Starting Points

May 18, 2010

Tempo - From War Comes Power

The idea of dual function came into being following independence. It was the desire to wield power in the name of maintaining stability.

JUST like the ups and downs of sea waves, the journey of the military in Indonesia has repeatedly changed course. Not only taking up arms, they have also pervaded the civilian domain. The war of independence opened the door for soldiers to play various roles. “Don’t forget that independence started from the struggle being waged by the militias,” said Lt. Gen. (ret) Agus Widjojo, the former Chief of Territorial Staff of the Indonesian Military (TNI), last week.

According to this Director of the National Institute for Democracy Governance, these militias constituted the armed wings of political struggle. For instance, there was the Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pesindo), the armed wing of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI); Hizbullah from Islamic forces; the Pioneer Front (Barisan Pelopor); and so on. The ones that were military in nature and truly the forerunner of the TNI are former members of the KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) and Peta (Pembela Tanah Air—Defenders of the Motherland—formed by the Japanese occupation forces). These components were incorporated into a professional army.

Following the proclamation of independence, there were three main founders of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, namely former students from Western Europe who wanted liberal-parliamentary democracy, freedom fighters at home such as Bung Karno, and the armed fighters. When seeking agreement, the armed fighters did not want to be left alone in setting up a state. “Some lost their legs and arms, lost their relatives and friends,” said Agus.

On October 5, 1945, a government notice was issued to form the People’s Security Army (TKR). Former KNIL major, Urip Sumohardjo, set up the highest TKR headquarters in Yogyakarta. At its first conference on November 12, 1945, Soedirman was elected the Supreme Commander/Minister for People’s Security.

To enable the TKR to become an obedient tool of the state, on January 25, the government issued an announcement to change TKR into the Army of the Republic of Indonesia (TRI), the only military organization of the country. On May 5, 1947 there was a Presidential Decree calling for the unification of the TRI and the militias into one army. Therefore, from June 3, 1947 the TNI had officially been founded.

Soedirman was a genuine military man with no political ambitions or desire for power. There was no dual function concept in him. When Sukarno-Hatta were arrested by the Dutch, and the Indonesian capital was occupied in December 1948 through the second Dutch Aggression, Soedirman continued with guerrilla warfare. “With or without the government,” he declared at that time. Abdul Haris Nasution, as Commander of the Java Command, imposed a military government for the whole of Java.

Ulf Sundhaussen, in his book Indonesia’s Military Politics 1945-1967: Toward ABRI Dual Function, writes about Soedirman’s anti-political attitude. Early in his leadership, every soldier was forbidden to become a member of a political party. “At that time, the concept was to fill the power vacuum so that the nation continued to survive,” said Fachrul Razi, TNI Deputy Commander during Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency.

During the era of President Sukarno, the political system created “equality.” The TNI, particularly the army, gradually became a political force. Eventually they were able to reject the President’s policy while regrouping political forces. “Not because they were rebellious, but because they saw each other as comrades in arms in seizing the independence.”

During the republic’s infancy there was no democratic control yet. Everything was done in terms of comrades in arms. Later there grew mutual suspicion between the army and the politicians. Balance of power kept changing until Nasution convinced Bung Karno to disband the Constituent Assembly and to return to the 1945 Constitution (UUD 45). “There was the TNI, especially the army, that entered the picture with the ticket as group representatives,” said Agus.

In 1958, General Nasution said the army could not be like that. A middle way was taken: The TNI, particularly the army, would not run the government as a military regime but they were not a dead instrument in the hands of politicians either. “Here was the entry point into dual function during President Sukarno’s era,” said Agus Widjojo.

In November 1958, Nasution as the Army Chief of Staff affirmed that the TNI whose name was changed to the Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces (ABRI) needed to be included in building the state. As a functional group, ABRI could enter the political sphere.

Nasution, in his book Indonesian National Army points out the position and the role of the combat forces in a state so that they were able to contribute to ensure stability. As Army Chief of Staff, he introduced this concept at the National Military Academy in November 1958. The essence is that the army involvement in building a state is not intended to seize power, rather to support stability.

This concept continued with President Sukarno’s decision to issue the decree to return to the 1945 Constitution on July 5, 1959. The role of ABRI as a functional group plus a sociopolitical force received a constitutional foundation. ABRI succeeded in becoming a military tool as well as a tool for controlling Bung Karno.

In 1962, ABRI formed a military command at every subdistrict (koramil). The next year at every village a village-developing non-com (babinsa) was set up. ABRI also tried to influence public opinion. Then the dailies Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha came out. At campuses, student regiments emerged one after the other.

During the era of the New Order, the dual function was interpreted as subordination to President Suharto. Suharto’s dual function was implemented even further away from Nasution’s dual function concept. “It was in Pak Harto’s interest to expand the TNI role which he said was useful to the highest political force,” said Agus Widjojo.

Tempo - The End of Duality

Not everyone within the TNI was happy with the scrapping of dwi fungsi. Conservative officers accused the reformists of being American lackeys.

DECEMBER 1999: an internal conflict within the Indonesian Military (TNI) was coming to a head, triggered by a plan by the East Timor Human Rights Violations Commission to question a number of army generals, including Gen. Wiranto, then Minister for Political & Security Affairs.

During a visit to the headquarters of the 6th Army Infantry Brigade in Solo, Central Java in mid-December 1999, Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman, Chief of the Army Strategic Command, called the plan “hurting the feelings of the military.” If the plan went through, he warned, the rank and file of the military would run amok.

Gen. Djaja’s statement drew strong reactions. Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, Commander of the Wirabuana Military Command VII said: “No, it’s not true, the rank and file are not soldiers serving the interests of certain generals,” he said. “A soldier’s loyalty goes to the people and the nation.”

The war of words between Suparman and Wirahadikusumah reflected the split within the military. The mutual recriminations were widely reported by the media, something unheard of under the New Order.

Many were deeply concerned with the then ongoing conflict within the military. Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar, then the Minister of Transportation, acknowledged such a conflict was not new in the past, but, “there had always been then a way to resolve the differences.”

With the fall of the New Order in May 1998 the military entered a new era of reformasi. Senior officers within the military had to make a quick decision: adjust to the changing situation and reform the military or be on the defensive and risk going against the current.

The roots of the conflict lay in a much more fundamental issue: dwi fungsi, the dual function of the military as a defense and security force and a social and political force in the life of the nation.

Suparman, a loyalist close to Wiranto, was viewed as representative of the conservatives within the military who wanted a gradual change of the social and political role of the military. Wirahadikusumah, on the other hand, was a progressive reformist who wanted the military to end its social and political role and “return to barracks.”

A month before the conflict came into the open, Wirahadikusumah released a book titled Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI (A New Indonesia and the Challenges to the TNI), a compilation of articles written by army officers, graduates of the military academy, class of 1973, such as Maj. Gen. Djasri Marin, Brig. Gen. Saurip Kadi, and Brig. Gen. Romulo Simbolon. Almost all of the writers were of the view that the military should reform and dual function end.

“The writers were members of the generation who were entrusted with keeping a warisan (legacy) by those who themselves failed to set a good example,” says Salim Said in his book Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwi Fungsi (The Rise and Fall of Dual Function). The young army officers were relieved with the fall of the New Order.

Wirahadikusumah’s book exacerbated the conflict between the conservatives and the reformists within the military. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, then-Army Chief of Staff, said in an interview with Tempo last week that an atmosphere of conflict filled the air within the military. “We all agreed the military should be reformed, but there was no agreement on how it was to be done.”

According to Tyasno, there were two major groups of thinkers within the military. The first group wanted the military to be a force of professionals dedicated to the defense and security of the country. The second group wanted the military to be a social and political force as well, but no longer merely as protector of the existing regime.

The driving force behind the first group, said Tyasno, was made up of generals Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Agus Widjojo, and Agus Wirahadikusumah. Tyasno admitted he belonged to the second group of conservative officers. “The territorial command system of the military should not be abolished because it was a means by which the military maintained relations with the people,” he said.

Tyasno charged the reformist officers with being overly influenced by the idea of civilian control of the military as in America. “Indeed, most of them were trained in America,” he said.

Gen. Widjojo, former Chief of Staff for Sociopolitical Affairs, denied Tyasno’s allegations. He said the reformists’ arguments were based on the 1945 Constitution. Speaking at length with Tempo last week about the history of dual function and the reasons why the military ended its sociopolitical role, Widodo said: “Under the Constitution, the military is supposed to function only as a national defense and security force.”

The conflict between the reformists and the conservatives carried on at the military headquarters at Cilangkap after the fall of President Suharto. According to Tyasno, leaders of each group worked hard to bring the military leadership to its side.

Gen. Fachrul Razi, former deputy chief of the military, recalled the dynamics of the conflict that raged on a decade ago. He said there were no sharp differences over the dual function issue. “The idea of ending dwi fungsi had been floated since reformasi began.” Most senior officers believed that the idea was a historical necessity. “For a very simple reason: where in the world is there a component of a nation acting as a super body over the rest of the nation?” he asked.

It was a conflict, said Razi, more on how and when the change should be made. “Some wanted it to be done gradually, others wanted it done now.” As chief of the military, Wiranto tried to accommodate everyone and ensure the change wouldn’t rock the boat. On 18 July 1998, only two months after the fall of the New Order, Wiranto announced four new paradigms by which the military would review its social and political role in Indonesia. The term dwi fungsi had since been dropped. “The civic work of the military was dropped, although its role in determining strategic policies remained,” writes Salim Said.

Widjojo said he and Yudhoyono, then his superior and Chief of Staff for Political Affairs, took part in the drafting of the new paradigms. “At that time, there had already been talk of scrapping the social and political role of the military,” he said. Only, he added, it was to be done gradually because of the unfavorable political condition with street demonstrations and economic woes continuing to destabilize the situation.

Two years later, a number of important positions in the military changed hands. Admiral Widodo was named chief of the military and Gen. Fachrul Razi his deputy. Gen. Widjojo was the new Chief of Sociopolitical Affairs replacing Gen. Yudhoyono, who joined the government of President Abdurrahman Wahid as Mining & Energy Minister.

The rotation marked a new era with reformist officers taking strategic positions within the military. The power of the conservatives declined drastically. In April 2000 the reformist officers succeeded in convincing the military leadership to scrap dual function.

The decision was announced by Widodo at the close of a military leadership conference at Cilangkap. “The main task of the military will henceforth be to act as a major component for the defense of the nation,” said Widodo. Thus ended the long history of dwi fungsi.

Tempo - A Decade after the Downfall

In the New Order era, soldiers dominated all aspects of the country—from private life to politics. Subjected to a wave of reform, the domination was eroded. Ten years ago, the Cilangkap military headquarters announced its preparedness to leave politics. This story marks the 12-year downfall of the authoritarian regime.

IN the Gatot Subroto hall, Cilangkap headquarters, Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander in Chief, Admiral Widodo Adi Sutjipto made history. On Wednesday, April 19, 2000, he declared that the military had abandoned its sociopolitical function, which “has departed from the TNI’s identity as the defender of the state”.

All the military top brass were present in the room, including three chiefs of staff. Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono and State Minister of Regional Autonomy Ryaas Rasyid also attended. The first TNI commander from the Indonesian Navy continued, “Functionally, the TNI has now focused itself on the execution of defense duties.”

Widodo, lastly Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal & Security Affairs in United Indonesia Cabinet I, at the time said the TNI was no longer fully accountable for public order, which had become the responsibility of the police. It was an important chapter that ended the military moves in various facets of life of the state through the dual-function doctrine.

Starting from the “middle path” concept of Abdul Haris Nasution in 1958, the dual function served as soldiers’ entry gate to politics. Basically it gave an opportunity to the military—as one of the political forces—to play a role in the government based on the principle of collective duty. This concept was created to prevent a military coup, which could feasibly recur. Nasution’s “middle path” was completed through the doctrine named Tri Ubaya Cakti, resulting from the Army Seminar I (1965) and II (1966) in Bandung.

President Suharto really benefited from the military dual function to support his power for over three decades. For the sake of “political stability and security”, he named military officers to be ministers, governors and regents. At the rural level, soldiers also became subdistrict or village heads. With the dual function, they also obtained free tickets to the House of Representatives.

As a result, development proceeded stably—though later found out to be fragile and corrupt. According to Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, TNI Commander in Chief replacing Widodo, Suharto prioritized people’s “stomach” matters. He ignored transparency—something that later was demanded by the public at large.

Endriartono related an anecdote to describe the atmosphere at the time. One day, Suharto was angling and failed to catch any fish. In fact, many other people had their catch. Asked about it, a fisherman answered, “In the face of Bapak, even men dare not open their mouths, let alone fish.”

On May 21, 1998, Suharto’s power tumbled. Soldiers’ role was challenged. Gradually, Cilangkap transformed itself despite the tug-of-war between various interests. In his book, Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwifungsi (The Growth and Ruin of Dual Function), Salim Said sees Widodo’s speech in Cilangkap as the military’s official divorce from the dual function.

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ACCORDING to Agus Widjojo, former TNI Territorial Chief of Staff, besides abandoning the double function, soldiers still had a choice: doggedly maintaining Suharto. But part of the top brass considered the time opportune to open the path to democracy. “If Pak Harto had been defended, the National Monument (Monas) would have been bloody,” he said.

By the fall of Suharto, Jakarta and several other cities were chaotic and in a mess. In the capital, tanks and armored vehicles barricaded city corners and the vicinity of the Presidential Palace. Roads leading to Monas and the Palace were blocked. Chinatown was guarded by armed troops. All shops and houses in the zone were closed. Some of their owners fled abroad.

The House of Representatives and People’s Consultative Assembly building was clamorous. Tens of thousands of students controlled the building. They urged Suharto to step down. The masses also planned to stage a mass rally of a million people at Monas Square, right in front of the Palace, on National Awakening Day, May 20, 1998.

The movement failed. Soldiers set up barbed wire around Monas. Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Reserve Command Kivlan Zein threatened to shoot Amien Rais, then Central Board General Chairman of Muhammadiyah, if he organized the rally. “Troops prepared tanks and ammunition to drive out protesters,” says Kivlan in the book, Konflik dan Integrasi TNI-AD (Conflict and Integration of the TNI/Army).

On May 21, 1998, Suharto was unable to resist the wave of protests. He made a speech declaring his resignation. The challenge to the double function persisted, even strengthening. From then on, Cilangkap introduced some changes.

Gen. Fachrul Razi, former TNI Deputy Commander, said public pressure was not the only factor affecting the military reform. “Despite being under pressure, if we’d rejected, no change would have happened,” said Fachrul, now Chairman of the People’s Conscience Party. He added the desire for reform had arisen before 1998. Some officers thought that TNI had become a super institution.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, former Sociopolitical Chief of Staff, stated the public denunciation of the military role completed and hastened the transformation. “The reform awareness had appeared before Suharto stepped down,” says Yudhoyono, now President, in the book, SBY Sang Demokrat (SBY the Democrat).

Indeed, the military made minor changes in the concluding years of the New Order. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edi Sudradjat, for instance, offered the idea of getting back to basics. In his view, soldiers should be professional, prioritizing the state defense duty.

In the term of Armed Forces Commander Gen. M. Jusuf, soldiers entering the civilian domain were put in order. He banned active soldiers from trading. Those violating the rule were dismissed or pensioned off earlier. M. Jusuf also banned companies set up under military units. Suharto in 1981 issued a warning to the military. Functional assignments should not lead to the placement of military personnel in non-military sectors.

Still, such statements eventually served as slogans. If implemented, they were not steadily observed for being ignored by successors. In 1997, Gen. R. Hartono, Army Chief of Staff since two years earlier, even wore a yellow jacket when attending a campaign held by the Golkar Party.

The reform began to be seriously handled as Cilangkap formed a team of 32 generals and six colonels. A number of officers known as reformists joined as members, like Agus Widjojo, Yudhoyono, and Agus Wirahadikusumah. Soon after the fall of Suharto, the team released four new TNI paradigms. First, soldiers must not always be in front. Second, soldiers already occupying civilian posts should only exert influence for good purposes. Third, soldiers should change their way from exerting direct influence to affecting indirectly. Fourth, soldiers should be ready to share political roles with the nation’s other components.

The four new paradigms were actually just toning down the dual function, already seen as deadwood by Cilangkap at the time. Agus Widjojo believed it took time for the military to be really rid of the political role. “The new paradigm concept was finished only two months after Pak Harto resigned,” noted Agus.

There were also radical officers. Led by Agus Wirahadikusumah, the group strongly voiced military reform. When he was Wirabuana Regional Military Commander, he even said territorial commands should be dissolved. In fact, territorial development had virtually been a “religion” for soldiers. Agus proposed the dissolution in phases, starting from the lowest territorial command of noncommissioned officers in villages known as babinsa.

Agus Widjojo and other progressive officers also suggested the transfer of territorial fostering function to regional administrations. The military function should be limited to defense only. Territorial commands are not authorized to cover society. “There’s a clear limit between military and civilian domains,” he said. Under the New Order, the commands of military precincts, districts, zones, and babinsa were involved in mobilizing public forces in general elections and nominations of regents, district heads, or village chiefs.

The radical idea was opposed by the conservative group, like Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, Army Chief of Staff, 1999-2000, and Jakarta Military Commander Djaja Suparman. Tyasno said the reform had considerably deviated. According to him, the reform tended to be oriented to the US and other advanced countries.

Tyasno added American soldiers really stayed in barracks because they had been formed by the state. “In Indonesia, soldiers set up the state,” he stressed. For this reason, Tyasno deemed it unnecessary to end the dual function.

At last, soldiers had to submit to the times. They were powerless to resist the reform ‘tsunami’. The dual function has been part of history since the speech of Admiral Widodo in the Gatot Subroto hall, Cilangkap.

10 YEARS TNI REFORM SPECIAL REPORT TEAM
Team Leader: Budi Setyarso
Coordinator: Sunudyantoro
Writers: Sunudyantoro, Wahyu Dhyatmika, Philipus Parera, Yandi M.R., Dwidjo Utomo Maksum, Oktamandjaya Wiguna, Cheta Nilawaty
Contributors: Mahbub Djunaidy, David Priyasidharta (Jember)
Research: Evan Koesumah
Editors: Budi Setyarso, Arif Zulkifli, Nugroho Dewanto, Idrus F. Shahab, Amarzan Loebis, M. Taufiqurohman, Hermien Y. Kleden, Wahyu Muryadi
Language Editors: Uu Suhardi, Dewi Kartika Teguh
Photographers: Mazmur A. Sembiring, Suryo Wibowo, Jacky Rachmansyah
Visual Design: Gilang Rahadian, Eko Punto P., Hendy Prakasa, Kendra H. Paramita, Kiagus Auliansyah, Aji Yuliarto, Agus Darmawan S., Tri Watno Widodo.

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My Country, Tis of Me - Tea Party 'Patriots'

There’s nothing patriotic about the Tea Party Patriots.
By Michael Kinsley

The right-wing populist Tea Party movement has politicians of both parties spooked. Democrats fear it will bring so many Republicans to the boil, and then to the voting booth, that they will lose control of Congress. Republicans fear the movement will frighten away moderates and leave their party an unelectable, ideologically extreme rump. The press, both alarmed and delighted by this political force that sprang from nowhere, is eager to prove its lack of elitism and left-wing bias by treating the Tea Party activists with respect. Journalists also sincerely appreciate having something new to write or talk about. It is in their interest to keep this story going.

A Harris poll released the last day of March reported that a third of all adults support the Tea Party, and slightly less than a quarter oppose it. Do they know what they are supporting, or opposing? The movement is not yet united on a single platform or agenda, like Newt Gingrich’s 1994 Contract With America, which started as a triumph and ended as an embarrassment. The lack of specifics allows anyone who is just existentially fed up (and who isn’t, on some days?) to feel right at home. No one will demand to know what he or she is fed up with. On Web sites and in speeches, Tea Party Patriots reveal a fondness for procedural gimmicks (like a ban on congressional earmarks), constitutional amendments (term limits, balanced budget), and similar magic tricks or shortcuts to salvation. Apart from a general funk, though, the one common theme espoused by TPPs is the monstrous danger of Big Government.

The Tea Party movement has been compared (by David Brooks of The New York Times, among others) to the student protest movement of the 1960s. Even though one came from the left and the other from the right, both are/were, or at least styled themselves as, a mass challenge to an oppressive establishment. That’s a similarity, to be sure. But the differences seem more illuminating.

First, the 1960s (shorthand for all of the political and social developments we associate with that period) were by, for, and about young people. The Tea Party movement is by, for, and about middle-aged and old people (undoubtedly including more than a few who were part of the earlier movement too). If young people discover a cause and become a bit overwrought or monomaniacal, that’s easily forgiven as part of the charm of youth. When adults of middle age and older throw tantrums and hold their breath until they turn blue, it’s less charming.

Second, although the 1960s ultimately spread their tentacles throughout the culture and around the world, politically there was just one big issue: ending the war in Vietnam. No such issue unites the Tea Party Patriots. You might guess from some of their materials on the Web that the repeal of health-care reform is the TPPs’ Vietnam, their towering cause. But even for devoted TPPs, stripping health insurance away from people who’ve just gotten it is unlikely to summon the same passions that the activists of the 1960s brought to stopping a misguided war. Not only do TPPs not have one big issue like Vietnam—they disagree about many of their smaller issues. What unites them is a more abstract resentment, an intensity of feeling rather than any concrete complaint or goal.

The antiwar movement also worked, sort of. As did the civil-rights movement that preceded it. Antiwar protests ultimately turned the establishment itself against the war, though extracting us from it still took years. By contrast, the Tea Party Patriots, I predict, are just the flavor of the month: the kind of story that the media are incapable of not exaggerating. The antiwar movement and the 1960s changed America in numerous ways forever. The Tea Party Patriots will be an answer on Jeopardy or a crossword-puzzle clue.

A final difference: although the 1960s featured plenty of self-indulgence, this wasn’t their essence. Their essence was selfless and idealistic: stopping the war; ending racism; eradicating poverty. These goals and some of the methods for achieving them may have been childishly romantic or even entirely wrongheaded, but they were about making the world a better place. The Tea Party movement’s goals, when stated specifically, are mostly self-interested. And they lack poetry: cut my taxes; don’t let the government mess with my Medicare; and so on. I say “self-interested” and not “selfish” because pursuing your own self-interest is not illegitimate in a capitalist democracy. (Nor is poetry an essential requirement.) But the Tea Party’s atmospherics, all about personal grievance and taking umbrage and feeling put-upon, are a far cry from flower power. There is a nasty, sour, vindictive tone to the Tea Party that certainly existed in the antiwar movement and its offspring, but never dominated the atmosphere created by these groups.

Some people think that what unites the Tea Party Patriots is simple racism. I doubt that. But the Tea Party movement is not the solution to what ails America. It is an illustration of what ails America. Not because it is right-wing or because it is sometimes susceptible to crazed conspiracy theories, and not because of racism, but because of the movement’s self-indulgent premise that none of our challenges and difficulties are our own fault.

“Personal responsibility” has been a great conservative theme in recent decades, in response to the growth of the welfare state. It is a common theme among TPPs—even in response to health-care reform, as if losing your job and then getting cancer is something you shouldn’t have allowed to happen to yourself. But these days, conservatives far outdo liberals in excusing citizens from personal responsibility. To the TPPs, all of our problems are the fault of the government, and the government is a great “other,” a hideous monster over which we have no control. It spends our money and runs up vast deficits for mysterious reasons all its own. At bottom, this is a suspicion not of government but of democracy. After all, who elected this monster?

This kind of talk is doubly self-indulgent. First, it’s just not true. Second, it’s obviously untrue. The government’s main function these days is writing checks to old people. These checks allow people to retire and pursue avocations such as going to Tea Party rallies. This basic fact about the government is no great secret. In fact, it’s a huge cliché, robably available more than once in an average day’s newspaper. But the Tea Party Patriots feel free to ignore it and continue serving up rhetoric about “the audaciousness and arrogance of our government,” and calling for the elimination of the Federal Reserve Board or drastic restraints on the power of the Internal Revenue Service.

“I like what they’re saying. It’s common sense,” a random man-in-the-crowd told a Los Angeles Times reporter at a big Tea Party rally. Then he added, “They’ve got to focus on issues like keeping jobs here and lowering the cost of prescription drugs.” These, of course, are projects that can be conducted only by Big Government. If the Tea Party Patriots ever developed a coherent platform or agenda, they would lose half their supporters.

Principled libertarianism is an interesting and even tempting idea. If we wanted to, we could radically reduce the scope of government—defend the country, give poor people enough money to live decently, and leave it at that. But this isn’t the TPP vision. The TPP vision is that you can keep your Medicare benefits and balance the budget by ending congressional earmarks, and perhaps the National Endowment for the Arts.

What is most irksome about the Tea Party Patriots is their expropriation of the word patriot, with the implication that if you disagree with them, you’re not a patriot, or at least you’re less patriotic than they are. Without getting all ask-notty about it, I think a movement labeling itself patriotic should have some obligation to demonstrate patriotism in a way other than demanding a tax cut. In their rhetoric, the Tea Party Patriots do not sound as if they love their country very much: they have nothing but gripes. Yes, of course, these are gripes against the government, not against the country itself. But that distinction becomes hard to maintain when you have nothing good to say about the government and nothing but whines to offer the country.

Times are tough, and some sympathy is due. Still, times have always been tough for many folks for one reason or another, and people didn’t always resort so quickly to all-purpose bellyaching, did they? But in recent years inchoate rage against the government has almost become part of our civic religion: the short list of values we all do share. To say, “Yeah, the government’s okay by me,” or even to express gratitude for a country that sends you a Social Security check and pays your medical bills, actually does seem almost un-American. Our new national motto is from the movie Network: “I’m as mad as hell and I’m not going to take this anymore.” And what is “this”? Ask not.

How the U.S. Engages the World with Social Media

State Department Social Media Logo The perception of the U.S. abroad varies widely, and is subject to many forces, including world events, media coverage, policy changes, and presidential administrations. In response, the U.S. State Department, America’s public relations branch, has been charged with the difficult task of engaging in the dialogue surrounding the controversial policies discussed in almost every corner of the world.

Social media has proven to be a valuable tool in this regard, and the State Department has made impressive gains in their mission to turn conflict into conversation. Cabinet officials, foreign dignitaries, and embassies are experimenting with ways to inject America’s voice into the global chatter. Some of their experiments are paying dividends that few expected. Here’s a look at some of these efforts.

Social Media Can Bridge the “Last Three Feet”

President Barack Obama garners an enormous response when he solicits the country’s opinion online, as when he circumvented the White House press corps with YouTube-submitted questions this past February — an effort that received over 11,000 responses.

But when Obama fields Internet () questions from local residents during an overseas trip, the numbers are staggering — a whopping 17,000 responses during a visit to Ghana, and an astounding 250,000 in South Africa (though some responses did come from outside Africa). Given the relatively smaller population and shallow Internet penetration, these numbers speak volumes about the world’s web-based engagement with U.S. leaders.

Obama’s responses alone, just out of sheer publicity, may have some positive impact on foreign attitudes. But, for Bill May, Director of the State Department’s Office of Innovative Engagement (i.e. social media), being at the epicenter of online chatter is what he thinks of as the “new version of the last three feet.”

May was invoking Edward R. Murrow’s famous public diplomacy strategy where he wrote, “The real crucial link in the international exchange is the last three feet, which is bridged by personal contact, one person talking to another.” In public diplomacy, there are a latent number of people throughout the world who will befriend America’s vision after a thorough conversation. The reverberation of Obama’s message, coupled with the hyper-local follow-ups from America’s Embassies, can reach more of those hidden friends than ever before.

Indeed, when Elizabeth Tradeau of the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria tweeted, “South Africa, what’s the impact of new media in your view of America?” there was a mix of negative and positive comments. But, one in particular seemed to prove May’s point:

America is Fun

For every serious news or political blog, there are likely twice as many dedicated to sex, drugs, or rock n’ roll. And when Bill Clinton pioneered a youth outreach strategy answering questions from MTV fans, it was the infamous “boxers or briefs” question that garnered him the most attention. In the end, entertainment is just so much more appealing.

Seizing on this strategy, the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia has seen Facebook () fan growth of jaw-dropping proportions — an increase from 36,000 to 120,000 in roughly one month. On a single Facebook post, the embassy often receives between 700 to 1,000 comments (that’s about 10 times more comments than The Huffington Post). This is especially astonishing when you consider that less than 10% of Indonesia’s population even uses Facebook.

So, what’s their winning strategy? Simple social games, where users can dress up Barack Obama in local garb and share the creation with friends, or suggest what Obama should eat during his next visit.

While the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia does delve into some culturally thorny issues, foreign diplomat Tristram Perry admits that Facebook is “not a good venue for hard policy topics.” Instead, he says “we make our Facebook fun. Jazz, technology, tourism — we have a fascinating history. There’s lots about it that people admire.”

The embassy saw huge traffic from an essay contest to win a trip to “Barack Obama’s America” (Hawaii and Chicago), where winners will blog about their tour for what will surely be a stadium’s worth of jealous peers back home.

Education

Many of the messages texted to President Obama plead for “not a hand out, but a hand up,” says Trudeau of the South Africans she speaks with. Centuries of colonization, war, and resource scarcity have paralyzed innovation in many parts of the world. To jump-start the economy, the U.S. helps plant what is seen as the seed of technological innovation: Education.

For instance, in the humble rural township of Mamelodi, just outside Pretoria, the Embassy provides technological and scientific literacy to disadvantaged children. In the Mae Jemison reading room, which is named after the first female African-American astronaut, children are “introduced to the Internet,” says Trudeau. She tells them, “This is how you use Google (); this is how you get an e-mail account,” and my personal favorite as a writing teacher, “don’t use Wikipedia () as a source.” The students’ curiosity is limitless. During class, Trudeau observes that students bunch up by computers “six-deep” in line “looking, exploring,” and are eager to learn more.

The current business culture in South Africa points to some promising returns on this educational investment. “It’s like being in Silicon [Valley] or San Francisco in 2004 with Biz Stone and all of his friends,” said one visiting American at a local technology conference, as recounted by Trudeau. “It’s journalists, it’s editors, it’s tech entrepreneurs … they all use Twitter () to connect. It’s a very interconnected, very engaged community,” Trudeau notes.

Media Outreach

The State Department has taken to providing timely information on crises and policy via social networks. During an attempted coup in Madagascar, a rumor began circulating that the threatened president was seeking refuge in the U.S. Embassy. After refuting the rumors themselves, the State Department tweeted out the correct information, “and immediately we started getting retweets and people saying ‘thanks for the correction,’” notes Daniel Schaub, Director of Digital Communications for the State Department. “And, then within probably an hour or so, the traditional media had caught it,” helping to blanket the spreading fire of a rumor that “could potentially put embassy staff at risk.”

Moreover, Schaub’s department manages Secretary Hillary Clinton’s blog, Dipnote, which provides rich context for otherwise curt policy pronouncements. Dipnote is now cited by news organizations such as the Associated Press and The New York Times for detailed explanations of Department policy and procedure.

The importance of this supplementary information should not be underestimated. A recent study suggests that the clarity of White House rhetoric can impact the political world. “If the president is able to define an intervention in simple, compelling terms, he is likely to get considerably more support from the public,” says Associate Professor Cooper Drury, editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy Analysis.

Conclusion

Every single Department official I spoke with admitted that the era of one-way broadcasting is dying. The ubiquity of mobile and social technologies means the U.S. must now have an ear as well as a voice. It seems like an unprecedented opportunity to open a dialogue with people and communities all over the world who would otherwise be isolated.

It should be noted that members of the State Department often disagree with their bosses on best practices. But, they also understand that conversation, even in 140 characters, may one day mean the difference between conflict and peace.

May 17, 2010

In U.S. visit, Mexican president to discuss drug war, immigration

Image via Wikipedia

By William Booth
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, May 17, 2010; A08

MEXICO CITY -- President Felipe Calderón arrives in Washington this week for a two-day state visit that was supposed to be a celebration of U.S.-Mexican cooperation in his drug war. Instead, it is likely to showcase Mexico's frustration over Arizona's tough new immigration law, which Calderón has described as anti-Mexican.

The measure requires police enforcing another law to question a person's immigration status if there is "reasonable suspicion" that the person is in the United States illegally. Its passage has put the hot-button issue of illegal immigration on the bilateral agenda.

At home, Calderón -- who is usually cautious, lawyerly and scripted in his public remarks -- speaks daily about the fight against the drug cartels, but rarely about immigration, although roughly 10 percent of Mexico's population lives in the United States.

He has been frank in his condemnation of the Arizona law, however, saying it "opens the door to intolerance, hate, discrimination and abuse in law enforcement" and noting that the U.S. economy was built with a lot of Mexican sweat, legal and not.

In remarks to Spain's El País newspaper Friday, he asserted that the law is creating tensions between the two countries.

In Mexico, the political class from right to left has closed ranks to deplore the Arizona measure, which has dominated front pages and TV news here. Elected officials from the three major parties are exhorting Calderón to challenge it in Washington, where on Wednesday he will be greeted with pomp and ceremony at the White House and feted with high-end Mexican fusion food at a state dinner, and will address a joint session of Congress.

But the atmosphere might be a little strained.

Soon after Arizona's Republican governor, Jan Brewer, signed the measure last month, Mexico issued a rare "travel advisory" to its citizens warning them of possible harassment in the state.

The governors of the six northern Mexican states that share a border with the United States have denounced the law and said they would boycott an upcoming governors' conference in Phoenix.

The Mexican Embassy in Washington is preparing amicus briefs to support lawsuits by civil rights groups seeking repeal of the measure. The head of Mexico's National Human Rights Commission declared the law "xenophobic." Mexican universities said they would suspend student-exchange programs involving Arizona. And cartoonists here have had a field day depicting an Arizona without Mexicans, where U.S. citizens are forced to cook their own food, cut their lawns, pick their crops and care for their children.

"So, yes, we don't like this law," Mexico's interior secretary, Fernando Gómez-Mont, said at a forum in Washington this month.

The drug issue

There are an estimated 460,000 illegal immigrants in Arizona, most of them from Mexico. Mexican migrants, legal and not, sent home more than $20 billion last year, the second leading source of legitimate foreign income in the country after oil sales. Illegal drug sales may account for as much as $25 billion.

The U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Carlos Pascual, who worked for six months to arrange the state visit for Calderón, has sought to calm emotions, repeating at every opportunity that President Obama and his administration consider the Arizona measure "misdirected" and are exploring legal challenges.

A former Mexican foreign minister, Jorge Castañeda, now a professor at New York University, has described the law as "stupid but useful," meaning that it may help create momentum for federal immigration reform.

The law also appears also to be feeding Mexican frustration -- usually expressed off the record -- that the United States is not doing enough in the drug war. Mexican officials are complaining more openly that authorities here are under grenade attack by drug-smuggling syndicates while pot pharmacies in Los Angeles sell bags of marijuana to so-called patients.

Authority figures in Mexico are coming under increasing assault. This weekend, a former presidential candidate mysteriously disappeared, and police think that kidnappers or drug gangs may be responsible. Diego Fernández de Cevallos, a powerbroker in Calderón's political party, went missing in the central state of Queretaro near his ranch, leaving his empty car and few clues.

Under the Merida Initiative aid package, U.S. taxpayers have contributed $1.3 billion to the fight, money that pays for Black Hawk helicopters, night-vision goggles and armored cars and trains for Mexican police and judges. Obama wants to continue the aid initiative and has asked for another $310 million for Mexico in 2011.

Calderón, who has described his northern neighbors as "the biggest consumers of drugs in the world," said last week that the binational struggle against drug trafficking will still be at the center of discussions in Washington.

"The president has to say something about the Arizona law in his speech, but he is really speaking more to Mexicans," said Raúl Benítez Manaut, an expert in national security issues and immigration at the Autonomous University of Mexico. "He also will be careful not to upset the Republicans in Congress, whom he needs to continue the fight against the cartels."

Systemic corruption

At home, Calderón has complained that billions of dollars in drug profits empower the cartels while the United States, with its freewheeling gun market, is the source of most of the weapons smuggled into Mexico.

More than 22,700 people have died in drug-related violence since Calderón declared war against the cartels in December 2006 and sent the first of 50,000 Mexican troops into the streets.

U.S. officials might push back, however. Although they have publicly applauded Calderón's courage in attacking the cartels, the fight has revealed systemic corruption in Mexico.

The latest shock was the discovery of a pile of documents that the government seized from the an associate of Mexico's most-wanted drug trafficker, Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán. The stash included lists of Mexican federal agents, their names and numbers and references to intelligence shared by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.