- JohnAMacDougall #Google #Chrome #Browser use growing rapidly http://tcrn.ch/cGSjY7 #internet
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JohnAMacDougall #Facebook launches (mostly) free #mobile site in #Indonesia http://bit.ly/9RJikh #internet #southeast ">1 Retweet
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May 19, 2010
My Tweets Earlier Today, 19 May 2010
Compassion, prejudice and American Muslims
By Walied Shater
Saturday, May 15, 2010; A15
I woke up early on Sept. 12, 2001, to get ready for work. I put on my best suit, my only custom-made shirt, my most expensive Nordstrom tie. I shined my shoes. I was tense and nervous and did not know what to expect from my co-workers. I had, by chance, been off duty the day before, the day of the horrific attacks on the United States, and of course by late evening on Sept. 11, the names of the suspected hijackers began to come out. All were Arabic or Muslim names like mine.
Since January 2000, I had been assigned to the most important division in the U.S. Secret Service: the Presidential Protective Division, commonly known as PPD. I held a top-secret clearance, reported to the White House daily, and traveled routinely on Air Force One or Marine One with the president. I loved the experience. I had never felt discriminated against at work or socially, except for a few "terrorist" jokes. I was a welcomed and trusted member of the division.
Sept. 12 was different, though. Nineteen men had killed close to 3,000 Americans the day before in the name of my religion.
As I entered the White House, I prepared myself mentally for the verbal barrage to come. I had grown up a tough kid in Brooklyn and had been raised a proud American Muslim.
As I walked to the office for agents on the president's detail, I was intercepted by a supervisor named Ron. When he asked to speak with me, I said I had to put my equipment bag in the office and would come right back. I was trying to buy time to get ready for what might come. As I approached Ron, a tall and strong man in his early 50s, I thought, "Here it comes, stay cool."
Ron stood up as a preemptive strike to anyone who might have said something to me that day. He told me I belonged. He embodied what was great about America. As the day went on I felt ashamed of the fears I had felt earlier.
When I concluded my five-year assignment on the PPD in 2005, managers told me I had led more presidential security advance teams than any other agent since 2000. My wife and I were proud of my work and proud for a nation in which an American Muslim can achieve anything. That is America.
Today, though, American Muslims feel under siege. Too many feel the American dream is not for them. For a few, radicalization is the next step. Anti-Muslim rhetoric has reached epic proportions in broader U.S. society -- largely tolerated, rarely condemned. While "terrorism experts" cite frequent travel to Muslim countries or Internet videos as primers for radicalization, the core primer, which is largely unremarked upon, is the siege mentality surrounding American Muslims.
Many factors contribute to this mentality, including rhetoric from fringe hate groups, the demonization of Muslims by Hollywood and repeated questions of loyalty by (conservative)
commentators. Nothing is more debilitating to the psyche of American Muslims than to have those in positions of authority remain silent after such
comments or, worse, contribute to the hostility.
American Muslims notice when, as happened last week, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service stopped using an anti-Muslim film "Obsession: Radical Islam's Obsession with the West" to train agents. But American Muslims also notice when a Florida Republican candidate for Congress, Dan Fanelli, runs television ads in which he points to a white man and asks, "Does this look like a terrorist?" and then turns to an Arab-looking man and asks, "Or this?"
Or when Congress invites the preacher Franklin Graham to speak at the National Day of Prayer event on Capitol Hill despite Graham's infamous remarks about Islam as a "very evil and wicked religion."
U.S. leaders need to do much more to help bring American Muslims into the mainstream. The president and others should follow the example set by former secretary of state Colin Powell when he endorsed then-candidate Barack Obama on "Meet the Press." Reacting to assertions that Obama was Muslim, Powell asked, "Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country? Is there something wrong with some 7-year-old Muslim American kid believing that he or she could be president?"
Not just American Muslims but all Americans need to see and hear examples of people like my former supervisor and Colin Powell.
The writer served as a special agent with the U.S. Secret Service from 1995 to 2007.
View all comments that have been posted about this article.
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May 18, 2010
Thai Tourism Takes Big Hit From Street Mayhem
Agnes Dherbeys for The New York Times
A porter in front of Dusit Thani, one of the grand hotels of Bangkok, as it prepared to close temporarily on Monday amid clashes between antigovernment protesters and the Thai military.
By SETH MYDANS
BANGKOK — Some of the city’s grandest hotels are shut and ringed with coils of glittering razor wire. Foreign visitors have deserted its temples and backpacker haunts. Military roadblocks hem in some of its famous nightspots.
Arrivals at Bangkok’s international airport are down by at least one-third, and hotel occupancy rates hover around 20 percent to 30 percent.
Thailand’s tourism industry, built on an image of gentleness, pleasure and smiles, is suffering its worst setback in decades — perhaps the worst in its history, according to tourism officials.
As scenes of the country’s violent uprising have spread around the world — bombs and bodies, street fights and gunfire — people abroad are asking whether it is safe to visit Bangkok.
The brief answer, from embassies and security experts and even some people in the tourism industry, is: probably not right now.
At least 37 people have died in five days of fighting between the military and antigovernment demonstrators, known as the red shirts. Although the two sides may now be edging toward negotiations, the potential for more violence remains.
Forty-seven nations have told their citizens to be cautious about travel to Thailand, and several, including the United States, have warned them to stay away.
The violence has been confined so far to a relatively small, though central, area of Bangkok. But the city is tense. Roadblocks, checkpoints and shutdowns of public transportation have made travel difficult. Taxi drivers refuse to take passengers to some parts of the city.
On Saturday, the United States Embassy issued an advisory that said, “All United States citizens should defer all travel to Bangkok and defer all nonessential travel to the rest of Thailand.” It said all nonemergency government workers and their families were authorized to leave.
On Tuesday, the Tourism Authority of Thailand issued its own advisory, saying, “Visitors and tourists are advised to be vigilant, follow news developments, exercise extra caution and avoid areas covered by the declaration of a severe emergency situation” — areas that include not only the capital, Bangkok, but also 21 provinces.
In fact much of Bangkok is peaceful, as are virtually all parts of the provinces covered in the advisory, and many Thais are disturbed to see their country portrayed as a place of violence.“When you get out from those areas of political turmoil, things seem to move as smoothly as ever,” said Korakot Punlopruksa, a travel writer and photographer. “We still live peacefully, we still love good food, and the sea is still beautiful.”
Thais try to break away from thoughts of the conflict, she said.
“Otherwise, we would go crazy.”
On Khaosan Road, a low-budget haven that is far from the fighting, the calm weighed like a heavy cloud over half-empty bars and souvenir shops and hostels. Rows of three-wheeled tuk-tuk taxis stood idle in front of empty Internet cafes and foot-massage parlors.
“It’s annoying,” said Muk Singh, 50, the proprietor of a tailor shop called Novo Fashion, speaking of the political violence. “It’s affecting us. We have expenses to meet and rent to pay.”
Most visitors seemed to shrug off the city’s tensions.
“We went to the train station today to buy tickets, and we saw soldiers with guns and police on barricades and SWAT teams,” said Jake Frieda, 19, from Britain, who is traveling before he attends college. “But I think they’re not bothering tourists. They’re leaving tourists alone.”
On Soi Cowboy, a street filled with bars where women dance in skimpy outfits, Bobby Edwards, 50, a retiree from Britain, said he had come here rather than to the more famous Patpong Road because of the protests.
“Patpong is the sex entertainment center of Bangkok,” he said. “The red shirts have basically closed it down because it’s located near of the center of their protests.”
Rebecca Hinckley, 33, a legal secretary from Ireland, said she had been terrified Saturday night when she had found herself in the wrong place at the wrong time.
“Two bombs went off, and we started running,” she said. “We could hear the crowds coming towards us, we could hear gunfire, we just started running like crazy. Everybody was very, very great to us. They were shouting, ‘Run, run, run!’ They were running with us.”
But still, she added: “I love Thailand. I still feel safe here. Unfortunately we were stupid enough to be out walking last night. It seems like everywhere else is quite normal.”
Tourism, one of Thailand’s most sophisticated and successful industries, accounts for 6 percent or 7 percent of the country’s economy. Twenty percent of employment in Thailand is directly or indirectly linked to tourism, according to the Thailand National Statistical Office.
Two weeks ago, before the worst of the violence erupted, Tourism and Sports Minister Chumpol Silapa-archa estimated that the number of tourists would slide by 10 percent, to 12.7 million this year, from 14.1 million last year. Earlier, officials had projected a rise to 15.5 million.
Charoen Wanganonanond, a spokesman for the Federation of Thai Tourism Associations, told The Bangkok Post: “It’s hard to say what will happen. What is certain is that the recovery process will be long and costly. This is the worst crisis ever faced in the history of the Thai tourism industry.”
Bangkok is already planning its clean-up operation once the protesters move out of the high-end shopping area they have occupied. The city administration said it would clean roads and sewers and water mains, remove garbage and bring in 1,000 monks to chant and accept alms.
Surveillance cameras, disabled by the protesters, will be repaired.
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Softbank to Help Twitter Get Even Bigger in Japan
By HIROKO TABUCHI
TOKYO — Twitter is set to get a big boost in Japan, one of its biggest and fastest-growing markets, after the Japanese cellphone carrier Softbank on Tuesday announced new handsets designed to link to the microblogging site, part of a major effort by Softbank to get a piece of America’s tech savvy.
Twitter has taken off in a big way here in the past two years, fanned by media exposure and the use of the service by a flurry of celebrities: Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama tweets frequently, as does the astronaut and national hero Soichi Noguchi, who tweets from the International Space Station.
The number of unique users in Japan surged from 521,000 in April 2009 to 7.52 million in March, a 15-fold increase, according to the technology ratings service Nielsen Online Japan. Figures show Twitter is fast catching up to Japan’s biggest social networking site, Mixi, which had about 10.8 million unique users in March. An analysis by Semiocast, based in Paris, in February found 14 percent of the millions of tweets per day worldwide are in Japanese.
“Twitter has seen tremendous growth all around the world in the past year, but in particular we’ve seen outstanding growth in Japan,” Evan Williams, chief executive of Twitter, said via a live link from the company’s headquarters in San Francisco at a Softbank news conference here. “It’s become one of our biggest and most important countries.”
“We believe Twitter is poised for even greater growth given the tremendous usage of keitai in Japan, and because Twitter has always been focused on the mobile, cellphone experience,” Mr. Williams added, using the Japanese word for cellphone.
Softbank, Japan’s fastest-growing cellphone carrier, with about 22 million subscribers, has been pushing Twitter as a new way to get Japanese hooked on its mobile data services. Softbank, which is the sole carrier of the iPhone in Japan, also runs the country’s most popular search engine and biggest Internet provider, and recently won exclusive rights to bring the iPad to Japan.
Softbank’s founder and chief executive, Masayoshi Son, has been one of Twitter’s biggest fans, tweeting enthusiastically, posting frequent replies to questions from followers and urging all of Softbank’s employees to tweet. He uses Twitter even from his bathtub, he claimed, using an iPhone and a Ziploc bag.
“Twitter has changed my life, my lifestyle,” he said. Japan is in fact leapfrogging older sites like Facebook to register directly to Twitter. “That’s why it’s experiencing explosive growth here in Japan,” Mr. Son said.
The service has benefited from a certain kind of herd mentality in Japan.
“Whenever Twitter celebrities are introduced on TV, tens of thousands of Japanese start to use it,” said Nobuyuki Hayashi, a Japan-based technology expert and author of three books on Twitter. In cities like Tokyo, where many people live alone and inviting friends over is rare, a lot of people may have been craving conversation partners they are now finding on Twitter, he said.
Another big factor is the compact nature of the Japanese script means 140 characters allows for more substantial and complex posts. The word “internationalization,” for example, takes up just 3 characters in Japanese.
But there are plenty of more mundane tweets, often reflecting the nation's love of cuisine. “Midnight ramen now,” read a recent post by the user @ico390, followed by a link to a picture of noodles snapped on a cellphone.
Softbank also has a 30 percent stake in the Silicon Valley video streaming site Ustream, a service Mr. Son said he hoped would encourage users to tweet links to videos as well as photos.
Usage is especially high among Japanese in their 20s and 30s, is concentrated in big cities and about 44 percent of all users have tweeted from their cellphones, according to a 2010 survey of 5,500 Japanese by the Tokyo-based Fujitsu Research Institute.
Computer users connect to Twitter for an average of 4.4 hours a day, while those who use handsets log in for 2.3 hours, according to a separate study of 10,500 users by Ascii Media Works.
Softbank’s Twitter widget, or embedded application, will display an icon on the welcome screen of 14 cellphones from Softbank that lets users jump directly to a customized Twitter site, according to Softbank. Many phones also come with touch panels, TV receivers, solar cells and waterproofing.
“We expect to start growing faster than ever here with increased awareness of Twitter,” said Kevin Thau, Twitter’s mobile platform director, visiting Japan for Softbank’s announcement. “People tend to explore when they get new phones. It’s great for discoverability,” he said. The official Twitter widget on Softbank, he said, is hopefully “the start of a trend around the world.”
The growth in Japan adds to the good news at Twitter, which said last month that it had 106 million registered users and was adding new users at the rate of 300,000 a day.
Twitter’s service in Japan has long led the way in a quest by the company to take advantage of its rapid growth for revenue. Since Twitter’s Japan site went online in April 2008, it has carried ads — something the U.S site did not have. Companies from Sony to Toyota have set up corporate Twitter accounts.
Last month, Twitter finally unveiled an advertising program in the United States that shows up when users search for keywords that advertisers have bought to link to their ads.
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Tempo - Cilangkap Metamorphosis
REFORMS marginalized the military that was dominant during the New Order era. The climax took place 10 years ago when TNI Commander in Chief, Admiral Widodo A.S., affirmed the military’s willingness to abandon politics. Thereafter, various reforms of the military institutions have been carried out.
Governance
During the New Order, military personnel on active duty were appointed as cabinet ministers. Only during the Habibie days were ministers from the military given two options: retire from the military to remain a member of the cabinet or return to their units. Here is the number of ministers from the military.
Development Cabinet I: 8 (all on active duty)
Development Cabinet II: 6 (all on active duty)
Development Cabinet III: 15 (14 active + 1 retiree)
Development Cabinet IV: 17 (4 active + 13 retirees)
Development Cabinet V: 14 (4 active + 10 retirees)
Development Cabinet VI: 10 (4 active + 6 retirees)
During the New Order, at least 83 people from the military were appointed governors.
Pelita I (1969-1974)
19 persons
Among others West Java Governor Solihin G.P. and Jakarta Governor Ali Sadikin
Pelita II (1974-1979)
20 persons
Among others Jakarta Governor H Tjokropranolo and Bali Governor Soekarmen
Pelita III (1979-1983)
16 persons
Among others West Java Governor Aang Kunaefi Kartawiria and Central Java Governor Supardjo Rustam
Pelita IV (1983-1988)
14 persons
Among others Central Java Governor Muhammad Ismail and East Java Governor Wahono
Pelita V (1988-1993)
12 persons
Among others East Java Governor Soelarso, Central Java Governor Muhammad Ismail, and West Java Governor Yogi S. Memed
Pelita VI (1993-1998)
Among others Jakarta Governor Soerjadi Soedirdja and Sutiyoso
DPR
The number of “free” seats for the military in the DPR was slashed following the reforms. The breakdown:
1960: 35 seats from 283 seats in the DPR-GR
1966: 36 seats from 283 seats in the DPR-GR
1966: 39 seats (16%) from 242 seats in the DPR-GR
1967: 43 seats (12%) from 350 seats in the DPR-GR
1968: 75 seats (16%) from 460 DPR seats
1972: 75 seats (16%) from 460 DPR seats, 155 in the MPR
1977: 75 seats (16%) from 460 DPR seats, 155 in the MPR
1982: 75 seats (16%) from 460 DPR seats, 155 in the MPR
1987: 100 seats (20%) from 500 DPR seats, 51 in the MPR
1992: 100 seats (20%) from 500 DPR seats, 50 in the MPR
1997: 75 seats (15%) from 500 DPR seats, 38 in the MPR
1999: 38 seats (7%) from 500 DPR seats, 14 in the MPR
The Nature of Palace-Cilangkap Relations
Four presidents after Suharto took different policies toward the military. Radical changes were made during the administration of Abdurrahman Wahid who was in power for only one and a half years.
HABIBIE ADMINISTRATION
He made the initial policy to separate the military from the police. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) is changed into the Indonesian Military (TNI). The military also severed organizational ties with Golkar and affirmed neutrality during the 1999 General Elections.
ABDURRAHMAN WAHID ADMINISTRATION
He separated the post of Defense Minister from ABRI Commander’s post and appointed civilian academic Juwono Sudarsono as Defense Minister. He carried out the separation of the National Police from the TNI.
During the Abdurrahman Wahid administration the Coordinating Agency to Support the Strengthening of National Stability (Bakorstanas) and the Special Research Institute (Litsus) are abolished. The army domination over the TNI Commander post is abolished by appointing Admiral Widodo A.S.
MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI ADMINISTRATION
She had no clear direction in putting the military in order, as seen from, among other things, the appointment of Matori Abdul Djalil who was not capable of becoming the Defense Minister. The post was left vacant for a long time after Matori suffered a stroke. The military had considerable influence over Megawati’s decision-making process, especially in attempts to solve the Aceh conflict.
SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO ADMINISTRATION
There have been no radical changes in matters of reorganizing the military. Attempts to settle the TNI business issues have not been finalized either.
1999
- Cilangkap expresses the New Paradigms on TNI’s Sociopolitical Roles:
- Changing its position and methods; the military should not necessarily be at the forefront at all times
- Changing its concept from occupying into influencing
- Changing the direct influencing method into indirect influencing method
- Willing to act together when making important state and government decision-making efforts
- Abolishment of Central and Regional Sociopolitical Council
- Changing the Sociopolitical Staff into Territorial Staff. Chief of Sociopolitical Staff is changed into Chief of Territorial Staff
- Liquidating ABRI Functionalism Staff, ABRI Community Security and Order, and ABRI Functionalism Development Board
- Abolishing ABRI Functionalism through retirement decision or change in status
- Assignment of soldiers outside their structural or functional positions in the Defense and Security Department/ABRI shall be designated as a change in status into civilian civil servants or retirees
- For soldier assignment outside the above, the status of active-duty soldier shall be given only to legislative positions, military secretary to the RI President and staff, RI Defense Attaché and staff, as well as aides to the president and vice president
- Severance of organizational ties with Golkar and keeping the same distance with all the existing political parties
- TNI commitment and neutrality consistency during the general elections
2000
Separation of the National Police from the Armed Forces, and ABRI becomes TNI by virtue of President Abdurrahman Wahid’s Decree No. 89/2000
2004
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Tempo - When Generals Redeploy
The TNI gave up its dual function. The TNI/Police Faction left earlier than the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) deadline.
... The words dual function make no more sense. Once again we’re back to defense/security duties. The TNI/Police are returning to professions...
THE verses marked the end of assignments of generals in Senayan. The poem entitled Pamit (Goodbye) was read out by Maj. Gen. Kohirin Suganda Saputra in the House of Representatives (DPR)/MPR building. Kohirin acted as spokesman for the TNI/Police faction in the September 24, 2004 session. All members of the MPR promptly rose from their seats and warmly applauded.
In the final session of MPR members for the 1999-2004 term, the TNI/Police faction was present in Senayan for the last time. The divorce between the military/police and Senayan was based on the Decree of the MPR No. VII/2000 on the role of the TNI and Police. The decree was endorsed on August 18, 2000. In the same year, the MPR also applied the separation between the military and police.
Pursuant to the MPR decree, TNI and police members no longer have the right to vote and be elected as of the 2004 General Elections. In compensation, the TNI/Police faction was still allowed to remain until 2009 so it could take part in policy making through the MPR. And this faction seemed to leave sooner than the deadline set in the decree. The TNI/Police said goodbye a week after the second phase of the 2004 presidential election.
In his speech, Kohirin said the decision meant the military’s determination to abandon practical politics. Soldiers would specialize themselves in their profession as apparatus of the state and executor of state defense and security. “It’s not due to pressure from any party,” assured Kohirin.
The faction of TNI and Police appeared on June 25, 1960 according to Presidential Decree No.156/1960 on the membership of the Mutual Assistance House of Representatives and the package of political legislation. The military and police always got “free” MPR/DPR seats until 2004.
When the New Order was born, the DPR provided 100 seats for the Indonesian Armed Forces faction. The number of seats in the DPR was reduced to 75 based on the decree of the 1993 MPR General Assembly. In the debate over the bill on structures and positions of the MPR, the DPR, and the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) in 1999, the soldiers’ free seats were again questioned by some factions.
The government in the draft debate proposed 55 seats. The TNI/Police faction in the same discussion offered 40 seats. The United Development Party faction recommended 2 percent soldiers in Senayan or 10 of the total of DPR members. The Development Functionaries faction allotted 25 seats for soldiers.
The book SBY Sang Demokrat (SBY the Democrat) says Territorial Chief of Staff Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono held an internal meeting to deal with seat allocation. They agreed to reduce the seat number by 50 percent or 38 seats.
Yudhoyono, also a spokesman for the TNI/Police faction, lobbied several factions for the 38 proposed. Finally, the MPR approved the total of 38 as stipulated in Law No. 4/1999 on the structures and position of the MPR, the DPR, and the DPRD.
Outside Senayan, the pressure for military reform was mounting. At a meeting in Ciganjur in 1998, Amien Rais, Akbar Tandjung, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati suggested that the presence of generals in Senayan should be until 2004. Public demos also earnestly demanded that the military return to barracks.
At a hearing with the Ad Hoc Committee of the MPR Working Body in February 2000, TNI Commander Admiral Widodo A.S. stated the military was ready to withdraw from Senayan in 2004. The TNI staff meeting on April 19-20, 2000 at last decided the military exit from politics by eliminating the dual function. Commander Widodo reported the meeting’s seven-point conclusion to President Abdurrahman Wahid.
The conclusion created a new military paradigm that led to a more pronounced departure from politics. The clear-cut statement of military leaders was not directly proportional to the consensus in Senayan. The MPR draft decree on the role of the military and police still allowed soldiers the opportunity to sit longer in Senayan.
Article 5 of the draft specified the military’s participation in policy determination through the MPR. In the plenary session in August 2000, the provision in the article was added by “no later than 2009”. It was meant as compensation because the military would have no more right to vote and be elected.
The grace period for soldiers faced no significant constraint in Senayan. At the plenary session to endorse the article, only one member lodged a protest. Hartono Marjono (deceased) from the Crescent Star Party faction presented a note of objection and rejected the extension of military assignments until 2009.
In his view, the reform demanded that the TNI’s assignment term be terminated in 2004. Harjono said the article in the decree was mistaken and unresponsive to public aspirations. “I can’t accept it if the TNI/Police later become a target of public denouncement,” he stated as he read out his objection.
The MPR decree kept going. Interruptions, said Speaker Amien Rais, would not in the least reduce the provision already agreed upon. “It’s surprising,” said former TNI/Police faction member Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo. “The political elite even maintained the TNI until 2009.”
At an annual session in 2002, the TNI/Police faction sped up the divorce from Senayan. In a faction internal lobby, Agus Widjojo talked to Commander in Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto. Agus said the military should hasten the withdrawal from Senayan. “If we do it now, we will depart honorably,” added Agus. Gen. Sutarto agreed and asked for the maintenance of TNI’s honor.
The hastened decision was considered too abrupt. Former Army Chief of Staff Tyasno Sudarto said the attempt to withdraw soldiers from the MPR/DPR was urged by foreign forces. According to him, the military should have remained in the MPR as group delegates. “What happened was the domination of external forces through globalization,” he added.
The military was determined to return to barracks and become professional. In the 2004 annual session, the TNI/Police faction did say goodbye. Kohirin read the verse: …we say goodbye with 10 fingers on the chest....
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Tempo - Military Traces in Tegalboto
The military headed Jember University for two decades. The intention was to absorb campus political upheavals.
THOUSANDS of people thronged the main roads and town square of Jember, East Java. Crowds of demonstrators were yelling “Hang Utrecht!”. In the middle of 1964, they protested against Secretary of the Dean of the Law School of Brawijaya University, Jember Branch, Dr Ernst Utrecht, who instructed the dissolution of the Islamic Students Association (HMI) in his school.
The stance of the chief adviser of the Indonesian National Students Movement (GMNI) was seen as a way of strengthening the domination of GMNI at the college that was later rechristened Jember University. A senior lecturer of the campus, Sumaryono, 73, related that the mass protest known as the Utrecht Incident was an explosion of the strong friction between students’ organizations. “These organizations were suspicious of each other,” said the 1964 law graduate of Jember University.
Sumaryono indicated that Utrecht was then referred to as an Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) cadre sympathizing with the Indonesian Communist Party. He was even said to be a patron of the leftist Indonesian Students Movement Center. According to Sumaryono, noticing a lecturer like Utrecht, Tawang Alun Foundation as university founder promptly invited soldiers to enter the campus after the September 30, 1965 Movement broke out for the elimination of communist sympathizers.
Tawang Alun Foundation sponsored by Jember Regent R. Soedjarwo set up a private college, Tawang Alun University. In January 1963, Tawang Alun became a state university after being turned into the Jember branch by Brawijaya University. In fact the central government appointed Jember District Military Commander Lt. Col. Winoto as rector, but foundation executives silently urged their member, R. Achmad, to abandon the post of University Presidium Chairman and give up his seat to Winoto.
The removal of Achmad was inseparable from the changing political constellation, when PNI was declining and the army dominating. “Achmad was a PNI member,” said Sumaryono. However, entering the New Order, the military was not leaving Jember University. After Winoto, the campus in Tegalboto was for two decades headed by soldiers: Lt. Col. Soedi Hardjo Hoedojo, Lt. Col. Soetardjo, and Lt. Col. Warsito. “Only Winoto was still active while the other three were retirees,” he added.
The military rectors made little academic change. But in campus political affairs, their moves were very apparent particularly with the introduction of the Campus Normalization policy. They banned the activities of organizations like GMNI and HMI on campus and programs of a political nature. “Students’ activities required the consent of university leaders,” said Assistant Rector for Student Affairs of Jember State University Andang Subahariyanto.
Andang, a 1983 alumnus of Jember University, also remembered how the campus library was rid of books blacklisted by the government, including the works of Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Arif Wibowo, a GMNI activist now a House member from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle faction, added lecturers once active in both organizations were mostly also removed.
After 20 years under the military, lecturers demanded university management be returned to civilians. “The era has changed and we have also had good human resources with some doctors,” said Sumaryono. Col. Warsito was the last military rector on Jember campus. In 1987, Dr Simanhadi replaced Warsito. Andang noted the numbers of schools and departments had since increased, lecturers sent abroad for studies, and students allowed to discuss latest issues.
Jember was only one of several state campuses with military rectors. Brig. Gen. Eri Soedewo in 1966 was named coordinator of state colleges in East Java. At the same time, he served as Presidium Chairman of Brawijaya University, Malang; Acting Rector and Dean of the Law School of Airlangga University, Surabaya; Presidium Chairman of the Teachers’ Training Institute (IKIP), Malang; and of IKIP Surabaya.
The same was true of Diponegoro University, Semarang. Based on the university’s official website, in 1965 Col. Soewondo held the post of assistant rector for student affairs, in cooperation with Semarang City Military Commander Col. Munadi. They were assigned to sterilize the campus from those seen as having a communist slant.
Historian Asvi Warman Adam recorded the September 30, 1965 incident indeed became soldiers’ entry gate to campuses. “They argued there were many arrests so various campus positions were vacant,” he said. Actually not all soldiers joining campuses were active officers, as some academics also became soldiers after compulsory military training. But they had the same mission. “It was to purge campuses of leftist people,” he added.
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Tempo - Appointing Unknowns
All high-ranking officials, including prospective regional heads, required the consent of Suharto. It was a “business” opportunity for his close circles.
ONE day, in September 1968.
SOEMITRO was summoned by Suharto—while in his early years in power.
+ “You should get prepared to replace Kartakusuma,” said the President.
Kartakusuma held the office of Defense and Security Chief of Staff with the rank of lieutenant-general. Soemitro was dazed and turned down the offer. Suharto had earlier talked to him about this. At the time Soemitro proposed three names: Lt. Gen. Mokoginta, Vice Admiral Sudomo, and Maj. Gen. H.R. Dharsono.
But Suharto insisted.
+ “No. You should be the one to replace Kartakusuma. Be prepared.”
In March in the following year, Soemitro was installed as chief of staff, his rank promoted to lieutenant-general.
Twelve years later, in 1994, Soemitro launched his autobiography entitled Soemitro. He writes, whenever somebody was wanted to occupy a position, President Suharto would make sure it was realized.
Suharto wanted loyal people around him, loyal to himself and to the dual function. Therefore, he always wanted to choose his “representatives” in various fields of operation himself. Most of them were active soldiers.
The same was true in selecting regional heads. According to former TNI Deputy Commander Fachrul Rozi, in practice, regional heads were actually selected by the TNI Commander in Chief. But the final decision remained in Suharto’s hands. “I don’t know much about the standard mechanism, perhaps the TNI Commander offered names to Pak Harto,” Fachrul told Tempo.
It was said that if Pak Harto replied “yes”, the names were accepted. But if Suharto promptly spoke of something in Javanese that meant more or less: “Well, I haven’t heard of the names yet, ‘A’,” it implied the commander had to find others.
Former TNI Territorial Chief of Staff Agus Widjojo said the implementation of the dual function by Suharto shifted considerably from the concept envisioned by Gen. Nasution. Originally, the dual function was designed as a security and social defense force. However, under Suharto, it became a security and sociopolitical defense force. “The reason was that without controlling politics, the TNI could not do much through policies considered good for the people,” added Agus.
Still, Fachrul Rozi saw the appointment of regional heads by Suharto—mostly being active soldiers—as good enough. At least, in his view, there were no bad leaders. “The persons named must have been good as they came from a long selection,” he continued. “If they later turned out to be bad, they would be replaced by their superiors,” Fachrul noted.
The TNI’s political line in the Suharto era, said Fachrul, remained unchanged: state politics. The problem was its contrary application. The public officials were not chosen by society but instead named by Suharto. “If I said there used to be positive leadership, it’s because the men were good compared with some bad ones elected today,” he indicated.
Trying to understand Suharto’s “thought,” Fachrul assumed that it was purposely done to ensure stability that became the main point of the President’s political guideline. “The development trilogy was stability, growth and equity. Stability came first,” he pointed out.
Undermining civil sovereignty, Suharto’s power to name regional heads also allowed his close circles the opportunity to do “business.” An example many people still remember is the bribery case of the Bantul Regent. It’s the case that allegedly led to the death of a journalist of the Bernas daily in Yogyakarta, Fuad Muhammad Syafruddin, on August 16, 1996.
Reportedly, for his reelection as regent, Sri Roso Sudarmo, then an army artillery colonel, bribed Dharmais Foundation owned by Suharto with Rp1 billion. This story circulated in an anonymous letter in the Bantul regency council at the time. Syafruddin wrote the story in his paper.
During the dual-function practice in the Suharto period, said Fachrul, many TNI officers disagreed and deemed it excessive. Nonetheless, as Suharto was too strong, none of them dared to oppose.
Moreover, Suharto knew very well how to “muffle” those attempting to shake him. He unhesitatingly threatened the circles regarded as undermining his power: in September 1989, in a flight aboard a DC-10 to Yugoslavia, Suharto replied to journalists’ questions about the succession of national leadership, which was then controversial in the country. And Suharto stated on the plane that he would beat up those trying to replace him unconstitutionally. “If it’s done unconstitutionally, by political leaders as well as generals, I say, I’ll beat them up,” he said laughingly.
The power of Suharto to bring the “green uniform” to the government was not limited to regional heads. The military also controlled executive positions of lucrative enterprises, like Pertamina and Bulog, besides strategic departments. The “military corps” filled various posts from minister, director-general, inspector-general, to ambassador. In the early New Order period, 22 of the 26 governors were soldiers. Starting 1967, soldiers were given 47 free seats in the House.
Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) seats were also dominated, though in some cases very disproportionally. For instance, the seven DPRDs in East Timor had all their speakers coming from the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), with nobody from the region, and the principle of representation was least realized.
But what did Suharto say about the dual function? In his state address before the House, August 16, 1980, Suharto stressed that ABRI was purposely involved in politics for the reform of political life in the country. “Particularly to create stable and dynamic political life and development implementation,” he said.
Suharto once might also be aware that he had by far gone off course. On March 23, 1981, he affirmed ABRI’s functional assignments should not lead to the placement of ABRI personnel to non-ABRI sectors. But this affirmation was not followed up by concrete improvements.
The statement about the “ABRI functionaries” turned out to be only realized seven years later. Gen. Rudini, as Minister of Home Affairs during 1988-1993, finally reduced the percentage of regional executives coming from the military. Yet the number discounted was very slight, from 50 percent to 41 percent.
Only after Suharto stepped down did the government’s political role fully return to civilians. The TNI voluntarily assumed the part only two years after Suharto toppled from the presidency.
Fachrul may be right that in fact many TNI officers were against the outrageous dual function and wished to introduce a change. But they were scared of Suharto.
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