Starting Points

Jul 3, 2010

Super Size Cabinet

Image by FriskoDude via Flickr

The President appoints three more deputy ministers, making his cabinet the largest since the New Order era.

DIRECTOR-General of Higher Education Fasli Jalal picked up the phone in his office, Thursday two weeks ago. On the other end of the line was Minister/State Secretary Sudi Silalahi, who asked Fasli to report to President Yudhoyono. “I was told to bring along my CV,” he said. Monday afternoon, last week, Fasli drove to the Presidential Palace after reporting to his superior, Muhammad Nuh. At the Palace, this alumni of Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA, received word from the President that he was about to become Deputy Minister of Education.

Fahmi’s inauguration took place at the State Palace, Wednesday last week. Aside from Fahmi, President Yudhoyono also inaugurated the Deputy State National Development Planning Minister for the Funding Division Lukita Dinarsyah Tuwo, and Secretary-General of the Defense Department Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, each serving as deputy minister in their corresponding government bodies. The deputy ministers’ inauguration was held at the same time with the inauguration of Dipo Alam—Deputy of the Coordinating Minister for the Economy—as the Minister/Cabinet Secretary, a position which had previously been left vacant ever since Sudi Silalahi, moved to the State Secretariat.

Minister of Education Muhammad Nuh warmly welcomed Fasli, his new deputy. “He would surely help me in doing my work,” said the former Minister of Communication & Information. Fasli has been around in the Education Department for a while. He joined the department a decade ago, as a senior staff who served under Minister Yahya Muhaimin during Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency, leading a number of directorates general. When drafting began for the United Indonesia Cabinet II, Fasli was one of the most favored candidates nominated to replace the predecessor, Bambang Sudibyo.

Like Nuh, Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro was delighted with Sjafrie’s appointment. “In my opinion, there has to be a deputy minister because we have lots of work and budget,” said this Minister of Energy & Mineral Resources from 2000-2009. According to him, Sjafrie will deal with matters related to the army and police, including foreign affairs whenever the minister is unavailable. Former Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono considers Sjafrie as the right man for the job due to his knowledge of military techniques.

Following the president’s announcement of his cabinet members last October, Nuh and Purnomo were among the ones who received the most attention because they were considered as not having enough experience to be placed in their positions. Politics observer Arbi Sanit thinks that Nuh’s experience—despite he once became a dean—is still insufficient. “He was chosen due to his closeness to SBY, he has no outstanding qualities,” said Arbi. While Jaleswari Pramowardhani, a military observer from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, thinks that Purnomo has a technocratic tendency and lacks military knowledge. “He did serve as deputy chair of the National Resilience Institute in 1998, but things are different now,” she said.

Deputy appointments for these two ministers raises suspicion that the president wants to provide some cover for his less capable cabinet members. However, the president has come up with his own answer. President Yudhoyono said the deputy minister appointment for some departments was based on the consideration of the heavy workload and the target of his current cabinet. According to SBY, he expects the Deputy Minister of Defense to help formulate policies and defense strategies, as well as modernize the defense system primary tools. As for the Deputy Minister of Education, SBY expects him to help with the education reforms.

Deputy minister appointment is the president’s privilege as mentioned in the State Department Law No. 39/2008. Its Article 10 says, “In case of heavy workloads which require special treatment, the president may appoint deputy ministers for corresponding deprtments.” Member of the House of Representatives (DPR) Agun Gunandjar Sudarsa said that the deputy minister appointments might actually help with the overgrown bureaucracy in several departments. “There are departments that have more than ten Echelon 1 officers,” said the Chairman of the State Department Law Special Committee.

Last week’s three deputy ministers appointment was the third wave of similar actions. Triyono Wibowo, appointed as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in September 11, 2008, was the first. Slightly different from the two following appointments, Triyono—then the Ambassador for the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Slovenia, and also acted as a UN Representative in Vienna—was appointed by Minister Hassan Wirajuda in the Department’s office at Pejambon, Central Jakarta.

In the second wave in November 11, 2009, more deputy ministers were appointed: Bayu Krisnamurti (Deputy Minister of Agriculture), Bambang Susantono (Deputy Minister of Transportation), Mahendra Siregar (Deputy Minister of Trade), Alex Retraubun (Deputy Minister of Industry), and Hermando Dardak (Deputy Minister of Public Works). That time, the President also appointed Gita Wirjawan as Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board. It means the United Indonesia Cabinet II now has nine deputy ministers.

According to plan, the number should have grown to 11, had the President inaugurated Fahmi Idris as Deputy Minister of Health and Anggito Abimanyu as Deputy Minister of Finance. Appointments for the 2006-2009 Chairman of the Indonesian Medical Association and Chairman of Fiscal Policy Board of the Department of Finance were cancelled due to administrative reasons. According to the Minister/State Secretary Sudi Silalahi, the two candidates have not met the requirement of occupying an Echelon 1-A structural position. “If that has not been fulfilled, we cannot proceed. We do not want to break the rules,” he said. Sudi offered no explanation on when the two would be inaugurated either.

Even as it is only an administrative one, politics observer Eep Saefulloh Fatah said the mistake is serious and fatal. “The president is reckless when taking such important policies,” he said. A day before the intended appointments, presidential spokesperson Julian Aldrin Pasha revealed the appointment plans to reporters. Although he mentioned no specific name, Julian nodded when Tempo asked him whether Fahmi Idris and Anggito Abimanyu were amongst the list. According to Julian, the deputy minister candidates have signed their performance contracts and integrity pacts.

On the deputy minister appointments, Eep thinks of it as a proof of the president’s lack of commitment towards bureaucracy reforms. “This is the most overcrowded cabinet in the reform era. It even has more people than the entire New Order cabinets,” he said. This deputy minister appointment is a different matter compared to when Suharto appointed his junior ministers. Junior minister was a position formed in preparation of a new department. For example, Cosmas Batubara was appointed Junior Minister of Public Housing before he occupied the position as minister in the next period.

According to Eep, there are some positions which actually require deputy ministers, like the Department of Defense and the Department of Finance. The many deputy ministers today shows that there is no clear criteria as to which department requires one. He further added that if such notion continues, soon there would be no reason not to appoint deputy minister in every department. “This is a fatal political mistake, one which clearly shows the President’s terrible imagination. His creativity is questionable,” he said.

As Eep said, the president is facing multiple choices. Included in his array of choices are the options to select between a competent, but non-partisan individual, a partisan individual who is also competent, or whether to adopt accommodation politics. “But the President could not decide between the three options,” he said. It later resulted in an overcrowded cabinet.

Constitutional law expert Irman Putra Sidin said that an overcrowded cabinet goes against the spirit of decentralization. “An officer who finds little to do in Jakarta will be looking for work, like getting his hands on something which should have been the portion of the regional administration,” he said.

Adek Media, Gunanto, Cornila Desyana

Palace Mouthpiece

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From the outset the newspaper was to be pro-Yudhoyono. No news or photos of demonstrations were featured.

IT was a Tuesday night in February last year, in the personal library of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in Cikeas, West Java. Ramadhan Pohan, the editor in chief of Jurnal Nasional newspaper was having a casual discussion with his host. It was a serious talk, even though there was much joking. For five hours, SBY, Chairman of the Democrat Party Board of Trustees spoke with this journalist who went on to become a member of the House of Representatives from the Democrat Party.

When night fell, the two moved to another room in the house. First Lady Ani Yudhoyono was busy in the kitchen. The President took his own dinner that night, and even went back for seconds. Ibu Ani prepared the rice and mixed vegetables.

That night was the first time Yudhoyono granted an interview about the issue of him being nominated to run for a second term of office in the 2009 Presidential Election. Jurnal Nasional was given the first opportunity to interview him.

l l l

ONE day in mid-2005. Three men from the Blora Center agreed to establish a media company. They were: Taufik Rahzen (an artist), Rully Charis Iswahyudi (a businessman), and Ramadhan Pohan (a former reporter for Jawa Pos). The Blora Center is a think tank which did the groundwork for Yudhoyono to step forward in the 2004 Presidential Election. Along the way the Blora Institute was formed, led by Taufik Rahzen—who later became a senior editor at the newspaper he formed.

This trio was helped by a team from the Brighten Institute—an institution where Yudhoyono sits as Chairman of the Board of Trustees. This team consisted of Joyo Winoto, Daddi Heryono, and Asto Sunu Subroto. On 1 June 2006, Jurnal Nasional was born.

The first general manager of Jurnal Nasional newspaper was Asto Sunu Subroto. A year later he was replaced by D.S. Priyarsono, who only held the position for a few months. The job then fell to N. Syamsuddin Ch. Haesy, who still presides over the paper today.

Image of Ramadhan Pohan

Jurnal’s close relationship with Yudhoyono has been thrown into the spotlight. It has been said that this paper received funds from a famous cigarette industry, the Sampoerna Group. This was denied by Ramadhan. However, Ramadhan did not deny that Jurnal is affiliated with Yudhoyono. “Jurnal Nasional does indeed defend SBY,” he said. From the outset, Jurnal was designed to be in alignment with the thinking of Yudhoyono, who wanted the media to publish positive news. “This is why there is news or photos of demonstrations in this newspaper.”

Hamid Dipo Pramono, the editor in chief of Jurnal Nasional after Ramadhan Pohan, denied the charge that Yudhoyono intervenes in the editing of the paper. According to him, the President has never given any special directions. “It is wrong if Jurnal is considered to be some sort of public relations body, and even more so if it [is said it] only takes orders from the Palace.”

Although the President does not intervene, according to some editorial staff at the paper, former Presidential Spokesman Andi Alifian Mallarangeng often interferes. Although he has never personally attended an editors meeting, he makes requests by telephone. Andi did not completely deny this. “I have a relationship with all editors in chief. If there is news which is inaccurate, I correct it,” he said.

Andi has been a regular writer for Jurnal from the beginning. His column, “From Kilometer 0.0”, has been routinely published since 29 May 2006. In addition to him, others from the Palace who write regularly are Anas Urbaningrum (currently Chairman of the Democrat Party faction in the DPR) and Denny Indrayana (a special staff member of the President in the legal field).

Ninin Damayanti

Jul 2, 2010

Why Is the Gulf Cleanup So Slow?

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By PAUL H. RUBIN

Destin, Fla.

As the oil spill continues and the cleanup lags, we must begin to ask difficult and uncomfortable questions. There does not seem to be much that anyone can do to stop the spill except dig a relief well, not due until August. But the cleanup is a different story. The press and Internet are full of straightforward suggestions for easy ways of improving the cleanup, but the federal government is resisting these remedies.

First, the Environmental Protection Agency can relax restrictions on the amount of oil in discharged water, currently limited to 15 parts per million. In normal times, this rule sensibly controls the amount of pollution that can be added to relatively clean ocean water. But this is not a normal time.

Various skimmers and tankers (some of them very large) are available that could eliminate most of the oil from seawater, discharging the mostly clean water while storing the oil onboard. While this would clean vast amounts of water efficiently, the EPA is unwilling to grant a temporary waiver of its regulations.

Next, the Obama administration can waive the Jones Act, which restricts foreign ships from operating in U.S. coastal waters. Many foreign countries (such as the Netherlands and Belgium) have ships and technologies that would greatly advance the cleanup. So far, the U.S. has refused to waive the restrictions of this law and allow these ships to participate in the effort.

The combination of these two regulations is delaying and may even prevent the world's largest skimmer, the Taiwanese owned "A Whale," from deploying. This 10-story high ship can remove almost as much oil in a day as has been removed in total—roughly 500,000 barrels of oily water per day. The tanker is steaming towards the Gulf, hoping it will receive Coast Guard and EPA approval before it arrives.

In addition, the federal government can free American-based skimmers. Of the 2,000 skimmers in the U.S. (not subject to the Jones Act or other restrictions), only 400 have been sent to the Gulf. Federal barriers have kept the others on stations elsewhere in case of other oil spills, despite the magnitude of the current crisis. The Coast Guard and the EPA issued a joint temporary rule suspending the regulation on June 29—more than 70 days after the spill.

The Obama administration can also permit more state and local initiatives. The media endlessly report stories of county and state officials applying federal permits to perform various actions, such as building sand berms around the Louisiana coast. In some cases, they were forbidden from acting. In others there have been extensive delays in obtaining permission.

As the government fails to implement such simple and straightforward remedies, one must ask why.

One possibility is sheer incompetence. Many critics of the president are fond of pointing out that he had no administrative or executive experience before taking office. But the government is full of competent people, and the military and Coast Guard can accomplish an assigned mission. In any case, several remedies require nothing more than getting out of the way.

Another possibility is that the administration places a higher priority on interests other than the fate of the Gulf, such as placating organized labor, which vigorously defends the Jones Act.

Finally there is the most pessimistic explanation—that the oil spill may be viewed as an opportunity, the way White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said back in February 2009, "You never want a serious crisis to go to waste." Many administration supporters are opposed to offshore oil drilling and are already employing the spill as a tool for achieving other goals. The websites of the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, for example, all feature the oil spill as an argument for forbidding any further offshore drilling or for any use of fossil fuels at all. None mention the Jones Act.

To these organizations and perhaps to some in the administration, the oil spill may be a strategic justification in a larger battle. President Obama has already tried to severely limit drilling in the Gulf, using his Oval Office address on June 16 to demand that we "embrace a clean energy future." In the meantime, how about a cleaner Gulf?

Mr. Rubin, a professor of economics at Emory University, held several senior positions in the federal government in the 1980s. Since 1991 he has spent his summers on the Gulf.

WSJ, July 2, 2010

ILO aids child soldier but many march on

Image by totaloutnow via Flickr

Friday, 02 July 2010 18:00 Perry Santanachote

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – Young Thu Zin Oo made his daily trip across the Pun Hlaing River from his village in North Okkalapa Township to the Sinmalite dock in Rangoon on December 15 last year. He and his family sold pork rinds for a living and needed to replenish their supply.

He never arrived at Sinmalite and failed to make the trip home that day either. Instead, he ended up in the Burmese army at the age of 17.

Thu Zin Oo’s story is all too common in Burma, which the UN has repeatedly cited as one of the world’s worst perpetrators of child recruitment to its army. Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimated that Burma had “enlisted” 70,000 child soldiers in 2002. The rights watchdog has yet to report a drop in this figure, despite the regime’s purported attempts to curb underage recruitment. On that ominous day in December, Thu Zin Oo became another statistic.

His bus trip required a transfer at Bayintnaung Junction. As Thu Zin Oo waited for his connection he noticed a man beckoning him from a distance. Curious, he went to him.

The man asked how he was earning his wage and Thu Zin Oo told him he made 1,500 Kyats a day selling pork rinds. The mystery man suggested he could make more as a mechanic and that he would help him get a job.

“I was really interested in what he’d said and agreed to follow him,” Thu Zin Oo said. “At that time I was thinking I would be able to make a better life for my parents.”

The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma’s self-styled ruling clique of generals, has repeatedly stated that its policy prohibits recruitment of anyone under the age of 18 but the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers names Burma as the only Asian country where government armed forces forcibly recruit and use children as young as 12 years old.

The US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report released this month, also listed Burma as a top offender. The report said: “The regime’s widespread use of and lack of accountability in forced labour and recruitment of child soldiers is particularly worrying and represents the top causal factor for Burma’s significant trafficking problem.”

It also chided Burma’s leaders for failing to not making significant efforts to eliminate the problem.

Under international pressure, Burma’s government officials agreed to comply with international standards and publicly vowed to crack down on the recruitment of children to the army, especially after the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1612 in 2005 to monitor the use of child soldiers. Working with the UN workers’ right body, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the government created a complaint system in 2007 to provide a way for victims to seek redress.

Yet reports of forced child recruitment, mostly of boys aged between 14 and 16, remain.

“The army at the senior level has passed military orders saying that no child under the age of 18 should be recruited,” ILO liaison officer in Rangoon, Steve Marshall, said. “I think the problem exists at a lower level where there are some conflicting pressures placed on personnel in the military.”

Marshall said senior level commanders had required battalion commanders to meet ambitious recruitment quotas amid high-desertion and low-enlistment rates.

There is also a disparity between the penalties for failing to meet the quota and the crime of underage recruitment. The UN reported in 2008 that punishments for recruiting a child included official reprimands and monetary fines, whereas battalion commanders faced loss of rank if they failed to meet recruitment quotas.

The quota in turn made recruitment a profitable business in which brokers or police are compensated for new recruits. Marshall estimates that recruiters pay around 30,000 Kyats (about US$4,700) for each boy.

According to HRW, unaccompanied and poor children are often targeted because they are easily lured with the promise of compensation, food or shelter. The ILO estimates that roughly one-third of child soldiers are recruited in this manner. If they refuse, recruiters use force or threaten to arrest them on some frivolous charge. One-third volunteer for the army and another third are simply abducted.

“Often a broker will say to a kid, ‘Hey, I can find you a job that pays money’,” said Marshall. “They think they’ll get a job in a tea shop or something and the next thing they know they’re in the army.”

With the promise of a good job, Thu Zin Oo went with the man from the train station but realised his grave mistake when they arrived the Danyingone Soldier Collection Centre. It all happened so quickly, he said, and before he could process what was going on, he was branded “Soldier Number TA/427438”. Later that night he was loaded into a locked train car with other boys in the same situation.

“In that carriage I saw about 100 young guys like me,” Thu Zin Oo said. “We were never allowed to use the toilet so the guy next to me urinated on the floor. As punishment he was badly beaten by some sergeants.”

Through the night the train transported the boys north to Pegu (Bago) Division. The camp was in the Yaytashay Township of Taungoo District.

During his 18 weeks of basic training, Thu Zin Oo was forced to cut and carry sugar cane while bullied by superiors. He recalled one instance of a group of trainees being beaten about the head with wooden poles for singing the national anthem too softly.

The Coalition reports that child soldiers are forced required to perform tasks that include combat, portering, scouting, spying, guarding camps and cooking. Escape attempts are punishable with up to five years in prison for “desertion”.

Near the end of his basic training, Thu Zin Oo was allowed to call his parents. “I told them I wanted to go home as I wasn’t happy,” he said.

His parents, relieved to find their son, contacted the ILO for help. The ILO investigated Thu Zin Oo’s case and compiled proof-of-age documentation. He was discharged from the army on June 8.

The ILO received 128 child soldier complaints between last April last and this April – a dramatic increase on previous years, with 50 complaints between 2007 and last year.

“The number of complaints that we have received has definitely increased,” Marshall said. “However, we believe it is a reflection of people’s understanding of the law and awareness of their right to lodge a complaint.”

Marshall said the government and the ILO had been working to increase awareness in Burma. The government has undertaken awareness workshops for military personnel, and the ILO with the Ministry of Labour have started conducting awareness-raising programmes targeted at local authorities. The former started distributing government-approved flyers this month that detail people’s legal rights and how to file a complaint.

“Progressively, we have been in a position where we’re in agreement with the government and an increased number of children have been discharged from the military,” he said.

The ILO had been able to aid in the release of all but three children whose parents had filed complaints. One has yet to be found and two claimed they wanted to stay in the military, Marshall said.

“The reality is that if the parents lodge a complaint and we’re able to obtain their proof of age, the success rate is extremely high,” he said. “The government, I must say, is very co-operative when the evidence is placed in front of them.”

On the other hand, obtaining the evidence can be difficult. It is a process that can take anywhere from a few weeks to several months. To prove that the person was recruited at an age below 18, the ILO must find official proof-of-age documentation.

“In Myanmar [Burma] that is not always easy. A lot of families do not have birth certificates and in many poorer families the kids are not in the formal schooling system,” Marshall said.

Before the ILO, Marshall said a lot of citizens thought child recruitment was a fact of life and did nothing. Others knew it was wrong but were too scared to raise the issue.

Advocacy group Human Rights Education Institute of Burma (HREIB) director Aung Myo Min said that this fear of reprisal was still deeply rooted, which was why the number of cases reported to the ILO failed to reflect the true extent of the problem. He recalled instances in which individuals were arrested, harassed or intimidated by officials for reporting the existence of child soldiers in the past.

“The ILO’s rate is successful but think about the hundreds of cases that are never reported to the ILO,” Aung Myo Min said.

He added his concern that the military regime’s newfound enlightenment on the issue may be disingenuous.

“They just want to save face because of international attention on the use of child soldiers by the army,” he said. “If they really wanted to change it, blaming their own army is not enough. They have the power and the responsibility to actually stop the use of child soldiers, prevent the children from entering into the camps and take legal action against those who recruit the children into the army.”

Burmese rebels in India plea bargain

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By JOSEPH ALLCHIN

Published: 2 July 2010

A group of Burmese ethnic rebels currently held in an Indian jail will next week enter into a plea bargain in what could be a momentous final stretch in a marathon 12-year fight for justice.

The group, composed of 10 fighters from the Karen National Union (KNU) and 24 from the now-defunct National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA), were lured in 1998 to the Indian Andaman Islands by an Indian intelligence officer named Colonel Grewal, who offered them a safe haven. He has since disappeared, and evidence suggests he may have been a double agent working for the Burmese military.

On arriving on Indian soil the group were accused of weapons smuggling; six of the men were murdered by Indian security forces and the rest placed in detention, in what has come to be known as Operation Leech.

Their trial lawyer, Akshay Sharma, speaking exclusively to DVB in Delhi yesterday, said that use of the plea bargain – a predominantly western legal concept – was exceptionally rare in India, but was beneficial to all parties.

Moreover, human rights lawyer and chief advocate on the case, Nandita Haksar, said that “the Indian intelligence community are on trial here”. Indeed an intelligence officer, speaking under condition of anonymity, was quoted in the Indian press several months after the incident as saying that defense authorities were “deliberately adopting dilatory tactics”.

The implications of guilt for the Indian security services appeared in court after a 10-year wait for a single charge sheet to be produced, with evidence that Sharma said was “full of discrepancies”.

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Key evidence such as the serial numbers of the supposedly smuggled weapons did not match, whilst “security reasons” stopped the Indian security services from bringing the explosives that the accused were charged with possessing to the Kolkata trial.

Lawyers have therefore suggested that the 12-year wait for a verdict and the “grey areas” have likely induced both prosecution and defence to for the plea bargain. One of the most telling of these “grey areas” was the failure by India’s own Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to produce key witnesses, such Colonel Grewal, the initial contact person for the freedom fighters. This was despite requests by the Indian state’s primary investigative bodies to produce this witness.

While the acquittal of the weapons smuggling charges has been “beneficial”, Haksar claimed that they conceal an ugly truth; a “hypocrisy” at the heart of Indian democracy. For whilst the 34 may soon walk free, it is now corroborated that the Indian security services have the blood of at least six Burmese rebels on their hands, while two more who were under custody “disappeared” during the course of the trial.

Their disappearance appears to be a misnomer when one considers the severity of the initial charges the Burmese were accused of. The charge of ‘waging war against the Indian state’ – a similar indictment to one brought on the Mumbai bombers – carries the maximum penalty of death, but they still managed to disappear, and no-one seems able to divulge their whereabouts, or indeed whether they are still alive. Moreoever, one of the early trial lawyers, T. Vasnatha, was murdered in what Sharma believes was an act of the Indian intelligence services.

Jul 1, 2010

Minority Rights Group International - State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2010

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1 July 2010

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Read the full global press release, the Asia press release in English or the Europe press releases in English and Hungarian.

Summary

State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2010 Cover

A decade into the new century sees religious minorities confronting serious violations of their rights around the globe. Following the violent attacks of 11 September 2001, governments of every political hue have used "war on terror" rhetoric to justify the repression of religious communities.

Other religious minorities have faced a violent backlash, often unjustly accused of siding with belligerents. In Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America, armed conflict and land seizures have forced minority and indigenous communities away from locations central to their religious beliefs. Europe has witnessed gains by extreme rightwing political parties which are targeting religious minorities with their inflammatory language.

In Central Asia, governments have introduced tough new registration requirements for religious communities and prevented the building of places of worship. In State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2010, Minority Rights Group International offers a comprehensive overview of the situation faced by minorities in a world increasingly divided along religious lines. It includes:

An analysis of government initiatives that contribute to the marginalisation of religious minorities, such as religious profiling and registration laws.
First-hand accounts, from around the world, of the discrimination and exclusion faced by those belonging to minorities who wish to exercise their right to freedom of religion and belief.
An exploration of grassroots efforts through interfaith dialogue to ease tensions, overcome conflicts, and promote peaceful and equitable development.
An overview of the human rights situation of minorities and indigenous peoples in every major world region.
The unique statistical ranking and analysis, Peoples under Threat 2010.

An invaluable reference for policy makers, academics, journalists and everyone who is interested in the human rights situation of minorities and indigenous peoples around the world.

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How Facebook Is Making Friending Obsolete

WSJ, 15 Dec 2009

by Julia Angwin

Friending wasn't used as a verb until about five years ago, when social networks such as Friendster, MySpace and Facebook burst onto the scene.

Suddenly, our friends were something even better - an audience. If blogging felt like shouting into the void, posting updates on a social network felt more like an intimate conversation among friends at a pub.

Inevitably, as our list of friends grew to encompass acquaintances, friends of friends and the girl who sat behind us in seventh-grade homeroom, online friendships became devalued.

Suddenly, we knew as much about the lives of our distant acquaintances as we did about the lives of our intimates – what they'd had for dinner, how they felt about Tiger Woods and so on.

Enter Twitter with a solution: no friends, just followers. These one-way relationships were easier to manage – no more annoying decisions about whether to give your ex-boyfriend access to your photos, no more fussing over who could see your employment and contact information.

Twitter's updates were also easily searchable on the Web, forcing users to be somewhat thoughtful about their posts. The intimate conversation became a talent show, a challenge to prove your intellectual prowess in 140 characters or less.

This fall, Twitter turned its popularity into dollars, inking lucrative deals to allow its users' tweets to be broadcast via search algorithms on Google and Bing.

Soon, Facebook followed suit with deals to distribute certain real-time data to Google and Bing. (Recall that despite being the fifth most popular Web site in the world, Facebook is barely profitable.) Facebook spokesman Barry Schnitt says no money changed hands in the deals but says there was "probably an exchange of value."

Just one catch: Facebook had just "exchanged" to Google and Microsoft something that didn't exist.

The vast majority of Facebook users restrict updates to their friends, and do not expect those updates to appear in public search results. (In fact, many people restrict their Facebook profile from appearing at all in search results).

So Facebook had little content to provide to Google's and Bing's real-time search results. When Google's real-time search launched earlier this month, its results were primarily filled with Twitter updates.

Coincidentally, Facebook presented its 350 million members with a new default privacy setting last week. For most people, the new suggested settings would open their Facebook updates and information to the entire world. Mr. Schnitt says the new privacy suggestions are an acknowledgement of "the way we think the world is going."

Facebook Chief Executive Mark Zuckerberg led by example, opening up his previously closed profile, including goofy photos of himself curled up with a teddy bear.

Facebook also made public formerly private info such as profile pictures, gender, current city and the friends list. (Mr. Schnitt suggests that users are free to lie about their hometown or take down their profile picture to protect their privacy; in response to users' complaints, the friends list can now be restricted to be viewed only by friends).

Of course, many people will reject the default settings on Facebook and keep on chatting with only their Facebook friends. (Mr. Schnitt said more than 50% of its users had rejected the defaults at last tally).

But those who want a private experience on Facebook will have to work harder at it: if you inadvertently post a comment on a friend's profile page that has been opened to the public, your comment will be public too.

Just as Facebook turned friends into a commodity, it has likewise gathered our personal data – our updates, our baby photos, our endless chirping birthday notes— and readied it to be bundled and sold.

So I give up. Rather than fighting to keep my Facebook profile private, I plan to open it up to the public – removing the fiction of intimacy and friendship.

But I will also remove the vestiges of my private life from Facebook and make sure I never post anything that I wouldn't want my parents, employer, next-door neighbor or future employer to see. You'd be smart to do the same.

We'll need to treat this increasingly public version of Facebook with the same hard-headedness that we treat Twitter: as a place to broadcast, but not a place for vulnerability. A place to carefully calibrate, sanitize and bowdlerize our words for every possible audience, now and forever. Not a place for intimacy with friends.

Write to Julia Angwin at julia.angwin@wsj.com

In Japan but surrounded by U.S. influence, Okinawa struggles with split identity

In Okinawa, once an independent kingdom, pay is low, jobs are few and many are angry about a liberation that's turned into an endless American military occupation. For Okinawans in America, many feel a desire to stay tied to their roots.

By Chico Harlan
Thursday, July 1, 2010; A01

CHATAN, JAPAN -- These days, when Melissa Tomlinson describes her fraught relationship with the United States, she speaks in English, the language she once rejected.

She grew up here on the island of Okinawa. Her mother was Japanese, and her father was an American who served in the U.S. Army, came to Okinawa, fell in love, fell out of love, then fell out of touch.

"I had plans to track him down, find him and punch him in the face," said Tomlinson, 22. "I just wanted to figure out my identity."

Tomlinson's family tensions illustrate the complex cultural clashes that dominate the politics of Okinawa and, lately, relations between what have been the world's two largest economies as they cope with a rising China and a belligerent North Korea.

For the more than 60 years since the end of World War II, native Okinawans and U.S. troops stationed on nearby bases have developed deep, passionate and generation-spanning ties that complicate political and diplomatic debates about the future of the U.S. military here.

Those passions have recently claimed the head of one Japanese prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, who had called for the Americans to be booted off Okinawa, and caused his successor to sharply tone down his party's assertive stance toward the United States.

A vocal majority of Okinawans still demand closing the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station. American officials, citing proximity to North Korea, China and Southeast Asia, insist it remain in Okinawa. Japan, in its attempt to mediate, has only frustrated both sides.

The current resolution, which Prime Minister Naoto Kan says his government will honor, calls for Futenma's eventual relocation to a less populated region in the north of the island. Kan apologized last week for the "heavy burden" facing Okinawans.

Many locals on this Pacific island hosting more than half of the 47,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan complain most commonly about the noise, congestion and crime. But emotional blood ties and cultural confusion amplify those concerns. Tormented by her identity, Tomlinson said she has tried to kill herself "a couple times" in the past two years.

Tomlinson said she struggles to convince herself -- and others -- that she is truly Japanese and Okinawan. She called her identity "ambiguous" and said her feeling of being an incomplete person has sometimes led to deep depression.

A generation of biracial Okinawans know about intercultural relationships, writ small. They know about romance and separations, child-support battles and reunions. They know that Japanese children refer to their biracial peers as "halfs," and nowadays, they know of the local American-Asian school, for biracial children, where those kids are taught to call themselves "doubles."

Okinawa's demographics separate it from mainland Japan. Here, the rates of single-parent households and divorce are twice the national average. At the American-Asian school, 70 percent of the 80 students come from single-parent households, Principal Midori Thayer said.

"Unfortunately, some kids never live with their father, but they cannot lose their DNA," she said. "Their body shows that they are not 100 percent Japanese."

Denny Tamaki, 50, the local representative to the Japanese parliament, knows only that his father, an American serviceman whom he has never met, was named William.

When William returned to the States and Tamaki's mother decided not to follow, she burned his photos and letters. When they moved to a new home, she didn't give him their new address. When Tamaki turned 10, his mother took him to a government office, where they officially changed his first name to Yasuhiro.

Tamaki knows little English and wants Futenma moved off Okinawa because "it feels like we're living under occupation." But he has a passion for American music -- Aerosmith, for instance -- and American television shows.

A decade ago he tried to track down his father, with no luck. When his kids ask about their grandfather, he tells them that it would take the detectives from "CSI: Miami" to find him.

Search for a father

Tomlinson's mother and father were married on Okinawa, and then moved together to Georgia after his tour on the island ended in 1975. Tomlinson was born in Hinesville, Ga., while her father was stationed at Fort Stewart.

Tomlinson's parents separated when she was 3; she returned to Okinawa in 1990 with her mother. Her father retained custody of their two older children, who stayed in the United States with him.

Growing up, Tomlinson said, she remembered nothing about the separation, and never spoke to her father or siblings. "I've had to live with some tough decisions," said Melissa's father, who requested that his name not be used.

Tomlinson said her conflicted feelings were often fueled by her mother, who told her she looked "like an American" and tried to hide her from her co-workers. She said they fought frequently, and she told her mother: "Why did you have me? I want to be a Japanese, but I don't get to choose."

In school, her dual identities battled. Sometimes she was an American who didn't speak proper English. Sometimes she was a Japanese who didn't look Japanese. For several years, she tried to forget every English word she knew.

During high school, she said, a teacher encouraged her to learn English because she would need it if one day she wanted to track down her father. "Maybe you can hear the truth," the teacher told her. "You should know both sides."

At the University of the Ryukyus, Tomlinson tried to find English-speaking friends. She watched American television without the subtitles. Still, she confided to friends that she felt depressed.

From her mother, Tomlinson had heard only nasty tales about her father, who was once stationed at the Army's Torii base. After her junior year in college, in spring 2009, she decided to try to find him and left school for a time.

In March, her U.S. military ID card, a privilege from a relationship she never had, was expiring. The Army passed along her father's address. She e-mailed him, asking for him to sign the required forms for a new ID.

Weeks later, she heard back from the father who had not seen her since she was 3.

"Hi Melissa, Hearing from you, to say the least, came as quite a shock," he wrote. "I was not aware that you could speak English let alone read or write it. The last time we had contact, and I am sure you do not remember it, you could only speak Japanese. Trying to bridge the gap with words after all this time would be futile. In life sometimes we have to make decisions that we don't know if they are right or not, but we have to live with them."

Tomlinson read and reread the e-mail. She discussed it with friends, and together they parsed the words. Their relationship continued, e-mail by e-mail, and she learned that he liked fishing, and that he missed Okinawa, and that he says he has thought about her every day.

For all these years, he wrote, he avoided contact because he didn't want her to be torn between parents.

"It would have made your life miserable," he wrote.

Jun 30, 2010

Myanmar elections mute ethnic voices

Image by Rusty Stewart via Flickr

The Morung Express, Nagaland

Brian McCartan | Source: AsiaTimes

Elections slated for later this year in Myanmar seem increasingly unlikely to democratically empower the country's various ethnic minority groups, which combined account for over 30% of the population.

While the ruling generals have touted the inclusiveness of their tightly controlled democratic transition, critics say the new constitution ignores ethnic demands for federalism while junta-drafted election laws prohibit the participation of the largest ethnic parties, some of which are attached to armed insurgent groups who for decades have fought for greater autonomy. The ruling junta has yet to announce a date for the elections, but many observers believe they will he held sometime in October. They will be the first polls held in Myanmar since 1990, when the opposition led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) swept to victory against military-sponsored parties, only to see the results annulled by the military before they could take power.
The generals have made clear their intention to hold new polls and that the participation of the NLD and ethnic ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups is not essential to their credibility. The NLD announced on March 29 that it would not re-register under the new election laws, which it considered unfair because of regulations that bar Aung San Suu Kyi, the party's detained leader, from contesting the polls. A number of NLD party leaders and other members have argued that non-participation plays into the regime's hands by not providing an alternative to the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the National Unity Party (NUP).

At least 39 other political parties have so far applied for registration with the newly formed election commission. Of those, only 15 are considered national parties, while many of the rest aim specifically to represent the interests of ethnic groups, including the Kachin, Kayin, Mon and Shan. The question of whether to participate in the elections has been as contentious an issue among ethnic political groups as it was with the NLD. Some see the electoral process as a sham for perpetuating military rule under the guise of democracy and advocate a boycott of the polls. Others believe the elections offer an unique chance to work from within the system and an alternative to the confrontation and armed struggle that has plagued Myanmar politics since independence from the UK in 1948.

The second and third most successful parties in the 1990 elections after the NLD, the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Arakan League for Democracy, have both supported the NLD's stand and opted not to re-register their parties for the upcoming election. The SNLD's decision was also based on the junta's refusal to free its two top leaders, who were both arrested on political charges in 2005.

Local contests

Significantly, many of the ethnic-based parties are looking to contest seats in local legislatures rather than at the national level. With their relative small sizes, the high cost of party registration and their lack of a national voice, many aspiring ethnic politicians feel that their chances of success and ability to effect change are better on the local level. Parties representing larger ethnic groups, such as the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), are seeking to contest the elections at all levels within their own states. Still other parties representing ethnic groups with much wider geographic coverage, such as the Kayin People's Party (KPP) and the Shan Nationals Democratic Party (SNDP), intend to contest the election for both local legislatures and at the national level across several states and divisions.

Competing for seats on state legislatures may have some real, if limited, advantages for ethnic aspirations. The new legislatures mandated by the 2008 constitution are a departure from the military-dominated "Peace and Development Committees" that currently decide policy in ethnic minority areas and are often a direct arm of the central government. Ethnic politicians hope that the local legislative bodies will be more representative of local communities and give them more say over affairs that matter to their ethnic constituents. With popular representation, there may be more opportunities for the promotion of local cultures and languages though influence over the media and education. Also important is to gain more influence and scrutiny over the exploitation of natural resources in ethnic minority areas.

According to a recent report on the elections by the Transnational Institute, "Nevertheless, many ethnic leaders point out that they will have a legitimate voice for the first time. This will allow ethnic grievances, in the past too easily dismissed as the seditious rumblings of separatist insurgents, to be openly raised." Without ethnic participation, the government backed, and largely ethnic Myanmar USDP and NUP will be calling the shots not only nationally, but also in the regional legislatures. While a far cry from the federalism that many ethnic leaders aspire for, the local legislatures offer the first forms of local autonomy since the post 1962 coup government of General Ne Win abolished ethnic councils established under the 1947 constitution. A post-independence federal system was promised as a result of a conference held at the town of Panglong in northern Myanmar between independence leader General Aung San and representatives of several ethnic groups. Federal principles agreed to at the conference were enshrined in the 1947 constitution, but by the late 1950's many felt they had not been adequately implemented. Agitation for a more truly federalist system was a major cause of the 1962 military coup, which was carried out in the name of preserving national unity.

Myanmar's 2008 constitution keeps the seven ethnic states and creates seven new self-administered zones for less numerous ethnic groups such as the Pa-O, Kokang and Wa. However, it makes few other concessions to ethnic aspirations for federalism and power sharing between ethnic groups and the majority Myanmar population. During the 1993-2008 National Convention that drafted the constitution, calls by ethnic representatives for a federal union were ignored. There is growing evidence that the generals are seeking to undermine and split the ethnic vote at the upcoming elections. This is being done largely through the junta's mass organization, the United Solidarity Development Association (USDA), and its newly formed political party, the USDP.

Many members of the USDP are former military officers and current members of government who have resigned their ranks to participate in the polls. They have actively courted ethnic minorities to join the junta-backed USDP. In the case of the disenfranchised Muslim Rohingya in western Myanmar, that has taken the form of offering identity cards granting them formal citizenship in exchange for their votes. According to the exile-run media group Shan Herald Agency for News, USDP members have used the USDA and local government officials to canvass for votes and to pressure villagers in Shan State to sign their names on the party's rolls. Shan leaders in Mandalay Division, where there are significant Shan populations, were approached in March to run as part of the USDP.

The junta has also effectively blocked several of the major ethnic political players from taking part in the elections due to an impasse over the transformation of armed ceasefire groups into army-controlled border guard units. The regime's seven-step "roadmap to democracy" had originally envisioned that the groups would either hand over their weapons or join the border guard force as a prelude to forming political parties and contesting the election.

Pre-election tension

That step was supposed to be accomplished before an election date was announced. Instead tensions have spiked between the junta and the ethnic militias as several deadlines have passed - the latest on April 28 - and the issue still remains unresolved. Over 20 ethnic insurgent groups have agreed to ceasefires with the junta since 1989 and have since largely run their own affairs. They consider retaining their weapons as a necessary protection until the generals can prove the sincerity of their political promises.

Only a few, mostly small groups have agreed to the junta's terms, including the National Democratic Army - Kachin (NDA-K) and the Kachin Defence Army (KDA). However, their political leaders have resigned and are now seeking to register respectively as the Union Democracy Party (Kachin State) and the Northern Shan State Progressive Party. The Kokang only agreed after a short offensive by the army drove out the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in August 2009 and brought in new leadership. The new leadership quickly declared its support for the 2010 elections and formed a political party.
Larger groups such as the United Wa State Party (UWSP), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have not been allowed to register parties for the election. Instead the regime has threatened to revoke the ceasefire status of groups and declare them illegal. Most recently tensions have increased in Mon State, where the NMSP has refused to meet with the military's intelligence head Lieutenant General Ye Myint to discuss the border guard issue. The junta has threatened to use force if the Mon does not agree to a meeting. Keeping the ceasefire groups out of the polls may work to the generals' electoral advantage. A June 2010 report by the Transnational Institute on the ethnic political situation described the ethnic ceasefire organizations, "in terms of history, membership, finance, and territorial control, the ceasefire forces far outweigh electoral parties in their ability to operate independently and, with an estimated 40,000 troops under arms, their existence was a continued reminder of the need for conflict resolution."

Both the Wa and the Kachin have said that they would like to support ethnic parties in the polls and negotiate the decommissioning of their armed wings with the new government after the elections. After two decades of unresolved political issues and disappointment in the 2008 constitution, they want to see proof of real political reform before agreeing to hand over their weapons. Indeed, the election commission has so far refused to accept the registration of three Kachin political parties. While two of the parties represent former ceasefire groups who have now become border guards, the KSPP has several former KIO members, including its leader, former KIO vice chairman Tu Ja. Some observers believe the party's registration has yet to be approved because of these links.

There is also a fear that the government will declare a state of emergency in the ceasefire areas, which would prohibit people standing for elections and voting. Already areas of southern Shan State and Karen State are unlikely to be allowed to vote due to a legal provision that says elections can only be held in areas free of conflict. This would mean that large portions of Myanmar would not be allowed to elect representatives to local or national legislatures.

Border-based ethnic political organizations, many of which are attached to armed insurgent groups still fighting the government, will not be able to take part in the elections. Although they have seemingly declined in strength and influence in recent years, their message of equal rights and justice still resonates with many people who see the newly formed parties as junta stooges. Peace talks with the government will also have to wait until a new government is formed following the elections. A section of the Political Parties Registration Law prohibits registration to any party that is involved with groups engaged in armed rebellion or involved with groups declared as "unlawful associations". The generals will be hard-pressed to prove the legitimacy of the elections without the participation of ethnic opposition parties or adequate ethnic representation. Should the ethnic groups continue to feel disempowered and a democratically elected pro-military government maintain the junta's current confrontational policies, further conflict will be almost unavoidable and hinder the country's supposed democratic transition.

Jun 29, 2010

Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant by Benedict Rogers

Reviewed by Bertil Lintner

CHIANG MAI - When Myanmar military dictator General Ne Win was still alive, foreign pundits often postulated that the country would change for the better once he passed from the scene. The country would still be ruled by the military, they predicted, but by a younger generation of more reform-minded officers that would bring Myanmar, also known as Burma, out of the Dark Ages.

Ne Win relinquished formal power in the late 1980s and pulled strings from behind the scenes leading up to his death in 2002. Did Myanmar change after that? Yes - but arguably for the worse. Repression intensified, with the number of political prisoners reaching into the thousands. Economic reforms put more money

in circulation, but intensified already rampant corruption. The government spent even less on health and education while ramping up military spending.

Today, the Myanmar military is more firmly entrenched in power than at any time since Ne Win's coup d'etat in 1962, which ended a 14-year period of weak but functioning parliamentary democracy. Now the era of Myanmar's current strongman, General Than Shwe, is drawing to an end. The 77-year-old general will soon retire and he has promised the country's first democratic elections in 20 years to mark the transition.

A new generation of pundits has predicted hopefully that Myanmar is on the cusp of positive change. They believe a hitherto unknown generation of Young Turks and other supposed closet liberals within the military will come to the fore and push the country in a more democratic direction. Elections, they predict, will at long last give civilian leaders some say over the country's governance.

In all likelihood, however, foreign pundits will be proven wrong yet again. Benedict Rogers' highly readable new book shows why Myanmar's military, even with Than Shwe's imminent retirement, has no intention of giving up power any time soon. After this year's polls Than Shwe may no longer be Myanmar's de facto head of state, but he has ensured through that he and his by now immensely wealthy family will be well protected when the next generation of soldiers assume power.

"Motivated by power and a determination to hold onto it," Rogers writes, "Than Shwe will use any tool necessary, from detention, torture and violence against his opponents, to lies, deceit, delay and false promises to the international community, or the manipulation of astrology and religion to convince his own people."
There is scant evidence that the next generation of military officers will be any more liberal in their outlook than their predecessors - in the same way as Than Shwe's generation certainly was no more broadminded after taking over from Ne Win. After half a century of wielding absolute power, the Myanmar military has developed its own ways of dealing with internal dissent and external criticism.

And democratic reforms, even minor and gradual ones, are not part of that mindset, as Rogers' book thoughtfully illustrates. Ne Win set the repressive agenda when he and the army seized power 48 years ago, and those ways have survived him through several of his successors.

To be sure, Rogers does not feign objectivity in his assessment of Than Shwe's life and times. As a member of Christian Solidarity Worldwide, a human-rights organization that specializes in religious freedoms, he has been a Myanmar activist for many years and openly declared his support for the country's pro-democracy opposition. But that does not detract from this well-researched book.

To the contrary, it is the first thorough study of Myanmar's undisputed strongman. It chronicles with detail how Than Shwe rose from a lowly position as a junior postal clerk to the most powerful soldier in the military-run country. Joining the military as a teenager, he was always immensely loyal to his commanders, a trait the book argues was a key to his eventual success. Those who questioned their superiors and official policies were ruthlessly purged under the new military order that Ne Win introduced after 1962.

Despite claims in his own official glorified biography, Than Shwe did not see as much combat as other top army officers who fought in jungle battlefields against ethnic insurgent groups. Rather he was attached to the military's Psychological Warfare Department and, later, the grandly named Central School of Political Science, where officers and other soldiers were taught Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Socialism" ideology.

Rogers quotes one of his inside sources as saying that Than Shwe "never talked about the country and its prospects with me. He seemed only focused on pleasing the higher officers and leaders. He always praised the leaders and never showed any ambition. He was certainly proud of being a soldier. He followed orders ... very carefully."

Rogers traces Than Shwe's rise through Myanmar's post-World War II period, the short-lived democratic era in the 1950s, and the disastrous years of austere socialism in the 1960s and 1970s which brought on the 1988 popular uprising and its bloody suppression. In 1992, Than Shwe became chairman of the ruling junta, known then as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC. He was promoted following the resignation of his predecessor General Saw Maung, who had become increasingly erratic.

Once in a position of absolute power, the postman-cum-tyrant, to use Rogers' description of Than Shwe, was surprisingly durable. Over the years he displayed an unprecedented megalomania among Myanmar military leaders. Few could have guessed that the often sullen and always taciturn soldier would endeavor to build a new capital city, Naypyidaw, or "the Abode of Kings", from an obscure patch in the jungle.

Nor did many foresee that he would replace Myanmar's original national philosophy of "unity in diversity" with a new concept of a unitary state in honor of the country's ancient warrior kings and empire-builders, Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya. Many believe his construction of the new capital city aims to leave behind a "Fourth Myanmar Empire" as a legacy of his rule.

It is unclear how Than Shwe's promised democratic transition fits with those kingly designs. Whether Myanmar holds elections this year, next year, or never, all the structures he put in place signal that the military is geared to remain in power for the foreseeable future. Rogers correctly portrays Than Shwe and his military henchmen as modern-day "tyrants" - and history shows that from a position of power tyrants have seldom negotiated their own demise.

Anyone who believes that a post-Than Shwe Myanmar is headed in a democratic direction should read this valuable book.

Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant by Benedict Rogers with a foreword by Vaclav Havel. Silkworm Books (May 2010). ISBN - 978-974-9511-91-6. Price US$20, 256 pages.

Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.

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