour of Commander Adérito and determined that the UNPOL member was wrong. We also have the case of the UIR Commander, Agostinho Gomes, whose intervention was aimed at resolving an incident at Manleuana Dili, however UNPOL accused him of human rights violations. Of course the UN wants to defend its reputation as UNPOL or UN but it forgets that it is not a "perfect" institution. If it had been a PNTL or F-FDTL member who was drunk and had beaten up others, perhaps the UN would have moved heaven and earth to produce a report in which they would have written a great deal on human rights. We always hear that alcohol, women and playing with guns do not go well together as they represent a security threat. On this matter we are all in full agreement as long as it does not apply only to the Timorese. In Australia, the military also apply this principle. But it seems that perhaps it does not apply to the UN! It is necessary to understand the fact that each of the interventions from each of the UNPOL countries has been uncoordinated and each has acted as they wanted.

The PNTL General Commander, Longuinhos Monteiro, is currently working to repair all that. What we do know is that if we compare the character, self-confidence and performance of some PNTL members with some UNPOL members, ours are much better. UNPOL members are controlled by politicians from their countries but they still want to teach our PNTL that they are better professionals than we.

CONCLUSION
: We all move according to the principle of "wanting to do what we (Timor Leste) want, rather than what others want". Although Timor-Leste is a small country, we have our own history, conveyed from generation to generation. As such, the Timorese must be able to choose between foreign opinions, since it would be unwise to follow those that merely seek to serve the interests of those countries.

Despite the negative aspects of international cooperation listed above, this cooperation is still extremely important and requires better coordination between Timorese authorities, the UN and foreign experts so that the Security Sector Reform project can move forward. However, this requires honesty by all. The UN and we must think on how we can improve things.

All of us who work on reforming the Security Sector have the strong support of the President of the Republic, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister, seeking to enable the proper reform of the Security Sector of Timor-Leste. Here we should highlight the contributions of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, who have always given us the utmost support in order for us to be able to apply that which is written in the Constitution of the Republic.

Finally, under the principle of "we (Timor Leste) do it because we (Timor Leste) want to follow universal values, not because others tell us to", meaning that "we (Timor Leste) want to do what we (Timor Leste) want, rather than what others want", it is important to understand that the experience of other States should be just a reference to us, rather than trying to reproduce it. If we all want to implement the ideal concept of security sector reform, it is important to understand that it will necessarily take its time, as only so can we find what is good for Timor-Leste.

*Secretary of State for Defence

Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

Jul 31, 2009

East Timor: Security Sector Relapse?

Simon Roughneen | 31 Jul 2009

DILI, Timor-Leste -- Security sector reform (SSR) is a vital part of state-building, especially in Timor-Leste, a country that came close to civil war in 2006. Significantly, though, few Timorese political leaders interviewed about the issue wanted to speak about one of the highest priorities for the U.N. Mission in Timor-Leste: completing -- and, by extension, to some degree implementing -- a comprehensive security sector review.

Neither the review nor the overall role of the U.N. in SSR was raised in any of World Politics Review's meetings with politicians in Timor-Leste. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a Dili-based foreign diplomat told WPR, "The Timorese will do SSR the Timorese way."

President Jose Ramos-Horta deflected the issue in a recent interview, focusing instead on the future of the army and police, in light of the imminent departure of resistance-era leaders due to retirement in the coming 2-3 years. Former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri told WPR that SSR proposals to date "are not really a reform," as what is proposed does not "have Timorese ownership."

All of the politicians interviewed spoke about the "resumption" of policing responsibilities by the Timorese police (PNTL) from the U.N. Mission. This is a vital part of SSR, given the police force's implosion in the 2006 violence. Moreover, the police has historically been subordinate to the army, known as the F-FDTL. That disparity was accentuated by the temporary Joint Command for national security set up after assassination attempts on President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao in February 2008.

The domestic security situation improved in the months thereafter, but the police remained subordinate to the army, which still involves itself in internal security. According to eyewitnesses, U.N. police attempts to intervene in a public order incident in Maliana in June 2009, near the Indonesian border, resulted in F-FDTL guns being pointed at the multinational forces.

Some police, meanwhile, are involved in smuggling and extortion, and double up as members of the country's martial arts gangs and clandestine societies. Participants in the 2006 violence are mostly still employed on the force, without any accountability for their actions.

It is estimated that over 100,000 Timorese may be gang members, itself a difficult security challenge. James Scambary, of the Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment (TLAVA), a research project that looks at ways to implement community security initiatives, reminded WPR that "in 2006-7, over 1,300 U.N. police and later the [Australian-led] International Stabilisation Force could not prevent gang fighting," which was an expression of both non-political and political violence.

Draft security laws recently submitted to the Timorese parliament include a civil protection component, featuring a proposed Authority for Civil Protection "to coordinate the civil protection agents at national, district and suco level." This could have the effect of legitimizing or rewarding gangs and past perpetrators of violence with official status. If carried out in tandem with focused community security work, on the other hand, the measure could yield positive results.

It remains a point of discussion whether the influence of international peacekeepers has itself been entirely positive. Shona Hawkes of the NGO monitoring group La'o Hamutuk says that giving the multinational forces immunity from prosecution sets a negative example for local counterparts. There are almost weekly skirmishes between the Portuguese National Republican Guard (GNR) and Timorese security forces, with the most recent one allegedly involving a GNR assault on the prime minister's personal security.

But SSR, in Timor-Leste and elsewhere, means more than fixing the police and army. It
is a wide-ranging concept, often difficult to implement in practice. By most definitions, it means addressing all of the "hard" -- and a good chunk of the "soft" -- parts of state power.
In Timor-Leste, according to a recent paper (.pdf) published by the Center for International Cooperation, that means addressing "important justice and rule-of-law issues, including poor judicial capacity, a long legacy of impunity, a decrepit detention system, parliamentary and civil society oversight of security institutions."

Police reform is just a part of the process and will not work if the wide range of SSR needs are not dealt with. Timor-Leste, for instance, has a backlog of more than 4,000 legal cases, and there are multiple examples of impunity at the highest political levels.

Without the following priority list, by no means exhaustive, SSR will remain elusive in the country:

- Reform of the legal system and an end to impunity;
- Adequate economic growth and development that provides jobs and education for idle youth who proliferate in the gangs;
- Transparent implementation of the proposed Land Law, which aims to clarify land ownership issues that were muddied by cycles of displacement and contradictory legal systems inherited from various occupying powers.

To put the explosive land issue in context, perhaps 50 percent of Dili's houses were "illegally" occupied after 1999. As James Scambary told WPR, "Much of the fighting and displacement in 2006 was over disputed land," with over 100,000 Timorese driven from their homes at the time.

But perhaps the key to SSR is negotiating the political interests that have yet to be untangled, accommodated, or overcome. This is unsurprising, as SSR usually comes after conflict, when politics is either atrophied or compromised by links to armed factions, whether official or otherwise.

The U.N. views SSR as both a post-conflict and a conflict-prevention issue. But as the OECD-DAC handbook on Security System Reform and Governance says, it can be "difficult to find local ownership for SSR, especially where it is most needed, for example where security forces are part of the problem or where SSR may have the potential to change current power relationships."

The U.N. inquiry into the events of 2006 highlighted fragile state institutions, weak rule of law, minimal parliamentary oversight, and deficiencies in the army and the police as contributing factors to the violence. In Timor-Leste, the security sector is characterized by personal relationships, political and regional affiliations, and old-boy networks of comradeships and rivalries built up over decades of resistance to violent foreign occupation.

It seems that whatever the government does, security forces will have considerable autonomy. The draft security laws task the heads of the military and police with proposing each force's rules of engagement, with subsequent approval in both cases by the president and the council of ministers.

Former Prime Minister Alkatiri says SSR is "not only a technical issue, and we have to depoliticize the institutions." His Fretilin government failed to do so, contributing to the 2006 meltdown. Whether its successor, led by an icon of the resistance doubling as both prime minister and defense minister, has the will to address SSR remains to be seen.

Simon Roughneen is a journalist currently in southeast Asia. His chapter on Security Sector Reform in Sudan was published in "Beyond Settlement" (Associated University Press, 2008).

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articlePrint.aspx?ID=4147

Jul 29, 2009

Security Sector Laws Submitted to Timor-Leste Parliament

New Government Bills admitted to Parliament and referred to Committees

On Monday, 29 June important government bills were admitted to Parliament and referred to the competent Standing Committees for consideration.

· Government Bill n. 25/II “Lei de Segurança Interna” (Law on Internal Security) and Government Bill n. 26/II “Lei de Segurança Nacional” (Law on National Security) put forth an integrated national security policy. They define a strategy of integrated action among the Armed Forces, Police and Civil Protection. Both bills were referred to the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defense (Committee B).

· Government Bill n. 27/II “Lei de Defesa Nacional” (Law on National Defense) establishes and regulates the country’s security framework, as provided by the Constitution of Timor-Leste and in line with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The bill was referred to the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defense (Committee B).

Early draft are below.

Internal Security Law English Translation.pdf

LeiBaSeguranzaNasionalJunho2009draft.pdf

NationalSecurityLawDraftEng.pdf

NationalSecurityLawJune2009draft.pdf

Jul 25, 2009

"The Last Resistance Generation": The Reintegration and Transformation of Freedom Fighters to Civilians in Timor-Leste

PAPER PRESENTED AT THE RMIT UNIVERSITY ‘HARII NASAUN IHA TIMOR-LESTE URBANU NO RURAL’ CONFERENCE, DILI, 8-10 JULY 2009.

Based on the research paper, ‘Forgotten Heroes or Bandidos? Timor Leste’s High Risk Youth: The long road to stability.’ [Sousa-Santos, draft, July 2009].

Contact Details: jss@sc-et.com

The Last Resistance Generation’:

The Reintegration and Transformation of Freedom Fighters to Civilians in Timor-Leste[1]

Jose Kai Lekke Sousa-Santos

The process of nationbuilding is a notoriously exclusive exercise despite the often used, but ill-exercised catch-cry ‘principle of participation’. The reality tends to be that the best intentions of the members of the international community often create an environment in which elements of the new society are often sequestered to the margins. In the case of Timor-Leste, these elements are mostly comprised of the last generation of freedom fighters to form the resistance movement and armed struggle against the Indonesian occupation. Referred to here as ‘the last resistance generation,’ this paper advances the argument that the failure to reintegrate and transform elements of this young demographic – many of whom are disenfranchised, unemployed, and poorly educated – has been a critical but not unforseen oversight of ten years of nationbuilding.

The failure to reintegrate and transform the last resistance generation is a paramount issue which continues to be, and has the potential to remain, in the worst case scenario, one of the central pillars or dynamics of instability in the process of nationbuilding and security sector reform(SSR). On the other hand, the best case scenario is that this issue will remain a fundamental socio-economic challenge to current and future leaders which will be responsible with the critical tasks of addressing the challenges of nation and statebuilding in a complex state such as Timor Leste. This paper examines the lack of a holistic approach addressing the reintegration and transformation of former informal and formal resistance groups leading to the marginalisation and disenfranchisement of this significant demographic, . This paper also highlights past and current state and international initiatives to reintegrate former recognized independence fighters into society, as well as unrecognized or uncategorized members of the resistance movement and also explores methods to positively transform, and engage this invaluable albeit potentially destabilising demographic.

A large number of these individuals and groups gained international notoriety as a consequence of the 2006 crisis. An underlying theme of this paper – in the words of one such prominent figure, “are we forgotten heroes or bandidos? And if they continue to call us bandidos, we will show them bandidos.” Unfortunately due to the attitudes sometimes shown by the international security forces, United Nations Police, and certain INGOs, the inadvertent demonization of these former heroes of the struggle for independence continues to occur and entrenches this culture of marginalisation.

Ten Years On

Timor-Leste now faces the same central predicament that most nations emerging out of war or civil strife experience: how does the state integrate those who fought or actively supported the struggle for independence and self-determination. Ten years of internationally managed or assisted initiatives, have yet to resolve this fundamental issue. Key grievances arisen from this demographic remain only partially addressed. Many of the youth who fought or were actively engaged in the struggle for independence – the last resistance generation– remain unacknowledged and are not included or able to fully participate in the economic, educational and state development accessible to many. This is mainly due to the traumatic factors which these young men and women faced during the Indonesian occupation from 1975-99. Moreover, during the ten years since the referendum, the opinions and solutions espoused by many well-meaning countries, humanitarian agencies, and international NGOs, on how to build the national security infrastructure,[2] have failed to fully take into account the historical and socio- cultural complexities. Hundreds of thousands of dollars and countless man-hours have been spent addressing the issue of security sector reform as part of the broader nationbuilding exercise – issues deemed by international stakeholders as paramount to the future stability of an emerging democracy in Timor-Leste. This paper does not advocate an across-the-board identification or solution to all these problems but rather seeks to address one of the key topics which, Timorese NGOs[3] advocating for disenfranchised youth and disaffected groups have red flagged as one of the few critical issues yet to be addressed and resolved.

The Marginalisation and Disenfranchisement of the ‘Last Resistance Generation’

Comprising what is termed here as ‘the last resistance generation,’ are a complex mix of countless remnants consisting of young former FALINTIL fighters; ritual arts groups and semi religious sects, of secret societies and clandestine youth cells incorporated into the structures of martial arts organisations. All were critical components of the resistance and independence movement which now ten years on from the referendum, continue to struggle with issues regarding cultural and national identity, deep-seated trauma, the loss associated with no longer fulfilling a vital role in society, and a fundamental sense of not belonging in mainstream civil society. The ongoing marginalisation of the last resistance generation by – and from - the process of nationbuilding underway in Timor-Leste since 1999, reflects a failure to genuinely acknowledge and address the historical role that many young Timorese played in the fight for independence, and threatens to undermine contemporary statebuilding efforts. The issue of marginalisation and disenfranchisement is by no means exclusive to this category. However, the inclusion, meaning participation and not just representation, of the last resistance generation, is of critical concern in the context of both security sector reform and national development.

The last resistance generation which played such a critical role during the final years of the struggle for independence now feel marginalised and/or discriminated against due to the lack of recognition for both their roles and involvement during the resistance leading to a loss of opportunities in education and socio-economic prosperity. A singularly common denominator – and occasionally unifying factor - amongst the majority of individuals and elements within these groups scattered throughout urban and rural Timor-Leste is the poverty of opportunity they have experienced and an overriding sense of not belonging. It is of no coincidence that a proportion within these groups are well-represented by a frequently quoted and critically important demographic fact: the largest demographic within Timor-Leste’s population is our youth and up to two-thirds of Timorese youth are either directly involved with or affiliated to martial arts, ritual arts or disaffected groups. This demographic combined – this last resistance generation – is potentially volatile as demonstrated during the 2006 crisis and presents an uncompromising security landscape which needs to be understood and engaged with by stakeholders, not demonised or further marginalised. This militaristic and often feared demographic should and could become Timor-Leste’s greatest resource.

Early DDRR Initiative

Despite early efforts in disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) programmes, many young former FALINTIL remain at the margins of society. Over 1000 former FALINTIL fighters went through the reintegration program, but thousands of others remained dissatisfied with their treatment and the manner in which the new army had been established.[4] In 2001 this dissatisfaction led to the creation of a number of veterans’ organisations and riots in December 2002.[5] Former FALINTIL fighters under the age of 35 who do not qualify to be considered as veterans under current government legislation are to a large extent uneducated, lacking in vocational skills, and suffering from extensive post-traumatic stress disorder. For instance, young former FALINTIL fighters who were not integrated into the newly-formed defence or police forces mainly due to high levels of post-traumatic stress disorder and / or the lack of educational skills, such as literacy and numeracy, are relegated to accepting menial positions in the very State that they have sacrificed so much to create.

The FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program or (FRAP) developed in 2000 under the UNTAET administration attempted to assist in the social and economic reintegration into civilian society of the 1,308 guerrilla fighters not selected to join the new East Timor Defence Force. Although a package consisting of: transport to their host communities; a transitional safety net of USD$500.00 provided over a 5 month period; a reintegration package or income generating activity; training; as well as job and medical referrals, it was not a long-term solution but rather provided initial support to the former combatants and did not engage or guarantee participation in the broader nation-building process.[6]

The Alkatiri / Fretilin Government created a secretary of state for veteran’s affairs and undertook the registering of veterans with the intention of granting pensions.[7] The caveat, however, is that only 350 veterans with service of fifteen years or more will receive monthly payments of calculated at USD$407 ($100 more a month than the public service salary). Veterans who have served eight to fourteen years only become eligible to receive a pension after the age of fifty-five. For many young fighters experiencing difficulties in accessing employment, education and vocational training, feel this to be unjust and discriminatory.

The transition from combatant life to civilian is shaped by context and it is arguable that for the transition, and therefore reintegration and transformation, to have a lasting impact, the unique cultural, historical, and social fabric and context of Timor-Leste must be an integral part of any strategy that seeks to address this issue. Particularly, the role of traditional leadership and power structures within Timor Leste, which comprises of large numbers of former combatants and clandestine elements – as central figures. The difficulties regarding the identification and validification of members of the clandestine movement has meant that as of yet there have been no similar programmes or initiatives to address and support the needs of these former clandestine elements and groups.

Former key elements of the independence movement such as formal and informal clandestine groups; ritual art groups; cells and elements within martial arts groups are at risk of morphing into disenfranchised and violent armed groups, organised criminal elements, and / or guns for hire.

Trauma and A Sense of Not Belonging = Violence and Instability

One of the critical and largely unaddressed consequences of the occupation is the widespread trauma experienced by those engaged both directly and indirectly in the struggle. Severe and untreated post-traumatic stress disorder has led to the elements who have contributed to the struggle being left at a disadvantage as opposed to the youth demographic which was not involved in the struggle for independence and was able to pursue and access a semi-normal life, for example, through educational, employment, and health care opportunities. Access to opportunities has better enabled this demographic to more easily integrate into an independent Timor-Leste and thereby overcome a certain level of trauma. Those who have little or no experience beyond the jungle and minimal opportunity to develop their skills beyond that of guerrilla warfare, civil disturbances, and the instigation of instability during the occupation, now find themselves within a vacuum regarding their identity, skill-sets, and a place and means in which to contribute to a now independent Timor-Leste. The lack of opportunity and sense of not belonging compounded by post-traumatic stress disorder can manifest in deep-seated resentment which will continue to maintain the availability of these groups as a source of political and civil instability.

A Source of Instability: Alternative Security Structures

The reintegration and transformation of young resistance veterans – including both FALINTIL and clandestine - into mainstream society is an essential component of nationbuilding and the mitigation of future conflict. It is of little coincidence that a number of the martial arts and ritual arts groups involved in the 2006-07 violence have their origins in the clandestine and guerrilla movement. Strong affiliations to both of the respective national security institutions – the F-FDTL and PNTL – as well as political parties and / or economic elites further necessitates the need for a comprehensive and holistic understanding and approach to transform past security and clandestine structures into the state apparatus. Due to their moral authority and legitimacy established during the occupation, many of these groups pose a challenge – and legitimate alternative - to state authority, specifically to the security sector and administrative institutions at the local and national levels.

Where to from here?

The approach advocated in this paper is a far more holistic, comprehensive, and socially appropriate approach that challenges those involved in SSR – the Government, the United Nations, international security stakeholders and INGOs– to engage this demographic not only in discussion but also into the security sector reform and nationbuilding process itself. Programmes initiated by local Timorese NGOs such as Uma Juventude, Ba Futuru, and many others, where selected young leaders from groups such as(7-7, 5-5, 3-3, 12-12, Fitar bua Malus, PSHT, KORK, Colimau Duah Ribuh and Sagrada Familia as well as Former FALINTIL fighters under the age of 35) were given the opportunity to engage in intensive training in conflict mediation, peacebuilding, and nationbuilding techniques, after completion of the programs the majority of participants have shown their effectiveness as agents of conflict mediation and change both at the grass-roots and national levels.

Academics and practitioners alike need to think outside the box and utilise programmes such as those conducted within the region in response to conflict in Bougainville and the Solomons Islands which gave young combatants the opportunity to experience possibilities beyond the jungle.

For instance, in response to the protracted civil war in Bougainville, the New Zealand Government invited leaders from the two warring factions from Bougainville on a study-tour of New Zealand where they were able to meet with Maori representatives and discuss traditional methods of maintaining nationhood and identity within a modern democratic state.

This eventuated in a change of attitudes on the part of the leaders of these warring factions, created bonds and understanding between the leaders based on mutual experience, and opened their eyes to the possibilities and benefits of dealing with long-standing conflicts and animosity through peaceful means within cultures similar to their own. This enabled Bougainvilleans to then peaceably address the long-standing self-determination movement between the Bougainvillean people and the Papua New Guinean state.

It is critical for the future peace and stability of Timor-Leste that all stakeholders involved in security sector reform – from the Timorese Government to the United Nations and all in between – that increased engagement with the last resistance generation is prioritised as it this group who themselves hold both the answers and the key to long-term security and stability in Timor Leste.

Selected References

International Crisis Group, ‘Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform,’ Crisis Group Asia Report No 143, 17 January 2008.

King’s College of London, ‘Independent Study of Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor,’ The Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, London, September 2000.

McCarthy, John, ‘Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP), A Final Evaluation Report,’ (USAID: Dili, East Timor), June 2002.

Rees, Edward, ‘The UN’s failure to integrate FALINTIL veterans may cause East Timor to fail,’ Online Opinion Australia, 2 September 2003

Sousa-Santos, Jose, ‘Forgotten Heroes or Bandidos? The Last Resistance Generation of Timor-Leste’ [draft research paper], July 2009.

Sydney Morning Herald, ‘East Timor at flashpoint as disillusionment sets in,’ 14 December 2002.


[1] This paper was presented at the RMIT University‘Harii Nasaun iha Timor-Leste Urbanu no Rural’ conference, Dili, 8-10 July 2009, and is based on the research paper, ‘Forgotten Heroes or Bandidos? Timor Leste’s High Risk Youth: The long road to stability.’ [Sousa-Santos, draft, July 2009].

[2] The earliest and most influential of which was the King’s College of London, ‘Independent Study of Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor,’ The Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, London, September 2000. For a recent critique of security sector reform initiatives, see International Crisis Group, ‘Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform,’ Crisis Group Asia Report No 143, 17 January 2008.

[3] Such as the national NGO Uma Juventude

[4] For a critical evaluation of the Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program, see John McCarthy, Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP), A Final Evaluation Report, (USAID: Dili, East Timor), June 2002.

[5] ‘East Timor at flashpoint as disillusionment sets in,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 14 December 2002.

[6] John McCarthy, Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP), A Final Evaluation Report, (USAID: Dili, East Timor), June 2002, ibid. See also, Edward Rees, ‘The UN’s failure to integrate FALINTIL veterans may cause East Timor to fail,’ Online Opinion Australia, 2 September 2003.

[7] International Crisis Group (2003), ‘Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform,’ p.20.